title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 435/98 by Leonie van BLADEL to the Commission. Supporting European security policy by rebuilding the Yugoslav economy

text: C 304/104 FI Euroopan yhteiso¤jen virallinen lehti 2. 10. 98 (98/C 304/155) KIRJALLINEN KYSYMYS E-0435/98 komissiolle esitta¤ja¤(t): Leonie van Bladel (UPE) (24. helmikuuta 1998) Aihe: Euroopan turvallisuuspolitiikan tukeminen Jugoslavian liittotasavallan kansantaloutta elvytta¤ma¤lla¤ Katsooko komissio, etta¤ rauhan ja vakauden sa¤ilytta¤minen Balkanin niemimaalla kuuluu Euroopan turvallisuus- poliittisiin intresseihin, etta¤ Jugoslavian liittotasavallan rooli on ta¤ssa¤ tavalla tai toisella ta¤rkea¤ ja etta¤ vaikka Jugoslavian liittotasavaltaa ei hallitakaan demokraattisesti, sen johtajat eiva¤t ta¤ha¤n tehta¤va¤a¤n pysty, jos maan kansalaiset eiva¤t tue johtajiaan riitta¤va¤sti? Katsooko komissio, etta¤ Jugoslavian liittotasavallan jatkuva taloudellinen ja kaupallinen erista¤minen, jota kansainva¤linen yhteiso¤ on ylla¤pita¤nyt jo pitka¤a¤n, yhdistettyna¤ maan kansantalouden huonoon hoitoon johtaa ka¤yta¤nno¤ssa¤ (cid:148)kurjistamispolitiikkaan(cid:148), josta kansainva¤linen yhteiso¤ on Jugoslavian liittotasavallan kansalaisten mielesta¤ suureksi osaksi vastuussa, ja etta¤ ta¤sta¤ syysta¤ Euroopan toivoma politiikka ei saa tarpeeksi laajaa tukea eika¤ viranomaisilla na¤ista¤ sisa¤poliittisista syista¤ ole kuin rajoitettu toimintamahdollisuus? Onko komissio edella¤ mainitun perusteella valmis vaatimaan tarvittavaa investointipa¤a¤omaa ja tarvittaessa myo¤s ta¤ma¤n pa¤a¤oman rationaaliseen sijoittamiseen tarvittavaa asiantuntija-apua Maailmanpankin ja Kansainva¤lisen valuuttarahaston kaltaisilta laitoksilta, ja siina¤ tapauksessa, etta¤ na¤ma¤ tahot eiva¤t ole ta¤ha¤n halukkaita tai eiva¤t ta¤ha¤n pysty, vaikuttamaan jollain toisella tavalla siihen, etta¤ Jugoslavian liittotasavallan talous saadaan ja¤lleen jaloilleen, jotta maan kansalaiset luottaisivat paremmin kansainva¤lisen yhteiso¤n tavoitteisiin ja ta¤ma¤n seurauksena myo¤s mahdollisesti eurooppalaiseen ajatusmaailmaan perustuviin poliittisiin na¤kemyksiin? Komission ja¤senen Hans van den Broekin komission puolesta antama vastaus (24. maaliskuuta 1998) Kosovon kriisi ja pelko sen levia¤misesta¤ alueen ulkopuolelle osoittavat selva¤sti Jugoslavian liittotasavallan ta¤rkea¤n tehta¤va¤n Balkanin alueen vakaudessa. Ne myo¤s osoittavat valitettavasti Belgradin haluttomuuden vastata ta¤ssa¤ suhteessa velvollisuuksistaan. Serbian talouden heikentymisesta¤ ei voi syytta¤a¤ kansainva¤lista¤ yhteiso¤a¤ tai aikaisempien pakotteiden (cid:145)jatkuvaa vaikutusta(cid:146) vaan se on pikemminkin seurausta Belgradin viranomaisten kyvytto¤myydesta¤ panna ta¤yta¤nto¤o¤n va¤ltta¤ma¤tto¤mia¤ talousuudistukseen kuuluvia toimenpiteita¤ ja noudattaa oleellisia poliittisia ja taloudellisia ehtoja, jotka joko kansainva¤liset rahoituslaitokset tai yhteiso¤ ovat liitta¤neet myo¤nta¤ma¤a¤nsa¤ taloudelliseen tukeen. Se myo¤s osoittaa, etta¤ Jugoslavian liittotasavallan johto ei tunne tarvitsevansa oman kansansa tukea. Komissio on edelleen valmis ehdottamaan kaupan yksipuolisen suosituimmuuskohtelun palauttamista tai Jugoslavian liittotasavallan sisa¤llytta¤mista¤ Phare-ohjelmaan heti, kun maa ta¤ytta¤a¤ oleelliset poliittiset ja taloudelliset ehdot. Na¤ihin ehtoihin, jotka koskevat myo¤s muita maita, joihin sovelletaan alueellista la¤hestymis- tapaa, kuuluvat demokratian ja ihmisoikeuksien perusperiaatteiden kunnioittaminen. Na¤ma¤ ovat kansainva¤lisesti tunnustettuja normeja, joista ei ole neuvotteluvaraa. Na¤iden ehtojen ta¤ytta¤minen on lisa¤ksi Serbian va¤esto¤n etujen mukaista, silla¤ sen poliittinen johto ei nykyisella¤a¤n ota va¤esto¤n tarpeita asianmukaisesti huomioon. (98/C 304/156) KIRJALLINEN KYSYMYS P-0437/98 komissiolle esitta¤ja¤(t): Mark Watts (PSE) (16. helmikuuta 1998) Aihe: Verovapaan myynnin lopettaminen Koska komissio on useaan kertaan todennut, etta¤ verovapaan myynnin lopettaminen etenee suunnitelmien mukaisesti kohti sen toteuttamista vuoden 1999 puoliva¤lissa¤, voiko komissio vahvistaa pa¤iva¤ma¤a¤ra¤n, johon mennessa¤ se aikoo esitta¤a¤ tarvittavan direktiiviehdotuksen, joka koskee ALV- ja valmisteveroja¤rjestelma¤a¤, joka on ta¤yta¤nto¤o¤npantava kaikissa ja¤senvaltioissa verovapaan myynnin lopettamisen ja¤lkeen toiminnassa olevien autolautta- ja lentoliikenneyhteyksien sujuvan toiminnan takaamiseksi?


title: SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE Nr. 404/98 von Katerina DASKALAKI an die Kommission. Probleme mit der Erzeugung von Olivenöl, Baumwolle und Zitrusfrüchten

eurovoc_concepts:
Greece
agricultural production
agricultural structure
citrus fruit
cotton
olive oil
over-production
private stock
production aid
storage

formats: html pdf print

text: 9. 10. 98 DE Amtsblatt der Europa¤ischen Gemeinschaften C 310/57 3. Im Planungsstadium mu¤ssen die regionalen Partner schriftlich zusichern, da(cid:223) die vom EFRE kofinanzier- ten Ma(cid:223)nahmen mit dem Umweltschutzrecht der Gemeinschaft vereinbar sein werden. Gema¤(cid:223) den Subsidiari- ta¤ts- und Partnerschaftsprinzipien sind die regionalen Partner fu¤r die Programmdurchfu¤hrung und fu¤r die Pru¤fung auf Erfu¤llung der Umweltauflagen verantwortlich. Des weiteren mu¤ssen die ja¤hrlichen Berichte daru¤ber Aufschlu(cid:223) geben, welche Ma(cid:223)nahmen getroffen wurden, um den Umweltschutz sicherzustellen. Aus dem letzten fu¤r Brandenburg vorliegenden Bericht geht hervor, da(cid:223) fu¤r alle Vorhaben die Stellungnahme der Umweltschutz- beho¤rde der lokalen Verwaltung erforderlich ist. Die Erfu¤llung der Bestimmungen kann des weiteren durch Vor-Ort-Kontrollen der Kommission u¤berpru¤ft und sichergestellt werden. (98/C 310/72) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-0398/98 von Nikitas Kaklamanis (UPE) an die Kommission (24. Februar 1998) Betrifft: Umwandlung eines armenischen Klosters in ein Hotel im besetzten Teil Zyperns Berichten der tu¤rkisch-zyprischen Zeitung (cid:132)KIBRIS POSTASI(cid:147) zufolge ist geplant, das armenische Kloster (cid:132)SOURP MAGAR(cid:147), das aus der Zeit um 1000 nach Christus stammt und wa¤hrend der Invasion von den tu¤rkischen Streitkra¤fte bombardiert worden war, in ein Hotel mit 50 Betten umzuwandeln. Das Kloster befindet sich in der Umgebung von Keryneia im besetzten Teil Zyperns, und nach den Pla¤nen des Pseudo-Staates soll es fu¤r 49 Jahre nach dem Leasing-Verfahren fu¤r eine Jahresmiete von 20. 000 Dollar angeboten werden. Dieses Vorgehen beweist erneut die Verachtung der tu¤rkischen Besatzungsstreitkra¤fte fu¤r das Kulturerbe der Insel und zeigt zugleich auch deutlich, wieviel Respekt den Denkma¤lern der christlichen Religion in den Augen der illegalen Besatzungsmacht in Nordzypern zukommt. Kann die Europa¤ische Kommission mitteilen, wie sie auf dieses eindeutig illegale Vorhaben eines barbarischen Regimes reagieren will, dessen einzige Stu¤tze 40. 000 tu¤rkische Soldaten sind, die nun schon seit 24 Jahren ununterbrochen 40% des zyprischen Inselterritoriums besetzt halten? Antwort von Herrn Van den Broek im Namen der Kommission (16. Ma¤rz 1998) Der ju¤ngste Besuch von 800 tu¤rkischen Zyprioten in einer Moschee in Larnaca und die Pilgerfahrten mehrerer Hundert griechischer Zyprioten zu einem Kloster im Norden der Insel sind Anzeichen fu¤r bescheidene Fortschritte in den Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Gemeinschaften. Die Achtung des kulturellen Erbes der anderen Gemeinschaft ist von grundlegender Bedeutung fu¤r die Wahrung der Identita¤t der beiden zypriotischen Volksgemeinschaften. Die Kommission mo¤chte einen Teil der Gelder des vierten Finanzprotokolls fu¤r die Restaurierung von Denkma¤lern auf der ganzen Insel verwenden (gemeinsames Projekt beider Gemeinschaften). Auch wenn dies bislang nicht mo¤glich war, wird die Kommission derartige Initiativen weiterhin unterstu¤tzen, und sie hofft, da(cid:223) die politischen Rahmenbedingungen auf Zypern deren Umsetzung schlie(cid:223)lich ermo¤glichen werden. (98/C 310/73) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-0404/98 von Katerina Daskalaki (UPE) an die Kommission (24. Februar 1998) Betrifft: Probleme mit der Erzeugung von Oliveno¤l, Baumwolle und Zitrusfru¤chten Die griechischen Landwirte machen die Bru¤sseler Entscheidungen verantwortlich fu¤r ihre Probleme mit der Erzeugung von Oliveno¤l, Baumwolle und Zitrusfru¤chten, weil sie diese Entscheidungen als sehr ungu¤nstig fu¤r ihre Betriebe betrachten. Sie sprechen von dem Druck, dem die griechische Baumwollerzeugung ausgesetzt ist, und betonen, da(cid:223) der Zitrusfru¤chteanbau von dem WTO-Abkommen u¤ber die mengenma¤(cid:223)ige Beschra¤nkung der subventionierten Ausfuhren stark beeintra¤chtigt wird. Die Oliveno¤lerzeuger leiden unter der spanischen U¤ berproduktion, aber auch der Weigerung des zusta¤ndigen Kommissionsmitgliedes, irgendwelche Ma(cid:223)nahmen zuzulassen. Die Gemeinschaftssubventionen fu¤r griechisches Oliveno¤l wurden um 30% gesenkt, aber statt den Zeitpunkt der Gemeinschaftsintervention vorzuziehen, fordert die Kommission eine private Einlagerung mit gemeinschaftlichen Beihilfen


