title: Unreliable narrator

text: It remains a matter of debate whether and how a non-first-person narrator can be unreliable, though the deliberate restriction of information to the audience can provide instances of unreliable "narrative", even if not necessarily of an unreliable "narrator". For example, in the three interweaving plays of Alan Ayckbourn's "The Norman Conquests", each confines the action to one of three locations during the course of a weekend.


title: Unreliable narrator

text: Wayne C. Booth was among the first critics to formulate a reader-centered approach to unreliable narration and to distinguish between a reliable and unreliable narrator on the grounds of whether the narrator's speech violates or conforms with general norms and values. He writes, "I have called a narrator "reliable" when he speaks for or acts in accordance with the norms of the work (which is to say the implied author's norms), "unreliable" when he does not." Peter J. Rabinowitz criticized Booth's definition for relying too much on facts external to the narrative, such as norms and ethics, which must necessarily be tainted by personal opinion. He consequently modified the approach to unreliable narration.


title: Unreliable narrator

text: Rabinowitz' main focus is the status of fictional discourse in opposition to factuality. He debates the issues of truth in fiction, bringing forward four types of audience who serve as receptors of any given literary work:


title: Unreliable narrator

text: Rabinowitz suggests that "In the proper reading of a novel, then, events which are portrayed must be treated as both 'true' and 'untrue' at the same time. Although there are many ways to understand this duality, I propose to analyze the four audiences which it generates." Similarly, Tamar Yacobi has proposed a model of five criteria ('integrating mechanisms') which determine if a narrator is unreliable. Instead of relying on the device of the implied author and a text-centered analysis of unreliable narration, Ansgar Nünning gives evidence that narrative unreliability can be reconceptualized in the context of frame theory and of readers' cognitive strategies.


title: Unreliable narrator

text: Unreliable Narration in this view becomes purely a reader's strategy of making sense of a text, i.e. of reconciling discrepancies in the narrator's account (cf. signals of unreliable narration). Nünning thus effectively eliminates the reliance on value judgments and moral codes which are always tainted by personal outlook and taste. Greta Olson recently debated both Nünning's and Booth's models, revealing discrepancies in their respective views.


title: Unreliable narrator

text: and offers "an update of Booth's model by making his implicit differentiation between fallible and untrustworthy narrators explicit". Olson then argues "that these two types of narrators elicit different responses in readers and are best described using scales for fallibility and untrustworthiness." She proffers that all fictional texts that employ the device of unreliability can best be considered along a spectrum of fallibility that begins with trustworthiness and ends with unreliability. This model allows for all shades of grey in between the poles of trustworthiness and unreliability. It is consequently up to each individual reader to determine the credibility of a narrator in a fictional text.


title: Unreliable narrator

text: Whichever definition of unreliability one follows, there are a number of signs that constitute or at least hint at a narrator's unreliability. Nünning has suggested to divide these signals into three broad categories.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The Battle of Khe Sanh (21 January – 9 July 1968) was conducted in the Khe Sanh area of northwestern Quảng Trị Province, Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), during the Vietnam War. The main US forces defending Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) were two regiments of the United States Marine Corps supported by elements from the United States Army and the United States Air Force (USAF), as well as a small number of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops. These were pitted against two to three divisional-size elements of the North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN).


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The US command in Saigon initially believed that combat operations around KSCB during 1967 were part of a series of minor PAVN offensives in the border regions. That appraisal was later altered when the PAVN was found to be moving major forces into the area. In response, US forces were built up before the PAVN isolated the Marine base. Once the base came under siege, a series of actions were fought over a period of five months. During this time, KSCB and the hilltop outposts around it were subjected to constant PAVN artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks, and several infantry assaults. To support the Marine base, a massive aerial bombardment campaign (Operation Niagara) was launched by the USAF. Over 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped by US aircraft and over 158,000 artillery rounds were fired in defense of the base. Throughout the campaign, US forces used the latest technology to locate PAVN forces for targeting. Additionally, the logistical effort required to support the base once it was isolated demanded the implementation of other tactical innovations to keep the Marines supplied.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: In March 1968, an overland relief expedition (Operation Pegasus) was launched by a combined Marine–Army/ARVN task force that eventually broke through to the Marines at Khe Sanh. American commanders considered the defense of Khe Sanh a success, but shortly after the siege was lifted, the decision was made to dismantle the base rather than risk similar battles in the future. On 19 June 1968, the evacuation and destruction of KSCB began. Amid heavy shelling, the Marines attempted to salvage what they could before destroying what remained as they were evacuated. Minor attacks continued before the base was officially closed on 5 July. Marines remained around Hill 689, though, and fighting in the vicinity continued until 11 July until they were finally withdrawn, bringing the battle to a close.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: In the aftermath, the North Vietnamese proclaimed a victory at Khe Sanh, while US forces claimed that they had withdrawn, as the base was no longer required. Historians have observed that the Battle of Khe Sanh may have distracted American and South Vietnamese attention from the buildup of Viet Cong (VC) forces in the south before the early 1968 Tet Offensive. Nevertheless, the US commander during the battle, General William Westmoreland, maintained that the true intention of Tet was to distract forces from Khe Sanh.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The village of Khe Sanh was the seat of government of Hương Hoa district, an area of Bru Montagnard villages and coffee plantations about from the Laotian frontier on Route 9, the northernmost transverse road in South Vietnam. The badly-deteriorated Route 9 ran from the coastal region through the western highlands and crossed the border into Laos. The origin of the combat base lay in the construction by US Army Special Forces of an airfield in August 1962 outside the village at an old French fort. The camp then became a Special Forces outpost of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, which were to keep watch on PAVN infiltration along the border and to protect the local population.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: James Marino wrote that in 1964, General William Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam, had determined, "Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base blocking enemy infiltration from Laos; a base for... operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstrip for reconnaissance to survey the Ho Chi Minh Trail; a western anchor for the defenses south of the DMZ; and an eventual jumping-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail." In November 1964, the Special Forces moved their camp to the Xom Cham Plateau, the future site of Khe Sanh Combat Base.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: In the winter of 1964, Khe Sanh became the location of a launch site for the highly-classified Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group. The site was first established near the village and later moved to the French fort. From there, reconnaissance teams were launched into Laos to explore and gather intelligence on the PAVN logistical system known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, also known as "Truong Son Strategic Supply Route" to the North Vietnamese soldiers.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Marino stated that "by 1966, Westmoreland had begun to consider Khe Sanh as part of a larger strategy." With a view to gain the eventual approval for an advance through Laos to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, he determined that "it was absolutely essential to hold the base." He gave the order for US Marines to take up positions around Khe Sanh. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, then began planning for incursion into Laos, and in October, the construction of an airfield at Khe Sanh was completed.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The plateau camp was permanently manned by the US Marines in 1967, when they established an outpost next to the airstrip. This base was to serve as the western anchor of Marine Corps forces, which had tactical responsibility for the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam known as I Corps. The Marines' defensive system stretched below the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) from the coast, along Route 9, to Khe Sanh. In 1966, the regular Special Forces troops had moved off the plateau and built a smaller camp down Route 9 at Lang Vei, about half the distance to the Laotian border.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: During the second half of 1967, the North Vietnamese instigated a series of actions in the border regions of South Vietnam. All of the attacks were conducted by regimental-size PAVN/VC units, but unlike most of the previous usual hit-and-run tactics, they were sustained and bloody affairs.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: In early October, the PAVN had intensified battalion-sized ground probes and sustained artillery fire against Con Thien, a hilltop stronghold in the center of the Marines' defensive line south of the DMZ, in northern Quảng Trị Province. Mortar rounds, artillery shells, and 122 mm rockets fell randomly but incessantly upon the base. The September bombardments ranged from 100 to 150 rounds per day, with a maximum on 25 September of 1,190 rounds.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Westmoreland responded by launching Operation Neutralize, an aerial and naval bombardment campaign designed to break the siege. For seven weeks, American aircraft dropped from 35,000 to 40,000 tons of bombs in nearly 4,000 airstrikes.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: On 27 October, a PAVN regiment attacked an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) battalion at Song Be, capital of Phước Long Province. The PAVN fought for several days, took casualties, and fell back. Two days later, the PAVN 273rd Regiment attacked a Special Forces camp near the border town of Loc Ninh, in Bình Long Province. Troops of the US 1st Infantry Division were able to respond quickly. After a ten-day battle, the attackers were pushed back into Cambodia. At least 852 PAVN soldiers were killed during the action, as opposed to 50 American and South Vietnamese.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The heaviest action took place near Dak To, in the Central Highlands province of Kon Tum. The presence of the PAVN 1st Division prompted a 22-day battle there and had some of the most intense close-quarters fighting of the entire conflict. US intelligence estimated between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN troops were killed, and 362 members of the US 4th Infantry Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and ARVN Airborne elements were killed in action, but three of the four battalions of the 4th Infantry and the entire 173rd were rendered combat-ineffective during the battle.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: American intelligence analysts were quite baffled by the series of enemy actions. No logic was apparent to them behind the sustained PAVN/VC offensives other than to inflict casualties on the allied forces. That was accomplished, but the casualties absorbed by the North Vietnamese seemed to negate any direct gains they might have obtained. The border battles, however, had two significant consequences, which were unappreciated at the time. They fixed the attention of the American command on the border regions, and they drew American and ARVN forces away from the coastal lowlands and cities in preparation for the Tet Offensive.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Things remained quiet in the Khe Sanh area through 1966. Even so, Westmoreland insisted for it not only to be occupied by the Marines but also for it to be reinforced. He was vociferously opposed by General Lewis W. Walt, the Marine commander of I Corps, who argued heatedly that the real target of the American effort should be the pacification and protection of the population, not chasing the PAVN/VC in the hinterlands.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Westmoreland won out, however, and the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment (1/3 Marines) was dispatched to occupy the camp and airstrip on 29 September. By late January 1967, the 1/3 returned to Japan and was relieved by Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (1/9 Marines). A single company replaced an entire battalion.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: On 24 April 1967, a patrol from Bravo Company became engaged with a PAVN force of an unknown size north of Hill 861. That action prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh. The PAVN forces were in the process of gaining elevated terrain before it launched the main attack. The 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 3rd Marine Regiment, under the command of Colonel John P. Lanigan, reinforced KSCB and were given the task of pushing the PAVN off of Hills 861, 881 North, and 881 South. PAVN forces were driven out of the area around Khe Sanh after suffering 940 casualties. The Marines suffered 155 killed in action and 425 wounded.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: To prevent PAVN observation of the main base at the airfield and their possible use as firebases, the hills of the surrounding Khe Sanh Valley had to be continuously occupied and defended by separate Marine elements.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: In the wake of the hill fights, a lull in PAVN activity occurred around Khe Sanh. By the end of May, Marine forces were again drawn down from two battalions to one, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman Jr. relieved Walt as commander of III MAF in June.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: On 14 August, Colonel David E. Lownds took over as commander of the 26th Marine Regiment. Sporadic actions were taken in the vicinity during the late summer and early fall, the most serious of which was the ambush of a supply convoy on Route 9. That proved to be the last overland attempt at resupply for Khe Sanh until the following March. In December and early January, numerous sightings of PAVN troops and activities were made in the Khe Sanh area, but the sector remained relatively quiet.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: A decision then had to be made by the American high command to commit more of the limited manpower in I Corps to the defense of Khe Sanh or to abandon the base. Westmoreland regarded the choice as quite simple. In his memoirs, he listed the reasons for a continued effort:Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base for blocking enemy infiltration from Laos along Route 9; as a base for SOG operations to harass the enemy in Laos; as an airstrip for reconnaissance planes surveying the Ho Chi Minh Trail; as the western anchor for defenses south of the DMZ; and as an eventual jump-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Not all leading Marine officers, however, had the same opinion. Cushman, the new III MAF commander, supported Westmoreland perhaps because he wanted to mend Army/Marine relations after the departure of Walt. Other concerns raised included the assertion that the real danger to I Corps was from a direct threat to Quảng Trị City and other urban areas, a defense would be pointless as a threat to infiltration since PAVN troops could easily bypass Khe Sanh, the base was too isolated, and the Marines "had neither the helicopter resources, the troops, nor the logistical bases for such operations." Additionally, Shore argued that the "weather was another critical factor because the poor visibility and low overcasts attendant to the monsoon season made such operations hazardous."


