title: Komission kertomus neuvostolle, Euroopan parlamentille ja talous- ja sosiaalikomitealle yhteisön menettelyn toteuttamiseksi kaasusta ja sähköstä teollisilta käyttäjiltä perittävien hintojen avoimuuden takaamiseksi annetun neuvoston direktiivin 90/377/ETY soveltamisesta

eurovoc_concepts:
electrical energy
gas
intermediate consumption
price of energy
prices policy

text: EUROOPAN YHTEISÖJEN KOMISSIO à ft * f t* Bryssel, 15. 03. 1996 KOM(96) 92 lopull. KOMISSION KERTOMUS NEUVOSTOLLE. EUROOPAN PARLAMENTILLE JA TALOUS- JA SOSIAALIKOMITEALLE yhteisön menettelyn toteuttamiseksi kaasusta ja sähköstä teollisilta käyttäjiltä perittävien hintojen avoimuuden takaamiseksi annetun neuvoston direktiivin 90/377/ETY soveltamisesta (komission esittämä 29 päivänä kesäkuuta 1990 annetun neuvoston direktiivin 90/377/ETY 8 artiklan mukaisesti) TIIVISTELMÄ JA SUUNTAVIIVAT Tämä kokoava kertomus hintojen avoimuudesta annetun direktiivin soveltamisesta on lajissaan toinen1. Siinä analysoidaan 29 päivänä kesäkuuta 1990 annetun neuvoston direktiivin 90/377/ETY toimivuutta sekä hintojen vertailevaa arviointia. Se on laadittu direktiivin 8 artiklan mukaisesti. Kertomuksen ENSIMMÄISESSÄ OSASSA, joka koskee direktiivin toimivuutta, kuvaillaan komission yksiköiden kohtaamia vaikeuksia direktiivin täytäntöönpanemisessa. Kutakin jäsenvaltiota kehotetaan erikseen parantamaan tietojen keräämisen edellytyksiä, jotta tietojen lähettämiselle asetettuja määräaikoja noudatettaisiin yhtenäisesti. Ottaen huomioon tutkimukseen osallistuvien maiden määrän kasvun on yhä vaikeampaa hyväksyä sitä, että yhden jäsenvaltion tai myöhästyminen voi estää tulosten julkaisemisen. laiminlyönti Komissio tutkii energian hintoja käsittelevän työryhmän asiantuntijoiden kanssa direktiivin toimivuuden parantamista erityisesti hintavertailutietoihin pohjautuen. Varsinkin hintojen luotettavuuden ja edustavuuden parantamista korostetaan. direktiivin 1 artiklan 3 kohdassa säädettyä jaottelua koskevan Ottaen huomioon ilmoituksen saamisessa havaitut vaikeudet kertomuksessa on uusia ehdotuksia kuluttajaluokkien soveltamisrajojen määrittämiseksi uudelleen. On myös erityisesti pyrittävä hintajärjestelmiä koskevassa 2 kohdassa säädettyjen ilmoitusten sisältöjen tarkentamiseen. Merkintähinnan osalta komissio kiinnittää jäsenvaltioiden huomiota siihen, että asiantuntijaryhmän on pikaisesti päästävä yhteisymmärrykseen oletetulle kuluttajalle ominaisen merkintähintaan perustuvan tarpeen ominaisuuksien määrittämisestä "sähköä" koskevan liitteen 15 kohdan toisen alakohdan mukaisesti ja mainitun liitteen edustavien erityisseikkojen, hintojen alennusten, kuluttajien luokkakohtaisen kokonaiskulutuksen ilmoittamista koskevan 16-21 kohdan velvoitteiden noudattamisesta. Näiden tietojen puuttuessa merkintähinnat eivät anna kuvaa vastaaville kuluttajille tosiasiassa määrätyistä hinnoista eikä niitä voida käyttää analyysia varten. lukumäärän ja Euroopan yhteisöjen tilastotoimisto jatkaa direktiivistä tiedottamista entiseen tapaan. Se tutkii tapoja valvoa direktiivissä säädettyjen ilmoitusten yhteydessä saatujen tietojen luotettavuutta tekemällä soveltuvin osin pistokokeita tiettyjen kuluttajien keskuudessa. Direktiivin maantieteellinen kattavuus on parantunut erityisesti Saksassa ja uusien jäsenvaltioiden liittymisen ansiosta, mutta muissa tapauksissa on edelleen jäljellä tiettyjä aukkoja. Vaikka sähkön hintojen avoimuus on tyydyttävää, kaasusta perittävien hintojen avoimuus sen sijaan huononee suurimpien kuluttajien tasolla. Komissio kehottaa asiantuntijoita liittymään mukaan tutkimaan tämän huononemisen syitä parannuskeinojen löytämiseksi. ks. KOM(93) 666 lopull. , 16. 12. 1993 2u Komissio on myös huolissaan mahdollisista seurannaisilmiöistä, kun kaupallista poikkeusta pitää hinnat luottamuksellisina pyritään lähes säännönmukaisesti pitämään kiinni tietojen antamisen kustannuksella. Hintailmoitukset ovatkin vähentyneet siellä, missä hintoja on alettu vapauttaa tuottajien voimakkaan kasvun ja sen aiheuttaman markkinoiden pirstoutumisen seurauksena. Yhä useammin käy niin, ettei kukaan tuottaja onnistu saamaan tarvittavaa kolmea kuluttajaa samaan luokkaan, jotta poikkeus pitää ilmoittaa. Olisi hinnat täsmennettävä, että kolmen kuluttajan sääntö koskee luonnollisesti paikan eikä tuottajan käsitettä. Komissio varoittaa tästä kehityssuunnasta, sillä avoimuus näissä paikoissa on edelleen tarpeen voimassa olevasta sääntelyjärjestelmästä tai markkinajärjestelyn tyypistä riippumatta. luottamuksellisina voitaisiin poistaa ja vastaava hinta * * * Euroopan yhteisöjen tilastotoimiston keräämien tietojen analysointi direktiivin yhteydessä muodostaa kertomuksen TOISEN OSAN. Siinä rajoitutaan ainoastaan sähkön ja kaasun hintoihin, joiden ilmoittamisesta säädetään direktiivin 8 artiklassa. Tämän analyysin poliittisena merkityksenä kaasun ja sähkön sisämarkkinoista parhaillaan käytävien keskustelujen yhteydessä on vastata niihin lukuisiin kysymyksiin, joita asetetaan erityisesti niiden mahdollisesta yhdenmukaistamisesta. hintakehityksestä sähkön kaasun ja ja Tässä mielessä vaikkakaan hinnat eivät ole merkittävästi muuttuneet sitten edellisen kertomuksen, merkittävät kurssivaihtelut ovat sitä vastoin vaikuttaneet valuuttoihin muuttaen perinpohjaisesti jäsenvaltioiden välisiä hintasuhteita. Tässä kertomuksen osassa tarkastellaan yhtäältä kunkin kansallisen valuutan osalta kunkin jäsenvaltion sisäistä hintakehitystä kehityskulun määrittämiseksi ja toisaalta vertaillaan ostovoimastandardeja. Niitä käyttämällä voidaan poistaa valuuttapariteettien vaihteluiden aiheuttamat vääristymät. Ostovoimastandardien vertailujen avulla havaitut kehityssuunnat ovat hyvin lähellä niitä kehitysnäkymiä, jotka ilmenevät ecuina ilmaistuja hintoja vertailemalla. Ecuina ilmoitetuista hinnoista laadittuja taulukoita on tämän kertomuksen liitteenä. Sähkön hinnat ovat kaiken kaikkiaan tosiasiassa hieman laskeneet tammikuusta 1985 tammikuuhun 1995. Kaasun hinnat ovat sen sijaan laskeneet huomattavasti seuraten näin energian ja erityisesti öljytuotteiden maailmanhintojen yleistä kehitystä. Sähköalalla hinnanalennukset kuvastavat teollisuuden rakennemuutosten aikaansaamaa tuottavuuden kasvua otettaessa sellaisia uusia sähköntuotantomuotoja käyttöön kuin sähkön ja höyryn yhdistetty tuotantoja muut uudet tekniikat, jotka liittyvät johtamistapaan ja markkinointiin (demand side management ja integrated resources planning). Saksaa lukuun ottamatta jäsenvaltioissa on havaittavissa selvää kaasun hintojen yhdenmukaistumista. Sähkön hintahaitari on sitä vastoin kasvanut, mikä voisi olla että sähköala piittaa kilpailusta kaasualaa vähemmän. Useissa osoituksena siitä, jäsenmaissa tyypilliset suurimmat viitekuluttajat hyötyvät kuitenkin edullisista ja suhteellisen samantasoisista sähkön hinnoista. Nämä hinnat ovat ryhmittyneet unionin keskellä raja-aluevyöhykkeelle, missä tariffit ja hintarakenteet näyttävät olevan siten laadittuja, että suurkuluttajille tarjotaan kilpailukykyisiä hintoja. Tämä on epäilemättä 3Q seurausta teollisuustuotteiden sisämarkkinoiden avautumisen aiheuttamista paineista sähkön tuottajahintojen muodostukseen. Eräissä tapauksissa tämä tapahtuu ottamatta huomioon yrityskustannusten todellista rakennetta ja siten pienkuluttajien kustannuksella, mistä osoituksena on tyypillisten äärihintojen erojen kasvu. Tällainen ristiinmenevä tukeminen on vielä huomattavampaa kaasualalla, missä tyypillisten hintojen ääripäiden välit ovat tuntuvasti merkittävämpiä kuin sähköalalla. Nämä erot olisivat olleet vieläkin suurempia, jos käytettävissä olisi ollut tyypillistä suurinta kuluttajaa koskevat tiedot. Yhteisön tasolla kaikkien esimerkkitapausten äärihintojen väli oli teollisuuskäytössä tammikuussa 1995 sähkön osalta 5 ja kaasun osalta 6,5. Tämä ero on enemmän kuin mitä voidaan järkevästi selittää taloudellisilla syillä eikä se voi johtua muusta kuin kansallisesta ja jopa alueellisesta markkinoiden lokeroitumisesta. Tämä ilmiö on erityisen korostunut Saksassa, missä kaasun hintojen hajauma on suurin koko yhteisössä kattaen yhteisön koko ylemmän otantapuoliskon sähkön osalta. Tämä tilanne paljastaa lisäksi eräissä tapauksessa tehdyt lähes kannattamattomat sijoitukset tai puutteelliset teolliset rakenteet. Direktiivissä puollettu hintojen julkisuus olisi saattanut aikaansaada hintojen mukautuksia siellä missä ne poikkeavat liikaa tavanomaisesta. Itse asiassa näyttää siltä, ettei hintojen avoimuus voi yksinään yhdenmukaistaa hintoja merkittävästi niin kauan kuin verkkoenergiamarkkinat eivät ole avoinna kilpailulle. Nämä toteamukset osoittavat aseman, joka hintojen avoimuudella voi olla sellaisten poikkeavuuksien havaitsemisessa, jotka voivat olla haitaksi energiapolitiikan tavoitteiden saavuttamiselle, energian sisämarkkinoiden toteutumiselle tai kuluttajille. Komissio toteuttaa pyrkimyksiään asiantuntijaryhmässä hintojen avoimuuden parantamiseksi, kaikissa jäsenvaltioissa kuluttajien laajan luokkiin jakautumisen ja markkinahintoja seuraavan täydellisen tiedonvälityksen toteuttamiseksi, tariffointijärjestelmien sekä hintatietojen hankkimisen ja esittämisen yhdenmukaistamiseksi, jotta niiden vertailtavuus paranisi. Nämä kehityssuunnat ovat yhdenmukaiset edellisen kertomuksen direktiivin soveltamista koskevien ja edelleen voimaan jäävien päätelmien kanssa (katso asiakirja KOM(93) 666 lopull. , 16. 12. 1993, s. 8). Komissio tutkii myös mahdollisuuksia muuttaa direktiiviä "kuluttajaluokka"- ja "paikka"-käsitteen tarkentamiseksi ja direktiivin maantieteellisen kattavuuden parantamiseksi. 4^ Summary and general approach CONTENTS PART ONE : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE 1. 2. 2. 1 2. 2 Content of the Directive Legal aspects Implementation Amendments to the Directive 3. Extension to new countries 3. 1 3. 2 3. 3 The new Member States European Economic Area Central and Eastern European countries 4. Operation of the Directive 4. 1 Price data •v. 4. 1. 1 Evaluation of the situation 4. 1. 2 Marker prices 4. 1. 3 Application of the rules on confidentiality 4. 1. 4 Breakdown of consumers and the corresponding volumes 4. 1. 5 Verification of the data 4. 1. 6 Definition of the locations 4. 2 The price systems 5. Publication of results PART TWO : ANALYSIS OF RESULTS Price situation and trends 6. Method employed 6. 1 6. 2 6. 3 Choice of measurement units Choice of sample Incidence of indirect taxation 7. Analysis of electricity prices to industrial users in the Community 7. 1 Electricity price situation and trends by location in national currency on 1 January 1985, 1990 and 1995 (a) (b) Productivity Degressivity 7. 2 Price situation and trends by location in PPS 7. 2. 1 Ranking of locations 7. 2. 2. Changes in ranking between 1990 and 1995 7. 2. 3 Electricity prices in ECU 7. 2. 4 Convergence 8. Analysis of gas prices to industrial users in the Community 8. 1 Gas price situation and trends by location in national currency on 1 January 1985, 1990 and 1995 Price situation and trends by location in PPS 8. 2 8. 2. 1 Ranking of locations on 1 January 1995 8. 2. 2 Gas prices in ECU 8. 2. 