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 409/98 by Carmen FRAGA ESTÉVEZ to the Commission. Coordination for aid for the development of the fisheries sectors of the ACP States

eurovoc_concepts:
ACP countries
European Commission
common fisheries policy
development policy
exchange of information
fishing agreement

text: 2. 10. 98 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 304/95 (98/C 304/142) SKRIFTLIG FR¯GA E-0403/98 fr(cid:229)n Lis Jensen (I-EDN) till kommissionen (24 februari 1998) A¤mne: Antalet rekommendationer fr(cid:229)n r(cid:229)det sedan 1986 Finns det statistiska uppgifter om hur m(cid:229)nga rekommendationer som r(cid:229)det har lagt fram? I s(cid:229) fall vill jag ga¤rna f(cid:229) veta hur m(cid:229)nga som har lagts fram sedan 1986 samt i hur ho¤g grad de har fo¤ljts av de enskilda medlemsla¤nderna. Svar fr(cid:229)n Jacques Santer p(cid:229) kommissionens va¤gnar (24 mars 1998) Under (cid:229)ren mellan 1986 och 1997 antog r(cid:229)det 37 rekommendationer som var riktade till medlemsstaterna. Kommissionen fo¤rfogar inte o¤ver n(cid:229)gon statistik o¤ver hur medlemsstaterna fo¤ljt rekommendationerna. (98/C 304/143) SKRIFTLIG FR¯GA E-0409/98 fr(cid:229)n Carmen Fraga Este·vez (PPE) till kommissionen (24 februari 1998) A¤mne: Samordning av sto¤d till utveckling av fiskerisektorerna i AVS-la¤nderna Europeiska unionen visar ett stort intresse fo¤r utvecklingen av fiskerisektorerna i AVS-la¤nderna. A¤ ven om projekten fo¤rvaltas via GD VIII a¤r det GD XIV som a¤r det beho¤riga direktoratet inom fiskeripolitiken. M(cid:229)nga utvecklings(cid:229)tga¤rder i tredje land vidtas › och denna tendens blir allt tydligare › inom ramen fo¤r protokoll om fiskeriavtalen. Med beaktande av det gemensamma svar som kommissionsledamoten Pinheiro gav den 23 april 1997 p(cid:229) de skriftliga fr(cid:229)gor som sta¤llts av ledamoten Arias Can(cid:152)ete (E-0923/97 till E-0934/97 (1)), och med beaktande av det tidigare na¤mnda sta¤lls kommissionen fo¤ljande fr(cid:229)gor: Kan kommissionen fo¤rklara om det existerar en verklig samordning vad ga¤ller utva¤rderingen av utvecklings- projekten p(cid:229) fiskeriomr(cid:229)det mellan ovanna¤mnda generaldirektorat? Ifall en samordning existerar, hur utfo¤r generaldirektoraten detta gemensamma arbete fo¤r att undvika att o¤verlappning uppst(cid:229)r som kunde inneba¤ra slo¤seri med gemenskapsmedel fo¤r utveckling? Vilken roll spelar i praktiken generaldirektorat VIII respektive XIV i de beslut som fattas inom EU om utvecklingen av fiskeriprogram fo¤r AVS-la¤nderna? (1) EGT C 319, 18. 10. 1997, s. 197. Svar fr(cid:229)n Joa(cid:152)o de Deus Pinheiro p(cid:229) kommissionens va¤gnar (11 mars 1998) Som fr(cid:229)gesta¤llaren p(cid:229)pekar a¤r det generaldirektorat XIV inom kommissionen som ansvarar fo¤r den gemensamma fiskeripolitiken, a¤ven utanfo¤r gemenskapen, och generaldirektorat VIII som ansvarar fo¤r utvecklingspolitiken, bland annat vad ga¤ller de la¤nder som gemenskapen har slutit fiskeavtal med. Kommissionen har vid upprepade tillfa¤llen erinrat om att det a¤r no¤dva¤ndigt att sta¤rka koherensen mellan fiskeavtalen och utvecklingspolitiken, dvs. att, i enlighet med artiklarna 130u och 130v i EG-fo¤rdraget, sa¤kersta¤lla att fiskeavtalen ing(cid:229)s och genomfo¤rs i o¤verenssta¤mmelse med de m(cid:229)lsa¤ttningar som faststa¤lls i de nationella och regionala programmen fo¤r utvecklingssamarbete p(cid:229) fiskeriomr(cid:229)det, som gemenskapen i tilla¤mpliga fall bidrar till. Denna o¤nskan om koherens och komplementaritet uttrycktes vid r(cid:229)dets mo¤te (utveckling) den 5 juni 1997 (resolution om koherens), vid r(cid:229)dets mo¤te (fiske) den 30 oktober 1997 och av parlamentet i resolutionen om internationella fiskeavtal av den 15 maj 1997 (A4-0149/97)


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 401/98 by Gianni TAMINO to the Commission. Consorzio Venezia Nuovo (New Venice Consortium) (SUPPLEMENTARY ANSWER)

eurovoc_concepts:
Veneto
competition
consortium
cultural heritage
heritage protection
large-scale construction
monopoly
public contract
town
works contract

formats: html print


title: SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE Nr. 432/98 von Leonie van BLADEL an die Kommission. In der serbischen Verfassung verankerte Garantien betreffend die Rechte der Minderheiten im Kosovo

eurovoc_concepts:
Kosovo
Serbia
application of the law
autonomy
constitution
ethnic group
human rights
protection of freedoms
rights of minorities

text: C 223/172 DE Amtsblatt der Europa¤ischen Gemeinschaften 17. 7. 98 Antwort von Herrn Santer im Namen der Kommission (26. Ma¤rz 1998) Die Kommission kann die Richtigkeit der Pressemeldungen, auf die sich die Herren Abgeordneten beziehen, weder besta¤tigen noch in Abrede stellen. Fu¤r die Achtung der Menschenrechte und die Gewa¤hrleistung der Grundfreiheiten in der Justiz sind die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten zusta¤ndig. Die Kommission ist nicht befugt, ein Urteil daru¤ber zu fa¤llen, ob die von einem Mitgliedstaat aufgrund strafrechtlicher Ermittlungen getroffenen Ma(cid:223)nahmen gerechtfertigt oder der vermuteten strafbaren Handlung angemessen sind. (98/C 223/224) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-0432/98 von Leonie van Bladel (UPE) an die Kommission (24. Februar 1998) Betrifft: In der serbischen Verfassung verankerte Garantien betreffend die Rechte der Minderheiten im Kosovo Die Lage in der serbischen Provinz Kosovo, in der die Mehrheit der Bevo¤lkerung sich aus ethnischen Albanern zusammensetzt, verschlechtert sich rasch. Nahezu jeden Tag gibt es in dem Gebiet auf beiden Seiten Tote und/oder Verwundete. Der Gegensatz zwischen einerseits der politischen Fu¤hrung Serbiens, die Kosovo als integralen Bestandteil Serbiens betrachtet, und andererseits den fu¤hrenden Kra¤ften der albanischen Bevo¤lkerung, die Kosovo zu einer unabha¤ngigen Republik machen wollen, scheint unu¤berwindbar. Wie auch andere internationale Instanzen hat sich die Kommission bereits wiederholt dahingehend gea¤u(cid:223)ert, da(cid:223) eine Lo¤sung des Problems innerhalb der Grenzen Serbiens, bzw. Jugoslawiens gefunden werden mu(cid:223), wenn den Albanern auch ein gro(cid:223)es Ma(cid:223) an Autonomie gewa¤hrt werden soll. Die serbischen Beho¤rden vertreten die Auffassung, da(cid:223) die serbische Verfassung allen Minderheiten in Serbien, und daher auch der albanischen Bevo¤lkerung, ein Ma(cid:223) an Autonomie bietet, die alle international akzeptierten Normen im Hinblick auf die Lage der Minderheiten erfu¤llt. Kann die Kommission mitteilen, inwieweit die Garantien, die die serbische Verfassung den Minderheiten in Serbien bietet, wirklich ausreichen? Falls diese Garantien nicht ausreichen, kann die Kommission dann mitteilen, in welcher Hinsicht die serbische Verfassung angepa(cid:223)t werden mu(cid:223)? Wenn die Garantien ausreichen, kann die Kommission dann mitteilen, inwieweit sich die serbischen Beho¤rden an die Verfassung halten? Antwort von Herrn Van den Broek im Namen der Kommission (25. Ma¤rz 1998) Das in der Verfassung der Republik Serbien von 1990 enthaltene Autonomiekonzept ist sehr begrenzt, insbesondere, da alle wirtschaftlichen Entscheidungen zentralisiert sind. Die Kosovo-Albaner haben sa¤mtliche ihnen 1974 im Rahmen der Fo¤deration zugestanden Legislativ- und Exekutivbefugnisse verloren. Menschen- und Minderheitenrechte in Kosovo wie auch in Serbien und der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien werden theoretisch in hohem Ma(cid:223)e durch die Verfassung der Republik Serbien von 1990 und die Verfassung der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien von 1992 garantiert. Au(cid:223)erdem ist die Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien aufgrund von Artikel 16 der Verfassung von 1992 verpflichtet, die verschiedenen von ihr geschlossenen internationalen Vertra¤ge und U¤ bereinkommen einzuhalten (einschlie(cid:223)lich der meisten der einschla¤gigen internationalen Klauseln u¤ber Menschenrechte). Diese Rechte werden jedoch von den serbischen Beho¤rden nicht respektiert. Als Beispiel sei das Gesetz u¤ber besondere Immobilientransaktionen erwa¤hnt, das Kosovo-Albaner daran hindert, Grundbesitz von serbischen Eigentu¤mern zu erwerben › was gegen das Recht auf unverletzliches Eigentum und gegen die Bestimmungen u¤ber die Gleichheit des sozialen und privaten Eigentums versto¤(cid:223)t