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Brigadier General Lowell English (assistant commander 3rd Marine Division) complained that the defense of the isolated outpost was ludicrous: "When you're at Khe Sanh, you're not really anywhere. You could lose it and you really haven't lost a damn thing."


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: As far as Westmoreland was concerned, however, all that he needed to know was that the PAVN had massed large numbers of troops for a set-piece battle. Making the prospect even more enticing was that the base was in an unpopulated area in which American firepower could be fully employed without civilian casualties. The opportunity to engage and destroy a formerly elusive enemy that was moving toward a fixed position promised a victory of unprecedented proportions.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: In early December 1967, the PAVN appointed Major General Tran Quy Hai as the local commander for the actions around Khe Sanh, with Le Quang Dạo as his political commissar. In the coming days, a campaign headquarters was established around Sap Lit. Two divisions, the 304th and the 325th, were assigned to the operation: the 325th was given responsibility for the area around the north, while the 304th was given responsibility for the southern sector. In attempting to determine PAVN intentions Marine intelligence confirmed that, within a period of just over a week, the 325th Division had moved into the vicinity of the base and two more divisions were within supporting distance. The 324th Division was located in the DMZ area north of Khe Sanh while the 320th Division was within easy reinforcing distance to the northeast. They were supported logistically from the nearby Ho Chi Minh Trail. As a result of this intelligence, KSCB was reinforced on 22 January 1968 by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment. According to the official PAVN history, by December 1967 the North Vietnamese had in place, or within supporting distance: the 304th, 320th, 324th and 325th Infantry Divisions, the independent 270th infantry Regiment; five artillery regiments (the 16th, 45th, 84th, 204th, and 675th); three AAA regiments (the 208th, 214th, and 228th); four tank companies; one engineer regiment plus one independent engineer battalion; one signal battalion; and a number of local force units.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: At positions west of Hill 881 South and north of Co Roc Ridge (), across the border in Laos, the PAVN established artillery, rocket, and mortar positions from which to launch attacks by fire on the base and to support its ground operations. The PAVN 130 mm and 152 mm artillery pieces, and 122 mm rockets, had a longer range than the Marine artillery support which consisted of 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers. This range overmatch was used by the PAVN to avoid counter-battery fire. They were assisted in their emplacement efforts by the continuing bad weather of the winter monsoon.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: During the rainy night of 2 January 1968, six men dressed in black uniforms were seen outside the defensive wire of the main base by members of a listening post. After failing to respond to a challenge, they were fired upon and five were killed outright while the sixth, although wounded, escaped. This event prompted Cushman to reinforce Lownds with the rest of the 2nd Battalion, 26th Marines. This marked the first time that all three battalions of the 26th Marine Regiment had operated together in combat since the Battle of Iwo Jima during the Second World War. To cover a defilade near the Rao Quan River, four companies from 2/26 were immediately sent out to occupy Hill 558, with another manning Hill 861A.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: On 20 January, La Thanh Ton, a PAVN lieutenant from the 325th Division, defected and laid out the plans for an entire series of PAVN attacks. Hills 881 South, 861, and the main base itself would be simultaneously attacked that same evening. At 00:30 on 21 January, Hill 861 was attacked by about 300 PAVN troops, the Marines, however, were prepared. The PAVN infantry, though bracketed by artillery fire, still managed to penetrate the perimeter of the defenses and were only driven back after severe close-quarters combat.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The main base was then subjected to an intense mortar and rocket barrage. Hundreds of mortar rounds and 122-mm rockets slammed into the base, levelling most of the above-ground structures. One of the first enemy shells set off an explosion in the main ammunition dump. Many of the artillery and mortar rounds stored in the dump were thrown into the air and detonated on impact within the base. Soon after, another shell hit a cache of tear gas, which saturated the entire area. The fighting and shelling on 21 January resulted in 14 Marines killed and 43 wounded. Hours after the bombardment ceased, the base was still in danger. At around 10:00, the fire ignited a large quantity of explosives, rocking the base with another series of detonations.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: At the same time as the artillery bombardment at KSCB, an attack was launched against Khe Sanh village, seat of Hướng Hóa District. The village, 3 km south of the base, was defended by 160 local Bru troops, plus 15 American advisers. At dawn on 21 January, it was attacked by a roughly 300-strong PAVN battalion. A platoon from Company D, 1/26 Marines was sent from the base but was withdrawn in the face of the superior PAVN forces. Reinforcements from the ARVN 256th Regional Force (RF) company were dispatched aboard nine UH-1 helicopters of the 282nd Assault Helicopter Company, but they were landed near the abandoned French fort/former FOB-3 which was occupied by the PAVN who killed many of the RF troops and 4 Americans, including Lieutenant colonel Joseph Seymoe the deputy adviser for Quang Tri Province and forcing the remaining helicopters to abandon the mission. On the morning of 22 January Lownds decided to evacuate the remaining forces in the village with most of the Americans evacuated by helicopter while two advisers led the surviving local forces overland to the combat base.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: To eliminate any threat to their flank, the PAVN attacked Laotian Battalion BV-33, located at Ban Houei Sane, on Route 9 in Laos. The battalion was assaulted on the night of 23 January by three PAVN battalions supported by seven tanks. The Laotians were overrun, and many fled to the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. The Battle of Ban Houei Sane, not the attack three weeks later at Lang Vei, marked the first time that the PAVN had committed an armored unit to battle.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: PAVN artillery fell on the main base for the first time on 21 January. Several rounds also landed on Hill 881. Due to the arrival of the 304th Division, KSCB was further reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment on 22 January. Five days later, the final reinforcements arrived in the form of the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, which was deployed more for political than tactical reasons. The Marines and ARVN dug in and hoped that the approaching Tết truce (scheduled for 29–31 January) would provide some respite. On the afternoon of 29 January, however, the 3rd Marine Division notified Khe Sanh that the truce had been cancelled. The Tet Offensive was about to begin.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Nine days before the Tet Offensive broke out, the PAVN opened the battle of Khe Sanh and attacked the US forces just south of the DMZ. Declassified documents show that in response, Westmoreland considered using nuclear weapons. In 1970, the Office of Air Force History published a then "top secret", but now declassified, 106-page report, titled "The Air Force in Southeast Asia: Toward a Bombing Halt, 1968". Journalist Richard Ehrlich writes that according to the report, "in late January, General Westmoreland had warned that if the situation near the DMZ and at Khe Sanh worsened drastically, nuclear or chemical weapons might have to be used." The report continues to state, "this prompted Air Force chief of staff, General John McConnell, to press, although unsuccessfully, for JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) authority to request Pacific Command to prepare a plan for using low-yield nuclear weapons to prevent a catastrophic loss of the U.S. Marine base."


