title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: The first scholar to give Peirce his considered professional attention was Royce's student Morris Raphael Cohen, the editor of an anthology of Peirce's writings entitled "Chance, Love, and Logic" (1923), and the author of the first bibliography of Peirce's scattered writings. John Dewey studied under Peirce at Johns Hopkins. From 1916 onward, Dewey's writings repeatedly mention Peirce with deference. His 1938 "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry" is much influenced by Peirce. The publication of the first six volumes of "Collected Papers" (1931–1935), the most important event to date in Peirce studies and one that Cohen made possible by raising the needed funds, did not prompt an outpouring of secondary studies. The editors of those volumes, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, did not become Peirce specialists. Early landmarks of the secondary literature include the monographs by Buchler (1939), Feibleman (1946), and Goudge (1950), the 1941 PhD thesis by Arthur W. Burks (who went on to edit volumes 7 and 8), and the studies edited by Wiener and Young (1952). The Charles S. Peirce Society was founded in 1946. Its "Transactions", an academic quarterly specializing in Peirce's pragmatism and American philosophy has appeared since 1965. (See Phillips 2014, 62 for discussion of Peirce and Dewey relative to transactionalism.)


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: By 1943 such was Peirce's reputation, in the US at least, that "Webster's Biographical Dictionary" said that Peirce was "now regarded as the most original thinker and greatest logician of his time".


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: In 1949, while doing unrelated archival work, the historian of mathematics Carolyn Eisele (1902–2000) chanced on an autograph letter by Peirce. So began her forty years of research on Peirce, “the mathematician and scientist,” culminating in Eisele (1976, 1979, 1985). Beginning around 1960, the philosopher and historian of ideas Max Fisch (1900–1995) emerged as an authority on Peirce (Fisch, 1986). He includes many of his relevant articles in a survey (Fisch 1986: 422–48) of the impact of Peirce's thought through 1983.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce has gained an international following, marked by university research centers devoted to Peirce studies and pragmatism in Brazil (CeneP/CIEP), Finland (HPRC and ), Germany (Wirth's group, Hoffman's and Otte's group, and Deuser's and Härle's group), France (L'I.R.S.C.E.), Spain (GEP), and Italy (CSP). His writings have been translated into several languages, including German, French, Finnish, Spanish, and Swedish. Since 1950, there have been French, Italian, Spanish, British, and Brazilian Peirce scholars of note. For many years, the North American philosophy department most devoted to Peirce was the University of Toronto, thanks in part to the leadership of Thomas Goudge and David Savan. In recent years, U.S. Peirce scholars have clustered at Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis, home of the Peirce Edition Project (PEP) –, and Pennsylvania State University.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: In recent years, Peirce's trichotomy of signs is exploited by a growing number of practitioners for marketing and design tasks.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: John Deely writes that Peirce was the last of the "moderns" and "first of the postmoderns". He lauds Peirce's doctrine of signs as a contribution to the dawn of the Postmodern epoch. Dewey additionally comments that "Peirce stands...in a position analogous to the position occupied by Augustine as last of the Western Fathers and first of the medievals".


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce's reputation rests largely on academic papers published in American scientific and scholarly journals such as "Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences", the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy", "The Monist", "Popular Science Monthly", the "American Journal of Mathematics", "Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences", "The Nation", and others. See Articles by Peirce, published in his lifetime for an extensive list with links to them online. The only full-length book (neither extract nor pamphlet) that Peirce authored and saw published in his lifetime was "Photometric Researches" (1878), a 181-page monograph on the applications of spectrographic methods to astronomy. While at Johns Hopkins, he edited "Studies in Logic" (1883), containing chapters by himself and his graduate students. Besides lectures during his years (1879–1884) as lecturer in Logic at Johns Hopkins, he gave at least nine series of lectures, many now published; see Lectures by Peirce.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: After Peirce's death, Harvard University obtained from Peirce's widow the papers found in his study, but did not microfilm them until 1964. Only after Richard Robin (1967) catalogued this "Nachlass" did it become clear that Peirce had left approximately 1,650 unpublished manuscripts, totaling over 100,000 pages, mostly still unpublished except on microfilm. On the vicissitudes of Peirce's papers, see Houser (1989). Reportedly the papers remain in unsatisfactory condition.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: The first published anthology of Peirce's articles was the one-volume "Chance, Love and Logic: Philosophical Essays", edited by Morris Raphael Cohen, 1923, still in print. Other one-volume anthologies were published in 1940, 1957, 1958, 1972, 1994, and 2009, most still in print. The main posthumous editions of Peirce's works in their long trek to light, often multi-volume, and some still in print, have included:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: 1931–1958: "Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce" (CP), 8 volumes, includes many published works, along with a selection of previously unpublished work and a smattering of his correspondence. This long-time standard edition drawn from Peirce's work from the 1860s to 1913 remains the most comprehensive survey of his prolific output from 1893 to 1913. It is organized thematically, but texts (including lecture series) are often split up across volumes, while texts from various stages in Peirce's development are often combined, requiring frequent visits to editors' notes. Edited (1–6) by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss and (7–8) by Arthur Burks, in print and online.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: 1975–1987: "Charles Sanders Peirce: Contributions to" The Nation, 4 volumes, includes Peirce's more than 300 reviews and articles published 1869–1908 in "The Nation". Edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner and James Edward Cook, online.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: 1976: "The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce", 4 volumes in 5, included many previously unpublished Peirce manuscripts on mathematical subjects, along with Peirce's important published mathematical articles. Edited by Carolyn Eisele, back in print.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: 1977: "Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between C. S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby" (2nd edition 2001), included Peirce's entire correspondence (1903–1912) with Victoria, Lady Welby. Peirce's other published correspondence is largely limited to the 14 letters included in volume 8 of the "Collected Papers", and the 20-odd pre-1890 items included so far in the "Writings". Edited by Charles S. Hardwick with James Cook, out of print.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: 1982–now: "Writings of Charles S. Peirce, A Chronological Edition" (W), Volumes 1–6 & 8, of a projected 30. The limited coverage, and defective editing and organization, of the "Collected Papers" led Max Fisch and others in the 1970s to found the Peirce Edition Project (PEP), whose mission is to prepare a more complete critical chronological edition. Only seven volumes have appeared to date, but they cover the period from 1859 to 1892, when Peirce carried out much of his best-known work. "Writings of Charles S. Peirce", 8 was published in November 2010; and work continues on "Writings of Charles S. Peirce", 7, 9, and 11. In print and online.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: 1985: "Historical Perspectives on Peirce's Logic of Science: A History of Science", 2 volumes. Auspitz has said, "The extent of Peirce's immersion in the science of his day is evident in his reviews in the "Nation" [...] and in his papers, grant applications, and publishers' prospectuses in the history and practice of science", referring latterly to "Historical Perspectives". Edited by Carolyn Eisele, back in print.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: 1992: "Reasoning and the Logic of Things" collects in one place Peirce's 1898 series of lectures invited by William James. Edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner, with commentary by Hilary Putnam, in print.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: 1992–1998: "The Essential Peirce" (EP), 2 volumes, is an important recent sampler of Peirce's philosophical writings. Edited (1) by Nathan Hauser and Christian Kloesel and (2) by "Peirce Edition Project" editors, in print.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: 1997: "Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking" collects Peirce's 1903 Harvard "Lectures on Pragmatism" in a study edition, including drafts, of Peirce's lecture manuscripts, which had been previously published in abridged form; the lectures now also appear in "The Essential Peirce", 2. Edited by Patricia Ann Turisi, in print.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: 2010: "Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Writings" collects important writings by Peirce on the subject, many not previously in print. Edited by Matthew E. Moore, in print.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce's most important work in pure mathematics was in logical and foundational areas. He also worked on linear algebra, matrices, various geometries, topology and Listing numbers, Bell numbers, graphs, the four-color problem, and the nature of continuity.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: He worked on applied mathematics in economics, engineering, and map projections (such as the Peirce quincuncial projection), and was especially active in probability and statistics.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce made a number of striking discoveries in formal logic and foundational mathematics, nearly all of which came to be appreciated only long after he died:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: In 1860 he suggested a cardinal arithmetic for infinite numbers, years before any work by Georg Cantor (who completed his dissertation in 1867) and without access to Bernard Bolzano's 1851 (posthumous) "Paradoxien des Unendlichen".


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: In 1880–1881 he showed how Boolean algebra could be done via a repeated sufficient single binary operation (logical NOR), anticipating Henry M. Sheffer by 33 years. (See also De Morgan's Laws.)


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: In 1881 he set out the axiomatization of natural number arithmetic, a few years before Richard Dedekind and Giuseppe Peano. In the same paper Peirce gave, years before Dedekind, the first purely cardinal definition of a finite set in the sense now known as "Dedekind-finite", and implied by the same stroke an important formal definition of an infinite set (Dedekind-infinite), as a set that can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with one of its proper subsets.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: In 1885 he distinguished between first-order and second-order quantification. In the same paper he set out what can be read as the first (primitive) axiomatic set theory, anticipating Zermelo by about two decades (Brady 2000, pp. 132–33).


