title: Religion in France

text: The major religions practiced in France include Christianity (about 50% overall, with denominations including Catholicism, various branches of Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Armenian Orthodoxy), Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Sikhism amongst others, making it a multiconfessional country. Sunday Mass attendance has fallen to 5% for Catholics, and the overall level of religious observance is generally lower than in the past.


title: Religion in France

text: In 2015, the Eurobarometer, a survey funded by the European Union, found that Christianity was the religion of 54.3% of the respondents, with Catholicism being the main denomination with 47.8%, followed by other Christians with 4.1% (Protestants with 1.8% and the Eastern Orthodox with 0.6%). Muslims were found to comprise the 3.3%, Jews were the 0.4% and members of other religions were the 1.6%. Unaffiliated people were the 40.4%, 22.8% declared to be atheist and 17.6% declared to be agnostic.


title: Religion in France

text: In 2017, the Pew Research Center found in their "Global Attitudes Survey" that 54.2% of the French regarded themselves as Christians, with 47.4% belonging to the Catholic Church, 3.6% were Unaffiliated Christians, 2.2% were Protestants, 1.0% were Eastern Orthodox. The 37.8% unaffiliated people were divided into 24.8% Atheists, 8.2% nothing in particular and 4.8% Agnostics. Muslims were 5.0%, Jews comprised 0.4% and members of other religions were 1.4%. 1.1% was either undecided or didn't answer the question.


title: Religion in France

text: In May 2019, the Eurobarometer conducted a survey in France, it was published in September 2019 within Special Eurobarometer 493, showing the following outcome: Christian 47%, with Catholicism as the main denomination with 41%, followed by Orthodox Christian, Protestants and other Christians with 2% each one. Muslims were found to be 5%, Jewish 1%, Buddhist 1%. The 40% unaffiliated people comprised Atheist 21% and Non believers or agnostics 19%. People with other religions were 5%, and refused to answer 1%.


title: Religion in France

text: According to the European Value Survey, between 2010 and 2012, 47% of French youth declared themselves as Christians, while according to IFOP study, based on a sample of 406, around 52% of 11 to 15 years declared themselves as Catholics, and according to CSA poll, around 65.4% of 18 to 24 year-old French declared themselves as Christians. A 2010 Pew Research Center survey found that 60% of French (7 millions) between the ages of 15 to 29 identified themselves as Christians.


title: Religion in France

text: In 2018, a study by the French polling agency "OpinionWay" funded by three Catholic institutions found, based on a sample of 1.000, that 41% of 18 to 30 years old French people declared themselves as Catholics, 3% as Protestants, 8% as Muslim, 1% were Buddhists, 1% were Jews and 3% were affiliated with other religions, 43% regarded themselves as unaffiliated. Regarding their belief of God, 52% believed that the existence of God to be certain or probable, whilst 28% believed it to be improbable and 19% regarded it as excluded.


title: Religion in France

text: In the same year, according to a study jointly conducted by London's St Mary's University's Benedict XVI Centre for Religion and Society and the Institut Catholique de Paris, and based on data from the European Social Survey 2014–2016, collected on a sample of 600, among 16 to 29 years-old Frenchmen 25% were Christians (23% Catholic and 2% Protestant), 10% were Muslims, 1% were of other religions, and 64% were not religious. The data was obtained from two questions, one asking "Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?" to the full sample and the other one asking "Which one?" to the sample who replied with "Yes". The disproportionately larger young Muslim population can be attributed to the group being younger and on average having more children, with Pew Research citing Europe-wide fertility figures of 1.6 children for non-Muslims and 2.6 for Muslims.


title: Religion in France

text: France guarantees freedom of religion as a constitutional right and the government generally respects this right in practice. A tradition of anticlericalism led the state to break its ties to the Catholic Church in 1905 and adopt a strong commitment to maintaining a totally secular public sector.


title: Religion in France

text: Catholicism is the largest religion in France. During the pre-1789 "Ancien Régime", France was traditionally considered the Church's eldest daughter, and the King of France always maintained close links to the Pope. However, the "Gallicanism" policy meant that the king selected bishops.


title: Religion in France

text: A strong Protestant population resided in France, primarily of Reformed confession. It was persecuted by the state for most of the time, with temporary periods of relative toleration. These wars continued throughout the 16th century, with the 1572 St. Bartholomew's Day massacre as its apex, until the 1598 Edict of Nantes issued by Henry IV.


title: Religion in France

text: For the first time, Huguenots were considered by the state as more than mere heretics. The Edict of Nantes thus opened a path for secularism and tolerance. In offering general freedom of conscience to individuals, the edict offered many specific concessions to the Protestants, for instance, amnesty and the reinstatement of their civil rights, including the right to work in any field or for the State and to bring grievances directly to the king.


title: Religion in France

text: The 1598 Edict also granted the Protestants fifty places of safety ("places de sûreté"), which were military strongholds such as La Rochelle for which the king paid 180,000 écus a year, along with a further 150 emergency forts ("places de refuge"), to be maintained at the Huguenots' own expense. Such an innovative act of toleration stood virtually alone in a Europe (except for the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth) where standard practice forced the subjects of a ruler to follow whatever religion that the ruler formally adopted – the application of the principle of "cuius regio, eius religio".


title: Religion in France

text: Religious conflicts resumed in the end of the 17th century, when Louis XIV, the "Sun King", initiated the persecution of Huguenots by introducing the "dragonnades" in 1681. This wave of violence intimidated the Protestants into converting to Catholicism. He made the policy official with the 1685 revocation of the Edict of Nantes. As a result, a large number of Protestants – estimates range from 200,000 to 500,000 – left France during the following two decades, seeking asylum in England, the United Provinces, Denmark, in the Protestant states of the Holy Roman Empire (Hesse, Brandenburg-Prussia, etc.), and European colonies in North America and South Africa.


title: Religion in France

text: The 1685 revocation of the Edict of Nantes created a state of affairs in France similar to that of virtually every other European country of the period, where only the majority state religion was tolerated. The experiment of religious toleration in Europe was effectively ended for the time being. In practice, the revocation caused France to suffer a brain drain, as it lost a large number of skilled craftsmen, including key designers such as Daniel Marot.


title: Religion in France

text: The French Revolution stripped the Catholic Church of most of its wealth, power and influence. The early revolutionaries sought to secularize all of French society, an effort inspired in part by the writings and philosophy of Voltaire. In August 1789, the new National Assembly abolished tithes, the mandatory 10% income tax which all Frenchmen (including non-Catholics) paid to the Catholic Church. In November 1789, they voted to expropriate the vast wealth of the Church in endowments, lands and buildings. In 1790, the Assembly abolished monastic religious orders. Statues and saints were rejected in a burst of iconoclasm, and most religious instruction ended.


title: Religion in France

text: The Civil Constitution of the Clergy of 1790, put the Catholic Church under state control. It required priests and bishops to be elected by their parishioners, which upset the traditional authority of the Church. The Republic legalized divorce and transferred birth, death, and marriage registrations to the state. The Catholic clergy was persecuted by the Paris Commune of 1792 to 1795 and by some of the Représentants en mission. Most notably, Jean-Baptiste Carrier conducted large-scale drownings of priests and nuns in the river Loire.


title: Religion in France

text: In 1793, the government established a secular Republican Calendar to erase the memory of Sundays, saint days and religious holidays, and to increase the number of working days by instituting a 10-day week. Traditionally, every seventh day – Sunday – was a day of rest, together with numerous other days for celebration and relaxation. The government tried to end all that; the new calendar only allowed one day in 10 for relaxation. Workers and peasants felt cheated and overworked. The new system disrupted daily routines, reduced work-free days and ended well-loved celebrations. When the reformers were overthrown or executed, their radical new calendar was quickly abandoned.


title: Religion in France

text: Religious minorities—Protestants and Jews—were granted full civil and political rights, which represented a shift towards a more secular government to some, and an attack on the Catholic Church to others. New religions and philosophies were allowed to compete with Catholicism. The introduction of the prominent cults during the revolutionary period – the Cult of Reason and the Cult of the Supreme Being – responded to the belief that religion and politics should be seamlessly fused together. This is a shift from the original Enlightenment ideals of the Revolution that advocated for a secular government with tolerance for various religious beliefs. While Maximilien Robespierre favored a religious foundation to the Republic, he maintained a hard stance against Catholicism because of its association with corruption and the counterrevolution.


title: Religion in France

text: The cults sought to erase the old ways of religion by closing churches, confiscating church bells, and implementing a new Republican Calendar that excluded any days for religious practice. Many churches were converted into Temples of Reason. The Cult of Reason was first to de-emphasize the existence of God, and instead focus on deism, featuring not the sacred, divine, nor eternal, but the natural, earthy, and temporal existence. To tie the church and the state together, the cults transformed traditional religious ideology into politics. The Cult of the Supreme Being used religion as political leverage. Robespierre accused political opponents of hiding behind God and using religion to justify their oppositional stance against the Revolution. It was a shift in ideology that allowed for the cult to use the new deistic beliefs for political momentum.


title: Religion in France

text: Following the Thermidorian Reaction the persecutions of Catholic clergy ceased and the role of new cults practically ended.


title: Religion in France

text: The Catholic Church was badly hurt by the Revolution. By 1800 it was poor, dilapidated and disorganized, with a depleted and aging clergy. The younger generation had received little religious instruction, and was unfamiliar with traditional worship. However, in response to the external pressures of foreign wars, religious fervor was strong, especially among women.


