title: Tezos

text: In 2011, Arthur Breitman first met South African cryptocurrency entrepreneur Johann Gevers through his friend Patri Friedman, the founder of The Seasteading Institute, who had hired Gevers for a project which Breitman had followed closely. In 2016, the Tezos Foundation was established in Zug Switzerland by Arthur and Kathleen Breitman, Swiss law firm MME and Gevers, to support an initial coin offering (ICO) for the Tezos platform. They planned for the foundation to become a non-profit that would raise money through the ICO and acquire DLS, which owned the group's technology.


title: Tezos

text: In addition to Switzerland's relatively lax financial oversight and effectively zero corporate tax rate, the benefits for Tezos of being in a foundation under the Swiss Civil Code included the ability to treat fundraising transactions as donations, and acting as an additional layer of institutional security to protect donations. Gevers became the foundation's first president.


title: Tezos

text: On July 1, 2017, the Tezos Foundation raised $232 million in Bitcoin and Ethereum in one of the biggest initial coin offerings (ICOs) at the time. The contributions were termed "non-refundable donations", which Kathleen Breitman likened to a pledge drive where people would receive tote bags, though some participants considered them to be an investment. If considered an investment rather than a donation, it would fall under the purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). After the ICO, it was planned that the Tezos Foundation would pay to acquire DLS, and if the Tezos blockchain functioned for at least three months, the Breitmans would receive 8.5% of the ICO and 10% of the tokens.


title: Tezos

text: By October, the Breitmans and Gevers were in a dispute over control of the project, with the Breitmans alleging Gevers pressured the foundation council into signing a contract giving him a bonus of $1.5 million. Gevers controlled the assets held by the foundation which stood at $820 million by December, including the Breitmans' share. The disagreements led to delays in the deployment of Tezos, which caused investors to bring lawsuits alleging fraud during the fundraiser and unauthorized sales of securities.


title: Tezos

text: In 2018, Gevers resigned and received $400,000, and the foundation board was replaced; Tezos went live that September.


title: Tezos

text: In 2020, the Tezos founders settled the lawsuits, with the Tezos Foundation paying $25 million, before federal courts ruled on whether the ICO was a sale of unregistered securities. Arthur Breitman joined the foundation's council in 2021.


title: Tezos

text: The primary protocol of Tezos utilizes liquid proof of stake (LPoS) and supports Turing-complete smart contracts in a domain-specific language called Michelson. Michelson is a purely functional stack-based language with a reduced instruction set and no side effects, designed with formal verification in mind.


title: Tezos

text: In Tezos' LPoS model, network nodes that validate blocks and add them to the blockchainknown as bakersare selected to perform those actions proportionally to their share of tez that they put up for stake (minimum 6,000 tez), and a baker receives staking rewards in the form of newly minted tez after successfully validating a block and adding it to the blockchain. Holders of tez can delegate their tez to bakers to share in the staking rewards that bakers receive. Holders of tez who do not stake or delegate their tez risk suffering a loss in value due to inflation as new tez are created and distributed to bakers for validating new blocks and adding them to the blockchain. As of January 2021, nearly 80% of all tez in circulation were either directly staked by bakers or delegated to bakers for staking.


title: Tezos

text: The Tezos protocol allows itself to be amended by a staged process performed by committing operations to the stored blockchain to submit proposals (intended code changes) and to vote on those changes. If a proposal receives enough votes the protocol updates itself to incorporate the code changes.


title: Tezos

text: The Tezos blockchain has been used for NFTs as an alternative to more energy-intensive projects such as Ethereum.


title: Tezos

text: In 2018, the Tezos Foundation commissioned the audit company Least Authority to perform five audits which were published in March 2019. These audits determined that Tezos protects against chain reorganizations and selfish-baking, which are two common issues in blockchains using Nakamoto-style consensus. A subsequent analysis confirms that selfish baking in Tezos results in insignificant profits, even when the baker attempting it has a very large portion of the stake. An independent 2020 study revealed a potential flaw in the consensus proof of stake mechanism that Tezos was using at the time, by providing a theoretical analysis of the feasibility and profitability of a block stealing attack referred to as "selfish endorsing". A change to the protocol was proposed to reduce the profitability of this dishonest behavior. With implementation of the Tenderbake protocol amendment, the described behavior was mitigated and is no longer actual.


title: Tezos

text: Tezos co-founder Arthur Breitman studied applied mathematics, computer science, and physics in France and financial mathematics at New York University under Nassim Nicholas Taleb before working in quantitative finance. Kathleen Breitman (née McCaffrey) studied at Cornell University and worked at a hedge fund and as a consultant. Arthur was the leader of an anarcho-capitalist group in New York, and Kathleen was a libertarian Republican; the two of them met at a crypto-anarchist lunch in 2010 and married in 2013.


title: Panama (2022 film)

text: Panama is a 2022 action thriller film directed by Mark Neveldine and starring Cole Hauser and Mel Gibson.


title: Panama (2022 film)

text: When the U.S. is on the brink of invading Panama, a former marine Becker is hired by a CIA operative Stark for a top secret arms trade mission. Alone and among the most dangerous arms dealers, Becker learns the true nature of political power.


title: Panama (2022 film)

text: The project was first announced in 2014 with Daniel Adams directing from a script he co-wrote with William Barber. In 2019, Morgan Freeman and Frank Grillo were attached to star in the film, with Adams still on board to direct. In 2020, it was announced that Mel Gibson and Cole Hauser will star in the film, with Mark Neveldine replacing Adams as director.


title: Panama (2022 film)

text: Principal photography commenced in December 2020 in Puerto Rico. The film was shot in 14 days over the course of 3 weeks.


title: OpenText

text: OpenText Corporation (also written "opentext") is a Canadian company that develops and sells enterprise information management (EIM) software.


title: OpenText

text: OpenText, headquartered in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, is Canada's fourth-largest software company as of 2022, and recognized as one of Canada's top 100 employers 2016 by Mediacorp Canada Inc.


title: OpenText

text: OpenText software applications manage content or unstructured data for large companies, government agencies, and professional service firms. OpenText aims its products at addressing information management requirements, including management of large volumes of content, compliance with regulatory requirements, and mobile and online experience management.


title: OpenText

text: OpenText employs over 16,000 people worldwide, and is a publicly traded company, listed on the NASDAQ (OTEX) and the Toronto Stock Exchange (OTEX).


title: OpenText

text: Timothy Bray, with University of Waterloo professors Frank Tompa and Gaston Gonnet, founded OpenText Corporation in 1991. It grew out of OpenText Systems Inc., founded in 1989. The founders spun the company off from a University of Waterloo project that developed technology to index the Oxford English Dictionary.


title: OpenText

text: Key people involved later include Tom Jenkins, who joined the company as COO in 1994. Tom Jenkins later became president and Chief Executive Officer, and has been Executive Chairman since 2013. John Shackleton served as president from 1998 to 2011, and as CEO from 2005 to 2011. Mark Barrenechea has been president and CEO of OpenText since 2012. Mark Barrenechea was named Canadian Business CEO of the year in 2015. From January 2016, Steve Murphy served as the President; however, the company eliminated the position in Q1 2017.


title: OpenText

text: OpenText is a supporter of the University of Waterloo Stratford Campus, contributing both funds and in-kind services to the school.


title: OpenText

text: In July 2020, OpenText has partnered with NINJIO. The collaboration strengthens Webroot Security Awareness Training with interactive, Hollywood-style videos showcasing viral material aimed at encouraging cyber-resilient activities such as phishing emails and inappropriate URLs detected.


title: OpenText

text: In 2014, OpenText acquired GXS Inc. and integrated it into their OpenText Business Network, which then acquired Inovis. In 2014 they also acquired Cordys for $33 million, and Actuate.


title: OpenText

text: On September 12, 2016, OpenText further expanded its share of the enterprise content management software market by buying that division of Dell EMC, which included Documentum, for US$1.6 billion. OpenText had originally had Documentum and Hummingbird, Ltd., as its chief competitors in this space, but this acquisition brought the long-time third competitor in Documentum under one corporate roof. Also in 2016, OpenText acquired Recommind after previously engaging with the company as a strategic partner.


title: OpenText

text: In 2017, OpenText acquired Guidance Software for US$240 million, and Covisint for US$103 million, which they integrated into their OpenText Business Network.


title: OpenText

text: In 2018, OpenText acquired Liaison Technologies for US$310 million, which they integrated into their OpenText ALLOY Platform.


title: OpenText

text: In 2019, OpenText acquired Catalyst Repository Systems, and then acquired Carbonite Inc. (including Webroot and Mozy, which Carbonite Inc. had earlier acquired) for approximately US$1.45 billion.


title: OpenText

text: In 2021, OpenText announced planned acquisition of Zix Corp for US$860 million, and in November, OpenText completed the acquisition of Bricata enabling next-generation Network Detection & Response (NDR) technology to the OpenText Security and Protection Cloud.


title: OpenText

text: In 2022, OpenText announced it would acquire British software firm Micro Focus in a deal valued at US$6billion, which is expected to close in early 2023.


title: OpenText

text: OpenText's products include enterprise content management (OpenText Content Suite, OpenText Extended ECM, OpenText Documentum), Business Network, customer experience management (OpenText Customer Experience Platform), digital process automation (OpenText AppWorks), discovery (OpenText Axcelerate eDiscovery and Investigations), security (OpenText EnCase Forensic Security Suite, OpenText Carbonite and Webroot solutions), and AI and analytics (OpenText Magellan Product Suite).