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Nevertheless, ultimately the nuclear option was discounted by military planners. A secret memorandum reported by US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, sent to US President Lyndon B. Johnson on 19 February 1968, was declassified in 2005. It reveals that the nuclear option was discounted because of terrain considerations that were unique to South Vietnam, which would have reduced the effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons. McNamara wrote: "because of terrain and other conditions peculiar to our operations in South Vietnam, it is inconceivable that the use of nuclear weapons would be recommended there against either Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces". McNamara's thinking may have also been affected by his aide David Morrisroe, whose brother Michael Morrisroe was serving at the base.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: During January, the recently installed electronic sensors of Operation Muscle Shoals (later renamed "Igloo White"), which were undergoing test and evaluation in southeastern Laos, were alerted by a flurry of PAVN activity along the Ho Chi Minh Trail opposite the northwestern corner of South Vietnam. Due to the nature of these activities, and the threat that they posed to KSCB, Westmoreland ordered Operation Niagara I, an intense intelligence collection effort on PAVN activities in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh Valley.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Niagara I was completed during the third week of January, and the next phase, Niagara II, was launched on the 21st, the day of the first PAVN artillery barrage. The Marine Direct Air Support Center (DASC), located at KSCB, was responsible for the coordination of air strikes with artillery fire. An airborne battlefield command and control center aboard a C-130 aircraft, directed incoming strike aircraft to forward air control (FAC) spotter planes, which, in turn directed them to targets either located by themselves or radioed in by ground units. When weather conditions precluded FAC-directed strikes, the bombers were directed to their targets by either a Marine AN/TPQ-10 radar installation at KSCB or by Air Force Combat Skyspot MSQ-77 stations.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Thus began what was described by John Morocco as "the most concentrated application of aerial firepower in the history of warfare". On an average day, 350 tactical fighter-bombers, 60 B-52s, and 30 light observation or reconnaissance aircraft operated in the skies near the base. Westmoreland had already ordered the nascent Igloo White operation to assist in the Marine defense. On 22 January, the first sensor drops took place, and by the end of the month, 316 acoustic and seismic sensors had been dropped in 44 strings. The sensors were implanted by a special naval squadron, Observation Squadron Sixty-Seven (VO-67). The Marines at KSCB credited 40% of intelligence available to their fire-support coordination center to the sensors.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: By the end of the battle, USAF assets had flown 9,691 tactical sorties and dropped 14,223 tons of bombs on targets within the Khe Sanh area. Marine Corps aviators had flown 7,098 missions and released 17,015 tons. Naval aircrews, many of whom were redirected from Operation Rolling Thunder strikes against North Vietnam, flew 5,337 sorties and dropped 7,941 tons of ordnance in the area. Westmoreland later wrote, "Washington so feared that some word of it might reach the press that I was told to desist, ironically answering what those consequences could be: a political disaster."


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Meanwhile, an interservice political struggle took place in the headquarters at Phu Bai Combat Base, Saigon, and the Pentagon over who should control aviation assets supporting the entire American effort in Southeast Asia. Westmoreland had given his deputy commander for air operations, Air Force General William W. Momyer, the responsibility for coordinating all air assets during the operation to support KSCB. This caused problems for the Marine command, which possessed its own aviation squadrons that operated under their own close air support doctrine. The Marines were extremely reluctant to relinquish authority over their aircraft to an Air Force general. The command and control arrangement then in place in Southeast Asia went against Air Force doctrine, which was predicated on the single air manager concept. One headquarters would allocate and coordinate all air assets, distributing them wherever they were considered most necessary, and then transferring them as the situation required. The Marines, whose aircraft and doctrine were integral to their operations, were under no such centralized control. On 18 January, Westmoreland passed his request for Air Force control up the chain of command to CINCPAC in Honolulu.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Heated debate arose among Westmoreland, Commandant of the Marine Corps Leonard F. Chapman Jr., and Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson. Johnson backed the Marine position due to his concern over protecting the Army's air assets from Air Force co-option. Westmoreland was so obsessed with the tactical situation that he threatened to resign if his wishes were not obeyed. As a result, on 7 March, for the first time during the Vietnam War, air operations were placed under the control of a single manager. Westmoreland insisted for several months that the entire Tet Offensive was a diversion, including, famously, attacks on downtown Saigon and obsessively affirming that the true objective of the North Vietnamese was Khe Sanh.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The Tet Offensive was launched prematurely in some areas on 30 January. On the following night, a massive wave of PAVN/VC attacks swept throughout South Vietnam, everywhere except Khe Sanh. The launching of the largest enemy offensive thus far in the conflict did not shift Westmoreland's focus away from Khe Sanh. A press release prepared on the following day (but never issued), at the height of Tet, showed that he was not about to be distracted. "The enemy is attempting to confuse the issue ... I suspect he is also trying to draw everyone's attention away from the greatest area of threat, the northern part of I Corps. Let me caution everyone not to be confused."


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Not much activity (with the exception of patrolling) had occurred thus far during the battle for the Special Forces Detachment A-101 and their four companies of Bru CIDGs stationed at Lang Vei. Then, on the morning of 6 February, the PAVN fired mortars into the Lang Vei compound, wounding eight Camp Strike Force soldiers. At 18:10 hours, the PAVN followed up their morning mortar attack with an artillery strike from 152 mm howitzers, firing 60 rounds into the camp. The strike wounded two more Strike Force soldiers and damaged two bunkers.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The situation changed radically during the early morning hours of 7 February. The Americans had forewarning of PAVN armor in the area from Laotian refugees from camp BV-33. SOG Reconnaissance teams also reported finding tank tracks in the area surrounding Co Roc mountain. Although the PAVN was known to possess two armored regiments, it had not yet fielded an armored unit in South Vietnam, and besides, the Americans considered it impossible for them to get one down to Khe Sanh without it being spotted by aerial reconnaissance.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: It still came as a shock to the Special Forces troopers at Lang Vei when 12 tanks attacked their camp. The Soviet-built PT-76 amphibious tanks of the 203rd Armored Regiment churned over the defenses, backed up by an infantry assault by the 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the 24th Regiment, both elements of the 304th Division. The ground troops had been specially equipped for the attack with satchel charges, tear gas, and flame throwers. Although the camp's main defenses were overrun in only 13 minutes, the fighting lasted for several hours, during which the Special Forces men and Bru CIDGs managed to knock out at least five of the tanks.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The Marines at Khe Sanh had a plan in place for providing a ground relief force in just such a contingency, but Lownds, fearing a PAVN ambush, refused to implement it. Lownds also rejected a proposal to launch a helicopter extraction of the survivors. During a meeting at Da Nang at 07:00 the next morning, Westmoreland and Cushman accepted Lownds' decision. Army Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Ladd (commander, 5th Special Forces Group), who had just flown in from Khe Sanh, was reportedly, "astounded that the Marines, who prided themselves on leaving no man behind, were willing to write off all of the Green Berets and simply ignore the fall of Lang Vei."