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: In 1886, he saw that Boolean calculations could be carried out via electrical switches, anticipating Claude Shannon by more than 50 years.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: By the later 1890s he was devising existential graphs, a diagrammatic notation for the predicate calculus. Based on them are John F. Sowa's conceptual graphs and Sun-Joo Shin's diagrammatic reasoning.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce wrote drafts for an introductory textbook, with the working title "The New Elements of Mathematics", that presented mathematics from an original standpoint. Those drafts and many other of his previously unpublished mathematical manuscripts finally appeared in "The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce" (1976), edited by mathematician Carolyn Eisele.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce agreed with Auguste Comte in regarding mathematics as more basic than philosophy and the special sciences (of nature and mind). Peirce classified mathematics into three subareas: (1) mathematics of logic, (2) discrete series, and (3) pseudo-continua (as he called them, including the real numbers) and continua. Influenced by his father Benjamin, Peirce argued that mathematics studies purely hypothetical objects and is not just the science of quantity but is more broadly the science which draws necessary conclusions; that mathematics aids logic, not vice versa; and that logic itself is part of philosophy and is the science "about" drawing conclusions necessary and otherwise.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Beginning with his first paper on the "Logic of Relatives" (1870), Peirce extended the theory of relations that Augustus De Morgan had just recently awakened from its Cinderella slumbers. Much of the mathematics of relations now taken for granted was "borrowed" from Peirce, not always with all due credit; on that and on how the young Bertrand Russell, especially his "Principles of Mathematics" and "Principia Mathematica", did not do Peirce justice, see Anellis (1995). In 1918 the logician C. I. Lewis wrote, "The contributions of C.S. Peirce to symbolic logic are more numerous and varied than those of any other writer—at least in the nineteenth century." Beginning in 1940, Alfred Tarski and his students rediscovered aspects of Peirce's larger vision of relational logic, developing the perspective of relation algebra.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Relational logic gained applications. In mathematics, it influenced the abstract analysis of E. H. Moore and the lattice theory of Garrett Birkhoff. In computer science, the relational model for databases was developed with Peircean ideas in work of Edgar F. Codd, who was a doctoral student of Arthur W. Burks, a Peirce scholar. In economics, relational logic was used by Frank P. Ramsey, John von Neumann, and Paul Samuelson to study preferences and utility and by Kenneth J. Arrow in "Social Choice and Individual Values", following Arrow's association with Tarski at City College of New York.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: On Peirce and his contemporaries Ernst Schröder and Gottlob Frege, Hilary Putnam (1982) documented that Frege's work on the logic of quantifiers had little influence on his contemporaries, although it was published four years before the work of Peirce and his student Oscar Howard Mitchell. Putnam found that mathematicians and logicians learned about the logic of quantifiers through the independent work of Peirce and Mitchell, particularly through Peirce's "On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation" (1885), published in the premier American mathematical journal of the day, and cited by Peano and Schröder, among others, who ignored Frege. They also adopted and modified Peirce's notations, typographical variants of those now used. Peirce apparently was ignorant of Frege's work, despite their overlapping achievements in logic, philosophy of language, and the foundations of mathematics.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: A philosophy of logic, grounded in his categories and semiotic, can be extracted from Peirce's writings and, along with Peirce's logical work more generally, is exposited and defended in Hilary Putnam (1982); the Introduction in Nathan Houser "et al." (1997); and Randall Dipert's chapter in Cheryl Misak (2004).


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Continuity and synechism are central in Peirce's philosophy: "I did not at first suppose that it was, as I gradually came to find it, the master-Key of philosophy".


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: From a mathematical point of view, he embraced infinitesimals and worked long on the mathematics of continua. He long held that the real numbers constitute a pseudo-continuum; that a true continuum is the real subject matter of "analysis situs" (topology); and that a true continuum of instants exceeds—and within any lapse of time has room for—any Aleph number (any infinite "multitude" as he called it) of instants.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: In 1908 Peirce wrote that he found that a true continuum might have or lack such room. Jérôme Havenel (2008): "It is on 26 May 1908, that Peirce finally gave up his idea that in every continuum there is room for whatever collection of any multitude. From now on, there are different kinds of continua, which have different properties."


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce held that science achieves statistical probabilities, not certainties, and that spontaneity (absolute chance) is real (see Tychism on his view). Most of his statistical writings promote the frequency interpretation of probability (objective ratios of cases), and many of his writings express skepticism about (and criticize the use of) probability when such models are not based on objective randomization. Though Peirce was largely a frequentist, his possible world semantics introduced the "propensity" theory of probability before Karl Popper. Peirce (sometimes with Joseph Jastrow) investigated the probability judgments of experimental subjects, "perhaps the very first" elicitation and estimation of subjective probabilities in experimental psychology and (what came to be called) Bayesian statistics.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce was one of the founders of statistics. He formulated modern statistics in "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" (1877–1878) and "A Theory of Probable Inference" (1883). With a repeated measures design, Charles Sanders Peirce and Joseph Jastrow introduced blinded, controlled randomized experiments in 1884 (Hacking 1990:205) (before Ronald A. Fisher). He invented optimal design for experiments on gravity, in which he "corrected the means". He used correlation and smoothing. Peirce extended the work on outliers by Benjamin Peirce, his father. He introduced terms "confidence" and "likelihood" (before Jerzy Neyman and Fisher). (See Stephen Stigler's historical books and Ian Hacking 1990.)


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce was a working scientist for 30 years, and arguably was a professional philosopher only during the five years he lectured at Johns Hopkins. He learned philosophy mainly by reading, each day, a few pages of Immanuel Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", in the original German, while a Harvard undergraduate. His writings bear on a wide array of disciplines, including mathematics, logic, philosophy, statistics, astronomy, metrology, geodesy, experimental psychology, economics, linguistics, and the history and philosophy of science. This work has enjoyed renewed interest and approval, a revival inspired not only by his anticipations of recent scientific developments but also by his demonstration of how philosophy can be applied effectively to human problems.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce's philosophy includes (see below in related sections) a pervasive three-category system: belief that truth is immutable and is both independent from actual opinion (fallibilism) and discoverable (no radical skepticism), logic as formal semiotic on signs, on arguments, and on inquiry's ways—including philosophical pragmatism (which he founded), critical common-sensism, and scientific method—and, in metaphysics: Scholastic realism, e.g. John Duns Scotus, belief in God, freedom, and at least an attenuated immortality, objective idealism, and belief in the reality of continuity and of absolute chance, mechanical necessity, and creative love. In his work, fallibilism and pragmatism may seem to work somewhat like skepticism and positivism, respectively, in others' work. However, for Peirce, fallibilism is balanced by an anti-skepticism and is a basis for belief in the reality of absolute chance and of continuity, and pragmatism commits one to anti-nominalist belief in the reality of the general (CP 5.453–57).


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: For Peirce, First Philosophy, which he also called cenoscopy, is less basic than mathematics and more basic than the special sciences (of nature and mind). It studies positive phenomena in general, phenomena available to any person at any waking moment, and does not settle questions by resorting to special experiences. He divided such philosophy into (1) phenomenology (which he also called phaneroscopy or categorics), (2) normative sciences (esthetics, ethics, and logic), and (3) metaphysics; his views on them are discussed in order below.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: On May 14, 1867, the 27-year-old Peirce presented a paper entitled "On a New List of Categories" to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, which published it the following year. The paper outlined a theory of predication, involving three universal categories that Peirce developed in response to reading Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, and G. W. F. Hegel, categories that Peirce applied throughout his work for the rest of his life. Peirce scholars generally regard the "New List" as foundational or breaking the ground for Peirce's "architectonic", his blueprint for a pragmatic philosophy. In the categories one will discern, concentrated, the pattern that one finds formed by the three grades of clearness in "" (1878 paper foundational to pragmatism), and in numerous other trichotomies in his work.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce did not write extensively in aesthetics and ethics, but came by 1902 to hold that aesthetics, ethics, and logic, in that order, comprise the normative sciences. He characterized aesthetics as the study of the good (grasped as the admirable), and thus of the ends governing all conduct and thought.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce regarded logic "per se" as a division of philosophy, as a normative science based on esthetics and ethics, as more basic than metaphysics, and as "the art of devising methods of research". More generally, as inference, "logic is rooted in the social principle", since inference depends on a standpoint that, in a sense, is unlimited. Peirce called (with no sense of deprecation) "mathematics of logic" much of the kind of thing which, in current research and applications, is called simply "logic". He was productive in both (philosophical) logic and logic's mathematics, which were connected deeply in his work and thought.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce argued that logic is formal semiotic: the formal study of signs in the broadest sense, not only signs that are artificial, linguistic, or symbolic, but also signs that are semblances or are indexical such as reactions. Peirce held that "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs", along with their representational and inferential relations. He argued that, since all thought takes time, all thought is in signs and sign processes ("semiosis") such as the inquiry process. He divided logic into: (1) speculative grammar, or stechiology, on how signs can be meaningful and, in relation to that, what kinds of signs there are, how they combine, and how some embody or incorporate others; (2) logical critic, or logic proper, on the modes of inference; and (3) speculative or universal rhetoric, or methodeutic, the philosophical theory of inquiry, including pragmatism.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: In his "F.R.L." [First Rule of Logic] (1899), Peirce states that the first, and "in one sense, the sole", rule of reason is that, "to learn, one needs to desire to learn" and desire it without resting satisfied with that which one is inclined to think. So, the first rule is, "to wonder". Peirce proceeds to a critical theme in research practices and the shaping of theories:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: <poem>...there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce adds, that method and economy are best in research but no outright sin inheres in trying any theory in the sense that the investigation via its trial adoption can proceed unimpeded and undiscouraged, and that "the one unpardonable offence" is a philosophical barricade against truth's advance, an offense to which "metaphysicians in all ages have shown themselves the most addicted". Peirce in many writings holds that logic precedes metaphysics (ontological, religious, and physical).