title: Religion in France

text: Napoleon took control by 1800 and realized that religious divisiveness had to be minimized to unite France. The Concordat of 1801 was an agreement between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII, signed in July 1801 that remained in effect until 1905. It sought national reconciliation between revolutionaries and Catholics and solidified the Roman Catholic Church as the majority church of France, with most of its civil status restored. The hostility of devout Catholics against the state had then largely been resolved. It did not restore the vast church lands and endowments that had been seized upon during the revolution and sold off. Catholic clergy returned from exile, or from hiding, and resumed their traditional positions in their traditional churches. Very few parishes continued to employ the priests who had accepted the Civil Constitution of the Clergy of the Revolutionary regime. While the Concordat restored much power to the papacy, the balance of church-state relations tilted firmly in Napoleon's favour. He selected the bishops and supervised church finances.


title: Religion in France

text: With the Bourbon Restoration the Catholic Church again became the state religion of France. Other religions were tolerated, but Catholicism was favored financially and politically. Its lands and financial endowments were not returned, but the government now paid salaries and maintenance costs for church activities. The bishops had regained control of Catholic affairs and of education. While the aristocracy before the Revolution did not place a high priority on religious doctrine or practice, the decades of exile created an alliance of throne and altar. The royalists who returned were much more devout, and much more aware of their need for a close alliance with the Church. They had discarded skepticism and now promoted the wave of Catholic religiosity that was sweeping Europe, with a new regard to the Virgin Mary, the Saints, and popular religious rituals such as saying the rosary. Devotionalism was far stronger in rural areas, and much less noticeable in Paris and the other cities. The population of 32 million included about 680,000 Protestants, and 60,000 Jews. They were tolerated. Anti-clericalism of the sort promoted by the Enlightenment and writers such as Voltaire had not disappeared, but it was in recession.


title: Religion in France

text: At the elite level, the intellectual climate changed dramatically from the intellectually oriented classicism to emotionally based romanticism. A book by François-René de Chateaubriand entitled "Génie du christianisme" ("The Genius of Christianity") (1802) had an enormous influence in reshaping French literature and intellectual life. It emphasized the power of religion in creating European high culture. Chateaubriand's book did more than any other single work to restore the credibility and prestige of Christianity in intellectual circles and launched a fashionable rediscovery of the Middle Ages and their Christian civilisation. The revival was by no means confined to an intellectual elite, however, but was evident in the real, if uneven, rechristianisation of the French countryside.


title: Religion in France

text: Napoleon III also strongly supported Catholic interests, financing the church and supporting Catholic missionaries in the emerging French Empire. His primary goal was conciliation of the religious and anti-religious interests in France, to avoid the conflicts that took place during the revolution, and which reappeared after he lost power.


title: Religion in France

text: In foreign policy, the French army prevented the anti-clerical Kingdom of Italy from taking complete control of Rome after it emerged in 1860 and annexed parts of the papal states. In Paris, the conservative Gallican bishops helped the Emperor control the French people, while liberal Catholic intellectuals wanted to use the Church as an instrument of reform. A problem arose with Pope Pius IX, who reigned 1846 to 1878. He began as a liberal, but suddenly in the 1860s became the leading champion of reactionary politics in Europe, in opposition to all forms of modern liberalism. He demanded complete autonomy for the church and religious and educational affairs, and had the First Vatican Council (1869–70) decree papal infallibility. Napoleon III's foreign-policy was too committed to the support of Rome for him to break with the Pope, but that alliance seriously weakened him at home. When he declared war on Prussia in 1870, he brought his army home, and the kingdom of Italy swallowed up the papal domains and the Pope became the prisoner of the Vatican. Vatican statements attacking progress, industrialization, capitalism, socialism, and virtually every new idea not only angered the liberal and conservative Catholic elements in France, but energized the secular liberals (including many professionals) and anti-clerical socialist movement; they escalated their attacks on church control of schools.


title: Religion in France

text: Throughout the lifetime of the Third Republic (1870–1940), there were battles over the status of the Catholic Church in France among the republicans, the monarchists and the other authoritarians (such as the Napoleonists). The French Catholic clergy and bishops were closely associated with the monarchists, and its higher hierarchy was largely drawn from noble families. The republicans power base was the anti-clerical middle class, who saw the Church's alliance with the monarchists as both a political threat to the republic and a threat to the modern spirit of progress. The republicans detested the Church for its political and class affiliations; for them, the Church represented the Ancien Régime, a time in French history most republicans hoped was long behind them. The republicans were strengthened by Protestant and Jewish support. Numerous laws successively weakened the Catholic Church. In 1879, priests were excluded from the administrative committees of hospitals and boards of charity; in 1880, new measures were directed against the religious congregations; from 1880 to 1890 lay women replaced nuns in many hospitals; in 1882, the Ferry school laws were passed. Napoleon's Concordat of 1801 continued to ensure state funding of the church, but in 1881, the government cut off salaries to priests it disliked.


title: Religion in France

text: Republicans feared that religious orders in control of schools—especially the Jesuits and Assumptionists—indoctrinated anti-republicanism into children. Determined to root this out, republicans insisted the state needed control of the schools for France to achieve economic and militaristic progress. (Republicans felt one of the primary reasons for the German victory in 1870 was their superior education system.)


title: Religion in France

text: The early anti-Catholic laws were largely the work of republican Jules Ferry in 1882. Religious instruction was pushed out of all schools, and religious orders were forbidden to teach in them. Funds were appropriated from religious schools to build more state schools. Later in the century, other laws passed by Ferry's successors further weakened the Church's position in French society. Civil marriage became the only legal one, divorce was introduced, and chaplains were removed from the army.


title: Religion in France

text: When Leo XIII became pope in 1878, he tried to calm Church-State relations. In 1884, he told French bishops not to act in a hostile manner toward the State ('Nobilissima Gallorum Gens').


title: Religion in France

text: In 1892, he issued an encyclical advising French Catholics to rally to the Republic and defend the Church by participating in republican politics ('Au milieu des sollicitudes').


title: Religion in France

text: This attempt at improving the relationship failed. Deep-rooted suspicions remained on both sides and were inflamed by the Dreyfus Affair (1894–1906). Catholics were for the most part anti-Dreyfusard. The Assumptionists published anti-Semitic and anti-republican articles in their journal La Croix. This infuriated republican politicians, who were eager to take revenge. Often they worked in alliance with Masonic lodges. The Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry (1899–1902) and the Combes Ministry (1902–05) fought with the Vatican over the appointment of bishops. Chaplains were removed from naval and military hospitals in the years 1903 and 1904, and soldiers were ordered not to frequent Catholic clubs in 1904.


title: Religion in France

text: Emile Combes, when elected Prime Minister in 1902, was determined to defeat Catholicism thoroughly. Shortly after taking office, he closed down all parochial schools in France. Then he had parliament reject authorisation of all religious orders. This meant that all fifty-four orders in France were dissolved and about 20,000 members immediately left France, many for Spain.


title: Religion in France

text: The Combes government worked with Masonic lodges to create a secret surveillance of all army officers to make sure that devout Catholics would not be promoted. Exposed as the Affaire Des Fiches, the scandal undermined support for the Combes government, and he resigned. It also undermined morale in the army, as officers realized that hostile spies examining their private lives were more important to their careers than their own professional accomplishments.


title: Religion in France

text: Radicals (as they called themselves) achieved their main goals in 1905: they repealed Napoleon's 1801 Concordat. Church and State were finally separated. All Church property was confiscated. Religious personnel were no longer paid by the State. Public worship was given over to associations of Catholic laymen who controlled access to churches. However, in practice, masses and rituals continued to be performed.


title: Religion in France

text: A 1905 law instituted the separation of Church and State and prohibited the government from recognising, salarying, or subsidising any religion. The 1926 Briand-Ceretti Agreement subsequently restored for a while a formal role for the state in the appointment of Catholic bishops, but evidence for its exercise is not easily obtained. Prior to 1905, the 1801–1808 Concordat compelled the State to support the Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church, the Calvinist Church, and the Jewish religion, and to fund public religious education in those established religions.


title: Religion in France

text: For historical reasons, this situation is still current in Alsace-Moselle, which was a German region in 1905 and only joined France again in 1918. Alsace-Moselle maintains a local law of pre-1918 statutes which include the Concordat: the national government pays, as state civil servants, the clergy of the Catholic diocese of Metz and of Strasbourg, of the Lutheran Protestant Church of Augsburg Confession of Alsace and Lorraine, of the Protestant Reformed Church of Alsace and Lorraine, and of the three regional Israelite consistories, and it provides for now non-compulsory religious education in those religions in public schools and universities. Also for historical reasons, Catholic priests in French Guiana are civil servants of the local government.


title: Religion in France

text: Religious buildings built prior to 1905 at taxpayers' expense are retained by the local or national government, and may be used at no expense by religious organisations. As a consequence, most Catholic churches, Protestant temples, and Jewish synagogues are owned and maintained by the government but are assigned by the government to their respective religious communities for "legal, exclusive, free, perpetual use." The government, since 1905, has been prohibited from funding any post-1905 religious edifice, and thus religions must build and support all new religious buildings at their own expense. Some local governments "de facto" subsidise prayer rooms as part of greater "cultural associations".


title: Religion in France

text: An ongoing topic of controversy is whether the separation of Church and State should be weakened so that the government would be able to subsidise Muslim prayer rooms and the training of imams. Advocates of such measures, such as Nicolas Sarkozy at times, declare that they would encourage the Muslim population to better integrate into the fabric of French society. Opponents contend that the state should not fund religions. Furthermore, the state ban on wearing conspicuous religious symbols, such as the Islamic female headscarf, in public schools has alienated some French Muslims, provoked minor street protests and drawn some international criticism.


title: Religion in France

text: In the late 1950s after the end of the Algerian war, hundreds of thousands of Muslims, including some who had supported France (Harkis), settled permanently to France. They went to the larger cities where they lived in subsidized public housing, and suffered very high unemployment rates. In October 2005, the predominantly Arab-immigrant suburbs of Paris, Lyon, Lille, and other French cities erupted in rioting by socially alienated young people, many of them second- or third-generation immigrants.