3 Convergence ANNEXES 1. Council Directive 90/377/EEC of 29 June 1990 : incorporation into national legislation 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. (a) (b) Standard industrial electricity consumers Standard industrial gas consumers Yearbooks and "Statistics in focus" published to date Electricity prices (net of taxes) to industrial users in Germany Electricity price situation and trends by location in national currency on 1 January 1985, 1990 and 1995 EUR 12: Electricity prices (net of taxes) to industrial users in PPS/10 MWh on 1 January 1995 EUR 12: Electricity prices (net of taxes) to industrial users in PPS/10 MWh on 1 January 1990 Ranking of locations in increasing order of price on 1 January 1995 Ranking of locations in increasing order of price on 1 January 1990 10. Electricity prices in ECU per 10 MWh per year on 1 January 1985, 1990 and 1995 11. Gas prices (net of tax) to industrial users by location in national currency : situation and trends on 1 January 1985, 1990 and 1995 12. 13. EUR 12: Gas prices (net of tax) to industrial users in PPS/100 GJ on 1 January 1995 EUR 12: Gas prices (net of tax) to industrial users in PPS/100 GJ on 1 January 1990 14. Gas prices (net of tax) to industrial users in Germany on 1 January 1990 and 1 January 1995 15. Ranking of locations in increasing order of price on 1 January 1995 16. Ranking of locations in increasing order of price on 1 January 1990 17. Gas prices in ECU in 1985, 1990 and 1995 GRAPHS I. II. Electricity prices 1985, 1990 and 1995 : comparison between the PPS and ECU values at a sample of 14 locations Gas prices 1985, 199Ô and 1995 : comparison between the PPS and ECU values at a sample of 12 locations SUMMARY AND GENERAL APPROACH This summary report on one hand the operation of the Price Transparency Directive is the second of its kind(*). It analyses implementation of Council Directive 90/377/EEC of 29 June 1990 and on the other hand it compares price evolution. It was written to comply with Article 8 of the Directive. Part One of this report, concerning implementation of the Directive, describes the difficulties encountered by the Commission with its application. The Member States will be asked individually to improve the conditions for collecting the data to ensure full compliance with the submission dates. The increasing number of countries participating in the survey makes it less and less acceptable for negligence or tardiness on the part of a single Member State to block publication of the results. The Commission will examine, with the experts on the Working Party on Energy Prices, the improvements to be made to operation of the Directive based, in particular, on the lessons learned from the price comparison. The accent will be placed on obtaining more reliable and more representative prices. In response to the difficulties encountered with obtaining the breakdown referred to in point 3 of Article 1 of the Directive, the report contains new proposals to redefine the limits for application of the consumer categories. A particular effort will also have to be made to define the content of the notifications on the price systems, as provided for in point 2 of the same Article. As regards the marker prices, the Commission draws the Member States' attention to the urgent need to reach agreement within the group of experts on the definition of the demand characteristics of the notional consumer to which the marker price applies, in accordance with the second paragraph of point 15 of the Annex on electricity, and to meet the obligations imposed by points 16 to 21 of the same Annex concerning notification of the representative special factors and price reductions, of the number of consumers and of total consumption by category. Without these details, the marker prices will not reflect the prices actually charged to the relevant consumers and will be unusable for analysis purposes. As in the past, the SOEC will continue to play its information role for the Directive. It will study means of checking the reliability of the data obtained from the communications provided for by the Directive and, where necessary, conduct direct surveys of certain consumers. The geographical coverage of the Directive has improved, particularly in Germany and with the extension to the new Member States, although gaps remain in other cases. Electricity prices are transparent enough, but gas prices to the biggest consumers, by contrast, have become less transparent. The Commission will ask the experts to study the causes in order to remedy this deterioration. (*} See COM(93)666 final of 16 December 1993. 5 The Commission is also concerned about the drift towards making the exemption on the grounds of commercial confidentiality the rule, to the detriment of information. In in price notifications from the locations where particular, there has been a fall liberalization has produced a proliferation of suppliers and the ensuing fragmentation of the market. More and more often no single supplier musters the three consumers required in a given category in order to lift the exemption on confidentiality grounds and publish the corresponding price. It should be made clear that the three consumers rule applies, of course, to the location, not supplier. The Commission warns against this drift since transparency remains essential, whatever the regulatory framework or howsoever the market is organized. * * * Part Two of the report analyses the price data collected by the SOEC under the Directive. It is restricted exclusively to the gas and electricity prices submitted under Article 8 of the Directive. In the context of the negotiations in progress on the internal gas and electricity market, the political importance of this analysis lies in the fact that it answers many questions arising, particularly on electricity and gas price trends and any possible convergence. In this respect, although no significant price changes have been recorded since the last report, sharp currency fluctuation has brought far-reaching changes to the relative prices between the Member States. This part of the report examines the price movements in each Member State in national currency first, in order to establish the trend, and then makes comparisons in terms of purchasing power standard (PPS), which provides a means of removing the distortion caused by fluctuations in currency parities. The trends observed from the PPS comparisons closely match the comparisons of the ECU prices. Tables setting out the ECU prices are annexed. Throughout the Community electricity prices fell slightly, in real terms, between January 1985 and January 1995. Gas prices, by contrast, fell considerably, following the world price trend for energy in general and for oil products in particular. The falling electricity prices reflect the productivity gains obtained from industrial restructuring, the introduction of new generating technologies, such as combined heat and power production, and other new marketing and management methods (demand side management and integrated resources planning). With the exception of Germany, a marked convergence of gas prices was observed in all Member States. By contrast, the spread of electricity prices has widened, which could indicate greater inertia in the electricity industry than in the gas sector in response to competition. However, in several Member States the biggest typical consumers qualify for low electricity prices which are relatively similar. These prices are closer together in central, frontier regions of the Union, where the tariffs and price structures seem to be designed to offer competitive prices to big consumers. Beyond doubt, this must be seen as one result of the pressure exerted on electricity generators' pricing by the opening-up of the internal market in industrial products. In some cases, this has been done without taking account of the generator's real cost structure and, hence, to the detriment of small consumers, as indicated by the widening gap between the maximum and minimum prices in the sample. This cross-subsidization is even more marked in the gas industry, where the gaps between the maximum and minimum prices in the sample are wider than for electricity. They would have been wider still had data been available for the largest consumer in the sample. At Community level, the interval between the maximum and minimum prices for the entire sample of industrial users gave a factor of 5 for electricity and of 6. 5 for gas in January 1995. This is bigger than can be reasonably explained by economic causes and can only stem from national and even regional fragmentation of the markets. This phenomenon is particularly marked in Germany, where the price spread is even wider than in the Community as a whole in the case of gas and covers the whole of the top half of the Community sample in the case of electricity. In some cases, this situation is also a sign of uneconomic investments or deficient industrial structures. The publication of prices provided for by the Directive possibly prompted adjustments of prices too far from the norm. It does not seem capable, on its own, of bringing about any significant convergence of prices until the grid-based energy markets are opened up to competition. These conclusions illustrate the role which price transparency can play in detecting anomalies likely to hamper achievement of the energy policy objectives and completion of the internal energy market or to damage consumers' interests. The Commission will continue its efforts within the group of experts to improve price transparency and obtain the exhaustive breakdown of consumers by categories in every Member State and full submission of the data concerning the marker prices, with a view to making the tariff systems, the supply conditions and the format of the price data more homogeneous to allow optimum comparability. This approach is in line with the conclusions reached in the first report on operation of the Directive, which still apply (cf. p. 6 of document COM(93)666 final of 16 December 1993). It will also examine the need to amend the Directive in order to clarify the concepts of "consumer categories" and "location" and the geographical coverage of the Directive. improve PART ONE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE 1. Content of the Directive Council Directive 90/377/EEC of 29 June 1990 established a procedure requiring the Member States to communicate to the Statistical Office of the European Communities (SOEC) the prices of gas and electricity to industrial users, the price systems in use, the breakdown of consumers and the corresponding volumes. The data on prices, price systems and tariffs are assembled on 1 January and 1 July each year and sent to the SOEC for publication in May and November respectively. These data have been collected following the procedure laid down in the Directive since 1 July 1991. The breakdown of industrial consumers and the corresponding volumes are submitted every two years These data are covered by the rules on commercial confidentiality and may not be published directly. They enable the SOEC to calculate the weighted average prices and the national and Community price indices, which may be published. 2. Legal aspects 2. 1 Implementation Every Member State has incorporated the Directive into its national law, except Spain, against which an infringement procedure has been initiated for this reason. Nevertheless, this gap in the legislation has not prevented regular submission of full data by the Spanish administration Details of the national measures adopted to implement the Directive are set out in Annex 1. 2. 2 Amendments to the Directive The Commission has started the procedure to amend the Annexes to the Directive to transfer Berlin from the North/Central Zone to the Eastern Zone. In practice, the notifications for Berlin have taken this into account since 1 July 1993. The amendment is about to be published in the Official Journal. 