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce goes on to list four common barriers to inquiry: (1) Assertion of absolute certainty; (2) maintaining that something is absolutely unknowable; (3) maintaining that something is absolutely inexplicable because absolutely basic or ultimate; (4) holding that perfect exactitude is possible, especially such as to quite preclude unusual and anomalous phenomena. To refuse absolute theoretical certainty is the heart of "fallibilism", which Peirce unfolds into refusals to set up any of the listed barriers. Peirce elsewhere argues (1897) that logic's presupposition of fallibilism leads at length to the view that chance and continuity are very real (tychism and synechism).


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: The First Rule of Logic pertains to the mind's presuppositions in undertaking reason and logic; presuppositions, for instance, that truth and the real do not depend on yours or my opinion of them but do depend on representational relation and consist in the destined end in investigation taken far enough (see below). He describes such ideas as, collectively, hopes which, in particular cases, one is unable seriously to doubt.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: In three articles in 1868–1869, Peirce rejected mere verbal or hyperbolic doubt and first or ultimate principles, and argued that we have (as he numbered them):


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: (The above sense of the term "intuition" is almost Kant's, said Peirce. It differs from the current looser sense that encompasses instinctive or anyway half-conscious inference.)


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce argued that those incapacities imply the reality of the general and of the continuous, the validity of the modes of reasoning, and the falsity of philosophical Cartesianism (see below).


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce rejected the conception (usually ascribed to Kant) of the unknowable thing-in-itself and later said that to "dismiss make-believes" is a prerequisite for pragmatism.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce sought, through his wide-ranging studies through the decades, formal philosophical ways to articulate thought's processes, and also to explain the workings of science. These inextricably entangled questions of a dynamics of inquiry rooted in nature and nurture led him to develop his semiotic with very broadened conceptions of signs and inference, and, as its culmination, a theory of inquiry for the task of saying 'how science works' and devising research methods. This would be logic by the medieval definition taught for centuries: art of arts, science of sciences, having the way to the principles of all methods. Influences radiate from points on parallel lines of inquiry in Aristotle's work, in such "loci" as: the basic terminology of psychology in "On the Soul"; the founding description of sign relations in "On Interpretation"; and the differentiation of inference into three modes that are commonly translated into English as "abduction", "deduction", and "induction", in the "Prior Analytics", as well as inference by analogy (called "paradeigma" by Aristotle), which Peirce regarded as involving the other three modes.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce began writing on semiotic in the 1860s, around the time when he devised his system of three categories. He called it both "semiotic" and "semeiotic". Both are current in singular and plural. He based it on the conception of a triadic sign relation, and defined "semiosis" as "action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of "three" subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs". As to signs in thought, Peirce emphasized the reverse: "To say, therefore, that thought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a time, is but another way of saying that every thought must be interpreted in another, or that all thought is in signs."


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce held that all thought is in signs, issuing in and from interpretation, where "sign" is the word for the broadest variety of conceivable semblances, diagrams, metaphors, symptoms, signals, designations, symbols, texts, even mental concepts and ideas, all as determinations of a mind or "quasi-mind", that which at least functions like a mind, as in the work of crystals or bees—the focus is on sign action in general rather than on psychology, linguistics, or social studies (fields which he also pursued).


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Inquiry is a kind of inference process, a manner of thinking and semiosis. Global divisions of ways for phenomena to stand as signs, and the subsumption of inquiry and thinking within inference as a sign process, enable the study of inquiry on semiotics' three levels:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce uses examples often from common experience, but defines and discusses such things as assertion and interpretation in terms of philosophical logic. In a formal vein, Peirce said:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce's theory of signs is known to be one of the most complex semiotic theories due to its generalistic claim. Anything is a sign—not absolutely as itself, but instead in some relation or other. The "sign relation" is the key. It defines three roles encompassing (1) the sign, (2) the sign's subject matter, called its "object", and (3) the sign's meaning or ramification as formed into a kind of effect called its "interpretant" (a further sign, for example a translation). It is an irreducible "triadic relation", according to Peirce. The roles are distinct even when the things that fill those roles are not. The roles are but three; a sign of an object leads to one or more interpretants, and, as signs, they lead to further interpretants.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: "Extension × intension = information." Two traditional approaches to sign relation, necessary though insufficient, are the way of "extension" (a sign's objects, also called breadth, denotation, or application) and the way of "intension" (the objects' characteristics, qualities, attributes referenced by the sign, also called depth, comprehension, significance, or connotation). Peirce adds a third, the way of "information", including change of information, to integrate the other two approaches into a unified whole. For example, because of the equation above, if a term's total amount of information stays the same, then the more that the term 'intends' or signifies about objects, the fewer are the objects to which the term 'extends' or applies.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: "Determination." A sign depends on its object in such a way as to represent its object—the object enables and, in a sense, determines the sign. A physically causal sense of this stands out when a sign consists in an indicative reaction. The interpretant depends likewise on both the sign and the object—an object determines a sign to determine an interpretant. But this determination is not a succession of dyadic events, like a row of toppling dominoes; sign determination is triadic. For example, an interpretant does not merely represent something which represented an object; instead an interpretant represents something "as" a sign representing the object. The object (be it a quality or fact or law or even fictional) determines the sign to an interpretant through one's collateral experience with the object, in which the object is found or from which it is recalled, as when a sign consists in a chance semblance of an absent object. Peirce used the word "determine" not in a strictly deterministic sense, but in a sense of "specializes", "bestimmt", involving variable amount, like an influence. Peirce came to define representation and interpretation in terms of (triadic) determination. The object determines the sign to determine another sign—the interpretant—to be related to the object "as the sign is related to the object", hence the interpretant, fulfilling its function as sign of the object, determines a further interpretant sign. The process is logically structured to perpetuate itself, and is definitive of sign, object, and interpretant in general.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Some of the understanding needed by the mind depends on familiarity with the object. To know what a given sign denotes, the mind needs some experience of that sign's object, experience outside of, and collateral to, that sign or sign system. In that context Peirce speaks of collateral experience, collateral observation, collateral acquaintance, all in much the same terms.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Among Peirce's many sign typologies, three stand out, interlocked. The first typology depends on the sign itself, the second on how the sign stands for its denoted object, and the third on how the sign stands for its object to its interpretant. Also, each of the three typologies is a three-way division, a trichotomy, via Peirce's three phenomenological categories: (1) quality of feeling, (2) reaction, resistance, and (3) representation, mediation.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: I. "Qualisign, sinsign, legisign" (also called" tone, token, type," and also called "potisign, actisign, famisign"): This typology classifies every sign according to the sign's own phenomenological category—the qualisign is a quality, a possibility, a "First"; the sinsign is a reaction or resistance, a singular object, an actual event or fact, a "Second"; and the legisign is a habit, a rule, a representational relation, a "Third".


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: II. "Icon, index, symbol": This typology, the best known one, classifies every sign according to the category of the sign's way of denoting its object—the icon (also called semblance or likeness) by a quality of its own, the index by factual connection to its object, and the symbol by a habit or rule for its interpretant.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: III. "Rheme, dicisign, argument" (also called "sumisign, dicisign, suadisign," also "seme, pheme, delome," and regarded as very broadened versions of the traditional "term, proposition, argument"): This typology classifies every sign according to the category which the interpretant attributes to the sign's way of denoting its object—the rheme, for example a term, is a sign interpreted to represent its object in respect of quality; the dicisign, for example a proposition, is a sign interpreted to represent its object in respect of fact; and the argument is a sign interpreted to represent its object in respect of habit or law. This is the culminating typology of the three, where the sign is understood as a structural element of inference.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Every sign belongs to one class or another within (I) "and" within (II) "and" within (III). Thus each of the three typologies is a three-valued parameter for every sign. The three parameters are not independent of each other; many co-classifications are absent, for reasons pertaining to the lack of either habit-taking or singular reaction in a quality, and the lack of habit-taking in a singular reaction. The result is not 27 but instead ten classes of signs fully specified at this level of analysis.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Borrowing a brace of concepts from Aristotle, Peirce examined three basic modes of inference—"abduction", "deduction", and "induction"—in his "critique of arguments" or "logic proper". Peirce also called abduction "retroduction", "presumption", and, earliest of all, "hypothesis". He characterized it as guessing and as inference to an explanatory hypothesis. He sometimes expounded the modes of inference by transformations of the categorical syllogism Barbara (AAA), for example in "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis" (1878). He does this by rearranging the "rule" (Barbara's major premise), the "case" (Barbara's minor premise), and the "result" (Barbara's conclusion):


