title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Britain's Debt Justice charity, formerly the Jubilee Debt Campaign, found in a 2022 study, based on World Bank figures, that more African governments' external debts were being owed to Western banks, asset managers and oil traders (35%) than to Chinese lenders (12%). It also found that interest rates charged on western private loans (5%) were almost double that of Chinese loans (2.7%) and that "the most indebted countries were less likely to have their debt dominated by China".


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Of 24 African countries that spent more than 15% of government revenue servicing debt in 2021, six countries - Angola, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Zambia - sent over a third of debt payments to Chinese lenders. Other private creditors accounted for over a third of payments in 12 countries.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Between 2006 and 2017, Kenya borrowed at least KSh. 1043.77 billion ($9.8 billion) from China. Chinese debt accounts for 21 percent of Kenya's foreign debt, and 72 percent of the country's bilateral debt. China lent Kenya funds to build highways and a railway between Mombasa and Nairobi totaling over US$6.5 billion by 2020. Kenya reportedly came close to default on Chinese loans to develop its largest and most lucrative port, the Port of Mombasa, in late December 2018; there was speculation that a default could have forced Kenya to relinquish control of the port to China. However, reports have cast doubt on Chinese debt-trap threat to the port. Kenyan media have debated whether Chinese loans are worth the risk, drawing analogies with the experience of Sri Lanka and saying that these loans could jeopardize Kenyan sovereignty.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: South Africa owes an estimated four percent of its annual gross domestic product to China. The country received multiple tranches of Chinese loans, some of which have raised concerns about opaque conditions and links to corruption. This includes a controversial $2.5 billion loan from the China Development Bank to the state-owned South African electrical utility Eskom which was arranged under the Jacob Zuma government. Another $2.5 billion loan to Eskom from Huarong Energy (a private Chinese company) was found improper by the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into state corruption, prompting Eskom chairperson Jabu Mabuza to say that the company would not repay the loan due to irregularities and corruption involved in the loan process.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: An additional R 370 billion ($25.8 billion) loan from the China Development Bank during the presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa was made to promote a 2018 economic stimulus package. The South African government initially described the loan as a "gift"; details of the loan were not made public, generating controversy. The government justified the loan, saying that the interest rate was not exorbitant but could not be disclosed due to a confidentiality clause. The loan was criticized by the opposition Democratic Alliance for risking the country's fall into a "debt trap".


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: In October 2021, an investigation by the Parliament of Uganda concluded that non-public loan terms by Exim Bank of China for a $200 million expansion of Entebbe International Airport were onerous and could potentially lead to the loss of the airport in case of default. In November 2021, the Chinese embassy in Uganda rejected statements that the airport might be confiscated. A 2022 study of the loan contract by AidData stated that the airport was not at risk of seizure.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Based on 2018 statistics in "The Economist", China probably holds one-fourth to one-third of Zambia's external debt (comparable to other creditors, such as the U.S. and the World Bank. That year, Zambian lawmakers debated whether Chinese loans put Zambian sovereignty at risk. According to "Africa Confidential", ZESCO (Zambia's state-owned power company) was in talks about repossession by a Chinese company. The Zambian government denied ZESCO privatization allegations. In July 2022, a committee of creditors co-chaired by China and France stated that they were committed to negotiating a restructuring of debt with Zambia under a G20 framework.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Critics of Chinese foreign policy argue that loans to Sri Lanka by the Exim Bank of China to build the Hambantota International Port and the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport are examples of debt-trap diplomacy. In 2007, the state-owned Chinese firms China Harbour Engineering Company and Sinohydro Corporation were hired to build the port for $361 million. Exim funded 85 percent of the project at an annual interest rate of 6.3 percent. After the project began losing money and Sri Lanka's debt-servicing burden increased, its government decided to lease the project to state-owned China Merchants Port on a 99-year lease for cash. The $1.12 billion lease to the Chinese company was used by Sri Lanka to address balance-of-payment issues. This raised concerns in the United States, Japan and India that the port might be used as a Chinese naval base to contain the country's geopolitical rivals, and the Chinese government might foreclose on the project.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Brahma Chellaney noted that China had gained considerable diplomatic leverage during the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa and enlarged its footprint in Sri Lanka. When a new government took power, Sri Lanka was on the "brink of default" and the new government had no choice but "to turn around and embrace China again". Chellaney described the Hambantota port as a strategically important natural asset with long-term value to China, even if it lacked short-term commercial viability. He said that China does not evaluate a borrrower's creditworthiness, and will lend even if a loan would place a borrower in debt distress. It was later learned that Sri Lanka's debt burden was $51 billion, and 95 percent of its government revenue was going to debt servicing.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Current Sri Lankan prime minister Mahinda Rajapaksa defended the country's relationship with China and rejected the country's debt trap image, adding that "China provided concessionary loans for many infrastructure projects [during the post-conflict development]." In regards to the Hambantota Port, he added, "The Hambantota Port is not a debt trap." Rajapaksa dismissed the view that Sri Lanka was forced to enter a 99-year lease with a Chinese company because of a failure to pay the project's debts, stating that the project is commercially viable and is transforming Sri Lanka's overall port infrastructure.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Karunasena Kodituwakku, the Sri Lankan ambassador to China, said that the Chinese government did not ask the Sri Lankan government to hand over the port; the Sri Lankan government initially asked China to lease the port. Other Sri Lankan representatives have noted that it made sense for Sri Lanka to welcome Chinese investment in the port because most of its commercial shipping was from that country."