title: OpenText

text: OpenText announced cloud-native containerized versions of many of the company's software applications in April 2020.


title: OpenText

text: This is the family of Documentum products. Documentum (company) was acquired by EMC, and when EMC was acquired by Dell, all of the Documentum IP was sold to Opentext.


title: OpenText

text: In 1996, the product originally called "Livelink" became OpenText's. Between 2003 and 2005, "Livelink" evolved from being the name of a single product to being a brand applied to the names of several OpenText software products. As a result of this change, "Livelink Server" became known as "Livelink Enterprise Server" (LES) and later "Livelink ECM. In 2012, OpenText introduced the OpenText Content Suite. Then the technology component formerly known as Livelink ECM - Enterprise Server became known as "OpenText Content Server", which is now a key component of OpenText Content Suite Platform.


title: OpenText

text: First released in May 2006, Livelink Enterprise Archive (LEA) became Archive Server in 2010. It is a key product in the Extended ECM scenario. With Version 16, the Archive Server was renamed to Archive Center.


title: OpenText

text: In July 2017, OpenText launched its artificial intelligence (AI) and analytics platform, OpenText Magellan, at the company's Enterprise World conference. The platform combines open source machine learning with advanced analysis and is able to merge, manage, and analyze both structure data and unstructured, textual content. It offers machine-assisted decision-making, automation, and business optimization in a scalable, flexible solution.


title: OpenText

text: OpenText RightFax provides network-based fax functionality to enterprise organizations and has evolved through many versions since it was first released in 1992.


title: OpenText

text: RedDot, founded in 1993, was a business unit of OpenText Corporation that the company refers to as the "Web Solutions Group". The software assists in the management of content, with regulatory compliance and industry specific requirements.


title: OpenText

text: Its core product, RedDot CMS is a Windows-based server application that provides Web content management in a multi-user environment. Complementary to the CMS or as a standalone product, LiveServer aggregates disparate document resources and serves them as Web pages.


title: OpenText

text: Red dots on the authoring interface indicated sections of editable content for each web page, hence the name RedDot for the product. This feature was popular with customers and won awards in 2001 for its usability. By 2006 RedDot was one of the few WCM vendors that continued to develop their own content authoring interface. Most other WCM vendors had moved to open source alternatives, or had licensed an online rich-text editor from commercial vendors such as Ephox or Ektron. In response to customer attempts to work around the limitations of the RedDot editor by installing other editors RedDot developed an integration layer to support CKeditor and Ephox EditLive! as alternative editors. In 2009 RedDot (rebranded the OpenText Web Solutions Group) made the Telerik RadEditor available alongside the existing RedDot editor for CMS 9.


title: OpenText

text: After the acquisition of Vignette, Web Solutions was rebranded again to become OpenText Web Site Management.


title: OpenText

text: Captiva Software became a subsidiary of OpenText in 2017. It makes software for document information processing and data capture from paper and electronic documents and provides related services. Information in the form of extracted content and files are acquired in the Captiva Solution and then delivered for storage or workflow into document management systems such as those from Documentum, OpenText, Microsoft, or IBM. In 2019 Captiva was rebranded as OpenText Intelligent Capture.


title: OpenText

text: AppEnhancer is a content management system that manages, organizes, and stores information from an application or as an extension to an existing application. The product was acquired during OpenText's purchase of Dell EMC's ECD (Enterprise Content Division) in 2017.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The Government of Thailand, or formally the Royal Thai Government (Abrv: RTG; , , ), is the unitary government of the Kingdom of Thailand. The country emerged as a modern nation state after the foundation of the Chakri Dynasty and the city of Bangkok in 1782. The Revolution of 1932 brought an end to absolute monarchy and replaced it with a constitutional monarchy.


title: Government of Thailand

text: From then on the country was ruled by a succession of military leaders installed after coups d'état, the most recent in May 2014, and a few democratic intervals. The 2007 Constitution (drafted by a military-appointed council, but approved by a referendum) was annulled by the 2014 coup-makers who ran the country as a military dictatorship.


title: Government of Thailand

text: Thailand has so far had seventeen Constitutions. Throughout, the basic structure of government has remained the same. The government of Thailand is composed of three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. The system of government is modelled after the Westminster system. All branches of government are concentrated in Bangkok, the capital city of Thailand.


title: Government of Thailand

text: From May 2014 until July 2019, Thailand was ruled by a military junta, the National Council for Peace and Order, which partially repealed the 2007 constitution, declared martial law and nationwide curfew, banned political gatherings, arrested and detained politicians and anti-coup activists, imposed internet censorship and took control of the media. On 24 March 2019, Thailand voted in the 2019 Thai general election, supporting a spread of opinion across many political parties vying to be in government.


title: Government of Thailand

text: King Vajiralongkorn (or Rama X) of Thailand has reigned since the death of his father Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX) on 13 October 2016; exercising limited rule since 1 December 2016 . He is the head of state, aided in his duties by the Privy Council of Thailand. The constitution stipulates that although the sovereignty of the state is vested in the people, the king will exercise such powers through the three branches of the Thai government. Under the constitution the king is given very little power, but remains a figurehead and symbol of the Thai nation. As the head of state, however, he is given some powers and has a role to play in the workings of government. According to the constitution, the king is head of the armed forces. He is required to be Buddhist as well as the defender of all faiths in the country. The king also retained some traditional powers such as the power to appoint his heirs, the power to grant pardons, and the royal assent.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The king is also head of the House of Chakri, the ruling house of Thailand founded by King Buddha Yodfa Chulaloke (or Rama I) in 1782. The monarchy and the royal family continues to command huge respect in Thailand, with its influence peaking during the Bhumibol Adulyadej reign. He wielded a great deal of popular respect and moral authority, which was used at times to resolve political crises. The monarch's official home is the Grand Palace, however the present king lives primarily in the Chitralada Palace in Bangkok. The monarch's household was managed by the Bureau of the Royal Household and his finances by the Crown Property Bureau, But are being transferred to direct control by the monarchy.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The heir presumptive to the throne is Prince Dipangkorn Rasmijoti, although it is up to the king's discretion whether Prince Dipangkorn will be named Crown Prince in the future. Succession to the throne is governed by the 1924 Palace Law of Succession, promulgated by King Vajiravudh. Palace law follows the male agnatic primogeniture, where males only are allowed to succeed and inheritance is passed only from father to son and through the male line only. However, the 1974 amendment to the Thai constitution allows for a princess to ascend the throne and this particular provision is retained under Section 21 of the 2017 Constitution which reads:In the case where the Throne becomes vacant and the King has not appointed an Heir under paragraph one, the Privy Council shall submit the name of the Successor to the Throne under section 20 to the Council of Ministers for further submission to the National Assembly for approval. In this regard, the name of a Princess may be submitted. Upon the approval of the National Assembly, the President of the National Assembly shall invite such Successor to ascend the Throne and proclaim such Successor as King.


title: Government of Thailand

text: Since 1932 the head of government of Thailand has been the Prime Minister of Thailand, usually the leader of the largest party or the largest coalition party in the lower house of parliament. The prime minister is, in accordance with the constitution, selected, first by an election in the lower house (According to the B.E.2560 Constitution, The Prime Minister will be elected by both houses till Next 5 years), then officially appointed by the King.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The prime minister, head of the executive branch, is also the leader of the Cabinet of Thailand. The prime minister retains the prerogative to appoint or remove any minister. As the most visible member of the government, the prime minister represents the country abroad and is the main spokesperson for the government at home. The prime minister's official residence is Phitsanulok Mansion, a mansion in the Dusit district of Bangkok.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The former prime minister was Yingluck Shinawatra of the Pheu Thai Party, the first female prime minister of Thailand. She was removed from office by the Constitutional Court of Thailand on 7 May 2014, on charges of abuse of power. She was replaced briefly by an interim prime minister, Niwatthamrong Boonsongpaisan, and then succeeded by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, leader of the 2014 Thai coup d'état. As a result of the Constitutional Court's decision on 24 August 2022 to temporarily suspend Prayut Chan-o-cha's premiership due to the ongoing debate about his 8-year term limit, Prawit Wongsuwan took over the position to serve as acting Prime Minister.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The Cabinet of Thailand or the Council of Ministers of Thailand is a council composed of 35 ministers of state and deputy ministers, who run the cabinet ministries of the kingdom. There are 20 cabinet ministries, accounting for the main portion of state employees. The cabinet is responsible for the formulation and execution of policies of the government. Members of the cabinet do not necessarily need to be members of the lower house as in other countries, but most often are. The Office of the Prime Minister and the cabinet offices occupy the Government House of Thailand.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The legislative branch (also called the Parliament of Thailand) of the Thai government was first established in the "temporary" constitution of 1932. The assembly first met on 28 June 1932 in the Ananda Samakhom Throne Hall. The National Assembly of Thailand is a bicameral legislature and is composed of two houses: the Senate and the House of Representatives. The legislative branch took its current form in 2007. The national assembly has 750 members. Both houses of the national assembly meet at the Sappaya-Sapasathan.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The upper house of the legislative branch was first established in 1946. However, for most of its history the Senate has been the stronghold of the military and the elite. The current Senate has 150 members. Seventy-six members are elected, one per province from 75 provinces of Thailand (Bueng Kan does not have an elected senator yet) and one from the Bangkok Metropolitan Area. The other 74 are selected by the Senate Selection Commission, made up of both elected and appointed officials.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The chamber is strictly non-partisan, and members may not be a member of a partisan organisation, the House of Representatives, the judiciary, or the cabinet for five years. The Senate has little legislative power, but retains considerable powers of scrutiny and appointment as the Senate is vested with the power to advise on the appointment of members of the judiciary and independent government agencies. The Senate sits for a set six year non-renewable term. The Senate cannot be dissolved. The Senate is presided over by a president of the Senate, who is also the Vice-President of the National Assembly. He is assisted by two vice-presidents of the Senate. The last election to the Senate was in 2008.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The Senate and the House of Representatives were abolished after 22 May 2014 coup by the "National Council for Peace and Order" (NCPO).