title: QUESTION ECRITE no 406/98 de Phillip WHITEHEAD à la Commission. Régimes de quantité prescrite (REPONSE COMPLEMENTAIRE)

eurovoc_concepts:
United Kingdom
bread
intra-EU trade
packaged product
trade restriction

text: 21. 5. 1999 FR Journal officiel des Communautés européennes C 142/1 I (Communications) PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN QUESTIONS ÉCRITES AVEC RÉPONSE (1999/C 142/001) QUESTION ÉCRITE E-0406/98 posée par Phillip Whitehead (PSE) à la Commission (24 février 1998) Objet: Régimes de quantité prescrite Quels États membres disposent d’un régime de quantité prescrite ayant fait l’objet d’une enquête et pourquoi la Commission estime-t-elle que l’existence d’un tel régime au sein du marché britannique du pain menace les grands échanges intracommunautaires? Réponse complémentaire donnée par M. Monti au nom de la Commission (4 décembre 1998) En 1993, la Commission, à la suite d’une question parlementaire H-228/93 de Mme von Alemann (1) relative aux difficultés rencontrées par les importateurs de pain préemballé provenant d’Allemagne, a soulevé la question de la compatibilité de la réglementation britannique relative aux gammes (Weights and Measures (Miscellaneous Foods) Order 1988 SI 1988/2040) avec les articles 30 à 36 du traité CE relatifs au principe de libre circulation des marchandises. En effet, le pain n’étant pas couvert par la direc- tive 80/232/CEE relative aux gammes de quantités nominales et de capacités nominales admises pour certains produits de préemballages (2), les articles 30 à 36 s’appliquent aux mesures nationales suscepti- bles d’entraver les échanges des produits en cause. La réglementation litigieuse prescrit pour le pain préemballé la quantité nominale de 400 grammes ainsi que des multiples de celle-ci, excluant par là, notamment, la quantité nominale de 500 grammes couramment utilisée dans d’autres États membres. La Commission considère cette réglementation comme étant contraire à l’article 30 du traité CE dans la mesure où la protection du consommateur et la loyauté des relations commerciales peuvent être suffisamment assurées par une mesure moins entravante des échanges consistant, par exemple, en l’indication de la quantité nette sur le produit préemballé. Suite à une mise en demeure en décembre 1996 les autorités britanniques se sont montrées disposées à modifier la réglementation en cause, en vue d’inclure notamment les quantités de 500 grammes et de 1 kilogramme. La modification législative est en cours. (1) Annexes JO 3-429 du 10. 3. 1993. (2) JO L 51 du 25. 2. 1980


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 434/98 by Leonie van BLADEL to the Commission. Freedom of the press in Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia

eurovoc_concepts:
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia
EU programme
Serbia
democratisation
freedom of the press
mass media

text: 2. 10. 98 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 304/103 ii) R(cid:229)dets direktiv av den 3 oktober 1989 om samordning av vissa besta¤mmelser som faststa¤llts i medlemsstaternas lagar och andra fo¤rfattningar om utfo¤randet av sa¤ndningsverksamhet fo¤r television (EGT L 298, 17. 10. 1989, s. 23). Artikel 12: TV-reklam f(cid:229)r inte diskriminera n(cid:229)gon p(cid:229) grund av ras, ko¤n eller nationalitet. Artikel 22: Medlemsstaterna skall sa¤kersta¤lla att sa¤ndningar inte inneh(cid:229)ller n(cid:229)got som uppammar hat, grundat p(cid:229) ras, ko¤n, religion eller nationalitet. iii) R(cid:229)dets fo¤rordning av den 2 juni 1997 om inra¤ttande av ett europeiskt centrum fo¤r o¤vervakning av rasism och fra¤mlingsfientlighet (EGT L 151, 10. 6. 1997, s. 1). (98/C 304/154) SKRIFTLIG FR¯GA E-0434/98 fr(cid:229)n Leonie van Bladel (UPE) till kommissionen (24 februari 1998) A¤mne: Pressfrihet i Bosnien, Serbien och Kroatien I Bosniens statliga massmedier fo¤rekommer det av och till kampanjer som riktas mot oberoende journalister och f(cid:229)tt sin inspiration av vissa myndigheter. I Serbien anva¤nds genomg(cid:229)ende de statliga massmedierna fo¤r bedrivande av propaganda fo¤r det regerande partiet och (cid:229)sikter av annat slag beka¤mpas d(cid:229) utan att deras fo¤retra¤dare vare sig f(cid:229)r go¤ra sin ro¤st ho¤rd eller bemo¤ta det som sagts eller skrivits om dem. Lokala TV- och radiostationer kommer allt oftare att st(cid:229) under kontroll av de politiska partier som har makten i ifr(cid:229)gavarande kommuner och pressen drabbas regelbundet av (cid:148)pappersbrist(cid:148). I Kroatien kontrolleras de flesta massmedierna, antingen de a¤r riksomfattande eller lokala, direkt eller indirekt av det regerande partiet HDZ och anva¤nds fo¤r propagandaa¤ndam(cid:229)l, (cid:229)terigen utan att andra (cid:229)sikter vare sig f(cid:229)r komma till tals eller bemo¤ta det som sagts eller skrivits. Oberoende massmedier utsa¤tts fo¤r hot om civilra¤ttsliga processer som iscensa¤tts av prominenta medlemmar av HDZ, bland vilka ofta regeringsmedlemmar ing(cid:229)r, och da¤rvid utsa¤tts massmedierna genomg(cid:229)ende fo¤r krav p(cid:229) ho¤ga skadest(cid:229)nd (cid:148)fo¤r fo¤rtal(cid:148). Kan kommissionen ge besked om vilka medel kommissionen fo¤rfogar o¤ver fo¤r att hja¤lpa upp situationen fo¤r massmedierna i de ifr(cid:229)gavarande la¤nderna samt om vilka av dessa medel som fo¤r na¤rvarande anva¤nds och p(cid:229) vilka punkter det beho¤ver utvecklas nya instrument? Svar fr(cid:229)n Hans van den Broek p(cid:229) kommissionens va¤gnar (13 mars 1998) Kommissionen insta¤mmer med analysen av mediernas situation i Bosnien-Herzegovina, Kroatien och Fo¤rbundsrepubliken Jugoslavien och a¤r liksom parlamentsledamoten o¤vertygad om att pressfriheten spelar en va¤sentlig roll i demokratiseringsprocessen. Det a¤r da¤rfo¤r som kommissionen sedan 1994 har utvecklat ett bist(cid:229)ndsprogram fo¤r de oberoende medierna i fo¤re detta Jugoslavien. Kommissionens program omfattar, med undantag av Slovenien, alla la¤nder i fo¤re detta Jugoslavien. De medier som under 1997 har f(cid:229)tt bidrag tillho¤r den tryckta och audiovisuella pressen (tidningar, radio, TV och nyhetsbyr(cid:229)er). De projekt som sto¤ds av kommissionen avser sa¤rskilt produktionsmedel fo¤r information eller program, journalistutbildning, ba¤ttre medel fo¤r distribution och spridning samt ra¤ttsskydd fo¤r medierna. 1997 godka¤ndes 77 projekt vilket motsvarar ett sammanlagt belopp p(cid:229) 11,24 miljoner ecu. Kommissionen planerar att fo¤r budget(cid:229)ret 1998 bevilja en budget till sin politik fo¤r sto¤d till oberoende medier i fo¤re detta Jugoslavien i samma storleksordning som fo¤r ra¤kenskaps(cid:229)ret 1997. Fo¤r att anpassa sig till situationen i dessa la¤nder har kommissionen fo¤r avsikt att decentralisera fo¤rvaltningen av mindre projekt till sina delegationer. En s(cid:229)dan decentralisering syftar till ett mer flexibelt och snabbare genomfo¤rande av programmen fo¤r de oberoende medierna


title: ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ (ΕΚ) αριθ. 433/98 ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ της 24ης Φεβρουαρίου 1998 για καθορισμό των κατ' αποκοπή τιμών κατά την εισαγωγή για τον καθορισμό της τιμής εισόδου ορισμένων οπωροκηπευτικών

eurovoc_concepts:
agri-monetary policy
citrus fruit
fruit vegetable
import price
perennial vegetable