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Deborah Bräutigam has disputed the usage of the term "debt-trap diplomacy". Concerning Sri Lanka, Bräutigam has noted that Chinese banks have been willing to restructure the terms of existing loans. She said that the Canadian International Development Agency financed the Canadian engineering and construction firm SNC-Lavalin's feasibility study for the port, and its study concluded in 2003 that construction of a port at Hambantota was feasible. A second feasibility report, concluded in 2006 by the Danish engineering firm Ramboll, reached a similar conclusion. According to Bräutigam, the port in Hambantota had to secure only a fraction of the cargo which went through Singapore to justify its existence. When President Maithripala Sirisena took office in 2015, Sri Lanka owed more to Japan, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank than to China; of the $4.5 billion in debt service Sri Lanka paid in 2017, only five percent was for Hambantota. Bräutigam was told by several Sri Lanka Central Bank governors that Hambantota (and Chinese finance in general) were not the major sources of the country's financial distress, and Bräutigam said that Sri Lanka did not default on any loans to China. Colombo had originally arranged a bailout from the IMF, but decided to raise the required funds by leasing the under-performing Hambantota Port to an experienced company as the Canadian feasibility study had recommended. Asanga Abeyagoonasekera, a Sri Lankan academic warned of a Chinese ‘strategic trap’ in Sri Lanka. Strategic-trap diplomacy term was coined by Asanga Abeyagoonasekera and published initially on 16 September 2021, assessing the Chinese Debt-trap diplomacy in Sri Lanka at an interview with Voice of America.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Chatham House published a research paper in 2020 concluding that Sri Lanka's debt distress was unconnected to Chinese lending, but resulted more from "domestic policy decisions" facilitated by Western lending and monetary policy than from Chinese government policies. The paper was skeptical of the claim that China could use Hambantota as a naval base (calling it "clearly erroneous"), and noted that Sri Lankan politicians and diplomats have repeatedly insisted that the topic was never brought up with Beijing; there has been no evidence of Chinese military activity at, or near, Hambantota since the port's lease began.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: The lease was delayed for several months by concerns about possible military use and by opposition from trade unions and political parties, who called it a sellout of Sri Lankan national assets to China. Sri Lanka has indicated that it is reconsidering the lease of the Hambantota port to China.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Local newspapers have published cartoons of Sri Lanka pleading for cash from neighboring SAARC countries. Indian observers have noted that the Colombo Port project with China has accelerated the country's debt crisis. According to Chinese state media, it is the largest project by China in Sri Lanka and has a total value of $1.4 billion. The damage to the once-prosperous tourism industry from the COVID-19 pandemic has also been blamed for failing to generate enough revenue to pay the country's debts.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: The 2022 Sri Lankan protests led to the resignation of former Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa. In 2022, Sri Lanka has suffered the worst economic crisis since it became independent in 1948. The country is confronting a severe food, fuel and medicine shortage. The country is also unable to severe its debt obligations to multiple creditors. Global financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank and World Bank, were seen as also responsible for addressing the crisis based on effective coordination with all creditors. Moreover, it was a result of combined effects that brought about the collapse of the Sri Lankan economy, including the COVID-19 pandemic, surging energy and food prices in the aftermath of the 2022 Ukraine conflict.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Pakistan has received $42.7 billion in World Bank assistance since 1980, of which $33.4 billion are loans and $9.3 billion are grants; this has allowed the bank to exert local and national decision-making power in the country via public contracts and the appointment of State Bank of Pakistan governors. According to State Bank data, Pakistan's debt to the People's Republic of China was $7.2 billion in 2017; it increased to $19 billion by April 2018 and $30 billion by 2020, primarily due to loans to fund China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects. "The New York Times" reported the investments' emerging military dimension in December 2018, calling it an opaque, poorly-governed debt trap. Experts have estimated that Pakistan would require nearly 40 years to pay back its debt to China. A number of scholars have said that the CPEC "subordinates Pakistan's interests to China's", and the CPEC and Pakistan's growing economic dependence on China could become a threat to Pakistan's sovereignty.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: China and Pakistan signed a 2017 agreement to build five hydropower projects, with China investing $50 billion. According to Hassan Abbas, a Pakistani-American scholar in South Asian and Middle Eastern studies, project delays are likely to escalate costs to $98 billion. With accumulated interest of almost $5 billion per year, Pakistan would have to pay almost $200 billion over 20 years to China; scholars suggest that the debt could give China undue influence in Pakistan's affairs. Part of the agreement was scrapped by Pakistan in late 2017 due to objections to its terms.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: China financed $22 billion in Malaysian projects during the administration of Prime Minister Najib Razak. Razak made a 31 May 2014 state visit to China, during which he was welcomed by Chinese premier Li Keqiang. China and Malaysia pledged to increase their bilateral trade to $160 billion by 2017 and increase economic and financial co-operation, especially in the production of halal food, water processing, railway construction, and ports.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Malaysia has several Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects under construction, including the East Coast Rail Line, Kuantan Port Expansion, Green Technology Park in Pahang, Forest City, Robotic Future City, and Samalaju Industrial Park Steel Complex.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: In September 2018, Minister of Finance Lim Guan Eng cancelled two contracts, worth approximately $2.795 billion, with China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau for oil and gas pipelines. Mahathir Mohamad and Finance Minister Lim Guan Eng criticized the projects as expensive, unnecessary, superfluous, non-competitive (because open bidding was prohibited), conducted with no public oversight, and favored Chinese state-owned firms and those affiliated with Razak's United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) party at inflated prices. Residents of Malacca City said that the port was unnecessary, and the small company which received the contract had ties to the previously ruling UMNO.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: About China's String of Pearls strategy in the Indian Ocean and China's motives in Malaysia and the Strait of Malacca, Malaysian Deputy Minister of Defense Liew Chin Tong said: "You look at a map and you can see the places where China is plotting ports and investments, from Myanmar to Pakistan to Sri Lanka, on toward Djibouti. What's crucial to all that? Our little Malaysia, and the Malacca Strait. I say publicly that we do not want to see warships in the Strait of Malacca or the South China Sea." The loans were later renegotiated; Mahathir Mohamad pledged support for the BRI, and was a key opening speaker at the 2019 BRI Summit in Beijing.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: People's Majlis (the Maldives parliament) speaker and former president Mohamed Nasheed said in December 2019 that the Maldives owed China $3.5 billion in loans, which included $1.5 billion in government-to-government loans, private loans, and sovereign guarantees. Nasheed said that the Chinese debt trap was an economic and human-rights issue, and an issue of sovereignty and freedom of the island nation. Nasheed has also said that project costs were inflated, and the debt on paper is far greater than the $1.1 billion actually received.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: According to the World Bank, by the end of 2021, Laos's public debt had skyrocketed to 88% of gross domestic product, with Chinese creditors accounting for a 47% share of foreign debt. In addition, Laos owes 11% of its debt to China from bilateral loans. The firing of Bank of the Lao P.D.R. Governor Sonexay Sitphaxay in June 2022 hints at the economic crisis and panic.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: According to Brahma Chellaney, China has taken effective control of Laos's electricity grid and, by extension, its water resources. Given the small size of Laos's economy with just seven million citizens, he finds China being able to exert enormous power over its resources.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: By 2008, the People's Republic of China surpassed Tajikistan's other creditors in outstanding loans; by the following year, 77 percent of Tajikistan's total loan portfolio consisted of Chinese loans. In 2011, Tajikistan's parliament agreed to cede approximately of land to China in exchange for waiving an outstanding debt amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: Tajikistan's 2018 debts to foreign creditors ("external debt") was estimated at $2.9 billion, of which $1.2 billion is owed to the Exim (Export-Import) Bank of China. That year, reports indicated that Xinjiang-based TBEA was granted gold-mine concessions in remuneration for TBEA costs to build a 400-megawatt power plant in Dushanbe. At the end of 2020, Tajikistan's total external debt neared $3.1 billion; of this, $1.12 billion (about 37 percent of the total) was owed to the Exim Bank of China.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: China's BRI has made a number of investments in the European Union and continental Europe, including the port of Piraeus in Greece, Portugal's energy and transport sectors, and Hungarian railways. More than 12,400 freight trains travelled between China and Europe in 2020.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: In April 2021, the Prime Minister of Montenegro asked the EU to help the country repay the $1 billion loan granted by the Exim Bank of China in 2014 to fund the A-1 motorway; it accounted for about 25 percent of Montenegro's external debt. Under the terms of the loan, China would receive thousands of hectares in case of non-payment. The project was called unfeasible and not economically viable in two feasibility studies by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank, the EU's rationale for refusing to fund it. With an estimated cost of $23.8 million per kilometre, it is one of the world's costliest highways. A paper by the China Africa Research Initiative called reporting of the land as collateral a rumor derived from mis-translation of a routine clause in the contract.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: An article on CNBC said that Chinese investment in Latin America had been burgeoning and that the project has been heavily criticized amid allegations of debt-trap diplomacy and neocolonialism. These concerns have been pronounced, especially in Venezuela and Ecuador. A 2019 study compiled by Boston University's Global Development Policy Center stated that Chinese lending has not driven Latin American countries, except possibly Venezuela, over IMF debt sustainability thresholds.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: In 2019, Lowy institute completed a systematic review of the evidence on whether or not China was doing debt-trap diplomacy in the Pacific Islands. Their findings were that China was not the main driver behind rising debt risks in the Pacific, nor was China the dominant creditor in the region. Only Tonga had China as a dominant creditor, but the researchers argued that this did not confer an advantageous position to China since they had to agree to defer repayments twice yet getting not much in return. They also found that Chinese lending terms were hardly predatory and that they "appear to be much more careful with loans", and concluded that "China has not been engaged in debt-trap diplomacy in the Pacific, as of yet". They also found the "overwhelming majority" of Chinese loans in the region are concessional enough to be deemed more as aid. However they also noted that the majority of the Pacific nations that are currently indebted to China, have little scope to take on more debts and recommended China to restructure their future approach to give more grant assistance, rather than more loans, to avoid overwhelming those nations with too much debts.


title: Debt-trap diplomacy

text: China has made loans to Kyrgyzstan, Laos, and Mongolia as part of the BRI. It also made a $115 million loan to Tonga to redevelop its infrastructure, and $2 billion in loans to Papua New Guinea (almost one-fourth of the country's national debt). China also has ongoing projects in Trinidad and Tobago, including a $500 million Chinese-built dry dock and a $102 million industrial park in La Brea.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: The Chicken Ranch is a legal, licensed brothel located about west of Las Vegas near the town of Pahrump, in Nye County, at 10511 Homestead Road. The 17-bed brothel sits on of land. A separate building, connected to the main house by a breezeway, contains three extensively-decorated themed "bungalows" catering to those customers wishing a more luxurious experience.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: Approximately 60 courtesans call the Chicken Ranch "home" with around 12 to 15 women living and working there at any time. The women often stay for at least 2 weeks at a time.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: The ladies are independent contractors and set their own prices and menu of services. Due to Nye County ordinances, solicitation cannot be done outside of the house of the brothel.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: The ranch used to house a collection of memorabilia from the original Chicken Ranch which was located outside of La Grange, Texas.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: The ranch is also site of the Leghorn Bar. The bar has a separate entrance for customers not wishing to enter the brothel parlor.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: Walter Plankinton opened the Nevada Chicken Ranch in 1976, as close to Las Vegas as legally possible. He encountered strong opposition from local law enforcement and other brothel owners. It remains the closest brothel to Las Vegas.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: The initial location of the Chicken Ranch was inside the town limits of Pahrump, where prostitution was illegal. Plankinton was arrested and found guilty of violating the town's laws. He moved the brothel to a new location within Nye County, but outside of town limits. After lengthy appeals he served 60 days in jail in 1981.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: Nye County did not require brothels to be licensed in 1976, and three other brothels operated legally in the county at the time. Nevertheless, officials circulated a petition opposing the Chicken Ranch and then tried to close it down as a "public nuisance "per se"". The resulting court case reached the Nevada Supreme Court, which ruled in Plankinton's favor in 1978.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: In 1978, the Chicken Ranch was burned to the ground, allegedly by arsonists. Plankinton reopened with a new set of trailers 5 days later.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: In 1982, Plankinton sold the Chicken Ranch for $1,250,000 to Kenneth Green, a San Francisco businessman, and Russel Reade, an ex-teacher. Reade, who had contributed $25,000 towards the purchase, became the manager. Around 15 women were working at the ranch at that time.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: Chicken Ranch Airport was an airstrip on premises which allowed small planes to land at the brothel. Pictures from 1994 show the airstrip was closed by this time.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: Don Stadterman was a chauffeur for the Chicken Ranch Brothel in Nevada for seven years. His book, "Ride With Me To The Chicken Ranch Brothel" is about the men he drove to the brothel and the ladies who worked there. Jeanie Kasindorf's book "Nye County Brothel Wars" (Linden Press/Simon & Schuster 1985) describes the opposition Plankinton encountered in Nye County.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: The six part Sundance Channel series "Pleasure for Sale" (2008) documented life in the Chicken Ranch, describing the sometimes tense relations among the sex workers there.


title: Chicken Ranch (Nevada)

text: The Chicken Ranch was the location for Orville Peck's video "Dead of Night". Women from the Chicken Ranch were featured throughout the video and thanked by Orville Peck at the end of the video.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Japan has the highest proportion of elderly citizens of any country in the world. According to 2014 estimates, about 38% of the Japanese population is above the age of 60, 25.9% are age 65 or above, a figure that increased to 29.1% by 2022. People aged 65 and older in Japan make up a quarter of the total population and are estimated to reach a third of the population by 2050.