title: Government of Thailand

text: The lower house of the legislative branch has been in existence in some form since 1932. The House of Representatives is the primary legislative house of the government of Thailand. The House includes 500 members. Three hundred seventy-five of the MPs are elected directly from single-seat constituencies around the country. The other 125 members are selected using "proportional representation" through party-lists. There are eight electoral areas from which the proportionally representative votes are taken and 375 constituencies. This system is called the "mixed member majoritarian" in which a voter has two votes, one for the constituency MP, and the other for a party in the voter's electoral area.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The house is a partisan chamber with seven political parties. The house is the primary legislative chamber and the more powerful of the two houses. The house has the power to remove both the prime minister and cabinet ministers through a vote of no confidence. The house sits for a term of four years, however a dissolution of the house can happen anytime before the expiration of the term. The house is led by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who is also the President of the National Assembly. He is assisted by two deputy speakers.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The leader of the largest party or largest coalition party will most likely become prime minister, while the leader of the largest party with no members holding any ministerial positions will become the leader of the opposition. The leader of the opposition is a powerful position with considerable influence. The leader is assisted by a shadow cabinet. The last general election for the house was in 2007.


title: Government of Thailand

text: After the 2007 election the People's Power party (PPP) won the most seats with the Democrats and Chart Thai party trailing behind. However, after the 2008 political crisis and the ruling of the constitutional court on 2 December 2008, in which the PPP plus the Chart Thai and Neutral Democratic Parties (coalition partners), the prime minister and several party executives were banned from politics for five years, the composition of the house changed. The successor of the PPP still retained most seats, however the remainder of the coalition partners defected and joined a Democrat-led government which was inaugurated on 17 December 2008, leaving the For Thais Party (successor of the PPP) and the Pracharaj Party in opposition.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The House of Representatives and the Senate were abolished after 22 May 2014 coup by the NCPO. Currently, according to the interim Constitution of Thailand imposed by NCPO, there is no House of Representatives. Legislative power is vested in the National Legislative Council, appointed by the NCPO.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The judiciary of Thailand is composed of four distinct systems: the Military Court (which has expanded its power since 22 May 2014), the Court of Justice system, the Administrative Court system and the Constitutional Court.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The Courts of Justice of Thailand is the largest of the court system and makes up the majority of courts in the kingdom. The courts as mandated in the constitution are composed of three tiers: the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court of Justice of Thailand.


title: Government of Thailand

text: There are no verbatim transcripts kept by the trial court. The court record is composed of the courts decision.


title: Government of Thailand

text: Research judges assist the sitting judges. Judges must take an examination and two different examinations are given: one exam is for judges trained in Thailand and a different examination is given for judges who graduate from foreign law schools. All judges are formally appointed by the king.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The Asian Human Rights Commission called the Thai legal system a "mess" and called for a drastic overhaul of Thailand's criminal procedures. It cited the rampant use of forced confessions, and the fact that even a senior justice ministry official admitted that 30% of cases went to court with no evidence. It also criticised the judiciary for failing to ensure that trials are conducted speedily, citing the case of four Thai men accused of plotting to kill Supreme Court President Praman Chansue (). The accused were present in court 461 times before 91 different judges since proceedings began in 1993 and ended in 2008. While these proceedings continued, Mr Praman died in 2007.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The administrative court system is made up of two tiers: The Administrative Courts of First Instance and the Supreme Administrative Court. The court system was first created in 1997. The court's main jurisdiction is to settle litigation between the state or an organ of state (government ministries, departments and independent agencies) and private citizens.


title: Government of Thailand

text: First set up in 1997, the Constitutional Court of Thailand was created solely as a high court to settle matters pertaining to the constitution. The court has since accumulated huge amounts of power and influence, generating many controversies on the way. This became especially clear during the 2006 and 2008 political crises, settling political deadlocks and social unrest.


title: Government of Thailand

text: Thailand's legal system blends principles of traditional Thai and Western laws. The Western-sourced laws are often misused and corrupted. The traditional "Thai" laws are the product of Hindu-Brahmin laws used by the Khmer Empire. There is no discovery in the Thai legal system. Slander and libel are not civil torts in Thailand but criminal offences.


title: Government of Thailand

text: Thailand's legal system has been often criticised by other countries for having penalties of life in prison or even death for crimes such as drug possession or smuggling, while having lenient penalties for crimes such as terrorism and marital abuse resulting in spousal death.


title: Government of Thailand

text: The criminally accused are entitled to have a court-appointed certified translator present in court if they cannot afford one. Appeals must be filed with the trial court within thirty (30) days of the judge reading, signing, and issuing the verdict. There are no juries in trials. Only Thai citizens can be admitted to the Bar and can practice before the courts. Attorneys must carry their current, yellow, bar card when in court and may be required to produce it on challenge.


title: Government of Thailand

text: In Thailand's southern border provinces, where Muslims constitute the majority of the population, provincial Islamic committees have limited jurisdiction over probate, family, marriage, and divorce cases.


title: Government of Thailand

text: Under Section 44 Thailand's Interim Constitution of 2014, the Prime Minister and NCPO leader has complete authority to perform any administrative, legislative, and judicial action as necessary, which then is deemed legal and constitutional.


title: Government of Thailand

text: Thailand is divided into 76 provinces ("changwat", singular and plural). The Ministry of the Interior appoints governors for all provinces. The metropolis of greater Bangkok is a special administrative area at the same level as a province, but the governor is popularly elected.


title: Government of Thailand

text: In November 2015 the government launched a "one-stop" website with information on all government services. The website, referred to as "GovChannel", is at GovChannel. It is operated by the Information and Communication Technology Ministry (MICT) and its subsidiary agency, the Digital Government Development Agency (DGA) (formerly the Electronic Government Agency [EGA]). GovChannel links information from four other government websites.


title: Government of Thailand

text: Bangkok, a metropolis of more than 10 million inhabitants, has been called the "world's most primate city". It is home to virtually all government ministries and functionaries. Bangkok is overcrowded, polluted, sinking, and traffic-congested. Its many problems have raised the issue of moving the nation's capital elsewhere, especially given the example of Indonesia's plans to move its capital from Jakarta. The idea is not new: two decades ago, the Thaksin Shinawatra administration assigned the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council (NESDC), to formulate a plan to move the capital to Nakhon Nayok. The flooding of Bangkok in 2011 revived the idea of moving government functions from Bangkok given its subsidence rate of two centimetres per year and its propensity to flood. In 2017, the military government assigned NESDC to study the possibility of moving government offices from Bangkok to Chachoengsao in the east.


title: Sam Palladio

text: Sam Christian Palladio Scott (born 21 November 1986) is an English actor and musician. He is best known for his starring role as Gunnar Scott in the ABC musical drama series "Nashville" (2012–18). Palladio has also had recurring roles on the comedy series "Episodes" (2012–15) and the science fiction series "Humans" (2015–2018). His feature film credits include "7 Lives" (2011), "Runner, Runner" (2013), "Strange Magic" (2015), "The Princess Switch" (2018), "" (2020) and "" (2021).


title: Sam Palladio

text: Palladio was born in Pembury, Kent, England, UK. He was brought up by his parents, who are both artists, in Penzance, Cornwall, England. Palladio was educated at Humphry Davy School and then studied Actor Musicianship at Rose Bruford College in Sidcup, London, graduating in 2008.


title: Sam Palladio

text: Palladio began his career with guest starring roles in various television series, including "Little Crackers", "Doctors", "The Hour", and "Cardinal Burns". He gained further recognition for his starring role as Gunnar Scott in the ABC musical drama series "Nashville". The series premiered to critical acclaim in 2012. It ended its run after six seasons in 2018. He also had a recurring role as Stoke on the comedy series "Episodes" between 2012 and 2015. Since 2016, he has had a recurring role as Ed in the science fiction drama series "Humans".