formats: pdf print

text: 25. 2. 98 EL Ep(cid:148)sglg Evgleq(cid:148)da tym Euqypa(cid:152)j(cid:150)m Joimot(cid:147)tym L 54/1 I (Pq(cid:145)neir cia tgm isw(cid:151) tym opo(cid:148)ym apaite(cid:148)tai dglos(cid:148)eusg) JAMOMISLOS (EJ) aqih. 433/98 TGS EPITQOPGS tgr 24gr Vebqouaq(cid:148)ou 1998 cia jahoqisl(cid:149) tym jat’ apojop(cid:147) til(cid:150)m jat(cid:145) tgm eisacyc(cid:147) cia tom jahoqisl(cid:149) tgr til(cid:147)r eis(cid:149)dou oqisl(cid:146)mym opyqojgpeutij(cid:150)m G EPITQOPG TYM EUQYPA(cid:136)JYM JOIMOTGTYM, (cid:130)womtar up(cid:149)xg: tg sumh(cid:147)jg cia tgm (cid:148)dqusg tgr Euqypa(cid:152)j(cid:147)r Joim(cid:149)tgtar, tom jamomisl(cid:149) (EJ) aqih. 3223/94 tgr Epitqop(cid:147)r, tgr 21gr Dejelbq(cid:148)ou 1994, swetij(cid:145) le tir keptol(cid:146)qeier evaqloc(cid:147)r tou jahest(cid:150)tor jat(cid:145) tgm eisacyc(cid:147) opyqojgpeutij(cid:150)m (1), (cid:149)pyr tqopopoi(cid:147)hgje tekeuta(cid:148)a ap(cid:149) tom jamomisl(cid:149) (EJ) aqih. 2375/96 (2), jai id(cid:148)yr to (cid:145)qhqo 4 paq(cid:145)cqavor 1, tom jamomisl(cid:149) (EOJ) aqih. 3813/92 tou Sulbouk(cid:148)ou, tgr 28gr Dejelbq(cid:148)ou 1992, swetij(cid:145) le tg kocistij(cid:147) lom(cid:145)da jai tir isotil(cid:148)er pou pq(cid:146)pei ma evaql(cid:149)fomtai sta pka(cid:148)sia tgr joim(cid:147)r ceyqcij(cid:147)r pokitij(cid:147)r (3), (cid:149)pyr tqopopoi(cid:147)hgje tekeu- ta(cid:148)a ap(cid:149) tom jamomisl(cid:149) (EJ) aqih. 150/95 (4), jai id(cid:148)yr to (cid:145)qhqo 3 paq(cid:145)cqavor 3, Ejtil(cid:150)mtar: (cid:149)ti o jamomisl(cid:149)r (EJ) aqih. 3223/94, se evaqloc(cid:147) tym apotekesl(cid:145)tym tym pokuleq(cid:150)m elpoqij(cid:150)m diapqaclate(cid:151)- seym tou C(cid:151)qou tgr Ouqoucou(cid:145)gr, pqobk(cid:146)pei ta jqit(cid:147)qia cia tom jahoqisl(cid:149) ap(cid:149) tgm Epitqop(cid:147) tym jat’ apojop(cid:147) til(cid:150)m jat(cid:145) tgm eisacyc(cid:147) ap(cid:149) tq(cid:148)ter w(cid:150)qer, cia ta pqo(cid:152)(cid:149)- mta jai tir peqi(cid:149)dour pou oq(cid:148)fomtai sto paq(cid:145)qtgl(cid:145) tou· (cid:149)ti, se evaqloc(cid:147) tym pqoamaveqh(cid:146)mtym jqitgq(cid:148)ym, oi jat’ apojop(cid:147) til(cid:146)r jat(cid:145) tgm eisacyc(cid:147) pq(cid:146)pei ma jahoqisto(cid:151)m, (cid:149)pyr amacq(cid:145)vomtai sto paq(cid:145)qtgla tou paq(cid:149)mtor jamomi- slo(cid:151), ENEDYSE TOM PAQOMTA JAMOMISLO: (cid:129)qhqo 1 Oi jat’ apojop(cid:147) til(cid:146)r jat(cid:145) tgm eisacyc(cid:147) pou amav(cid:146)qo- mtai sto (cid:145)qhqo 4 tou jamomislo(cid:151) (EJ) aqih. 3223/94 jaho- q(cid:148)fomtai (cid:149)pyr amacq(cid:145)vomtai stom p(cid:148)maja pou elva(cid:148)metai sto paq(cid:145)qtgla. (cid:129)qhqo 2 O paq(cid:150)m jamomisl(cid:149)r aqw(cid:148)fei ma isw(cid:151)ei stir 25 Vebqoua- q(cid:148)ou 1998. O paq(cid:150)m jamomisl(cid:149)r e(cid:148)mai desleutij(cid:149)r yr pqor (cid:149)ka ta l(cid:146)qg tou jai isw(cid:151)ei (cid:145)lesa se j(cid:145)he jq(cid:145)tor l(cid:146)kor. Bqun(cid:146)kker, 24 Vebqouaq(cid:148)ou 1998. Cia tgm Epitqop(cid:147) Franz FISCHLER L(cid:146)kor tgr Epitqop(cid:147)r (1) EE L 337 tgr 24. 12. 1994, s. 66. (2) EE L 325 tgr 14. 12. 1996, s. 5. (3) EE L 387 tgr 31. 12. 1992, s. 1. (4) EE L 22 tgr 31. 1. 1995, s. 1. L 54/2 EL Ep(cid:148)sglg Evgleq(cid:148)da tym Euqypa(cid:152)j(cid:150)m Joimot(cid:147)tym 25. 2. 98 PAQAQTGLA tou jamomislo(cid:151) tgr Epitqop(cid:147)r, tgr 24gr Vebqouaq(cid:148)ou 1998, cia tom jahoqisl(cid:149) tym jat’ apojop(cid:147) til(cid:150)m jat(cid:145) tgm eisacyc(cid:147) cia tom jahoqisl(cid:149) til(cid:150)m eis(cid:149)dou oqisl(cid:146)mym opyqojgpeutij(cid:150)m Jydij(cid:149)r SO 0702 00 00 0707 00 05 0709 10 00 0709 90 70 0805 10 10, 0805 10 30, 0805 10 50 0805 20 10 0805 20 30, 0805 20 50, 0805 20 70, 0805 20 90 (se Ecu/100 wiki(cid:149)cqalla) (se Ecu/100 wiki(cid:149)cqalla) Jydij(cid:149)r tq(cid:148)tgr w(cid:150)qar (1) Jat’ apojop(cid:147) til(cid:147) jat(cid:145) tgm eisacyc(cid:147) Jydij(cid:149)r SO Jydij(cid:149)r tq(cid:148)tgr w(cid:150)qar (1) Jat’ apojop(cid:147) til(cid:147) jat(cid:145) tgm eisacyc(cid:147) 204 212 624 999 052 053 068 999 220 999 052 204 999 052 204 212 600 624 999 204 999 052 204 400 53,6 106,3 192,3 117,4 107,4 170,8 96,0 124,7 159,1 159,1 123,0 128,9 125,9 58,1 38,0 39,5 53,9 48,8 47,7 78,1 78,1 58,5 68,4 68,5 0805 30 10 0808 10 20, 0808 10 50, 0808 10 90 0808 20 50 464 512 600 624 662 999 052 400 600 999 060 064 388 400 404 528 720 728 999 388 400 512 528 999 115,4 97,7 96,7 73,6 36,2 76,9 64,7 59,4 82,7 68,9 50,2 42,6 107,9 88,0 92,5 79,1 79,8 96,0 79,5 93,8 117,4 68,2 69,4 87,2 (1) Omolatokoc(cid:148)a tym wyq(cid:150)m pou jahoq(cid:148)fetai ap(cid:149) tom jamomisl(cid:149) (EJ) aqih. 2317/97 tgr Epitqop(cid:147)r (EE L 321 tgr 22. 11. 1997, s. 19). O jydij(cid:149)r «999» amtipqosype(cid:151)ei «(cid:145)kker jatacyc(cid:146)r»


title: SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL nr. 374/98 af Nuala AHERN til Kommissionen. Vurdering af "Sham Recovery"-metodens anvendelse i selskaber, der har kontrakt om anvendelse af oparbejdningsfaciliteter.

eurovoc_concepts:
EU Member State
fuel reprocessing
irradiated fuel
plutonium
radioactive waste
uranium
waste management
waste recycling

text: 9. 10. 98 DA De Europ(cid:230)iske F(cid:230)llesskabers Tidende C 310/55 Svar afgivet p(cid:229) Kommissionens vegne af Neil Kinnock (3. april 1998) Kommissionen kender intet til noget s(cid:230)rligt provisionssystem eller en belgisk ministeriel afgłrelse af den slags, det (cid:230)rede medlem henviser til. Kommissionen vil tage denne sag op med de belgiske myndigheder for at f(cid:229) hele sammenh(cid:230)ngen klarlagt. (98/C 310/69) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL E-0370/98 af Nuala Ahern (V) til Kommissionen (24. februar 1998) Om: Forel(cid:230)ggelse af den fjerde beretning fra Den St(cid:229)ende Arbejdsgruppe om Sikker Transport af Radioaktivt Materiale i Den Europ(cid:230)iske Union. Hvorn(cid:229)r vil Kommissionen forel(cid:230)gge den fjerde beretning fra Den St(cid:229)ende Arbejdsgruppe om Sikker Transport af Radioaktivt Materiale i Den Europ(cid:230)iske Union for henholdsvis Parlamentet, Ministerr(cid:229)det og Det (cid:216)konomiske og Sociale Udvalg? Hvordan bestemmer GD XVII arbejdsgruppens sammens(cid:230)tning? Hvor mange eksperter fra ikke-statslige miljłgrupper er medlemmer af arbejdsgruppen? Og hvordan r(cid:229)dfłrer arbejdsgruppen sig med ikke-statslige miljłgrupper og forskningsinstitutter som en del af sit arbejde? Svar afgivet p(cid:229) Kommissionens vegne af Christos Papoutsis (27. marts 1998) Et udkast til meddelelse omfattende den fjerde beretning fra den st(cid:229)ende arbejdsgruppe om sikker transport af radioaktivt materiale vil om kort tid blive forelagt for Kommissionen med henblik p(cid:229) godkendelse og udsendelse til de forskellige institutioner. Arbejdsgruppens sammens(cid:230)tning er baseret p(cid:229) Europa-Parlamentets beslutning af 22. januar 1982 (1), i henhold til hvilken »Kommissionen opfordres til at neds(cid:230)tte en st(cid:229)ende s(cid:230)rlig arbejdsgruppe for transport af radioaktive stoffer og radioaktivt affald, sammensat af repr(cid:230)sentanter for Kommissionen og nationale eksperter«. Kommissionen p(cid:229)tog sig derefter at gennemfłre Europa-Parlamentets beg(cid:230)ring og opfordrede medlemsstaterne til at udpege deres nationale eksperter p(cid:229) omr(cid:229)det til gruppen. Alle s(cid:230)rligt udn(cid:230)vnte eksperter hidrłrer fra de kompetente ansvarlige myndigheders og disse tekniske stłtteorganisationers side. Ingen af dem kommer fra ikke-statslige organisationer (NGO). Dog er en r(cid:230)kke bekymringer, som nogle NGO(cid:146)er har givet udtryk for, allerede blevet forelagt for eksperterne i den st(cid:229)ende arbejdsgruppe med henblik p(cid:229) en n(cid:230)rmere vurdering. (1) EFT C 40 af 15. 2. 1982, s. 42. (98/C 310/70) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL E-0374/98 af Nuala Ahern (V) til Kommissionen (24. februar 1998) Om: Vurdering af »Sham Recovery«-metodens anvendelse i selskaber, der har kontrakt om anvendelse af oparbejdningsfaciliteter. »Sham Recovery« er en metode, der angiveligt har til form(cid:229)l at genvinde genanvendeligt materiale, men som i realiteten indeb(cid:230)rer bortskaffelse af affald. Hvilket overblik har Kommissionen over, i hvor hłj grad metoden er blevet brugt af selskaber, med hvilke der er indg(cid:229)et kontrakt om anvendelse af oparbejdningsfaciliteterne i (a) BNFL i Sellafield, (b) UKAEA Technology i Dounreay og (c) COGEMA i La Hague?