title: Aging of Japan

text: The aging of Japanese society, characterized by sub-replacement fertility rates and high life expectancy, is expected to continue. Japan had a post-war baby boom between 1947 and 1949, followed by a prolonged period of low fertility. These trends resulted in the decline of Japan's population beginning in 2011. In 2014, Japan's population was estimated to be 127 million; this figure is expected to shrink to 107 million (16%) by 2040 and to 97 million (24%) by 2050, should current demographic trends continue. A recent global analysis found that Japan was one of 23 countries which could see a total population decline of 50% or more by 2100. These trends have led some researchers to claim that Japan is transforming into a "super-ageing" society in both rural and urban areas.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Japanese citizens largely view Japan as comfortable and modern, with no widespread sense of a "population crisis." The Japanese government has responded to concerns about the stresses demographic changes place on the economy and social services with policies intended to restore the fertility rate as well as making the elderly more active in society.


title: Aging of Japan

text: The number of Japanese people 65 years or older nearly quadrupled over a period of 40 years to 33 million in 2014, accounting for 26% of Japan's population. In the same period, the number of children aged 14 and younger decreased from 24.3% of the population in 1975 to 12.8% in 2014. The number of elderly people surpassed the number of children in 1997, and sales of adult diapers surpassed diapers for babies in 2014. This change in the demographic makeup of Japanese society, referred to as population aging ("", ), has taken place in a shorter period of time than in any other country.


title: Aging of Japan

text: According to population projections based on the current fertility rate, individuals over the age of 65 will account for 40% of the population by 2060, and the total population will fall by one-third from 128 million in 2010 to 87 million by 2060. Economists at Tohoku University established a countdown to national extinction, which projects that Japan will have only one remaining child in 4205. These predictions prompted a pledge by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe to set a threshold for population decline at 100 million.


title: Aging of Japan

text: The aging of the Japanese population is a result of one of the world's lowest fertility rates combined with a high life expectancy.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Japan's life expectancy was 85 years in 2016, 81.7 years for males and 88.5 years for females. As Japan's overall population shrinks due to low fertility rates, the proportion of elderly increases.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Life expectancy at birth increased rapidly from the end of World War II, when the average was 54 years for women and 50 for men, and the percentage of the population aged 65 years and older has increased steadily since the 1950s. The increase in life expectancy translated into a depressed mortality rate until the 1980s, but mortality has increased again to 10.1 per 1000 people in 2013 — the highest since 1950.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Factors such as improved nutrition, advanced medical and pharmacological technologies, and improved living conditions have all contributed to the longer-than-average life expectancy. Moreover, peace and prosperity following World War II were integral to the massive economic growth of post-war Japan, which also contributed to the population's longevity. The proportion of health care spending has also dramatically increased as Japan's older population spends more time in hospitals and visiting physicians. On any given day in 2011, 2.9% of people aged 75–79 were in a hospital, and 13.4% were visiting a physician.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Japan's total fertility rate (or TFR, the number of children born from each woman in her lifetime) has remained below the replacement threshold of 2.1 since 1974, and reached a historic low of 1.26 in 2005. Experts believe that signs of a slight recovery reflect the expiration of a "tempo effect," as fertility rates accommodate a major shift in the timing and number of children, rather than any positive change. As of 2016, the TFR was 1.41 children born per woman.


title: Aging of Japan

text: A range of economic and cultural factors contributed to the decline in childbirth during the late 20th century: later and fewer marriages, higher education, urbanization, increase in nuclear family households (rather than the extended family), poor work-life balance, increased participation of women in the workforce, a decline in wages and lifetime employment, small living spaces and the high cost of raising a child.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Many young people face economic insecurity due to a lack of regular employment. About 40% of Japan's labor force is non-regular, including part-time and temporary workers. Non-regular employees earn about 53 percent less than regular ones on a comparable monthly basis, according to the Labor Ministry. Young men in this group are less likely to consider marriage or to be married. Many young Japanese people also report that fatigue from overwork hinders their motivation to pursue romantic relationships.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Although most married couples have two or more children, a growing number of young people postpone or entirely reject marriage and parenthood. Conservative gender roles often mean that women are expected to stay home with the children rather than work. Between 1980 and 2010, the percentage of the population who had never married increased from 22% to almost 30%, even as the population continued to age, and by 2035 one in four men will not marry during their prime parenthood years. The Japanese sociologist Masahiro Yamada coined the term for unmarried women in their late 20s and 30s who continue to live with their parents.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Government survey results released on 14 June 2022 showed 1 in 4 singles in their 30s have no desire to marry. Reasons are loss of freedom, financial burden and housework. In 2021 marriages declined to 514,000. There's a diversification of families such as common-law relationships, unmarried and divorced. Only 46.4% of men and women in their 30s hope to marry, while 26.5% of men and 25.4% of women prefer to remain single. Among the never before married: more women said they do not want to shoulder the burden of housework, childcare and nursing care. More men said financial and job instability were the reasons to shun marriage. More women than men don't want to change their surname.


title: Aging of Japan

text: In 2015, 1 in 10 Japanese adults in their 30s reported having had no heterosexual sexual experiences. Even when researchers made estimations to account for people who report no heterosexual intercourse but may have had same-sex intercourse, around 5 percent of people, or one in 20, aged 30 to 39 years old, would still lack sexual experience. The percentage of 18 to 39-year-old women without sexual experience was 24.6% in 2015, an increase from 21.7% in 1992. Likewise, the percentage of 18 to 39-year-old men without sexual experience was 25.8% in 2015, an increase from 20% in 1992. Men with stable jobs and a high income were found to be more likely to have sex, while low-income men were 10 to 20 times more likely to have had no sex experience. Conversely, women with lower income were more likely to have had intercourse. Men who were unemployed are eight times more likely to be virgins, and men who are part-time or temporary employed had a four times higher virginity rate. This indicates that money and social status are important for men in dating.


title: Aging of Japan

text: According to a 2010 survey, 61% of single Japanese men in their 20s, and 70% of single Japanese men in their 30s call themselves "herbivore men" (s"ōshoku danshi"), meaning that they are not interested in getting married or having a girlfriend.


title: Aging of Japan

text: A 2022 survey by the Japanese Cabinet Office found that circa 40% of unmarried Japanese men in their 20s have never been on a single date. By comparison, 25% of young adult women said they never dated. 5% of married men and women had zero dating partners and probably used "konkatsu" (short for "kekkon katsudo", or marriage hunting, a series of strategies and events similar to finding employment) to find a spouse.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Demographic trends are altering relations within and across generations, creating new government responsibilities and changing many aspects of Japanese social life. The aging and decline of the working-age population has triggered concerns about the future of the nation's workforce, potential economic growth, and the solvency of the national pension and healthcare services.


title: Aging of Japan

text: A smaller population could make the country's crowded metropolitan areas more livable, and the stagnation of economic output might still benefit a shrinking workforce. However, the low birth rate and high life expectancy has also inverted the standard population pyramid, forcing a narrowing base of young people to provide and care for a bulging older cohort even as they try to form families of their own. In 2014, the aged dependency ratio (the ratio of people over 65 to those age 15–65, indicating the ratio of the dependent elderly population to those of working age) was 40%, meaning two aged dependents for every five workers. This is expected to increase to 60% by 2036 and to nearly 80% by 2060.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Elderly Japanese have traditionally commended themselves to the care of their adult children, and government policies still encourage the creation of , where a married couple cares for both children and parents. In 2015, 177,600 people between the ages of 15 and 29 were caring directly for an older family member. However, the migration of young people into Japan's major cities, the entrance of women into the workforce, and the increasing cost of care for both young and old dependents have required new solutions, including nursing homes, adult daycare centers, and home health programs. Every year Japan closes 400 primary and secondary schools, converting some of them to care centers for the elderly.


title: Aging of Japan

text: There are special nursing homes in Japan that offer service and assistance to more than 30 residents. In 2008, it was recorded that there were approximately 6,000 special nursing homes available that cared for 420,000 Japanese elders. With many nursing homes in Japan, the demand for more caregivers is high. In Japan, family caregivers are preferred as the main caregiver because it is a better support system if an elderly person is related to his/her caregiver. Therefore, it is possible that Japanese elderly people can perform activities of daily living (ADLs) with little assistance and live longer if his/her caregiver is a family caregiver.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Many elderly people live alone and isolated, and every year thousands of deaths go unnoticed for days or even weeks, in a modern phenomenon known as .


title: Aging of Japan

text: The disposable income in Japan's older population has increased business in biomedical technologies research in cosmetics and regenerative medicine.


title: Aging of Japan

text: The Greater Tokyo Area is virtually the only locality in Japan to see population growth, mostly due to internal migration from other parts of the country. Between 2005 and 2010, 36 of Japan's 47 prefectures shrank by as much as 5%, and many rural and suburban areas are struggling with an epidemic of abandoned homes (8 million across Japan). Masuda Hiroya, a former Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications who heads the private think tank Japan Policy Council, estimated that about half the municipalities in Japan could disappear between now and 2040 as young people, especially young women, move from rural areas into Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, where around half of Japan's population is already concentrated. The government is establishing a regional revitalization task force and focusing on developing regional hub cities, especially Sapporo, Sendai, Hiroshima and Fukuoka.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Internal migration and population decline have created a severe regional imbalance in electoral power, where the weight of a single vote depends on where it was cast. Some depopulated districts send three times as many representatives per voter to the National Diet as their growing urban counterparts. In 2014, the Supreme Court of Japan declared the disparities in voting power violate the Constitution, but the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, which relies on rural and older voters, has been slow to make the necessary realignment.


title: Aging of Japan

text: The increasing proportion of elderly people has a major impact on government spending and policies. As recently as the early-1970s, the cost of public pensions, health care, and welfare services for the aged amounted to only about 6% of Japan's national income. In 1992 that portion of the national budget was 18%, and it is expected that by 2025 28% of national income will be spent on social welfare. Because the incidence of chronic disease increases with age, the health care and pension systems are expected to come under severe strain. In the mid-1980s, the government began to re-evaluate the relative burdens of government and the private sector in health care and pensions, and it established policies to control government costs in these programs.