title: Sam Palladio

text: His film credits include roles as Calvin in the British drama film "7 Lives" (2011), as Shecky in the crime thriller film "Runner, Runner" (2013), and as Roland in the animated musical fantasy film "Strange Magic" (2015). He was also the lead singer in a band called Salt Water Thief. In 2020, he appeared on an episode of "The Repair Shop", receiving his grandfather's RAF cap after it had been restored by the programme's experts.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: Solihull Moors Football Club is a professional football club based in Solihull, West Midlands, England. The club currently competes in the National League, the fifth tier of the English football league system, after achieving promotion from the National League North in the 2015–16 season.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: The club was founded in 2007 by the merger of Moor Green (founded in 1901) and Solihull Borough (founded in 1953). The Moors entered the Conference North, the sixth tier of English football in 2007 where they remained until their promotion in 2016 under Marcus Bignot. After avoiding relegation in 2016–17 and 2017–18, the Moors narrowly missed out on promotion to League Two for the first time in their history by finishing in 2nd place. Solihull Moors play their home matches at Damson Park.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: On 10 July 2007, the club was formally announced as being merged and details of the new club logo and kits for the forthcoming season were released. In one of their first games Solihull Moors beat Birmingham City reserves. This fixture happened annually as part of an agreement which allowed Birmingham to play their reserve games at Solihull's ground. With the overhaul of reserve football in England, Birmingham City's development squads now play their fixtures at their club's training facilities rather than at Solihull Moors. The Birmingham City Women's team of the FA Women's Super League have played at the ground since 2014.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: In November 2007, the club announced a partnership with National Division One rugby union club Pertemps Bees. The deal was intended to see the two clubs share the Damson Park facilities as well as the formation of community and coaching projects for Solihull. This was finally made official in 2010. The groundsharing arrangement came to an end in 2012, as Bees dropped into the fourth tier of English Rugby Union. As a relic of that short-lived groundsharing deal, one of the seated stands at Solihull Moors' Damson Park is part of the Bees' main stand from their former Sharmans Cross Road home.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: Throughout the 2007–08 Conference North campaign, then-manager Bob Faulkner kept much of the same squad that had represented Moor Green the previous season, with some summer additions from elsewhere. No Solihull Borough players were retained. Solihull Moors' first ever league goal was an equaliser scored from range by Darren Middleton, in a game that also saw Moors score their first ever league point, a 1–1 home draw with Barrow in their first ever competitive game. Moors had to wait two further weeks for a first ever competitive win, beating Gainsborough Trinity 3–1 at home. The club finished their first ever season in seventeenth position in the Conference North, securing survival with a win away at Blyth Spartans in April 2008. In their first FA Cup campaign, Solihull Moors reached the Fourth Qualifying Round before being dispatched 5–0 by Rushden & Diamonds, then of the Football Conference.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: A number of changes were made to the Solihull Moors squad ahead of the 2008–09 season, with 8 summer signings made. Progress for the first team was slight, however, with the Moors managing sixteenth place in the league. The youth side, in contrast, made enormous strides, finishing as Midland Floodlit Youth League champions, and reaching the second round of the FA Youth Cup, before losing a close tie 2–0 to the academy side of professional club Tranmere Rovers. The cup run saw Solihull beat Wellington 18–0 during qualification. Five of that season's impressive youth crop signed for the senior squad during the close season.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: A topsy-turvy 2009–10 season saw Moors go from relegation candidates in mid-September to mid-table by the new year, before slipping to a more customary seventeenth position by the end of the season. A seemingly revolving-door transfer policy reflected the difficulty of the season for Solihull Moors on the pitch.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: On 7 February 2011, Moors manager Bob Faulkner died of cancer aged 60, after almost 25 years of managing Moor Green and Solihull Moors combined. Micky Moore, his assistant and also former Solihull Borough manager, was the initial replacement, however he resigned on 21 June 2011 to take up the full-time position of assistant manager at Mansfield Town. Moors finished seventh in the Conference North that season, then their best finish since the formation of the club. Under Faulkner and Moore's leadership, a squad that boasted the attacking prowess of Adam Cunnington and Matt Smith only narrowly missed out on the playoffs, following a late season collapse as momentum faded. At this point, extra seating was installed at Damson Park in anticipation of promotion challenges to come. The club also reached the final of the Birmingham Senior Cup for the first time during this season, losing 2–0 to West Bromwich Albion at The Hawthorns.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: Marcus Bignot was announced as the new manager of Solihull Moors on 27 June 2011. The ex-Crewe, Bristol Rovers, QPR and Millwall defender arrived at the club a week after the departure of Moore. With some players integral to the strong performance in the previous season having moved on, he inherited a youthful squad that lacked experience, which won none of its pre-season friendlies. The first seven games of the season ended in defeat. Using his connections in the game, Marcus brought in several new players and immediately results started to improve, so much so that by January the possibility of the playoffs seemed achievable. However, it proved impossible to maintain the momentum and by the end of the season the club finished just above the drop zone, in nineteenth place.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: After a difficult first season under Marcus Bignot, the Moors continued their progress on the pitch towards challenging for promotion from the Conference North. The club finished ninth in 2013, followed by an eighth-place finish in 2014. 2014 also saw the introduction of a more robust club infrastructure at Solihull Moors, with the number of teams within the club's youth and junior structure rising from 3 to 27. Efforts to promote the club within the local community and increase attendances also slowly began to pay off at this point, with attendances up 80% on previous years. Moors had a more difficult 2014–15 season, managing only twelfth in the Conference North. However, 2014–15 also brought new opportunities for the club, with Birmingham City Ladies joining the Moors at Damson Park.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: The Moors reached new heights under Bignot in 2015–16, winning the National League North title and securing promotion for the first time to the National League. The team finished the season with 85 points, winning the league comfortably with three games to spare. Promotion was secured on a night that Solihull were not even playing, as a defeat for North Ferriby United at Stalybridge Celtic mathematically confirmed their championship. Solihull also lifted the Birmingham Senior Cup for the first time – at the second time of asking – defeating Birmingham City 2–1 at St Andrew's.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: Solihull Moors began their first National League campaign away at Sutton United on 6 August 2016, winning their first match at national level 3–1. Moors have since had their first ever televised game, winning 4–0 at home to Southport in front of the cameras on 4 October 2016. Solihull also booked their place in the first round of the FA Cup for the first time, after beating Kettering Town at home in the Fourth Qualifying Round. In the first round the team defeated Yeovil Town of League Two. In November, Bignot left to take the manager's job at Grimsby Town.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: Moors appointed former Hednesford Town and Redditch United manager Liam McDonald, who guided the team to 16th in their maiden campaign in the fifth tier. The Moors were knocked out of the FA Cup in the second round by League Two side Luton Town, losing 6–2 having led 2–0 at half time. The Moors had a poor start to the 2017–18 season, resulting in McDonald leaving the club by mutual consent in October 2017. McDonald was replaced by Richard Money, who himself left the club later that month and was replaced by Mark Yates and his assistant Tim Flowers in November. Yates and Flowers pulled off the "great escape" with a run of 12 wins in 29 matches, resulting in the club rising from bottom of the league at Christmas, to 18th place by the end of the season, securing safety by 6 points. This achievement led to newly promoted League Two Macclesfield Town appointing Yates as their new manager, with Flowers taking the top job at Moors.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: In the 2018–19 National League season Solihull achieved their best ever league finish, coming 2nd with a total of 86 points. Under Flowers, the Moors spent the entire season at or around the top of the league. They ultimately had to settle for second place and a place in the play-offs as they missed out on the title by three points. The Moors were knocked out of the play-offs by AFC Fylde in their semi-final at Damson Park, a 2nd-minute goal from Danny Philliskirk proving the difference. The club also reached the second round of the FA Cup where they held Blackpool to a 0–0 draw in the televised home leg in front of a record crowd but lost the replay at Bloomfield Road 3–2, conceding an extra time penalty. In the following FA Cup campaign, the Moors were eliminated by League One side Rotherham United in the second round despite leading 3–0 in the 76th minute before conceding four late goals. Following disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2019–20 season was halted in March 2020 with Solihull finishing in 9th place. In 2021–22 Solihull finished third and went on to win their play-off semifinal, but lost the final after extra-time, having scored the first goal of the match .


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: Currently known as the ARMCO Arena for sponsorship reasons, the club ground is situated on Damson Parkway in the Damsonwood area of town, about north of Solihull town centre, next to the Land Rover car plant.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: The ground has two seated stands on either side of the pitch, and a covered stand of mixed seating and terracing at the south-eastern end of the ground, where all six entrances are located. The main stand lies on the south-western side of the ground and is connected to the clubhouse. The clubhouse contains two separate bar areas, and is also home to a pie & chips shop on match days. The stand has seating at the bottom, and a balcony above reserved for sponsors and club officials. In 2019, boxes were added. Adjacent to the main stand is an area of hard standing with a raised toilet block. The steps leading to the entrances to the toilet facilities provide the only small area of terracing at that end of the ground and, when their side is attacking that end of the pitch, are popular with a group of Solihull Moors fans calling themselves "The Number 2 Crew".


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: Turnstiles open into the area next to the main stand, which also hosts the club shop and a hot food concession, the hard standing area on the opposite side of the pitch from the main stand, and into the other large stand. This area, known as "The Shed" — or sometimes also "The Tuck Shop End" to supporters — is currently officially titled the "Jerroms Stand" for sponsorship reasons. As its nickname suggests, it is home to the club tuck shop, which sells refreshments throughout the match but not hot food.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: Much of the rest of the ground is undeveloped hard standing. Nearest to the turnstiles on the north-east side of the ground, is a toilet block and, sometimes, a second hot food stall, depending on segregation requirements and demand. Opposite the main stand is a single step of terracing that straddles the halfway line of the pitch. Further along that side, in the opposite direction from the Jerroms Stand, is a smaller area of covered seating that was erected in 2016. The furthest end of the ground from the turnstiles is all hard standing, and is known as the "Forest Stand" for sponsorship reasons.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: The ARMCO Arena welcomed Birmingham City Ladies for the first time in the 2014–15 FA Women's Super League season, who also competed in the UEFA Women's Champions League. Birmingham City Ladies tend to play their WSL matches on Sundays, therefore avoiding clashes with Solihull Moors fixtures.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: In April 2017, the stadium received Grade A status from the FA Ground Grading Technical Panel. The stadium seats 770 across its three different seated areas. Overall capacity is 3,050. Plans are under way to increase the overall capacity to 4313 by developing all sides of the ground, in line with requirements of the National League. On 7 October 2017, Richard Money took charge of his first game for Moors, with a then-record attendance of 2,658.