3. Extension to new countries 3. 1 The new Member States The accession of three new countries to the European Union has prompted the addition of new locations to the Annexes to the Directive. This automatic technical adjustment was contained in the Act of Accession. The locations are Vienna, Upper Austria and Tyrol in Austria and the country as a whole (national price) in the case of Finland and Sweden. It is fair to ask how representative these national prices are for these two competitive markets. The first notifications were submitted to the SOEC by the dates stipulated. 3. 2 European Economic Area The Treaty on the European Economic Area likewise provides for submission of the data provided for by the Directive to the SOEC. In practice, only Norway is under this obligation, as both Iceland and Liechtenstein are exempted. Norway has started to transmit data to the SOEC already. The data for the enlarged Community plus Norway will be given in forthcoming SOEC publications. 3. 3 Central and Eastern European countries The Commission's White Paper on approximation of the legislation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe provides for applying the most important Community legislation on energy to these countries. The Directive on the transparency of gas and electricity prices is one of the key measures mentioned. 4. Operation of the Directive Collaboration between the SOEC and the national bodies responsible for collecting the data in the Member States has been satisfactory. The national experts have been tackling the practical problems created by the technical and commercially sensitive nature of the work with a will to succeed, although this does not necessarily mean that the solutions offered have always been the fastest or most satisfactory. * 4. 1 Price data 4. 1. 1 Evaluation of the situation All the data on electricity prices have been received and published, except in the case of the United Kingdom, where full data are available for London only. In the case of gas, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain data on the biggest typical consumers. The SOEC had received only two figures for the entire European Union in January 1995. Also, the submission dates set in the Directive are not always observed, leading to delays in publication of "Statistics in focus" (formerly "Rapid reports"). 4. 1. 2 Marker prices The marker prices required by Part II of the electricity annex to the Directive apply to consumers with maximum demand above the volume set for typical reference consumers (i. e. above 10 MW). They apply to three categories of industrial consumer with maximum demand in the region of: 25 MW, covering consumers with maximum net demand of between 17. 5 and 37. 5 MW, 50 MW (maximum net demand of between 37. 5 and 62. 5 MW), and 75 MW (maximum net demand of between 62. 5 and 75. 0 MW). V, These marker prices are available from nine Member States but not from Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg, which have fewer than the three consumers in each category provided for in the Directive. Member States' attention is drawn to the fact that once the number of consumers in any category reaches three (the point at which the confidentiality clause ceases to apply), submission of the data becomes compulsory with effect from the next submission date, without any need for a reminder from the SOEC. Some Member States have yet to define the supply characteristics which apply to the marker price (load factor, distribution between peak and off-peak periods, etc. ). Without these details, the SOEC is unable to guarantee that the data are homogeneous. The. same applies to the special factors specified in paragraph 17 of the electricity annex which may be applied to reduce prices and of which notification must be given as provided for in paragraph 18 of the Annex. The Commission departments concerned will examine, with each Member State concerned, the obstacles to regular submission of this information and ways of improving the quality of the information published. 4. 1. 3 Application of the rules on confidentiality The growing difficulties encountered in certain Member States with collection of the prices stem largely from misapplication of the rules on confidentiality in paragraph 20 of the Annex on gas and paragraph 19 of the Annex on electricity. In practice, the immediate consequence of liberalization of a national electricity or gas industry is to increase the number of transactions with different suppliers in a given region, thus making it increasingly difficult to find three consumers It must be remembered that the Directive supplied by the same distributor. stipulates that there must be at least three consumers per category in the Member State or region concerned, but makes no mention of extending this clause to distributors Were this rule applied, no prices could be communicated from regions where there are several distributors each with fewer than three clients in any one category. By way of example, of the four locations selected in the United Kingdom, only London provided a full set of electricity prices in January 1995. Real price trends (in purchasing power standard (PSS)) in London show a general reduction from la to IgL between 1990 and 1995 (Ih and Ii were not submitted for January 1990). This ranges from a maximum reduction of 20. 8% in the case of Ic to 12. 1% for Ig, 8% for la and lb, and around 4% for Id and If. However, comparison with the few comparable data available for the other locations reveals different trends: Leeds reported increases of 6. 2% for la and 9% for lb and a reduction of just 1. 8% for Id and of 9. 5% for Ig. In Birmingham prices generally increased, except for a 17. 3% reduction for Ig. In Glasgow there was an 11% increase for la and lb, the only consumers for which prices have been submitted since July 1994. A particular effort will have to be made at these locations to meet the requirements of the Directive. In the Member States with a competitive market on which prices are fixed freely, a national average price fails to reflect the diversity of the prices or to attain the principal objective declared in the first recital of the Directive, which states that "transparency, to the extent that it reinforces the conditions ensuring that competition is not distorted in the common market, is essential to the achievement and smooth functioning of the internal energy market. " This implies that a sufficient number of price surveys are needed to make it possible to check that these conditions have indeed been met. The Working Party on Energy Prices will examine, in concertation with the Commission, means of supplementing the price data without endangering the undertakings' trade secrets. 4. 1. 4 Breakdown of consumers and the corresponding volumes Cf. Annex 2, page 28. 10 The breakdown of consumers and the corresponding volumes provided for in point 3 of article 1 of the Directive creates problems because in some Member States the structure of the undertakings' customer files allows no such breakdown. in the survey to participants As the Directive provides no definition of the categories of consumption, the SOEC attempted to align them on the typical consumers (see the note from the SOEC of Directive 90/377/EEC). However, it must be emphasized that Article 1 gives no definition of the categories and does not preclude setting other limits for the categories covered by the breakdowns. As experience has shown that it is extremely difficult to make the categories coincide with the typical consumers, there is nothing to prevent the Commission from proposing re-examining this point within the working party in order to find a formula for obtaining satisfactory information without impairing transparency. application concerning In practice, although point 3 in Article 1 clearly defines the consumers as those defined in the annexes, it does not say what is meant by breakdown of consumers or what the limits are for the individual categories. Consequently, the Commission considers that the data provided for in point 3 of Article 1 could equally well apply not to the typical consumers (who, by definition, cannot be taken as the limits for the categories) but to other types of sale (for example,-to small, medium-sized and big industrial undertakings), Which would enable the. SOEC to calculate the average selling prices. This assumes submission of the volumes marketed in each category and of the corresponding revenue. The Commission will put this interpretation to the Member States within the Working Party on Energy Prices in order to ensure the earliest, possible introduction of these notifications, which are essential for calculation of the weighted prices and of the national and Community price indices. 4. 1. 5 Verification of the data One loophole often pointed out is the lack of means for the SOEC to check the accuracy of the information received. As part of its task of observing the energy market, the Commission could consider the possibility of enlisting specialists to conduct random surveys of consumers in order to check the accuracy of the prices collected. 4. 1. 6 Definition of the locations In order to reflect consumers' real position as accurately as possible, the prices are recorded at a single location wherever possible rather than giving the average prices per country. These locations can be a city, conurbation or distribution network, as appropriate. The choice of location is based on how representative it is, in terms of population, economic importance, even geographical coverage of the country, different tariff districts and harmonization with the locations used for the prices of other energy sources to allow comparisons. Consideration could be given to including this definition in the annexes to the Directive, where appropriate. 4. 2 The price systems 11 Although the notifications of the price systems are regular enough, the transparency of the price systems, on the other hand, should be improved. In particular, analysis has shown that the standards of information are not the same in every Member State. The SOEC has published guidelines on ways of making the data supplied more consistent, with the cooperation of the experts on the working party. The tariff and price-setting arrangements vary widely from one location to another. Sometimes the prices are based on tariffs, sometimes on standard contracts containing terms allowing a degree of flexibility. 5. Publication of results The information collected by the SOEC under the Directive is published in the "Rapid reports: Energy and industry" series and, since 1995, in the "Statistics in focus" series. Five yearbooks on energy prices have also been published in series 4C (energy and industry) since the Directive entered into force. See Annex 3 for a list of publications. The energy prices yearbooks cover a wider field than the Directive. They provide long time series placing the electricity and gas prices to domestic and industrial users in their historical context, together with series covering all fuels, particularly coal, heating gas oil and residual fuel oil, with which electricity and gas compete. They also contain abundant information on the methods and units used and on the incidence of taxation on these products. Finally, they provide useful information on consumer price index and GDP trends in the Member States. 12 PART TWO ANALYSIS OF RESULTS Price situation and trends 6. Method employed 6. 