title: Aging of Japan

text: The large share of elderly inflation-averse voters may also hinder the political attractiveness of pursuing higher inflation, consistent with the evidence that aging may lead to lower inflation. With the increasing older population and decreasing young population, 38% percent of the population will be people aged 65 and older by 2065. This concludes that Japan has the highest amount of public debt in the world because of the low fertility rates and aging population. Japan's government has spent almost half of its tax revenue trying to recover from their debt. According to IMF, Japan has a 246.14 debt percentage of GDP, making it the highest public debt.


title: Aging of Japan

text: From the 1980s on there was an increase of older-age workers and a shortage of young workers in Japan's workforce, from employment practices to benefits to the participation of women. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated in 2002 that Japan would experience an 18% decrease of young workers in its workforce and an 8% decrease in its consumer population by 2030. The Japanese labor market is already under pressure to meet demands for workers, with 125 jobs for every 100 job seekers at the end of 2015, as older generations retire and younger generations become smaller in quantity.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Japan made a radical change in how its healthcare system is regulated by introducing long-term care insurance in 2000. The proportion of old Japanese citizens will soon level off; however, there is a decline in the young population due to zero growth, death exceeding the births. For example, the number of young people under the age of 19 in Japan will constitute only 13 percent in the year 2060, which used to be 40 percent in 1960.


title: Aging of Japan

text: The decline in the working population is impacting the national economy. It is causing a shrinkage of the nation's military. The government has focused on medical technologies such as regenerative medicines and cell therapy to recruit and retain more of the older population into the workforce. A range of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have also pioneered new practices for retaining workers beyond mandated retirement ages, such as through workplace improvements to create working environments better suited to older workers as well as new job tasks specifically for older workers.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Mounting labor shortages in the 1980s and 90s led many Japanese companies to increase the mandatory retirement age from 55 to 60 or 65, and today many allow their employees to continue working after official retirement. The growing number of retirement age people has put a strain on the national pension system. In 1986, the government increased the age at which pension benefits begin from 60 to 65, and shortfalls in the pension system have encouraged many people of retirement age to remain in the workforce and have driven some others into poverty.


title: Aging of Japan

text: The retirement age may go even higher in the future if Japan continues to have older age populations in its overall population. A study by the UN Population Division released in 2000 found that Japan would need to raise its retirement age to 77 (or allow net immigration of 17 million by 2050) to maintain its worker-to-retiree ratio. Consistent immigration into Japan may prevent further population decline; therefore, it is encouraged that Japan develops policies that will support a large influx of young immigrants.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Less desirable industries, such as agriculture and construction, are more threatened than others. The average farmer in Japan is 70 years old, and while about a third of construction workers are 55 or older, including many who expect to retire within the next ten years, only one in ten are younger than 30.


title: Aging of Japan

text: The decline in working-aged cohorts may lead to a shrinking economy if productivity does not increase faster than the rate of Japan's decreasing workforce. The OECD estimates that similar labor shortages in Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Sweden will depress the European Union's economic growth by 0.4 percentage points annually from 2000 to 2025, after which shortages will cost the EU 0.9 percentage points in growth. In Japan, labor shortages will lower growth by 0.7 percentage points annually until 2025, after which Japan will also experience a 0.9 percentage points loss in growth.


title: Aging of Japan

text: The city Nagareyama in Chiba Prefecture is 30 kilometers from Tokyo. In the early 2000s, Nagareyama experienced an exodus of young people, due to lack of childcare facilities. In 2003, mayor Yoshiharu Izaki made investments in childcare centers a primary focus of the city's government spending. It included a transit service at Nagareyama-centralpark Station where parents can drop off their children on their way to work. Here the children are shuttled by buses to day care centers, driven by local seniors. There is also a summer camp for children while their parents work during holidays. These and other family-friendly approaches (such as local events and community spaces where children and elderly interact) lured young working parents from Tokyo to Nagareyama. As a result the city's population grew over 20% between 2006 and 2019, with many parents listing childcare as one of the main reasons to move to Nagareyama. 85% of families in the city have more than one child, and young children are expected to outnumber the elderly in the near future.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Matsudo city in Chiba has had a population increase of 3.1% since 2015. It said to be due to day care centers near or inside train stations without waiting lists and four co-working spaces with childcare rooms. The population of Akashi in Hyōgo grew 3.6%. This is attributed to a childcare facility with a large indoor playground near the local JR train station since 2017. There's also a "diaper subscription" where support staff deliver necessities for infants for free.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Western Japan (Kyushu, Chūgoku region, and Shikoku) has a higher birth rate than Central and Eastern Japan. The ten prefectures with a TFR of 1.55 or higher are all located in the Kyushu or Chugoku regions, except for Fukui Prefecture. Prefectures with a low TFR are concentrated in eastern or northern Japan. Central Japan is average.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Okinawa prefecture has had the highest birth rate in Japan for over 40 years since recording began in 1899. Okinawa was the only prefecture with a natural population increase in 2018. The fertility rate was 1.89 while Tokyo had the lowest of 1.20, and the national average in 2018 was 1.42. There were 15,732 births and 12,157 deaths, according to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The average age of marriage is lower in Okinawa, at 30 years for men and 28.8 years for women. The national average is 31.1 years for men and 29.4 years for women.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Anthropologist Dr. Thang Leng Leng (National University of Singapore) said families tend to have more than two children because of "Okinawa's sense of social norms, in terms of 'this is how things should be.'" It is considered normal to marry and then have children. This is despite Okinawa having less welfare for children compared to other regions in Japan. It's not unusual for women in their 40s to have children. 1 in 20 babies born at the Nanbu Tokushukai Hospital is conceived via IVF. Living in Okinawa is considered less stressful due to lower living costs. Raising a child is less expensive, and fewer students attend university in Okinawa. Dr. Thang said people in Okinawa are more relaxed with a tropical culture and not so punctual as the rest of Japan. The work ethic in Okinawa is more laid back. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's workplace policies enable returning mothers to work more flexible and leave work earlier. There's less competition in the workplace due to fewer high-paying large corporations compared to Osaka and Tokyo. Pediatrician, Chuken Miyagi said there's a culture of mutual help and support called . Grandparents and relatives live relatively close to help family members and mothers with raising their children. There's a high sense of closeness among the people of Okinawa because society is largely rural. In big cities like Tokyo, people frequently rent houses and live there temporarily which hampers the development of close bonds with the neighborhood and local people. Okinawa has increasing numbers of ; fathers who are actively involved in child-rearing. The ratio of mothers to fathers at the Jinen Pediatric Clinic in Okinawa is 7 to 3 compared to 10 to 0 in mainland Japan (2018).


title: Aging of Japan

text: The Japanese government is addressing demographic problems by developing policies to encourage fertility and retain more of its population, especially women and the elderly, in the workforce. Incentives for family formation include expanded opportunities for childcare, new benefits for those who have children and a state-sponsored dating service. Some policies have focused on engaging more women in the workplace, including longer maternity leave and legal protections against pregnancy discrimination, known in Japan as . However, "Womenomics," the set of policies intended to bring more women into the workplace as part of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's economic recovery plan, has struggled to overcome cultural barriers and entrenched stereotypes.


title: Aging of Japan

text: These policies could prove useful for bringing women back into the workforce after having children, but they can also encourage the women who opt not to have children to join the workforce. The Japanese government has introduced other policies to address the growing elderly population as well, especially in rural areas. Many young people end up moving to the city in search of work, leaving behind a growing elderly population and a smaller workforce to take care of them. Because of this, Japan's national government has tried to improve welfare services such as long-term care facilities and other services that can help families at homes, such as daycare or in-home nursing assistance. The Gold Plan was introduced in 1990 to improve these services and attempted to reduce the burden of care placed on families, followed by long-term care insurance (LTCI) in 2000. These plans have been upgraded and revised over the years to provide more local welfare services and institutions in rural areas, yet the rapidly increasing elderly population makes these efforts difficult to maintain.


title: Aging of Japan

text: A net decline in population due to a historically low birth rate has raised the issue of immigration as a way to compensate for labor shortages. While public opinion polls tend to show low support for immigration, most people support an expansion in working-age migrants on a temporary basis to maintain Japan's economic status. Comparative reviews show that Japanese attitudes are broadly neutral and place Japanese acceptance of migrants in the middle of developed countries.


title: Aging of Japan

text: The number of immigrants would have to increase by eight percent in order for Japan's economy to be stable. Japan's government is first trying to increase tourism rates, which boosts their economy and brings in foreign workers. The government has also recruited international students, which allow foreigners to begin work and potentially stay in Japan to help the economy while existing initiatives such as the JET Program encourage English-speaking people from across the world to work in Japan as English language teachers. However, Japan is strict when accepting refugees into their country. Only 27 people out of 7,500 refugee applicants were granted into Japan in 2015. However, Japan provides high levels of foreign and humanitarian aid. In 2016, there was a 44% increase in asylum seekers to Japan from Indonesia, Nepal, and the Philippines. Since Japan does not generally permit low-skilled workers to enter, many people went through the asylum route instead. This allowed immigrants to apply for asylum and begin work six months after the application. However, it did not allow foreigners without valid visas to apply for work.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Japan has focused its policies on work-life balance with the goal of improving the conditions for an increase in birth rate. To address these challenges, Japan has established goals to define the ideal work-life balance that would provide the environment for couples to have more children with the passing of the Child Care and Family Care Leave Law, which took effect in June 2010.