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: For the 2021–22 season Solihull Moors signed a five-year deal with ARMCO to rename the stadium the "ARMCO Arena".


title: Solihull Moors F.C.

text: Farsley Celtic resigned from the league mid-season and their record was subsequently expunged, leaving 21 teams in the league.


title: Police corruption

text: Police corruption is a form of police misconduct in which law enforcement officers end up breaking their political contract and abuse their power for personal gain. This type of corruption may involve one or a group of officers. Internal police corruption is a challenge to public trust, cohesion of departmental policies, human rights and legal violations involving serious consequences. Police corruption can take many forms, such as bribery.


title: Police corruption

text: Soliciting or accepting bribes in exchange for not reporting organized drug or prostitution rings or other illegal activities and violations of law, county and city ordinances and state and federal laws.


title: Police corruption

text: Bribes may also include leasing unlawful access to proprietary law enforcement databases and systems.


title: Police corruption

text: Flouting the police code of conduct in order to secure convictions of civilians and suspects—for example, through the use of falsified evidence. There are also situations where law enforcement officers may deliberately and systematically participate in organized crime themselves.


title: Police corruption

text: In most major cities there are internal affairs sections to investigate suspected police corruption or misconduct, including selective enforcement, but there are situations where Internal Affairs also hides departmental and individual corruption, fraud, abuse and waste by individual officers, groups of officers or even unwritten departmental policies. There are also Police Commissions who are complicit in the same cover-ups, often to hide internal and departmental problems, both from public view, and also from inter-departmental reviews and investigations. Certain officers can be fired, then rehired by petition after they accrue enough signatures, often from the very criminals and violators from whom corrupt officers have garnered previous favors in exchange for officers "turning a blind eye", resulting in selective enforcement of violations being deterred, but actually promoted.


title: Police corruption

text: Similar entities include the British Independent Police Complaints Commission. Police corruption is a significant widespread problem in many departments and agencies worldwide.


title: Police corruption

text: It is not possible to measure the level of corruption in a country. Surveys of police officers, citizens and businesses can be used to provide estimates on levels of corruption. These are often inaccurate, as respondents involved in corruption are reluctant to provide any information implicating themselves in criminal activity. Despite this limitation, information collected from International Crime Victim Surveys and surveys conducted by the Global Corruption Enumerated Barometer can be used to estimate the level of police corruption.


title: Police corruption

text: Police officers have several opportunities to gain personally from their status and authority as law enforcement officers. The Knapp Commission, which investigated corruption in the New York City Police Department in the early 1970s, divided corrupt officers into two types: "meat-eaters", who "aggressively misuse their police powers for personal gain", and "grass-eaters", who "simply accept the payoffs that the happenstances of police work throw their way."


title: Police corruption

text: There are multiple typologies of police corruption that have been asserted by academics. However, common corrupt acts that have been committed by police officers can be classified as follows:


title: Police corruption

text: Corrupted behavior can be caused by the behavioral change of the officer within the department's "subculture". A subculture is a group of individuals within a culture that share the same attitudes and beliefs. Police officers within the department share the same norms and that new behavioral development can be attributed through psychological, sociological, and anthropological paradigms.


title: Police corruption

text: Accurate information about the prevalence of police corruption is hard to come by, since the corrupt activities tend to happen in secret and police organizations have little incentive to publish information about corruption. Police officials and researchers alike have argued that in some countries, large-scale corruption involving the police not only exists but can even become institutionalized. One study of corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department (focusing particularly on the Rampart scandal) proposed that certain forms of police corruption may be the norm, rather than the exception, in American policing. In the UK, an internal investigation in 2002 into the largest police force, the Metropolitan Police, Operation Tiberius found that the force was so corrupt that "organized criminals were able to infiltrate Scotland Yard "at will" by bribing corrupt officers ... and that Britain's biggest force experienced 'endemic corruption' at the time".


title: Police corruption

text: Where corruption exists, the widespread existence of a Blue Code of Silence among the police can prevent the corruption from coming to light. Officers in these situations commonly fail to report corrupt behavior or provide false testimony to outside investigators to cover up criminal activity by their fellow officers. The well-known case of Frank Serpico, a police officer who spoke out about pervasive corruption in the New York City Police Department despite the open hostility of other members, illustrates how powerful the code of silence can be. In Australia in 1994, by 46 votes to 45, independent politician John Hatton forced the New South Wales state government to override the Independent Commission Against Corruption and the advice of senior police to establish a ground-breaking Royal Commission into Police Corruption However, in a number of countries, such as China, Pakistan, Malaysia, Russia, Ukraine, Brazil or Mexico, police corruption remains to be one of the largest social problems facing their countries.


title: Police corruption

text: Until 2010, few corruption cases have been prosecuted against the Austrian police. There have been a low number of indictments relating to corruption. This is supported by Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index which ranks Austria among the 16 countries with the lowest corruption levels with 7.8 points. The general public support these statistics further as only 25% believe that bribe offering and bribe acceptance is widespread amongst Austrian police officers. Whilst this figure may still appear to be high, it is still much lower than the average for the EU (34%). The success, in comparison to many other nations, can be in part attributed to the stable economic performance of the state, which allows the Austrian police force to receive appropriate salaries. As a result, the likelihood that a significant number of Austrian police officers would consider engaging in corrupt practices as a way of making a living is minimal, and rather acts of police corruption tend to be committed episodically. Austria is a gateway to the European Union from the Eastern European countries, which creates additional corruption opportunities. Despite this, studies illustrate that officers and supervisors tend to be knowledgeable about the boundaries of the police culture, especially with regards to the types of behaviours permitted and prohibited.


title: Police corruption

text: Whilst Austria has somewhat been devoid of corruption, there have been several corruption cases particularly over the last several years, which question the accountability of the Austrian police. In 2006, the Vienna police chief was charged with abuse of office and unauthorized acceptance of gifts from private companies, testament to the rising number of corruption acts committed by Austrian police. This is further expressed by Eurobarometer data that emphasises this recent spike in police corruption, as surveys highlighted that in 2011 80% of Austrian citizens exclaimed that corruption was a serious problem, compared to 60% in 2009. The figures from 2011 are above the EU average of 76%, indicating that the recent years have been littered with police corruption crimes that include abuse of office, unauthorized disclosure of information, as well as bribe acceptance. Despite such a rapid elevation in corruption cases amongst police authorities in Austria, no public data and scarce quantities of academic research detailing the number of police officers registered or suspected of or involved in acts of corruption are available. This makes it extremely difficult to assess the extent and nature of the corrupt practices being conducted by the Austrian police. This is because the institutions in charge of countering corruption have only started analyzing it in the last few years, due to the contemporary context that police corruption in Austria is situated. Despite this recent escalation in police corruption prevalence, Austria still remains a country that is characterized by a low number of corruption cases compared to other countries throughout the world.


title: Police corruption

text: The economic security of Austria has allowed the police to develop internal control measures that are necessary for identifying and combating corruption. Established internal control measures include the Office for Internal Affairs, the Office for Public Affairs, as well as the Office of the Ombudsman. These developments, amongst many others, are illustrative of the active, preventive approach adopted by the Austrian government and the Ministry of the Interior to address the recent trend of corruption manifestations. These institutional bodies, coupled together with the high degree of intolerance toward corruption amongst Austrian citizens, and the stable nature of the Austrian economy, appear to facilitate the foundations for a positive framework needed in order to mitigate and eradicate police corruption throughout Austria.


title: Police corruption

text: In mainland China, the collusion between corrupt police officers and gang bosses is a big concern, bringing legitimacy crisis to the police as well as the ruling party. Since the 1990s, China's anti-corruption campaigns have focused on serious organized crime and corrupt government officials who act as 'protective umbrella' (protectors) for local gangsters. Criminal organizations who are not able seek protection from local police officers are very likely to be destroyed during China's anti-crime campaigns, while criminal groups under police protection are able to survive and control illegal businesses (e.g. gambling, prostitution and drugs) in their territories. Wang's book "The Chinese Mafia", based on rich empirical data, examines how organized crime and police corruption interact, how gang bosses make use of social network to initiate and build mutually beneficial networks with police officers.


title: Police corruption

text: Belgium's levels of corruption in police and business matters are considered to be low. A 2012 ranking specifically on police corruption rated Belgium 16 out of 176. The 2013 Special Eurobarometer stated that 67% percent of Belgium's population felt general corruption, not just police-related, was widespread, compared to the EU average of 76%.


title: Police corruption

text: Respondents to the Global Corruption Barometer in 2014 stated that, on a scale of 1-5 (5 being extremely corrupt), police corruption was at 3.2. 11% of respondents felt police corruption had increased since 2011, 51% felt it had decreased. 61% of respondents felt the government's response to police corruption was ineffective.


title: Police corruption

text: Two independent organizations deal with police corruption: the General Inspectorate of the Police (AIG) and the Committee P. There are also 196 internal control units within local police forces to deal with minor incidents and police misconduct in conjunction with the AIG and Committee P. In 2011, out of 1,045 investigations by the AIG, 6 were specifically corruption-based, with higher numbers of breaching professional confidence (44) or fraud (26), but lower (3) of abuse of police power. To maintain impartiality, the AIG has completely separate servers to the police, but draws on a number of databases for its investigations, as well as working together with the Committee P. The Committee P generally deals with the most important corruption cases, such as those relating to organized crime or torture. Belgium also has other institutions which deal with corruption, including police-related cases, on a wider scale: the Standing Police Monitoring Committee, and the Central Office for the Repression of Corruption (OCRC).