title: Religion in France

text: For the next three convulsive weeks, riots spread from suburb to suburb, affecting more than three hundred towns...Nine thousand vehicles were torched, hundreds of public and commercial buildings destroyed, four thousand rioters arrested, and 125 police officers wounded.


title: Religion in France

text: Traditional interpretations say the riots were spurred by radical Muslims or unemployed youth. Another view states that the riots reflected broader problem of racism and police violence in France.


title: Religion in France

text: In March 2012, a Muslim radical named Mohammed Merah shot three French soldiers and four Jewish citizens, including children in Toulouse and Montauban.


title: Religion in France

text: In January 2015, the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, that had ridiculed Muhammad, and a Jewish grocery store came under attack from radicalized Muslims who had been born and raised in the Paris region. World leaders rallied to Paris to show their support for free speech. Analysts agree that the episode had a profound impact on France. "The New York Times" summarized the ongoing debate:


title: Religion in France

text: So as France grieves, it is also faced with profound questions about its future: How large is the radicalized part of the country's Muslim population, the largest in Europe? How deep is the rift between France's values of secularism, of individual, sexual and religious freedom, of freedom of the press and the freedom to shock, and a growing Muslim conservatism that rejects many of these values in the name of religion?


title: Religion in France

text: Christianity is the largest group of religions of France, but has recently stopped being a majority of the overall population. According to a survey held by Institut français d'opinion publique (Ifop) for the centre-right Institut Montaigne think-tank, 51.1% of the total population of France was Christian in 2016. The following year, a survey by Ipsos focused on Protestants and based on 31,155 interviews found that 57.5% of the total population of France declared to be Catholic and 3.1% declared to be Protestant.


title: Religion in France

text: In 2016, "Ipsos Global Trends", a multi-nation survey held by Ipsos and based on approximately 1,000 interviews, found that Christianity is the religion of 45% of the working-age, internet connected population of France; 42% stated they were Catholic, 2% stated that they were Protestants, and 1% declared to belong to any Orthodox church.


title: Religion in France

text: In 2019, the Eurobarometer, a survey funded by the European Union, found that Christianity was the religion of 47% of the French, with Catholicism being the main denomination with 41%, followed by Orthodox Christian, Protestants and other Christians with 2% each one.


title: Religion in France

text: France is home to the Sanctuary of Our Lady of Lourdes and the Taizé Community, an ecumenical Christian monastic fraternity in Taizé, Saône-et-Loire, Burgundy, two important pilgrimage sites. The Sanctuary of Our Lady of Lourdes appeals to a broader demographic, with 6 million people a year (before the pandemic) visiting Lourdes. With a focus on youth, Taize Community, on the other hand, has become one of the world's most important sites of Christian pilgrimage with over 100,000 young people from around the world converging each year for prayer, Bible study, sharing, and communal work.


title: Religion in France

text: A 2016 survey held by Institut Montaigne and Ifop found that 5.6% of the French population had an Islamic background, while 5.3% declared they were Muslims by faith. According to the same survey 84.9% of surveyed people who had at least one Muslim parent said were Muslims, 3.4% were Christians, 10.0% were not religious and 1.3% belonged to other religions.


title: Religion in France

text: According to Pew Research, in 2050 France will be 12.7% Muslim in the zero migration scenario (no migration to or from Europe), 17.4% in the medium migration scenario (regular migration continues and refugee flows cease), or 18% in the high migration scenario (2014 to mid-2016 refugee inflow patterns continue as well as regular migration).


title: Religion in France

text: In 2016, 0.8% of the total population of France, or about 535,000 people, were religious Jews. In the 21st century, France has the largest Jewish population in Europe and the third-largest Jewish population in the world (after Israel and the United States).


title: Religion in France

text: Jewish presence in France is documented since the early Middle Ages. France was a center of Jewish learning in the Middle Ages, but persecution increased as the Middle Ages wore on, including multiple expulsions and returns. During the late 18th-century French Revolution, France was the first country in Europe to emancipate its Jewish population. Antisemitism nonetheless persisted despite legal equality, manifested for instance in the Dreyfus affair of the late 19th century.


title: Religion in France

text: During World War II, the Vichy government collaborated with Nazi occupiers to deport numerous French Jews and foreign Jewish refugees to concentration camps. 75% of the local Jewish population in France nonetheless survived the Holocaust, but a much higher percentage of the foreign Jewish refugees who had more recently arrived to France were deported and killed.


title: Religion in France

text: The majority of French Jews in the 21st century are Sephardi and Mizrahi North African Jews, many of whom (or their parents) emigrated from former French colonies of North Africa after those countries became independent in the 1950s and 1960s. They migrated to France in the second half of the 20th century. French Jews span a wide range of religious affiliations, from the ultra-Orthodox Haredi communities to the large segment of Jews who are entirely secular and who commonly marry outside the Jewish community.


title: Religion in France

text: As of the 2000s, Buddhism in France was estimated to have between 1 million (Ministry of the Interior) strict adherents and 5 million people influenced by Buddhist doctrines, very large numbers for a Western country. Many French Buddhists do not consider themselves "religious". According to scholar Dennis Gira, who was the director of the Institute of Science and Theology of Religions of Paris, Buddhism in France has a missionary nature and is undergoing a process of "inculturation" that may represent a new turning of the "Wheel of the Dharma", similar to those that it underwent in China and Japan, from which a new incarnation of the doctrine — a "French Buddhism" — will possibly arise.


title: Religion in France

text: In 2012, the European headquarters of the Fo Guang Shan monastic order opened in France, near Paris. It was the largest Buddhist temple in Europe at that time.


title: Religion in France

text: Hinduism is a minority religion followed in France by 0.25% of total population, mainly by Indians and Sri Lankans, in whom Tamils community forms a major group in the country. Though being in very small number, the Hindu culture deeply influence the society of France by Yoga, Meditation and in recent times organisations like ISKCON had played a major role.


title: Religion in France

text: Paganism, in the sense of Contemporary paganism, in France included a broad variety of traditions and movements. As with neopaganism in other countries, these traditions sit somewhere on a gradient, with one side represented by reconstructionist religious movements and on the other side by a variety of witchcraft and shamanic traditions with a focus on personal revelation. Pagans and pagan movements often blend elements of both influences. The term "pagan" (Latin "paganus"), used by Christians to define those who maintained polytheistic religions, originally meant "rural person, countryfolk, civilian", as a dweller of a "pagus" (rural district).


title: Religion in France

text: The more identitary and reconstructionist Pagan movements are the majority and are represented by Celtic Druidry and Germanic Heathenry, while Wicca is an example of a non-identitary Pagan movement. Polytheism, nature worship, animism and pantheism are common features in Pagan theology. Rituals take place in both public and in private domestic settings. Academic research has placed the Pagan movement along a spectrum, with eclecticism on one end and polytheistic reconstructionism on the other.


title: Religion in France

text: All Pagan movements place great emphasis on the divinity of nature as a primary source of divine will, and on humanity's membership of the natural world, bound in kinship to all life and the Earth itself. The animistic aspects of Pagan theology assert that all things have a soul - not just humans or organic life - so this bond is held with mountains and rivers as well as trees and wild animals. As a result, Pagans believe the essence of their spirituality is both ancient and timeless, regardless of the age of specific religious movements. Places of natural beauty are therefore treated as sacred and ideal for ritual, like the nemetons of the ancient Celts.


title: Religion in France

text: Many Pagans hold that different lands (and/or cultures) have their own natural religion, with many legitimate interpretations of divinity, and therefore reject religious exclusivism.


title: Religion in France

text: While the Pagan community has tremendous variety in political views spanning the whole of the political spectrum, environmentalism is often a common feature.


title: Religion in France

text: According to the French sociologist Régis Dericquebourg, in 2003 the main small religious minorities were the Jehovah's Witnesses (130,000, though the European Court on Human Rights reckoned the number at 249,918 "regular and occasional" Jehovah's Witnesses), Adventists, Evangelicals, Mormons (31,000 members), Scientologists (4,000), and Soka Gakkai Buddhists. According to the 2005 Association of Religion Data Archives data there were close to 4,400 Baháʼís in France. According to the 2007 edition of the "Quid", other notable religious minorities included the New Apostolic Church (20,000), the Universal White Brotherhood (20,000), Sukyo Mahikari (15,000–20,000), the New Acropolis (10,000), the Universal Alliance (1,000), and the Grail Movement (950).


title: Religion in France

text: Many groups have around 1,000 members, including Antoinism, Aumism, Christian Science, Invitation to Life, Raelism, and the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, while the Unification Church has around 400 members. In 1995, France created the first French parliamentary commission on cult activities which led to a report registering a number of religious groups considered as socially disruptive and/or dangerous. Some of these groups have been banned, including the Children of God.


title: Religion in France

text: In Paris and the surrounding Île-de-France region French Muslims tend to be more educated and religious, and the vast majority of them consider themselves loyal to France. Among Muslims in Paris, in the early 2010s, 77% disagreed when asked whether violence is an acceptable moral response for a noble cause or not; 73% said that they were loyal to France; and 18% believed homosexuality to be acceptable.


title: Religion in France

text: In 2015 there were 2,500 mosques in France, up from 2,000 in 2011. In 2015, Dalil Boubakeur, rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris, said the number should be doubled to accommodate the large and growing population of French Muslims.


title: Religion in France

text: Financing to the construction of mosques was a problematic issue for a long time; French authorities were concerned that foreign capital could be used to acquire influence in France and so in the late 1980s it was decided to favour the formation of a "French Islam", though the 1905 law on religions forbids the funding of religious groups by the state. According to Salah Bariki, advisor to the mayor of Marseille in 2001, at a Koranic school in Nièvre only three percent of the books were written in French and everything was financed from abroad. She supported the public participation in financing an Islamic cultural centre in Marseille to encourage Muslims to develop and use French learning materials, in order to thwart foreign indoctrination. Even secular Muslims and actors of civil society were to be represented by the centre. Local authorities have financed the construction of mosques, sometimes without minarets and calling them Islamic "cultural centres" or municipal halls rented to "civil associations". In the case of the plans to build the Mosque of Marseille, due to protests and tribunal decision by the National Rally, the National Republican Movement, and the Mouvement pour la France, the rent of an terrain for the mosque was increased from €300/year to €24,000/year and the renting period was reduced from 99 to 50 years.


title: Religion in France

text: France came to an uproar in January, 2015, when eight writers and cartoonists were shot dead by two terrorists who raided the French satirical magazine "Charlie Hebdo." For years, it had been threatened by Muslim fundamentalists for publishing cartoons criticizing prophet Muhammad. While condemnation of this attack was unanimous in the West and amongst the internationally recognized governments of the Muslim World, some militants approved, stating that it was right to kill those who insult Muhammad.