1. Choice of measurement units Two reference units can be used for price comparisons between Member States: the ECU or the PPS (purchasing power standard). Each has its own merits, depending on the objective of the comparison. The PPS is a reference unit based on the purchasing power parities between the different national currencies, irrespective of variations in currency parity. The purchasing power parities are obtained from the average price ratios between the different countries for the same basket of goods and services. These parities are scaled to keep the value of the Community's GDP the same in PPS as in ECU Comparison of the ECU and PPS prices between Member States shows that no currency corresponds exactly to the purchasing power attributed thereto. This phenomenon reflects the overvaluation or undervaluation of every national currency. The PPS/ECU ratios in Table 1 indicate the order of magnitude of this relative overvaluation or undervaluation of each national currency. If the ratio is over 100, the currency is strong and general price levels high. If it is under 100, the currency is weak and price levels low, as confirmed by the differences in GDP values between Member States, expressed in ECU. When the prices are expressed in ECU, the countries with an overvalued currency are at a disadvantage as their prices appear higher than they really are, whereas the opposite applies to countries with a weak national currency. These distortions can be corrected by expressing the prices in PPS which removes the currency overvaluation or undervaluation element inherent in the ECU prices. PPS and ECU values in national currency on 1 January 1990 and 1 January 1995 Table 1 Jan-90 B PPS ECU 42. 41 42. 61 DK 10. 1 7. 88 m 151 190 2. 25 2. 04 117. 7 132 7. 1 6. 9 m 0. 74 0. 77 IT 1514 1514 42. 69 42. 62 NL 2. 33 2. 29 111. 5 179. 2 PPS/ECU 99 n 12817 UQ. 29 79. 47 89. 16 102. 89 96. 10 100 10016 101. 74 62. 22 UK 0 656 0 72» 90 10 13 Jan-95 B PPS ECU 40. 28 39 16 DK 9. 43 7. 49 2. 28 1. 90 D GR E 130. 37 164. 52 231. 6 295. 7 78. 3 F 7. 05 6. 57 IRL 0. 71 0. 8 88. 8 IT 1693. 38 1999. 01 L 43. 11 39. 16 NL 2. 29 2. 13 84. 7 110. 0 107. 5 P UK 133. 25 196. 13 67. 9 0. 69 0 79 87. 3 PPS/ECU 102. 9 125. 9 120. 0 79. 2 107. 3 A second problem is that the differences in general price levels between countries at a given time cannot reflect the differences between the prices for each individual product as there is only a single exchange rate. It therefore follows that the prices converted into nominal values at the market exchange rates are distorted because the currencies are under the influence of factors independent of national price movements. Calculation of-the purchasing power parities provides a means of re-establishing the real prices. Use of PPS is all the more important in comparisons of electricity and gas prices, where the consumer markets for the products are closed. Owners of plants in different Member States who wish to compare the consolidated cost of supplies to the different plants in the group will express the prices in ECU or in any national currency. However, the ECU and national currencies fluctuate constantly, under the impact of variations in the currency parities. Consequently, owners will prefer to use the PPS to compare the economic value of supplies of goods and services to each of their plants, since this provides a means of obtaining comparable values cleared of all factors associated with currency fluctuations. 6. 2. Choice of sample A choice had to be made from the 33 locations covered by the electricity survey (excluding the new Member States) to keep the report reasonably readable. Consequently, 14 locations were selected as suitably representative and offering complete price series. One location per Member State was chosen from Italy, Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece, all of which apply a standard nationwide tariff, and where, therefore, the choice of locations poses no problem. In France, Paris was considered representative of the French market, where there are only minimal differences between locations. In the case of the United Kingdom, only London was selected as no other location had provided full series of data. Only Lisbon was chosen in Portugal for the same reasons. Of course these choices dictated by purely methodological considerations in no way prejudice the importance, stressed throughout this report, of keeping as many locations as possible in the survey. In Germany and the Netherlands no single location could reflect the diversity of electricity prices The locations which most frequently recorded the lowest and highest prices in the sample and, hence, embrace all the others were therefore chosen. In the Netherlands, this choice was dictated by the price gap between Rotterdam and North Brabant, while in Germany the main reason was the large number of locations (11) and the price scatter. 14 Annex 4 shows electricity prices in Germany in 1995 and 1990 expressed in national currency (DM/10 MWh). The progress on transparency can be seen from the increased number of locations covered and from the fact that the 1995 table is complete, whereas over half the data were missing in January 1990. The intervals between the maximum and minimum prices at each location vary between a factor of 2. 3 and 3, slightly above the Community average (2) except in Dusseldorf, where it is 3. 95 because of the abnormally high price to the smallest consumer, 67% higher than the price to consumer lb. The extremely complex price structures at the German locations make it difficult to sum up the situation as regards electricity prices to industrial users. Prices in Hamburg are amongst the highest in the Community, behind only Portugal and Spain (from Ie upwards). By contrast, prices are close to the Community average in the Western Zone and in the Southern Zone, particularly for categories Ie, Id and If. Compared with other locations in the Community, prices in Germany range between the Community average and the highest prices. One point to note is that all the prices in the new Lander lie between the maximum and minimum prices in the old Lander, a sign of satisfactory integration of the tariffs. In Leipzig and Rostock, for example, prices to categories Ig, Ih and Ii are amongst the most moderate. 6. 3. Incidence of indirect taxation Since in most cases indirect taxes are deductible by industry, their impact was considered negligible and the study was restricted solely to the prices net of all taxes based on application of the tariffs and contracts. 7. Analysis of electricity prices to industrial users in the Community The tables in Annex 5 show the price trends for the 14 locations in the sample. As no comparison is made, the prices could be expressed in national currency. The objective is to compare the situation before and after the Directive. The dates of 1 January 1985, 1990 and 1995 were chosen, as ten years was considered long enough to show the long-term trend. The tables also include the consumer price indices (CPI) and GDP index. The consumer price indices are the monthly values on 1 January each year. The GDP index is an annual value, calculated on the basis that 1985=100. Comparison of the price trends with the consumer price index gives an indication of the productivity gains or losses in the electricity industry. The ratio between the maximum and minimum prices at each location in turn allows assessment of how the tariff burden is spread between consumers. 7. 1. Electricity price situation and trends by location in national currency on 1 January 1985. 1990 and 1995 As a result of the Directive, progress has been made with improving the transparency of electricity prices, since the number of locations has increased and, for the first time, full data are available for at least one location in each Member In contrast to gas, the falling world market prices for primary energy State. 15 sources have exerted no downward pressure on electricity prices. This is one factor which must be borne in mind when assessing productivity trends. (a) Productivity A rough estimate of the productivity improvements in the electricity sector can be obtained by comparing electricity price and CPI trends. If prices are rising slower than the CPI it can be assumed that progress has been made. In practice, a general improvement can be observed, except in Hamburg and Spain where the relative deterioration in prices could be due to a deterioration in the cost structure and in Italy where, by contrast, the price increases reflect a drive towards truer pricing with a view to privatization. In Portugal, Greece and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom, where inflation was high, the price increases were well below the increase in the CPI. At the low-inflation locations, the biggest productivity improvements were in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Moderate progress was made in Belgium, the Western Zone of Germany and France. This progress stems partly from passing on the reductions in the cost of primary energy supplies in the tariffs and partly from the introduction of new generation technologies (gas/steam turbines) or of improved business management techniques (integrated resources management). Finally, some of the national electricity industries have been liberalized and had to be restructured to make them more competitive. (b) Degressivity The interval between Ii and la (the minimum and maximum prices at each location in the sample) provides a measure of degressivity. If the factor is very high, the tariff is highly degressive and it can be assumed that the costs are not shared evenly between consumer categories but to the advantage of big consumers. On 1 January 1995 this was the case in Italy (coefficient of 3. 36), Belgium (3. 25), Luxembourg (3. 21) and Ireland (2. 77). Conversely, a coefficient below the average for the sample is a sign of a tariff particularly favourable to small consumers, as in London (1. 88) and Rotterdam (1. 90). At all the other locations, this coefficient is slightly over 2: Spain (2. 12), Greece (2. 14), Portugal (2. 18), Paris (2. 22), Hamburg (2. 27) and Western Zone of Germany (2. 46). Prices in Denmark, with a coefficient of 1. 26, stand out amongst all the others, not only because they are the lowest but also because of the gentle price curve which, in turn, suggests that the position is very different from at the other locations. Whether upward or downward, the price movements between 1985 and 1995 favoured the biggest consumers, above all in Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and, even more so, Italy. By contrast, the increases were shared more evenly between all consumers in Hamburg, the Western Zone of Germany, Greece, Spain and Portugal and tended to favour small industrial consumers in Denmark and France. In the Netherlands, restructuring hit small consumers during the first period, but this was corrected during the second. In London, restructuring of the tariff put an end to one anomaly in the degressive scale and restored the differentials between la, lb and Ic to normal proportions. 16 7. 