title: Aging of Japan

text: The law provides both mothers and fathers with an opportunity to take up to one year of leave after the birth of a child (with the possibility to extend the leave for another six months if the child is not accepted to enter nursery school) and allows employees with preschool-age children the following allowances: up to five days of leave in the event of a child's injury or sickness, limits on the amount of overtime in excess of 24 hours per month based on an employee's request, limits on working late at night based on an employee's request, and opportunity for shorter working hours and flex time for employees.


title: Aging of Japan

text: The goals of the law would strive to achieve the following results in 10 years are categorized by the female employment rate (an increase from 65% to 72%), percentage of employees working 60 hours or more per week (decrease from 11% to 6%), rate of use of annual paid leave (an increase from 47% to 100%), rate of child care leave (an increase from 72% to 80% for females and .6% to 10% for men), and hours spent by men on child care and housework in households with a child under six years of age (an increase from 1 hour to 2.5 hours a day).


title: Aging of Japan

text: Japan's population is aging faster than any other country on the planet. The population of those 65 years or older roughly doubled in 24 years, from 7.1% of the population in 1970 to 14.1% in 1994. The same increase took 61 years in Italy, 85 years in Sweden, and 115 years in France. Life expectancy for women in Japan is 87 years, five years more than that of the U.S. Men in Japan with a life expectancy of 81 years, have surpassed U.S. life expectancy by four years. Japan also has more centenarians than any other country (58,820 in 2014, or 42.76 per 100,000 people). Almost one in five of the world's centenarians live in Japan, and 87% of them are women.


title: Aging of Japan

text: In contrast to Japan, a more open immigration policy has allowed Australia, Canada, and the United States to grow their workforce despite low fertility rates. An expansion of immigration is often rejected as a solution to population decline by Japan's political leaders and people. Reasons include fear of foreign crime, and a desire to preserve cultural traditions.Historically, European countries have had the largest elderly populations by proportion as they became developed nations earlier and experienced the subsequent drop in fertility rates, but many Asian and Latin American countries are quickly catching up. As of 2015, 22 of the 25 oldest countries are located in Europe, but Japan is currently the oldest country in the world, and its rapidly aging population displays a trend that other parts of Asia such as South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are expected to follow by 2050. As recently developed nations continue to experience improved health care and lower fertility rates, the growth of the elderly population will continue to rise. In 1970–1975, only 19 countries had a fertility rate that can be considered below-replacement fertility and there were no countries with exceedingly low fertility (<1.3 children); however, between 2000 and 2005, there were 65 countries with below-replacement fertility, and 17 with exceedingly low fertility.


title: Aging of Japan

text: While there has been a global trend of lower fertility and longer life expectancy, it is first evident in the more developed countries and occurs more rapidly in developing or recently developed countries. One of the most astounding aspects of Japan's elderly population, in particular, is that it is both fast-growing and has one of the highest life expectancies, equating to a larger elderly population and an older one. According to the World Health Organization, Japanese people are able to live 75 years without any disabilities and fully healthy compared to other countries. Also, American women usually live to around 81 years and American men 76; but compared to Japan, women live to around 87 years and men to 80 years. There is demographic data that shows Japan is an older and more quickly aging society than the United States.


title: Aging of Japan

text: Japan is leading the world in aging demographics, but the other countries of East Asia are following a similar trend. In South Korea, where the fertility rate is the world's lowest (0.81 as of 2022), the population is expected to peak in 2030. The smaller states of Singapore and Taiwan are also struggling to boost fertility rates from record lows and to manage aging populations. China's fertility rate is lower than Japan's and is aging faster than almost all other countries in modern history. More than a third of the world's elderly (65 and older) live in East Asia and the Pacific, and many of the economic concerns raised first in Japan can be projected to the rest of the region. India's population is aging exactly like that of Japan, but with a 50-year lag. A study of the populations of India and Japan for the years 1950 to 2015 combined with median variant population estimates for the years 2016 to 2100 shows that India is 50 years behind Japan on the aging process.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: Where'd You Go, Bernadette is a 2019 American comedy-drama film directed by Richard Linklater from a screenplay by Linklater, Holly Gent, and Vince Palmo, based on the 2012 novel of the same name by Maria Semple. It stars Cate Blanchett, Billy Crudup, Kristen Wiig, Judy Greer, and Laurence Fishburne.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: "Where'd You Go, Bernadette" was released on August 16, 2019, by Annapurna Pictures through their United Artists Releasing joint venture. It received mixed reviews from critics.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: Architect-turned-agoraphobic recluse Bernadette Fox is settled down with her husband Elgie Branch and their 15-year-old daughter Bee in a dilapidated former schoolhouse in Seattle. Bernadette seldom leaves home and cringes at human interaction, including with the other parents at Bee's school, especially their neighbor, Audrey Griffin. Despite this, she is quite close to Bee.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: Bee requests a family trip to Antarctica as reward for good grades, and her parents reluctantly agree. As the trip approaches, Bernadette’s behavior becomes increasingly odd, and she considers use of various prescription drugs to control her worsening anxiety and insomnia. Bernadette’s tension with Audrey also escalates after the latter accuses Bernadette of driving over her foot and the hillside above Audrey's, recently cleared of blackberries by Bernadette, slides into Audrey's garden and house during a rainstorm. Bernadette insists that she was only complying with Audrey's request to remove the invasive plants, but Elgie accuses her of knowing that the hill would collapse without the blackberries to hold it in place.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: One day, Bernadette returns home to find Elgie, his assistant, Dr. Kurtz, and FBI Agent Strang at her home for an intervention. They reveal that Manjula, the “personal assistant” in India that Bernadette uses and has given all of her personal and financial information and passwords, is actually a front for a Russian criminal organization that the FBI has been watching. Dr. Kurtz and Elgie want Bernadette to go to a psychiatric hospital for treatment while he and Bee go to Antarctica. Feeling ambushed and misunderstood, Bernadette sneaks out of the house.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: Bernadette hides at Audrey's, and they make amends. Audrey helps Bernadette fly to Antarctica without her family. Elgie and Bee follow in hot pursuit, after Agent Strang tells them that the Russian criminals, who were on their way to Seattle to defraud Bernadette while she and her family were away, have been arrested and are no longer a threat.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: In Antarctica, Bernadette befriends Becky, a researcher, who tells her the research station at the South Pole has to be completely rebuilt and needs an architect. Bernadette sneaks off her cruise ship and into Palmer Station, and convinces the team leader to give her a spot on the next convoy to the South Pole.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: Meanwhile, Elgie realizes he has failed his wife by not being more supportive of her creativity. He and Bee catch up with Bernadette at Palmer Station, and, realizing her passion has been reignited, give their blessing to spend five weeks at the Pole.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: In January 2013, Annapurna Pictures and Color Force acquired the rights to the film adaptation of the novel and set Scott Neustadter and Michael H. Weber to write the screenplay. Semple, Bryan Unkeless, and Ted Schipper executive produced. In February 2015, Richard Linklater was announced as director of the film, and Cate Blanchett was cast as Bernadette in November. In April 2016, it was announced that Holly Gent Palmo and Vince Palmo had taken over writing duties on the film, with Linklater also receiving credit.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: In March 2017, Kristen Wiig joined the cast, and Billy Crudup was added in May, marking his second collaboration with Blanchett, after appearing with her in "Charlotte Gray" (2001). In June, Judy Greer, James Urbaniak, and Laurence Fishburne joined the cast of the film, and Troian Bellisario came on board in July. Emma Nelson's casting was announced in June 2018.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: Principal photography began on July 10, 2017. Set in Seattle, filming took place in Pittsburgh and Vancouver. Scenes set in Antarctica were filmed in Greenland.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: Originally scheduled for release in the USA on May 11, 2018, the film was later pushed back to October 19. The release date was then pushed to March 22, 2019, and then August 9, before finally settling on August 16, 2019.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: The film was significantly delayed for release in the UK for two years due to the film’s huge under-performance, before eventually appearing on Amazon Prime Video and other streaming services on 15 March 2021.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: In the United States and Canada, "Where'd You Go, Bernadette" was released alongside "Blinded by the Light", "", and "Good Boys", and was projected to gross around $5 million from 2,404 theaters in its opening weekend. It ended up making $1.2 million on its opening day, including $200,000 from Thursday night previews, and $3.5 million for the weekend, finishing 11th at the box office. By the end of its run, the film had grossed $9.2 million domestically and $11 million worldwide on a budget of $18 million.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: On Rotten Tomatoes, the film holds an approval rating of based on reviews, with an average rating of . The website's critical consensus reads, ""Where'd You Go, Bernadette" offers dispiriting proof that a talented director, bestselling source material, and terrific cast can add up to far less than the sum of their parts." On Metacritic, which uses a weighted average, the film has a score of 51 out of 100, based on 39 critics, indicating "mixed or average reviews." Audiences polled by CinemaScore gave the film an average grade of "B" on an A+ to F scale, while those at PostTrak gave it an average of 3.5 out of 5 stars and a 60% "definite recommend".


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: Richard Roeper of the "Chicago Sun-Times" gave the film 2 out of 4 stars and wrote: "Filmed in a solid but straightforward style, populated by troubled characters who are aggressively off-putting, frustratingly passive and/or easily lampooned clichés, "Where'd You Go, Bernadette" is one of the most disappointing movies of 2019." In his 1/4 star review for "The Globe and Mail", Barry Hertz said, "There is, buried deep somewhere in Linklater's film or however many edits it may have undergone – the thing reeks of indecision – an insightful, even invigorating story about what happens to a creative genius once they stop creating. But the actual work presents a good argument that, for some artists, it might be best to quit while you're ahead."