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: Naked Lunch is a 1991 surrealist science fiction drama film written and directed by David Cronenberg and starring Peter Weller, Judy Davis, Ian Holm, and Roy Scheider. It is an adaptation of William S. Burroughs' 1959 novel of the same name, and an international co-production of Canada, Britain, and Japan.


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: The film was released on 27 December 1991 in the United States by 20th Century Fox, and 24 April 1992 in the United Kingdom by First Independent Films. It received positive reviews from critics, but was a box office flop, garnering only $2.6 million out of a $17–18 million budget due to a limited release. It won numerous honours, including the National Society of Film Critics Award for Best Director and seven Genie Awards, notably Best Motion Picture. "Naked Lunch" has since become a cult film, acclaimed for its surrealistic visual and thematic elements.


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: In 1953, Exterminator William Lee finds that his wife Joan is stealing his supply of insecticide to use as a recreational drug. Lee is arrested by the police, and he begins hallucinating due to being exposed to the insecticide. Lee comes to believe that he is a secret agent, and his boss, a giant talking beetle, assigns him the mission of killing Joan, who is allegedly an agent of an organization called Interzone Incorporated. Lee dismisses the beetle's instructions and kills it. Lee returns home to find Joan having sex with Hank, one of his writer friends. Shortly afterwards, he accidentally kills her while attempting to shoot a drinking glass off her head to emulate William Tell.


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: Having inadvertently accomplished his mission, Lee flees to Interzone, located in a city somewhere in North Africa. He spends his time writing reports concerning his mission; these documents, at the insistence of his visiting literary colleagues, are eventually compiled into the titular book. While Lee is addicted to assorted mind-altering substances, his replacement typewriter, a Clark Nova, becomes a talking insect which tells him to find Dr. Benway by seducing Joan Frost, a doppelgänger of his dead wife. There is a row at gunpoint with Joan's husband Tom, after Lee steals his typewriter, which is then destroyed by the Clark Nova insect. Lee also encounters Yves Cloquet, who is apparently an attractive young gay Swiss gentleman. However, Lee later discovers that Yves is merely disguised as a human, and that his true form is a huge monstrous shapeshifting centipede.


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: After concluding that Dr. Benway is actually secretly masterminding a narcotics operation for a drug called "black meat" which is supposedly derived from the guts of giant Brazilian centipedes, Lee encounters Tom's housekeeper Fadela, previously observed to be an agent of the narcotics operation. Fadela reveals herself as Dr. Benway in disguise. After being recruited as a double agent for the black meat operation, Lee completes his report and flees Interzone to Annexia with Joan Frost. Stopped by the Annexian border patrol and instructed to prove that he is a writer as he claims, Lee produces a pen. When this proves insufficient for passage, Lee, now having realized that accidentally murdering his wife has driven him to become a writer, demonstrates his William Tell routine using a glass atop Joan Frost's head. He again misses, and thus re-enacts the earlier killing of his wife. The border guards cheerfully bid him welcome to Annexia, and his new life as a writer. Lee is shown shedding a tear at this bittersweet accomplishment.


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: The screenplay for "Naked Lunch" is based not only on Burroughs' novel, but also on other fiction by him, and autobiographical accounts of his life. Cronenberg said it was necessary to "Throw the book away" as a direct adaptation would have been far too expensive and "would be banned in every country in the world."


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: The shooting of Joan Lee is based on the 1951 death of Joan Vollmer, Burroughs' common-law wife. Burroughs shot and killed Vollmer in a drunken game of "William Tell" at a party in Mexico City. He would later flee to the United States. Burroughs was convicted "in absentia" of homicide and sentenced to two years, which were suspended. Burroughs stated in the introduction to his book "Queer" that Joan's death was the starting point of his literary career, saying: "I am forced to the appalling conclusion that I would have never become a writer but for Joan's death".


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: The film score is composed by Cronenberg's staple composer, Howard Shore, and features free jazz musician Ornette Coleman. The music of the Master Musicians of Jajouka led by Bachir Attar is also featured throughout the film. The use of Coleman's composition "Midnight Sunrise", recorded for his "Dancing in Your Head" album, is relevant, as author William S. Burroughs was present during the 1973 recording session.


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: "Naked Lunch" was released on 27 December 1991 in a limited release of 5 theaters, grossing $64,491 on its opening weekend. It went on to make $2,641,357 in North America.


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: On Rotten Tomatoes the film has a 70% rating based on 37 reviews, with an average rating of 7/10. The consensus reads, "Strange, maddening, and at times incomprehensible, "Naked Lunch" is nonetheless an engrossing experience." On Metacritic, it has a weighted average score of 67 out of 100 based on reviews from 16 critics, indicating "generally favorable reviews".


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: Roger Ebert gave the film two-and-a-half stars out of four and wrote, "While I admired it in an abstract way, I felt repelled by the material on a visceral level. There is so much dryness, death and despair here, in a life spinning itself out with no joy". Janet Maslin of "The New York Times" wrote, "for the most part this is a coolly riveting film and even a darkly entertaining one, at least for audiences with steel nerves, a predisposition toward Mr. Burroughs and a willingness to meet Mr. Cronenberg halfway", but did praise Weller's performance: "The gaunt, unsmiling Mr. Weller looks exactly right and brings a perfect offhandedness to his disarming dialogue". Richard Corliss of "Time" gave a mixed review, calling it "way too colorful - cute, in a repulsive way, with its crawly special effects - and tame compared with its source." In his review for the "Washington Post", Desson Howe criticized what he felt to be a "lack of conviction".


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: "Newsweek"s David Ansen wrote, "Obviously this is not everybody's cup of weird tea: you must have a taste for the esthetics of disgust. For those up to the dare, it's one clammily compelling movie". "Entertainment Weekly" gave the film a "B+" rating with Owen Gleiberman praising Weller's performance: "Peter Weller, the poker-faced star of "RoboCop", greets all of the hallucinogenic weirdness with a doleful, matter-of-fact deadpan that grows more likable as the movie goes on. The actor's steely robostare has never been more compelling. By the end, he has turned Burroughs' stone-cold protagonist – a man with no feelings – into a mordantly touching hero".


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: In his review for "The Village Voice", J. Hoberman wrote, "Cronenberg has done a remarkable thing. He hasn't just created a mainstream Burroughs on something approximating Burroughs's terms, he's made a portrait of an American writer". Jonathan Rosenbaum in his review for the "Chicago Reader" wrote, "David Cronenberg's highly transgressive and subjective film adaptation of "Naked Lunch" ... may well be "the" most troubling and ravishing head movie since "Eraserhead". It is also fundamentally a film about writing – even "the" film about writing".


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: Burroughs scholar Timothy S. Murphy found the film to be a muddled adaptation that reflects Cronenberg's mind more than the novel: he feels that Burroughs' subversive, allegorically political depiction of drugs and homosexuality becomes merely aesthetic. Murphy argues that Burroughs' social and politically situated literary techniques become in the film merely the hallucination of a junkie, and that by using the life of Burroughs himself as a framing narrative, Cronenberg turns a fragmented, unromantic, bitterly critical and satirical novel into a conventional bildungsroman.


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: The film has been selected for a Criterion Collection release, an organization that releases high quality DVDs for important classic and contemporary films.


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: At the 13th Genie Awards, "Naked Lunch" received 11 nominations and was perceived as being in an unusually tight competition with Jean-Claude Lauzon's "Léolo". The film also competed for the Golden Bear at the Berlin Film Festival.