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce 1883 in "A Theory of Probable Inference" ("Studies in Logic") equated hypothetical inference with the induction of characters of objects (as he had done in effect before). Eventually dissatisfied, by 1900 he distinguished them once and for all and also wrote that he now took the syllogistic forms and the doctrine of logical extension and comprehension as being less basic than he had thought. In 1903 he presented the following logical form for abductive inference:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: The logical form does not also cover induction, since induction neither depends on surprise nor proposes a new idea for its conclusion. Induction seeks facts to test a hypothesis; abduction seeks a hypothesis to account for facts. "Deduction proves that something "must" be; Induction shows that something "actually is" operative; Abduction merely suggests that something "may be"." Peirce did not remain quite convinced that one logical form covers all abduction. In his methodeutic or theory of inquiry (see below), he portrayed abduction as an economic initiative to further inference and study, and portrayed all three modes as clarified by their coordination in essential roles in inquiry: hypothetical explanation, deductive prediction, inductive testing.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce's recipe for pragmatic thinking, which he called "pragmatism" and, later, "pragmaticism", is recapitulated in several versions of the so-called "pragmatic maxim". Here is one of his more emphatic reiterations of it:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: As a movement, pragmatism began in the early 1870s in discussions among Peirce, William James, and others in the Metaphysical Club. James among others regarded some articles by Peirce such as "" (1877) and especially "" (1878) as foundational to pragmatism. Peirce (CP 5.11–12), like James ("", 1907), saw pragmatism as embodying familiar attitudes, in philosophy and elsewhere, elaborated into a new deliberate method for fruitful thinking about problems. Peirce differed from James and the early John Dewey, in some of their tangential enthusiasms, in being decidedly more rationalistic and realistic, in several senses of those terms, throughout the preponderance of his own philosophical moods.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: In 1905 Peirce coined the new name pragmaticism "for the precise purpose of expressing the original definition", saying that "all went happily" with James's and F.C.S. Schiller's variant uses of the old name "pragmatism" and that he coined the new name because of the old name's growing use in "literary journals, where it gets abused". Yet he cited as causes, in a 1906 manuscript, his differences with James and Schiller and, in a 1908 publication, his differences with James as well as literary author Giovanni Papini's declaration of pragmatism's indefinability. Peirce in any case regarded his views that truth is immutable and infinity is real, as being opposed by the other pragmatists, but he remained allied with them on other issues.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Pragmatism begins with the idea that belief is that on which one is prepared to act. Peirce's pragmatism is a method of clarification of conceptions of objects. It equates any conception of an object to a conception of that object's effects to a general extent of the effects' conceivable implications for informed practice. It is a method of sorting out conceptual confusions occasioned, for example, by distinctions that make (sometimes needed) formal yet not practical differences. He formulated both pragmatism and statistical principles as aspects of scientific logic, in his "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" series of articles. In the second one, "", Peirce discussed three grades of clearness of conception:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: By way of example of how to clarify conceptions, he addressed conceptions about truth and the real as questions of the presuppositions of reasoning in general. In clearness's second grade (the "nominal" grade), he defined truth as a sign's correspondence to its object, and the real as the object of such correspondence, such that truth and the real are independent of that which you or I or any actual, definite community of inquirers think. After that needful but confined step, next in clearness's third grade (the pragmatic, practice-oriented grade) he defined truth as that opinion which "would" be reached, sooner or later but still inevitably, by research taken far enough, such that the real does depend on that ideal final opinion—a dependence to which he appeals in theoretical arguments elsewhere, for instance for the long-run validity of the rule of induction. Peirce argued that even to argue against the independence and discoverability of truth and the real is to presuppose that there is, about that very question under argument, a truth with just such independence and discoverability.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce said that a conception's meaning consists in "all general modes of rational conduct" implied by "acceptance" of the conception—that is, if one were to accept, first of all, the conception as true, then what could one conceive to be consequent general modes of rational conduct by all who accept the conception as true?—the whole of such consequent general modes is the whole meaning. His pragmatism does not equate a conception's meaning, its intellectual purport, with the conceived benefit or cost of the conception itself, like a meme (or, say, propaganda), outside the perspective of its being true, nor, since a conception is general, is its meaning equated with any definite set of actual consequences or upshots corroborating or undermining the conception or its worth. His pragmatism also bears no resemblance to "vulgar" pragmatism, which misleadingly connotes a ruthless and Machiavellian search for mercenary or political advantage. Instead the pragmatic maxim is the heart of his pragmatism as a method of experimentational mental reflection arriving at conceptions in terms of conceivable confirmatory and disconfirmatory circumstances—a method hospitable to the formation of explanatory hypotheses, and conducive to the use and improvement of verification.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce's pragmatism, as method and theory of definitions and conceptual clearness, is part of his theory of inquiry, which he variously called speculative, general, formal or universal rhetoric or simply methodeutic. He applied his pragmatism as a method throughout his work.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: In "The Fixation of Belief" (1877), Peirce gives his take on the psychological origin and aim of inquiry. On his view, individuals are motivated to inquiry by desire to escape the feelings of anxiety and unease which Peirce takes to be characteristic of the state of doubt. Doubt is described by Peirce as an "uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief." Peirce uses words like “irritation” to describe the experience of being in doubt and to explain why he thinks we find such experiences to be motivating. The irritating feeling of doubt is appeased, Peirce says, through our efforts to achieve a settled state of satisfaction with what we land on as our answer to the question which led to that doubt in the first place. This settled state, namely, belief, is described by Peirce as “a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid.” Our efforts to achieve the satisfaction of belief, by whichever methods we may pursue, are what Peirce calls “inquiry”. Four methods which Peirce describes as having been actually pursued throughout the history of thought are summarized below in the section after next.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Critical common-sensism, treated by Peirce as a consequence of his pragmatism, is his combination of Thomas Reid's common-sense philosophy with a fallibilism that recognizes that propositions of our more or less vague common sense now indubitable may later come into question, for example because of transformations of our world through science. It includes efforts to work up in tests genuine doubts for a core group of common indubitables that vary slowly if at all.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: In "" (1877), Peirce described inquiry in general not as the pursuit of truth "per se" but as the struggle to move from irritating, inhibitory doubt born of surprise, disagreement, and the like, and to reach a secure belief, belief being that on which one is prepared to act. That let Peirce frame scientific inquiry as part of a broader spectrum and as spurred, like inquiry generally, by actual doubt, not mere verbal, quarrelsome, or hyperbolic doubt, which he held to be fruitless. Peirce sketched four methods of settling opinion, ordered from least to most successful:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce held that, in practical affairs, slow and stumbling ratiocination is often dangerously inferior to instinct and traditional sentiment, and that the scientific method is best suited to theoretical research, which in turn should not be trammeled by the other methods and practical ends; reason's "first rule" is that, in order to learn, one must desire to learn and, as a corollary, must not block the way of inquiry. Scientific method excels over the others finally by being deliberately designed to arrive—eventually—at the most secure beliefs, upon which the most successful practices can be based. Starting from the idea that people seek not truth "per se" but instead to subdue irritating, inhibitory doubt, Peirce showed how, through the struggle, some can come to submit to truth for the sake of belief's integrity, seek as truth the guidance of potential conduct correctly to its given goal, and wed themselves to the scientific method.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Insofar as clarification by pragmatic reflection suits explanatory hypotheses and fosters predictions and testing, pragmatism points beyond the usual duo of foundational alternatives: deduction from self-evident truths, or "rationalism"; and induction from experiential phenomena, or "empiricism".


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Based on his critique of three modes of argument and different from either foundationalism or coherentism, Peirce's approach seeks to justify claims by a three-phase dynamic of inquiry:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Thereby, Peirce devised an approach to inquiry far more solid than the flatter image of inductive generalization "simpliciter", which is a mere re-labeling of phenomenological patterns. Peirce's pragmatism was the first time the scientific method was proposed as an epistemology for philosophical questions.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: A theory that succeeds better than its rivals in predicting and controlling our world is said to be nearer the truth. This is an operational notion of truth used by scientists.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce extracted the pragmatic model or theory of inquiry from its raw materials in classical logic and refined it in parallel with the early development of symbolic logic to address problems about the nature of scientific reasoning.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Abduction, deduction, and induction make incomplete sense in isolation from one another but comprise a cycle understandable as a whole insofar as they collaborate toward the common end of inquiry. In the pragmatic way of thinking about conceivable practical implications, every thing has a purpose, and, as possible, its purpose should first be denoted. Abduction hypothesizes an explanation for deduction to clarify into implications to be tested so that induction can evaluate the hypothesis, in the struggle to move from troublesome uncertainty to more secure belief. No matter how traditional and needful it is to study the modes of inference in abstraction from one another, the integrity of inquiry strongly limits the effective modularity of its principal components.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce's outline of the scientific method in §III–IV of "A Neglected Argument" is summarized below (except as otherwise noted). There he also reviewed plausibility and inductive precision (issues of critique of arguments).