title: Police corruption

text: In 2004, the high-profile case of Belgian serial killer and child molester Marc Dutroux resulted in outrage in the community amidst allegations of police corruption and incompetence. Dutroux was meant to be under police surveillance the night he kidnapped two of his victims, but the police had programmed the camera to operate only during the day. The police failed to locate two living victims being held captive during a search of Dutroux's home in 1995. A locksmith who was accompanying the police during the search said he heard children's cries, but was dismissed by the police. The police claimed that they did not view seized videotapes of Dutroux constructing his "dungeon" as at the time they had no VCR. Dutroux claimed he was part of a sex ring that involved high-ranking members of Belgian police and government. The widespread anger over the continued failings of the police and Dutroux's sex-ring allegations, as well as residing judge Jean-Marc Connerott's dismissal, led to the "White March" in 1996, demanding reforms to Belgian police and judicial systems. Connerotte testified that the investigation was deliberately hampered by officials. Dutroux also escaped from police custody in 1998 before being apprehended. A parliamentary commission into the Dutroux case in 1998 found that the defendant benefited from police corruption and incompetence. Although police were cleared of direct compliance in Dutroux's crimes, the report cited major gross negligence throughout Belgium's police system, and an overhaul was called for. The case severely damaged the Belgian community's trust in their police and law enforcement systems.


title: Police corruption

text: In 2006, a Flemish, i.e. Dutch-speaking, Belgian police officer was sentenced to six months in jail for attempting to extort the equivalent of £160,000 from the parents of a missing woman in 2004, telling them they would be more likely to see their daughter again if they acquiesced. He confessed, but after serving his sentence successfully appealed his sacking from the police as the sacking had been done by a French-speaking officer. Belgium has laws in place to uphold the "rights" of the speakers of each language, including that of a police officer who is being disciplined to undergo questioning in their own language. The former officer was working on a compensation claim and calling for reinstatement as of 2012.


title: Police corruption

text: Data from the 2011 Eurobarometer research places Bulgaria fourth in the European Union (EU) in terms of bribes paid to public officials. The main factor behind this ranking is bribes paid to police officers. According to the same research, Bulgaria sits first on the list of EU member states with widespread police corruption.


title: Police corruption

text: While much of the duties of safeguarding - largely through oppression - the communist rule in Bulgaria was undertaken by the Ministry of Interior (MoI), after 1989 its make-up changed dramatically. From 1990 to 1993, almost one quarter of the MoI's staff were dismissed - between 12,000 and 19,000 police officers, 60-90% of which were officers at the medium and senior levels. Additionally, a role in the political conflicts of the 1990s led to further dismissals of national and regional police detectives and mass layoffs of middle ranking officers. Simultaneously, Bulgaria was undergoing a transition from the Soviet Communist regime to democracy, leading to a sharp increase in crime and criminal incidents (up to ten times in growth for some crimes), coupled with a severe economic downturn and the emergence of a large number of criminal groups. The effects of these drastic changes to the MoI and dramatic upheaval of Bulgaria's political landscape culminated with the financial and economic crisis of 1996–97, during which police corruption rose on almost all levels.


title: Police corruption

text: Before these changes, during the period of 1944–1989, abuses within the MoI were investigated by the State Security - an almost exact replica of the Soviet KGB - who had total control of law enforcement. This was achieved by monitoring the political loyalty of MoI staff, but also by exceptional powers to investigate abuses; including the use of undercover agents and virtually unlimited powers to investigate. However, the considerable experience accumulated over these years was lost immediately after the democratic change in 1989, when the body was disbanded.


title: Police corruption

text: After Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, the country was seriously challenged to eliminate instances of police corruption. As a result of this, the deputy-chief of a police service was dismissed over accusations of illicit contact with an alcohol producer, and police misconduct has been limited by institutional and legal changes.


title: Police corruption

text: However, Bulgaria continues to experience everyday police corruption, and the Bulgarian people continue to hold negative views of the nation's police force. Corruption and conflicts of interest continue to offer a serious challenge to public perceptions of the Bulgarian police, attitudes that are not only encouraged by political scandals and frequent media coverage of police corruption, but also by the personal experiences of everyday Bulgarians. In 2013, 65% of respondents to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer thought that the police were either corrupt, or extremely corrupt. However, comparing this to 86% who felt the same of the judiciary and 71% for the parliament/legislator, shows that Bulgarians are regaining trust in their police force, or at the very least, have more trust in them than other public officials who have some effect on their legal protection.


title: Police corruption

text: In 2011, Eurobarometer research that asked respondents to report whether or not they have been pressured to pay bribes to the police ranked Bulgaria first in the EU, with 7% of respondents claiming that they had been. Within this research, it was found that 450,000 Bulgarians annually were asked for bribes by police, a number that did not change substantially between 2009 and 2011. According to the same research, 70% of Bulgarians believe that bribe-taking is widespread in the police force.


title: Police corruption

text: This perception was not aided by the arrest of seventeen traffic police officers on 27 September 2011 for charges of corruption and operating in organised crime groups. According to Sofia City Prosecutor Nikolai Kokinov, these officers were pooling the bribes they received at the end of their shifts and dividing the money between them, sometimes taking up to 500 liva a shift. According to Kokinov, police do not receive large bribes, but instead are given small ones regularly.


title: Police corruption

text: These arrests have not affected instances of bribing the police. Transparency International's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer recorded 17% of respondents claiming that they paid a bribe to the police.


title: Police corruption

text: Bulgaria begun undergoing political stabilisation in the late 1990s/early 2000s, after which attempts were made to fill the watchdog and counter-corruption enforcement agency hole left by the State Security. A telephone hotline and internet site was open for the submission of complaints to be used by the MoI Inspectorate. The Inspectorate was also given controlling, preventive and disciplinary functions by the Ministry of Interior Act. It is split into two divisions: "control of management" and "countering corruption in the Ministry of Interior". The 35 officers of the Inspectorate have a number of functions, ranging from assessing corruption risks, undertaking inspections aimed at reducing and preventing corruption, reviewing complaints received about the MoI and supervising the implementation of inspections. They report directly to the Minister of Interior.


title: Police corruption

text: In 2008, Bulgaria also introduced a new intelligence and counter-intelligence agency, the State Agency for National Security (SANS). It is directly subordinated to the Prime Minister and exists outside the MoI, which gives the agency a degree of independence if it is tasked with investigating corruption within the MoI, particularly regarding corruption among senior officers and management. However, SANS is purely intelligence-gathering, and has no police powers.


title: Police corruption

text: As a result of these two initiatives, 74 disciplinary sanctions were imposed against members of the Bulgarian police. Of these 74, six cases were referred to the prosecution, and the MoI was advised to dismiss officers accused to misconduct in a further seven of them.


title: Police corruption

text: 2008 also saw the establishment of the Internal Security Directorate (ISD) of the MoI, the first service since 1990 that has multiple officers around the country, as well as the ability to combine covert methods with police powers. This means that for the first time since the dissolution of the State Security, a branch of the MoI had the ability to use surveillance techniques to expose police corruption, including a network of undercover agents, as well as take proactive measures - on the basis of risk analysis - to end corruption, actively seeking and collecting evidence on MoI staff without complaints being submitted, something that neither SANS nor the Inspectorate can do. In 2011, data from the ISD indicated that 1,200 complaints were followed up on that year, leading to around 300 infringements being substantiated and 100-120 officers were dismissed or indicted. This large upswing is due to the organisational changes undertaken in the MoI, which no longer allow complaints to remain within the division they were made, but instead must be referred to the ISD or the Inspectorate.


title: Police corruption

text: Further changes were undertaken to reduce police corruption in 2014, with all MoI cars being equipped with GPS systems, and then video cameras and microphones being fitted to all traffic police patrol cars that record what passes between traffic police and drivers. As part of this initiative, rules were changed that allowed an MoI vehicles to carry out roadside checks of motorists. As of 25 November, these checks have only been allowed to be undertaken by traffic police. Bulgarian Interior Minister Vesselin Vuchkov claimed these new measures were expected to cut corruption by 80% by reducing direct contact between police and motorists, and thus lowering the opportunity for police to receive bribes and participate in corruption.


title: Police corruption

text: Accepting bribes is a common form of street police corruption in Croatia. According to the International Victim Crimes Survey, 15 out of 100 respondents reported paying a bribe within the last year – 44% of which were paid to police officers. This frequency is higher than most other East-European countries, with respondents suggesting that police in Croatia are targeted more frequently for successful bribes compared to other countries in East-Europe. These results indicate that police corruption, especially in regards to the acceptance of a bribe by a police officer, seems to be more prevalent among Croatian police than among police in other East-European countries.


title: Police corruption

text: Prosecution of corruption is based on the 1997 Criminal Code. Article 337 of the code states that "a public official who abuses the office, oversteps the limits of official authority, or fails to perform the official duty with the aim of obtaining pecuniary gain or other non-pecuniary benefit could be charged criminally". As well as this, section 347 of the code prohibits the acceptance of a bribe by any public official, explicitly listing police officers. These two sections provide grounds for the prosecution of police for several forms of police corruption.