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: In 1994, Bomb the Bass released the single "Bug Powder Dust" which opens with the quote "I think it's time to discuss your, uh, philosophy of drug use as it relates to artistic endeavour" and closes with the quote "I think it's time for you boys to share my last taste of the true black meat: the flesh of the giant aquatic Brazilian centipede." The song also includes various other quotes, items and themes from the film woven into the lyrics.


title: Naked Lunch (film)

text: In a 1996 episode of "The Simpsons", "Bart on the Road", Bart, Nelson, and Milhouse use Bart's fake driver's license to get into the theatre to see an adult film. The film they choose, based on its title and R rating, is "Naked Lunch". When they silently exit the theatre, Nelson looks up to the marquee and says, "I can think of at least two things wrong with that title."


title: English Defence League

text: The English Defence League (EDL) is a far-right, Islamophobic organisation in the United Kingdom. A social movement and pressure group that employs street demonstrations as its main tactic, the EDL presents itself as a single-issue movement opposed to Islamism and Islamic extremism, although its rhetoric and actions target Islam and Muslims more widely. Founded in 2009, its heyday lasted until 2011, after which it entered a decline.


title: English Defence League

text: Established in London, the EDL coalesced around several football hooligan firms protesting the public presence of the small Salafi group Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah in Luton, Bedfordshire. Tommy Robinson, a former member of the British National Party (BNP), soon became its "de facto" leader. The organisation grew swiftly, holding demonstrations across England and often clashing with anti-fascist protesters from Unite Against Fascism and other groups, who deemed it a racist organisation victimising British Muslims. The EDL also established a strong social media presence on Facebook and YouTube. Moving towards electoral politics, it established formal links with the far-right British Freedom Party, a breakaway from the BNP. The EDL's reputation was damaged in 2011 after supporters were convicted of plotting to bomb mosques and links were revealed with Norwegian far-right terrorist Anders Behring Breivik. In 2013 Robinson—supported by the Quilliam think tank—left the group. He claimed it had become too extreme, and established the short-lived rival Pegida UK. EDL membership declined significantly following Robinson's departure and various branches declared independence.


title: English Defence League

text: Ideologically on the extreme-right or far-right of British politics, the EDL is part of the international counter-jihad movement. Rejecting the idea that Muslims can truly be English, the EDL presents Islam as an intolerant, primitive threat seeking to take over Europe. Some political scientists and other commentators characterised this Islamophobic stance as culturally racist. Both online and at its events, EDL members have incited violence against Muslims, with supporters carrying out violent acts both at demonstrations and independently. The EDL's broader ideology features nationalism, nativism, and populism, blaming a perceived decline in English culture on high immigration rates and an uncaring political elite. It distinguished itself from Britain's traditional far-right by rejecting biological racism, antisemitism, and homophobia. Commentators differ on whether the EDL itself is ideologically fascist, although several of its leaders were previously involved in fascist organisations and some neo-Nazis and other fascists attended EDL events.


title: English Defence League

text: Headed by a small leadership team, in its heyday the EDL sub-divided into over 90 local and thematic divisions, each with considerable autonomy. Its support base consisted primarily of young, working-class white British men, some from established far-right and football hooligan subcultures. Polls indicated that most UK citizens opposed the EDL, and the organisation was repeatedly challenged by anti-fascist groups. Many local councils and police forces discouraged EDL marches, citing the high financial cost of policing them, the disruptive influence on community harmony, and the damage caused to counter-terrorism operations.


title: English Defence League

text: In the early 21st century, Muslims were Britain's second largest and fastest-growing religious group; according to the 2011 census, 2.7 million people in England and Wales described themselves as Muslim, representing 4.8% of the total population. At the same time, Muslims became the main scapegoat for far-right groups across Western society. In Britain, this was partly because prejudices against Jews and African-Caribbean people—both communities the far-right previously used as social scapegoats—were increasingly socially unacceptable. In the latter half of the 20th century, most British Muslims were of South Asian heritage. When they faced racist abuse, such as "Paki-bashing", it was usually because of their racial background, rather than their religious belief. By the 21st century, British Muslims were increasingly targeted because they were Muslim, including by members of other ethnic minorities in the country.


title: English Defence League

text: The British National Party (BNP) was most successful at exploiting growing hostility against Muslims. It launched an overtly anti-Muslim campaign in 2000, which gained momentum after Salafi jihadi Muslims perpetrated the 2001 September 11 attacks in the United States and then the 7 July 2005 London bombings. This resulted in growing electoral success for the BNP: it secured a seat on the London Assembly in 2008 and two seats at the European Parliament in 2010. By 2011, this support had declined, with the party losing many of its local council seats. However, as noted by the political scientist Chris Allen, the BNP had "extended the frontier of the far right in British politics", creating an environment on which the English Defence League would later capitalise.


title: English Defence League

text: The town of Luton in Bedfordshire—which had a Muslim population of around 18%—had a history of radical Islamist recruitment. On 10 March 2009, the small, extreme British Salafi Islamist group Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah demonstrated in the town to protest against the Royal Anglian Regiment's homecoming parade following the latter's posting in Afghanistan. The demonstration was a deliberately provocative publicity stunt, and had been disowned by representatives from Luton's Islamic communities. The protest, although small, attracted media attention, generating anger that the authorities had given the demonstration permission and police protection.


title: English Defence League

text: A former regiment member, James Yeomans, organised a counter protest called "Respect Our Troops" for 28 March. After local anti-Islamist blogger Paul "Lionheart" Ray publicised the event online, various self-described "anti-jihadist" far-right groups that had emerged from the football hooligan firm scene—including the Welsh Defence League (WDL) and the March for England (MfE)—announced their intention to attend. Fearing the far right would hijack his event, Yeomans cancelled it. In its place, Ray organised an "anti-jihadist" march for St. George's Day, led by the newly founded United People of Luton (UPL), although this was broken up by police. The UPL organised a second demonstration for 24 May, titled "Ban the Terrorists": this again resulted in disorder, with police making several arrests. A related group was Casuals United, founded by established football hooligan Jeff Marsh: their website used the tagline "One Nation, One Enemy, One Firm", reflecting the group's desire to unite rival football firms in opposition to what it called the "Islamification" of Britain.


title: English Defence League

text: It was from this environment that the English Defence League was officially formed on 27 June 2009. Ray claimed to have been its founder, describing how the EDL united the UPL with other "anti-jihadist" groups from around England. Its creation reflected what the political scientist Roger Eatwell termed "cumulative extremism", whereby the "activities of one extremist group trigger the formation of another". The EDL took its name from that of the Welsh Defence League; its founders also considered the name "British Defence League", but rejected this as being too similar to that of the British National Party. The EDL's foundation was accompanied by an impromptu protest outside the East London Mosque in Whitechapel, which police quickly dispersed. The following week the group picketed an event in Wood Green, North London organised by Salafi Islamist preacher Anjem Choudary and his Islam4UK group. Its first major public appearance to attract attention was in August, when the EDL and Casuals United held a joint protest in Birmingham, prompted by Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah's conversion of an eleven-year-old white boy in that city. Ray distanced himself from that event, arguing that the chosen date—8 August—was a deliberate reference to 88, a code for HH (Heil Hitler), in neo-Nazi circles.


title: English Defence League

text: Not long after the group's formation, Ray formed a sub-group, the St. George Division; this broke from the EDL soon after, when Ray emigrated. This left the way for Tommy Robinson to become the EDL's "de facto" leader. A former BNP member with multiple criminal convictions for assault, Robinson's real name is Stephen Yaxley-Lennon; the pseudonym was borrowed from the head of a Luton football hooligan firm who had written several books about hooliganism. Robinson was clearly spoken, articulate and able to present his views in an assured and eloquent way during television interviews and other encounters with the media. According to the political scientist Joel Busher, Robinson was "a high-energy, fast-talking, all action character whose combination of swagger, self-deprecation and derring-do helped make him a popular figurehead within the movement." Ray was critical of his successor, and—from his new base in Malta—posted videos to YouTube in which he threatened to retake control of the EDL. These threats came to nothing.


title: English Defence League

text: Robinson's right-hand man was his cousin, Kevin Carroll, also a former BNP member with a criminal conviction; Carroll was the first of the pair to attract national attention, appearing on the BBC documentary "Young, British and Angry".


title: English Defence League

text: Another senior member was the multimillionaire IT consultant and fundamentalist Christian Alan Ayling, who used the pseudonym Alan Lake; allegations have been made, but not substantiated, that Lake was the group's primary financier, providing it with millions of pounds. Lake never become a visible figure in the movement and few members knew his name; it was at Lake's flat in London's Barbican area, however, where Ray, Robinson, and Ann Marchini had discussed the EDL's formation in May 2009.


title: English Defence League

text: Following the BNP's decline as a serious electoral force, the EDL's profile rose dramatically. The group portrayed itself as a necessary response to public frustration at the government's inaction in dealing with what the EDL initially termed "extremist Muslim preachers and organisations". It claimed that Englishness had been marginalised throughout England, citing the fact that some state schools only supplied halal meat and had stopped celebrating Nativity plays at Christmas time as evidence. It was also claimed that some local authorities had ceased flying the flag of St George.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL focused on organising demonstrations: between 2009 and 2015, it held an average of between ten and fifteen demonstrations per year, attracting crowds of between 100 and 3000. It faced opposition from media commentators and anti-fascist groups, who described it as racist, far right, and extreme right, terms rejected by the group. Most notable among the anti-fascist groups organising counter-protests was Unite Against Fascism, while Islamic groups sometimes also held counter-protests. In turn, the EDL targeted left-wing groups. In December 2010, Robinson threatened action against student anti-fee protesters, while in 2011 the EDL harassed Occupy anti-capitalist protesters in London. During the 2011 England riots, contingents of EDL members mobilised in largely white areas of Outer London, such as Enfield and Eltham, claiming that they were there to "defend" them from rioters. These also resulted in clashes with police, and in one incident EDL members attacked a bus primarily carrying black youths.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL began to lose momentum in 2011. Factors that contributed to this included regional rivalries between divisions, a resurgence of sectarian enmities between rival football firms, and personal squabbles. By early 2011, several divisions in northern England were referring to themselves as "the Infidels", expressing an increasingly separate identity from the EDL. Several of the northern groups expressed support for a former EDL regional organiser, John "Snowy" Shaw, who had accused Robinson and Carroll of financial impropriety. At a February 2011 EDL rally in Blackburn, Shaw's supporters violently clashed with Robinson's; Robinson fought with a fellow member at the rally, resulting in a September 2011 conviction for assault.