title: SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL nr. 418/98 af Paul RÜBIG til Kommissionen. Den faste EU-repræsentation i ASEAN-landene

eurovoc_concepts:
ASEAN countries
Commission Delegation
Malaysia
Singapore

text: C 304/98 DA De Europ(cid:230)iske F(cid:230)llesskabers Tidende 2. 10. 98 (98/C 304/147) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL E-0418/98 af Paul Ru¤ big (PPE) til Kommissionen (24. februar 1998) Om: Den faste EU-repr(cid:230)sentation i ASEAN-landene Under en rejse til Malaysia og Indonesien kunne en delegation fra Europa-Parlamentet danne sig et omfattende billede af den łkonomiske krise i Asien. Til trods for EU(cid:146)s og dets medlemsstaters mange aktiviteter og ikke mindst Det Europ(cid:230)iske Monet(cid:230)re Instituts initiativer samt de mulige virkninger af denne krise for Europa er det nłdvendigt, at EU fra officielt hold gennem s(cid:229)vel konkrete initiativer som via medierne bidrager til at lłse disse problemer. Det ville is(cid:230)r v(cid:230)re łnskv(cid:230)rdigt, om Den Europ(cid:230)iske Union oprettede faste repr(cid:230)sentationer som i Kuala Lumpur og Singapore. Dette blev ogs(cid:229) gentaget under plenarmłdet i Europa-Parlamentet i slutningen af januar. Er Kommissionen enig i, at en stłrre tilstedev(cid:230)relse i medierne samt udvidet repr(cid:230)sentation i ASEAN-landene vil indvirke positivt p(cid:229) EU(cid:146)s optr(cid:230)den og dets muligheder for at głre sig g(cid:230)ldende i hele omr(cid:229)det? Har Kommissionen planer om at tage konkrete initiativer og oprette delegationer i ASEAN-omr(cid:229)det? Kan Kommissionen i s(cid:229) fald allerede forel(cid:230)gge en tidsplan for disse initiativers gennemfłrelse? Svar afgivet p(cid:229) Kommissionens vegne af Hans Van den Broek (17. marts 1998) Det (cid:230)rede medlem henvises til Kommissionens svar p(cid:229) skriftlig forespłrgsel P-290/98 fra Jan Bertens (1). (1) Se side 72. (98/C 304/148) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL E-0422/98 af Graham Watson (ELDR) til Kommissionen (24. februar 1998) Om: Computerproblemet (cid:229)r 2000 Hvilke undersłgelser har Kommissionen gennemfłrt om virkningen af (cid:229)r 2000-problemet i EU(cid:146)s institutioner? (98/C 304/149) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL E-0425/98 af Graham Watson (ELDR) til Kommissionen (24. februar 1998) Om: Computerproblemet (cid:229)r 2000 Hvor meget ansl(cid:229)r Kommissionen, at det vil koste at sikre, at der i alle EU(cid:146)s institutioner tages hłjde for (cid:229)r 2000-problemet? Samlet svar afgivet p(cid:229) Kommissionens vegne af Erkki Liikanen p(cid:229) skriftlige forespłrgsler E-0422/98 og E-0425/98 (3. april 1998) Kommissionen er bet(cid:230)nkelig ved virksomheders, infrastrukturers og offentlige administrationers s(cid:229)rbarhed over for (cid:229)r 2000-computerproblemet og ved de mulige konsekvenser for forbrugerne. Kommissionen har vedtaget en meddelelse (1) med det form(cid:229)l at hłjne oplysningsniveauet og planl(cid:230)gge foranstaltninger til behandling af (cid:229)r 2000-spłrgsm(cid:229)lene. Som supplement til de aktiviteter, der iv(cid:230)rks(cid:230)ttes af den private sektor og medlemsstaterne,


title: REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 434/98 DELLA COMMISSIONE del 24 febbraio 1998 che stabilisce i prezzi comunitari alla produzione e i prezzi comunitari all'importazione per i garofani e le rose in applicazione del regime che disciplina l'importazione di taluni prodotti della floricoltura originari di Cipro, di Israele, della Giordania, del Marocco, nonché della Cisgiordania e della Striscia di Gaza

eurovoc_concepts:
common price policy
floriculture
import policy
producer price
third country

text: 25. 2. 98 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:133) europee L 54/3 REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 434/98 DELLA COMMISSIONE del 24 febbraio 1998 che stabilisce i prezzi comunitari alla produzione e i prezzi comunitari all’im- portazione per i garofani e le rose in applicazione del regime che disciplina l’importazione di taluni prodotti della floricoltura originari di Cipro, di Israele, della Giordania, del Marocco, nonch(cid:130) della Cisgiordania e della Striscia di Gaza LA COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNIT(cid:211) EUROPEE, visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunit(cid:133) europea, visto il regolamento (CEE) n. 4088/87 del Consiglio, del 21 dicembre 1987, che stabilisce le condizioni di applica- zione dei dazi doganali preferenziali all’importazione di taluni prodotti della floricoltura originari di Cipro, di Israele, della Giordania, del Marocco, nonch(cid:130) della Gisgiordania e della Striscia di Gaza (1), modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CE) n. 1300/97 (2), in particolare l’articolo 5, paragrafo 2, lettera a), considerando che, in applicazione dell’articolo 2, para- grafo 2 e dell’articolo 3 del regolamento (CEE) n. 4088/ 87, ogni due settimane sono fissati i prezzi comunitari all’importazione e i prezzi comunitari alla produzione per i garofani a fiore singolo (standard), i garofani a fiore multiplo (spray), le rose a fiore grande e le rose a fiore piccolo, applicabili per periodi di due settimane; che, a norma dell’articolo 1 ter del regolamento (CEE) n. 700/88 della Commissione, del 17 marzo 1988, recante modalit(cid:133) di applicazione del regime applicabile all’importazione nella Comunit(cid:133) di determinati prodotti della floricoltura originari di Cipro, di Israele, della Giordania e del Marocco, nonch(cid:130) della Cisgiordania e della Striscia di Gaza (3), modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CE) n. 2062/97 (4), tali prezzi sono fissati per periodi di due settimane in base a dati ponderati forniti dagli Stati membri; che (cid:138) importante fissare immediatamente tali prezzi per poter stabilire i dazi doganali applicabili; che, a tal fine, (cid:138) opportuno disporre l’entrata in vigore imme- diata del presente regolamento, HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO: Articolo 1 I prezzi comunitari alla produzione e i prezzi comunitari all’importazione per i garofani a fiore singolo (standard), i garofani a fiore multiplo (spray), le rose a fiore grande e le rose a fiore piccolo, previsti dall’articolo 1 ter del regola- mento (CEE) n. 700/88, sono fissati nell’allegato per un periodo di due settimane. Articolo 2 Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il 25 febbraio 1998. Esso si applica dall’25 febbraio al 10 marzo 1998. Il presente regolamento (cid:138) obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile in ciascuno degli Stati membri. Fatto a Bruxelles, il 24 febbraio 1998. Per la Commissione Franz FISCHLER Membro della Commissione (1) GU L 382 del 31. 12. 1987, pag. 22. (2) GU L 177 del 5. 7. 1997, pag. 1. (3) GU L 72 del 18. 3. 1988, pag. 16. (4) GU L 289 del 22. 10. 1997, pag. 1. L 54/4 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:133) europee 25. 2. 98 ALLEGATO Periodo: 25 febbraio (cid:190) 10 marzo 1998 (in ecu/100 pezzi) Prezzi comunitari alla produzione Garofani a fiore singolo (standard) Garofani a fiore multiplo (spray) Rose a fiore grande Rose a fiore piccolo 15,83 11,94 71,64 27,60 Prezzi comunitari all’importazione Garofani a fiore singolo (standard) Garofani a fiore multiplo (spray) Rose a fiore grande Rose fiore piccolo Israele Marocco Cipro Giordania Cisgiordania e Striscia di Gaza 19,68 20,01 (cid:190) (cid:190) (cid:190) 14,86 17,11 (cid:190) (cid:190) (cid:190) 26,97 25,42 (cid:190) (cid:190) (cid:190) (cid:190) (cid:190) (cid:190) (cid:190) (cid:190)


title: QUESTION ECRITE no 395/98 de Daniela RASCHHOFER à la Commission. Effets de l'Agenda 2000 sur la Communauté des Quinze

eurovoc_concepts:
Austria
Central and Eastern Europe
accession to the European Union
economic consequence
enlargement of the Union
frontier region
impact study
labour market
migratory movement


title: Unterrichtung über das Inkrafttreten für die Gemeinschaft des Übereinkommens der Wirtschaftskommission für Europa der Vereinten Nationen über die Annahme einheitlicher technischer Vorschriften für Radfahrzeuge, Ausrüstungsgegenstände und Teile, die in Radfahrzeuge(n) eingebaut und/oder verwendet werden können, und die Bedingungen für die gegenseitige Anerkennung von Genehmigungen, die nach diesen Vorschriften erteilt wurden ("Geändertes Übereinkommen von 1958")

eurovoc_concepts:
UN regional commission
accession to an agreement
approval
motor vehicle
multilateral agreement
revision of an agreement
technical regulations
vehicle parts

text: L 53/22 ‹ ‹DE Amtsblatt der Europ(cid:132)ischen Gemeinschaften 24. 2. 98 Unterrichtung (cid:129)ber das Inkrafttreten f(cid:129)r die Gemeinschaft des (cid:154)bereinkom- mens der Wirtschaftskommission f(cid:129)r Europa der Vereinten Nationen (cid:129)ber die Annahme einheitlicher technischer Vorschriften f(cid:129)r Radfahrzeuge, Ausr(cid:129)stungs- gegenst(cid:132)nde und Teile, die in Radfahrzeuge(n) eingebaut und/oder verwendet werden k(cid:148)nnen, und die Bedingungen f(cid:129)r die gegenseitige Anerkennung von Genehmigungen, die nach diesen Vorschriften erteilt wurden („Ge(cid:132)ndertes (cid:154)ber- einkommen von 1958“) (1) Das (cid:154)bereinkommen der Wirtschaftskommission f(cid:129)r Europa der Vereinten Nationen (cid:129)ber die Annahme einheitlicher technischer Vorschriften f(cid:129)r Radfahrzeuge, Ausr(cid:129)stungs- gegenst(cid:132)nde und Teile, die in Radfahrzeuge(n) eingebaut und/oder verwendet werden k(cid:148)nnen, und die Bedingungen f(cid:129)r die gegenseitige Anerkennung von Genehmigungen, die nach diesen Vorschriften erteilt wurden („Ge(cid:132)ndertes (cid:154)bereinkommen von 1958“), tritt f(cid:129)r die Gemeinschaft am 24. M(cid:132)rz 1998 in Kraft, da die in Artikel 7 Absatz 3 des (cid:154)ber- einkommens vorgesehenen Verfahren am 23. Januar 1998 abgeschlossen wurden. (1) ABl. L 346 vom 17. 12. 1997, S. 78


title: INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA n. 417/98 dell'on. Freddy BLAK alla Commissione. Iniziative contro la disoccupazione

eurovoc_concepts:
EAGGF
European Regional Development Fund
European Social Fund
FIFG
fight against unemployment
integration into employment
investment aid
job access
regional aid
vocational training