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: 1. (or retroductive) phase. Guessing, inference to explanatory hypotheses for selection of those best worth trying. From abduction, Peirce distinguishes induction as inferring, on the basis of tests, the proportion of truth in the hypothesis. Every inquiry, whether into ideas, brute facts, or norms and laws, arises from surprising observations in one or more of those realms (and for example at any stage of an inquiry already underway). All explanatory content of theories comes from abduction, which guesses a new or outside idea so as to account in a simple, economical way for a surprising or complicated phenomenon. The modicum of success in our guesses far exceeds that of random luck, and seems born of attunement to nature by developed or inherent instincts, especially insofar as best guesses are optimally plausible and simple in the sense of the "facile and natural", as by Galileo's natural light of reason and as distinct from "logical simplicity". Abduction is the most fertile but least secure mode of inference. Its general rationale is inductive: it succeeds often enough and it has no substitute in expediting us toward new truths. In 1903, Peirce called pragmatism "the logic of abduction". Coordinative method leads from abducting a plausible hypothesis to judging it for its testability and for how its trial would economize inquiry itself. The hypothesis, being insecure, needs to have practical implications leading at least to mental tests and, in science, lending themselves to scientific tests. A simple but unlikely guess, if not costly to test for falsity, may belong first in line for testing. A guess is intrinsically worth testing if it has plausibility or reasoned objective probability, while subjective likelihood, though reasoned, can be misleadingly seductive. Guesses can be selected for trial strategically, for their caution (for which Peirce gave as example the game of Twenty Questions), breadth, or incomplexity. One can discover only that which would be revealed through their sufficient experience anyway, and so the point is to expedite it; economy of research demands the leap, so to speak, of abduction and governs its art.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: 3. phase. Evaluation of the hypothesis, inferring from observational or experimental tests of its deduced consequences. The long-run validity of the rule of induction is deducible from the principle (presuppositional to reasoning in general) that the real "is only the object of the final opinion to which sufficient investigation would lead"; in other words, anything excluding such a process would never be real. Induction involving the ongoing accumulation of evidence follows "a method which, sufficiently persisted in", will "diminish the error below any predesignate degree". Three stages:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce drew on the methodological implications of the four incapacities—no genuine introspection, no intuition in the sense of non-inferential cognition, no thought but in signs, and no conception of the absolutely incognizable—to attack philosophical Cartesianism, of which he said that:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce divided metaphysics into (1) ontology or general metaphysics, (2) psychical or religious metaphysics, and (3) physical metaphysics.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce was a scholastic realist, declaring for the reality of generals as early as 1868. Regarding modalities (possibility, necessity, etc.), he came in later years to regard himself as having wavered earlier as to just how positively real the modalities are. In his 1897 "The Logic of Relatives" he wrote:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce retained, as useful for some purposes, the definitions in terms of information states, but insisted that the pragmaticist is committed to a strong modal realism by conceiving of objects in terms of predictive general conditional propositions about how they "would" behave under certain circumstances.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce believed in God, and characterized such belief as founded in an instinct explorable in musing over the worlds of ideas, brute facts, and evolving habits—and it is a belief in God not as an "actual" or "existent" being (in Peirce's sense of those words), but all the same as a "real" being. In "" (1908), Peirce sketches, for God's reality, an argument to a hypothesis of God as the Necessary Being, a hypothesis which he describes in terms of how it would tend to develop and become compelling in musement and inquiry by a normal person who is led, by the hypothesis, to consider as being purposed the features of the worlds of ideas, brute facts, and evolving habits (for example scientific progress), such that the thought of such purposefulness will "stand or fall with the hypothesis"; meanwhile, according to Peirce, the hypothesis, in supposing an "infinitely incomprehensible" being, starts off at odds with its own nature as a purportively true conception, and so, no matter how much the hypothesis grows, it both (A) inevitably regards itself as partly true, partly vague, and as continuing to define itself without limit, and (B) inevitably has God appearing likewise vague but growing, though God as the Necessary Being is not vague or growing; but the hypothesis will hold it to be "more" false to say the opposite, that God is purposeless. Peirce also argued that the will is free and (see Synechism) that there is at least an attenuated kind of immortality.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce held the view, which he called objective idealism, that "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws". Peirce asserted the reality of (1) absolute chance (his tychist view), (2) mechanical necessity (anancist view), and (3) that which he called the law of love (agapist view), echoing his categories Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively. He held that fortuitous variation (which he also called "sporting"), mechanical necessity, and creative love are the three modes of evolution (modes called "tychasm", "anancasm", and "agapasm") of the cosmos and its parts. He found his conception of agapasm embodied in Lamarckian evolution; the overall idea in any case is that of evolution tending toward an end or goal, and it could also be the evolution of a mind or a society; it is the kind of evolution which manifests workings of mind in some general sense. He said that overall he was a synechist, holding with reality of continuity, especially of space, time, and law.


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce outlined two fields, "Cenoscopy" and "Science of Review", both of which he called philosophy. Both included philosophy about science. In 1903 he arranged them, from more to less theoretically basic, thus:


title: Charles Sanders Peirce

text: Peirce placed, within Science of Review, the work and theory of classifying the sciences (including mathematics and philosophy). His classifications, on which he worked for many years, draw on argument and wide knowledge, and are of interest both as a map for navigating his philosophy and as an accomplished polymath's survey of research in his time.


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: Aladdin and the King of Thieves is a 1996 American direct-to-video animated musical fantasy adventure film produced by Walt Disney Television Animation. It is the second sequel to the 1992 film "Aladdin", and serves as the final chapter and installment of the "Arabian Nights"-inspired Disney franchise beginning with the first film, and continuing with its first direct-to-video sequel "The Return of Jafar" and the animated TV series.


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: The film is inspired by the tale "Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves" from "One Thousand and One Nights", replacing Ali Baba with Aladdin, and for the first time since the original "Aladdin", the film has a completely new soundtrack instead of the rearranged music from the original film for "The Return of Jafar" and the series. This film also marks the return of actor Robin Williams, reprising his role as Genie from the first film and not by Dan Castellaneta, who voiced him in the second film, the series, and other media afterwards.


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: Though this film serves as the series finale of the television series, the characters also appear in a 1999 crossover episode of the animated series "Hercules", titled "Hercules and the Arabian Night", as well as the 2007 direct-to-video title called "", both of them after this plot. The film received mixed to negative reviews, although it was deemed an improvement over "The Return of Jafar".


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: At Agrabah, Aladdin and Princess Jasmine prepare to get married. During the ceremony, the legendary Forty Thieves appear, trying to steal a magical staff. After driving them off, Aladdin and his friends discover the Oracle, a woman within the staff that has the power to answer a single question about absolutely anything to any individual. She reveals that the Thieves want the staff to get to the "ultimate treasure". She hints to Aladdin that all his questions can be answered by his father, who is alive still, much to everyone's surprise. According to the oracle, Aladdin's father is with the Forty Thieves, "trapped within their world".


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: Aladdin, along with Abu, Iago and Carpet, tracks the thieves and stows away into their hideout, Mount Sesame. There, he discovers that his father Cassim is actually the King of Thieves, their leader. The two have a brief, heartfelt reunion before Cassim's chief subordinate Sa'luk tries to punish Aladdin for infiltrating in their hideout. Cassim, however, cleverly suggests that Aladdin instead face the initiation ritual known as "the Challenge": if he defeats another one of the Forty Thieves, he can take their place. Aladdin defeats Sa'luk and is welcomed into the band. Cassim then reveals why he left his wife and son: to find the Hand of Midas, a powerful artifact that can transform anything it touches into gold. Cassim believed that, with it, he could return to his family and get them out of poverty. With the staff, he could question the oracle as to the precise whereabouts of the artifact. Aladdin convinces Cassim to return with him to Agrabah to live an honest life. Initially hesitant, Cassim agrees after realizing that the wedding can be his last chance to get the Oracle.


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: For a while, Cassim is glad to spend quality time with Aladdin and his friends. However, he decides to carry on his original scheme with Iago as his new henchman. Meanwhile, Sa'luk travels to Agrabah and sells out his fellow thieves by telling Razoul the password to their hideout in exchange for immunity from prosecution. After all but seven of the thieves are captured, Razoul learns that Aladdin is one of the forty, and his father Cassim is the King himself. While attempting to steal the Oracle, Cassim and Iago are captured by the royal guards, and Razoul reveals to the Sultan that Cassim is the King of Thieves. The Sultan has Cassim and Iago imprisoned for life. Aladdin frees them, but is discovered by Razoul. Despite being a criminal, Aladdin returns to the palace to take responsibility for his actions. The Sultan makes ready to punish Aladdin, but Genie and Jasmine come to his defense, stating that all he wanted was to give his father a second chance. Understanding this, The Sultan accepts Aladdin's apology and resumes preparations for the wedding.


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: Cassim and Iago return to Mount Sesame, only to be captured by Sa'luk and the remaining seven thieves, who force them to use the oracle to find the location of the Hand of Midas. The Oracle directs them to the Vanishing Isle, a marble fortress built on the back of an enormous turtle that periodically dives to the bottom of the ocean, where the Hand is hidden. Iago gets away and goes off to lead Aladdin and Jasmine, Abu and Carpet to his imprisoned father. Aladdin manages to free and reconcile with his father. Working together, they retrieve the Hand just as the turtle is starting to submerge. However, they are ambushed by Sa'luk, who takes Aladdin hostage, demanding that Cassim surrender the Hand. Cassim throws the Hand to Sa'luk, who grabs it by the wrong end and is transformed into a lifeless gold statue. Realizing that his obsession has only brought trouble and his son is actually his ultimate treasure, Cassim throws the Hand into the ship with the remaining thieves aboard, turning it into gold and sinking it.


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: That night, Aladdin and Jasmine finally get married, with all their friends and family present. Cassim watches the wedding from afar, since he is still a wanted man, and Iago decides to join him on his travels.


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: Additional voices are provided by Jeff Bennett, Corey Burton, Jess Harnell, Clyde Kusatsu, Rob Paulsen, and Frank Welker.


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: Following the success of "The Return of Jafar", Disney announced in January 1995 that a third film was in production. Later in June, it was scheduled for a home video release in 1996. In September 1995, it was confirmed that Robin Williams would reprise the role of the Genie reportedly for a $1 million salary after he received an apology from Joe Roth for Disney breaching an agreement not to use his voice to merchandise products inspired by "Aladdin". With Williams on board, all recordings and animation footage of Dan Castellaneta as the Genie was scrapped, and all of the Genie's scenes were rewritten to fit Williams' comedic style.


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: Upon its release, the film was accompanied by a marketing campaign at more than $70 million with commercial tie-ins with Best Western, Welch's, Chuck E. Cheese's, Tropicana, Reese's, Hershey's, TGI Fridays, Red Lobster, Friendly's, Applebee's, SEGA, Hasbro, Dairy Queen, Popeyes, Wendy's, Mattel, McDonald's, Scholastic, General Mills, Wawa, Kellogg's, Mars, Nestlé, Cadbury, Holiday Inn Express, Holiday Inn, Days Inn, Capcom, Oral-B, Duracell, Energizer and Kodak.