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: Two of Bernadette's structures — the fictitious Twenty-Mile House and Beeber Bifocal House — were compared to the first two of 18 visions of Bernadette Soubirous.


title: Where'd You Go, Bernadette (film)

text: Her final conception in the film was based on the Halley Research Station, designed in real life by Hugh Broughton Architects.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: The Maratha caste is composed of 96 Marathi clans originally formed in the earlier centuries from the amalgamation of families from the peasant (Kunbi), shepherd (Dhangar), pastoral (Gavli), blacksmith (Lohar), carpenter (Sutar), Bhandari, Thakar and Koli castes in Maharashtra. Many of them took to military service in the 16th century for the Deccan sultanates or the Mughals. Later in the 17th and 18th centuries, they served in the armies of the Maratha Empire, founded by Shivaji, a Maratha Kunbi by caste. Many Marathas were granted hereditary fiefs by the Sultanates, and Mughals for their service.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: According to the Maharashtrian historian B. R. Sunthankar, and scholars such as Rajendra Vora, the "Marathas" are a "middle-peasantry" caste which formed the bulk of the Maharashtrian society together with the other Kunbi peasant caste. Vora adds that the Maratha caste is the largest caste of India and dominate the power structure in Maharashtra because of their numerical strength, especially in the rural society.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: According to Jeremy Black, British historian at the University of Exeter, "Maratha caste is a coalescence of peasants, shepherds, ironworkers, etc. as a result of serving in the military in the 17th and 18th century". They are dominant caste in rural areas and mainly constitute the landed peasantry. As of 2018, 80% of the members of the Maratha caste were farmers.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Marathas are subdivided into 96 different clans, known as the "96 Kuli Marathas" or "Shahānnau Kule." Three clan lists exist but the general body of lists are often at great variance with each other. These lists were compiled in the 19th century.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: The Maratha king Shivaji founded the Maratha empire that included warriors and other notables from Maratha and several other castes from Maharashtra. This empire was the dominant in India for much of 18th century.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: The term "Maratha" referred broadly to all the speakers of the Marathi language. In the 17th century, it also served as a designation for peasants from the Deccan Plateau who served as soldiers in the armies of Muslim rulers and later in the armies of Shivaji. Thus, the term "Maratha" became a marker of an endogamous caste for them. A number of Maratha warriors, including Shivaji's father, Shahaji, originally served in those Muslim armies. By the mid-1660s, Shivaji had established an independent Maratha kingdom. After Shivaji's death, Marathas fought under his sons and defeated Aurangzeb in the Mughal–Maratha Wars. The Maratha empire was further expanded into a vast empire by the Maratha Confederacy including Peshwas, stretching from central India in the south to Peshawar (in modern-day Pakistan) on the Afghanistan border in the north, and with expeditions in Bengal to the east.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: By the 19th century, the empire had become a confederacy of individual states controlled by chiefs such as the Peshwa, Gaekwads of Baroda, the Holkars of Indore, the Scindias of Gwalior, the Puars of Dhar and Dewas, and Bhonsles of Nagpur. The Confederacy remained the pre-eminent power in India until their defeat by the British East India Company in the Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817–1818).


title: Maratha (caste)

text: By the 19th century, the term "Maratha" had several interpretations in the British administrative records. In the Thane District Gazetteer of 1882, the term was used to denote elite layers within various castes: for example, "Maratha-Agri" within the Agri caste and "Maratha-Koli" within the Koli caste. In the Pune District, the words Kunbi and Maratha had become synonymous, giving rise to the Maratha-Kunbi caste complex. The Pune District Gazetteer of 1882 divided the Kunbis into two classes: Marathas and other Kunbis. The 1901 census listed three groups within the Maratha-Kunbi caste complex: "Marathas proper", "Maratha Kunbis" and Konkan Maratha.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: According to Steele, in the early 19th century, Kunbis, who were agriculturists, and the Marathas who claimed Rajput descent and Kshatriya status, were distinguished by their customs related to widow remarriage. The Kunbis allowed it and the higher status Marathas prohibited it. However, there is no statistical evidence for this. However, the Kunbis and Marathas had hypergamous inter-community marriages – a rich Kunbi could always marry his daughter to a poor Maratha.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Historically, the Maratha population comprised more than 31% of the population in Maharashtra and the Kunbi was 7%, whereas the upper castes, Marathi Brahmins, Saraswat Brahmins, and Prabhus, were earlier only about 4% of the population. The Other Backward Class population (other than the Kunbi) was 27% while the population of the Mahars was 12%.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Gradually, the term "Maratha" came to denote an endogamous caste. From 1900 onwards, the Satyashodhak Samaj movement defined the Marathas as a broader social category of non-Brahmin groups. These non-Brahmins gained prominence in the Indian National Congress during the Indian independence movement. In independent India, these Marathas became the dominant political force in the newly formed state of Maharashtra.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: The ritual caste hierarchy in Maharashtra is led by the Deshasthas, Chitpawans, Karhades, Saraswats and the Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhus. The Maratha are ranked lower under this classification than the above castes but are considered higher than the Kunbi, backward castes and castes that were considered ritually impure. According to the Chairperson of the Centre for Social Justice and Governance, this caste ranking is significant even in recent times in inter-caste matrimonial alliances between Maharashtrians.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Modern research has revealed that the Marathas and Kunbi have the same origin. Most recently, the Kunbi origin of the Maratha has been explained in detail by historians Richard Eaton and Stewart Gordon. Marathas who were distinguished from the Kunbi, in the past claimed genealogical connections with Rajputs of northern India. However, modern researchers demonstrate, giving examples, that these claims are not factual. Modern scholars agree that Marathas and Kunbi are the same. Anthropologist J. V. Ferreira writes: "The Maratha claim to belong to the ancient 96 Kshatriya families has no foundation in fact and may have been adopted after the Marathas became with Shivaji a power to be reckoned with". Gordon writes how the Maratha caste was generated from the Kunbis who served the Muslim rulers, prospered, and over time adopted different customs like different dressing styles, employed genealogists, started identifying as Maratha, and caste boundaries solidified between them. In the nineteenth century, economic prosperity rather than martial service to the Muslims replaced the mobility into Maratha identity. Eaton gives an example of the Holkar family that originally belonged to the Dhangar (shepherd) caste but was given a Maratha or even an "arch-Maratha" identity. The other example, given by Susan Bayly, is of the Bhonsles who originated among Maratha and Kunbi populations of the Deccani tiller-plainsmen. Similarly, scholars write that the Shinde( also known as Scindia) Maratha clan originated from the Kunbi caste and the Scindia's founder was a servant of the Peshwa who would carry his slippers. Dhanmanjiri Sathe states that "The line between Marathas and Kunbis is thin and sometimes difficult to ascertain". Iravati Karve, an anthropologist, showed how the Maratha caste was generated from Kunbis who simply started calling themselves "Maratha". She states that Maratha, Kunbi and Mali are the three main farming communities of Maharashtra – the difference being that the Marathas and Kunbis were "dry farmers" whereas the Mali farmed throughout the year. Cynthia Talbot quotes a saying in Maharashtra, "when a Kunbi prospers he becomes Maratha". The Kunbi origin has been one of the factors on the basis of which the head of Maharashtra State Backward Class Commission (MSBCC), a Judge, M.G. Gaikwad, and some others in 2018, stated that Maratha associations have submitted historical proofs and petitions to be included in the Other Backward Class. The decision for giving reservation in jobs and education for Marathas based on the petitions that Marathas and Kunbis are one and the same caste was upheld by the Mumbai court in 2019.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Expansion of Maratha Empire also resulted in the voluntary relocation of substantial numbers of Maratha and other Marathi-speaking people outside Maharashtra, and across a big part of India. Today several significant communities descended from these emigrants live in the north, south and west of India. These descendant communities tend often to speak the local languages, although many also speak Marathi in addition. Notable Maratha families outside Maharashtra include Bhonsle of Tanjore, Scindia of Gwalior, Gaekwad of Baroda, Holkar of Indore, Puar of Dewas and Dhar, Ghorpade of Mudhol.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: In 17th century Maharashtra, the Brahmins and CKPs were the communities that had a system of higher education in Gurukula or lower-level education in clerical work or book-keeping. Education of all other castes and communities consisted of listening to oral reproductions from sacred texts like the Puranas and Kirtans. However, despite lack of education, the Maratha caste due to their long tradition of service in military of the Yadavas and later the Muslim sultanates produced good soldiers and commanders.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Stewart Gordon writes that the prominent Ghorpade Maratha family, for instance, was not literate and had to use Brahmins as record keepers.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Gail Omvedt concludes that during the British era, the overall literacy of Brahmins and CKPs was overwhelmingly high as compared to the literacy of the Maratha and Kunbi communities where it was strikingly low. The artisan castes were intermediate in terms of literacy. For all castes, men were more literate than the women from that caste(respectively). Female literacy, as well as English literacy, showed the same pattern among castes.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: A Bhandari author from 1920s quotes, according to Monika Vaidya, that Brahmins are not to blame for the lack of education of Marathas, as shown by other non-Brahmin communities whose occupations required education, like the Prabhus, Saraswats and CKP. These communities got education despite the barriers imposed by the Brahmins and it has been argued that the need for reservations does not arise if each community tries for its own development.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Like other Maharashtrian communities such as Kunbis, Malis, Mahars, etc., the marriage of a man to his maternal uncle's ("mama" in Marathi) daughter is common in the Maratha community. Maratha and Kunbis intermarried in a hypergamous way i.e. a rich Kunbi's daughter could always marry a poor Maratha. Anthropologist Donald Attwood shows giving an example of the Karekars of Ahmednagar that this trend continues even in recent times indicating that the social order is fluid and flexible.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Being a politically dominant caste, the Marathas have not been able to progress beyond the social practices of Dowry (Dowry refers to the durable goods, cash, and real or movable property that the bride's family gives to the bridegroom, his parents, or his relatives as a condition of the marriage.). 80% of the Maratha community are farmers and there have been cases where the Maratha farmers had to sell their lands just to get their daughters married. Data compiled by the Maratha Kranti Morcha members showed that the expenditure incurred by an average low income and poor Maratha family has doubled in the last 10 years when it comes to dowry. A member said (in 2018), "The dowry amount ranges from Rs 7 lakh to Rs 50 lakh, depending on the profession of the groom. The lower-middle class Marathas too often have to bear an expenditure of Rs 7 lakh to Rs 10 lakh for a daughter's wedding. Even in the remote villages, a small and marginal farmer spends Rs 2 lakh to Rs 3.5 lakh on a daughter's wedding." Some caste members tried to use the Morcha to address the issue of Dowry but they did not get a positive response. Dowry has now attained a status symbol in the community and that is part of the issue.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Research by a sociologist has shown that the restrictions faced by widows among Brahmins, Saraswats and CKP were significantly more than those faced by widows in Maratha caste.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Rosalind O'Hanlon, Professor at the University of Oxford stated that the Hindu God Khandoba, also known by the name Mhasoba, is traditionally very popular in the Maratha caste. She quotes about the devotion of the Marathas in the 19th century to Mhasoba as follows:


