eurovoc_concepts:
agricultural guidance
agricultural quota
reform of the CAP
sheep
suckler cow

text: COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Brussels, 09. 09. 1996 COM(96) 430 final REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL ON THE APPLICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS IN THE ANNUAL EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM SCHEMES REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS IN THE ANNUAL EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM SCHEMES I. INTRODUCTION 2 II. THE NECESSARY CONTROL ON PRODUCTION AND COMMUNITY SPENDING a) b) Production Community expenditure 4 5 III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNCIL'S IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS WHICH FALL UNDER MEMBER STATE COMPETENCE The reference year and the initial allocation of rights The initial national reserves The system of quota transfers and leasing a) b) c) d) Management of the national reserves e) Sensitive Zones 5 6 7 7 8 IV. THE FUNCTION OF THE COMMISSION'S DETAILED RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS a) b) c) Individual limits Usage rules The transfer and leasing mechanisms 9 9 10 V. EVALUATION OF THE QUOTA REGIMES AND CONCLUDING REMARKS a) b) c) d) e) Controlling production and spending National reserves and their management Systems of quota transfer Sensitive Zones Concluding remarks 11 11 12 12 13 ANNEXES Beef and Sheepmeat Production and Consumption - EU15 (1986-1996) I. Suckler and Dairy Cow Numbers in EC-12 (1989-1995) II Community Expenditure in Ewe and Suckler Cow Premium (1980-1995) III. Application of Individual Producer Limits for Ewe Premium - EC 12 IV. Application of Individual Producer Limits lor Suckler Cow Premium - EC 12 V. Individual Producer Limits in the new Member States - Ewe and Suckler Cow Premium VI Individual Rights to Ewe and Goat Premium - EU15 VII. Individual Rights to Suckler Cow Premium - EU15 VIII. Evolution in Ewe and Suckler Cow Premium Claims (1992-1995) IX Operation of the National Reserve in 1993 - Ewe Premium X. Operation of the National Reserve in 1993 - Suckler Cow Premium XL XII. Operation of the National Reserve in 1994 - Ewe Premium XIII. Operation of the National Reserve in 1994 - Suckler Cow Premium Calendar for Ewe premium Application in 1995 - EU 15 XIV X I. INTRODUCTION Council Regulations (EEC) No 3013/89 and No 805/68 require that the Commission make a report, before 1 July 1996, on the application of the arrangements laid down in the individual producer limits in the annual ewe and suckler cow premium schemes respectively, together with, where appropriate, any necessary proposals. This report fulfills that obligation. The report is designed to look at the administrative experiences of applying the premium quota systems since the 1992 Reform. Its preparation began before the current BSE crisis and it does not represent the Commission's views over how the beef regime shall be adapted following the crisis. It does, nevertheless, form part of the background which will need to be taken into account when ideas for changing the beef regime are assessed. The origins of the premium quotas can be traced to the 1992 CAP Reform when solutions to two problems common to the Community's sheep and beef sectors were sought: the trend of increasing internal production coupled with escalating Community expenditure. In the sheep sector, rising production in the 1980*s, stimulated by readily available premiums, was undermining Community prices and, owing to the price compensatory method of calculation of the ewe premium, causing a dramatic growth in Community expenditure. In the beef sector, after several years of greater surpluses, the Reform provided the opportunity to shift policy, in the light of the necessary adjustments of production to internal consumption trends and export possibilities, in particular those relating to the approaching GATT commitments, away from beef price support through costly intervention mechanisms and more towards direct payments to producers as premia. In the sheep sector, the Commission's response to these pressures was to propose, in the context of the 1992 Reform, to replace the stabilizer, which had proved incapable of controlling production, with the requirement that a producer must hold a right to each Ewe Premium and to establish individual producer limits to the number of those rights, a policy more commonly known as the introduction of 'individual quotas'. The aim of this measure was to limit the number of animals kept by individual producers since stockrearing without premium, in most circumstances, is unprofitable. For the beef sector, the compromise on the whole of the 1992 Reform extended this idea of individual quotas to suckler cows. The reasons for this were that the Council compromise included a bigger increase on the Suckler Cow Premium than the Commission had already proposed and that Council wanted to ensure that this increase did not lead to an uncontrolled increase in the suckler cow herd. Furthermore, the introduction of limits on the eligibility to premia in the beef sector proved valuable in the final stages of the negotiation of the GATT agreement which followed the 1992 Reform. The basic regulations establishing individual quotas in the two sectors ' , similar in their main outline, laid down that the quotas be allocated to each active producer, on the basis of the number of premiums paid in a past "reference" year 2, particular to the sector involved. Member States were Articles 5a - 5d of Regulation (EEC) No 3013/89 for the sheep sector and Articles 4e and 4f of Regulation (EEC) No 805/68 for the beef sector. From 1995 onwards, in the sheep sector, owing to the introduction of individual quotas, the Council's former 'headage limit1 rule, by which the payment of ewe premium was made at the full rate for producers with no more than 1000 ewes in LFA's and 500 ewes in non-LFA's, became superfluous and was abolished. The net also given some latitude in choosing the reference year. General rules to accommodate the case of producers who did not claim premium in the reference year and the distribution of rights within producer groups were also made. As a consequence, the total sum of all the individual producer limits in each of these two sectors constitutes a virtual ceiling to their productive capacities and sets a maximum Community expenditure for their support. Furthermore, fixing a total number of ewe and suckler cow premium rights in each of the new Member States which entered the Union in 1995, decided as part of the Accession agreements, maintained the philosophy of limiting productive capacity in the two sectors. Council legislation also gave producers the opportunity to adjust each year the number of rights they hold to premium through the provisions for transfer and, should the Member State so choose, temporary leasing of quota. Member States were given the option of setting up a "commercial" system of transfers which allows producers to deal directly between themselves or an "administrative" system in which rights are transferred via the national reserve. Only one Member State, France, chose the latter option. Except for certain demarcated zones in each Member State out of which rights may not transferred because sheep or beef production is especially important, a producer is allowed to transfer rights to another producer, either with his holding or without. However, transfers without the holding must surrender up to 15% of the transferred rights to the national reserve, a procedure more commonly known as the 'syphon'. The national reserve of premium rights in each Member State was set up by retaining between 1 and 3% of the initial individual allocation of rights and was used to reallocate rights amongst suggested priority categories of producers, determined according to each Member State's own criteria. In addition, Council agreed to the creation of a non-forfeitary initial reserve equal to 1% of the sum of the rights in less-favoured areas (LFA's). Council subsequently instructed the Commission to make detailed rules for the application of the quota systems 3 which, due to the similarity between the sectors in the Council policy, followed a common philosophy in their initial conception and subsequent refinement. This report, within the limits already indicated above, addresses the production and budgetary consequences of the policy and the outcomes of the main Council provisions laid down in what has been a preliminary period of setting up the system. It is based on the information supplied to the Commission by Member States and any comments will be confined to those items on which data are available. 4 For the most part, the measures described only affected those Member States which were part of the Union before the CAP reform. However, where appropriate, new Member States will be included in the appraisal. In addition, a brief review of the detailed implementing rules, adopted by the Commission, is presented. effect on a producer's quotas was that those rights held above the 'headage limits' (on which the producer had been able to claim premium at half the full rate) were converted into full-rate rights at half the number. 3 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3567/92 for the sheep sector and Regulation (EEC) No 3886/92 for the beef sector. For example, since it is not a statutory requirement from Member States, the Commission is not in possession of any official data concerning aspects of quota trading such as the number of rights leased or the value of rights on the open market. II. a) THE NECESSARY CONTROL ON PRODUCTION AND COMMUNITY SPENDING Production Annex I shows the trends in sheepmeat and beef production in the 5 years prior to the 1992 Reform, and the evolution of those parameters subsequent to the introduction of the individual quota policy. It can be seen clearly that the quota policy has brought an effective stabilisation of Community sheepmeat production, at around 1. 15m tonnes/year, a result which would not have been achievable under the stabiliser mechanism operating previously for the same purpose. On the other hand, in the beef sector, the data do not show the same degree of curtailment in production. The Reform came into effect towards the end of a period with a downward trend in production (1991-1994). Production has now recovered again, and is set to continue upwardly because, although dairy cow numbers have fallen, there has been a sustained growth in the EU suckler cow herd in recent years (Annex II). This expansion in suckler cow numbers has occurred because, despite the introduction of individual quotas, there have been notable increases to the total number of premium rights fixed at the outset of the system, namely: i) ii) the increase in the total claims in 1992 witnessed in practically all Member States 5 who took the option available to them of fixing 1992 as the reference year (i. e. the same year as the introduction of the quotas themselves), as producers responded to the fact that premium rights were now in limited supply. The effect of this decision was tc raise premium claims by 1. 3 million, that is by 15%, in 1992 compared with 1991, in the Member States concerned, which added an equivalent number of rights to the EU total, and to create a situation where there was enough quota available across the Union to sustain an increase in suckler cow numbers of 9% between 1992 and 1995. the raising of the milk ceiling from 60. 000 to 120. 000 litres per holding in the mixed suckler/dairy cow enterprises responded to the request of certain Member States, made during the CAP Reform, to extend the quota scheme to medium-sized mixed herds. Acceptance of such holdings resulted in 821. 160 extra rights being created. Thus, the control ('maitrise') of production and expenditure that was expected from the introduction of individual producer limits for suckler cow premium can only begin to take effect once the EU suckler cow herd has approached the limit set by the total number of rights available (Annex ÎI). Given that around one million rights still remain unused and that the other support mechanisms which operate in the beef sector may allow producers to keep more stock than they have quota for, complete stabilization of the EU suckler cow herd, and the Community budget which supports it, is not likely to occur in the near future. 5 Only Greece did not choose 1992 as the reference year. b) Community expenditure The other principal objective of the introduction of individual limits in the ewe and suckler cow premium regimes was to control spending. In the sheep sector, this task was relatively straightforward: putting a limit to the potential number of ewes in the Community would limit total expenditure, save for those fluctuations which arise due to changes in average Community market price, a parameter used in the calculation of the annual ewe premium. Annex III shows that the quota regime has indeed had the desirable result of constraining spending in ewe premium to around 1. 700 MECU. For the beef sector, the introduction of individual quotas for suckler cow premium was part of an overall reform which brought a reduction in market price support measures (intervention), compensated by increases in the level of premiums and a revised export refund policy. Therefore, Annex III shows that expenditure in suckler cow premium has increased substantially in the past 15 years. The increase in the cost of the suckler cow premium regime is partly due to the increase in the level of the premium 6 and partly due to the increases in the number of rights available, in line with the argument on cow numbers already given, but expenditure could be expected, from current information, to stabilise at a maximum of 1. 