text: C 323/36 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunita‘ europee 21. 10. 98 (98/C 323/44) INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA E-0417/98 di Freddy Blak (PSE) alla Commissione (24 febbraio 1998) Oggetto: Iniziative contro la disoccupazione Puo‘ la Commissione indicare la ripartizione, per singoli settori, dei finanziamenti UE destinati alle iniziative contro la disoccupazione nel ramo commerciale? Puo‘ inoltre precisare quali Direzioni Generali gestiscono tali finanziamenti e specificare i criteri di valutazione utilizzati per attribuire priorita‘ ai progetti presentati? Risposta del Sig. Flynn a nome della Commissione (6 maggio 1998) Il Fondo sociale europeo (FSE) e‘ il principale stumento comunitario per sviluppare le risorse umane e migliorare il funzionamento del mercato del lavoro in tutto il territorio comunitario. L(cid:146)FSE non ha un(cid:146)impostazione settoriale, ma copre un(cid:146)ampia gamma di attivita‘ destinate a migliorare le possibilita‘ di occupazione delle persone che sono sul mercato del lavoro, fornendo loro la formazione necessaria per trovare lavoro o consentendo loro l(cid:146)accesso a nuove possibilita‘ di occupazione. Tuttavia le autorita‘ locali, nell(cid:146)ambito del quadro di sostegno comunitario e conformemente al regolamento del FSE, possono proporre programmi specifici che favoriscono lo sviluppo dell(cid:146)occupazione a livello locale, in un settore specifico. Oltre meta‘ degli stanziamenti del FSE per lo sviluppo delle risorse umane nel corso del periodo 1994-1999 sono destinati a provvedimenti che in generale hanno come obiettivo coloro che sono esclusi o a rischio di esclusione dal mercato del lavoro, sebbene non sia possibile suddividere per settori questi dati generali. Mentre il FSE si occupa essenzialmente di consentire a persone che hanno un diverso collegamento con il mercato del lavoro, di mantenere o migliorare le loro capacita‘ di trovare un(cid:146)occupazione, altri fondi strutturali, quali il Fondo europeo agricolo di orientamento e di garanzia (FEAOG), lo strumento finanziario di orientamento della pesca (SFOP) e il Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale (FESR) sostengono e stimolano opportunita‘ di occupazione attraverso investimenti nelle infrastrutture e nelle capacita‘, nonche· investimenti nelle zone rurali e nelle aziende agricole. I criteri adottati per determinare il tipo di progetto ammissibile a beneficiare di un sostegno dei fondi strutturali figurano nelle relative linee direttrici, recentemente nel contesto della valutazione intermedia (1). (1) Assistenza strutturale comunitaria e occupazione, COM(96) 109 def. Nota per l’Orientamento relativo a interventi nelle zone industriali in declino (Obiettivo 2) per il secondo periodo di programmazione 1997-1999, del 29. 4. 1996. Priorita‘ per l’adeguamento dei Programmi dei fondi strutturali fino alla fine del 1999 › Linee direttrici della Commissione del 30. 5. 1997. (98/C 323/45) INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA E-0419/98 di Gu¤ nter Lu¤ ttge (PSE) alla Commissione (24 febbraio 1998) Oggetto: Esclusione dalla concorrenza per determinate operazioni in pista a norma della direttiva 96/67/CE relativa all(cid:146)accesso al mercato dei servizi di assistenza a terra negli aeroporti della Comunita‘ Le note ai paragrafi 5. 1 › 5. 3 dell(cid:146)allegato alla direttiva 96/67/CE (1) relativa all(cid:146)accesso al mercato dei servizi di assistenza a terra negli aeroporti della Comunita‘ prevedono che determinate operazioni in pista siano escluse dalla concorrenza nel caso in cui siano effettuate da organizzazioni per la sicurezza dei voli. Ritiene la Commissione che in tal caso non si applichino alla esecuzione di tali operazioni neanche le disposizioni della legge tedesca sui servizi di assistenza a terra negli aeroporti, essendo escluse in linea di principio dal campo d(cid:146)applicazione della direttiva e quindi anche dalla sua trasposizione? E‘ la Commissione informata circa l(cid:146)interpretazione di tale direttiva da parte degli Stati membri e in che modo intende essa garantire una sua applicazione uniforme? (1) GU L 272 del 25. 10. 1996, pag. 36


title: Information om ikraftträdandet för gemenskapens del av överenskommelsen inom Förenta nationernas ekonomiska kommission för Europa om antagande av enhetliga tekniska föreskrifter för hjulförsedda fordon och för utrustning och delar som kan monteras och användas på hjulförsett fordon samt om villkoren för ömsesidigt erkännande av godkännande utfärdat på grundval av dessa föreskrifter ("Reviderad överenskommelse av år 1958")

text: L 53/22 ‹ SV ‹ Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 24. 2. 98 Information om ikrafttr(cid:132)dandet f(cid:148)r gemenskapens del av (cid:148)verenskommelsen inom F(cid:148)renta nationernas ekonomiska kommission f(cid:148)r Europa om antagande av enhetliga tekniska f(cid:148)reskrifter f(cid:148)r hjulf(cid:148)rsedda fordon och f(cid:148)r utrustning och delar som kan monteras och anv(cid:132)ndas p(cid:134) hjulf(cid:148)rsett fordon samt om villkoren f(cid:148)r (cid:148)msesidigt erk(cid:132)nnande av godk(cid:132)nnande utf(cid:132)rdat p(cid:134) grundval av dessa f(cid:148)re- skrifter (”Reviderad (cid:148)verenskommelse av (cid:134)r 1958”) (1) (cid:153)verenskommelsen inom F(cid:148)renta nationernas ekonomiska kommission f(cid:148)r Europa om antagande av enhetliga tekniska f(cid:148)reskrifter f(cid:148)r hjulf(cid:148)rsedda fordon och f(cid:148)r utrustning och delar som kan monteras och anv(cid:132)ndas p(cid:134) hjulf(cid:148)rsett fordon samt om villkoren f(cid:148)r (cid:148)msesi- digt erk(cid:132)nnande av godk(cid:132)nnande utf(cid:132)rdat p(cid:134) grundval av dessa f(cid:148)reskrifter (”Reviderad (cid:148)verenskommelse av (cid:134)r 1958”) tr(cid:132)der i kraft f(cid:148)r gemenskapens del den 24 mars 1998, efter det att f(cid:148)rfarandena enligt artikel 7. 3 i (cid:148)verenskommelsen har avslutats den 23 januari 1998. (1) EGT L 346, 17. 12. 1997, s. 78


title: INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA n. 420/98 dell'on. Graham WATSON alla Commissione. Regime fiscale tedesco

eurovoc_concepts:
EU national
German Democratic Republic
Germany
United Kingdom
arts
fiscal policy
free movement of persons
redemption
sport
tax system

text: C 386/16 Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:224) europee IT 11. 12. 98 Risposta data dalla sig. ra Wulf-Mathies in nome della Commissione (20 aprile 1998) ¨ utile ricordare che la costruzione della stazione di trasferimento dei rifiuti solidi urbani a Vigo non Ł stata cofinanziata con fondi comunitari. Per contro, un progetto di smaltimento dei rifiuti in Galizia Ł stato presentato dalle autorit(cid:224) spagnole alla Commissione nel giugno 1997 onde ottenere un cofinanziamento da parte del Fondo di coesione (e non del Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale). La Commissione sta attualmente effettuando una valutazione approfondita del progetto, con il sostegno tecnico di esperti esterni. Un(cid:146)eventuale decisione di cofinanziamento potr(cid:224) essere presa unicamente se il progetto rispetta tutte le politiche comunitarie, ivi compresa quella in tema di ambiente. Nel quadro dell(cid:146)istruzione della pratica di reclamo di cui la Commissione Ł stata investita, una domanda di informazioni Ł stata rivolta alle autorit(cid:224) spagnole. I ricorrenti saranno debitamente informati dalla Commissione in merito a qualsiasi sviluppo della situazione. (98/C 386/020) INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA E-0420/98 di Graham Watson (ELDR) alla Commissione (24 febbraio 1998) Oggetto: Regime fiscale tedesco Due anni fa le autorit(cid:224) tedesche hanno introdotto una «Ausl(cid:228)ndersteuer» (imposta per gli stranieri) su chi lavora in Germania nel settore dello sport o delle arti. Questo prelievo ha un(cid:146)aliquota fissa del 25 %. Un cittadino britannico che lavora in Germania e paga il 7 % di «Solidarit(cid:228)tszuschlag» (prelievo aggiuntivo di solidariet(cid:224)) sui redditi da lavoro ha il diritto di reclamare il rimborso del 25 % dall(cid:146)ufficio delle imposte in quanto cittadino del Regno Unito. In realt(cid:224) ci(cid:242) si scontra con molti problemi. La Commissione Ł a conoscenza di questa imposta? Qual Ł il suo parere sul suo effetto ed Ł del parere che costituisca un ostacolo alla libert(cid:224) di circolazione cui si potrebbe fare opposizione in giudizio? Risposta data dal sig. Monti in nome della Commissione (5 maggio 1998) La Commissione Ł al corrente delle modifiche della legislazione tedesca in base alle quali la trattenuta fiscale speciale del 15 %, imposta sui redditi da lavoro degli artisti o sportivi non residenti, Ł stata abolita nel 1996 cosicchØ tali redditi sono ora soggetti alla trattenuta fiscale minima generale del 25 % imposta in Germania sul reddito dei non residenti. A seconda delle situazioni individuali questa imposta pu(cid:242) essere rimborsata interamente o in parte a seguito della presentazione di una dichiarazione dei redditi. Inoltre, in base alla convenzione fiscale bilaterale esistente fra Germania e Regno Unito le imposte tedesche danno origine a un credito d¢imposta a valere sull¢imposta britannica esigibile su tale reddito. In tali circostanze e in considerazione del fatto che le imposte sul reddito non sono armonizzate all¢interno della Comunit(cid:224), la Commissione non ritiene che la normativa in oggetto sia contestabile in sede giudiziaria


title: Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on: - the 'Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation No 19/65/EEC on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices', and - the 'Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty'

eurovoc_concepts:
ESC opinion
EU Member State
competition policy
economic policy
single market