2. Price situation and trends bv location in PPS Annexes 6 and 7 provide an overview of electricity prices (net of all taxes) to industrial users in the Community on 1 January 1995 and 1 January 1990, expressed in PPS. These tables allow comparisons between different locations. In both 1995 and 1990 Danish consumers paid the lowest PPS prices in the sample and Portuguese consumers the highest. These countries clearly mark the two opposite ends of the scale, with all the other prices therefore between the two. The first conclusion is that price trends between 1990 and 1995 differed far more in terms of purchasing power than of monetary parity, although they remained within moderate limits, with one or two exceptions. These were in North Brabant (with an increase of 30. 7% for Ic and a reduction of 19. 4% for la), followed by Rotterdam (25% reduction for lb) and Italy (19. 0% increase for la). All the other price movements observed were smaller. The analysis ends at Ig since no data were available for Ih and Ii in January 1990. Compared with 1 January 1990, on 1 January 1995 moderate increases or. reductions were observed at every location, with the average trend for the entire sample downward, matching the trend in national currency. Increases of around 10% or lower were recorded in Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Hamburg. Reductions on the same scale were observed in the Western Zone of Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and London (the data for the other locations in the United Kingdom were incomplete). There were ups and downs in Denmark, with the prices falling up to Id and increasing from Ie on. In Spain, the opposite was observed, with increases for la and lb and small reductions for the others. Finally, in the Netherlands restructuring of the tariffs brought big reductions or increases for all consumers as costs were transferred from one category to another. At every location the PPS prices followed the same curve as the prices in national currency, except in Denmark, where they showed transfers of costs between consumers, in Greece, where they reflected a relative fall in the PPS prices and Ireland where prices held steady in national currency but rose in PPS, showing that they had become higher in terms of purchasing power. Price rises over the report period generally remained below inflation, with numerous examples of restructuring of the tariffs reflecting the concern to adjust prices to the demand profile. At many locations, electricity prices were widely scattered in the case of small consumers but converged towards the same low-price range as consumption increased. This could suggest that producers set their tariffs to keep prices to big consumers close to the prices charged by their immediate neighbours. 7. 2. 1. Ranking of locations In Annexes 8 and 9 the horizontal line cutting the table in two represents the median, the theoretical value above and below which an equal number of observations fall. This provides a means of measuring any convergence of prices, by calculating the gap between the prices at each location and the median. These tables display the relative position of each location in increasing order of price on 17 1 January 1990 and 1 January 1995. They also reveal far-reaching differences in price structures from one location to another in the sample. Ranking the locations by frequency of appearance in each position, Denmark, North Brabant, France and Rotterdam, in that order, can be considered the cheapest locations in the sample, followed by Greece, the Western Zone of Germany and the United Kingdom (for small industrial consumers), Ireland (for moderate consumers) and Belgium and Luxembourg (for the biggest consumers). The most costly locations for all consumers are Hamburg and Portugal, joined, for moderate and big industrial consumers, by Spain. 7. 2. 2. Changes in ranking between 1990 and 1995 Comparison of Annexes 8 and 9 shows the changes in ranking of the individual locations on the relevant dates. Denmark (ranked first) and Portugal (last) still hold the same position for all their typical consumers. Amongst the low-cost locations, France, Rotterdam and North Brabant all showed minor changes. Luxembourg and the Western Zone of Germany fell significantly. Luxembourg has even become the location with the lowest prices, after Denmark, for big consumers. The United Kingdom (London) and Greece have both improved their relative positions. As for the high-cost locations (i. e. the locations above the median), Belgium's position deteriorated in the case of small and moderate consumers. Spain and Italy's position deteriorated for all consumers, except category Ic in Spain. In Ireland, no significant changes were reported. Finally, prices in Hamburg drew closer to those charged in Spain. 7. 2. 3. Electricity prices in ECU The ECU tables in Annex 10 are for information only. They made it possible to plot the price difference graphs for the various units on pp. 45 and 46. * 7. 2. 4. Convergence To determine whether prices converged between 1990 and 1995, the number of observations within an interval of 10% and 25% on either side of the median for the sample was determined in January 1990 and January 1995, i. e. " before and after the Directive entered into force. TABLED OBSERVATIONS within intervals of 10% and 25% on either side of the median (January 1995/January 1990) MEDIAN 01/95 +-10% +-25% la 1250 2 11 lb 1255 3 11 Ic 1031 7 11 Id 840 8 10 Ie 714 7 10 If 685 68 10 Ig 576 Ih 56? Ii 4U 6 5 11 10 10 18 MEDIAN 01/90 12% 1252 1065 827 726 682 577 +-10% +-25% 7 8 9 10 8 12 8 11 7 11 5 11 6 11 Over the report period, the scatter increased only for small consumers (up to If) and the trend reversed from Ig on. This is confirmed by the variations in Pearson's coefficient of variability (standard deviation x 100 divided by the arithmetic mean) which rose from 25. 87% in 1990 to 27. 76% in 1995 for If (wider scatter) but, conversely, fell from 28. 26% to 25. 59% for Ig (narrower scatter) over the same period. This is confirmed by the variations in the standard deviation (square root of the variance = s), which rose from 179 for If in 1990 to 191. 5 in 1995 but, conversely, fell from 167 in 1990 to 151 in 1995 in the case of Ig. It is impossible to compare these coefficients for the largest consumers in the sample since no figures are available for Ih and Ii in 1990. However, these figures are known for 1995, when the standard deviation and coefficient of variability were 147 and 25. 48% respectively for Ih and 132 and 25. 68% for Ii. These percentages are of the same order as for Ig. There are therefore strong reasons to presume that the findings for Ig also apply to Ih and Ii and that prices have converged for all big consumers. 8. Analysis of gas prices to industrial users in the Community The same method will be used to analyse gas prices. As in the case of electricity, the prices are based on direct application of the tariffs and contracts. Fourteen of the 34 locations covered by the survey were selected, based on similar criteria to ensure a representative subsample. It must be made clear from the outset that gas prices are noticeably less transparent than electricity prices, particularly in the case of the biggest consumers. 8. 1 Gas price situation and trends bv location in national currency on 1 January 1985. 1990 and 1995 The tables in Annex 11 show the sharp deterioration in the transparency of gas prices to industrial users in January 1995 (except in the case of Weser-Ems and the Netherlands). In contrast to electricity prices, there are numerous blanks amongst the prices charged to the biggest consumers, either because no consumers were surveyed in these categories or because there were fewer than three. Nevertheless, there has been a marked deterioration in transparency, since seven prices were reported in January 1990 for 15 but just two in January 1995, despite the greater penetration by gas over this period. Geographically, price transparency is improving in Germany. As regards price trends, the repercussions of falling world gas prices on prices to end-users vary from one location to another. Finally, at many locations the price scale has become more degressive, to the benefit of large-scale industry. Over the first period (from January 1985 to January 1990) there was generally a big reduction, both in the gas-producing and gas-importing Member States. From 1990 to 1995 the situation was more varied. The reductions continued at many 19 locations, albeit at a slower rate, but a few increases were observed, principally for the smallest standard industrial consumers whose prices seem to be directly influenced by the increase in the CPI. The situation over the entire period was marked by a general consolidation of the reductions. At most locations, the price scale became markedly more degressive between January 1990 and 1995 in favour of the biggest standard consumers in the sample, often by substantial proportions, with the notable exception of London. There has been extensive restructuring of the tariffs at the expense of small and medium-si zed industrial undertakings, which indicates strong pressure exerted by competition on the internal market on the biggest consumers, who demand and obtain the most competitive gas prices. Competition from other energy sources plays an extremely important role for large offtakes in the gas sector but virtually no role at all for small and medium-sized industrial users who bear the full burden of the tariff restructuring in response to falling oil and oil-product prices. 8. 2 Price situation and trends by location in PPS Annexes 12 and 13 show the situation as regards PPS gas prices, net of all taxes, to industrial users on 1 January 1995 and 1 January 1990 respectively, based on direct application of the tariffs and terms of sale. The unit used in the case of gas is 100 GJ. Prices are lowest in Denmark and the Western Zone of Germany up to standard consumer 13-1 and in France from 13-2 on (15 not communicated). Prices are highest in Spain up to 13-2 and in Berlin from 13-1 to 14-2 (15 not communicated). Prices in the Netherlands lie in between. Only two (identical) prices are available for 15, from the Netherlands and Weser-Ems, both gas-producing regions. These prices are extremely favourable, compared with the 11 submitted for 14-2. As regards the tariff structure, at every location the switch from 12 to 13-1 (identical offtake but better load factor) attracts a significant price reduction, except in Berlin and Luxembourg, where there is no significant difference. By contrast, the improvement in consumption conditions between 13-1 and 13-2 or between 14-1 and 14-2 (same offtake but better load factor) attracts only a small price cut or no change at all at most locations, except in Belgium"; France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Compared with January 1990, the 1995 PPS prices were slightly lower in the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Strasbourg and in Belgium but higher in Ireland and Turin. Changes to the tariff base in favour of big industry were observed in Weser-Ems, Paris, Spain and the Netherlands. In Naples, similar changes were made in favour of small industrial consumers. No comparison was possible for Denmark, Berlin, Hanover and Birmingham for lack of data. In some cases, this was because no correlation with the past was established, in others because the Directive is not fully applied. Compared with the Community sample as a whole, Germany is at both ends of the scale, with Weser-Ems sharing the lowest prices with Denmark and Paris, but the Berlin sample sharing the highest prices with Spain. Consequently, the price 20 scatter in Germany is wider for gas than for electricity, with the locations with the lowest gas prices comparable to the cheapest locations in the European Union. Still in Germany, the interval between the highest price (DM 1306 in Dusseldorf) and the lowest (DM 584 in Weser-Ems) was slightly over 2 in 1990 but rose to 3. 