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Ladd and the commander of the SOG compound (whose men and camp had been incorporated into the defenses of KSCB) proposed that, if the Marines would provide the helicopters, the SOG reconnaissance men would go in themselves to pick up any survivors. The Marines continued to oppose the operation until Westmoreland actually had to issue an order to Cushman to allow the rescue operation to proceed. The relief effort was not launched until 15:00, and it was successful. Of the 500 CIDG troops at Lang Vei, 200 had been killed or were missing and 75 more were wounded. Of the 24 Americans at the camp, 10 had been killed and 11 wounded.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Lownds infuriated the Special Forces personnel even further when the indigenous survivors of Lang Vei, their families, civilian refugees from the area, and Laotian survivors from the camp at Ban Houei Sane arrived at the gate of KSCB. Lownds feared that PAVN infiltrators were mixed up in the crowd of more than 6,000, and lacked sufficient resources to sustain them. Overnight, they were moved to a temporary position a short distance from the perimeter and from there, some of the Laotians were eventually evacuated, although the majority turned around and walked back down Route 9 toward Laos.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The Lao troops were eventually flown back to their homeland, but not before the Laotian regional commander remarked that his army had to "consider the South Vietnamese as enemy because of their conduct." The Bru were excluded from evacuation from the highlands by an order from the ARVN I Corps commander, who ruled that no Bru be allowed to move into the lowlands. Ladd, back on the scene, reported that the Marines stated, "they couldn't trust any gooks in their damn camp." There had been a history of distrust between the Special Forces personnel and the Marines, and General Rathvon M. Tompkins, commander of the 3rd Marine Division, described the Special Forces soldiers as "hopped up ... wretches ... [who] were a law unto themselves." At the end of January, Tompkins had ordered that no Marine patrols proceed more than 500 meters from the Combat Base. Regardless, the SOG reconnaissance teams kept patrolling, providing the only human intelligence available in the battle area. This, however, did not prevent the Marine tanks within the perimeter from training their guns on the SOG camp.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Lownds estimated that the logistical requirements of KSCB were 60 tons per day in mid-January and rose to 185 tons per day when all five battalions were in place. The greatest impediments to the delivery of supplies to the base were the closure of Route 9 and the winter monsoon weather. For most of the battle, low-lying clouds and fog enclosed the area from early morning until around noon, and poor visibility severely hampered aerial resupply.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Making matters worse for the defenders, any aircraft that braved the weather and attempted to land was subject to PAVN antiaircraft fire on its way in for a landing. Once the aircraft touched down, it became the target of any number of PAVN artillery or mortar crews. The aircrew then had to contend with antiaircraft fire on the way out. As a result, 65% of all supplies were delivered by paradrops delivered by C-130 aircraft, mostly by the USAF, whose crews had significantly more experience in airdrop tactics than Marine air crews. The most dramatic supply delivery system used at Khe Sanh was the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System, in which palletized supplies were pulled out of the cargo bay of a low-flying transport aircraft by means of an attached parachute. The pallet slid to a halt on the airstrip while the aircraft never had to actually land. The USAF delivered 14,356 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh by air (8,120 tons by paradrop). 1st Marine Aircraft Wing records claim that the unit delivered 4,661 tons of cargo into KSCB.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The resupply of the numerous, isolated hill outposts was fraught with the same difficulties and dangers. The fire of PAVN antiaircraft units took its toll of helicopters that made the attempt. The Marines found a solution to the problem in the "Super Gaggle" concept. A group of 12 A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers provided flak suppression for massed flights of 12–16 helicopters, which would resupply the hills simultaneously. The adoption of this concept at the end of February was the turning point in the resupply effort. After its adoption, Marine helicopters flew in 465 tons of supplies during February. When the weather later cleared in March, the amount was increased to 40 tons per day.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: As more infantry units had been assigned to defend KSCB, artillery reinforcement kept pace. By early January, the defenders could count on fire support from 46 artillery pieces of various calibers, five tanks armed with 90-mm guns, and 92 single or Ontos-mounted 106-mm recoilless rifles. The base could also depend on fire support from US Army 175-mm guns located at Camp Carroll, east of Khe Sanh. Throughout the battle, Marine artillerymen fired 158,891 mixed rounds. In addition, over 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped until mid-April by aircraft of the USAF, US Navy and Marines onto the area surrounding Khe Sanh. This equates to roughly 1,300 tons of bombs dropped daily — 5 tons for every one of the 20,000 PAVN soldiers initially estimated to have been committed to the fighting at Khe Sanh. Marine analysis of PAVN artillery fire estimated that the PAVN gunners had fired 10,908 artillery and mortar rounds and rockets into Marine positions during the battle.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Communications with military command outside of Khe Sanh was maintained by an U.S. Army Signal Corps team, the 544th Signal Detachment from the 337th Signal Company, 37th Signal Brigade in Danang. The latest microwave/tropospheric scatter technology enabled them to maintain communications at all times. The site linked to another microwave/tropo site in Huế manned by the 513th Signal Detachment. From the Huế site the communication signal was sent to Danang headquarters where it could be sent anywhere in the world. The microwave/tropo site was located in an underground bunker next to the airstrip.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: On the night of the fall of Lang Vei, three companies of the PAVN 101D Regiment moved into jump-off positions to attack Alpha-1, an outpost west of the Combat Base held by 66 men of Company A, 1st Platoon, 1/9 Marines. At 04:15 on 8 February under cover of fog and a mortar barrage, the PAVN penetrated the perimeter, overrunning most of the position and pushing the remaining 30 defenders into the southwestern portion of the defenses. For some unknown reason, the PAVN troops did not press their advantage and eliminate the pocket, instead throwing a steady stream of grenades at the Marines. At 07:40, a relief force from Company A, 2nd Platoon set out from the main base and attacked through the PAVN, pushing them into supporting tank and artillery fire. By 11:00, the battle was over, Company A had lost 24 dead and 27 wounded, while 150 PAVN bodies were found around the position, which was then abandoned.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: On 23 February, KSCB received its worst bombardment of the entire battle. During one 8-hour period, the base was rocked by 1,307 rounds, most of which came from 130-mm (used for the first time on the battlefield) and 152-mm artillery pieces located in Laos. Casualties from the bombardment were 10 killed and 51 wounded. Two days later, US troops detected PAVN trenches running due north to within 25 m of the base perimeter. The majority of these were around the southern and southeastern corners of the perimeter, and formed part of a system that would be developed throughout the end of February and into March until they were ready to be used to launch an attack, providing cover for troops to advance to jumping-off points close to the perimeter. These tactics were reminiscent of those employed against the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, particularly in relation to entrenching tactics and artillery placement, and the realization assisted US planners in their targeting decisions.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Nevertheless, the same day that the trenches were detected, 25 February, 3rd Platoon from Bravo Company 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was ambushed on a short patrol outside the base's perimeter to test the PAVN strength. The Marines pursued three enemy scouts, who led them into an ambush. The platoon withdrew following a three-hour battle that left six Marines dead, 24 missing, and one taken prisoner.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: In late February, ground sensors detected the 66th Regiment, 304th Division preparing to mount an attack on the positions of the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion on the eastern perimeter. On the night of 28 February, the combat base unleashed artillery and airstrikes on possible PAVN staging areas and routes of advance. At 21:30, the attack came on, but it was stifled by the small arms of the Rangers, who were supported by thousands of artillery rounds and air strikes. Two further attacks later in the morning were halted before the PAVN finally withdrew. The PAVN, however, were not through with the ARVN troops. Five more attacks against their sector were launched during March.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: By mid-March, Marine intelligence began to note an exodus of PAVN units from the Khe Sanh sector. The 325C Divisional Headquarters was the first to leave, followed by the 95C and 101D Regiments, all of which relocated to the west. At the same time, the 304th Division withdrew to the southwest. That did not mean, however, that battle was over. On 22 March, over 1,000 North Vietnamese rounds fell on the base, and once again, the ammunition dump was detonated.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: On 30 March, Bravo Company, 26th Marines, launched an attack toward the location of the ambush that had claimed so many of their comrades on 25 February. Following a rolling barrage fired by nine artillery batteries, the Marine attack advanced through two PAVN trenchlines, but the Marines failed to locate the remains of the men of the ambushed patrol. The Marines claimed 115 PAVN killed, while their own casualties amounted to 10 dead, 100 wounded, and two missing. At 08:00 the following day, Operation Scotland was officially terminated. Operational control of the Khe Sanh area was handed over to the US Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division for the duration of Operation Pegasus.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Cumulative friendly casualties for Operation Scotland, which began on 1 November 1967, were: 205 killed in action, 1,668 wounded, and 25 missing and presumed dead. These figures do not include casualties among Special Forces troops at Lang Vei, aircrews killed or missing in the area, or Marine replacements killed or wounded while entering or exiting the base aboard aircraft. As far as PAVN casualties were concerned, 1,602 bodies were counted, seven prisoners were taken, and two soldiers defected to allied forces during the operation. American intelligence estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 PAVN troops were killed during the operation, equating to up to 90% of the attacking 17,200-man PAVN force. The PAVN acknowledged 2,500 men killed in action. They also reported 1,436 wounded before mid-March, of which 484 men returned to their units, while 396 were sent up the Ho Chi Minh Trail to hospitals in the north.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The fighting at Khe Sanh was so volatile that the Joint Chiefs and MACV commanders were uncertain that the base could be held by the Marines. In the US, the media following the battle drew comparisons with the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu, which proved disastrous for the French. Nevertheless, according to Tom Johnson, President Johnson was "determined that Khe Sanh [would not] be an 'American Dien Bien Phu'". He subsequently ordered the US military to hold Khe Sanh at all costs. As a result, "B-52 Arc Light strikes originating in Guam, Okinawa, and Thailand bombed the jungles surrounding Khe Sanh into stubble fields" and Khe Sanh became the major news headline coming out of Vietnam in late March 1968.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Planning for the overland relief of Khe Sanh had begun as early as 25 January 1968, when Westmoreland ordered General John J. Tolson, commander, First Cavalry Division, to prepare a contingency plan. Route 9, the only practical overland route from the east, was impassable due to its poor state of repair and the presence of PAVN troops. Tolson was not happy with the assignment, since he believed that the best course of action, after Tet, was to use his division in an attack into the A Shau Valley. Westmoreland, however, was already planning ahead. Khe Sanh would be relieved and then used as the jump-off point for a "hot pursuit" of enemy forces into Laos.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: On 2 March, Tolson laid out what became known as Operation Pegasus, the operational plan for what was to become the largest operation launched by III MAF thus far in the conflict. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1 Marines) and the 2/3 Marines would launch a ground assault from Ca Lu Combat Base (16 km east of Khe Sanh) and head west on Route 9 while the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division, would air-assault key terrain features along Route 9 to establish fire support bases and cover the Marine advance. The advance would be supported by 102 pieces of artillery. The Marines would be accompanied by their 11th Engineer Battalion, which would repair the road as the advance moved forward. Later, the 1/1 Marines and 3rd ARVN Airborne Task Force (the 3rd, 6th, and 8th Airborne Battalions) would join the operation.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Westmoreland's planned relief effort infuriated the Marines, who had not wanted to hold Khe Sanh in the first place and who had been roundly criticized for not defending it well. The Marines had constantly argued that technically, Khe Sanh had never been under siege, since it had never truly been isolated from resupply or reinforcement. Cushman was appalled by the "implication of a rescue or breaking of the siege by outside forces."