800 MECU per year once the unused and additional rights mentioned in section (i) above have been taken up. III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COUNCIL'S IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS WHICH FALL UNDER MEMBER STATE COMPETENCE Within the Council's implementing rules, certain decisions concerning the application of the producer limits were delegated to Member States. This measure of flexibility operated in live main areas: a) The reference year and the initial allocation of rights. The reference year chosen in each Member State may be found in Annex IV for the sheep sector (for the most part, 1991) and Annex V for the beef sector, where 1992 was most generally adopted. In addition, Annex IV shows for the sheep sector a 'coefficient' calculated for those Member States where the total number of ewes decreased between 1989 and 1991 and where this coefficient was used to calculate an extra number of rights to be added to the individual limit of each producer. This was the case in Spain, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. The suckler cow premium was programmed in 1992 to rise from 70 ECU in 1993, 90 ECU in 1994 and to 120 ECU per head in 1995. Resulting from these calculations, Annex VII for the sheep sector, and Annex VIII for the beef sector, show the potential, or sum total, of premium rights available in each Member State for allocation to individual producers upon the introduction of the quota system. The figures presented have been verified for the sheep sector 7 by the Commission on the basis of the reference year chosen by each Member State. The figures for suckler cow premium rights await the Commission's approval. The potential rights for the new Member States are also included, these totals having been agreed upon Accession and incorporated into each sector's base regulation. Aside from the problem mentioned above concerning premium claims in 1992 in the beef sector and the notable administrative effort required in the exercise, no particular difficulties were encountered with this measure in most Member States. In general, the provisions made for producers who had not made claims or who had been penalised in the reference year were successful in their implementation because they permitted Member States to deal equitably with those hardship cases which arose. However, in the sheep sector, Italy and Greece did express to Council the problems which they had experienced in fixing individual limits amongst producers who, for various reasons, had underclaimed in the reference year and were not covered by the existing provisions. Consequently, in 1995, Council agreed that, subject to verification by the Commission,8 Italy and Greece should be allowed to distribute up to 600. 000 additional rights from the national reserve to accommodate those producers who had not received their correct initial quota. b) The initial national reserves. Annexes IV, V and VI again show the approach taken by each Member State, within the limits of the Council legislation, for the setting up of the initial national reserves in both sectors. While globally the measures taken supplied the national reserve in each Member State with 1 to 3% of the total sum of the individual limits, the tables illustrate that the percentage of rights forfeited in relation to the size of the individual producer limit varied appreciably. Annexes VII and VIII illustrate the numbers of rights which were available to establish the national reserves, including the extra rights resulting from the additional 1% LFA reserve. In this respect, it must be noted that, from the outset, the national reserves in the different Member States have been under varying pressure from the demand of producers. The limited United Kingdom national reserves, in both sectors, originally set at 1% of the total rights, have particularly high demand and considerable administrative difficulties have been experienced in satisfying applications from producers. On the other hand, the Netherlands, after fixing a relatively high percentage forfeit of rights to the national reserve (3%) under circumstances of low suckler cow premium demand, had to refix the forfeit at 1% and subsequently return the surplus rights to producers. Final verification still awaited for the figure for Germany and Italy (Sipjly). In the verification carried out in April 1996, the Commission agreed to an increase to the national reserves in Italy and Greece by 600. 000 rights. c) The system of quota transfers and leasing. In general terms, the operation of the system of quota transfer is uniform across the Community with most Member States opting for the direct producer-to-producer transfers while also permitting temporary leasing of rights. The two notable exceptions to this norm are to be found in France, which only allows direct transfers to occur between producers when the entire holding is also transferred, all other operations taking place as transfers from a producer to the national reserve and the Netherlands, where no temporary leasing is permitted. No insuperable problems in the operation of the transfer system have been experienced by Member States and producers appear to have adapted well to the obligations placed on them by the administrative procedures put in place to effect such transfers. The French authorities have registered the difficulties they have faced due to the extra effort and complications associated with the "administrative" system which they adopted. The Commission has responded to these requests with a series of adjustments to the detailed rules aimed at simplifying as far as possible the transfer procedures, 9 while at the same time avoiding an excessive divergence between the two systems. The level at which the 'syphon' is applied in each Member State may be seen, in Annexes IV, V and VI to vary between the 1% operating in the Netherlands to the 15% applied in the majority of Member States. In this respect, the 'syphon' has proven itself to be an acceptable and workable policy instrument for supplying a certain number of right to the national reserve which may be redistributed to priority groups by the Member States (see below). d) Management of the national reserves. In numerical terms, the supply of rights to the national reserve by the 'syphon' may be seen in Annexes X-XIII, which show the functioning of the national reserves in both sectors for 1993 and 1994. The data for 1995 have only been supplied by a few Member States. Although the 'syphon' was rather insignificant in the first year of the operation of the national reserves, in comparison with the initial number of rights, in 1994 it contributed around a third of the rights available from the national reserve to sheep producers each year, upon request to the national authorities. In the beef sector, the contribution of rights from the 'syphon' to the national reserve remains at a lower level (4% in 1994), though it makes an important contribution to the rights available in the national reserves in Belgium and Portugal. The relatively minor rôle of the 'syphon' is probably a reflection of the smaller number of transfers without holding which take place in the beef sector, in comparison to the sheep sector where transactions are, generally speaking, more mobile. The same tables (Annexes X-XIII) also illustrate the functioning of the national reserves in terms of the attribution of rights to producers. These measures, forming part of the 1994 Simplification Exercise of the CAP Reform, are described in Chapter IV below. In the sheep sector in 1993, over 90% of the initial reserve was allocated to producers though this percentage fell to around 38% in 1994, with Spain, Italy and the Netherlands having the lowest percentage allocations. Furthermore, the data in Annex XII suggest that, in 1994, several Member States (in particular Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland and Portugal) withdrew rights from producers as a result of transfers without holding (the 'syphon') and then 'recycled' those rights to other producers from the national reserve with respect to the same marketing year. In the beef sector, the demand on the initial national reserve was relatively low in 1993 (48%) but remained more constant the following year, a Community average of 53% of the rights being attributed to producers in 1994. Furthermore, an analysis of the data with respect to the 1994 calendar year indicate that the practice of 'recycling' rights is much less widespread in the beef sector than the sheep sector: only Belgium attributed to producers all the rights which were available in its 1994 national reserve. At the other end of the spectrum, Spain did not attribute any rights from the national reserve in 1994 because ofdifllcultics in making a fair allocation of rights which would satisfy the extremely high demand. In general terms, the management of the national reserves has not posed unsurmountable complications for national administrations, given the important extent to which decision-making was delegated to Member States in this area. However, in the United Kingdom, there has been a significant problem with some producers in both sectors of the so-called 'developers' priority category who, owing to the insufficient number of rights available in the 1993 national reserve, were not initially allocated all the rights they requested. Following a judgment in a national court, the UK authorities decided to reallocate part of the national reserve for this category of producers which has caused a delay in closing definitively the allocation exercise for 1993 and subsequent years. e) Sensitive Zones A further measure within the competence of Member States is illustrated in Annexes IV, V and VI which indicate the zones designated as particularly important for sheep and beef production and, therefore, out of which premium rights may not be transferred. This designation has been more colloquially known as 'ring-fencing'. Most Member States have 'ring-fenced' the LFA's of their territory, a decision which is coherent with their policy priorities for such areas. The two notable exceptions to this norm are found in France and the United Kingdom. Firstly, the French authorities have nominated the entire French territory a Sensitive Zone. Secondly, the United Kingdom authorities have divided their whole territory into seven Sensitive Zones, based on regional and LFA criteria. The only other exceptions are Belgium, divided for these purposes into two zones according to land classification, and Germany which specified the dykelands, as well as the LFA's of its territory, as a Sensitive Zone. The designation of these Sensitive Zones has widespread acceptance from all interested parties and the Commission has received no evidence, to date, to suppose that the measure, within the terms in which it was originally conceived, has been misused or misapplied. 10 However, some Member States have expressed their concern that within certain 'ring-fences' rights may be accumulating and having a negative impact of an environmental nature (see Evaluation below). 8 IV. THE FUNCTION OF THE COMMISSION'S DETAILED RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS The most pertinent rules in the Commission Regulations for applying individual producer limits in the sheep and beef sectors have the following basic structure: a) Individual limits In order to make the administration of the producer limits as workable as possible, for the ewe premium, only those producers with a minimum of 10 ewes were allocated an initial quota. In suckler cow premium, owing to the greater economic value of each animals, no lower limit was set. b) Usage rules Several rules were introduced in the regulations by which a producer would forfeit to the national reserve a certain proportion of his rights if he did not claim premium on those rights during determined periods. The aim of these rules was to increase the mobilization of rights by avoiding an excessive number of rights staying with producers who did not use themselves and, furthermore, did not choose to transfer or lease those rights to another producer. For this purpose, a general usage rule was defined whereby a producer, who has not made use of at least 50% of his rights during two consecutive years, would forfeit the part not used during the last year to the national reserve. Moreover, with the intention of deterring speculative acquisition of rights by producers who did not intend to use them immediately, a more stringent usage rule was placed on those producers who receive rights free of charge from the national reserve. At the outset of the quota system, if such a producer did not make use of all his rights during the three years following the receipt of rights from the national reserve, he would forfeit the part not used n. Furthermore, the same producer was not authorized to transfer or lease any rights during that three year period. The latest change to be made in the usage rules, which came into force in 1996 as part of the 1994 simplification exercise, unified these two rules into one, such that the minimum percentage usage has been raised to 70% each year. This measure aims to prompt producers to mobilize the rights which they could retain under the existing, relatively lenient, general usage rule. On the other hand, such a simplification of the rules was justified because the risk posed by speculative requests for rights from the national reserve had not been fulfilled. 1 ' A couple of years into the system, it became evident that producers who had received rights from the national reserve and, in the extreme case a small number, were under an excessively heavy obligation in having to use all the rights they owned during the following three years: even natural fluctuations in flock size could cause them to have to surrender part of their rights. Therefore, it was decided to relax the rule to an average usage of 90% over the same three year period. This relaxation was subsequently taken further in 1996 by the introduction of a single usage rule (70% every year). c) The transfer and leasing mechanisms For clarity and ease in the operation, the Commission legislation introduced a minimum to the number of rights which may be transferred or leased n at any one time, with both parlies involved having an obligation to notify the competent authorities of the transfer within a deadline, two months before the premium claim was made. However, once the transfer system was set up and running, Member States became aware that simplification in some of the associated procedures was necessary, particularly in France where the 'administrative' system is operated. In time for the 1995 premium claims, the minimum number of rights involved in a transfer without holding were simplified by rewording the previous formula which was based on percentages of the producer's quota. At the same time, the deadline for notification of a transfer was redefined so as to allow producers to notify the authorities up until the day on which they made their premium claim. It therefore gives producers and administrations more time to organize and to process transfers and reduces the confusion between the deadline for transfer notification and the deadline for premium claim which had arisen amongst producers. However, where the Commission legislation provided the most significant concessions to the rules on transfers has been on the opening of second trading periods in both sectors in both 1993 and 1994 '\ These derogations were justified because of transitional problems at the outset of the regime, in particular, producers across the whole Community experienced appreciable difficulty in trading quota or acquiring from the national rights sufficient rights to cover their premium claims within the deadlines originally set. Finally, as an example taken from the sheep sector, the various deadlines for applications and notifications which have resulted from the application of the Commission rules in each Member State, are summarized in Annex XIV for the 1995 marketing year. 12 In order to avoid a producer holding onto rights by leasing them out to another producer for an unlimited length of time, a rule was instituted which obliges producers to use all their rights during at least two consecutive years over a five-year period. Since this rule means that producers could lease out rights from the beginning of the quota system in 1993 for three years, 1996 is, in effect, the first year of its application. A second trading period was admitted for 1995 and 1996 but does not apply to all Member States: only Italy and Greece were given this provision to assist in the allocation of the 600. 