text: C 116/22 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 28. 4. 1999 1. 4. In any case, the legislation is unlikely to do much to achieve its declared aim of reducing tax evasion. Where a Member State imposed a withholding tax, it would receive this tax into its exchequer; on the other hand, if it opted to inform the Member State where the taxpayer was domiciled, the tax would be collected by that Member State. In these circumstances, all Member States will naturally elect to impose a withholding tax and none will choose the option to inform. The “co-existence” is, therefore, a myth. 1. 4. 1. The result of this is that the minimum tax of 20 % will also be the maximum tax, since Member States in which the taxpayers are resident will continue to be ignorant of the existence of the transactions, which will consequently escape the higher rates of tax which would, in most cases, have been levied if the information method had been used. ’ Reason Self-explanatory Result of the vote Against: 72; for: 40; abstentions: 7. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on: — the ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation No 19/65/EEC on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices’, and — the ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty’ (1999/C 116/06) On 4 November 1998 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 198 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-mentioned proposals. The Section for the Single Market, Production and Consumption, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 11 February 1999. The rapporteur was Mr Regaldo. At its 361st plenary session (meeting of 24 February 1999), the Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 118 votes for with two abstentions. 1. Introduction The Commission has issued its Communication(1) on 1. 1. the application of the Community competition rules to vertical restraints in response to the 227 written submissions received during the consultation exercise on the Green Paper(2). Its primary objective is to shape a new Community vertical restraints policy in order to remedy the shortcomings of the current one. 1. 2. For its part, the Committee takes the view that firstly, an effective policy is needed as vertical restraints are a key (1) OJ C 365, 26. 11. 1998, p. 3. (2) OJ C 296, 29. 9. 1997. component of EU competition policy and play a significant role in promoting business competitiveness, market integration, economic and social cohesion and consumer welfare. 1. 3. Vertical agreements such as agreements and concerted practices entered into by firms, each operating at a different stage of the economic process, in respect of the supply and/or purchase of goods or the marketing of services (otherwise known as vertical restraints) have in time shown a pro- competitive tendency. However, the current rules on vertical restraint need to be updated in line with the ongoing change in production processes and the evolution and multiplication of different types of distribution point. 28. 4. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 116/23 1. 4. The proposed new rules constitute a far-reaching reform of current policy based on formal statutory criteria and specific sectoral rules. The main features of the new policy, which is to be 1. 5. based on the analysis of its economic impact, are as follows: — a single block exemption regulation for all vertical restraints in respect of finished products, intermediate products and services, apart from a few hardcore restric- tions not subject to the block exemption (list of ‘black clauses’); — one or two market-share thresholds are proposed, in order to link block exemptions to companies’ market power; — a ‘safe harbour’ is to be created which should distinguish the agreements that are deemed to be legal (below the threshold) from those which may require individual examination (above the threshold); — the rules will be fleshed out by a set of guidelines detailing the political line to be followed above the market power thresholds and providing for withdrawal of the block exemption below the thresholds, as well as providing companies with clearer criteria and guidelines for calculat- ing market shares; — the new policy envisages increased decentralization, to enable Community competition rules to be enforced by national competition courts and authorities; — a limit on the duration of the exempted agreements, to be differentiated by type of agreement; — a transitional period — to be determined — for the adaptation of agreements already in existence when the new rules come into force. 1. 6. To bring the new policy into effect, the Commission proposes a detailed set of measures on which the Committee has been invited to express its opinion: — a draft amendment of Article 4(2) of Council Regulation No 17(2), the first regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, allowing the Commission to exempt retroactively the vertical agreements when notification takes place at a later date. On the basis of the new powers conferred by the the 1. 7. Council under the two above-mentioned regulations, Commission will be able to commence work on adopting: — the new draft regulation applicable to all vertical restraints in all distribution sectors, except motor vehicles and other vertical relations covered by other regulations and communications, in accordance with the general lines of the communication; — a series of guidelines to accompany the regulation, specify- ing the policy conducted by the Commission above and beyond the thresholds set and copper-fastening the possibility of withdrawing the block exemption. 1. 8. One consequence of the new regulation will be the demise of the present block exemption regulations concerning exclusive distribution [Regulation 1983/83(3)]; exclusive pur- chasing [Regulation 1984/83(4)]; and franchising [Regulation 4087/88(5)]. 1. 9. After the consultation period, the new regulation and guidelines should be adopted by the Commission and enter into force by the end of the year 2000. 2. General comments 2. 1. The Commission Communication emphasizes that analysis of the different options set out in the green paper has revealed their shortcomings in terms of resolving the problems caused by the present arrangements: rigid, overly formalistic rules, neglect of market power and excessively narrow block exemptions. — a communication outlining the new policy on the appli- cation of Community competition rules on vertical restraints; 2. 2. The proposal, in the communication, aims at moving current policy towards a new, less formalistic approach which takes account of the economic impact of the agreements under consideration and strives to simplify supervision procedures. — a draft amendment of Council Regulation No 19/65 EEC(1) to implement decentralization and to extend the powers vested in the Commission for applying Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices; (1) OJ 36, 6. 3. 1965. (2) OJ 13, 21. 2. 1962, amended by Regulation No 59, OJ 52, 10. 7. 1962, by Regulation No 118/63/EEC, OJ 162, 7. 11. 1963 and by Regulation (EEC) No 2822/71, OJ L 285, 29. 12. 1971. (3) OJ L 173, 30. 6. 1983, p. 1, as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1582/97, OJ L 214, 6. 8. 1997, p. 27. (4) OJ L 173, 30. 6. 1983, p. 5, as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1582/97, OJ L 214, 6. 8. 1997, p. 27. (5) OJ L 359, 28. 12. 1988, p. 46. C 116/24 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 28. 4. 1999 This should lead to a break with previous practice and is, in principle, to be welcomed as it ties in with the approach advocated by the Committee in its earlier opinion on the Green Paper on vertical restraints(1). In that opinion, the Committee recommended moving 2. 3. away from the current rigidity and analysing vertical cooper- ation with the requisite flexibility, enabling the block exemp- tion system to accommodate new forms of distribution geared to changing market conditions and, at the same time, to give companies the legal certainty they need in future agreements. It also stressed the importance of market structure for evaluat- ing the effects of vertical restraints and acknowledged the role of arbitration as a precondition for proper competition and market integration: a role which must be guaranteed at the level of both consumers and middlemen. 2. 4. As outlined, the new policy not only takes these takes up other highly recommendations on board, but important suggestions. These include the need to look at similar economic situations with comparable horizontal or vertical market effects in the same way, even if their legal structures differ in certain respects, and to consider how the required substantial new departure in Community policy on vertical restraints ‘should be integrated into the process of updating and modernizing the current legal and regulatory framework, rather than abandoning it’. Lastly, the Committee called for revamping of the economic and legal theories which underlay the earlier interpretation of Article 85, particularly in the area of block exemption regulations. 2. 5. The Committee now notes that the Commission aims to amend the current broad interpretation of Article 85 (which prohibits most vertical agreements containing exclusivity clauses or other restrictions on economic operators’ freedom of action). It intends to base its document on the concept of market power accompanied firstly by an extension of the scope of block exemptions and, secondly, by simplification of the notification procedure for agreements. In this regard, it is worth recalling that the Court of Justice has consistently ruled that vertical agreements — particularly exclusive-distribution agreements — are not automatically subject to Article 85(1). 3. Specific comments 3. 1. Exemption for distribution agreements: a wider block exemption will give parties to selective distribution agree- ments, exclusive purchasing agreements and franchising agree- ments welcome flexibility to conclude contractual arrange- (1) OJ C 296, 29. 9. 1997. ments which suit their commercial needs and reduce the need to fit such agreements into the straitjacket of the individual block exemptions. The Committee welcomes the fact that the new block exemption will apply to a wider range of activities by the distributor, including the supply or purchase, or both, of goods for resale or processing, as well as the marketing of services and intermediate goods, in addition to finished goods for resale only. It particularly welcomes the fact that goods or products may be ‘processed’ as opposed to the old, more restricted test of ‘for resale only’. It would hope for further guidance upon the width 3. 1. 1. of these activities to be given either in the recitals in the preamble or the new proposed Guidelines to the Block Exemption. Finally, the Committee welcomes the inclusion of vertical agreements of associations of SME retailers within the block exemption, since that meets the point raised by the Committee in its opinion. The Committee, moreover, points out that, as 3. 1. 1. 1. regards market dynamics, such forms of cooperation should not be restricted to SMEs alone. The exemption should also apply to agreements whose parties exceed the Commission’s precise definition of SME but are, nevertheless, equivalent to SME in terms of real market power. 3. 1. 2. The Committee also points out that the definition of vertical agreements does not cover (nor does it appear intended to cover)(2) agency agreements in respect of goods and services. The Committee hopes the Commission will take the opportunity to clarify its position in relation to agents who are not integrated into the principal’s business(3). 3. 2. The proposed new policy envisages using market shares as a criterion for determining whether block exemptions apply, with the laudable aim of giving firms which do not possess market power the opportunity of securing legal certainty below the defined market share threshold. The Committee notes that the introduction of thresholds is also warranted in terms of the need to prevent companies which do possess market power benefiting from exemptions, with the concomitant risk that their market power will have an adverse impact on competitiveness and jeopardize consumer interests. 3. 2. 1. The Committee wishes, however, to point out that: — high market share is not synonymous with high market power. The Commission should publish in its Guidelines the factors, such as the possibility of foreclosing the market, to be taken as evidence that a high market share reflects real market power; (2) See the Green Paper on vertical restraints, p. ii, Executive Summary. (3) According to the case law of the European Court and the Commission, if the agent is integrated into the principal’s business, Article 85(1) does not apply at all. 28. 4. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 116/25 — the Commission retains the reserve power of withdrawing the benefit of the block exemption; — the Commission can also enforce Article 86 in the case of individual or joint market domination. The Committee made the same comment concerning Option III in the green paper, referring specifically to the approved system of block exemptions for technology transfer(1). The Committee notes that 3. 6. the new arrangements, based on a single set of rules for block exemptions, effectively terminate the present sectoral regulations, namely in beer and petrol, excluding cars: however, this does not necessarily mean that the specific circumstances justifying their original adoption have ceased to exist. The guidelines should reflect these specific factors in implementing the new single regulation and, if necessary, allow the specific regulations to continue. Generally speaking, the Committee accepts the need 3. 3. for a market share cap as a condition for a wider block exemption, in the distribution context. It would remind the Commission, however, that the introduction of a market share test in the distribution block exemption will require careful treatment in the sense that sufficient guidance must be given on its calculation to ensure that the parties will make use of the block exemption. The Committee therefore welcomes the guidance given on Section IV — Point 5 and suggests that: 3. 7. The Committee acknowledges the Commission’s will- ingness to strike a balance between (a) an approach based on analysing market effects and (b) a reasonable level of legal certainty. To this end, the Commission notice on defining relevant markets(2), used as the basic reference for the forth- coming general exemption regulation, should be accompanied by guidelines going into greater detail and clarity on the indications previously supplied for calculating market shares and the arrangements in the event of thresholds being exceeded. a) the Commission gives guidance in its proposed Guidelines; and b) offers a ‘quick look facility’ to parties in difficulty. The Committee is also unclear about the basis on 3. 