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Regardless, on 1 April, Operation Pegasus began. Opposition from the North Vietnamese was light and the primary problem that hampered the advance was continual heavy morning cloud cover that slowed the pace of helicopter operations. As the relief force made progress, the Marines at Khe Sanh moved out from their positions and began patrolling at greater distances from the base. Things heated up for the air cavalrymen on 6 April, when the 3rd Brigade encountered a PAVN blocking force and fought a day-long engagement.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: On the following day, the 2nd Brigade captured the old French fort near Khe Sanh village after a three-day battle. The link-up between the relief force and the Marines at KSCB took place at 08:00 on 8 April, when the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment entered the camp. The 11th Engineers proclaimed Route 9 open to traffic on 11 April. On that day, Tolson ordered his unit to immediately make preparations for Operation Delaware, an air assault into the A Shau Valley. At 08:00 on 15 April, Operation Pegasus was officially terminated. Total US casualties during the operation were 92 killed, 667 wounded, and five missing. Thirty-three ARVN troops were also killed and 187 were wounded. Because of the close proximity of the enemy and their high concentration, the massive B-52 bombings, tactical airstrikes, and vast use of artillery, PAVN casualties were estimated by MACV as being between 10,000 and 15,000 men.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Lownds and the 26th Marines departed Khe Sanh, leaving the defense of the base to the 1st Marine Regiment. He made his final appearance in the story of Khe Sanh on 23 May, when his regimental sergeant major and he stood before President Johnson and were presented with a Presidential Unit Citation on behalf of the 26th Marines.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: On 15 April, the 3rd Marine Division resumed responsibility for KSCB, Operation Pegasus ended, and Operation Scotland II began with the Marines seeking out the PAVN in the surrounding area. Operation Scotland II would continue until 28 February 1969 resulting in 435 Marines and 3304 PAVN killed.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Author Peter Brush details that an "additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II through the end of June 1968". He goes on to state that a further 72 were killed as part Operation Scotland II throughout the remainder of the year, but that these deaths are not included in the official US casualty lists for the Battle of Khe Sanh. Twenty-five USAF personnel who were killed are also not included.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The evacuation of Khe Sanh began on 19 June 1968 as Operation Charlie. Useful equipment was withdrawn or destroyed, and personnel were evacuated. A limited attack was made by a PAVN company on 1 July, falling on a company from the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, who were holding a position 3 km to the southeast of the base. Casualties were heavy among the attacking PAVN, who lost over 200 killed, while the defending Marines lost two men. The official closure of the base came on 5 July after fighting, which had killed five more Marines. The withdrawal of the last Marines under the cover of darkness was hampered by the shelling of a bridge along Route 9, which had to be repaired before the withdrawal could be completed.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Following the closure of the base, a small force of Marines remained around Hill 689 carrying out mopping-up operations. Further fighting followed, resulting in the loss of another 11 Marines and 89 PAVN soldiers, before the Marines finally withdrew from the area on 11 July. According to Brush, it was "the only occasion in which Americans abandoned a major combat base due to enemy pressure" and in the aftermath, the North Vietnamese began a strong propaganda campaign, seeking to exploit the US withdrawal and to promote the message that the withdrawal had not been by choice.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The PAVN claim that they began attacking the withdrawing Americans on 26 June 1968 prolonging the withdrawal, killing 1,300 Americans and shooting down 34 aircraft before "liberating" Khe Sanh on 15 July. The PAVN claim that during the entire battle they "eliminated" 17,000 enemy troops, including 13,000 Americans and destroyed 480 aircraft.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Regardless, the PAVN had gained control of a strategically important area, and its lines of communication extended further into South Vietnam. Once the news of the closure of KSCB was announced, the American media immediately raised questions about the reasoning behind its abandonment. They asked what had changed in six months so that American commanders were willing to abandon Khe Sanh in July. The explanations given out by the Saigon command were that "the enemy had changed his tactics and reduced his forces; that PAVN had carved out new infiltration routes; that the Marines now had enough troops and helicopters to carry out mobile operations; that a fixed base was no longer necessary."


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: While KSCB was abandoned, the Marines continued to patrol the Khe Sanh plateau, including reoccupying the area with ARVN forces from 5–19 October 1968 with minimal opposition. On 31 December 1968, the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion was landed west of Khe Sanh to commence Operation Dawson River West, on 2 January 1969 the 9th Marines and 2nd ARVN Regiment were also deployed on the plateau supported by the newly established Fire Support Bases Geiger and Smith; the 3-week operation found no significant PAVN forces or supplies in the Khe Sanh area. From 12 June to 6 July 1969, "Task Force Guadalcanal" comprising 1/9 Marines, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment and 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 2nd ARVN Regiment occupied the Khe Sanh area in Operation Utah Mesa. The Marines occupied Hill 950 overlooking the Khe Sanh plateau from 1966 until September 1969 when control was handed to the Army who used the position as a SOG operations and support base until it was overrun by the PAVN in June 1971. The gradual withdrawal of US forces began during 1969 and the adoption of Vietnamization meant that, by 1969, "although limited tactical offensives abounded, US military participation in the war would soon be relegated to a defensive stance."


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: According to military historian Ronald Spector, to reasonably record the fighting at Khe Sanh as an American victory is impossible. With the abandonment of the base, according to Thomas Ricks, "Khe Sanh became etched in the minds of many Americans as a symbol of the pointless sacrifice and muddled tactics that permeated a doomed U.S. war effort in Vietnam". Correspondent Michael Herr reported on the battle, and his account would inspire the surreal "Do Long Bridge" scene in the film "Apocalypse Now", which emphasized the anarchy of the war.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Commencing in 1966, the US had attempted to establish a barrier system across the DMZ to prevent infiltration by North Vietnamese troops. Known as the McNamara Line, it was initially codenamed "Project Nine". It was later renamed "Dye Marker" by MACV in September 1967, just as the PAVN began the first phase of their offensive by launching attacks against Marine-held positions across the DMZ. The attacks hindered the advancement of the McNamara Line, and as the fighting around Khe Sanh intensified, vital equipment including sensors and other hardware had to be diverted from elsewhere to meet the needs of the US garrison at Khe Sanh. Construction on the line was ultimately abandoned and resources were later diverted towards implementing a more mobile strategy.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: The precise nature of Hanoi's strategic goal at Khe Sanh is regarded as one of the most intriguing unanswered questions of the Vietnam War. According to Gordon Rottman, even the North Vietnamese official history, "Victory in Vietnam", is largely silent on the issue. The question, known among American historians as the "riddle of Khe Sanh," has been summed up by John Prados and Ray Stubbe: "Either the Tet Offensive was a diversion intended to facilitate PAVN/VC preparations for a war-winning battle at Khe Sanh, or Khe Sanh was a diversion to mesmerize Westmoreland in the days before Tet." In assessing North Vietnamese intentions, Peter Brush cites the claim of Vietnamese theater commander, Võ Nguyên Giáp, "that Khe Sanh itself was not of importance, but only a diversion to draw U.S. forces away from the populated areas of South Vietnam." That has led other observers to conclude that the siege served a wider PAVN strategy by diverting 30,000 US troops away from the cities that were the main targets of the Tet Offensive.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Whether the PAVN actually planned to capture Khe Sanh or the battle was an attempt to replicate the Việt Minh triumph against the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu has long been a point of contention. Westmoreland believed that the latter was the case, and his belief was the basis for his desire to stage "Dien Bien Phu in reverse." Those who agree with Westmoreland reason that no other explanation exists for Hanoi to commit so many forces to the area instead of deploying them for the Tet Offensive. The fact that the North Vietnamese committed only about half of their available forces to the offensive (60–70,000), most of whom were Viet Cong, is cited in favor of Westmoreland's argument. Other theories argued that the forces around Khe Sanh were simply a localized defensive measure in the DMZ area or that they were serving as a reserve in case of an offensive American end run in the mode of the American invasion at Inchon during the Korean War. However, North Vietnamese sources claim that the Americans did not win a victory at Khe Sanh but were forced to retreat to avoid destruction. The PAVN claimed that Khe Sanh was "a stinging defeat from both the military and political points of view." Westmoreland was replaced two months after the end of the battle, and his successor explained the retreat in different ways.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: General Creighton Abrams also suggested that the North Vietnamese may have been planning to emulate Dien Bien Phu. He believed that was proved by the PAVN's actions during Tet. He cited the fact that it would have taken longer to dislodge the North Vietnamese at Hue if the PAVN had committed the three divisions at Khe Sanh to the battle there instead of dividing its forces. However, the PAVN committed three regiments to the fighting from the Khe Sanh sector.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Another interpretation was that the North Vietnamese were planning to work both ends against the middle, a strategy that has come to be known as the Option Play. The PAVN would try to take Khe Sanh, but if could not, it would occupy the attention of as many American and South Vietnamese forces in I Corps as it could, which would facilitate the Tet Offensive. This view was supported by a captured North Vietnamese study of the battle in 1974 that stated that the PAVN would have taken Khe Sanh if it could have done so, but there was a limit to the price that it would pay. Its main objectives were to inflict casualties on US troops and to isolate them in the remote border regions.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Another theory is that the actions around Khe Sanh and the other battles at the border were simply feints ands ruse meant to focus American attention and forces on the border. A historian, General Dave Palmer, accepted that rationale: "General Giap never had any intention of capturing Khe Sanh ... [it] was a feint, a diversionary effort. And it had accomplished its purpose magnificently."


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: Marine General Rathvon M. Tompkins, the commander of the 3rd Marine Division, pointed out that had the PAVN actually intended to take Khe Sanh, PAVN troops could have cut the base's sole source of water, a stream 500 m outside the perimeter of the base. If only it had contaminated the stream, the airlift would not have provided enough water to the Marines. Also, Marine Lieutenant General Victor Krulak seconded the notion that there was never a serious intention to take the base by arguing that neither the water supply nor the telephone land lines were ever cut by the PAVN.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: One argument that was then leveled by Westmoreland and has since often quoted by historians of the battle is that only two Marine regiments were tied down at Khe Sanh, compared with the several PAVN divisions. When Hanoi made the decision to move in around the base, Khe Sanh was held by only one or two American battalions. Whether the destruction of one battalion could have been the goal of two to four PAVN divisions was debatable. However, even if Westmoreland believed his statement, his argument never moved on to the next logical level. By the end of January 1968, he had moved half of all US combat troops, nearly 50 maneuver battalions, to I Corps.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: On 30 January 1971, the ARVN and US forces launched Operation Dewey Canyon II, which involved the reopening of Route 9, securing the Khe Sanh area and reoccupying of KSCB as a forward supply base for Operation Lam Son 719. On 8 February 1971, the leading ARVN units marched along Route 9 into southern Laos while the US ground forces and advisers were prohibited from entering Laos. American logistical, aerial, and artillery support was provided to the operation.


title: Battle of Khe Sanh

text: After the ARVN defeat in Laos, the newly-reopened KSCB came under attack by PAVN sappers and artillery and the base was abandoned once again on 6 April 1971.


title: Tony Ressler

text: Antony P. Ressler (born October 12, 1960) is an American billionaire hedge fund manager and sports team owner.


title: Tony Ressler

text: He co-founded the private equity firms Apollo Global Management in 1990, and Ares Management in 1997.