000 extra ewe rights conceded by Council Regulation (EC) No 1265/95 and the UK may open a second period for 1995 in both sectors (and for 1996 in sheep) in order to accommodate those producers affected by delays in the distribution of the 1993 national reserve. 10 V. EVALUATION OF THE QUOTA REGIMES AND CONCLUDING REMARKS At what is still a relatively early stage in the implementation of the policy of individual producer limits in the ewe and suckler cow premium schemes, the Commission has a number of comments to make on the development of the regime and the progress made so far. a) i) ii) Controlling production and spending The most important consequence of introducing producer quotas for ewe premium has been the control effected on sheepmeat production and Community expenditure in the sector. In the beef sector, for the reasons indicated above, the same degree of control in production and expenditure has manifestly not been attained. b) National reserves and their management iii) The lighter pressure on the beef national reserves than on the sheep reserves, in the first two years of the operation, is consistent with the Commission's concern that, even before the BSE crisis, the current state of the suckler cow premium quotas is failing to exert the necessary control on production. The most important reasons why the beef national reserves are not under pressure is that most Member States adopted 1992 as the reference year for suckler cow quota, which meant that herd sizes did not evolve substantially by 1993 and that most producers had sufficient rights in 1993 based on their 1992 claim. Secondly, the obligations for quota usage placed on producers who receive rights from the national reserve and the introduction of the density factor in suckler cow eligibility may have dissuaded producers initially from applying. However, since census data show that suckler cow numbers arc increasing across the Union, information on the development of the national reserves in 1995, not yet made available to the Commission by all Member States, will be particularly indicative of the current state of the quota policy across the Union. iv) With regard to the management of the national reserves, in general terms, the system can be said to operate well. However, the data available to the Commission suggest that, particularly in the sheep sector, there is some divergence in the criteria for attribution of rights in that some Member States are operating a 'recycling' of rights, i. e. withdrawal and reallocation of rights to other producers in the same year while others are not. The reasons for this difference may be that in some Member States there is a known lack of demand from producers for rights and recycling would presumably not be necessary while other Member States may have chosen administrative procedures which result in the 'recycling' of rights being made in the year following withdrawal. v) For reasons of controlling production and reducing quota speculation, the Commission wishes to comment that, in its opinion, 'recycling' of rights can encourage inflated applications for premiums 14. The Commission recognizes that the current Council legislation In effect, with this approach, the number of rights to 'recycle' wiil only be known after the end of the application period for premium. Producers must therefore make their premium claim without knowing to what extent the Member State can meet their request for supplementary rights free from the national reserve. Certain U leaves the management of the national reserves largely in the hands of the Member States and that there are no provisions covering deadlines for the distribution of the national reserves. However, the Commission invites Member States to take the necessary implementing measures in order to distribute the national reserve before the end of the application period for premium, that is, before the end of the transfer and leasing period. c) Systems of quota transfer vi) vii) Notwithstanding the comments made above with reference to national reserves, the Commission draws Council's attention to the fact that the second trading periods, justifiably conceded to Member States in the past, are related to this issue in that they permitted producers to optimize, in effect, their quota usage in 1993 and 1994. Consequently, the Commission announces that, from now on, it will take a far harder line against second that the initial problems experienced by producers and trading periods, confident administrations with the setting up of the quota regime are now overcome. Concerning the national systems for the transfer of rights, the Commission emphasizes that major efforts have been made to accommodate the requests of Member States for more llexible transfer procedures but that measures which would lead to too great a divergence between the 'commercial' system and the 'administrative' system, have been refused. For this reason, the Commission has not been prepared to admit leasing of rights through the national reserve since, under the 'administrative' system, this would mean that individual quotas would tend to operate as regional ceilings, with all the inconveniences in terms of control ("maitrise") of production that such ceilings incur. viii) In relation to the same question of national systems for transfers, the Commission notes the fact that the low monetary value attributed to rights by the French administration is causing producers to retain unused rights. The Commission hopes that the changes made to the usage rules from 1996 onwards will help alleviate the problem of low quota availability. d) Sensitive Zones ix) x) The Commission reaffirms that the direct consequence of 'ring-fencing' of premium rights is to limit the transfer of rights within a Member State. However, the Commission remarks that, due to the different criteria which have been used to establish Sensitive /ones in each Member State, a practical consequence of this provision is that rights may not be transferred between all zones or all Member States of the Union. The Commission is aware that, in certain instances, it has been suggested that the 'ring- fencing' of quota within a Member State is beginning to exert a negative impact on the rural environment, by accumulating rights within their boundaries, which is an undesirable consequence of this provision. Therefore, the Commission draws Member States' attention to this topic, with a view to finding a better balance between the socio-economic objectives of this provision and certain objective criteria of environmental protection. producers, in the hope of receiving the supplementary rights they have requested, will tend to inflate their premium claim and therefore retain more animals than their individual quota. 12 e) Concluding remarks In view of the above evaluation, the Commission concludes that individual producer limits have so far been a successful policy tool for controlling production and expenditure in the sheep sector but not in the suckler cow segment of the beef sector. Therefore, given that changes in the ewe premium regime are not justified and that the whole beef regime is under review in the light of the current BSE crisis, the Commission considers that it is not an appropriate moment to make any proposals in respect of the quota regimes in either of the premium schemes. & ;t. j- 13 BEEF AND SHEEPMEAT PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION - EU15 (1986-1996) PRODUCTION ET CONSOMMATION DES VIANDES BOVINE ET OVINE - UE15 (1986-1996) ERZEUGUNG UND VERBRAUCH VON RIND- UND SCHAFFLEISCH - EUR15 (1986-1995) ANNEX 1900 4- 1800 4- 1700 4- 1600 4- 1500 g S E ¥ i4oo r 4- 1300 4- 1200 4-1100 m | JC CO • *— Beef Production • & • • Consumption —a—Sheepmeat Production 4-1000 --o--Consumption 900 Ko s: !. d* , Q" - - Q. •* a". ET -•' 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 9500 9000 8500-f 8000 4- c 7500 + c o % 7000 4- o m 6500 dr 6000 5500 4- 5000 1986 Source: DGVI SUCKLER AND DAIRY COW NUMBERS - EC12 (1989-1995) NOMBRES DE VACHES ALLAITANTES ET LAITIERES - CE12 (1989-1995) MUTTERKUH- UND MILCHKUHBESTANDE - EUR12 (1989-95) ANNEX II -*—Total cows -•— Dairy cows - - Potential rights -*•— Suckler cows 1996 35000 30000 4- Source: EUROSTAT 4500 4000 3500 4- 3000 + D U LU S 2500 2000 4- 1500 4- 1000 + 500 4- COMMUNITY EXPENDITURE IN EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM (1980-1995) DEPENSES COMMUNAUTAIRES POUR LES PRIMES A LA BREBIS ET A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE (1980-1995) GEMEINSCHAFTSAUSGABEN FUR MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERKUHPRAMIEN (1980-1995) ANNEX • Total Beef Sector Budget • Ewe and Goat Premium • Suckler Cow Premium Year ANNEX IV APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS FOR EWE PREMIUM - EC12 APPUCATION DE LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES POUR LA PRIME A LA BREBIS - CE12 ANWENDUNG DER ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHEN OBERGRENZEN MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE - EUR12 Belglque/BelgIS Danmark Deutschland Ellas Espafla France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nedertand Portugal United Kingdom 1991 1 1991 1 1991 1991 1990 1989 1991 1991 1991 1991 1989 1990 1 1 1,00239 1,02157. 1 1 1 1 1,06 1. 0116 no no no no yes partially no no no no partially partially Globally-1% < 33 rights • 0% > 33 rights «1. 5% < 13 right» « 0 rights 13-60 rights « 1 right >60rights«2rights • > 17 rights - 3% < 200 rights • 3% > 200 rights « 2% 2% 1% 10-100 rights « 0% 101-200 rights « 1% 201-300 rights - 2% 301-400 rights • 3% 501-1000 rights « 4% > 1000 rights «5% < 17 rights *0 > 3% 17 rights « 3S 3% 3% 1% 10% 10% 15% 15% 10% 15% 15% 15% 15% 1% 15% Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Via national reserve Between producers Between producers Via national reserve Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Not permitted Not permitted Between producers 15% • Between producers Between producers 2 zones None LFA's; dykes zone None LFA's The whole country I LFA's Not decided The whole country LFA's LFA's 7 zones covering the whole country Decision concerning a) Reference year b) Coefficient c) Supply of rights to National Reserve due to coefficient > 1 d) Percentage of rights retained for the initial National Reserve In relation to the size of the initial producer limit e) Percentage of rights !o be surrendered to National Reserve in case of transfer without holding ("syphon") f) Method of transfer of rights without holding g) Leasing of rights f) Definition of Sensitive Zones out of which rights may not be transferred SCVT~: Me"ibsr Steies APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS FOR SUCKLER COWS - EC12 APPLICATION DES LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES POUR LA PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - CE12 ANWENDUNG DER ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHEN OBERGRENZEN MUTTERKUHPRÂMIE - EUR12 Belglque/BelgiS Danmark Deutschland Ellas Espafla France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nederiand Portugal United Kingdom 1992 443. 588 1992 1992 1990 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 135. 937 651. 122 149. 778 1. 462. 527 3. 886. 366 1. 106. 528 787. 993 14. 765 98. 006 286. 554 1. 805. 323 ANNEX V 1% < 20 rights • 0 rights 20-49 rights «1 right > 49 rights • 2 rights 3% 2% 2% 3% 1% 3% 3% 1% 1% 1% 10% 10% 15% 5% 10% 15% 5-14% 15% 15% 1% 5% 15% Between producers Between producers Between producers DôtwBcn producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Via national reserve Between producers Between producers Via national reserve Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Not permitted Not permitted Between producers Between producers Between producers Whole country Whole country LFA's LFA's Decision concerning a) Reference year b) Potential rights c) Percentage of rights retained for the initial National Reserve in relation to the size of the initial producer limit 0 d) Percentage of rights to be surrendered to National Reserve in case of transfer without holding fsyphon") e) Method of transfer of rights without holding f) Leasing of rights g) Definition of Sensitive Zones out of whteh rights may not be transferred Sout»: Member States INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES - EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM 1 LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES DANS LES NOUVEAUX ETATS-MEMBRES - PRIME A LA BREBIS ET A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE 1 ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHE OBERGRENZEN IN DEN NEUEN MITGLIEDSTAATEN - MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERKUHPRAMIEN 1 Ewe Premium Suckler Cow Premium Ôsterreich Suomi/Finland Sverige Ôsterreich Suomi/Finland Sverige ANNEX VI d) Percentage of rights retained for the initial National Reserve in relation to the size of the initial producer limit e) Percentage of rights to be surrendered to National Reserve in case of transfer without holding ("syphon") Rights remaining after attribution of individual limits were sufficient 1% Rights remaining after attribution of individual limits were sufficient Rights remaining after attribution of individual limits were sufficient 1% Rights remaining after attribution of individual limits were sufficient 15% 10% 15% f) Method of transfer of rights without holding Between producers g) Leasing of rights Under discussion Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers 15% • Between producers i | Under discussion j ; i 10% 15% Between producers Between producers Between producers Between producers Under discussion LFA's The whole country Under discussion ! LFA's The whole country f) Definition of Sensitive Zones out of which rights may not be transferred 11nformation as received from Member States INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO EWE AND GOAT PREMIUM - EU151 DROITS INDIVIDUELS A LA PRIME A LA BREBIS ET A LA CHEVRE - UE15 1 INDIVIDUELLE ANSPRÛCHE AUF MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERZIEGENPRÂMIE * EUR151 ANNEX VII A Premiums paid in reference year B Extra LFA reserve C Additional rights D=A+B+C Total potential rights3 E Initial individual limits F Initial National Reserve G Rights available (1993 and 1994) H I « G - (H/2) Of which: at 50% Conversion to full rights (1995)3 0 0 8 78 161 64 36 68 0 0 23 128 566 1 1 9 1 8 31 54 0 0 30 14 109 70 104. 1. 330 10. 990 19. 