title: English Defence League

text: Robinson's criminal record prevented him from entering the US, but in September 2011 he sought to do so illegally by using someone else's passport. He was caught and returned to Britain; in January 2013 he was convicted of breaching the Identity Documents Act 2010 and imprisoned for ten months. Robinson's imprisonment coincided with Carroll's bail conditions, which barred him from contacting fellow EDL members; this left the organisation without its co-leaders for part of 2012.


title: English Defence League

text: The revelation of links to Norwegian far-right activist Anders Behring Breivik, perpetrator of a series of bombing and shooting attacks in July 2011, killing 77 people, further damaged the EDL. He was affiliated with the EDL's Norwegian sister organisation, the Norwegian Defence League, and stated that he had "more than 600 EDL members as Facebook friends and have spoken with tens [sic] of EDL members and leaders". Breivik described EDL co-founder Ray as his "mentor", having been in communication with him since 2002. Four months before his attack, Breivik posted on the EDL website, describing them as an "inspiration" and "a blessing to all in Europe". Online, he described having attended an EDL rally in Bradford. Robinson denied any EDL links with Breivik and deplored the killings; however, after Breivik was convicted, some EDL members praised his actions. In July 2011, Interpol requested Maltese police investigate Ray due to his links with Breivik; he too condemned the killings, calling them "pure evil". In December 2011, two EDL supporters—one a serving soldier in the British military—were convicted of plotting to bomb a mosque in Stoke-on-Trent.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL developed links with the British Freedom Party (BFP), a BNP breakaway founded in October 2010. The BFP was led by Eddy Butler, who had previously made an unsuccessful attempt to oust the BNP leader Nick Griffin. The BFP wanted to move closer to mainstream politics by disassociating itself from the BNP's emphasis on biological racism and imitating continental European right-wing groups such as the Dutch Party for Freedom. In May 2012, it was announced that Robinson and Carroll would join the BFP's executive council as joint vice chairs, cementing links between the BFP and the EDL. Robinson soon resigned from this position, citing a desire to focus on the EDL, although critics suggested that this may have been to shield the BFP from criminal proceedings he then faced.


title: English Defence League

text: In 2012, Carroll stood for election in the Police and Crime Commissioner elections. In January 2013, he took charge of the BFP after its leader, Paul Weston, resigned. The BFP did poorly at a series of local elections, failing to gain sufficient votes to have its deposits returned; its failure to register correctly led the Electoral Commission to remove its registration. Among the EDL grassroots, there had been much opposition to association with the BFP; many feared that it would damage the EDL's reputation or stressed their desire to be part of a street movement rather than a political party. The EDL subsequently established links with another BNP breakaway group; in February 2013, it provided a security force for an event by the far-right British Democratic Party (BDP), which was founded by Andrew Brons, who had previously represented the BNP at the European Parliament.


title: English Defence League

text: By early 2013, commentators believed that the EDL was in decline, reflected in the decreasing numbers attending its events, Robinson's imprisonment, and its failure to enter electoral politics. Groups which had closely allied to the EDL, such as Casuals United and March for England, were reasserting their individual identities. Splinter groups appeared, among them the North West Infidels, North East Infidels, South East Alliance and Combined Ex-Forces. Some of these, such as the North West Infidels and South East Alliance, adopted more extreme perspectives, cooperating with the fascist National Front and making reference to the white supremacist 14 words slogan on their social media. Other activists moved away from the EDL to focus on campaigning for Brexit, the UK's exit from the European Union. It is possible that the electoral growth of the right-wing UK Independence Party (UKIP) in this period also contributed to the EDL's decline, with many EDL supporters finding it easier to vote for UKIP than physically attend EDL events. In April 2013, the EDL leadership requested that members use tactical voting to benefit UKIP; the latter responded by distancing itself from the EDL.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL experienced a brief resurgence in its fortunes after Islamist militants killed the British Army soldier Lee Rigby in southeast London in May 2013. The group tripled its number of Facebook followers in the 24 hours after the incident, and organised several flash demonstrations. At one such event, Robinson told members that "What you saw today [i.e. Rigby's killing] is Islam. Everyone's had enough." On 27 May, the EDL held a demonstration in central London that attracted a thousand participants; another, held in central Birmingham in July, attracted several hundred.


title: English Defence League

text: On 8 October 2013, Robinson and Carroll announced that they were leaving the EDL following meetings with the think tank Quilliam. Robinson said that street protests were "no longer effective" and "acknowledged the dangers of far-right extremism". He stated his intention to continue to combat extremism by forming a new party. Both Robinson and Carroll had been taking lessons in Islam from a Quilliam member, Usama Hasan, and stated their intent to train in lobbying institutions. Quilliam had given Robinson £8000 to facilitate his departure; it hoped that in doing so it would "decapitate" the EDL. Robinson's departure generated much anger among the grassroots, many of whom came to regard him as a traitor. A meeting of the group's regional organisers led to the EDL's adoption of a new system of collective leadership, through which the 19 regional organisers formed a governing committee with a rotating chair. The first to take on this role was Tim Ablitt; in February 2014 he was succeeded by Steve Eddowes; and in December 2015 by Ian Crossland, with the grassroots having been given a voice in his selection through an online vote.


title: English Defence League

text: Although the EDL had declined, the sentiments feeding it—especially anger at immigration and Islam—remained widespread in white working-class communities across Britain. Other far-right groups emerged to claim the space in British society that it left vacant, often utilising the EDL's tactics. Britain First sought to court disenchanted EDL members, although the two groups were mutually hostile. Like the EDL, Britain First utilised street protests, organising what it called "Christian patrols" through areas with Islamic communities, as well as "mosque invasions" in which members marched into mosques to disrupt proceedings. In December 2015, Robinson launched another anti-Islam street movement, Pegida UK, with fellow far-right activist Anne Marie Waters; his hope was to imitate the successes of the German Pegida movement.


title: English Defence League

text: Political scientists locate the EDL on the far-right of the left–right political spectrum, sometimes referring to its ideology as "extreme right", or "right-wing extremism". In various respects, it resembles other far-right groups, particularly those that emerged across early 21st century Europe. From its early days, its demonstrations were attended by members of older far-right parties such as the National Front and the British National Party, however the EDL itself differs from these older groups by reaching out to Jews, people of colour, and LGBT people, against whom the far right historically discriminated. Thus, the historian of the far right Paul Jackson referred to it as part of a "new far right" which presents itself as being more moderate than its predecessors. The ethnographer Hilary Pilkington suggested that Cas Mudde's concept of the "populist radical right" better defines the EDL than "far-right". The EDL has been characterised as populist because of its claim to represent "ordinary people" against the liberal elites whom it alleges control the country.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL disavows the "far-right" label, describing itself as "non-political, taking no position on right-wing vs. left-wing. We welcome members from all over the political spectrum, and with varying views on foreign policy, united against Islamic extremism and its influence on British life." Its online material nevertheless often condemns left-wingers. When examining the EDL's public statements, Jackson cautioned against automatically taking them at face value; as he noted, far-right groups typically present "front stage" messages for public consumption which conceal the more aggressive views expressed in private.


title: English Defence League

text: EDL members regularly refer to Islam as an "ideology" or a "cult" rather than a "religion", and perceive it as a threat to Western culture. Evoking Samuel P. Huntington's notion of the Clash of Civilizations, the group's discourse constructs a binary division between Western and Islamic culture, the former presented as tolerant and progressive and the latter as intolerant and backward. EDL rhetoric explicitly distinguishes Muslims from the English national group: for the EDL, a Muslim cannot be truly English, and the idea of an English Muslim or a British Muslim identity is not considered acceptable.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL is part of the international "counter-jihad" movement. The political scientist Hilary Aked defined counter-jihadism as "a section of the far-right distinguished by its hostility to migrants, Muslims and Islam." Another political scientist, Matthew Goodwin, noted that the counter-jihad movement was "united by their belief that Islam and Muslims are posing a fundamental threat to the resources, identities and even survival of Western states", and that counter-jihad groups were "more confrontational, chaotic and unpredictable than traditional anti-immigrant and ethnic nationalist movements in Western democracies".


title: English Defence League

text: Pilkington characterised the EDL as an "anti-Islamist movement", but considered there to be crossover with broader anti-Islam or anti-Muslim positions. The EDL states it only opposes the "Islamic extremist" but not the "ordinary Muslim", a distinction also drawn by many of its activists. However, the EDL's rhetoric regularly fails to make this distinction. It is likely that many encountering the EDL's rhetoric are not able to appreciate a distinction between different interpretations of Islam, and research among the group's grassroots found that many did not do so. Various scholars describe the EDL as Islamophobic, a characterisation the EDL rejects. It does so by defining "Islamophobia" as a phobia or affected prejudice, a definition different from the majority of academics and activists employing the term, stating that "the English Defence League do not 'fear' Islam, we do not have a 'phobia' about Islam, we just realise the very serious threat it poses".