title: Tony Ressler

text: Born in 1960 to a Jewish family, Ressler was one of five children of Dorothy and Ira Ressler. His father was an attorney and World War II veteran. Ressler earned a BSFS from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and an MBA from Columbia Business School. After university, he worked at Drexel Burnham Lambert eventually reaching senior vice president in the high yield bond department with responsibility for the new issue/syndicate desk.


title: Tony Ressler

text: In 1990, on the heels of the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert, he co-founded the private equity firm Apollo Global Management with Leon Black, Drexel's managing director, head of the Mergers & Acquisitions Group, and co-head of the Corporate Finance Department; John Hannan, Drexel's former co-director of international finance; Craig Cogut, a lawyer who worked with Drexel's high-yield division in Los Angeles; Arthur Bilger, the former head of the Drexel's corporate finance department; and Marc Rowan, Josh Harris and Michael Gross, all of whom worked under Black in the mergers and acquisitions department. In 1997, he co-founded Ares Management with former Apollo Global Management co-worker John H. Kissick and Bennett Rosenthal, who joined the group from the global leveraged finance group at Merrill Lynch.


title: Tony Ressler

text: Ressler is a member of the executive committee of the board of directors of the Cedars-Sinai Medical Center; finance chair and member of the executive committee of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art; a board member of Campbell Hall Episcopal School in Studio City, California; and one of the founding members of the board and finance chair of the Painted Turtle Camp, an organization that takes children with chronic and life-threatening illnesses on camping trips. Ressler is a supporter of military veterans through the work of The Greatest Generations Foundation.


title: Tony Ressler

text: In 2005, he belonged to an investment group that made a successful bid led by Mark Attanasio to purchase Major League Baseball's Milwaukee Brewers.


title: Tony Ressler

text: Since June 2015 he is the majority owner of the Atlanta Hawks basketball team, when he purchased the team for an estimated US$730 million. It was ultimately sold to him for $850 million.


title: Tony Ressler

text: To purchase Atlanta Hawks of the National Basketball Association Ressler formed a group that includes former NBA player Grant Hill, Sara Blakely, Jesse Itzler, Steven Price, and Rick Schnall.


title: Tony Ressler

text: On June 16, 1989, he married actress Jami Gertz. They live in Los Angeles, and have three sons: Oliver Jordan Ressler (born 1992), Nicholas Simon Ressler (born 1995), and Theo Ressler (born 1998). Gertz-Ressler High Academy, a member of Alliance College-Ready Public Schools, is named after the couple. They are members of the Wilshire Boulevard Temple.


title: Tony Ressler

text: His sister, Broadway producer Debra Ressler, is married to Apollo co-founder Leon Black. His brother, Richard Ressler, is a principal and founder of CIM Investment management.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: Devil (also known as The Night Chronicles 1: Devil) is a 2010 American supernatural horror film directed by John Erick Dowdle. The screenplay by Brian Nelson was from a story by M. Night Shyamalan. Starring Chris Messina, Logan Marshall-Green, Geoffrey Arend, Bojana Novakovic, Jenny O'Hara, and Bokeem Woodbine, the film revolves around five strangers who become trapped in an elevator. "Devil" was released on September 17, 2010. Critics praised the film's atmosphere and performances, but criticized the short running-time and story.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: A Bible verse, 1 Peter 5:8, appears onscreen. An unseen man narrates with a story about his childhood, where his mother explained the circumstances that surround The Devil roaming the earth. A man jumps to his death from a skyscraper, leaving a suicide note about the Devil's approaching presence. Shortly thereafter, an elevator in the building gets stuck with five people inside: a temporary security guard, a mechanic/former soldier, a mattress salesman, a young woman, and an elderly woman. A repairman cannot get the elevator working and nearly dies while attempting to do this.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: In the elevator, the lights frequently flicker and turn off completely for intervals. During an interval, one of the security guards, Ramirez, watching through the security camera sees a face on the monitor he believes is the devil, but his partner Lustig doubts it. At the same time, the young woman feels something on her back and the group becomes suspicious of the mattress salesman. When the lights return, the young woman has a bite mark on her back and the salesman has blood on his hands. Detective Bowden, who was investigating the earlier suicide, is called to the scene.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: The lights go out again, and the elevator mirrors break. When the lights return, the mattress salesman's jugular vein is impaled with a broken mirror shard and he dies, escalating it into a crime scene investigation. Outside, security guards, the repair technician, and the fire department attempt to get in, to no avail. The passengers begin to suspect each other, while the security guards monitoring through the camera talk to them one-way via the speaker, as they cannot hear the passengers. As the group argues, the repair technician's rappelling device breaks and he falls to his death on top of the elevator, terrifying the occupants. Ramirez tries to convince the detectives that this could be The Devil's Meeting, but is unsuccessful. An unknown woman attempts to enter the building unsuccessfully, and goes around to the back.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: Bowden and his partner use the sign-in sheet and elevator camera to identify the group. The temporary guard is identified as Ben Larson, who has a criminal record of assault and beating someone into a coma. The mattress salesman is identified as Vince McCormick, who lost many people their assets through a Ponzi scheme. The young woman is identified as Sarah Caraway, who is married to a rich man and plans leaving him after stealing his money, as she has done before. The elderly woman is identified as Jane Kowski, who was caught on the security camera stealing a woman’s wallet. The mechanic and former soldier cannot be identified due to him not signing in, making him the main suspect.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: Upon review of security footage, the detectives see the mechanic had entered the building with a bag he does not have anymore. They find the bag filled with tools hidden in the lobby bathroom and suspect him more. Suddenly, the lights in the elevator flicker and shut off a fourth time. When they turn back on, the older woman is seen hanging from the ceiling by her neck via a light cable.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: Ramirez shows Bowden the devil face he saw earlier, but Bowden does not believe him. Bowden then discusses the death of his wife and son: they were killed in a hit-and-run five years prior, and the driver left a note that said "I'm so sorry" at the scene.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: As the detectives investigate the soldier, Ben and the soldier get in a fight, each suspecting the other as the killer. Sarah tells Ben to kill the soldier before he kills them and Ben attacks the soldier. Bowden comes back to the control room and diffuses the situation by having the passengers put their hands on the wall. Out of answers, Bowden asks Ramirez how to save them, if the devil is truly there. Ramirez responds, "They all die." Lustig goes into the basement to shut off the power where the fire fighters are drilling into the wall. He notices a shorted wire on the floor and attempts to move it.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: The detectives talk to the lawyer the young woman was supposed to meet with and try to contact Sarah's husband. Lustig, severely shocked, causes a scene by stumbling into the lobby and collapsing amidst the crowd. Bowden calls for the medics. In the elevator, Sarah takes her hands off the wall, but the soldier tells her to put them back. Bowden discovers that Sarah took all her husband's money and her husband might know it. After learning the husband owns the building's security company, they suspect the husband hired Ben to kill Sarah and that he killed the others to cover it. However, the fourth outage ends with Ben's neck broken.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: The soldier and Sarah suspect each other, arming themselves with mirror shards, but Bowden defuses the situation by telling them about his recovery from alcoholism following his family's death. The lights go out again, and Sarah's throat is slit. The soldier tries to stop the bleeding.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: The unknown woman from before is brought into the control room. She tells them that the soldier is her fiancé. He actually came for a job interview and he did not want to take his tools along, so he hid them. He has requested his fiancee to fetch him after the interview. His name is Tony Janekowski. The detectives realize he had signed in, and Jane Kowski, the elderly woman's presumed identity, was not real. The Devil manifests in the form of the elderly woman. Tony tries to trade his life for Sarah, but the devil says he cannot do that. Tony grabs the radio and confesses that he fled from a fatal accident five years ago. Bowden realizes that Tony is responsible for the death of his family.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: The Devil, powerless now that Tony has repented, vanishes after causing the elevator to plunge several floors. The firefighters are finally able to get in, but the old lady is gone. As the corpses of Sarah, Ben, and Vince are wheeled away, Bowden decides to take Tony into custody, and, while en route, reveals to Tony that it was his family in that accident. Much to his own surprise, he forgives Tony.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: In October 2008 M. Night Shyamalan and Media Rights Capital announced that "Devil" would be made with the Dowdle brothers as directors and Brian Nelson as screenwriter.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: Filming started on October 26, 2009 in Toronto with John Erick Dowdle as director and Drew Dowdle as an executive producer. There was additional shooting for the film several months later in Los Angeles and Philadelphia.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: Joe Cobden had to train for four months to prepare for his role. He said that preparing for his death scene, which took four days to shoot, was the hardest scene to shoot except for the introduction and closing.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: John Erick Dowdle and Drew Dowdle said that the movie is based on a Devil's Meeting, which is a premise that the Devil is on Earth to test evildoers by tormenting them. Shyamalan acknowledged that the basic structure of the story was "an Agatha Christie nod." In Christie's 1939 novel "And Then There Were None", as in "Devil", a group of people with guilty pasts are trapped in an isolated area and begin to die one by one. Overall, it was inspired by the 2009 manga "Akumu no Elevator" by author Kinoshita Handa and illustrator Roppongi Aya.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: The film was set to have a release date on February 11, 2011, but was bumped up to September 17, 2010. The film's trailer debuted online on July 13, 2010.


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: The film was not screened to critics in advance. Review aggregator Rotten Tomatoes gives the film a score of 49% based on 99 reviews, with an average rating of 5.20/10. The site's consensus reads, "It's better than many of the other films M. Night Shyamalan has been associated with, but "Devil" never gets more than a few low-budget thrills out of its fiendishly promising premise."