665 7. 850 4. 959 9. 561 4 866 2. 742 20. 028 69 101 1. 344 9. 564 18. 195 7. 100 4. 755 7. 381 4 839 2. 541 18. 985 1 3 98 877 1. 468 742 208 1. 706 0 92 169 826 70 104 1. 442 10. 441 19. 663 7. 842 4. 963 9. 087 4 931 2. 710 19. 811 0,10 0,50 19,30 7,70 530,10 0,14 13,80 193,40 0,00 2,40 40,30 639,00 69,95 103,75 1. 432,35 11. 037,15 19. 397,95 7. 841,93 4. 956,10 9. 590,30 4,00 929,80 2. 689,85 19. 491,50 258 78. 169 70. 878 6. 190 77. 068 1446,74 77. 544,63 206 80 180 78. 635 i I i i Rights X 1000 Member State Belglque/BelglS Danmark Deutschland 4 Ellas Espafla France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nederiand Portugal United Kingdom Ewes Goats Total* 69 103 1. 313 6. 585 17. 004 7. 581 4. 869 7. 861 4 836 2. 229 19. 791 0 0 0 3. 726 2. 492 174 0 1. 032 0 0 476 0 69 103 1. 313 10. 311 19. 496 7. 755 4. 869 8. 893 4 836 2. 705 19. 791 Sub-total EC-12 68. 245 7. 900 76. 145 Ôsterreich * Suomi/Finland * Sverigeb Total EU-15 1 Based on information supplied by Member States 2 Verified by the Commission with exception of Deutschland and Italy (Sicily) 3 Including 600. 000 additional rights for Italy and Greece 4 Excluding New Lander 5 Art 5e(1) of Reg. 3013/89 INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO SUCKLER COW PREMIUM - EU15 (1) DROITS INDIVIDUELS A LA PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - UE15 INDIVIDUELLE ANSPRÛCHE AUF MUTTERKUHPRÂMIE - EUR15 ANNEX VIII A B C D E F Reference year total Additional rights (mixed herd)(3) Additional rights (non-payment) (4) Additions! fight* for oxtontfficstfon (*) Less favoured areas (Q1. %) (Addreserve) Total potential rights (A-E) O 1. Wtial Individual ceMngs (non-less favoured) H I J 2. Initial individual ceilings (less favoured) Additional rights sftocstod (ftibcod herd) (6) National initial reserve Total available rights (G+H+l+E) 403. 029 36. 080 3. 022 1. 457 443. 588 255. 495 145. 700 36. 080 4. 856 443. 588 Belgique/ Belgiê Danmark 121. 099 13. 320 1. 518 0 135. 937 134. 144 0 837 956 135. 937 Deutschland(2) Deutschland- NBL(7) 354. 931 111. 240 2. 674 2. 277 471. 122 119. 813 224. 174 31. 378 91. 207 468. 849 180. 000 180. 000 EHas (1990) 137. 775 10. 520 411 1. 072 149. 778 13. 353 107. 225 250 27. 878 149. 778 Esparla 1. 363. 610 84. 320 2. 462 12. 135 1. 462. 527 135. 475 1. 192. 906 9. 916 112. 095 1. 462. 527 France (8) 3. 616. 219 242. 480 3. 443 24. 224 3. 886. 366 1. 086. 431 2. 422. 477 242. 480 110. 754 3. 886. 366 Ireland 1. 024. 757 63. 400 10. 247 8. 124 1. 106. 528 212. 319 812. 438 18. 611 55. 036 1. 106. 528 Italia 690. 609 90. 160 2. 000 5. 224 787. 993 163. 097 506. 793 2. 968 107. 910 785. 992 Luxembourg 11. 648 3. 000 Nederland 67. 444 30. 560 0 0 117 14. 765 0 11. 592 2. 398 658 14. 765 2 98. 006 66. 587 183 6. 829 24. 405 98. 006 Portugal (9) 240. 099 17. 760 26. 741 1. 954 286. 554 23. 858 240. 875 517 20. 684 285. 934 UnHed Kingdom 1. 669. 538 118. 320 6. 382 11. 083 1. 805. 323 551. 639 1. 097. 217 11199 123. 776 1. 794. 914 TOTAL 9. 700. 758 821. 160 58. 900 67. 669 10. 828. 487 2. 762. 211 6. 761. 580 363. 463 - 680. 215 10. 813. 184 1 ) Except for those In column B, ad figures are provisionat; figures are besed on Information supplied by Member States (TO BE VERIFIED BY THE COMMISSION). 2) Former Lander only. 3) Regulation (EEC) 805/68, ArUd(6) and Annex II. 4) R (EEC) 805/68, Art. 4d(3) and R. (EEC) 3886/92. Art. 29. 5) Regulation (EEC) 3888/92, Art. 38(3). Estimated figures (in the case of FR •/-15. 000). 6) R. (EEC) 3886/92, Art. 29. 7) Not including rights resulting from the former German Lander switch. Régulation (EEC) 805/68 Art 4k(1 Xb). 8) Not including add'itional rights destined to DOM (fewer than 35. 000 rights). Regulation (EEC) 3763/91 Art. 5(3) as amended by R. (EC) 2598/95. 9) Not Including up to 78. 740 rights for extensive livestock after collectivisation. Regulation (EC) 1017/94 Art. 2 as amended by R. (EC) 1461/95. I I ANNEX IX EVOLUTION IN EWE A ND SUCKLER C OW PREMIA GRANTED - (1992-1995) EVOLUTION DES PRIMES OCTROYEES A LA BREBIS ET A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - (1992-1995) ENTWICKLUNG DER GEWAHRTEN MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERKUHPRAMIEN - (1992-1995) Premfa x 1000 EWE AND GOAT PREMIA GRANTED SUCKLER COW PREMIA GRANTED Member State Potential Rights1 1992 1993 1994 1995* MS Potential Rights2 1992 1993 1994 1995* Belglque/BelgiS Danmark Deutschland Ettas Espafta France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nedorland Portugal United Kingdom fs. L 70 104 1. 330 10. 990 19. 665 7. 850 4. 959 9. 561 4 866 2. 742 20. 028 70 • * 106 1. 876 10. 972 19. 788 7. 393 5. 024 9. 737 4 854 2. 652 19. 543 69 85 1. 742 9. 640 17. 818 7. 292 4. 825 9. 541 4 735 2. 675 18. 526 • * « • • * 64 81 1. 721 11. 974 17. 009 7. 306 4. 656 10. 652 3 715 2. 840 20. 416 * • » * • • • * * 64 72 1. 753 11. 974 19. 232 7. 237 4. 674 11. 365 4 727 2. 695 20. 077 BE DK DE EL ES FR IR IT LX NL PT UK AAA 136 651 150 1. 463 3. 886 1. 107 788 15 98 287 1. 805 403 121 447* 132 1. 364 3. 616 1. 025 691 12 67 240 1. 670 435 102 413 126 1. 243 3. 603 884 674 13 50 226 1. 558 424 104 506 117 1. 171 3. 492 910 807 13 52 238 1. 552 427 101 535 120 1. 380 3. 600 955 783 15 60 286 1. 591 Subtotal EC-12 78. 169 78. 019 • 72. 952 • 77. 437 • 79. 874 EC-12 10. 830 9. 788 9. 327 9. 386 9. 853 ôsterreich Suoml/Flnland Sverige 206 80 180 160 64 152 OST SU SV 325 55 155 m Total EU-15 78. 635 80. 250 EU-15 11. 365 267 26 127 10. 273 4 information provided by Member States (figures in italics are provisional or estimated daim data) 1 From Annex VI 2 From Annex VII OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1993 - EWE PREMIUM FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1993 - PRIME A LA BREBIS BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATLICHEN RESERVEN 1993 - MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE ANNEX X (a) Transfers w/o holding Rights ceded to National Reserve due to (b) Insufficient usage (c) Total I Rights attributed free of charge from NR Of which: rights from supplementary LFA reserve* Balance of National Reserve (end 1993) Member State Initial National Reserve to Belglque/Belglô Danmark Deutschland Ellas Espafta France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nederland Portugal United Kingdom » 801 2. 576 98. 730 876. 775 1. 425. 329 742. 061 204. 581 1. 533. 633 444 58. 091 166. 065 815. 137 TOTAL EU-12 5. 924. 223 117. 293 192 1. 247 10. 264 17. 760 46. 076 0 6. 981 2. 647 0 0 4. 545 27. 581 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 192 1. 247 10. 264 17. 760 46. 076 0 6. 981 2. 647 0 0 4. 545 27. 581 972 2. 290 88. 948 817. 956 1. 462. 625 662. 958 188. 464 1. 404. 482 390 27. 614 169. 132 782. 137 99 0 6. 650 78. 597 152. 632 36. 513 25. 222 390 0 127. 940 - - 21 1. 533 20. 046 76. 579 8. 780 79. 103 23. 098 131. 798 54 30. 477 1. 478 60. 581 117. 293 5. 607. 968 428. 043 433. 548 1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 5 (2) of Reg. 3567/92 2 Derived from Art 5c of Reg. 3013/89 3 Figures liable to change as a resuit of reassessment of national reserve attribution OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1993 - SUCKLER COW PREMIUM FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1993 - PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATUCHEN RESERVEN 1993 - MUTTERKUHPRÂMIE ANNEX XI Member State Initial National Reserve Belglque/BelgIS Danmark Deutschland4 Ellas Espafla France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nederland Portugal United Kingdom* 6. 313 956 93. 484 28. 950 124. 230 134. 978 63. 160 113. 134 775 24. 407 20. 684 134. 859 TOTAL EU-12 745. 930 Of which: LFA Reserve - 1. 457 2. 277 1. 072 12. 135 24. 224 8. 124 5. 224 775 2 1. 954 11. 083 68. 327 Rights ceded to National Reserve due to (b) Insufficient usage' (a) Transfers w/o holding ("syphon") * (c) Total Rights attributed free of charge fromNR Of which: righto from LFA reserve* Balance of National Reserve (end 1993) Of which: rights from LFA reserve - - - - - 376 1. 389 379 708 550 144 1. 943 5. 489 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - 376 1. 389 379 708 550 144 1. 943 5. 489 6629 1. 372 38. 763 25. 646 74. 651 58. 925 20. 557 54. 777 172 7. 933 20. 308 50. 127 359. 850 - - - - 1457 480 1. 072^ 12. 135 43. 325 172 1954 16. 807 77. 402 60 973 55. 100 3. 304 50. 287 76. 053 43. 153 58. 357 603 16. 474 520 66. 675 - - - - - - - 1. 797,50 8. 124,00 5. 224,00 602,80 2,00 391. 559 ^_ 15. 750,30. 1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 30 (2) of Reg. 3886/92 2 Derived from Art 4e (1) of Reg. 805/68 3 Art 33 of Reg. 3886/92 4 Former Lander only 5 Figures liable to change follwoing reassessment of attribution OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1994 - EWE PREMIUM 1 FONCTIONNEMENT DE RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1994 - PRIME A LA BREBIS 1 BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATLICHEN RESERVEN 1994 - MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE 1 ANNEX XII Balance of Rights ceded to National Reserve due to Rights attributed Of which: rights Balance of Member State National Reserve (end 1993) (a) Transfers w/o (b) Insufficient holding ("syphon") usage Belgique/Belglë l\i Danmark Deutschland Ellas Espafta France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nederland Portugal United Kingdom * 21 1. 533 20. 046 76. 579 8. 780 79. 103 23. 098 131. 798 54 30. 477 1. 478 60. 581 223 10. 199J 7. 594 18. 784 86. 589 37. 126 14. 751 7. 444 1. 025 2. 858 27. 184 - TOTAL EU-12 433. 548 213. 777 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 (c) Total free of charge from LFA National Reserve from NR reserve* (end 1994) ^ 244 7. 682 25. 758 91. 102 6. 297 41. 721 34. 741 0 3. 574 4. 308 27. 184 223 10. 199 7. 594 18. 784 86. 589 37. 126 14. 751 7. 444 - - - 1. 025 2. 858 27. 184 0 0 1. 308 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 4. 050 1. 882 4. 261 89. 072 74. 508 3. 108 139. 242 - 27. 928 28 60. 581 213. 777 242. 611 1. 308' 404. 660 1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 5 (2) of Reg. 3567/92 2 Derived from Art, 5c of Reg. 3013/89 3 Figures liable to change following reassessment of the national reserve attribution OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1994 - SUCKLER COW PREMIUM 1 FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1994 - PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE1 BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATLICHEN RESERVEN 1994 - MUTTERKUHPRAMIE 1 ANNEX XIII Member State Initial National Reserve Belgique/Belgl5 Danmark Deutschland4 Ellas Espafta France Ireland Italia Luxemburg Nederland Portugal United Kingdom ' N Of which: LFA Reserve 0,00 0,00 1. 797,50 - • - - 0,00 602,80 2,00 0,00 0,00 60,00 973,00 55. 100,20 3. 304,20 50. 287,00 76. 053,00 43. 153,00 58. 357,00 602,80 16. 474,10 520,10 86. 675,00 I Rights ceded to National Reserve due to (•) (b) Insufficient Transfers w/o usage1 holding ("syphon") * (c) Total Rights attributed free of charge fromNR Of which: rights from LFA reserve* Balance of National Reserve (end 1993) Of which: rights from LFA reserve 995,00 58,00 996,60 83,60 1. 799,70 11. 326. 00 660,00 219,60 31,60 31,50 292,40 2. 339,00 0,00 375,00 0,00 385,20 0,00 0. 00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 995,00 433,00 996,60 468,80 1. 799,70 11. 326,00 660,00 219,60 31,60 31,50 292,40 2. 339,00 1. 055,00 822,00 47. 391,20 3. 165,00 0. 00 68. 997,00 19. 096,00 42. 480,00 529,80 55,30 489,60 32. 215. 00 1. 064,40 0,00 0,00 - - - - - - - - - 0,00 584,00 8. 705. 60 608,00 52. 086. 70 18. 382,00 24. 717,00 16. 096,60 104,60 16. 450,30 322,90 56. 799,00 - - - - - - - 1797. 5 8124 5224 602,8 2 TOTAL EU-12 391. 559,40 2. 402,30 18. 833,00 760,20 19. 593,20 216. 295,90 1. 064,40 194. 856,70 15. 750 1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 30 (2) of Reg. 3886/92 2 Derived from Art 4e (1) of Reg. 805/68 3 Art 33 of Reg. 3886/92 4 Former Lander only 5 Figure liable to change following reassessment of 1993 attribution CALENDAR FOR EWE PREMIUM APPLICATIONS IN 1995 - EU15 CALENDRIER POUR LES DEMANDES DE PRIME A LA BREBIS EN 1995 - UE15 ZEUPLAN FUR DIE BEANTRAGUNG DER MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE - EUR15 ANNEX XIV MEMBER STATE Deadlina for Parmanant Deadlina for Tamporary Pariod for Application for Deadline for attributing Period for Premium Retention Period Period for Application Tranafera(a) Leaalng (a) Right, from N Reserve rights from N reserve Application (b) (inclualve) for Fattened Lamb Premium Balglque/BalgIS 14 Oct 1994 14 Oct 1994 15 Dec-18 Jan 15 Dec 1994-16 Jan 1995 17 Jan-26 Apr 1995 15 Dec-16 Jan Danmark 31 Mar 1995 31 Mar 1995 31 Dec 1994 1 Mar 1995 1 - 31 Mar 1995 1 Apr - 9 Jul 1995 not applicable Deutschland 1 Jun - 31 Oct 1994 1 Jun - 31 Oct 1994 1-31 Jan 1994 none 1-31 Jan 1995 1 Feb-11 May 1995 Ellas Espafla Franca Ireland tV3 Italia 1 Feb 1995 1 Feb 1995 1 Dec 1994-15 Feb 1995 1 Doc 1994-15 Feb 1995 16 Feb-26 May 1995 1 Dec 1994-15 Feb 1995 31 Mar 1995 31 Mar 1995 before 31 Oct 1994 15 Jan 1995 1-31 Mar 1995 '1 Apr - 9 Jul 1995 1-31 Mar 1995 8 Jan 1995 31 Mar 1995 before 30 Nov 1994 6-31 Jan 1995 31 Jan-10 May 1995 6 - 31 Jan 1995 23 Jan 1995 23 Jan 1995 before 16 Dec 1994 31 Oct 1995 1) 3 -23 Jan 1995 1) 23 Jan - 2 May 1995 not applicable 2) 1-16 Mar 1995 (c) 2) 16 Mar-23 Jun 1995(c) 24 Mar 1995 24 Mar 1995 before 15 Feb 1995 16 Apr 1995 15 Feb-24 Mar 1995 25 Mar-2 Jul 1995 15 Feb-24 Mar Luxembourg 20 Jan 1995 20 Jan 1995 1 Feb-15 Feb 1995 15 Feb-25 May 1995 not applicable Nederiand Osterreich Portugal Suoml Sverige 14-DBC-94 not applicable 5 Dec-30 Dec 1994 20 Feb 1995 20 Feb -23 Mar 1995 23 Mar • 30 Jun 1995 not applicable not applicable not applicable not applicable not applicable 7 - 31 Jan 1995 1 Feb-11 May 1995 15 Dec 1994 15 Dec 1994 15 Jan-28 Feb 1995 7 Sep 1995 15 Jan-28 Feb 1995 1 Mar-8 Jun 19951 15 Jan -28 Feb 1995 not applicable not applicable not applicable not applicable 13-31 Mar 1995 1 Apr • 9 Jul 1995 not applicable 9 Mar 1995 9 Mar 1995 1 - 31 Jan 1995 20 Feb 1995 1 -31 Mar 1995 1 Apr-9 Jul 1995 1-30 Apr 1995 United Kingdom - 6B 20 Feb 1995 20 Feb 1995 1 Dec-31 Jan 1996 not yet known 1)15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 1)16 Dec 1994-25 Mar 1995 15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 2) 15 Jan-20 Feb 1995 2)21 Feb 1995-31 May 1995 •NI 20 Feb 1995 20 Feb 1995 1 Dec-31 Jan 1996 not yet known 1)15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 1)16 Dec 1994-25 Mar 1995 15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 2) 15 Feb-15 Mar 1995 2) 15 Mar 1995-23 Jun 1995 S'-'bser'çrts: s«or unta tha date of premium application; b=or up to 20 days later, with 1%/day reduction; c=second application period only for producers failing to receive rights from NR ISSN 0254-1475 COM(96) 430 final DOCUMENTS EN 03 Catalogue number : CB-CO-96-430-EN-C ISBN 92-78-08030-6 Office far Official Publications of the European Communities L-2985 Luxembourg 3o