46 in 1995 between Berlin (on DM 1497) and Dortmund/Dusseldorf (DM 433). The tables in Annex 14 compare DM gas prices at 10 locations in Germany on 1 January 1990 and 1 January 1995. 8 2. 1 Ranking of locations on 1 January 1995 Without exception, and irrespective of the fact that the locations chosen are not always the same for the two sources, the relative ranking of the locations is not the same for both gas and electricity prices Locations with high gas prices sometimes have low electricity prices and vice-versa (see Annexes 15 and 16), which suggests that the two sources are not in competition. Comparison of the tables in Annexes 15 and 16 shows the changes in the ranking of the sample between 1990 and 1995. The following countries, in order, had prices below the median everywhere in 1995: Denmark (no data in 1990), Weser-Ems (no significant change in comparison with 1990), Birmingham (no data in 1990), Paris and the Netherlands (which lost ground in categories II and 12 but consolidated their strong position from 13-1 on). The following were above the median everywhere: Spain, Naples and Berlin (except in the case of 12), Turin (except from 14-1 on) and Ireland (except for 13-1). Luxembourg and London maintained the same pattern in 1995, amongst the lowest gas prices for II and 12 but well above the median from 13-1 on. Belgium aligned its prices on the median, clearly in 1990, but far less so in 1995. Transparency has deteriorated since 1990. It is inadequate for the biggest gas consumers, as can be seen from the lack of data from many locations. This limits the scope for comparisons. The most striking features are as follows: Denmark, the Weser-Ems region and the Netherlands are the leading contenders for the lowest prices for all consumers combined. They are joined by London and Birmingham in the case of small industrial consumers. Both these locations are close to the production sites, which is an indication that the comparative advantages have been passed on satisfactorily in the price of the end-product. Ireland, however, is an exception and has very high prices despite having its own resources. France (Paris) is close to the median for II and 12 and the cheapest location in the sample in 1995 from 13-2 on, despite the fact that it has no substantial resources of its own and is a leading importer. Strasbourg, with its autonomous arrangements, is far worse placed than the rest of the country. Of the other importing locations, Belgium and Luxembourg are clearly below the median for II and 12, are amongst the most expensive locations in the sample for 13-1 but return close to the median again for large offtakes. Berlin is close to the median for II and 12 but then becomes the most expensive location in the entire sample from 13-1 on. Spain has the highest prices for II and 12, followed by Ireland and the Italian locations. It is also amongst the most expensive locations from 13-1 on. 8. 2. 2 Gas prices in ECU 21 As in the case of electricity, the ECU gas prices in Annex 17 made it possible to plot the graphs comparing ECU and PPS prices (see pp. 47 and 48) and to show the differences between the two modes used. 8. 2. 3 Convergence The number of observations within intervals of 10% and 25% on either side of the median was higher everywhere in January 1995 than in January 1990 except in the case of II, where the scatter widened in response to the numerous price increases in this category. The increase in the number of observations indicates a clear convergence of gas prices in the Community. TABLE OBSERVATIONS within intervals of 10% and 25% on either side of the median (January 1995/January 1990) 11 12 13-1 13-2 14-1 14-2 15 MEDIAN Of/189S 575 471 377 351 340 321 +-10% +-25% 2 8 6 10 8 11 10 13 7 9 5 10 Comparison of the coefficients of variability (see definition on p. 19) between 1990 and 1995 for the standard consumers for which full series are available confirms this. Although the variability rose from 32. 8% to 42% for II, it fell considerably for the following three standard consumers: - from 27. 5% to 17. 5% for 12, - from 22% to 12. 6% for 13-1, - from 24. 3% to 13% for 13-2. Beyond 13-2, the data are incomplete, which makes measurements of this type impossible. The perfect symmetry from II to 13-1 between the concentration of the observations around the median on the one hand combined with the reduction in the coefficients of variability on the other suggest that the same symmetry should extend to the consumer categories above 13-1 and tends to confirm that the average reduction in gas prices in the European Union has been accompanied by greater convergence. This Is possible, even though gas is a closed market protected against gas-gas competition by exclusive rights, since this market is nevertheless open to "oblique" competition from neighbouring markets. 22 ANNEX 1 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 90/377/EEC OF 29 JUNE 1990 INCORPORATION INTO NATIONAL LEGISLATION Member State Type of Act Date of adoption Date of publication Date of notifcation Date of entry into force A B D DK E1 FIN F G2 IRLS 1 LUX4 NL P Ss UK Federal law - 04-12-92 04-03-94 01-01-95 Ministerial Decree published in Moniteur Belge 18-05-92 18-05-92 28-09-92 Agreement signed. Details published In the Bundesanzeiger 08-07-93 30-07-93 17-09-93 18-05-92 08-07-93 Decree issued by Energy Ministry 16-03-92 16-03-92 01-04-92 16-03-93 Not yet fully incorporated Agreement reached between the INS and the parties concerned - - 09-02-94 01-01-95 Law published in the Journal Officiel de la République 19-07-93 20-07-93 05-10-94 Law published in Efimeris tes Guverneseus 25-07-91 25-07-91 09-08-91 (Existing provisions) - - - 20-07-93 25-07-91 01-07-91 Law published in the Gazette Ufficiale 20-02-92 20-02-92 26-03-92 20-02-92 (Existing provisions) Agreement signed between Ministry of Economic Affairs and relevant parties - -. - - - 25-05-92 01-07-91 01-01-92 Ministerial Decree published in Diario da Republica 30-05-92 30-05-92 10-06-92 30-05-92 ? Energy Act of 1976 ? - 7 - ? - ? 01-07-91 see footnotes on next page. 23 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. In Spain an Order published in the Boletfn Oficial del Estado on 31 May 1995 implemented the part of the Directive concerning electricity prices, but the Commission has yet to be notified of the general regulation on the transparency of gas prices. This gap in the legislation has not prevented regular submission of full data by the Spanish administration. Greece has implemented only the part of the Directive relating to electricity. In line with paragraph 2 of Article 9 and with Annex 1 to the Directive, Greece is exempted from the provisions on natural gas which is not yet available nationwide. ' Only administrative measures were deemed necessary in view of the laws and other provisions already adopted. The Commission accepted this solution in an exchange of letters. The provisions of the existing Act were deemed sufficient to implement the Directive, i. e. to incorporate it into national law. Contacts have been established with the Swedish administration to verify whether the Directive has been incorporated and why the Commission has not been notified. 24 Reference consumer Annual consumption (in kWh) Maximum demand (in kWh) Annual utilisation (in hours) ANNEX 2 Typical industrial electricity consumers: 30 000 50 000 160 000 1 250 000 2 000 000 10 000 000 24 000 000 50 000 000 70 000 000 30 50 100 500 500 2 500 4 000 10 000 10 000 1 000 1 000 1 600 2 500 4 000 4 000 6 000 5 000 7 000 i Reference consumer Annual consumption (in GJ) Load factor Typical industrial gas consumers: 418. 60 (or 116 300 KWh) No load factor laid down* 4 186. 00 (or 1 163 000 KWh) 200 days - 41 860. 00 (or 11. 63 GWh) 200 days 1 600 hours. 41 860. 00 (or 11. 63 GWh) 250 days 4 000 hours ' 418 600. 00 (or 116. 3 GWh) 250 days 4 000 hours la lb Ic Id Ie If ig Ih Ii II 12 13-1 13-2 14-1 14-2 15 'If necessary 115 - 200 days 418 600. 00 (or 116. 3 GWh) 330 days 8 000 hours 4 186 000. 00 (or 1 163 GWh) 330 days 8 000 hours 25 ANNEX. 3 ISSUES OF "STATISTICS IN FOCUS' PUBLISHED TO DATE 1993 No 19 Electricity prices (domestic) -1 January 1993 No 20 Gas prices (domestic) -1 January 1993 1994 1995 No 1 No 2 No 3 No 4 No 13 No 14 No 19 No 20 No 21 No 22 No 33 No 35 No 8 No 9 No 13 No 14 Electricity prices (industry) -1 July 1993 Gas prices (industry) - 1 July 1993 Electricity prices (domestic) - 1 July 1993 Gas prices (domestic) - 1 July 1993 Pricing systems (electricity) Pricing systems (gas) Gas prices (domestic) -1 January 1994 Electricity prices (domestic) -1 January 1994 Electricity prices (industry) -1 January 1994 Gas prices (industry) -1 January 1994 Electricity prices for industry in the EU -1 July 1994 Gas prices for industry in the EU -1 July 1994 Electricity prices for industry -1 January 1995 Gas prices for industry in the EU -1 January 1995 Gas prices (domestic) -1 January 1995 Electricity prices (domestic) -1 January 1995 YEARBOOKS ON ENERGY PRICES Gaspreise - Gas prices - Prix du gaz 1990 -1994 Elektrizitätspreise - Electricity prices - Prix de l'électricité 1985 - 1993 Gaspreise - Gas prices - Prix du gaz 1985 -1993 Elektrizitätspreise - Electricity prices - Prix de l'électricité 1990 -1994 Gaspreise - Gas prices - Prix du gaz 1990 -1994 Energiepreise - Energy prices - Prix de l'énergie 1973 -1993 Energiepreise - Energy prices - Prix de l'énergie 1973 -1994 Elektrizätspreise - Electricity prices - Prix de l'électricité 1990 -1995 Gaspreise - Gas prices - Prix du gaz 1990-1995 26 ANNEX 4 ELECTRICITY PRICES 5NET OF TAX) TO INDUSTRIAL USERS IN GERMANY (in DM/100 MWh/year) 01/01/95 DM/10 MWh/Year DOsseldorf Hamburg Hannover W. Geblet Frankfurt Stuttgart MOnchen S. Geblet Erfurt Leipzig Rostock 01/01/90 DM/10 MWh/Year DOsseldorf Hamburg Hannover W. Geblet Frankfurt Stuttgart MOnchen S. Geblet Erfurt Leipzig Rostock ELECTRICITY PRICES (NET OF TAX) TO INDUSTRIAL USERS IN GERMANY Ic Id lb le la 6036 3548 3364 2768 4198 3726 3891 3442 3697 2939 3700 ' 3020 3548 3316 2768 4169 3632 3846 3400 3565 2884 3700 2681 3020 2602 2436 2631 2798 2609 2957 2767 2702 3348 2144 2423 2169 2012 2200 2263 2008 1932 2064 2187 2174 1896 1943 1824 1777 1789 1861 1645 1626 1748 1846 1770 ELECTRICITY PRICES (NET OF TAX) TO INDUSTRIAL USERS IN GERMANY Ic Id lb le la NA NA NA 2976 NA 3474 3235 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 2882 NA 3474 3235 NA NA NA NA 2582 2833 2412 2694 2626 2749 2477 2406 NA NA NA 2066 2326 2013 2086 1996 2247 2004 1924 NA NA NA 1837 1858 1700 1863 1632 1867 1643 1620 NA NA NA 27 If 1760 1943 1606 1627 1718 1780 1613 1579 1746 1693 1770 If 1701 1858 1686 1713 1661 1779 1613 1577 NA NA NA Ig 1402 1627 1517 1259 1481 1481 1416 1384 1601 1364 1503 Ig 1358 1550 1417 1334 1349 1480 1416 1383 NA NA NA Ih 1635 1765 1588 1366 1660 1634 1478 1418 1596 1466 1431 Ih NA NA ' NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA II 1276 1622 1408 1123 1401 1334 1364 1304 1425 1243 1234 li NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ELECTRICITY PRICE SITUATION AND TRENDS BY LOCATION IN NATIONAL CURRENCY ON 1 JANUARY 1986,1990 and 1996 ANNEX S Electricity prices net of tax to industrial users Belgium (B) Year I. P. C. P. I. B. la lb Ic Id Ie If 1985 1990 1995 97. 