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: Dennis Harvey of "Variety" gave "Devil" a lukewarm review, saying "Like the solid B-thrillers of yore that often outshone A-pics topping double bills, M. Night Shyamalan-produced "Devil" is nothing very special or original, but it gets the job done briskly and economically."


title: Devil (2010 film)

text: "Devil" was intended to be the first of "The Night Chronicles" trilogy, which involved the supernatural within modern urban society. In June 2010, Shyamalan announced the second film titled "12 Strangers", later changed to "Reincarnate". The film was about a jury discussing a case dealing with the supernatural. Chris Sparling was set to write the script and Daniel Stamm would direct. Shyamalan also confirmed that the story for the currently untitled third installment was going to be taken from the abandoned sequel to "Unbreakable". As of 2020, neither film has been produced, but his unused "Unbreakable" sequel idea later became the basis for "Split".


title: Fred Trump Jr.

text: Frederick Crist Trump Jr. (October 14, 1938 – September 26, 1981; nicknamed "Freddy") was an American airplane pilot and maintenance worker. The eldest son to realtor Fred Trump Sr., he fell out of his father's favor when he chose to become an airline pilot. Fred Sr. then chose Fred Jr.'s younger brother Donald to take over the family business.


title: Fred Trump Jr.

text: Frederick Crist Trump Jr. was born on October 14, 1938, as the first son of wealthy real estate developer Fred Trump and Mary Anne MacLeod Trump in Queens, New York. In 1956 Fred Jr. graduated from St. Paul's School. In that same year his father Fred Sr. donated money to have the playing fields redone and in his honor were renamed Trump Field. Fred Jr. attended Lehigh University and joined a historically Jewish fraternity, Sigma Alpha Mu, even though he was not Jewish. He became president of the fraternity and graduated with a B.A. in business, also completing ROTC and entering the Air National Guard as a second lieutenant.


title: Fred Trump Jr.

text: In 1958, Fred Jr. met Linda Clapp while vacationing in the Bahamas. She later became a stewardess and asked him for help finding an apartment near Idlewild Airport; they soon began dating. He proposed to her in 1961. In early 1962, they were married in Florida, and she resigned from the airline, which did not allow its stewardesses to be married. They settled in Manhattan and had their first child, Frederick Crist Trump III, in November 1962. The next year, they moved into one of Fred Sr.'s apartments in Jamaica, Queens. During this time, Fred Jr. did maintenance jobs on his father's properties. Fred Sr. wanted his oldest son to be "invulnerable" so he could take over his real-estate business, E. Trump & Son, but Fred Jr. was the opposite in personality. In 1966, Fred Jr. was listed in newspapers as vice president of E. Trump & Son, but he had a difficult time working with his father. Fred Jr. left the company to pursue his dream of being a pilot, quickly being accepted at Trans World Airlines, which created tension with his father. According to Fred Jr.'s daughter, Mary L. Trump (born 1965), her grandfather "dismantled him by devaluing and degrading every aspect of his personality." Both Fred Sr. and Donald mocked him for his decision to become an airline pilot, comparing it to driving a bus or being a chauffeur.


title: Fred Trump Jr.

text: By 1970, after a series of domestic incidents, Clapp asked Fred Jr. to leave and arranged for Fred Sr. to change the locks. When his alcoholism prevented him from continuing to function as a pilot, he returned to work for his father's business. He eventually moved into the unfurnished attic of his parents' house, and once again did maintenance on Trump properties. On September 26, 1981, at the age of 42, he died from a heart attack caused by his alcohol use. Donald Trump, who has said of his abstinence since 1976, initially cited the formative influence of their father's teetotalism, but later shifted all credit to the adult experience with his brother, claiming:Every day he lectured me, "Look at the mess I'm in. If I ever catch you smoking, you'll be sorry, drinking even a glass of booze because you'll like it too much." ... Freddy did a good job.


title: Fred Trump Jr.

text: In 1999, just after Fred Sr.'s funeral, Fred III's son, William Trump, was born with cerebral palsy. The Trump family agreed to pay for the child's medical expenses. Fred Sr.'s will was revealed, which Donald Trump helped write. It mandated that Fred Jr.'s children, Fred III and Mary, would be excluded from their father's share of Fred Sr.'s inheritance; over $20 million would be divided among Fred Sr.'s other children. Fred III and Mary filed a lawsuit, alleging that Fred Jr.'s siblings, including Donald, used "undue influence" on a dementia-addled Fred Sr. to cut them out of the inheritance. Donald, who later said he "was angry because they sued," suspended the medical benefits for Fred Jr.'s children, as well as Fred III's infant son. According to Mary, she and Fred III sued to have the benefits reinstated, but only her infant nephew received "some accommodations" as a result.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The uniforms of the United States Navy include dress uniforms, daily service uniforms, working uniforms, and uniforms for special situations, which have varied throughout the history of the navy. For simplicity in this article, "officers" refers to both commissioned officers and warrant officers.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The United States Navy has three categories of dress uniforms, from least to most formal: service, full, and dinner dress.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: Service dress uniforms are worn for official functions not rising to the level of full or dinner dress. They are also commonly worn when traveling in official capacity, or when reporting to a command. The civilian equivalent is a business suit. Service Dress Blue may be worn year-round, while Service Dress White is reserved for summer or tropical zones. Ribbons are worn over the left breast pocket in all variations of the service dress uniform. An all-weather overcoat or reefer coat may be worn with service dress uniforms in cold or inclement weather.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The Service Dress Blue (SDB) uniform consists of a dark navy blue suit coat and trousers (or optional skirt for women) that are nearly black in color, a white shirt, and a black four-in-hand necktie for men or a neck tab for women. The material is generally wool or a wool blend, depending on the vendor. The men's jacket is double-breasted with six gold-colored buttons, and the women's jacket single breasted with a single row of four gold-colored buttons. Rank insignia are gold sleeve stripes for commissioned officers, while rating badges and service stripes are worn on the left sleeve by chief petty officers (CPOs). The prescribed headgear is a white combination cap, although a navy blue garrison cap is optional in some situations when the jacket is not worn, unless stated otherwise by the prescribing authority. Beginning in 2016, the Navy began phasing out the distinct female combination cap and now prescribes a cover similar to the male version for female officers and CPOs; the prior female versions were authorized for wear until October 2018. Commissioned and warrant officers above grade W-2 wear a cap badge of the U.S. shield and eagle in silver upon gold crossed anchors, warrant officers at grade W-1 a pair of crossed anchors, while CPOs wear a single fouled anchor. The combination cover's chinstrap is gold for commissioned and warrant officers, narrower gold for midshipmen and warrant officers 1, and black for CPOs. Females typically wear beltless slacks with the SDB, although since January 2017, belted slacks can be worn as an alternative.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The Service Dress White uniform had until recently been different for the men's and women's variations. Men wear a high stand-collared white tunic, with shoulder boards for officers or metal anchor collar devices for CPOs, white trousers, and white shoes. This uniform is informally called "chokers" due to the standing collar. The material, formerly cotton, today is a weave of polyester known as "Certified Navy Twill". The white combination cap is the prescribed headgear.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: Women previously wore a uniform similar to the Service Dress Blue uniform but with a white coat and skirt or trousers. Officer's rank insignia consisted of lacing on the sleeves in the same manner as on the blue uniform, while CPOs wore rank insignia pins on the lapels of the jacket. However, the Navy announced female uniform changes to resemble the men's uniforms, and female officers and CPOs began wearing stand-collared tunics similar to the male uniform in early 2017, with full replacement of the old-style uniform by the end of January 2020 (delayed from an initial date of December 2019).


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: Service Dress Blues for male junior enlisted sailors are based on the classic sailor suit in navy blue, colloquially referred to as "crackerjacks" because of the sailor-suited figure that adorns the packaging of Cracker Jack snacks. It consists of a navy blue wool pullover jumper with an elongated "tar-flap" collar adorned with three rows of white stripes and two white stars, one at each corner of the collar. The jumper's cuffs are similarly adorned with white stripes. A black silk or synthetic fiber neckerchief, rolled diagonally, is worn around the neck, under the collar, with the ends tied in a square knot in the center of the chest. The trousers for the uniform are flared as "bell bottoms". The trousers have traditionally featured a broad-fall opening, though changes to the trousers announced in 2012 have added a zippered fly, rendering the buttons merely decorative. A traditional white "Dixie cup" hat is also worn, as well as black leather shoes.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: For a brief period in the 1970s and early 1980s, male enlisted sailors in paygrades E-1 to E-6 wore a double-breasted blue uniform based on the version worn by officers and CPOs, but with grey buttons and a combination cover with an emblem consisting of a silver eagle and the letters "USN".


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The female junior enlisted sailors' Service Dress Blue uniform was formerly similar to the short-lived male uniform from the 1970s. This uniform was phased out and was replaced by a female-cut variant of the "crackerjacks" with the transition begun in October 2016 and completed by the end of January 2020 (delayed from its initial date of December 2019).