title: Kommissionens forordning (EG) Nr. 1734/96 af 9. september 1996 om ændring af bilag I til Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2658/87 om told- og statistiknomenklaturen og den fælles toldtarif

eurovoc_concepts:
Combined Nomenclature
common customs tariff
customs regulations
enlargement of the Union
nomenclature
tariff nomenclature

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title: Entwurf für einen BESCHLUSS DES RATES zur Änderung des Beschlusses 91/116/EWG des Rates zur Einsetzung des Europäischen Beratenden Ausschusses für statistische Informationen im Wirtschafts- und Sozialbereich

eurovoc_concepts:
EU statistics
advisory committee (EU)
scientific research
socioeconomic conditions

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text: KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN Brüssel, den 09. 09. 1996 KOM(%) 439 cndg. 96/0223 (CNS) Entwurf für einen BESCHLUSS DES RATES zur Änderung des Beschlusses 91/116/EWG des Rates zur Einsetzung des Europäischen Beratenden Ausschusses für statistische Informationen im Wirtschafts- und Sozialbercich (von der Koni mission vorgelegt) BEGRÜNDUNG Vorgeschlagene Änderungen des Beschlusses des Rates 91/116/EWG zur Einsetzung statistische Informationen im Wrrtschafts- und Sozialberëich des Europäischen Beratenden Ausschusses für Durch den Beschluß des Rates 91/116/EWG wurde der Europäische Beratende Ausschuß für statistische Informationen im Wirtschafts- und Sozialbereich eingesetzt. Diesem beratenden Ausschuß gehören Vertreter des wissenschaftlichen, des wirtschaftlichen und des sozialen Bereichs aus den Mitglied Staaten an. Die ist es, den Rat und die Kommission bei der Hauptaufgabe des Ausschusses Koordinierung der Zielsetzungen im Bereich der Politik der gemeinschaftlichen statistischen Information zu unterstützen. In Artikel 4 des genannten Beschlusses 91/116/EWG des Rates zur Einsetzung des europäischen Beratenden Ausschusses für statistische Informationen im Wirtschafts und Sozialbereich wird die Zahl der Ausschußmitglieder derart festgelegt, daß die genaue Zahl der vertretenden repräsentativen Persönlichkeiten aus den Mitglredstaaten angegeben wird. Aufgrund des Beitritts von Österreich, Finnland und Schweden muß die Anzahl der Ausschußmitglieder aus den Mitgliedstaaten angepaßt werden. Dies betrifft die Zahl der Präsidenten oder Leiter der nationalen statistischen Ämter (12) und die jeweils zwei Vertreter für jedem Mitgliedstaat, die vom Rat zu ernennen sind (24). Um diesen Beschluß des Rates flexibler zu machen und damit die Zahl der Ausschußmitglieder bei einem künftigen Beitritt neuer Mitgliedstaaten nicht eigens durch Änderungsvorschläge angpaßt werden muß, wird vorgeschlagen, in Artikel 4 die Erwähnung der genauen Zahl der Ausschußmitglieder zu streichen. B E S C H L U SS D ES R A T ES vom. 199. zur Änderung des Beschlusses 91/116/EWG des Rales zur Einsetzung des Europäischen Beratenden Ausschusses für statistische Informationen im Wirtschafts- und Sozialhcreich DER RAT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION gestützt auf den Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, gestützt auf den Vertrag über den Beitritt des Königreichs Norwegen, der Republik Österreich, der Republik Finnland und des Königreichs Schwedens1, insbesondere auf Artikel 169 dieses Vertrags, nach Kenntnisnahme des von der Kommission vorgelegten. Beschlusssentwurfs, nach Stellungnahme des Europäischen Parlaments, nach Stellungnahme des Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschusses, in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe: Artikel 4 des Beschlusses 91/116/EWG2 zur Einsetzung des Europäischen Beratenden Ausschusses für statistische Informationen im Wirtschafts- und Sozialbereichs gibt die genaue Zahl der Ausschußmitglieder an. Durch den Beitritt von Österreich, Finnland und Schweden muß die Zahl der Ausschußmitglieder entsprechend angepaßt werden. HAT FOLGENDE BESCHLUSS ERLASSEN: Einziger Artikel Artikel 4 des Beschlusses 91/116/EWG des Rates zur Einsetzung des Europäischen Beratenden Ausschusses im Wirtschafts- und Sozialbereich wird durch folgenden Wortlaut ersetzt: Informationen statistische für 1 2 ABl. Nr. C 241 vom 29. 8. 1994, S. 3. ABI. Nr. L 59 vom 6. 3. 1991, S. 21. Der Ausschuß setzt sich zusammen aus: vier Vertretern der Kommission, unter denen sich das für die Politik der statistischen Information verantwortliche Kommissionsmitglied befindet; dem Vorsitzenden des Ausschusses Zahlungsbilanzstatistiken; für die Währungs-, Finanz- und den Präsidenten oder Leitern der nationalen Mitgliedstaaten; statistischen Ämter der jeweils zwei Mitgliedern für jeden Mitgliedstaat, die vom Rat nach Konsultation mit der Kommission bestimmt werden und bei denen es sich um repräsentative Persönlichkeiten der verschiedenen wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Gruppen und der Wissenschaft handelt. Zur Ernennung dieser Mitglieder jeder Mitglicdstaat dem Rat eine Liste mit vier Kandidaten vor. Der Rat muß der tragen, den verschiedenen Gruppen aus dem Notwendigkeit Rechnung Wirtschafts- und Sozialbereich sowie dem Bereich der Wissenschaft eine angemessene Vertretung zu sichern. " legt Geschehen zu Brüssel am (Datum) Im Namen des Rates Der Präsident Finanzbogen BEZEICHNUNG DER MAONAHME Vorgeschlagene Änderung des Ratsbeschlusses 91/116/EWG zur Einsetzung des Europäischen Beratenden Ausschusses fiir statistische Informationen im Wirtschafts und Sozialbereich 2 HAUSHALTSLINIE(N) AO-2510 3 RECHTSGRUNDLAGE Beschluß 91/1. 16/EWG des Rates vom 25. Februar 1991 4 BESCHRED3UNG DER MAßNAHME 4. 1 Allgemeines Ziel der Maßnahme Aufgrund des Beitritts von Österreich, Finnland und Schweden wird der Bezug auf die Zahl der Mitglieder aus den Mitgliedstaaten hinsichtlich der Zahl der Präsidenten oder Leiter der nationalen statistischen Ämter (12) und der beiden vom Rat zu ernennenden Vertreter jedes Mitgliedstaats (24) hinfällig und muß daher aufgehoben werden. 4. 2 Dauer der Maßnahme und ggf. Bestimmungen über ihre Erneuerung oder Verlängerung Unbestimmt S 5 EINSTUFUNG DER AUSGABEN/EINNAIIMKN 5. 1 NOA 5. 2 NGM 5. 3 Betroffene Einnahmen: entfällt 6 ART DER AUSGABEN/EINNAHMEN — Sonstige: Erstattung von Reisekosten und Tagegeldern 7 FINANZIELLE AUSWIRKUNGEN Siehe Ziffer 10. 8 VORGESEHENE BETRUGSBEKÄMPFUNGSMAÖNAHMEN ERGEBNISSE) (UND GEGEBENENFALLS 9 ANGABEN ZUR KOSTEN-WIRKSAMKEITS-ANALYSE — Notwendige Integration der neuen Mitgliedstaaten 10 VERWALTUNGSAUSGABEN (EINZELPLAN III TEIL A »ES HAUSHALTSPLANS) Die notwendigen Verwaltungsmittel werden bereitgestellt gemäß der jährlichen Entscheidung der Kommission über die Mittelzuweisung, unter Berücksichtigung insbesondere des Personalbestands und der von der Haushaltsbehörde bewilligten Zusatzbeträge. c 10. 1 Auswirkungen auf die Zahl der Planstellen Keine 10. 2 Globale finanzielle Auswirkungen des zusätzlichen Personals Keine 10. 3 Zunahme sonstiger Verwaltungsausgaben aufgrund der Maßnahme Haushaltslinie (Nr. u. Bezeichnung) A0-2510 Insgesamt Beträge 1996 (ECU) Bcrcchnungsmclhodc Zusatzkosten (geschätzt) Vollsitzung (6 neue Mitglieder) - Unterausschüsse 8 Sitzungen pro Jahr (3 neue Mitglieder) - Büro 3 Sitzungen pro Jahr (2 neue Mitglieder) 5000 20000 5000 30000 Die jährlichen Ausgaben betragen 104 000 ECU und werden durch die vorhandenen Mittel gedeckt. } ISSN 0254-1467 KOM(96) 439 endg. DOKUMENTE DE 17 Ol 10 05 Katalognummer : CB-CO-96-445-DE-C ISBN 92-78-08647-9 Amt für amtliche Veröffentlichungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften L-2985 Luxemburg