title: Police corruption

text: In order to establish a successful corruption-control system in Croatia it is essential that police be held responsible for corruption. There must be a legally sound basis for the punishment of corrupt police officers and legal tools to achieve this punishment. Section 337 and 347 makes this achievable, as do the sanctions listed in the Criminal Code. As well as this, these norms of not accepting police corruption should be enforced. That is, police officers must be held responsible for their actions and sanctions should be exercised.


title: Police corruption

text: Police corruption in Cyprus is unofficially monitored by the Independent Authority for the Investigation of Allegations and Complaints Against the Police. In 2013, the Authority heard a total of 145 complaints against the police by the public, from 132 complaints in 2012. However, there is no official, government-mandated authority to combat and monitor corruption, nor an official government anti-corruption strategy. Corruption within the Cyprus Police should be handled internally, as per the Cyprus Code of Police Ethics.


title: Police corruption

text: Corrupt activities among the police are typically defined as using a position of power to influence particular decisions, such as nepotism, the giving and taking of bribes, accessing information that is not directly related to an officer's current work or investigation(s), and lower levels of organised crime are also commonly noted in cases of police corruption.


title: Police corruption

text: A Eurobarometer Report by the European Commission in 2009 indicated that the grand majority of Cypriots (94%) believe that corruption is widespread in the police and the wider public affairs sector at national, regional, and local levels. A follow-up survey in 2012 indicated that 97% of Cypriots believed that corruption was a major issue for the country.


title: Police corruption

text: The 2009 report also showed that 89% of Cypriots believed that corruption was widespread within the Cyprian Police Service involving bribes and the abuse of positions of power (nepotism), compared to an average of 39% of European Union citizens believing corruption is widespread among their own police services or institution. Additionally, 80% of Cyprian respondents to the Eurobarometer 2009 Report agreed that corruption is unavoidable within the public, police, and government sectors, whereas only 14% disagreed with the statement.


title: Police corruption

text: The 2013 Eurobarometer Report on Corruption indicated that the top three reasons for corruption occurring in Cyprus are; "because politicians and government are not doing enough to fight corruption (88%), the lack of real punishment (87%), and the lack of meritocracy (87%)". Oddly, 65% of Cypriots have reported to have a strong level of confidence in the police in an unofficial 2013 survey comparing trust in the police across 50 countries. However, this disparity may be influenced by the continually changing perceptions of respondents based on recent experiences, or the political climate. Due to Cyprus' geographical composition as an island, corruption can spread across several networks, as high-ranking locals across several disciplines such as politics, law enforcement, judicial officials, and businessmen interact closely within the same social circles; whereas these relationships may be significantly diffused across larger mainland countries.


title: Police corruption

text: Transparency International (TI) has recommended that a Coordinating Body Against Corruption should be established under the Cyprian Attorney General, which is able to combat and enact strategic policies against corruption in the public and law enforcement sectors. Specifically, TI has recommended that an increase in police salaries, a reinforcement of the ethical code, and improved working conditions should be implemented to discourage the risk of accepting bribes to increase officers' own income. Additionally, a greater transparency in the disclosure of assets, or second jobs to supplement income, should be incorporated into the duties of high-ranking law enforcement officials, so that future conflicts of interest can be made aware of and monitored.


title: Police corruption

text: Police corruption in the Czech republic can be perceived in two categories: petty everyday corruption (e.g. bribery and favouritism), and major economic corruption, involving foreign investments requiring both state support and subsidy decision-making.<ref name="Tchequie / Czech Republic"></ref>


title: Police corruption

text: Within these areas sections 158 – 162 detail forms of corruption ranging from abuse of power by a public official, to indirect bribery.


title: Police corruption

text: The Czech Republic joined the EU in May 2004, following the splitting of Czechoslovakia in 1993. Since this split, corruption has made a steady incline. In 2001, 163 individuals were prosecuted with corrupt activity, of those 142 in relation to bribery. This in comparison to the 110 individuals prosecuted in 2000. In 1995 the number of ascertained crimes committed by officers with involvement in management and administration was calculated at 1,081, by 1999 this figure had jumped 10.1% to 5,081, which steadily declined into the 2000s.


title: Police corruption

text: Royalties gained through major economic corruption are largely conspicuous. Tied up in ostentatious villas, over budget public construction projects and local government offices^. These "landmarks" are prominent enough to prompt guided tours around Prague. Curious tourists are directed between structures funded through large sums of taxpayers' money. Money ending up in the pockets of civil servants and corrupt businessmen.


title: Police corruption

text: In 1991 the "Service for the Protection of Economic Interests" was set up, this later evolved into the "Unit for Combating Corruption and Serious Economic Crime of the Criminal Police and Investigation Service" in January 2002. Its function: to detect connections between corruption and organised crime, in cooperation with the "Criminal Police Service and Investigation Unit of the Czech Police for Revealing Organised Crime".


title: Police corruption

text: Similarly the "Inspection Department of the Ministry of the Interior" (IDMI), a police unit that deals with offences committed by police officers. This unit targets petty everyday corruption, involving low-level employees of the state who abuse their power for personal gain.


title: Police corruption

text: Policemen earn a fraction the salary of a military officer. Where the Fire Brigade has 14 districts within the Czech Republic, the Police force only has 8, resulting in limited opportunity for climbing regional ranks. Policemen must also undergo far lengthier training than their better-paid Army and Fire Brigade colleagues. Such inequities prompt feelings of resentment among Police ranks.


title: Police corruption

text: As a result, systems are now in place to combat petty corruption. Including automated cameras at traffic lights sending infringements directly to a driver, avoiding any physical interaction with a policing officer.


title: Police corruption

text: At the same time, "The Unit for Combating Corruption and Financial Crime" (UOKFK), established by the Ministry of the Interior, also provides continuing education relating to domestic corruption and integrity of the Czech police force.


title: Police corruption

text: Police Corruption in the Czech Republic is an ongoing issue, however one that is actively combatted through state and local action.


title: Police corruption

text: When asked specifically about public perceptions of police corruption, a rating of 2 was given (with 1 being least corrupt and 5 being most), which was lower than the perceived corruption in any other sector surveyed, other than education which also was rated a 2.


title: Police corruption

text: Danish police have a respectable reputation of not being associated with corruption and the public have great trust in the Danish police force. Although corruption is a rarity amongst Danish Police, there are effective procedures in place for the investigation and punishment of any police corruption. The Danish Independent Police Complaint Authority was formed to handle any allegations (corruption or other matters) made against the police force. The Police Complaints Authority council and chief executive deliberate and make decisions, based upon complaints of police misconduct, independently of police and prosecutors. To ensure transparency, the council consists of two members of the general public, as well as the chair, who is a High Court Judge, an attorney, and a professor of jurisprudence. This council is reappointed every four years. Outlined in a very clear and simple document, is a guide of how complaints can be made by oneself, a bystander or on behalf of another. The document explains how lodging a complaint is free of charge and can be made in writing online or in person, or over the telephone, within six months of the relevant incident.


title: Police corruption

text: In 2012, the Police Complaints Authority received 655 complaints, with most cases involving accusations of general misconduct such as traffic violations (e.g., speeding without activated police lights), excessive use of force during arrests, foul language, or illegitimate access to the police database (officers are only allowed to check the database in police cases they are directly involved in), whereas accusations of corruption were very rare. There were concerns surrounding the difficulty with the investigation of a number of the general misconduct incidents due to problems with identifying the involved officers. This resulted in the suggestion of police officers wearing identity numbers on their uniforms. Uniform numbers were introduced in 2016.


title: Police corruption

text: Estonia's experiences of corruption in general, and more specifically, corruption in the police force are low in comparison to the European Union's average. While there are no specific anti-corruption agency or body which deals with corruption in Estonia, the Security Police Board and Police Board are in charge of investigating and regulating any instances of police corruption. The Security Police, established in 1993, is an impartial board within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Their main aims are to gather intelligence, counter-terrorism, and enact anti-corruption measures. This board comprises four regional departments who mainly deal with corruption surrounding "higher officials". The majority of their force have received higher education with "specialised training in corruption investigations". Their primary purpose is to investigate instances of corruption crime, committed only by public servants. The achievements of this board, thus far, have been solving cases in significant white-collar crime and corruption in border and customs guard.


title: Police corruption

text: In regards to the Estonian Police, in particular, while all police officers have to go through some initial anti-corruption training there are no yearly requirements they must fulfill in terms of continued training.


title: Police corruption

text: The general police are governed by the Police Board who have an Internal Control Division who are responsible for the investigation of misconduct and corruption. The Police board is in control of investigating smaller instances of corruption, as well as those cases concerning civic officials. These anti-corruption strategies and boards fall under multiple Anti-Corruption Strategies which have been implemented by the Ministry of Justice. The most recent of these strategies is the 'Anti-Corruption Strategy 2013-2020'. The strategy crosses many private and public areas and sectors of Estonia. The aim of the strategy is to both raise awareness and educate the population of corruption and corruption-willingness. Within the guidelines of this strategy all decisions, regulations and policies implemented by the different ministries and boards must abide by the rule of transparency, whereby the public must be informed of what is occurring, how much it will cost and why. In the report for this strategy it is acknowledged there is a higher risk of corruption for those working in law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the Ministry of Justice pays close attention to these areas and have set about implementing strict measures and bodies to govern all law enforcement agencies. While the anti-corruption strategy has greatly assisted in decreasing levels of corruption in the general police force, the rate of corruption in the Border and Custom Guard Agency is still fairly high.