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: At the time of its release, "King of Thieves" was reportedly outselling "The Return of Jafar", but Disney declined to disclose actual sales figures for the release. In 1996, the film sold million units in the United States, generating at least in sales revenue. It was the sixth best-selling film video release in the United States during 1996.


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: On January 18, 2005, the film was re-released as a special edition DVD and VHS, the same day as the previous film, "The Return of Jafar", with the DVD version receiving digitally restored picture, remastered sound, two additional games, and a behind-the-scenes bonus feature. However, the film was matted into a 1.85:1 anamorphic widescreen ratio (an aspect ratio Disney has rarely used for television animation at the time). The DVD went back into the Disney Vault along with the other two films in the series in January 2008. "Aladdin and the King of Thieves", along with "The Return of Jafar", was released on Blu-ray/DVD/Digital HD Combo Pack on January 5, 2016 as a Disney Movie Club exclusive in North America (with both films matted into a 1.78:1 widescreen ratio this time).


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: Based on 12 reviews collected by Rotten Tomatoes, the film received a 33% approval rating from critics, with an average score of 4.84/10. Caryn James of "The New York Times" praised the sequel as "far better than "The Return of Jafar"", while acknowledging that "the video has some other weak spots, but these hardly matter when "Aladdin and the King of Thieves" is so brimming with comic invention and adventure." Scott Blakey of the "Chicago Tribune" wrote that the story grows tedious after an hour and recommended "The Fool and the Flying Ship" instead. "The Washington Post" stated the "art of animation is strictly Saturday morning quality again (jobbed out to Disney's overseas JV team), and the score is a long step backward from the original, meaning the movie lacks the lingering resonance and memorable visual moments of Disney's big-budget affairs. Essentially, the movie is comparable to other reputable animated titles like "The Swan Princess" and "Balto" – pretty good, but not exactly Disney."


title: Aladdin and the King of Thieves

text: In 2005, screenwriter Robert Reece pitched a fourth "Aladdin" film to DisneyToon executives, although it never came to fruition.


title: Rickshaw

text: A rickshaw originally denoted a two- or three-wheeled passenger cart, now known as a pulled rickshaw, which is generally pulled by one person carrying one passenger. The first known use of the term was in 1879. Over time, cycle rickshaws (also known as pedicabs or trishaws), auto rickshaws, and electric rickshaws were invented, and have replaced the original pulled rickshaws, with a few exceptions for their use in tourism.


title: Rickshaw

text: Pulled rickshaws created a popular form of transportation, and a source of employment for male labourers, within Asian cities in the 19th century. Their appearance was related to newly acquired knowledge of ball-bearing systems. Their popularity declined as cars, trains and other forms of transportation became widely available.


title: Rickshaw

text: Auto rickshaws are becoming more popular in some cities in the 21st century as an alternative to taxis because of their low cost of hire.


title: Rickshaw

text: "Rickshaw" originates from the Japanese word "jinrikisha" (, "jin" = human, "riki" = power or force, "sha" = vehicle), which literally means "human-powered vehicle".


title: Rickshaw

text: The first rickshaws were invented in France in the late 17th century, to fulfill, along with other types of carriages such as cabriolets and fiacres, the unmet demand for public transportation created by the 1679 cessation of Paris' first omnibus service. These vehicles, called "vinaigrettes" for their resemblance to the handcarts used by contemporary vinegar-sellers, were fully-enclosed two-wheeled carriages with space for a single person. Usually, they were moved by two people; one holding the bars at the front and the other pushing from behind.


title: Rickshaw

text: Rickshaws were independently invented in Japan circa 1869, after the lifting of a ban on wheeled vehicles from the Tokugawa period (1603–1868), and at the beginning of a period of rapid technical advancement in Japan.


title: Rickshaw

text: There are many theories about the inventor, with the most likely and widely accepted theory describing the rickshaw as having been invented in Japan in 1869, by Izumi Yosuke, who formed a partnership with Suzuki Tokujiro and Takayama Kosuke to build the vehicles, having been "inspired by the horse carriages that had been introduced to the streets of Tokyo a few years earlier".


title: Rickshaw

text: Though the origins of the rickshaw are not entirely clear, they seem to be Japanese, and of Tokyo specifically. The most widely accepted theory offers the name of three inventors, and gives 1869 as the date of invention.


title: Rickshaw

text: The vehicle had a wooden carriage that rode on "superior Western wheels" and was a dramatic improvement over earlier modes of transportation. Whereas the earlier sedan chairs required two people, the rickshaw generally only required one. More than one person was required for hilly or mountainous areas. It also provided a smoother ride for the passenger. Other forms of vehicles at the time were drawn by animals or were wheelbarrows. The vehicle also has an collapsible hood for protection from sun or rain.


title: Rickshaw

text: The Powerhouse Museum in Sydney, has had a rickshaw in its collection for over 120 years. It was made about 1880 and is described as:


title: Rickshaw

text: A rickshaw, or jinrikisha, is a light, two-wheeled cart consisting of a doorless, chairlike body, mounted on springs with a collapsible hood and two shafts. Finished in black lacquer-ware over timber, it was drawn by a single rickshaw runner.


title: Rickshaw

text: In the Late 19th century, hand-pulled rickshaws became an inexpensive, popular mode of transportation across Asia. Peasants who migrated to large Asian cities often worked first as a rickshaw runner. It was "the deadliest occupation in the East, [and] the most degrading for human beings to pursue."


title: Rickshaw

text: Starting in 1870, the Tokyo government issued a permit to build and sell 人力車 (jinrikisha: rickshaw in Japanese) to the trio that are believed in Asia to be the rickshaw's inventors: Izumi Yosuke, Takayama Kosuke, and Suzuki Tokujiro. In order to operate a rickshaw in Tokyo, a seal was required from these men. By 1872, they replaced the kago and norimono, becoming the main mode of transportation in Japan, with about 40,000 rickshaws in service. At that time man-power was much cheaper than horse-power; horses were generally only used by the military. Some of the rickshaws were artistically decorated with paintings and rear elevations. In this time, the more exuberant styles of decorations were banned. If the families were well-off financially they might have their own rickshaw runner. Generally, runners covered in a day, at an average traveling speed of .


title: Rickshaw

text: Singapore received its first rickshaws in 1880 and soon after they were prolific, making a "noticeable change in the traffic on Singapore's streets." Bullock carts and gharries were used before rickshaws were introduced.


title: Rickshaw

text: Many of the poorest individuals in Singapore in the late nineteenth century were poverty-stricken, unskilled people of Chinese ancestry. Sometimes called coolies, the hardworking men found that pulling a rickshaw was a new opportunity for employment.


title: Rickshaw

text: In China, the rickshaw was first seen in 1873 and was used for public transportation the following year. Within a year there were 10,000 rickshaws in operation. Around 1880 rickshaws appeared in India, first introduced in Simla by Reverend J. Fordyce. At the turn of the century they were introduced in Calcutta, India, and by 1914 were a conveyance for hire. The rickshaw was also introduced to Korea in the late 19th century.


title: Rickshaw

text: Hand-pulled rickshaws became an embarrassment to modernizing urban elites in the Third World, and were widely banned, in part because they were symbolic, not of modernity, but of a feudal world of openly marked class distinctions. Perhaps the seated rickshaw passenger is too close to the back of the laboring driver, who, besides, is metaphorically a draught animal harnessed between shafts.


title: Rickshaw

text: The cycle rickshaw was built in the 1880s and was first used with regularity starting in 1929 in Singapore. They were found in every south and east Asian country by 1950. By the late 1980s there were estimated 4 million cycle rickshaws in the world.


title: Rickshaw

text: Rickshaws were introduced to Durban, South Africa, and by 1904 there were about 2,000 registered rickshaw pullers. Rickshaws operated in Nairobi in the beginning of the 20th century; pullers went on strike there in 1908. In the 1920s, they were used in Bagamoyo, Tanga, Tanzania and other areas of East Africa for short distances.


title: Rickshaw

text: The rickshaw's popularity in Japan had declined by the 1930s with the advent of automated forms of transportation like automobiles and trains. After World War II, when gasoline and automobiles were scarce, they made a temporary comeback. The rickshaw tradition has stayed alive in Kyoto and Tokyo's geisha districts. In the 1990s, German-made cycle rickshaws called "velotaxis" were introduced in Japanese cities, including Kobe.


title: Rickshaw

text: In post-war Hong Kong, rickshaws was one of the main transportation either for transporting goods or for transporting people during the Japanese invasion, known as the Battle of Hong Kong. Japanese military hired many rickshaw pullers to have them gathered and organize with other cooks and seamen for an underground armed team to enact the anti-British Colony clan. However, after World War II, other forms of transport such as pedicabs and streetcar became strong competitors of rickshaws, leading the business of rickshaws into stagnation.


title: Rickshaw

text: Chiuchow men formed a faction within the Canton rickshaw pullers union in the 1920s. In addition, the Chiuchow pullers could be identified by their hats which were rounded and flat at the top; while the rival Hoklo men had a cone-shaped headgear with sharp points at the top. However, rickshaw use began to decline in the 1920s as the government introduced the streetcar system in 1924. The number of rickshaw pullers had declined from 44,200 to 25,877 six months after the opening of the tramway. It had also caused the Beijing tramway riot in October 1929. A rough form of a rickshaw is sometimes used for hauling coal, building materials or other material. Both motorized and pedal-power cycle rickshaws, or pedicabs, were used for short distance passenger travel. There are still many rickshaws in many cities for either touring purposes (in big cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, with traditional Chinese rickshaws) or short range transportation in some counties. However, the new Communist government banned rickshaws in Canton in the early 1950s, leading to another low tide of rickshaws.