title: REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 1748/96 DELLA COMMISSIONE del 9 settembre 1996 recante modifica del regolamento (CE) n. 1383/96 che indice una gara avente ad oggetto la restituzione all'esportazione o la tassa all'esportazione di frumento tenero verso Ceuta, Melilla ed alcuni paesi ACP

eurovoc_concepts:
ACP countries
Ceuta and Melilla
award of contract
common wheat
export refund
export tax


title: REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 1750/96 DELLA COMMISSIONE del 9 settembre 1996 recante fissazione dei valori forfettari all'importazione ai fini della determinazione del prezzo di entrata di alcuni ortofrutticoli

eurovoc_concepts:
citrus fruit
fruit vegetable
grape
import price
stone fruit


text: COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITÀ' EUROPEE à -it *ù* Bruxelles, 09. 09. 1996 COM(96) 439 def. 96/0223 (CNS) Progetto di DECISIONE DEL CONSIGLIO recante modifica della decisione del Consiglio 91/116/CEE che istituisce un comitato consultivo europeo dell'informazione statistica nei settori economico e sociale (presentata dalla Commissione) RELAZIONE Proposta di modifica della decisione del Consiglio 91/116/CEE che istituisce un comitato consultivo europeo dell'informazione statistica nei settori economico e sociale La decisione del Consiglio 91/116/CEE ha istituito il comitato consultivo europeo dell'informazione statistica nei settori economico e sociale, composto da esponenti del mondo scientifico, economico e sociale degli Stati membri. Compito principale del comitato è quello di aiutare il Consiglio e la Commissione a coordinare Hi obiettivi della politica comumlaria dell'infoi ma/ione statistica. L'articolo 4 della decisione del Consiglio 91/1 In/CLE, che istituisce un comitato consultivo europeo dell'informazione statistica nei settori economico e sociale, fissa il numero di membri del comitato, specificando il numero di rappresentanti provenienti dagli Stati membri. In seguito all'adesione di Austria, Finlandia e Svezia, si rende necessario eliminare le discrepanze relative al numero di membri degli Stati membri per quanto riguarda il numero di presidenti e direttori generali degli istituti nazionali di statistica (12) e i due rappresentanti per ciascuno Stato membro nominati dal Consiglio (24). Per rendere più flessibile la decisione del Consiglio, affinché le future adesioni di nuovi Stati membri non rendano necessario proporre nuove modifiche riguardo al numero di partecipanti del comitato, si suggerisce di radiare dall'articolo 4 il riferimento al numero esatto dei membri. DECISIONE DEL CONSIGLIO Del 199. recante modifica della decisione del Consiglio 91/116/CEE che istituisce un comitato consultivo europeo dell'informazione statistica nei settori economico e sociale. IL CONSIGLIO DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunità europea, visto il trattato. relativo all'adesione del Regno di Norvegia, della Repubblica d'Austria, del la. Repubblica di Finlandia e del Regno di Svezia1, in particolare l'articolo 169, visto il progetto di decisione presentato dalla Commissione, visto il parere del Parlamento europeo, visto il parere del Comitato economico e sociale, considerando che l'articolo 4 della decisione del Consiglio 91/116/CEE2, che istituisce un comitato consultivo europeo dell'informazione statistica nei settori economico e sociale, stabilisce il numero di membri che compongono il comitato; considerando che in seguito all'adesione di Austria, Finlandia e Svezia si rende necessario correggere opportunamente il numero di membri del comitato. DECIDE: Allietilo muco L'articolo 4 della decisione del Consiglio 91/116/CEE, che istituisce un comitato consultivo europeo dell'informazione statistica nei settori economico e sociale, è sostituito dal testo seguente: "Il comitato è così composto: quattro membri che rappresentano la Commissione, fra cui il membro della medesima competente per la politica dell'informazione statistica: il presidente del comitato delle statistiche monetarie, finanziarie e della bilancia dei pagamenti; c,\i n. e n. CU :M I d el 1, 4 9 do 1 6. 3. 1 9 9 1, 2<Ò. a. 1994 , p,. uj. 2 1. p a g. J 3 i presidenti o direttori generali degli istituti nazionali di statistica degli Stati membri; due rappresentanti per Stato membro designati dal Consiglio, previa consultazione della Commissione, tra personalità rappresentative delle diverse categorie economiche e sociali e del mondo scientifico. Ai fini della nomina di tali membri, ogni Stato trasmette al Consiglio un elenco comprendente quattro candidati. Il Consiglio deve tenere conto della necessità di garantire una rappresentanza adeguata delle differenti categorie economiche e sociali e del mondo scientifico. " Fatto a Bruxelles, addì Per il Consiglio Il Presidente V SCHEDA FINANZIARIA 1. DENOMINAZIONE DELL'AZIONE Emendamenti proposti per la decisione 91/116/CEE che istituisce un Comitato Consultivo europeo dell'informazione statistica in campo economico e sociale 2. LINEA DI BILANCIO AO-2510 3 BASE GIURIDICA Decisione del Consiglio n° 91/116/ŒE, del 25 febbraio 1991 4. DESCRIZIONE DELL'AZIONE 4. 1. Obiettivo generale dell'azione. In seguito all'adesione dell'Austria, della Finlandia e della Svezia, è necessario sopprimere il riferimento, ormai superato, al numero di membri nominati dagli Stati membri, e composto dai presidenti o dai direttori generali degli Istituti nazionali di Statistica (12), e ai due rappresentanti per ogni Stato, membro la cui nomina spetta al Consiglio (24). 4. 2. Periodo previsto per l'azione e modalità di rinnovo o proroga. A tempo indeterminato. 5. CLASSIFICAZIONE DELLE SPESE/ENTRATE 51 SNO 5. 2. SND 5. 3. Tipo di entrate previste: nessuno 6. NATURA DELLE SPESE Altre: Rimborsi deUe spese di viaggio ed indennità giornaliere 7. INCIDENZA FINANZIARIA Or. punto IO r 8. DISPOSIZIONI ANTIFRODE PREVISTE 9. ELEMENTI D'ANALISI COSTO-EFFICACIA — Esigenza di integrare i nuovi Stati membri. 10. SPESE AMMINISTRATIVE (PARTE A DELLA SEZIONE HI DEL BILANCIO GENERALE) Lo smobilizzo effettivo delle necessarie risorse amministrative risulterà dalla decisione annuale della Commissione sulla destinazione delle risorse, che tiene conto, in particolare, degli effettivi e degli importi supplementari eventualmente accordati dall'autorità di bilancio. 10. 1. Incidenza sul numero degli effettivi: nessuna. 10. 2. Incidenza finanziaria globale delle risorse umane supplementari: nessuna. 10. 3. Incremento di altre spese di funzionamento in conseguenza dell'azione Linea di bilancio (n° e denominazione) Importo 1996 (ECU) Modalità di calcolo A0 - 2510 Spese supplementari (stima): 5 000 Riunione plenaria (6 nuovi membri) 20 000 - Subcomitati; 8 riunioni all'anno (3 nuovi Stati membri) 5 000 - Consiglio direttivo; 3 riunioni all'anno (2 nuovi Stati membri) TOTALE 30 000 La spesa annuale totale ammonta a 104 000 ecu e saràcopcrta dalle risorse esistenti. G ISSN 0254-1505 COM(96) 439 def. DOCUMENTI IT 17 01 10 05 N. dì catalogo : CB-CO-96-445-IT-C ISBN 92-78-08651-7 Ufficio delle pubblicazioni ufficiali delle Comunità europee L-2985 Lussemburgo >