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL fears that Muslims want to dominate Britain by imposing sharia law. It claims that this takeover is being facilitated by higher birth rates among Muslims than non-Muslims, and characterises the building of mosques as evidence of this desire for domination. It presents Muslim attempts to participate in political life as entryism, an attempt to expand Islamic influence in the Britain. The group and its members also allege that British Muslims implicitly support Islamic extremism by failing to speak out against it.


title: English Defence League

text: EDL discourse refers to "Islamic supremacism", the belief that Muslims express a superiority complex over non-Muslims. It believes that Muslims view non-Muslims as legitimate targets for abuse and exploitation. A topic of particular anger among members is the role of men from Muslim backgrounds in grooming gangs largely targeting underage white girls. For instance, in drawing attention to the fact that men from Islamic backgrounds were disproportionately represented in the Rochdale and West Midlands child sex grooming scandals, the EDL claimed these men found justification for their actions in Qur'anic references to non-Muslims being inferior. Conversely, when white sex offenders were exposed, EDL members regarded the perpetrator's ethnicity or religion as irrelevant. EDL members also expressed anger at perceived Muslim involvement in drug dealing and other crimes impacting their communities, and at the perceived wealth of British Muslims, which they contrasted with their own strained economic situation.


title: English Defence League

text: The sociologists Simon Winlow, Steve Hall and James Treadwell noted that all the EDL members they encountered expressed hatred of Muslims. Many placed this hatred in relation to local issues and personal experiences; for instance, EDL members regarded being poorly treated by an Asian shopkeeper as evidence that Muslims intrinsically hate the white working class. Others expressed anger at events they had seen in the media, such as Muslims burning remembrance poppies in protest at British military activities abroad. On the EDL's social media, many supporters incite violence against Muslims: examples include "we need to kill", "time to get violent", and "Kill any muslim u see [sic]". Chants during rallies included "Die, Muslim, die", and "Give me a gun and I'll shoot the Muzzie scum". The racial slur "paki" was also common at private EDL meetings, and at demonstrations; chants used include "I hate Pakis more than you" and "If we all hate Pakis, clap your hands".


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL is nationalist, or ultra-nationalist, and its members regard themselves as patriots. Some academics argued it is ethnic nationalist, although Pilkington stressed that despite their nativist sentiment, most members' sense of English pride was distinct from the "white pride" of fascists. Its members' understandings of "Englishness" are nevertheless ambiguous and ill-defined; the only thing they agree upon about the English way of life is that Muslims fundamentally reject it. The EDL presents English identity as something that is under threat, and its views are reflected in chants like "we want our country back". Its nationalism is foregrounded in its nomenclature and symbols, which regularly include the cross of St George. Such imagery evokes the symbolism of the medieval Crusades; its Latin motto, "in hoc signo vinces", was that of the first Christian Roman Emperor, Constantine.


title: English Defence League

text: Alessio and Meredith thought the EDL is anti-immigrant, and anti-migrant sentiment is common among EDL members. They see immigration as detrimental to the white British, socially divisive, and fundamentally changing the nature of England. EDL members see migrants as economic competition, outcompeting white British workers for jobs by working for less that the legal minimum wage. At the same time, they often express sympathy for migrants as individuals seeking a better life, and typically distinguish between "good" migrants who worked hard and paid taxes and "bad" migrants who live off the welfare state.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL says it is not racist, and employs the slogan "Black and White unite: all races and religions are welcome in the EDL". It formed specific divisions for Hindu, Sikh, Jewish, Greek and Cypriot, and Pakistani Christian supporters, and small numbers of Asian, African, and mixed heritage supporters attended its events. These are often viewed as "trophy" members, with many white members asking to have their photographs taken with them. Members are often keen to stress that they have ethnic minority friends and family members as a means of countering accusations of racism, adopting the view that "lack of racism towards one group is assumed to be evidence of lack of racism against all". Members often view the multi-racial nature of England as a positive thing, although almost uniformly reject the ideology of multiculturalism, portraying it as something mainstream politicians have encouraged out of a desire to be seen as cosmopolitan and progressive and because of a fascination for the exoticism of other cultures.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL condemns homophobia and established an LGBT division in March 2010. This pro-LGBT rights stance allows the EDL to criticise what it presents as the left's refusal to confront Islamic homophobia. Pilkington argued that this pro-LGBT rights stance was not solely a cynical ploy by the EDL's leadership, but reflected widespread views within the movement. She observed gay and transgender speakers receiving a warm reception at EDL rallies, while the LGBT rainbow flag was regularly flown at EDL rallies; at the same time, Pilkington heard homophobic comments at EDL events.


title: English Defence League

text: Several commentators have argued that the EDL is not fascist. Nigel Copsey, a historian of the far-right, stated that the EDL was not driven by the same "ideological end-goal" as neo-fascist and other fascist groups; unlike fascists, the EDL has not expressed a desire for major structural change to the British state. Several fascist groups distanced themselves from the EDL; the BNP leader Nick Griffin for instance claimed the EDL was a false flag operation manipulated by "Zionists". Conversely, the political scientists Dominic Alessio and Meredith Kristen argued that the EDL "embodied" many of the "key characteristics of fascism": a staunch nationalism and calls for national rebirth, a propensity for violence, and what they described as "pronounced anti-democratic and anti-liberal tendencies" among its leaders. They highlighted that much of the group's leadership came directly from the fascist BNP, and that EDL events have been supported by present and former members of fascist groups like the National Front (NF), the Racial Volunteer Force, Blood & Honour, and Combat 18.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL is not a neo-Nazi organisation. It distanced itself from neo-Nazism, for instance by burning a Nazi flag, flying the Israeli flag during demonstrations, and creating a Jewish division. In 2010, Robinson stated: "We're not Nazis, we're not fascists – we will smash Nazis the same way we will smash militant Islam." Early EDL demonstrations were nevertheless advertised on the white supremacist website Stormfront, and Holocaust denial has been espoused on the EDL's social media platforms. Neo-Nazis have attended EDL events, where individuals have given the Nazi straight-arm salute. In 2011, the head of the EDL's Jewish Division, Roberta Moore, left the organisation, citing the presence of neo-Nazis and other fascists. Some of these individuals have been banned from EDL events by the group, a move with widespread support from EDL members more broadly, who were keen to distance themselves from neo-Nazism.


title: English Defence League

text: A social movement—and more specifically a new social movement and social movement organisation—the EDL is a direct action or street-based protest movement. A pressure group rather than a political party, its members often stress their opinion that it was not a political organisation. Like other counter-jihad groups in Western countries, the EDL describes itself as a human rights organisation, a characterisation not widely accepted among the British public.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL's informal structure lacks strict hierarchy, or clear leadership. In its early years, the EDL was controlled by a leadership group referred to as the "team"; this included Robinson, although other members often remained anonymous or used pseudonyms. In 2010, the EDL went through a formal restructuring to deal with Robinson's absence, although until October 2013 the EDL was led by Robinson and Carroll as co-leaders, supported by the regional organisers of the 19 regional divisions. After that duo left, it was reorganised around a committee leadership headed by a rotating chair.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL lacks a central regulatory structure through which to impose a uniform approach to strategy or maintain ideological purity. It operates through a loose network of local divisions, each largely autonomous; this loose structure is popular among the membership. There is no system of official membership recognised through membership cards, and no membership fees. The EDL formerly divided into at least ninety different divisions. Branches typically held their meeting in pubs with sympathetic owners, referred to as "HQs". These meetings—which were infrequent and often poorly attended—were typically unstructured, lacking any formal agenda or the taking of minutes. As well as these divisional meetings, EDL divisions also held "meet and greet" events to attract new membership.


title: English Defence League

text: Some divisions were based on locality and others on special interests. The latter included a women's division, Jewish division, Sikh division, Hindu division, and LGBT division. For a brief period it also had a disabled division, green division, a soldiers' division, and a youth division. These groups were designed to raise the profile of particular social groups within the EDL itself and help to draw recruits from sectors of society that normally avoided membership in a far-right grouping, such as ethnic minorities and LGBT people. Some local divisions covered whole cities or counties while in other cases there could be more than one division representing a single postcode, in part due to personal disputes. Local groups were organised into a series of nine areas: North West, North East, East Midlands, West Midlands, East Anglia, South West, South East, South East Central, and Greater London. In 2010, new regional organisers were introduced for each; the EDL was heavily reliant on these grassroots networks and the initiative of local and regional leaders.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL's primary activity was street protests, which regularly attracted media attention. These protests came in three forms: national demonstrations attracting activists from across the country, local demonstrations featuring largely the local EDL division, and flash demonstrations held without giving the authorities prior warning of the event. The use of aggressive street rallies has a long history among the British far right, having been previously used by the British Union of Fascists in the 1930s, the National Front in the 1970s, and the British National Party in the 1980s and 1990s.


title: English Defence League

text: Copsey noted that the "overwhelming majority" of attendees at EDL demonstrations were "young, white, working-class males". Relatively few women attended, and similarly comparatively few people of colour joined. EDL members had a "street uniform" in the form of wristbands, t-shirts, and hoodies bearing the group's logo. The hoodie was often selected for its intimidating atmosphere and for its symbolic connections with the chav stereotype, thus reasserting members' working-class identity. Many members wore masks decorated with either the EDL logo or the St George's cross; some wore pig face masks or masks of figures whom they wished to ridicule, such as the Salafi jihadist leader Osama bin Laden. Others carried the English flag of St George or the British Union Jack flag, and the Israeli and LGBT Pride flags were also often in attendance. Reflecting the place of football hooligans in the EDL, some male members wore expensive designer clothing to its rallies.


title: English Defence League

text: To reach national events, local EDL groups often hired coaches to transport them to their destination. The coach provided a space in which these members engaged in singing, banter, story-telling, and practical jokes. As well as being protests, these demonstrations served as social events for EDL members, helping to forge a sense of solidarity and of the EDL as "one big family". At demonstrations, many members—including those too young to legally drink—consume large quantities of alcohol, with some also consuming cocaine prior to the protest.


title: English Defence League

text: At demonstrations, speeches typically focus on the perceived threat of Islamification, but also raise issues like the dangers of political correctness and the errors of the political left. EDL demonstrations were typified by continuous chanting with aggressive slogans aimed at Muslims. Pilkington divided these chants into three types: those which were anti-Islam, those which were patriotic in referencing an English identity, and those which were identity affirming in making specific reference to the EDL itself. Alongside chants, the EDL often employed songs, including the UK national anthem "God Save the Queen", patriotic songs like "Keep St George in my Heart, Keep me English"—sung to the tune of the hymn "Give Me Joy in My Heart"—and the anti-Islam themed "There were Ten Muslim Bombers in the Air".