title: Rickshaw

text: In Singapore, the rickshaw's popularity increased into the 20th century. There were approximately 50,000 rickshaws in 1920 and that number had doubled by 1930. Cycle rickshaws were used in Singapore beginning in 1929. Within six years pulled rickshaws were outnumbered by cycle rickshaws, which were also used by sightseeing tourists.


title: Rickshaw

text: In the 1930s, cycle rickshaws were used in Dhaka, Bangladesh, Kolkata, India; and Jakarta, Indonesia. By 1950 they could be found in many South and East Asian countries. By the end of the 20th century, there were 300,000 such vehicles in Dhaka. By the end of 2013, there were about 100,000 electric rickshaws in Delhi.


title: Rickshaw

text: Pedicabs were introduced in North America in 1962, where they were a means of transportation at the Seattle World's Fair in the state of Washington.


title: Rickshaw

text: The 21st century has seen a resurgence in rickshaws, particularly in motorized rickshaws and cycle rickshaws. Auto rickshaws, also called velotaxis, have resurged as they are about 1/3 to 1/2 the cost of regular taxis. German velotaxis are three-wheeled, powered vehicles with a space for a driver and, behind the driver, space for two passengers. Cycle rickshaws are used in many Asian, North American, and European cities. They are increasingly being used as an eco-friendly way of short-range transportation, particularly in urban areas. Along with auto rickshaws, they are also used (particularly by Asian cities) for tourism, because of their "novelty value as an entertaining form of transportation".


title: Rickshaw

text: In Madagascar, pulled cycle and auto rickshaws are a common form of transportation in a number of cities, especially Antsirabe. They are known as "pousse-pousse", meaning "push-push".


title: Rickshaw

text: Macau still uses tri-wheeled bicycle rickshaw, or riquexó in Portuguese, as Macau was a Portuguese colony in the past. This kind of transportation was very famous until the late 20th century, due to the fact of being a small city and few cars, not so many motorcycles, very bad public transport and no other transport such as train or subway. You can go around Macau peninsula and the twos island on rickshaw, and visit the Riquexó Museum and see the evolution of rickshaws from the 18th century until modern times.


title: Rickshaw

text: Automated cycle rickshaws, called velotaxis, are popular in Kyoto and Tokyo, Japan. Their use is growing at a rate of about 20–30% a year in Japanese cities. The traditional rickshaws are still alive for travelers in some tourist places in Japan. Rickshaws are found in Hong Kong. In China, automated and pedal-power cycle rickshaws, or pedicabs, are used for short distance passenger travel in large cities and many medium-sized cities. Most Indian cities offer auto rickshaw service; hand-pulled rickshaws do exist in some areas, such as Kolkata (Calcutta) as a part of their transport system which also includes cycle rickshaws. Sri Lanka has over 1 million auto rickshaws registered in use as of 2018.


title: Rickshaw

text: In Australia, cycle rickshaws or trishaws (3 wheels) are used in Melbourne and St Kilda. They are also seen in Cowaramup, Western Australia at Bakehouse '38.


title: Gina Philips

text: Gina Philips (née Consolo; born May 10, 1970) is an American actress. She had recurring roles on David E. Kelley's "Ally McBeal", as Sandy Hingle, and "Boston Public", as Jenna Miller. She is perhaps best known as Trish Jenner in the horror film "Jeepers Creepers" (2001). She reprised her role in a cameo in "Jeepers Creepers 3" (2017).


title: Gina Philips

text: Philips was born in Miami Beach, Florida, to an Italian father and an Ashkenazi Jewish mother. She attended the University of Pennsylvania but dropped out halfway through her senior year, in order to pursue acting. However, they allowed her to walk through graduation with the rest of her graduating class since she was only one class shy. Philips is known for her recurring roles on David E. Kelley's "Ally McBeal" as Sandy Hingle and "Boston Public" as Jenna Miller. She has also made guest appearances on "", "Sliders", "ER", "", "Medium" and "Monk".


title: Gina Philips

text: Philips landed her first supporting film role in "". It aired on the Fox Network on March 7, 1995. In 1996, Philips had a small role in "Unforgivable" as Tammy, the daughter of an abusive father. The film premiered on April 30, 1996, on CBS, and received little to no critical acclaim. In 1997, Philips played her first lead role in "Born Into Exile" as Holly, a 14-year-old runaway.


title: Gina Philips

text: In 2001, Philips was cast as a lead in the 2001 horror film "Jeepers Creepers". The film received mixed reviews from critics. In 2003, Philips was originally going to appear again as Trish Jenner in "Jeepers Creepers 2", as the plot was about her character and Patricia Belcher's character hunting down The Creeper, but the plot changed considerably during script rewrites, with Philips turning down what had become a minor role.


title: Gina Philips

text: Her next film was the American comedy drama "The Anarchist Cookbook", which received mostly negative reviews.


title: Gina Philips

text: In 2004, she starred in the low budget horror films "Dead & Breakfast" and "Jennifer's Shadow". In 2006, Philips again played a lead in a low-budget horror film, "Ring Around the Rosie" as a young woman plagued by horrible visions and dreams of tragic past events while spending time at her grandparents' secluded summerhouse. The next year she starred in the horror film "The Sickhouse" and the Lifetime television film "My Baby Is Missing". The film was released as a DVD under the title "Stolen Innocence" on 7 January 2010.


title: Gina Philips

text: In 2011, she began work on the Jennifer Lynch film "Chained" (previously titled "Rabbit") a Canadian psychological thriller filmed in Regina, Saskatchewan and released in 2012.


title: Gina Philips

text: She reprised her previous role, in a brief cameo, in the third "Jeepers Creepers" film, "Jeepers Creepers 3". Shooting began in Louisiana in February 2017, and the film was released in September of that year.


The 1792 United States presidential election was the second quadrennial presidential election. It was held from Friday, November 2, to Wednesday, December 5, 1792. Incumbent President George Washington was elected to a second term by a unanimous vote in the electoral college, while John Adams was re-elected as vice president. Washington was essentially unopposed, but Adams faced a competitive re-election against Governor George Clinton of New York.


title: 1792 United States presidential election

text: Electoral rules of the time required each presidential elector to cast two votes without distinguishing which was for president and which for vice president. The recipient of the most votes would then become president, and the runner-up vice president. The Democratic-Republican Party, which had organized in opposition to the policies of Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, supported Clinton for the position of vice president. Adams, meanwhile, was backed by the Federalist Party in his bid for another term. Neither party had fully organized, and partisan divisions had not yet solidified.


text: Washington received 132 electoral votes, one from each elector. Adams won 77 electoral votes, enough to win re-election. Clinton finished in third place with 50 electoral votes, taking his home state of New York as well as three Southern states. Two other candidates won the five remaining electoral votes. This election was the first in which each of the original 13 states appointed electors, as did the newly added states of Kentucky and Vermont.


text: In 1792, presidential elections were still conducted according to the original method established under the U.S. Constitution. Under this system, each elector cast two votes: the candidate who received the greatest number of votes (so long as they won a majority) became president, while the runner-up became vice president. The Twelfth Amendment would eventually replace this system, requiring electors to cast one vote for president and one vote for vice president, but this change did not take effect until 1804. Because of this, it is difficult to use modern-day terminology to describe the relationship among the candidates in this election.


text: Washington is generally held by historians to have run unopposed. Indeed, the incumbent president enjoyed bipartisan support and received one vote from every elector. The choice for vice president was more divisive. The Federalist Party threw its support behind the incumbent vice president, John Adams of Massachusetts, while the Democratic-Republican Party backed the candidacy of New York Governor George Clinton. Because few doubted that Washington would receive the greatest number of votes, Adams and Clinton were effectively competing for the vice presidency; under the letter of the law, however, they were technically candidates for president competing against Washington.


text: Born out of the Anti-Federalist faction that had opposed the Constitution in 1788, the Democratic-Republican Party was the main opposition to the agenda of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton. They had no chance of unseating Washington, but hoped to win the vice presidency by defeating the incumbent, Adams. Many Democratic-Republicans would have preferred to nominate Thomas Jefferson, their ideological leader and Washington's Secretary of State. However, this would have cost them the state of Virginia, as electors were not permitted to vote for two candidates from their home state and Washington was also a Virginian. Clinton, the Governor of New York and a former anti-Federalist leader, became the party's nominee after he won the backing of Jefferson and James Madison. Clinton was from an electorally important swing state, and he convinced party leaders that he would be a stronger candidate than another New Yorker, Senator Aaron Burr. A group of Democratic-Republican leaders met in Philadelphia in October 1792 and selected Clinton as the party's vice presidential candidate.


text: By 1792, a party division had emerged between Federalists led by Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, who desired a stronger federal government with a leading role in the economy, and the Democratic-Republicans led by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and Representative James Madison of Virginia, who favored states' rights and opposed Hamilton's economic program. Madison was at first a Federalist until he opposed the establishment of Hamilton's First Bank of the United States in 1791. He formed the Democratic-Republican Party along with Anti-Federalist Thomas Jefferson in 1792.


text: The elections of 1792 were the first ones in the United States to be contested on anything resembling a partisan basis. In most states, the congressional elections were recognized in some sense as a "struggle between the Treasury department and the republican interest," to use the words of Jefferson strategist John Beckley. In New York, the race for governor was fought along these lines. The candidates were Chief Justice John Jay, a Hamiltonian, and incumbent George Clinton, the party's vice presidential nominee.