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Maratha leaders said that "Chhatrapati Shivaji is worshiped by the Maratha community, while different sections of society hold him in high esteem". "Shivaji Jayanti" (his birthday) is celebrated with folk dances, songs, plays and Puja. There was some controversy over the date but it is now celebrated on 19 February. Earlier, the regional Marathi political parties – Shiv Sena as well as the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena were celebrating it as per the Tithi according to the Hindu Calendar ("Falgun Vadya Tritiya" – third day of the month of Falgun), whereas the State Government was celebrating it as per the Gregorian Calendar.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Research by modern anthropologists and historians has shown that the Maratha caste originated from the amalgamation of families from the peasant communities that belonged to the Shudra Varna. However, after gaining political prominence with Shivaji's rise to power, this caste started claiming Kshatriya descent and genealogies were fabricated including those for Shivaji. Thus, the "96 clans"(Kuls)("96 Kuli Marathas" or "Shahānnau Kule") genealogies were concocted most likely after Shivaji came to power. Gordon explains that there are three such lists for the 96 clans compiled in the 19th century and they are "impossible to reconcile" due to this nature of origin of the caste. Jaffrelot writes that this process where Shudras pretend to be Kshatriyas and follow their customs is called "Kshatriyatization" and is a variation of Sanskritization.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Modern scholars such as M. S. A. Rao and Francine Frankel also agree that the Varna of Marathas remained Shudra, an indication being: "the maratha practice of hypergamy which permitted inter-marriage with rising peasant kunbi lineages, and created a hierarchy of maratha kuls, whose boundaries were flexible enough to incorporate, by the twentieth century, most of the kunbi population".


title: Maratha (caste)

text: By the late 19th century, some Brahmins made public proclamations of their Shudra status but some moderate Brahmins were keen to ally with the influential Marathas of Bombay in the interests of Indian independence from Britain. These Brahmins, motivated by such political reasons, supported the Maratha claim to Kshatriya status, but the success in this political alliance was sporadic and fell apart entirely following independence in 1947.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: As late as the turn of 20th century, the Brahmin priests of Shahu, the Maratha ruler of Kolhapur refused to use Vedic mantras and would not take a bath before chanting, on the grounds that even the leading Marathas such as Shahu and his family belonged to the Shudra varna. This opinion about the Shudra varna was supported by Brahmin Councils in Maharashtra and they stuck to their opinion even when they (the Brahmins) were threatened with the loss of land and property. This led to Shahu supporting Arya Samaj and Satyashodhak Samaj as well as campaigning for the rights of the Maratha community. He soon became the leader of the non-Brahmin movement and united the Marathas under his banner.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Gaikwad, the leader of Sambhaji Brigade, a prominent Maratha caste organisation, stated in an interview, that before Indian Independence, "Backward Class federation had raised the concerns of the Shudra communities including the Marathas".


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Maratha caste does not have the upanayanam or "sacred thread ceremony" of ritually upper caste Hindus. However, despite the ritual status, the Marathas have significant political power.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: In the 21st century, the Government of Maharashtra cited historical incidents for the claim of Shudra status of prominent Maratha families to form a case for reservation for the Marathas in the state. Additionally, a report by an independent commission in November 2018 concluded that the Maratha caste is educationally, socially and economically a backward community.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: In Karnataka, the Marathas are classified as Other Backward Class with the exception of the Marathas of Kodagu district who are classified as a Scheduled Tribe. In Maharashtra, they were classified as a Forward caste by the Mandal commission. In 2018, they were classified as Socially and Educationally Backward (SEBC) and were granted 16% reservation in jobs and education. In 2019, the court upheld the quota but recommended that the quota be cut to 12%.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: In November 2022, the Government of Maharashtra declared that needy Maratha students who live in hostels would be getting a stipend of Indian Rupees sixty thousand per year.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Claude Markovits, director of center of Indian and South-Asian studies, writes, that in 1875, in places such as Pune and Ahmednagar, Marwadi moneylenders became victims of coordinated attacks by the "local peasantry of the Maratha caste". Historian, David Ludlen states that the motivation for the violence was destroying the debt agreements that the moneylenders held over the Maratha farmers. These riots were known as the "Deccan riots". According to John McLane, the victims were mostly Marwadi moneylenders but Marathi speaking Brahmin moneylenders were usually spared. However, according to Lele, in Ahmednagar, Poona and Satara, the Marathas led the riots to challenge the Brahmins, who were a majority of the money lenders.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Following the assassination of Gandhi in 1948 by Nathuram Godse, a Chitpawan Brahmin from Pune, other Brahmins in Maharashtra became targets of violence, mostly from elements from the Maratha caste. Later, in Sangli, Jains and Lingayats joined the Marathas in their attacks against the Brahmins. Thousands of offices and homes were also set on fire. Molestation incidents were also reported during these attacks. On the first day alone, the number of deaths in Bombay were 15, and 50 in Pune.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: One scholar has observed, "It will be too much to believe that the riots took place because of the intense love of Gandhiji on the part of the Marathas. Godse became a very convenient hate symbol to damn the Brahmins and burn their properties."


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Donald Rosenthal opines that the motivation for the violence was the historic discrimination and humiliation that the Maratha community faced due to their caste status. He writes, "Even today, local Brahmins claim that the Marathas organized the riots to take political advantage of the situation".


title: Maratha (caste)

text: In Satara alone, the official reports show that about 1000 houses were burnt in about 300 villages. There were "cruel, cold-blooded killings" as well – for example, one family whose last name happened to be 'Godse' had three of its male members killed. Brahmins suffered from serious physical violence as well as economic violence in the form of looting.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Maureen Patterson concludes that the greatest violence took place not in the cities of Mumbai, Pune and Nagpur – but in Satara, Kolhapur and Belgaum. Destruction was extensive in Kolhapur. Earlier in the century, Shahu of Kolhapur had actively collaborated with the British against the Indian freedom struggle which he identified being led by Chitpavan Brahmins such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak. Shahu was also actively involved in the anti-Brahmin movement as well. During the 1948 disturbances, in Sangli, the local Jain and the Lingayat communities joined the Marathas in the attacks against the Brahmins. Here, specifically, the factories owned by the Chitpawan Brahmins were destroyed. This event led to the hasty integration of the Patwardhan ruled princely states into the Bombay Province by March 1948.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: The BDD Chawl in the Worli inner suburb of Mumbai is a complex of buildings which were built in 1920s to house workers employed by the textile mills.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: In the 1970s, at the height of the Dalit Panther movement, fights between the Chawl's dominant Maratha population and the Neo-Buddhists living in 20-odd buildings resulted in full-scale riots. Violence between the communities continued through the 1970s to the early 1990s.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Sambhaji Brigade is a branch of "Maratha Seva Sangh"(a Maratha caste organisation) and has committed acts of violence. In 2004, a mob of 150 Maratha activists attacked the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute - the reason being a book by James Laine. The vandalism led to loss of valuable historic documents and an estimated loss of Rs 1.25 crore. Sanskrit and religious documents dating back to the 16th century were destroyed, translation of the RigVeda by the Shankaracharya was thrown on the road. A woman who tried to call the police had bricks pelted at her by the mob.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: In 2017, the statue of Ram Ganesh Gadkari, a noted playwright and poet who showed Sambhaji in a poor light in his 1919 play 'Rajsanyas', was uprooted and thrown in the river by Sambhaji Brigade. The Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhu(CKP), the community to which Gadkari belonged later organised a meeting to protest this incident at the "Ram Ganesh Gadkari Rangayatan"(a theatre named after Gadkari) in Thane. BJP leader Nitesh Rane later rewarded the vandals and made inflammatory remarks claiming that he had announced a reward earlier in 2016 for removing the bust, and was proud of the act carried out by the accused.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: In 2018, several incidents of violence were reported due to agitation over the delay of the inclusion of the Maratha caste in the Other Backward Class category. The agitation was started by the Maratha Kranti Morcha. In June 2018, the Marathas threatened violent protests if their demands were not met. In July, Maratha protests turned violent as the protesters attacked police and torched police vehicles. Several incidents, including some deaths, were reported in other locations as well – several police were injured by the mobs, public property was damaged and private cars were torched. In Navi Mumbai itself, hundreds of vehicles were torched and buses were set on fire in cities such as Mumbai and Pune.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: In a widely publicised 2017 incident, a Brahmin scientist by the name of Medha Vinayak Khole(Deputy Director-General for the weather forecasting section) filed a police complaint against her Maratha domestic worker, Nirmala Yadav, for hiding her caste and "violating ritual purity and sanctity". Khole even insulted the latter's Gods, Khandoba (a popular God worshipped by most Marathi Hindu communities) and Mhasoba (a Hindu God worshiped by Pastoral communities and very popular in the Marathas). The "Akhil Bhartiya Bramhan Mahasangh" initially came out in support of Khole. However, there were widespread protests not just by Maratha caste organisations but also by non-caste organisations like Domestic Workers Unions and Women's organisations and Khole was widely criticised.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: The 1919 Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms of the British colonial government called for caste based representation in legislative council. In anticipation a Maratha league party was formed. The league and other groups came together to form the non-Brahmins party in the Marathi speaking areas in the early 1920s under the leadership of Maratha leaders Keshavrao Jedhe and Baburao Javalkar. Their early goals in that period were capturing the Ganpati and Shivaji festivals from Brahmin domination. They combined nationalism with anti-casteism as the party's aims. Later on in the 1930s, Jedhe merged the non-Brahmin party with the Congress party and changed the Congress party in the Maharashtra region from an upper-caste dominated body to a more broadly based but Maratha-dominated party. Apart from Jedhe, most Congress leaders from the Maratha /Kunbi community remained aloof from the Samyukta Maharashtra campaign of the 1950s. However, they have dominated the state politics of Maharashtra since its inception in 1960.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: The INC was the preferred party of the Maratha/Kunbi community in the early days of Maharashtra and the party was long without a major challenger, and enjoyed overwhelming support from the Maratha dominated sugar co-operatives and thousands of other cooperative organisations involved in the rural agricultural economy of the state such as marketing of dairy and vegetable produce, credit unions etc. The domination by Marathas of the cooperative institutions and with it the rural economic power allowed the community to control politics from the village level up to the Assembly and Lok Sabha seats. Since the 1980s, this group has also been active in setting up private educational institutions. Major past political figures of Congress party from Maharashtra such as Panjabrao Deshmukh, Keshavrao Jedhe, Yashwantrao Chavan, Shankarrao Chavan and Vilasrao Deshmukh have been from this group.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Sharad Pawar, who has been a towering figure in Maharashtrian and national politics, belongs to this group.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: The state has had many Maratha government ministers and officials, as well as in local municipal councils, and panchayats. Marathas comprise around 32 per cent of the state population. 10 out of 16 chief ministers of Maharashtra hailed from the Maratha community as of 2012.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: The rise of the Hindu Nationalist Shiv Sena and Bharatiya Janata Party in recent years have not dented Maratha representation in Maharashtra Legislative assembly.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Shiv Sena's strength mainly came from the Maratha support which it drew away from the Congress. In 1990, 24 MLAs elected from Shiv Sena were Marathas which increased to 33 in 2004 (more than 50%). Thus, researcher Vora concludes that the Shiv Sena has been emerging as a "Maratha Party".