title: English Defence League

text: During demonstrations, the EDL have regularly been met with opposition from anti-fascist groups like Unite Against Fascism, and sometimes also from Islamic groups. The clashes between the rival groups often resulted in violence and public disorder, with the police seeking to keep the two apart.


title: English Defence League

text: The police and local authorities initially allowed most EDL rallies to take place and did not often request banning orders. In October 2010, West Yorkshire Police successfully requested a government ban on the EDL holding a rally in Bradford, fearing that it would spark violent racial tensions akin to those which had taken place in 2001. In October 2010, the Home Secretary Theresa May granted Leicester Police's request to ban a planned EDL march in that city. By September 2011, over 600 arrests had been made in connection with EDL demonstrations and the policing costs were estimated to have exceeded £10 million. In some cases, most of those arrested were EDL members; in others, most of those arrested were counter-protesters.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL sometimes mobilise around local tensions between Islamic and non-Muslim communities, campaigns often organised by local divisions rather than the national leadership. After inebriated Somali women racially assaulted a white woman in Leicester in June 2010, the EDL organised a protest rally there, attributing the attack to the supremacist attitude that Islam supposedly cultivated among its followers. When a white man was assaulted by Asian youths in the Hyde area of Greater Manchester, the EDL again organised a demonstration, blaming the attack on Muslims, although police had not ascertained the perpetrators' religious background. In April 2011, the group demonstrated in Blackburn in response to hit and run incidents where Muslim drivers had hit non-Muslims; the EDL disregarded requests by the victims' families not to politicise the events.


title: English Defence League

text: In 2011, the EDL launched a nationwide campaign, "No New Mosques", which built upon earlier campaigns against mosque construction organised by various local divisions. When a mosque was due to be built in West Bridgford, an EDL organiser and three associates placed a severed pig's head at the site, accompanied with the spray-painted slogan "No mosque here EDL Notts". In April 2010, 3000 EDL demonstrators protested the construction of a new mosque in Dudley. Two months later, EDL members occupied the roof of an abandoned building on the site of the proposed mosque, expressing their intent to play the Islamic call to prayer five times a day to alert locals to the noise pollution they would suffer when the mosque was built. Police swiftly removed the demonstrators.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL is aware that its demonstrations prove costly for local authorities. The Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council for instance stated that policing the 2010 EDL protest had cost over £1 million. To deal with an EDL protest in Leicester, the Leicestershire Police Force had to put on its largest operation in 25 years, bringing in 2000 police officers to manage the demonstration. The EDL used this leverage to pressurise local councils into agreeing to some of its demands; in 2010 it issued a letter stating that any local councils that held Winter-themed festivities rather than explicitly Christmas-themed ones could "have their town/city visited by the English Defence League throughout the following year".


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL claims to disavow violence, although many attending its rallies stated that they did so because they enjoyed the adrenalin rush brought on by violent confrontation. Some also described violent clashes as the best way to draw media attention to their cause, and presented their violence as being heroic. Meadowcroft and Morrow argued that many football hooligans joined the EDL because of the opportunity that its rallies offered for violence at a time when there were decreasing opportunities to do so at football matches themselves due to greater use of banning orders targeting known hooligans, a more effective police presence, and increasing ticket prices that had becoming prohibitively high for those on low incomes.


title: English Defence League

text: In various cases, EDL demonstrators damaged Asian-owned businesses and property; in October 2011, EDL members stormed and ransacked an Ahmadiyya Islamic bookstore in Sandwell, and in August 2011 an EDL member was convicted for vandalising a mosque. Demonstrations also led to physical attacks on Asians themselves. Not all targets of EDL violence have been Muslim; in a July 2010 demonstration in Dudley, EDL members attacked a Hindu temple. It is unclear whether they mistook it for a mosque or whether it reflected broader racist attitudes among the demonstrators.


title: English Defence League

text: EDL members also disrupted the meetings of opponents; in September 2010 they disrupted a UAF meeting in Leicester, and later that month attacked a meeting of the Socialist Workers Party in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. EDL members also targeted left-wing bookshops and trade union buildings, and members have been jailed for attacking staff at office buildings hosting anti-EDL meetings. The EDL also targeted demonstrators from the anti-capitalist Occupy movement; in November 2011, 179 EDL members were arrested in central London for threatening members of Occupy London. Journalists that covered EDL marches also received death threats.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL makes significant use of the internet, including an official website and accounts on social media platforms such as Facebook and YouTube. In using social media, the EDL seeks to bypass the mainstream media, which it regards as being biased against it. The EDL hierarchy has moderated these social media accounts, blocking users critical of the EDL, but did not appear to remove posts advocating violence towards Muslims. The use of Facebook allowed the group to build momentum and expectancy ahead of public events. The EDL's Facebook following peaked at 100,000 before the Facebook corporation closed the group's account.


title: English Defence League

text: Unlike political parties, the EDL does not produce leaflets expressing any political programme or print a magazine or newsletter. The "EDL News" section of its website published articles, commentary and information on forthcoming events and campaigns, which were then linked to through its social media. The EDL also used its website and eBay to sell branded merchandise, although pulled merchandise from its website in 2010.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL formed links with ideologically similar groups internationally, particularly in Europe and the United States. These included sectors of the US Tea Party movement; it affiliated with the US-based Stop Islamization of America run by Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer. Geller served as the EDL's bridge to the Tea Party movement, but later distanced herself from it, claiming that the EDL contained neo-Nazi elements. When Moore was head of the EDL's Jewish Division, she established links with a far-right Jewish American group, the Jewish Task Force. In September 2010, EDL representatives joined demonstrations in New York City's Lower Manhattan to protest against the construction of the "Ground Zero Mosque", and in 2012 attended the "Stop Islamization of Nations" conference, again in New York City.


title: English Defence League

text: EDL members attended a Berlin rally organised by the Citizens' Movement Pax Europa in April 2010 in support of Geert Wilders, a right-wing, populist politician who had been charged for comparing Islam to Nazism. In June 2010 two EDL representatives attended the Counter-Jihad 2010 conference held by the anti-Muslim International Civil Liberties Alliance in Zurich. In October 2010, Robinson and other EDL members travelled to Amsterdam to protest outside Wilders's trial, although Wilders himself stated that he had no personal contact with the EDL. Here, Robinson announced plans for a "European Friendship Initiative" with the German, Dutch, and French Defence Leagues. In April 2011, Robinson and other EDL representatives attended a small rally in Lyon, alongside the French far-right group Bloc Identitaire; various participants, including Robinson, were arrested. In June 2011, it sent representatives to Pax Europa's counter-jihadist conference in Stuttgart.


title: English Defence League

text: It has partnered with the Welsh Defence League, Scottish Defence League, and Ulster Defence League, none of which had the same success as their English counterpart. The Scottish Defence League retained secret links with the BNP, although in Scotland, it was difficult to bridge sectarian divisions between rival football firms. Sectarianism was also a major issue for the Ulster Defence League, which decided against holding any demonstrations in Northern Ireland itself.


title: English Defence League

text: The Welsh Defence League faced divisions between its contingent from Swansea, some of whom were former members of Combat 18, and the Casuals United-contingent from Cardiff. After a BBC Wales investigation into the group revealed that a number of its members had neo-Nazi beliefs, in 2011 it was shut down and replaced by the Welsh Casuals.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL also established links to the Danish Defence League, which established 10 chapters within its first year of operation. However recent attempts to establish a presence in Denmark and the Netherlands have failed to attract support and were respectively described as "a humiliation" and as "a damp squib".


title: English Defence League

text: The Norwegian Defence League (NDL) is a sister organisation of the EDL. There are strong connections between the two organisations, and the leadership of the EDL is also actively involved in the leadership of NDL. Members of the NDL have on several occasions travelled to England to participate in EDL protests.


title: English Defence League

text: The EDL's size has been difficult to gauge. It has no official system of membership, and thus no membership list. Pilkington argued that the EDL's active membership, meaning those who attended its rallies and events, peaked between January and April 2010, when national demonstrations could accrue 2000 people, but by the end of that year this had declined to between 800 and 1000. By 2012, the group's national demonstrations were typically only attracting between 300 to 700 people. In 2011, Bartlett and Littler estimated that between 25,000 and 35,000 people were active EDL members, the highest concentration being in Greater London. In July 2010, the EDL had 22,000 Facebook followers; following the 2013 killing of Lee Rigby this reached 160,000, and as of February 2015 had risen further to 184,000. Its Facebook following was smaller than that of its rival, Britain First; in 2015, when the EDL had 181,000 followers, Britain First had 816,000.


title: English Defence League

text: Pilkington noted a "high turnover in the movement", while Winlow, Hall and Treadwell observed that members "drift in and out of its activities". Many of the EDL's supporters did not attend its street protests and were called "armchair warriors" by the group. Researchers found many supporters did not attend demonstrations because they feared violence, arrest, and the loss of employment, while many EDL women and older men saw demonstrations as primarily being events for young men. Involvement with the EDL could bring problems for its members which would dissuade their ongoing involvement; these included financial costs, the loss of friends, potential police scrutiny, and the restrictions it placed on their time. Various members described losing friendships and family relationships because of their involvement in the EDL, while others concealed their involvement fearing that they would lose their jobs. Some expressed fears that social services would take their children into care if their EDL membership was known, or that they would be the target of violence from anti-fascists and Muslims.


title: English Defence League

text: Most EDL members are young, working-class, white men. The EDL unites three main constituencies: football hooligans, longstanding far-right activists, and a range of socio-economically marginalised people. Copsey noted that "beyond their antagonism towards Islam, there is no ideology that binds this ragbag coalition together", and that the EDL was therefore always susceptible to fracture. For most EDL members, their membership is their first active involvement in a political group.