eurovoc_concepts:
Asia
EIB loan
Latin America
cooperation policy
use of aid

text: KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN Brüssel, den 09. 09. 1996 KOM(%) 429 endg. BERICHT DER KOMMISSION AN DEN RAT UND DAS EUROPÄISCHE PARLAMENT über die Vergabe und Inanspruchnahme von Darlehen der Europäischen Investitionsbank für Vorhaben von gemeinsamem Interesse in den Ländern Lateinamerikas und Asiens, mit denen die Gemeinschaft Kooperationsabkommen geschlossen hat (1995-1996) INHALT 1. Einführung 2. Rechtsrahmen 3. Einbeziehung der EIB-Aufgaben in Lateinamerika und Asien in die Operationen der Bank außerhalb der Gemeinschaft 4. Bilanz des dritten Tätigkeitsjahres 5. Allgemeine Erläuterungen zu den eingeleiteten Operationen und Bewertung der Ausführung des Mandats der Europäischen Investitionsbank in Lateinamerika und Asien Anhang 1 Lateinamerika und Asien: Verzeichnis der Länder, mit denen die Gemeinschaft Kooperationsabkommen geschlossen hat, sowie der Länder, Investitionsbank die ein Rahmenabkommen mit der Europäischen geschlossen haben Anhang 2 Übersicht über die Operationen der Europäischen Investitionsbank in Lateinamerika und Asien während des entsprechenden Mandats (23. 2. 1993 bis 22. 2. 1996) Anhang 3 Übersicht über die sektorale und geographische Verteilung der Finanzierungen Anhang 4 Übersicht über den Anteil der verschiedenen Finanzierungsquellen an den von der Europäischen Investitionsbank finanzierten Vorhaben. 1. Einführung Dieser Jahresbericht über die Aktivitäten der Europäischen Investitionsbank (EIB) in bestimmten Ländern Lateinamerikas und Asiens (ALA) wurde im Rahmen des Ratsbeschlusses 93/115/EWG vom 15. Februar 1993 (ABl. Nr. L 45 vom 23. 2. 1993) erstellt. Er bezieht sich auf das dritte und letzte Jahr dieses ersten ALA-Mandats der EIB und umfaßt den Zeitraum vom 23. 2. 1995 bis 22. 2. 1996. Der Bericht über das zweite Tätigkeitsjahr wurde dem Rat und dem Europäischen Parlament im Oktober 1995 übermittelt (vgl. KOM(95)507 endg. vom 30. 10. 1995). im dritten Jahr Der vorliegende Bericht vermittelt nicht nur Fakten über die eingeleiteten Operationen, sondern zieht auch eine Bilanz der den seit Beginn der entsprechenden EIB-Tätigkeit gewonnenen Erfahrungen. Diese Bilanz bezieht sich auf einen Gesamtbetrag von 750 Mio. ECU (gegenüber 500 Mio. ECU in den Jahren 1993 und 1994) fur 21 Projekte (gegenüber dreizehn 1993/94) in dreizehn verschiedenen Ländern (gegenüber zehn 1993/94). 2. Rechtsrahmen Der rechtliche und institutionelle Rahmen der EIB-Autgaben in Lateinamerika und Asien ist durch folgende Beschlüsse und Dokumente abgesteckt worden: - Beschluß des Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften vom 19. Mai 1992, mit dem die Bank zu Finanzierungen in den Ländern Lateinamerikas und Asiens aufgefordert wurde, die zum Zeitpunkt der Verabschiedung des Beschlusses Kooperationsabkommen mit der Gemeinschaft geschlossen hatten1. Diese Aufforderung erstreckt sich auf einen Zeitraum von drei Jahren und sieht einen jährlichen Betrag von 250 Mio. ECU vor. Ferner wird präzisiert, daß die Darlehen für Projekte von gegenseitigem Interesse vergeben werden sollen, die den üblichen Kriterien der Bank entsprechen. - Beschluß des Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften vom 15. Februar 1993 (Beschluß 93/115/EWG, ABl. vom 23. Februar 1993) über eine Garantie der Gemeinschaft für die in diesem Rahmen finanzierten Operationen. - Beschluß des Rates der Gouverneure der EIB vom 22. Februar 1993, mit dem die Bank ermächtigt wird, diese Operationen bis zu einem Betrag von insgesamt 250 Mio. ECU jährlich während eines Zeitraums von drei Jahren unter der Bedingung durchzufuhren, daß die Gemeinschaft die volle Garantie fiir die gewährten Darlehen übernimmt. 30 Länder erfüllen dieses Kriterium (17 in Lateinamerika, 13 in Asien). Ein Verzeichnis dieser Länder ist in Anhang l beigefügt. Seit dem Ratsbeschluß vom 19. 5. 1992 wurde außerdem ein Kooperationsabkommen mit Vietnam geschlossen. - Bürgschaftsvertrag zwischen der Gemeinschaft und der EIB, unterzeichnet am 4. und 17. November 1993. Dieses Dokument bezieht sich auf die oben erwähnten Texte und weist daraufhin, daß die Garantie fur einen Zeitraum von drei Jahren gilt, der am 23. Februar 1996 abläuft. Neben diesen Texten, die die Rechtsgrundlage fur die Tätigkeit der EIB bilden, schließt diese entsprechend der für andere geographische Regionen üblichen Praxis mit den Ländern, in denen sie tätig wird, ein "Rahmenabkommen", in dem der rechtliche, fiskalische und finanzielle Rahmen ihrer Operationen in den betreffenden Ländern festgelegt wird. 3 Einbeziehung der EIB-Aufgaben in Lateinamerika und Asien in die Operationen der Bank außerhalb der Gemeinschaft Mit den Aufgaben in Lateinamerika und Asien werden der Bank besondere Verpflichtungen zur Unterstützung der Kooperationspolitik der Gemeinschaft übertragen Die schon seit langem bestehenden Verbindungen mit den Ländern dieser Regionen führten dazu, daß die Gemeinschaft seit 1976 mit einigen dieser Länder eine Kooperationspolitik eingeleitet hat, die im Laufe der Jahre bis zu dem Beschluß von 1992 und 1993 über die EIB-Operationen zunehmend ausgeweitet wurde. Das Interesse der betreffenden Länder (ALA-Länder und Länder der Europäischen Union) sowie der europäischen Unternehmen und Wirtschaftsakteure an den Interventionen der Bank in Lateinamerika und Asien ist im dritten Jahr der Tätigkeit weiter gewachsen Die gewonnenen Erfahrungen bestätigen immer mehr, daß die Bank in diesen Regionen eine ergänzende Funktion übernehmen kann. Auch die internationale Finanzwelt betrachtet die EIB-Finanzierungen nach wie vor als eine nützliche Ergänzung ihrer eigenen Operationen Nach Ablauf ihres ersten dreijährigen Mandats hat sich die Bank somit als Geldgeber in den ALA-Ländern fest etabliert. Diese Aspekte werden in Absatz 5 näher ausgeführt 4 Bilanz des dritten Tätigkeitsiahres Im Laufe des dritten Tätigkeitsjahres, das am 22. Februar 1996 zu Ende ging, genehmigte der Verwaltungsrat der Bank die sieben in der nachstehenden Tabelle aufgeführten Finanzierungen im Gesamtumfang von 250 Mio. ECU. Außerdem wurde eine Finanzierung in Höhe von 12 Mio. ECU im Rahmen der im ersten Jahr erteilten Globalgenehmigung über 20 Mio. ECU durchgeführt. Eine detaillierte Übersicht über die bis zum Ende des dritten Jahres der EIB-Tätigkeit in den ALA-Ländern eingeleiteten und unterzeichneten Operationen ist als Anhang 2 angefügt. Land Sektor gebundener Betrag2 (in Mio. ECU) gegenseitiges Interesse Lateinamerika Argentinien Wasseraufbereitung 70 Müllbehandlung Kolumbien Verkehr Paraguay Wasseraufbereitung Asien China Energie Pakistan Energie (Pakistan" ) (Energie) Thailand Erdgasbeförderung 38 17 55 24 (12) 18 aus Union; Garantie der agcntinisch-curopäischcs Vorhaben zur Betreibung konzessionierter öffentlicher Dienstleistungen unter Beteiligung öffentlicher Vcrsorgungsuntcrnchmcn aus eines der Europäischen EU; Geschäftsbankenkonsortiums Verbesserung der Umwelt argentinisch-europäischer Darlehensnehmer; Kofinanzierung durch eine Entwicklugsbank aus der EU; Verbesserung der Umwelt; Transfer europäischer Technologie Konzcssionsvcrgabc an ein von EU-Unternehmen geführtes Konsortium; Beitrag regionalen Zusammenarbeit und Integration (erklärte Ziele des Kooperationsabkommens zwischen der EU und der Andengruppe) zur Verbesserung der Umwelt; Projektausarbeitung durch einen europäischen Berater Umweltschutz; Beteiligung europäischer Berater an der Projektvorbereitung; Konfinanzierung mit einem europäischen öffentlichen Unternehmen europäischer Technologie; Beteiligung große Beteiligung Transfer europäischer Berater; sehr europäischer Bauunternehmen (Joint Venture mit einem europäischen Unternehmen; Verbesserung der Umwelt; Vorbereitung durch europäische Berater Verbesserung der Umwelt durch Verwendung von Erdgas anstelle von Erdölerzeugnissen; Beitrag zu europäischer einem Sektor/Projekt mit Beteiligung im Bereich der Erdgaserschließung und - nutzung starker 22 Mio. ECU des am 31. 01. 95 vom EIB-Verwaltungsrat genehmigten Darlehens "Indonesien - Erdgasbeförderung und -Verteilung" wurden im dritten Jahr verbucht (vgl. Halbjahresbericht KOM(96)72 endg. der Kommission vom 1. 3. 96 an den Rat und das Europäische Parlament für den Zeitraum 23. 2. 95 bis 22. 8. 95). Dieses pakistanische Projekt privater Projektträger ist im Rahmen der im ersten Jahr erteilten Globalgenehmigung vorgesehen. 5. Allgemeine Erläuterungen zu den eingeleiteten Operationen und Bewertung der Ausführung des EIB-Mandats in den ALA-Ländern 5. 1 Wie im Vorjahr überstieg die Nachfrage die verfügbaren Mittel im dritten Jahr erheblich. Wie in den ersten beiden Jahren konnte daher der Jahreshöchstbetrag von 250 Mio. ECU gebunden werden. Vor allem aufgrund des hohen Mittelbedarfs der förderungswürdigen Länder, konnte der im Rahmen des Mandats vorgesehen Gesamtbetrag von 750 Mio. ECU vollständig gebunden werden (siehe Anhang 2). 5. 2 5. 3 Gemäß dem Mandat, das der EIB übertragen wurde, waren die finanzierten Projekte sowohl für die ALA-Länder als auch für die Europäische Union von Interesse. Die Finanzierungen des dritten Jahres, die diesem spezifischen Konzept des gegenseitigen Interesses entsprachen, erfüllten wie im Vorjahr ein oder mehrere der nachstehenden Kriterien: regionale Integration, Verbesserung der Umwelt, Transfer Joint Ventures zwischen europäischen und lokalen Unternehmen, Erteilung privater Konzessionen zur Durchführung und Betreibung von Investitionensprojekten, die den Charakter einer öffentlichen Dienstleistung haben, oder Vorbereitung der Projekte durch europäische Berater (siehe Ziff. 4). europäischer Technologie, Der interessanteste Aspekt ist die zunehmende Bedeutung von Projekten mit Beteiligung privater europäischer Partner: Im dritten Jahr stieg der Anteil der von der EIB genehmigten privaten Vorhaben auf 50 % (gegenüber 42 % im Jahr 1994 und 20% im Jahr 1993). Angesichts der bereits vorgeschlagenen Projekte, die im Rahmen des neuen Mandats vorgelegt werden könnten, könnte dieser Anteil noch wachsen. Eine solche Entwicklung ist von großer Bedeutung und stellt das ALA-Mandat in einen besonderen Zusammenhang. Sie zeigt in der Tat, daß: • • die EIB mit dieser Finanzierungsart europäischen Unternehmen bei Investitionen in den "Schwellenländern", denen die meisten ALA zuzurechnen sind, zur Seite stehen kann. Für diese Unternehmen sind die "Schwellenländer" Märkte, die erhebliche Wachstumschancen bieten. diese Art der Finanzierung von den besagten Unternehmen besonders geschätzt wird, da sie - nach wie vor im Rahmen des Marktes - von ihren Merkmalen her besonders gut auf die Finazierung von Projekten im Bereich privatisierter öffentlicher Dienstleistungen abgestimmt ist, die sich in diesen Regionen sehr rasch entwickeln und bei denen europäische Unternehmen sehr aktiv sind (Energie, Telekommunikation, Wasser etc. ). 