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Maratha Seva Sangh, a Maratha caste based organisation and its youth wing Sambhaji Brigade came into the political scene after the BORI attack. The group distances itself from the Hindu nationalist parties like the BJP and Shiv Sena and invokes a secular anti-Brahmin genealogy from Shivaji, Tukaram, Jyotirao Phule and B. R. Ambedkar. In late 2004, Maratha Seva Sangh announced that they had established a new religion called "Shiv Dharma" to protest "Vedic Brahminism" and oppose Hinduism. The details of this are published in "Jijau Brigade va Sambhaji Brigade Sanskarmala, Maratha Sanskarmala I".


title: Maratha (caste)

text: The Duke of Wellington, after defeating the Marathas, noted that the Marathas, though poorly led by their Generals, had regular infantry and artillery that matched the level of that of the Europeans and warned other British officers from underestimating the Marathas on the battlefield. He cautioned one British general that: "You must never allow Maratha infantry to attack head on or in close hand to hand combat as in that your army will cover itself with utter disgrace".


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Norman Gash says that the Maratha infantry was equal to that of British infantry. After the Third Anglo-Maratha war in 1818, Britain listed the Marathas as one of the Martial Races to serve in the British Indian Army although it was unclear whether this categorisation referred to the Maratha caste or a subset of some Marathi castes. Despite praising the military prowess of the Marathas, the British considered them inferior to Sikhs and Gurkhas in terms of other masculine traits due to prevailing Christian notions of being a "man at arm" in battlefield i.e., they disapproved of Maratha utilisation of guerrilla warfare in combat along with their uncharitable and ruthless attitudes. However, racial theories have been discredited.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: Lord Roberts, commander-in-chief of the Indian Army 1885–1893, who came up with the "Martial Race" theory, stated that in order to improve the quality of the army, there was a need to use "more warlike and hardy races" instead of the current sepoys from Bengal, the Tamils, Telugus and the Marathas. Based on this theory, Gurkhas and Sikhs were recruited by the British army and they were "construed as martial races" in preference to other races in India. Historian Sikata Banerjee notes a dissonance in British military opinions of the Maratha, wherein the British portrayed them as both "formidable opponents" and yet not "properly qualified" for fighting in the western manner, criticising the Maratha guerrilla tactics as an improper way of war. Banerjee cites an 1859 statement as emblematic of this disparity:


title: Maratha (caste)

text: The Maratha Light Infantry regiment is one of the "oldest and most renowned" regiments of the Indian Army. Its First Battalion, also known as the "Jangi Paltan" ("Warrior Platoon"), traces its origins to 1768 as part of the Bombay Sepoys.


title: Maratha (caste)

text: The battle cry of Maratha Light Infantry is "Bol Shri Chattrapati Shivaji Maharaj ki Jai!" ("Hail Victory to Emperor Shivaji!") in tribute to the Maratha sovereign and their motto is "Shatrujeet" (victory over enemy).


title: Popular Mobilization Forces

text: The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) ( "al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī"), also known as the People's Mobilization Committee (PMC) and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), is an Iraqi state-sponsored umbrella organization composed of approximately 67 different armed factions, with around 128,000 fighters that are mostly Shia Muslim groups, but also include Sunni Muslim, Christian, and Yazidi groups. However, an investigation led by Former Prime Minister of Iraq, Haider al-Abadi revealed that approximately 60,000 are real soldiers, while the others 70,000 are "Ghost soldiers". The Popular Mobilization Units as a group was formed in 2014 and have fought in nearly every major battle against ISIL. It has been called the new Iraqi Republican Guard after it was fully reorganized in early 2018 by its then–Commander in Chief Haider al-Abadi, Prime Minister of Iraq from 2014 to 2018, who issued "regulations to adapt the situation of the Popular Mobilization fighters". Some of its component militias are considered terrorist groups by some states, while others have been accused of sectarian violence. During the 2019–2021 Iraqi protests, the organisation was accused of killing and wounding large numbers of protesters and activists.


title: Popular Mobilization Forces

text: While the factions have their own flags, a yellow or white flag with the phrase "Al-Hashd Al-Sha'bi" is also used by PMF along with the Iraqi flag.


title: Popular Mobilization Forces

text: With regard to the official native name, the Arabic word ("ash-Shaʿbī") translates as "people's" or "popular", as referred to the people; the Arabic word ("al-Ḥashd") translates as "mobilization", as in the group of people mobilized rather than the process of mobilization. In other contexts, "al-hashd" may translate as other terms such as "crowd", "horde", "throng", "gathering" .


title: Popular Mobilization Forces

text: Originally, there were seven forces in the PMF, which had been operating with Nouri al-Maliki's support since early 2014. These were:


title: Popular Mobilization Forces

text: According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour for the Carnegie Middle East Center, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki used these forces to combat the emergence of ISIL and maintain his influence in predominantly Sunni areas.


title: Popular Mobilization Forces

text: The People's Mobilization Forces (PMF) were formed by the Iraqi government on 15 June 2014 after top Iraqi Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani's non-sectarian fatwa on "Sufficiency Jihad" on 13 June. The fatwa called for defending Iraqi cities, particularly Baghdad, and to participate in the counter-offensive against ISIL, following the Fall of Mosul on 10 June 2014. The forces brought together a number of Shia militias, most of which receive direct support from Iran, along with a small number of Sunni tribesmen by uniting existing militias under the "People's Mobilization Committee" of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in June 2014. The forces would fall under the umbrella of the state's security services and within the legal frameworks and practices of the Ministry of Interior. On 19 December 2016, Iraqi President Fuad Masum approved a law passed by parliament in November that incorporated PMU in the country's armed forces. The pro-Assad website "Al-Madsar News" reports that, with this incorporation, the PMU are now subject to the supreme commander of the national armed forces and will no longer be affiliated to any political or social group. However, many of these irregulars have continued to operate independently of the Iraqi state.


title: Popular Mobilization Forces

text: On 21 March 2017, the PMU announced the launch of a special forces course, in order to create a Special Forces Division. The training program covered a variety of missions with direction from the Iraqi Special Operations Forces. On December 11, 2017, the PMU began to be entirely consolidated under the Iraqi Armed Forces, following a call by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to integrate. However, as late as May 2018, this integration had yet to take place, and PMF members remained without the same wages and privileges as soldiers in the regular Iraqi Armed Forces.


title: Popular Mobilization Forces

text: According to some sources, the Popular Mobilization Forces have made a fundamental difference on the battlefield, as they have undermined the superiority of ISIL at the level of guerrilla warfare, as well as at the level of the psychological operations.


title: Popular Mobilization Forces

text: In February 2019, (PMF) raided a base belonging to Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces, during the raid the group's leader Aws al-Khafaji was arrested by Iraqi forces, the Popular Mobilization Forces claimed that the raid was part of an ongoing operation to crack down on fake groups claiming to be part of PMF in order to commit crimes. The group also never formally declared itself as part of PMF nor had it ever registered as part of PMF with the Iraqi government.