7 (100) 109. 2 116. 6 124 (131) 504 550 581 502 542 575 457 452 476 368 346 359 328 296 304 307 283 288 Denmark (DK) in BFR/100 KWh/Yea ig 264 245 236 Ih NA NA Ii NA NA 209 179 inDKR/100KWh/Year Year I. P. C. P. I. B. la lb Ic Id Ie If ig Ih Ii 1985 1990 1995 98 (100) 4249 4196 4007 3842 3330 3527 3094 3272 2935 119. 5 121 4720 4662 4452 4273 3743 3720 3445 3561 3316 132 (131) 3656 3597 3496 3264 3240 3169 3029 2962 2907 Hamburg (D) Year I. P. C. P. I. B. 99. 3 (100) 105. 8 112. 7 1985 1990 1995 la NA NA lb NA NA Ic Id Ie If 3187 2242 1800 1800 ig NA 2833. 2326 1858 1858 1550 Ih NA NA Ii NA NA in DM/100 KWh/Year 125 (132) 3548 3548 3020 2423 1943 1943 1627 1755 1522 28 Madrid (E) 1985 1990 1995 | | | j |985 1990 1995 1 Western Zone (D) in DM/100 KWh/Year | Year I. P. C P. I. B. la lb Ic Id Ie If ig 1985 1990 99. 3 (100) 2748 2658 2379 1887 1674 1530 1193 105. 8 112. 7 2975 2882 2594 2086 1863 1713 1334 Ih NA NA Ii NA NA | 1995 125 (132) 2768 2768 2436 2012 1777 1627 1259 1366 1123 J Athens(GR) in DR/100 KWh/Year j Year I. P. C. P. I. B. (a lb Ic Id Ie If ig 92. 5 (100) 1088 1084 1002 832 775 775 657 201. 3 211 1740 1735 1603 1330 1239 1239 1049 410 (359) 2467 2467 2278 1813 1678 1678 1426 1307 1155 j Year I. P. C. P. I. B. la lb ic Id Ie If 97 (100) 1143 1002 941 869 781 741 133. 2 142. 8 1588 1588 1339 172 (178) 1934 1934 1465 1229 1347 1094 1026 1203 1127 Î014 1016 911 Paris (F) in FF/100 KWh/Year Year I. P. C P. I. B. la lb Ic Id Ie If ig Ih Ii 1985 1990 1995 97. 4 (100) 7807 7089 4708 4708 3860 3860 3210 114. 7 119. 4 6465 6465 5930 4947 4033 4033 3436 NA NA NA NA 128 (134) 6673 6673 6156 5089 4275 4275 3688 3345 3001 29 Ih NA NA Ii NA NA in PTA/100 KWh/Yea ig 669 934 Ih NA NA Ii NA NA Dublin (IRL) Year I. P. C. P. I. B. la lb Ic Id Ie If 1985 1990 1995 98. 3 (100) 1063 1063 116. 7 114. 8 1015 130 (126) 1015 1001 1001 879 804 804 693 614 614 610 501 501 593 469 469 Italy (I) in IRL/100 KWh/Year ig 536 403 403 Ih NA NA Ii NA NA 404 367 in LIT/100 KWh/Year Year I. P. C. P. I. B. la lb Ic Id Ie If ig 96. 1 (100) 23073 21054 16891 14417 12356 12410 9168 128. 2 139 20873 19049 14886 12412 11166 10893 8029 Ih NA NA Ii NA NA 1985 1990 1995 163 (171) 27320 21980 17192 15442 12671 12671 10323 9694 8134 30 Luxemburg (L) Year I. P. C. P. I. B. 1985 1990 1995 97. 8 (100) 108 124 117 (132) Rotterdam (NL) la 545 582 556 lb 542 583 563 ic Id Ie If 422 450 433 346 368 353 296 313 300 275 242 230 in L F R/100 KWh/Year ig 225 206 189 ' Ih NA NA Ii NA NA 196 173 in HFL/100 KWh/Year Year I. P. C. P. I. B. la lb Ic Id Ie If ig Ih NA NA Ii < NA NA 991 Ih NA NA Ii NA NA 1985 1990 1995 1985 1990 1995 98. 6 (100) 3125 3003 2536 2361 2187 2025 1720 102. 5 104 NA 2950 2168 1815 1521 1411 1122 119 (117) 2177 2182 2401 1874 1491 1294 1053 1118 Lisbon (P) in ESC/100 KWh/Year Year I. P. C. P. I. B. la lb Ic Id Ie If ig 93. 9 (100) 1511 1373 1156 1017 925 925 856 160. 7 192 1943 1948 1613 1398 1253 1255 1149 237 (288) 2408 2499 2057 1764 1568 1568 1284 1197 1105 London (UK) Year I. P. C. P. I. B. la lb Ic Id Ie 1985 1990 1995 96. 4 (100) 126. 3 131. 1 154 (157) 631 650 753 623 637 735 580 701 615 454 529 534 396 462 473 in UKL/100 KWh/Year ig NA 413 414 Ih Ii NA. NA 428 NA NA 401 If 395 460 449 31 ANNEX 6 EUR12: ELECTRICITY PRICES (NET OF TAXES) TO INDUSTRIAL USERS (in PPS/10 MWh on 1/01/1996) Electricity prices net of tax to industrial users on 1/1/1995 Belgium(B) Denmark(DK) Western Zone(D) Hamburg(D) Athens(GR) MadridÇE) Paris(F) DubUnflRL) Itafyfl) LuxembourgfL) Rotterdam(NL) North BrabantfNL) Lisbon(P) London(UK) la 1443 441 1212 1553 1069 1483 947 1422 1613 1289 949 772 1807 1090 1428 435 1212 1553 1065 1483 947 1403 1298 1306 951 793 1875 1064 Jc 1182 424 1067 1322 984 1124 873 1126 1015 1005 1047 919 1544 890 là 755 397 778 851 725 923 607 702 748 625 650 495 1177 685 -m 715 389 712 851 725 864 607 657 748 533 564 493 1177 650 Ih *519 586 374 367 551 598 712 768 616 564 778 779 523 475 565 566 610 572 439 455 549 488 441 455 964 898 444 361 492 666 499 699 426 514 480 402 432 433 829 529 620 580 891 399 881 1061 783 1033 722 860 912 819 817 587 1324 773 32 EUR 12 in PPS/10 MWhtyr Mi 1. 22 2. 46 2. 33 2. 14 2. 12 2. 22 2. 77 3J6 3. 21 2. 20 1. 78 2. 18 1. 88 Hamburg(D) Athens(GR) MadridfE) Parb(F) Dublin (IRL) Italy (I) Electricity prices net of tax to industrial usert on 1/1/1990 ANNEX 7 EUR12: ELECTRICITY PRICES (NET OF TAXES) TO INDUSTRIAL USERS (in PPS/10 mWh on 1/01/1990) Bdgiam(B) Denmark(DK) la 1296 lb 1277 Ic 1065 463 457 436 Western ZonefD) 1321 1280 1152 Id 815 419 926 697 If 667 U 577 m N. A. ii NA. 367 365 338 349 NA. 827 761 592 N. A. NA. N. A. N. A. 1258 1033 825 825 688 N. A. NA. 1148 1145 1058 878 818 818 692 N. A. NA. 1350 1350 1138 1045 930 872 794 N. A. NA. 905 905 830 1366 1348 1082 1357 1238 968 Luxembnrg(L) 1363 1364 1053 Rotterdam(NL) NA. 1266 North BrabantfNL) 958 921 930 703 693 827 807 861 779 575 565 565 481 N. A. NA. 675 631 543 N. A. N. A. 726 708 522 N. A. NA. 732 567 482 N. A. NA. 653 605 481 N. A. NA. 488 486 427 N. A. NA. Lisbon(P) LondonfUK) Glasgow(UK) 1741 1746 1445 1253 1123 1124 030 N. A. NA. 990 969 1067 1189 1156 1124 805 878 703 700 628 N. A. NA. 744 682 602 N. A. NA. 33 EUR 12 in PPS/10 MWh/yr Ia/Ii 2. 25 1. 33 2. 23 1. 83 1. 66 1. 70 1. 88 2. 52 2. 60 2. 83 2. 63 2. 24 1. 69 1. 58 1. 98 ANNEX 8 RANKING OF LOCATIONS IN INCREASING ORDER OF PRICE ON 1 JANUARY 1995 RAWING OF LOCATIONS IN INCREASING ORDER OF PRICE la lb to id la If ta 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 e 9 10 11 12 13 14 Denmark (DK) North Brabant (NL) Paris (F) Rotterdam (NL) Athens (GR) London (UK) Western Zone (D) Denmark (DK) North Brabant (NL) Paris (F) Rotterdam (NL) London (UK) Athens (GR) Western Zone (D) Luxemburg (L) Dublin (IRL) Belgium (B) Madrid (E) Hamburg (D) Italy (1) Lisbon (P) Italy (1) Luxembourg (L) Dublin (IRL) Belgium (B) Madrid (E) Hamburg (D) Lisbon (P) Denmark (DK) Paris (F) London (UK) North Brabant (NL) Athens (GR) Luxembourg (L) Italy") Rotterdam (NL) Western Zone (D) Madrid (E) Dublin (IRL) Belgium (B) Hamburg (D) Lisbon (P) Denmark (DK) North Brabant (NL) Paris (F) London (UK) Athens (GR) Rotterdam (NL) Luxembourg (L) DubKnflRL) Western Zone (D) Belgium (B) Italy (1) Madrid (E) Hamburg (D) Lisbon (P) Denmark (DK) North Brabant (NL) Paris (F) Luxembourg (L) Rotterdam (NL) London (UK) Dublin (IRL) Athens (GR) Italy (1) Belgium (B) Western Zone (D) Hamburg (D) Madrid (E) Lisbon (P) Denmark (DK) North Brabant (NL) Luxemburg (L) Rotterdam (NL) Paris (F) London (UK) Dublin (IRL) Western Zone (D) Belgium (B) Athens (GR) Italy (1) Hamburg (D) Madrid (E) Lisbon (P) Denmark (DK) Luxemburg (L) North Brabant (NL) Paris (F) Rotterdam Western Zone (D) Dublin (IRL) (NL) Belgium (B) London (UK) Italy (1) Athens (GR) Hamburg (D) Madnd(E) Lisbon (P) 1/1M95 m Denmark (DK) Luxembourg (L) North Brabant (NL) Pans (F) Rotterdam (NL) Belgium (B) Athens (GR) Dublin (IRL) Italy (1) Western Zone (D) London (UK) Hamburg (D) Madrid (E) Lisbon (P) 11 Denmark (DK) Luxembourg (L) Paris (F) Rotterdam (NL) North Brabant (NL) Belgium (B) Italy (1) Western Zone (D) Athens (GR) Dublin (IRL) London (UK) Hamburg (D) Madrid (E) Lisbon (P) 34 ANNEX 9 RANKING OF LOCATIONS IN INCREASING ORDER OF PRICE ON 1 JANUARY 1990 RANKING OF LOCATIONS IN INCREASING ORDER OF PRICE la lb to Id le If Denmark (DK) Paris (F) North Brabant (NL) London (UK) Athens (GR) Glasgow (UK) Belgium (B) Western Zone (D) Madrid (E) Italy (1) Luxembourg (L) Dublin (IRL) Lisbon (P) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 Denmark (DK) Paris (F) North Brabant (NL) London (UK) Athens (GR) Glasgow (UK) Italy (1) Rotterdam (NL) Belgium (B) Western Zone (D) Dublin (IRL) Madrid (E) Luxembourg (L) L:sior (P) Denmark (DK) North Brabant (NL) Paris (F) Rotterdam (NL) Italy (1) Luxembourg (L) Athens (GR) Belgium (B) London (UK) Dubttn (IRL) Glasgow (UK) Madrid (E) Western Zone (D) Hamburg (D) Lisbon (P). Denmark (DK) North Brabant (NL) Paris (F) Rotterdam (NL) London (UK) Italy 0) Belgium (B) Dublin QRL) Luxembourg (L) Athens (GR) Glasgow (UK) Western Zone (D) Hamburg (D) Madrid (E) Usbon(P) Denmark (DK) North Brabant (NL) Paris (F) Rotterdam (NL) Dublin (IRL) Belgium (B) London (UK) Italy (1) Luxembourg (L) Glasgow (UK) Athens (GR) Hamburg (D) Western Zone (D) Madrid (E) Usbon(P) Denmark (DK) North Brabant (NL) Paris (F) Luxembourg (L) Rotterdam (NL) Dublin (IRL) Belgium (B) Glasgow (UK) London (UK) Italy (1) Western Zone (D) Athens (GR) Hamburg (D) Madrid (E) Lisbon (P) 10 Denmark (DK) North Brabant (NL) Paris (F) Rotterdam (NL) Luxembourg (L) Italy (1) Dublin (IRL) Belgium (B) Western Zone (D) Glasgow (UK) London (UK) Hamburg (D) Athens (GR) Madnd (E) Lisbon (P) 1/1/1990 Ih Ii Denmark (DK) 35 ANNEX 10 ELECTRICITY PRICES IN ECU PER 10 MWh PER YEAR (1 January 1985,1990 and 1995) Electricity prices in ECU per 10 MWh per year Electricity prices in ECU per 10 MWh per year la Jan-85 , Jan-90 Jan-95 lb Jan-85 Jan-90 Jan-95 Belgium (B) Denmark (DK) Western Zone (D) Hamburg (D) Athens (GR) Madrid (E) Paris (F) Dublin (IRL) Italy (1) Luxemburg (L) Rotterdam (NL) North Brabant (NL) Lisbon (P) London (UK) ' 1132 535 1237 0 1200 929 1148 1489 1684 1224 1244 778 1251 1015 1290 599 1464 0 915 1204 931 1320 1378 1366 0 974 1084 893 1484 Belgium (B) 488 Denmark (DK) 1456 Western Zone (D) 1866 Hamburg (D) 837 Athens (GR) 1176 Madrid (E) 1015 Paris (F) 1274 Dublin (IRL) 1367 Italy (I) 1419 Luxemburg (L) 1021 Rotterdam (NL) 830 North Brabant (NL) 1228 Lisbon (P) 955 London (UK) 1127 529 1196 0 1196 815 1042 1489 1537 1217 1195 743 1137 1002 1272 592 1418 0 < 913 1204 931 1302 1257 1367 1286 936 1087 874 1468 480 1456 1866 834 1176 1015 1257 1100 1438 1024 853 1274 932 Electricity prices in ECU per 10 MWh per year Electricity prices in ECU per 10 MWh per year Ic Jan-85 Jan-90 Jan-95 Id Jan-85 Jan-90 Jan-95 Belgium (B) Denmark (DK) Western Zone(D) Hamburg (D) Athens (GR) Madrid (E) Paris (F) Dublin (IRL) Italy (1) Luxemburg (L) Rotterdam (NL) North Brabant (NL) Lisbon (P) London (UK) 1026 505 1071 1434 1105 765 692 1231 1233 948 1009 1102 957 933 1060 565 1276 1394 843 1015 854 1045 982 1056 945 715 900 962 1215 Belgium (B) 467 Denmark (DK) 1281 Western Zone(D) 1588 Hamburg (D) 770 Athens (GR) 890 Madrid (E) 937 Paris (F) 1008 Dublin (IRL) 860 Italy (I) 1107 Luxemburg (L) 1127 Rotterdam (NL) 827 484 849 1009 918 706 692 971 1052 777 940 989 North Bra bant (NL) , 613 1049 Lisbon (P) 780 London (UK) 842 731 36 812 543 1026 1144 700 932 712 798 819 863 791 584 780 726 917 436 1058 1274 613 819 774 771 772 902 879 632 899 677 ANNEX 10 Electricity prices in ECU per 10 MWh per year Electricity prices in ECU per 10 MWh per year Ie Jan-85 Jan-90 Jan-95 If Jan-85 Jan-90 Jan-95 Belgium (B) Denmark (DK) Western Zone (D) Hamburg (D) Athens (GR) Madrid (E) Paris (F) Dublin (IRL) Italy (I) Luxemburg (L) Rotterdam (NL) North Brabant (NL) Lisbon (P) London (UK) 737 420 753 810 855 635 567 854 902 665 870 558 766 636 694 475 917 914 652 829 581 652 737 733 663 496 699 634 776 Belgium (B) 433 Denmark (DK) 935 Western Zone (D) 1022 Hamburg (D) 567 Athens (GR) 731 Madrid (E) 650 Paris (F) 629 Dublin (IRL) 634 Italy (I) 765 Luxemburg (L) 700 Rotterdam (NL) 533 North Brabant (NL) 799 Lisbon (P) 600 London (UK) 690 444 689 810 855 602 567 830 906 618 806 556 766 635 664 472 843 914 652 778 581 609 719 569 615 494 700 631 • 735 423 856 1022 567 685 550 588 634 587 607 531 799 570 Electricity prices in ECU per 10 MWh per year Ig Jan-85 Jan-90 Jan-95 Belgium (B) Denmark (DK) Western Zone (D) Hamburg (D) Athen (GR) Madrid (E) Paris (F) Dublin (IRL) Italy (I) Luxemburg (L) Rotterdam (NL) North Bra bant (NL) Lisbon (P) London (UK) 593 390 537 0 725 544 472 750 669 505 685 675 709 0 575 438 656 763 552 709 495 524 530 483 989 434 641 567 603 404 662 856 482 616 561 506 516 483 494 474 655 525 37 ANNEX 11 Gas prices (net of tax) to industrial users by location in national currency: situation and trends on 1 January 1985,1990 and 1995 —- Gas prices (net of tax) to industrial users Belgium (B) in BFR/100 GJ/Year I. P. C. P. I. B. 11 12 13-1 13-2 14-1 I4-2 15 97. 