text: Although Washington had been considering retiring, both sides encouraged him to remain in office to bridge factional differences. Washington was supported by practically all sides throughout his presidency and gained more popularity with the passage of the Bill of Rights. However, the Democratic-Republicans and the Federalists contested the vice-presidency, with incumbent John Adams as the Federalist nominee and George Clinton as the Democratic-Republican nominee. Federalists attacked Clinton for his past association with the anti-Federalists. Adams easily secured re-election.


text: Washington was re-elected unanimously, receiving one vote from each of the 132 participating electors. Adams received votes from 77 electors and Clinton 50; the four electors from Kentucky voted for Thomas Jefferson, and one South Carolina elector voted for Aaron Burr. The distribution of the electoral vote between the four runners-up showed a high degree of party discipline, with only two electors voting contrary to the majority in their state. Adams received the support of New England, South Carolina, and the Mid-Atlantic states (excepting New York), while Clinton carried New York and most of the South. Adams as the second-place finisher was elected vice president, serving until his election to the presidency in 1797; each of his three rivals would go on to serve as vice president in turn, Jefferson from 1797 to 1801 (when he alike succeeded to the presidency), Burr from 1801 to 1805, and Clinton from 1805 until his death in 1812.


text: Nine of the 15 states eligible to chose representatives to the electoral college did so by a vote of the state legislature; the remaining six employed some form of popular vote. Of these, complete returns from Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania survive; surviving returns from Virginia are incomplete, and popular vote records from Kentucky are not known to exist. Of the states with complete returns, only Pennsylvania saw real partisan competition; a Federalist electoral slate pledged to Washington and Adams was selected, although one elector voted for Washington and Clinton. At the time, party organizations were still in their infancy, and the partisan allegiance of the candidates was not always evident: it is therefore difficult to say whether the Pennsylvania vote for Clinton was an instance of a faithless elector, or an elector voting as pledged.


text: "Only 6 of the 15 states chose electors by any form of popular vote, while pre-Twelfth Amendment electoral vote rules obscure the intentions of the voters, and those states that did choose electors by popular vote restricted the vote via property requirements."<br>


text: Six of the fifteen states chose electors by any form of popular vote. The vote totals of Kentucky and Virginia appear to be lost. Vote totals for 13 of 76 Virginia counties exist.


text: The states chose 135 electors, out of whom 132 cast ballots. (Two electors from Maryland and one from Vermont were absent and did not vote.) As per the terms of the unamended constitution, each elector was permitted two votes for president, with a majority of "the whole number of electors appointed" necessary to elect a president. Each of the participating electors cast one vote for Washington, who was elected president. The electors were split on their second choice: Adams received 77 votes to Clinton's 50, enough to secure a second-place finish behind Washington and the vice presidency.


text: The Constitution, in Article II, Section 1, provided that the state legislatures should decide the manner in which their Electors were chosen. Different state legislatures chose different methods:


title: Evaluation

text: systematic determination and assessment of a subject's merit, worth and significance, using criteria governed by a set of standards. It can assist an organization, program, design, project or any other intervention or initiative to assess any aim, realisable concept/proposal, or any alternative, to help in decision-making; or to ascertain the degree of achievement or value in regard to the aim and objectives and results of any such action that has been completed. The primary purpose of evaluation, in addition to gaining insight into prior or existing initiatives, is to enable reflection and assist in the identification of future change. Evaluation is often used to characterize and appraise subjects of interest in a wide range of human enterprises, including the arts, criminal justice, foundations, non-profit organizations, government, health care, and other human services. It is long term and done at the end of a period of time.


title: Evaluation

text: Evaluation is the structured interpretation and giving of meaning to predicted or actual impacts of proposals or results. It looks at original objectives, and at what is either predicted or what was accomplished and how it was accomplished. So evaluation can be formative, that is taking place during the development of a concept or proposal, project or organization, with the intention of improving the value or effectiveness of the proposal, project, or organisation. It can also be summative, drawing lessons from a completed action or project or an organisation at a later point in time or circumstance.


title: Evaluation

text: Evaluation is inherently a theoretically informed approach (whether explicitly or not), and consequently any particular definition of evaluation would have been tailored to its contextthe theory, needs, purpose, and methodology of the evaluation process itself. Having said this, evaluation has been defined as:


title: Evaluation

text: The main purpose of a program evaluation can be to "determine the quality of a program by formulating a judgment" Marthe Hurteau, Sylvain Houle, Stéphanie Mongiat (2009). An alternative view is that "projects, evaluators, and other stakeholders (including funders) will all have potentially different ideas about how best to evaluate a project since each may have a different definition of 'merit'. The core of the problem is thus about defining what is of value."


title: Evaluation

text: From this perspective, evaluation "is a contested term", as "evaluators" use the term evaluation to describe an assessment, or investigation of a program whilst others simply understand evaluation as being synonymous with applied research.


title: Evaluation

text: There are two function considering to the evaluation purpose Formative Evaluations provide the information on the improving a product or a process Summative Evaluations provide information of short-term effectiveness or long-term impact to deciding the adoption of a product or process.


title: Evaluation

text: Not all evaluations serve the same purpose some evaluations serve a monitoring function rather than focusing solely on measurable program outcomes or evaluation findings and a full list of types of evaluations would be difficult to compile. This is because evaluation is not part of a unified theoretical framework, drawing on a number of disciplines, which include management and organisational theory, policy analysis, education, sociology, social anthropology, and social change.


title: Evaluation

text: However, the strict adherence to a set of methodological assumptions may make the field of evaluation more acceptable to a mainstream audience but this adherence will work towards preventing evaluators from developing new strategies for dealing with the myriad problems that programs face. It is claimed that only a minority of evaluation reports are used by the evaluand (client) (Datta, 2006). One justification of this is that "when evaluation findings are challenged or utilization has failed, it was because stakeholders and clients found the inferences weak or the warrants unconvincing" (Fournier and Smith, 1993). Some reasons for this situation may be the failure of the evaluator to establish a set of shared aims with the evaluand, or creating overly ambitious aims, as well as failing to compromise and incorporate the cultural differences of individuals and programs within the evaluation aims and process. None of these problems are due to a lack of a definition of evaluation but are rather due to evaluators attempting to impose predisposed notions and definitions of evaluations on clients. The central reason for the poor utilization of evaluations is arguably due to the lack of tailoring of evaluations to suit the needs of the client, due to a predefined idea (or definition) of what an evaluation is rather than what the client needs are (House, 1980). The development of a standard methodology for evaluation will require arriving at applicable ways of asking and stating the results of questions about ethics such as agent-principal, privacy, stakeholder definition, limited liability; and could-the-money-be-spent-more-wisely issues.


title: Evaluation

text: Depending on the topic of interest, there are professional groups that review the quality and rigor of evaluation processes.


title: Evaluation

text: Evaluating programs and projects, regarding their value and impact within the context they are implemented, can be ethically challenging. Evaluators may encounter complex, culturally specific systems resistant to external evaluation. Furthermore, the project organization or other stakeholders may be invested in a particular evaluation outcome. Finally, evaluators themselves may encounter "conflict of interest (COI)" issues, or experience interference or pressure to present findings that support a particular assessment.


title: Evaluation

text: General professional codes of conduct, as determined by the employing organization, usually cover three broad aspects of behavioral standards, and include inter-collegial relations (such as respect for diversity and privacy), operational issues (due competence, documentation accuracy and appropriate use of resources), and conflicts of interest (nepotism, accepting gifts and other kinds of favoritism). However, specific guidelines particular to the evaluator's role that can be utilized in the management of unique ethical challenges are required. The Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation has developed standards for program, personnel, and student evaluation. The Joint Committee standards are broken into four sections: Utility, Feasibility, Propriety, and Accuracy. Various European institutions have also prepared their own standards, more or less related to those produced by the Joint Committee. They provide guidelines about basing value judgments on systematic inquiry, evaluator competence and integrity, respect for people, and regard for the general and public welfare.


title: Evaluation

text: The American Evaluation Association has created a set of Guiding Principles for evaluators. The order of these principles does not imply priority among them; priority will vary by situation and evaluator role. The principles run as follows:


title: Evaluation

text: Furthermore, the international organizations such as the I.M.F. and the World Bank have independent evaluation functions. The various funds, programmes, and agencies of the United Nations has a mix of independent, semi-independent and self-evaluation functions, which have organized themselves as a system-wide UN Evaluation Group (UNEG), that works together to strengthen the function, and to establish UN norms and standards for evaluation. There is also an evaluation group within the OECD-DAC, which endeavors to improve development evaluation standards. The independent evaluation units of the major multinational development banks (MDBs) have also created the Evaluation Cooperation Group to strengthen the use of evaluation for greater MDB effectiveness and accountability, share lessons from MDB evaluations, and promote evaluation harmonization and collaboration.


title: Evaluation

text: The word "evaluation" has various connotations for different people, raising issues related to this process that include; what type of evaluation should be conducted; why there should be an evaluation process and how the evaluation is integrated into a program, for the purpose of gaining greater knowledge and awareness? There are also various factors inherent in the evaluation process, for example; to critically examine influences within a program that involve the gathering and analyzing of relative information about a program.


title: Evaluation

text: Founded on another perspective of evaluation by Thomson and Hoffman in 2003, it is possible for a situation to be encountered, in which the process could not be considered advisable; for instance, in the event of a program being unpredictable, or unsound. This would include it lacking a consistent routine; or the concerned parties unable to reach an agreement regarding the purpose of the program. In addition, an influencer, or manager, refusing to incorporate relevant, important central issues within the evaluation