5. 4 Der durchschnittliche Umfang der eingeleiteten Finanzierungen ist von 36 Mio. ECU im zweiten auf 33 Mio. ECU im dritten Jahr zurückgegangen4. Der durchschnittliche Umfang aller in den drei Jahren des ersten ALA-Mandats eingeleiteten Finanzierungen beträgt im Rahmen der Globalgenehmigung von 20 Mio. ECU finanzierten Operationen) 36 Mio. ECU bzw. (ohne die Darlehen im Rahmen der Globalgenehmigung) 38 Mio. ECU Durchschnittliche Darlehensbeträge dieser Größenordnung erlaubten zum einen eine gute geographische Verteilung des Gesamtbetrags von 750 Mio. ECU und entsprachen zum anderen dem Ziel der Bank, die Kosten ihrer Operationen auf einem vertretbaren Niveau zu halten. (einschließlich der 5. 5 Die sektorale Aufgliederung der Finanzierungen im dritten Jahr zeigt eine Konzentration auf den Energie- und Umweltsektor. Dies entspricht den Zielen der Kooperationsabkommen zwischen den ALA-Ländern und der Europäischen Union, in denen die besondere Bedeutung der Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Energie und Umweltschutz oftmals unterstrichen wird. Energie Verkehr Telekommunikation Umwelt Industrie 3. Jahr 48% 15% - 37% - (2. Jahr) (24%) (21%) (30%) (16%) (9%) Anhang 3 zeigt die sektorale Verteilung sämtlicher während des ersten ALA- Mandats gewährten Finanzierungen im Gesamtvolumen von 750 Mio. ECU. 5. 6 Im Hinblick auf die geographische Aufgliederung sorgte die Bank weiterhin für eine gerechte Verteilung zwischen den beiden Regionen wie auch zwischen den einzelnen Ländern. Die geographische Aufteilung zwischen den beiden Regionen hat sich im letzten Mandatsjahr kaum geändert: Lateinamerika: 52 % (57 %), Asien: 48 % (43 %). Drei der sieben im dritten Jahr eingeleiteten Operationen betreffen Länder, die in den Vorjahren noch keine EIB-Darlehen erhalten hatten (China, Kolumbien, Paraguay). Die Interventionen konzentrierten sich auf eine begrenzte Anzahl von Ländern5; Vorrang erhielten die Länder, bei denen die vorgeschlagene Finanzierungsart den Bedürfhissen der Darlehensnehmer am besten entspricht. Mit gewissem Vorrang wurden außerdem die Regionen bzw. Länder behandelt, die ihre Beziehungen zur Gemeinschaft verstärken (MERCOSUR, Chile, ASEAN, Südasien. ). Durchschnittliche Interventionen ohne Berücksichtigung der beiden Vorhaben, die im Rahmen der eher auf kleine und mittlere Investitionsvorhaben ausgerichteten Globalgenehmigung im Umfang von 20 Mio. ECU finanziert wurden. Die Bank wurde in den drei Jahren in 13 der theoretisch 30 förderungswürdigen Länder tätig (vgl. Anhänge 2 und 3). Eine Ausnahme bildet Mexiko; für dieses Land hatte der Verwaltungsrat die Finanzierung eines Vorhabens genehmigt Diese Genehmigung wurde zurückgezogen, als sich Mexiko entschied, das Projekt nicht weiter zu verfolgen. Anhang 3 zeigt die geographische Verteilung sämtlicher während des ersten ALA- Mandats gewährten Finanzierungen im Gesamtvolumen von 750 Mio. ECU 5 7 Die mit und multilateralen Zusammenarbeit bilateralen Finanzierungsinstituten in den ALA-Ländern ist nach wie vor ausgezeichnet Vier der sieben im dritten Jahr eingeleiteten Operationen werden von ein oder zwei multilateralen Finanzierungsinstituten (Asiatische Entwicklungsbank, Weltbank) oder mit einem bilateralen Finanzierungsinstitut kofinanziert (vgl. Anhang 2). Auf der Projektebene ergänzen sich die Maßnahmen der Bank und der anderen multilateralen Institute (öffentliche, aber auch private Projekte, bei denen sich diese Institute in zunehmendem Maße einschalten). Außerdem sind diese Institute eine wertvolle allgemeine, geographische und für sektorbezogene Studien. Informationsquelle Anhang 4 zeigt den Anteil der veschiedenen Finanzierungsquellen an den von der EIB finanzierten Projekten. 5. 8 5. 9 Die Zusammenarbeit der EIB mit dem europäischen Bankensektor - bei der Vergabe von Garantien oder direkten Kofinanzierungen - hat sich verstärkt. Die EIB und die europäischen Geschäftsbanken ergänzen sich insofern, als diese - vor allem im Hinblick auf Laufzeiten und tilgungsfreie Zeiten - kaum vergleichbare Mittel anbieten können wie die EIB. Durch die Verbindung mit ergänzenden Finanzinstrumenten ergibt sich eine interessante Kombination. Im Laufe des dritten Jahres wurden mit sechs Ländern (Bolivien, China, Kolumbien, Mexiko, Indonesien und Uruguay) neue Rahmenabkommen geschlossen, in denen zwischen dem betreffenden Staat und der EIB die für die Durchführung der Projekte im öffentlichen wie im privaten Sektor erforderlichen allgemeinen Rechtsgrundlagen festgelegt wurden. Ein vollständiges Verzeichnis der 16 Rahmenabkommen, die zu Ende des dritten Jahres unterzeichnet waren, findet sich in Anhang 1. LATEINAMERIKA UND ASIEN 1) Verzeichnis der Länder, die ein Kooperationsabkommen mit der Europäischen Gemeinschaft geschlossen haben. Inzwischen wurde ein weiteres Abkommen mit Vietnam unterzeichnet. Anhang 1 ASIEN LATEINAMERIKA ASEAN-Länder (Brunei, Indonesien, Malaysia, Philippinen, Singapur, Thailand) Bangladesch China Indien Macau Mongolei Pakistan Sri Lanka Anden-Gruppe (Bolivien, Kolumbien,Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela) Mittelamerikanische Länder (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador) Argentinien Brasilien Chile Mexiko Paraguay Uruguay 2) Verzeichnis der Länder, die ein Rahmenabkommen mit der EIB geschlossen haben (Stand: 22. Februar 1996) ASIEN China Indien Indonesien Pakistan Philippinen Thailand 6. 12. 95 17/25. 11. 93 20. 06. 95 25/28. 02. 94 15. 09. 94 10/17. 01. 94 LATEINAMERIKA Argentinien Brasilien Bolivien Chile Kolumbien Costa Rica Mexiko Paraguay Peru Uruguay 3. 10. 94 19. 12. 94 12. 10. 95 7. 10. 94 13. 03. 95 30. 11. 93 9. 03. 95 19. 09. 94 2. 10. 94 21. 04. 95 Über Rahmenabkommen mit Panama und Sri Lanka wird zur Zeit verhandelt. ÜBERSICHT ÜBER DIE EIB-FINANZIERUNGEN IN LATEINAMERIKA UND ASIEN vom 23. 2. 1993 bis zum 22. 2. 1996 (Ratsbeschluß 93/115/EWG) Anhang 2 1. LATEIN AMERIKA LAND PROJEKT BEZEICHNUNG SEKTOR ARGENTINIEN Route Mercosur Verkehr (öffentlich) BETRAG DES EIB-DARLEHENS (Mio. ECU) 45* PROJEKT GESAMTKOSTEN (Mio. ECU) 134 ANMERKUNGEN Kofinanzierung mit der Interameri kanischen Entwicklungsbank (TDB) Privates Projekt - konzessionierte öffentliche Dienstleistung Privates Projekt - konzessionierte öffentliche Dienstleistung Kofinanzierung durch ein europä isches Entwicklungsinstitut Kofinanzierung mit der Weltbank (IBRD) Privates Projekt - konzessionierte öffentliche Dienstleistung Garantien europäischer Banken Kofinanzierung mit IDB Kofinanzierung mit IBRD 46 70 6 40* 75 38* 44 17 152. 8 197 13 113 731 97 354 60 27 408 (54 %) 154 2005,8 Kofinanzierung mit IDB Gas natural Ban Aguas Argentinas AJLINCO BRASILIEN CESAN CHILE KOLUMBIEN COSTA RICA PARAGUAY PERU Lateinamerika INSGESAMT CTC-Compafiia de Teléfonos de Chile BOGOTA ICE Costa Rica Asuncion Sewerage Pan American Highway Noch nicht unterzeichnet Erdgasverteilung (privat) Wasseraufbereitung (privat) Müllbehandlung (privat) Sanierung (öffentlich) Telekommunikation (privat) Verkehr (privat) Energie (öffentlich) Abwasseraufbereitung (öffentlich) Verkehr (öffentlich) 10 2. ASIEN LAND PROJEKT BEZEICHNUNG SEKTOR CHINA Ping Hu Oil and Gas Development Energie (öffentlich) BETRAG DES EJJB-DARLEHENS (Mio. ECU) 55 PROJEKT GESAMTKOSTEN (Mio. ECU) 770,2 INDIEN INDONESIEN PAKISTAN Powergrid Gaz Transmission (Sumatra) CLIPAN KESC Ghazi-Barotha Hydropower Energie (öffentlich) Ergasbeförderung (öffentlich) Finanzsektor (privat) Energie (öffentlich) Energie (öffentlich) Sai Hydro Energie (privat) PHILIPPINEN Davao Airport DUCC Cement Verkehr (öffentlich) Industrie (privat) THAILAND Erawan Gaz Pipeline Erawan Parallel Gas Pipeline - Phase II Erdgasbeförderung (öffentlich) Erdgasbeförderung (öffentlich) ASIEN INSGESAMT GESAMTSUMME (Lateinamerika und Asien) Noch nicht unterzeichnet 11 55 46 8* 36 24 12* 25 23 40 18 342 (46 %) 750 (100 %) 173,8 474 480 1668,5 26 86 107,7 547,8 97,7 4431,7 6437,5 ANMERKUNGEN Kofinanzierung mit der Asiati schen Entwicklungsbank (ADB) und dem französischen Staat Kofinanzierung mit der EBRD Kofinanzierung mit der ÄDB Privates Projekt - Europäisch indonesisches Joint Venture Kofinanzierung mit der ADB Kofinanzierung mit EBRD, ADB und einem europäischen Entwicklungsinstitut Privates Projekt - Joint Venture mit einem europäischen Unternehmen Kofinanzierung mit ADB Privates Projekt - industrielles Joint Venture Kofinanzierung mit EBRD und ADB SEKTORALE UND GEOGRAPHISCHE AUFTEILUNG DER GESAMTFINANZIERUNGEN LAND Anzahl der Projekte SEKTOR Anhang 3 ! INSGESAMT (Mio. ECU) Energie Verkehr Telekomm Umwelt Industrie Finanzsektor • ARGENTINIEN BRASILIEN CHILE KOLUMBIEN COSTA RICA PARAGUAY PERU LATEIN AMERIKA INSGESAMT CHINA INDIEN INDONESIEN PAKISTAN PHILIPPINEN THAILAND ASIEN EVSGESAMT GESAMTSUMME 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 2 3 2 *> 11 21 76 40 17 133 75 75 46 44 90 55 55 46 72 58 286 45 38 27 110 25 25 23 23 8 8 376(50. 1%) 135 (18%) 75 (10%) 133 (17. 7%) 23(3. 1%) 8(1. 1%) 16" (22. 3%) : 40 (5. 3%) 1 "5 (10. 0%) ! 38 (5. 1%) j 44 (5. 8%) i 1" (2. 3%) ; 2^ (3. 6%) ; 408(54. 4%) 1 55 (7. 3%) ! 55 (7. 3%) i 54 (". 2%) | "2 (9. 6%) | 48 (6. 4%) | 58 (7. 8%) i i 342(45. 6%) ! "50(100%) i , L. 12 Anhang 4 ANTEIL DER VERSCHIEDENEN FINANZIERUNGSQUELLEN AN DEN VON DER EIB FINANZIERTEN PROJEKTEN EIB 750 11. 7% MULTILATERALE FINANZIERUNGSrNSTITUTE SONSTIGE1 (Mio. ECU) INSGESAMT IBRD 539 8. 4% IDB 377 5. 8% ADB 800 12. 4% 3 972 61. 7% 6 438 100% Staaten, öffentliche Einrichtungen und sonstige Finanzierungsquellen, einschließlich der Eigenmittel des Darlehensnehmers und/oder Projektträgers. 13 "ISSN 025^1467 KOM(96) 429 endg. DOKUMENTE DE 09 il Katalognummer : CB-CO-96-429-DE-C ISBN 92-78-08017-9 Amt fur amtliche Veröffentlichungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften L-2985 Luxemburg


title: Verordening (EG) nr. 1754/96 van de Commissie van 9 september 1996 betreffende het beëindigen van de visserij op kabeljauw door vissersvaartuigen die de vlag voeren van Portugal

eurovoc_concepts:
Portugal
fishing controls
fishing rights
ship's flag