7 100 36840 38840 38840 36840 38840 36840 36840 109,2 116. 6 24620 24620 24620 24620 24620 24620 24620 124 (131) 23700 23700 23700 23700 23700 23700 23700 Denmark (DK) in DKR/100 GJ/Year I. P. C. P. I. B. 11 12 13-1 13-2 14-1 14-2 15 98 119. 5 100 121 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 132 (131) 3870 3650 2710 2710 2370 2370 NA NA NA Year 1985 19Ö0 1995 Year 1985 1990 1995 Weser-Ems (0) in DM/100 GJ/Year Year I P C. P. I. B. 11 12 13-1 I3-2 14-1 14-2 15 1985 1990 1995 Year 1985 1990 1995 99. 3 100 1438 1394 1292 1292 1279 1237 1228 105,8 112,7 125 (132) Berlin (D) I. P. C. P. I. B. 99. 3 100 105,8 112,7 638 978 11 NA NA 794 875 665 678 665 678 809 569 609 569 in DM/100 GJ/Year 12 13-1 I3-2 14-1 NA NA NA NA NA NA I4-2 NA NA 872 NA NA 900 584 517 IS NA NA NA 125 (132) 1497 1072 1050 1050 Madrid (E) in PTA/100 GJ/Year Year I. P. C. P. I. B. 11 12 13-1 I3-2 14-1 I4-2 15 1985 1990 1995 97 100 160400 153600 152700 152700 133,2 142,8 118400 78500 73800 73800 NA NA NA NA 172 (178) 190010 83020 52170 50250 46110 46110 NA NA NA Paris (F) in FF/100 GJ/Year Year I. P. C. P. I. B. 11 12 13-1 I3-2 14-1 I4-2 15 1985 1990 1995 97. 4 100 114. 7 119,4 128 034) 5352 3796 3960 4847 3157 3337 4222 2298 2132 4129 2242 1945 3850 1975 1691 3780 3753 1925 1640 1901 NA 38 Dublin (IRL) I. P. C. Pl. B 11 12 13-1 98. 3 100 118,7 114. 8 130 (126) 630 380 549 559 380 446 NA 340 254 I3-2 NA 340 254 Milano (1) in IRL/100 GJ/Year 14-1 I4-2 NA 175 NA NA 175 NA in LIT/100 GJ/Year I. P. C. P. I. B. 11 12 13-1 I3-2 14-1 I4-2 | •I NA | 175 NA | | •I 96,1 100 1118900 1084500 1008300 984900 937000 914400 862400 128,2 139. 4 1163600 1122400 529500 496600 4S62O0 434800 408500 163 (171) 1456300 1011900 855100 626500 575900 543800 NA Year 1985 1990 1995 Year 1985 1990 1995 Luxemburg (L) Year I. P. C. P. I. B 11 12 13-1 I3-2 in LUF/100 GJ/Year 14-1 NA I4-2 NA 97,8 100 32880 32160 30800 28750. 106 116,6. 20003 17691 16991 16767 16603 16603 124 (132) 19451 17610 17237 15149 15086 15066 Rotterdam (NL) in HFL/100 GJ/Year I. P. C. P. I. B. 11 12 13-1 I3-2 14-1 I4-2 15 98,6 100 102,5 104,4 119 (117) 1594 1140 1184 1582 1125 1162 1492 1492 1410 1410 1328 762 742 762 742 645 593 645 593 1985 1990 1995 Year 1985 1990 1995 London (UK) in UKL/100 GJ/Year Year I. P. C. P. I. B. 11 12 13-1 I3-2 14-1 1985 1990 1995 98,4 100 126,3 131. 1 154 (157) 343 386 333 325 303 298 308 290 262 308 286 256 308 246 256 I4-2 308 242 227 39 15 NA NA NA NA 518 15 271 156 NA ANNEX 12 EUR12: GAS PRICES (NET OF TAX) TO INDUSTRIAL USERS IN PPS/100 GJ on 01/01/1995 Gas prices (net of tsx) to industrial users on 1/1/1995 11 12 13-1. 3-2 14-1 14-2 15 11/15 BELGIUM (B) DENMARK(DK) WESER-EMS(D) BERLIN(D) MADRID(E) PARIS(F) STRASBURG(F) DUBLINflRL) TURINfT) NAPLES(I) LUXEMBURG(L) ROTTERDAM(NL) LONDON(UK) BIRMINGHAM(UK) 588 411 428 655 1454 562 650 769 753 1099 451 516 481 497 461 387 383 469 637 473 571 625 598 598 408 507 432 428 •or last known consumer where no 15. 342 288 297 460 385 276 334 356 370 370 351 324 373 351 418 288 297 460 400 303 353 356 387 387 400 324 379 975 40 342 251 249 394 354 240 N. A. N. A. 340 340 350 259 371 334 316 251 249 382 354 233 N. A. N. A. 321 321 350 259 328 N. A. N. A. N. A. 226 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 226 N. A. N. A. 1. 90 1. 60 1. 90 1. 70 4. 10 2. 40 1. 90 2. 10 2. 30 3. 42 1. 30 1. 20 1. 50 1. 50 ANNEX 13 EUR12: GAS PRICES (NET OF TAX) TO INDUSTRIAL USERS IN PPS/100 G J on 01/01/1990 Gas prices (net of tax) to •> industrial users on 1 /1 /1990 t$-1 ft 12 Belgium(B) 580 469 421 /3-2 352 14-1 352 14-2 329 /5 321 HM 1. 80 Hanover(D) 672 569 • 497 492 470 272 272 2. 50 Weser-Ems(D) 372 353 296 296 271 271 260 1. 40 Madrid(E) Paris(F) 1006 667 627 627 N. A N. A ' N. A 1. 60 533 443 323 315 277 270 N. A 2. 00 Strasbourg(F) 700 579 N. A 346 N. A N. A N. A 2. 00 Dublin(IRL) 511 511 458 458 236 236 236 2. 10 Turin(l) Naples(l) 699 651 344 323 304 283 266 2. 60 1130 944 344 323 304 283 266 4. 20 Luxembourg(L) 468 414 398 393 389 389 N. A 1. 20 Rotterdam(NL) 489 483 327 327 277 277 N. A 1. 80 London(UK) 588 461 441 435 374 368 237 2. 50 41 ANNEX 14 GAS PRICES (NET OF TAX) TO INDUSTRIAL USERS IN GERMANY on 1 January 1990 and 1995 Gas prices (net of tax) to industrial users on 1/1/95 Dusseldorf Hamburg Hanover Dortmund Frankfurt Stuttgart Munich Weser-Ems Dresden Berlin 11 1350 1022 1289 1003 1069 1231 1161 978 1233 1497 12 983 1014 972 850 983 1097 1094 875 994 1072 Gas prices (net of tax) to industrial users on 1/1/90 Dusseldorf Hamburg Hanover Dortmund Frankfurt Stuttgart Munich Weser-Ems Dresden Berlin 11 1306 1103 1512 1028 992 1075 1482 838 NA NA 12 982 1103 1280 834 939 1103 1002 794 NA NA 13-1 967 861 844 822 847 1058 1028 678 892 1050 13-1 967 928 1119 806 718 1181 1114 665 NA NA 13-2 919 786 836 789 817 944 836 678 836 1050 13-2 924 853 1108 773 718 923 1032 665 NA NA 42 14-1 803 708 792 733 781, 875 797 569 667 900 14-1 914 834 1058 684 714 923 864 609 NA NA Germany 15 433 NA NA 433 NA NA 456 517 NA NA Germany 15 635 612 612 621 714 834 609 584 NA NA 14-2 756 NA NA 703 753 750 742 569 NA 872 14-2 772 612 612 684 714 834 751 609 NA NA ANNEX 15 Ranking of locations in increasing order of price on 1 January 1995 Ranking of locations in increasing order of price 01/01/1995 11 Denmark(DK) 12 Weser-EmsfD) 13-1 DenmarkfDK) 13-2 Paris(F) MM ParisfF) 14rZ ParisfF) M Weser-Ems(D) Weser-Ems(D) DenmarkfDK) Weser-EmsfD) Denmark(DK) Weser-EmsfD) Weser-EmsfD) RotterdamfNL) Luxembourg(L) Luxembourg(L) Paris(F) Weser-Ems(D) DenmarkfDK) DenmarkfDK) London(UK) Birmingham(UK) Rotterdam(NL) Rotterdam(NL) RotterdamfNL) RotterdamfNL) BirminghamfUK) LondonfUK) Strasbourg/?) StrfisbourgfF) BirminghamfUK) BelgiumfB) Rotterdam(NL) BelgiumfB) DubMnORL) Belgium(B) TurinO) Turinfl) Paris(F) Bertin(D) Birmingham(UK) Birmingham(UK) NaplesO) NaplesO) s Belgium(B) Paris(F) LondonfUK) Luxembourg(L) BelgiumfB) LondonfUK) Strasbourg(F) Rotterdam(NL) TurinO) Dublin(IRL) LuxembourgfL) LuxembourgfL) 10 Ber1in(D) Strasbourg(F) NaplesO) TurinO) MadridfE) MadridfE) TurinO) TurinO) Luxembourg(L) NaplesO) LondonfUK) BeriinfD) Dublin (IRL) NaplesO) MadridfE) LondonfUK) BeriinfD) NaplesO) DubMnORL) BelgiumfB) Madrid(E) Madrid(E) Madrid(E) BeriinfD) BeriinfD) 43 ANNEX 16 f RANKING OF LOCATIONS IN INCREASING ORDER OF PRICE on 1 January 1990 Ranking of locations in increasing older of pike II. 12 Î3-1 13-2 14-1 14-2 GazOJ/Ol/90 IS Weser-EmsfD) Weser-Ems(D) Weser-Ems(D) Weser-EmsfD) Dublin(IRL) DublinflRL) Dublin(IRL) LuxembourgfL) LuxembourgfL) ParisfF) ParisfF) Weser-EmsfD) ParisfF) LondonfUK) RotterdamfNL) ParisfF) RotterdamfNL) Turinfl) ParisfF) Weser-EmsfD) Weser-EmsfD) DublinflRL) LondonfUK) Turinfl) Naplesfl) RotterdamfNL) HanoverfD) Turinfl) ParisfF) BelgiumfB) Naplesfl) RotterdamfNL) Turinfl) RotterdamfNL) Naplesfl) BelgiumfB) RotterdamfNL) LuxembourgfL) Strasbourg(F) Naplesfl) Turinfl) HanoverfD) LondonfUK) DublinflRL) BelgiumfB) BelgiumfB) BelgiumfB) Naplesfl) BelgiumfB) HanoverfD) HanoverfD) LondonfUK) LuxembourgfL) LondonfUK) BelgiumfB) Turinfl) StrasbourgfF) DublinflRL) LondonfUK) LuxembourgfL) LondonfUK) Strasbourg(F) Turinfl) HanoverfD) DublinflRL) HanoverfD) LuxembourgfL) MadridfE) MadridfE) MadridfE) HanoverfD) Naplesfl) Naplesfl) MadridfE) 44 ANNEX 17 GAS PRICES IN ECU IN 1985 - 1990 - 1995 Gas prices in ECU/100 GJ/Year Gas prices in ECU/100 GJ/Year 11 Jan-85 Jan-90 Jan-95 12 Jan-85 Jan-90 Jan-95 Belgium(B) Denmark(DK) Weser-Ems (D) Madrid(E) Paris(F) Strasbourg(F) Dublin(IRL) Turin(l) Naples(l) Luxembourg(L) Rotterdam(NL) London(UK) 827 NA 647 1304 786 937 882 877 NA 738 634 551 578 NA 412 897 548 720 494 710 605 Belgium(B) 517 Denmarfc(DK) 514 Weser-Ems(D) 1155 Madrid(E) 602 Paris(F) 697 Strasbourg(F) 689 Dublin(IRL) 638 Turin(l) 1148 931 Naples(l) 469 497 530 497 Luxembourg(L) 556 Rotterdam(NL) 422 London(UK) 758 NA 627 1249 683 779 783 827 NA 722 630 523 467 NA 390 595 456 695 494 661 958 416 490 416 Gas prices in ECU/100 GJ/Year Gas prices in ECU/100 GJ/Year 13-1 Jan-85 Jan-90 Jan-95 I3-2 Jan-85 Jan-90 Jan-95 Belgium(B) Denmark(DK) Weser-Ems(O) Madrid(E) Paris(F) Strasbourg(F) Dublin(IRL) Turin(l) Naples(l) Luxembourg(L) Rotterdam(NL) London(UK) 692 NA 581 1241 620 NA NA 736 736 692 594 495 419 NA 327 559 332 NA 442 349 349 399 332 398 408 BelgiumfB) 362 Denmark(DK) 357 Weser-Ems(D) 317 Madrid(E) 324 Paris(F) 378 Strasbourg(F) 319 Dublin(IRL) 328 Turin(l) 328 Naples(l) 440 Luxembourg(L) 348 Rotterdam(NL) 332 London(UK) 632 NA 581 1241 606 639 NA 719 719 646 594 495 350 NA 327 559 324 356 442 328 328 393 332 393 474 487 460 505 508 612 560 506 506 450 454 378 329 362 357 305 296 358 319 313 313 387 348 327 45 Gas prices in ECU/100 GJ/Year Gas prices in ECU/100 GJ/Year 14-1 Jan-85 Jan-90 Jan-95 14-2 Jan-85 Jan-90 Jan-95 611 NA 556 NA 555 NA NA 668 668 NA 561 495 327 NA 299 NA 278 NA 227 287 287 390 281 332 303 316 299 280 249 NA NA 272 272 385 278 287 Belgium(B) Denmark(DK) Weser-EmsfD) Madrid(E) Paris(F) Strasbourg(F) DubIin(IRL) Turin(I) Naples(I) Luxembourg(L) Rotterdam(NL) London(UK) 632 NA 575 NA 565 NA NA 684 684 NA 561 495 350 NA 299 NA 285 NA 227 309 309 390 281 338 329 Belgium(B) 316 DenmarkfDK) 299 Weser-EmsfD) 280 Madrid(E) 257 ParisfF) NA Strasbourg(F) NA DublinflRL) 288 Turinfl) 288 Naples(I) 385 Luxembourg!,!. ) 278 RotterdamfNL) 325 London(UK) Gas prices in ECU/100 GJ/Year 15-1 Jan-85 Jan-90 Jan-95 BelghunfB) DenmarkfDK) Weser-EmsfD) MadridfE) ParisfF) StrasbourgfF) Dublin(IRL) Turin(l) Naples(l) Luxembourg(L) Rotterdam(NL) London(UK) 605 NA 552 NA 551 NA NA 630 630 NA 529 436 320 NA 287 NA 275 NA 227 270 270 NA NA 214 NA NA 272 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 243 NA 46 GRAPHS ELECTRICITY PRICES 1985. 1990, 1995 tz J a n - 85 W?ÊÊÊà Jan-90 H7". 3 J. jn 9! Notes: 1- Bclgium(B)4- Hamburg(D)7- Pans(F)!0- Luxembourg(L)13 - Lisbon(P) 2- Dcnmark(DK)5- Athcns(G)8- Dublin(IRL)! 1- Roöcrdaxn(NL))4- London(UK) 3- Western Zone(D)6- Madnd(E)9- IUly(I)l2- North Brabant 47 GRAPHS ELECTRICITY PRICES 1985. 1990. 1995 Notes: 1- Belgium(B)4-Hamburg(D)7-Paris(F)10-Luxembourg(L)13- Lisbon(P) 2- Denmark(DK)5- Athens(G)8- Dublin(IRL)11-Rotterdam(NL)14- London(UK) 3- Western Zone(D)6- Madrid(E)9- ltaly(l)12- North Brabant 48 1ÔCO ifOO GRAPHS NATURA!. GAS PRICES IN 1985 1990 and 1995 iVM // fCU II I 000 l soo >?oo SPA 12 ECU 12 SPA 13- l ECU 13-1 l ?oo ~j Jan-85 [ l Ä l ^l Jan-95 Notes: i- Be!gium(B)4- Hamburg(D)7- Dublin(IRL)10- Luxembourg(L) 2- Denmark(DK)5- Paris (F)8-Turin(I)l 1- RotterdamfNL)) 3- Weser-Ems(D)6- Strasbourg (F)9-Naples(I)12- London (UK) / ic> ~~ GRAPHS NATURAL GAS PRICES IN 1985. 1990 and 1995 Notes 1- Belgium(B)4-Hamburg(D)7-Dublin(IRL)10-Luxembourg(L) 2- Denmark(DK)5- Paris (F)8-Turin(l)l 1- Rotterdam(NL)) 3- Weser-Ems(D)6- Strasbourg (F)9-Naples(l)12-London (UK) 30 ISSN 1024-4492 KOM(96) 92 lopullinen ASIAKIRJAT FI 10 12 Luettelonumero : CB-CO-96-097-FI-C ISBN 92-78-01242-4 Euroopan yhteisöjen virallisten julkaisujen toimisto L-2985 Luxemburg