title: Police corruption

text: Due to Estonia's position on the border of the European Union (EU) their Border and Customs Guards come in contact with a great deal of organised crime and immigrants wanting to cross the Eastern border of Estonia into the EU. The result being many officials in this agency see the opportunity to increase their wealth through corruption and in turn accept bribes to let immigrants into Estonia and the EU. These type of corrupt officials pose a serious threat to both national security and the security of the EU when they let in illegal immigrants, in particular those involved in organised crime. In the Permanent Mission of Estonia, the Estonian Government states the aim of all anti-corruption strategies set up in their country is to ensure their population is allowed full enjoyment of their human rights. Through the long-term anti-corruption strategies, the Estonian Government aims to rid their country of any sort of corruption which could infringe on people's rights or pose a threat to national or international security.


title: Police corruption

text: Finland has been found to consistently be one of the world's least corrupt nations. In 2012, the Corruption Perceptions Index rated the Finns as the world's least corrupt country (tie with Denmark and New Zealand). However, they fell to third in 2013 and remained there the following year, losing only one point on the table in that time. The Finns believe that this is due to heavily ingrained societal values that are shared amongst the population, as well as there being adequate wages and low disparities of income for the majority of the country. The latter reduces the propensity to accept bribes and checks economic greed.


title: Police corruption

text: In terms of police corruption, regular surveys of the public are taken in order to gauge perceptions of transparency in law enforcement officials. The 2007 Police Barometer survey found that one in four Finns think that it is very likely that corruption exists in some form within the police. Further, one in six Finns think that the police might act in an unethical manner towards foreigners by misusing information or mistreating detainees. The survey also found that trust in police remains high, but whilst the public consider that law enforcement officers generally conduct themselves well in interactions with clients and citizens, the standard has deteriorated somewhat. This could be due to the high expectations Finns carry of the police, but it certainly shows that the public are of a high opinion of the transparency afforded them in the department of law enforcement.


title: Police corruption

text: More recent surveys show significant changes in the figures, however. In 2012, when Finland was at the top of the Corruption Perceptions Index, 27% of Finns believed that it was very likely that corruption existed in some form within the police. This figure is not dissimilar from the 2007 Police Barometer survey, yet the figure in the 2014 survey jumps to 42% of Finns. This is most likely due to the high-profile case of Jari Aarnio, the former chief investigator and head of Helsinki's anti-drugs police, who spent 30 years in the anti-drugs force in Finland, but which was later revealed to be a drug lord himself. The story on Aarnio broke in September 2013, and in June 2015 the former head of the Helsinki drug squad was sentenced to 20 months imprisonment for aggravated abuse of office from 2009 to 2010 and for taking bribes from a private company. Prosecutors asked for a 13-year sentence during hearings.


title: Police corruption

text: France is a member of the Council of Europe which has many legal frameworks against corruption in place including GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption) which applies for all Council of Europe signatories. GRECO works by equally monitoring rights and obligations of the Council of Europe's Member States. Police are bound by the Recommendations on Codes of Conduct for Public Officials and Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. In addition, France has its own Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen approved in August 1789 which outlines the rights of civilians inclusive of conduct applicable to public officials for fair treatment. In 1993, The Central Service for the Prevention of Corruption was also established in France to prevent corruption and transparency of economical life and public procedures. There are a number of bodies that monitor and investigate police corruption in France. The Inspection Générale de la Gendarmerie Nationale enables consistency, independency and impartiality of inspections carried out by the Gendarmerie Nationale.


title: Police corruption

text: Inspection Générale de la Police monitors and regulates police behaviour and the Commission Nationale de Deontologie de la Securite (CNDS) monitors ethical and moral codes required to be upheld by security forces in France. Other strategies such as disabling officers to be on duty in their originating neighborhood and prohibiting officers from working in private investigation for three years after leaving the police force are enforced to ensure impartiality.


title: Police corruption

text: There are limited studies or reports on police corruption within France because the issue is generally avoided by official institutions and no institution has a comprehensive understanding of its prevalence. This may be due to a lack of attention from media and other social science areas. It is a common assumption that police corruption in France is a rare occurrence in the area of organised crime. One explanation for institutional corruption in France is the hierarchical police system. This is due to higher rankings and specialised units having more discretion and being at higher risk of corruption.


title: Police corruption

text: Areas that have a heavy presence of organised crime, such as Marseille, are known to experience higher levels of police corruption.


title: Police corruption

text: In 2012, twelve French police officers were apprehended after an internal complaint was lodged into suspected corruption within the elite anti-crime squad, also known as the Brigade Anti-Criminalite (BAC) that operates within the Marseille north. This region is known for high drug activity. Despite attention being brought to the head of Centrale Directorate of National Security, Pascal Ladalle, a full-scale judicial enquire was not undertaken until the new police chief of Marseille was appointed. A total of 30 officers from the squad have been suspended for allegedly seizing drugs, money, cigarettes and jewellery from dealers and letting them go. The seized narcotics, money and valuables were all found in a makeshift ceiling at their station after a few months of investigation and surveillance. Investigations are still pending.


title: Police corruption

text: François Stuber was a police captain and Deputy Head of the Drug Squad in Strasbourg, France. One of Stuber's duties was to destroy drugs seized from operations; however between 2003 and 2007, the officer instead traded narcotics including marijuana, heroin and cocaine to an established drug network. In addition to this, Stuber also imported drugs from various other networks. The former captain had an intimate relationship with a worker from the local court, Laurence Hamon, where they would use court information to ensure his drug network associates were not under investigation. This method was also employed to avoid tracing mechanisms imposed by the Inspection Generale de la Police Nationale to detect any abuse of information. Stuber worked closely with Laurence, using her residence to store the seized drugs and her banking accounts to launder money. Stuber was jailed for the maximum term of 10 years.


title: Police corruption

text: The German federal police BKA (Bundeskriminalamt), the German foreign intelligence service/espionage agency BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst) and also the German domestic intelligence service/espionage agency BfVS (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) were all founded by Nazis after World War II.


title: Police corruption

text: In 2020 in the German city of Essen, in North Rhine-Westphalia, the homes of 30 racist Nazi police officers were raided by their colleagues brought together from several different German states. The Nazi cops shared images like swastikas, a depiction of refugees in a gas chambers, and Reich flags.


title: Police corruption

text: The substantial legislation covering corruption offences within the German Criminal Code is indicative of the importance placed on combating this type crime in Germany. In general, corruption is construed as an individual offence, although it is possible to be prosecuted for actions committed on behalf of a corporation under the Administrative Offences Act.


title: Police corruption

text: Alongside civil servants, judges and other public officials undertaking or appointed a public administrative role, police officers may be held liable for criminal prosecution for corruption-related offences under Sections 331-338 of the German Criminal Code. Specifically, according to Section 331, a public official who requires, allows themselves to be promised, or accepts an advantage for themselves or a third party for the discharge of their duty is liable to criminal prosecution.


title: Police corruption

text: An advantage involves any type of benefit that may improve the individual's financial, legal or personal standing, which they are not legally entitled to receive. Although there is no statutory minimum to what can be interpreted as an unlawful benefit, minor customary advantages that are unlikely to impact the perception or decision making process of the individual are not considered criminal.


title: Police corruption

text: Additionally, pursuant to Section 332 of the German Criminal Code, the past or future undertakings of an official act (e.g. lobbying of certain laws, services regulations, etc.) that violate official duties are considered unlawful. Penalties for this offence, as well as bribery in a public office in general, can range from fines to imprisonment, where the sanctions apply to each count of bribery, with a maximum sentence of 10 years for serious cases.


title: Police corruption

text: In addition to legislation, strategic approaches which target all German government bodies, including the police, are employed through the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration. This directive recommends internal auditing, employment of a contact person for corruption related-issues rotation of staff and the principle of multiple controls in order to prevent and combat corruption within governmental bodies.


title: Police corruption

text: Beyond the domestic level, Germany is heavily involved in the creation and compliance to international anti-corruption standards via the United Nations, the World Bank, the Group of Eight (G8) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). German public institutions, such as the police, have also been acknowledged by the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) to have done considerable work to prevent corruption.


title: Police corruption

text: Public perception of police corruption is low among German citizens according to the 2013 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption report. German respondents (16%) were among the least likely (within European Union) to think that corruption, or the giving and taking of bribes and abuse of power for personal gain, is widespread among police and customs officers. More generally, 92% of German respondents do not feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives, considerably higher than the 70% EU average. However, although more than half (59%) of respondents believe that corruption is prevalent within Germany, this is still considerably lower than the 76% EU average.


title: Police corruption

text: Despite the more than half of German respondents perceiving a prevalence of corruption in German society, the actual experience of corruption is quite low. Less than 1% of German respondents reported they were requested or expected to pay a bribe in the year of the report, while only 9% indicated they were personally aware of someone who had accepted bribes, respectively below the 4% and 12% average among European Union citizens.


title: Police corruption

text: Today, Greece experiences some of the highest levels of police corruption in Europe, with 99% of its citizens believing that corruption in the country is widespread.


title: Police corruption

text: Transparency International surveys show that Greece ranks high among European Union nations in terms of perceptions of corruption. From 2013 to 2016, during the height of the Greece's debt crisis, the annual Transparency International reports showed that Greeks ranked second-most corrupt among EU countries, behind only Bulgaria. (the country's relative position among European countries was more favorable before and after this period).