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: Until 2016, the junior enlisted Service Dress White uniform, for both sexes, consisted of a white jumper with plain collar, white bell-bottom trousers with a fly front (or optional skirt for women), black leather shoes, the black neckerchief worn in the same fashion as with the Service Dress Blue uniform. Males wore the white "Dixie cup" cap, while females wore the same cap as their Service Dress Blue uniforms. That Service Dress White jumper was actually derived from the former Undress White, with its wide cuff-less sleeves and no piping. However, beginning in October 2015, Service Dress White jumpers were changed to feature navy blue piping on cuffed sleeves, stars and navy blue piping on the collar, and a yoke, making it a 'photo-negative' of the Service Dress Blue jumper.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: Ribbons are worn with these uniforms over the top left pocket opening, along with qualification or warfare insignia. Either the all-weather coat or peacoat may be worn with this uniform in cold or inclement weather. The color of the enlisted rate insignia and service stripes for the Service Dress Blues is either red or gold based upon how many years the wearer has served (prior to 2019 it was contingent on disciplinary history); the colors on the Service Dress Whites are always black.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: Full Dress uniforms are worn for ceremonies such as changes of command, retirements, commissionings and decommissionings, funerals, weddings, or when otherwise appropriate. Full Dress is similar to Service Dress except that instead of ribbons, full-size medals are worn above the left breast pocket, with ribbons worn on the opposite side for decorations without corresponding medals. Swords or cutlasses are authorized for wear by officers and chief petty officers, and may be required for Lt. Commander and above.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: For the Ceremonial Guard in Washington, D.C., the junior enlisted Full Dress uniforms are further modified with the wearing of a white pistol belt, ascot, and dress aiguilette (the latter two are white for winter and navy blue for summer), and white canvas leggings. Other honor guards are only authorized leggings and white pistol belt.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The dinner dress uniforms of the United States Navy are the most formal and have the most variations. For officers, there are Dinner Dress Blue and Dinner Dress White, Dinner Dress Blue Jacket and Dinner Dress White Jacket, and Formal Dress. Although trousers are authorized, women frequently wear the appropriate color skirt.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: Dinner Dress Blue and White are identical to their Service Dress versions, but worn with miniature medals and badges with no ribbons. Dinner Dress Blue is additionally worn with a dress shirt and black bow tie. These variants are commonly worn by many junior officers and enlisted personnel as substitutes for the more formal Dinner Dress Jacket variant which is only prescribable for Lieutenant Commander and above and optional for Lieutenant and below.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The Dinner Dress Blue/White Jacket uniforms feature a short mess jacket with three buttons on either side, worn open with a black bow tie and gold cummerbund (women substitute a neck tab for the bow tie). Male officers show rank stripes on the sleeves of the jacket for the blue version and on shoulder boards for the white version, while women officers only wear sleeve stripes. This uniform is equivalent to black tie in usage.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The Formal Dress variation is the most formal, and is identical to the Dinner Dress Blue Jacket uniform but worn with a white waistcoat with gold buttons in place of the cummerbund, a white bow tie, and matching mother-of-pearl studs and cuff links. Though rarely used, men can also substitute a tailcoat for the standard dinner dress jacket with this uniform. The female version is substantially the same as Dinner Dress Blue Jacket, but substitutes the mother-of-pearl studs and cuff links for gold. This uniform is equivalent to white tie in usage. Additionally, this uniform is only prescribed for chiefs and officers.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: Those holding the rank of lieutenant and below have the option of using the Dinner Dress uniform when Dinner Dress Jacket is prescribed. The enlisted sailors who are chief petty officer and above wear a uniform similar to the officers, but with rank insignia and service stripes on the left sleeve. While enlisted who are petty officer first class and below have optional Dinner Dress Jacket uniforms similar to the officers and chiefs, they may also wear their Dinner Dress uniform, which is the traditional Service Dress "sailor suit", with miniature medals instead of ribbons.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: Service uniforms are the U.S. Navy's daily wear uniforms, and exist in several variations. They are intended for use in office environments, in positions that interact with the public, and in watch situations. Skirts are authorized for women in all service uniforms.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The Navy first authorized a khaki uniform in 1913 as a practical garment for early naval aviators; they were given permission to wear Marine Corps khaki uniforms with naval insignia when flying or working on aircraft. Khakis were authorized aboard submarines in 1931 and as an officer's working uniform on all ships in 1941.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The Service Khaki uniform today is reserved for officers and enlisted sailors at chief petty officer and above. It is a short-sleeved khaki button-up shirt and matching trousers, worn with a gold belt buckle. The shirt features two front flap pockets and an open collar. Ribbons are worn above the left pocket of the shirt, with the warfare insignia above them. A nametag may be worn above the right pocket, and rank insignia is worn on the collar. The regulations for ribbons state the highest three awards, or all ribbons can be worn at once. Headgear consists of either a combination cap with a khaki cover or a khaki garrison cap. Currently black and brown oxford shoes are authorized for all officers and CPOs, though traditionally brown shoes are worn only by aviators. Females are authorized to wear the same over-blouse as junior enlisted sailors. The uniform is also worn by cadet officers and cadet chief petty officers in the Navy Junior ROTC.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The "Summer White Service" uniform (formerly known as Tropical White Long and nicknamed the "milkman" and "Good Humor" uniform) consists of a short-sleeved, open-collared white button-up shirt, white trousers and belt, and white dress shoes. Authorized headwear is the combination cap. Officers wear shoulder boards with this uniform, while chiefs wear metal collar insignia. The women's shirt for all ranks has shoulder straps, but carry nothing except for shoulder boards worn by officers. Like Service Khakis, Summer Whites are available in several materials (poly/cotton and Certified Navy Twill). When assigned as the Uniform of the Day, a Plan of the Day/Plan of the week will state "Summer White." Either the All-Weather Coat, Blue jacket, or Peacoat may be worn with this uniform. While once authorized for junior enlisted, it is now restricted to officers and chiefs. Members E-6 and below previously wore a short-sleeved Summer White uniform with rate insignia on the left sleeve, but the uniform was discontinued by the Navy in December 2010.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The U.S. Navy underwent a comprehensive review of every uniform from 2004 through 2007, intending to replace the different working uniform for all hands and the seasonal service uniforms with a single year-round service uniform for junior enlisted personnel below chief petty officer. The Navy Service Uniform has replaced the Winter Blue Uniform and Summer White Uniform (both discussed below), which were phased out on 31 December 2010 when the rollout of the new service uniform was completed. Enlisted personnel now have a single Service Uniform. Navy Junior ROTC units also received this new uniform, where, unlike in the U.S. Navy proper, it is worn by both cadet officers and enlisted cadets.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The Navy Service Uniform is a year-round service uniform to withstand day-to-day classroom and office-like environments where the service uniform is typically worn. It consists of a short-sleeve khaki shirt for males and a khaki weskit-style blouse for females, made from a wash and wear 75% polyester, 25% wool blend, with permanent military creases, black trousers for males with beltless slacks for females and optional beltless skirt, and a black unisex garrison cap. Silver anodized-metal rank insignia is worn on shirt/blouse collars and cap. The service uniform also includes a black relaxed-fit jacket with a knit stand-up collar and epaulets, on which petty officers wear large, silver anodized-metal rate insignia.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: Working uniforms are described by the navy as being worn when other uniforms may become unduly soiled or are otherwise inappropriate for the task at hand. These are worn at sea and in industrial environments ashore. In July 2010, the Navy Working Uniform and coveralls became the only authorized working uniforms. V-neck sweaters were authorized with coveralls until 2015.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The Navy Working Uniform (NWU) is a utility uniform with multiple pockets on the shirt and trousers. Three versions of the uniform exist, each with a multi-color digital camouflage print pattern similar to those introduced by other services. Type I is predominantly blue with some gray for the majority of sailors. It was originally developed for shipboard use, but proved unsuitable for shipboard environments and was discontinued in 2019. Type II is a desert digital pattern currently restricted to SEALs and other sailors such as Seabees assigned to Naval Special Warfare Units when in desert environments. Type III is a woodland digital pattern for sailors in shore commands and riverine units. The camouflage patterns are similar to the MARPAT worn on the Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform by U.S. Marines.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The colors of the NWU Type I, according to the U.S. Navy, were intended to reflect the navy's heritage and connection to seaborne operations, while hiding wear and stains, something unavoidable with the utilities and working khakis used previously. The colors were chosen to match the most commonly used paint colors aboard ship, extending the lifetime of the uniform on long deployments where uniforms often come into contact with freshly painted surfaces. An anchor, USS "Constitution", and eagle (ACE) emblem is embroidered on the left breast pocket on all Type I NWUs. Accessories included a navy blue cotton T-shirt, an eight-point utility cover, and a web belt with closed buckle. The uniform was worn with rank insignia on both collar points and on the front panel of the utility cover, with sew-on name and "U.S. NAVY" tapes, also on the new digital background pattern, having gold-colored lettering for officers, CPOs and midshipmen. All ranks below CPO wore silver-lettered name tapes. The NWU Type I was phased into service beginning in January 2009., but was phased out as of 1 October 2019.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The Type II and III patterns are overall darker than their respective MARPAT progenitors, modified with different color shades and a vertically-aligned pixel pattern for the woodland version (compared to the horizontal alignment of woodland MARPAT). The additional patterns addressed the fact that the blue and grey Type I pattern was not meant for a tactical environment. Rank insignia is embroidered and worn on a tab in the center of the torso, name and "U.S. Navy" taps are embroidered in brown (Type II) or black (Type III). Backlash from Marines, including an objection from Commandant Conway, led to restrictions when wear regulations were released in 2010. The Type II is restricted for wear to Naval Special Warfare personnel, while Type III was restricted to Navy ground units until late 2016.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: The uniforms are primarily composed of a 50/50 nylon and cotton blend, which eliminates the need for a "starch and press" appearance and reduces the possibility of snags and tears from sharp objects (thus making the garment last longer). However this blend combines high flammability with the strength to hold onto the sailor's body while burning.


title: Uniforms of the United States Navy

text: In August 2016 the U.S. Navy announced that it is eliminating the NWU Type I in favor of the Type III which was phased in by 1 October 2019 for wear as the standard working uniform ashore for all Navy personnel. Type III will begin being issued to new navy recruits in October 2017. The Type II will remain restricted to wear by Naval Special Warfare sailors when in desert environments. The Navy's goal of developing a single working uniform for wear aboard ship and ashore and by all ranks and rates which the NWU Type I was supposed to fulfill was never realized by the Type I. Soon after its introduction it was found to be unsuitable for shipboard wear because of its lack of flame resistance and so was banned from wear aboard ship (except for when in port) thus making it essentially a uniform to be worn while ashore only. As a uniform for wear ashore only, a pattern designed to conceal stains aboard ships is not nearly as effective at concealment as a pattern designed to conceal people on land, thus the IIIs are used ashore. The Navy continues to work to develop a new shipboard working uniform.