4. which the choice of thresholds was actually made. In practice, there would be a 10 % threshold for ‘de minimis’ agreements; a second of up to 20 %; a third between 20 and 40 %; and a fourth above 40 %. 3. 4. 1. The Commission finally proposes choosing between a single 25-35 % threshold and a dual 20 % or 40 % threshold system. A 25-35 % market share threshold certainly offers advantages, in terms of simplicity and clarity, compared with the dual-threshold system, which would undoubtedly be complicated and could lead back to a formalistic approach. It could also have the opposite effect to that intended, on legal certainty for companies: the number of notifications could rise rather than fall. 3. 4. 2. 30 % of market share. The Committee recommends a single threshold of 3. 8. The Committee takes note of the advantages of using market share thresholds: below the threshold, vertical restraints are presumed to be free of any significant overall negative effect on competition and are therefore compatible with Article 85(1), with the exception of hardcore restrictions (such as imposed sales prices and resale restrictions defined under the black-clause approach). Legal certainty is thus granted to these kinds of agreement. 3. 9. However, the Committee notes the disadvantages for SMEs in the distribution sector which may flow from this presumption of compatibility. If a distribution network depends on a vendor whose market share is below the threshold which will ultimately be set, the corresponding distribution contracts — which do not contain hardcore restrictions — will not be monitored at all. In order to avoid this situation — which could weaken the position of distribution SMEs and, quite apart from questions of fairness, could lead to the Commission receiving numerous complaints — the Committee calls upon the Commission to ensure that clauses are inserted which, in such cases, would restrict the powers of vendors vis-à-vis distribution SMEs or, at least, would provide the latter with effective safeguards. 3. 5. The inadequate indication of precise, easily applicable criteria for calculating market shares and defining relevant markets, in terms of both products and services and geographi- cally, could give rise to legal uncertainty, with the risk of further burdening rather than simplifying procedures, as mooted by the Commission in the new policy. 3. 10. The Committee welcomes both the assurance that there will be no presumption of illegality above the market- share cap, and the introduction of Guidelines to cover the three issues (negative clearance, exemption or prohibition) of the scope of Article 85(1), the Commission’s policy under Article 85(3), and its policy in relation to its withdrawal powers. The Committee would have at least liked to see a draft of such guidelines before drawing up the present opinion. (1) OJ C 102, 24. 4. 1995. (2) OJ C 312, 14. 10. 1997, p. 15. C 116/26 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 28. 4. 1999 3. 10. 1. The Commission did, however, confirm that it will take upon itself the burden of proving that an agreement is in breach of Article 85(1). Nevertheless, the Committee considers that should an agreement be declared invalid, though not by virtue of having exceeded the market share cap, the declaration of invalidity should take immediate rather than retroactive effect. This has not been clearly stated in the amendments to current rules proposed by the Commission. on a given market, insofar as they are not sure of achieving any form whatsoever of market — or customer — exclusivity as a quid pro quo. It seems clear that the Commission still intends to continue allowing undertakings to permit restraints on active sales on a exclusive distributors’ territory; however, the Committee also wants the Commission to be able to permit an agreement between a supplier and a distributor under which the distributor will only engage in active sales vis-à-vis more specific customers determined by the supplier. 3. 11. The Committee welcomes the removal of the whitelist from the block exemption and would expect to see guidance on acceptable clauses in the proposed Guidelines. The Committee notes that by establishing a list of hardcore restrictions (blacklist) automatically falling outside the general exemption, the Commission’s new policy heralds a new approach which is to be welcomed, since it overturns the present restrictive approach allowing block exemptions in respect of specific clauses. The Committee is pleased to note that by acceding to its request, the Commission recognizes that clauses involving maximum and recommended resale prices are, under certain conditions, compatible with competition rules. National pro- visions, which at present have been accepted by the Com- mission, should therefore remain valid under the future regime. The Committee is nevertheless concerned at 3. 12. the number of clauses in the blacklist and the difficulty in interpreting and implementing them. In practice, this might not simplify matters for companies when defining agreements, thereby encouraging them to resort to notification in order to ensure legal certainty. Section V, point 3 of the Communi- cation(1), for example, which prohibits the imposition of restrictions on distributors with regard to sales outside their contractual territory, gives great cause for concern since it substantially modifies the previous interpretation of territorial exclusivity. It would therefore require considerable clarification for the purposes of implementation. Similarly, the Commission needs to shed further light on the legality of ‘tying clauses’ in conjunction with ‘no-compete’ clauses. 3. 12. 1. Furthermore, doubts arise regarding the Com- mission’s interpretation of exclusive distribution agreements which also provide for exclusive purchasing and which its in market integration terms, document considers harmful although they have thus far been exempted (see the Grundig- Consten judgement, 1966)(2). 3. 12. 2. The ESC agrees that the existing ban on passive sales under exclusive distribution agreements must be maintained. It is, however, important to recognize the importance of permit- ting restraints in active sales. Obviously undertakings do not wish to assume the difficult task of introducing a new product (1) OJ C 365, 26. 11. 1998, p. 3. (2) Judgment of 13. 7. 1966, ECJ Reports 1966, p. 429. 3. 13. The Committee notes that the duration has been left undefined: limited duration, varying in accordance with the type of agreement, is envisaged. This seems to imply jettisoning the current rules , which allow for a five-year period renewable to ten, seen by companies as necessary in order to plan investments properly. Given that the Commission and, in the future, possibly the national authorities may have the power to withdraw exemptions if difficulties arise, any limit on the duration of agreements must reflect the length of time required for a return on investment, specifically in the beer and retail petrol sectors. 3. 13. 1. The Committee does not know how the Com- mission plans to react in the event of innovative vertical agreements or in cases where suppliers own the premises. Again, the document refers to future guidelines. The Committee notes that as proposed in the amend- 3. 14. ment to Article 1 of Regulation 19/65/EEC, the new provision is to apply to ‘categories of agreements between two or more undertakings, each operating at a different stage of the economic process’. Given market dynamics and the complexity and integration of certain production and processing processes, the Committee wonders whether it would not be better to delete the reference to stages of the economic process and focus instead on the economic purpose of the agreement for which exemption is sought. 3. 15. As regards flanking measures, the Committee also welcomes the revision of Article 4(2) to allow retroactive exemption of non-notified agreements above the market share cap. It agrees that such a reform could help to reduce the pressure of individual notifications, although the Committee would like to remind the Commission that this does not preclude the possibility that parties above the threshold may nevertheless wish to notify immediately after the agreement is made, in order to avoid subsequent opportunistic disputes. 3. 15. 1. The Committee therefore remains concerned that the applications for individual notification above the market share threshold will be submitted to the Commission with no assurance of a decision within a reasonable time, nor any certainty of a result other than a comfort letter. As it mentioned 28. 4. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 116/27 in its opinion, it would like to see a procedural mechanism which has some time limits built in, such as a non-opposition procedure. Another possible model could be the time limits built into the merger control regulation(1). The Committee looks forward to such a change as part of the more general reform of procedures by the Commission. 3. 15. 2. The Commission should also prepare itself pro- cedurally for notification by parties which are in dispute about entitlement to exemption. Such cases have previously been in the absence of retrospective dealt with by the courts, exemption. 3. 16. With regard to the main flanking measure involving devolution to national authorities of application of Com- munity competition rules, the Committee notes that the new policy empowers national authorities to withdraw the benefit of block exemption in their territory, and to bring Article 85(1) to bear above the market-share cap. The Committee would emphasize that the new approach is a major departure from the current one, which gives the Commission sole responsibility for full application of Article 85(3). 3. 16. 1. Although the Committee basically backs Com- mission efforts to decentralize the implementation of compe- tition policy, it would at the same time point to the risks inherent in such an approach for the uniformity and consist- ency of EU competition policy. For companies, re-assigning powers to national authorities might be detrimental if differ- ences in official and legal practice in the Member States were to jeopardize uniform application of the law within the single market and impair procedural efficiency. The Commission should lay down clear procedural rules to prevent legislative fragmentation as a result of different approaches to industrial or competition policy in the various Member States. Moreover, the Commission must be authorized to initiate proceedings against national authorities in respect of monitoring com- pliance with legal and technical specifications. Arrangements must also be made for cross-border investigations since, unlike the Commission, national cartel authorities have no powers in this regard. The ‘one-stop-shop’ principle in Europe should always be the top priority, even in the event of decentralized application. That said, increasingly delegating smaller agree- ments involving primarily parties located in one Member State to the competition authorities of that state will help lighten the Commission’s workload, and enable it to concentrate its efforts upon those agreements with a Community-wide significance. economic effects of such agreements, assuming that such agreements are not part of a wider network of agreements and there is no danger of foreclosure of the relevant market. It thinks that the reasoning of the ECJ in ‘Delimitis v. Henninger Brau’(1991)(2) suggests that the Court takes a relaxed view of hardcore restraints in the case of small agreements with weak economic effects under Article 85(1), and considers that the Commission should rethink its position under Article 85(3). 3. 18. The Committee welcomes as a step in the right direction the Commission’s willingness to treat as acceptable the ‘non-hardcore vertical restraints’ below a 20 % threshold, should the two threshold system of market share caps be adopted. This shows that the Commission is applying econ- omic thinking to the application of the block exemption at the lower end of the market share spectrum. 3. 19. The Committee would recommend that if a single threshold market share cap is adopted, such a principle should be retained by the Commission, if necessary in the Guidelines. 3. 20. The Committee also suggests that the Commission, consistent with its new, more economic approach to vertical agreements, should take the further step of re-examining its use of a blacklist of all hard core restraints in the case of all small vertical agreements, including those under the 10 % threshold in the Notice of Agreements of Minor Importance. 3. 21. The Committee welcomes the Commission’s pre- paredness to make use of the withdrawal mechanism as suggested in the Communication. There must be a careful balance between the safeguards built into the block exemption and the reserve power of the withdrawal procedure. 3. 22. its earlier opinion on vertical restraints(3). The Committee reiterates its endorsement, voiced in 4. Final comments The Committee notes that the guidelines, a key com- 4. 1. ponent of the new policy, should have been submitted by the Commission in conjunction with the new single regulation, prior to any amendment of Regulations (EEC) 19/65 and 17/62. 3. 17. The Committee also welcomes the Commission’s willingness to take into account the economic context of vertical distribution agreements. It therefore questions whether allhardcore restraints, including those below a low market share threshold, have to be blacklisted in view of the weak 4. 2. With the exception of the points made in the above general and specific comments, particularly with regard to the use of the market share criterion, the Committee endorses the introduction of the new regulation with a single 30 % threshold. (1) OJ L 257/90, p. 13. (2) I ECR — 935 (1991). (3) OJ C 296, 29. 9. 1997. C 116/28 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 28. 4. 1999 4. 3. This would facilitate the widespread use of the regu- lation, leaving the Commission to focus exclusively on those cases in which market power is liable to jeopardize compliance with the rules of competition. 4. 4. With regard to the blacklist clauses, the Committee is greatly concerned about the clause contained in Section V, point 3 of the Communication, which, as mentioned in point 3. 11 above, substantially modifies the previous interpretation of territorial exclusivity. 4. 5. As mentioned in point 3. 12, the Committee stresses the need for the Commission to bear in mind, when defining the duration of the agreements, the length of time required for a return on investment. Brussels, 24 February 1999. In the light of these comments, 4. 6. the Committee endorses the Commission’s initiative, and calls upon it to take account of the views expressed in the present opinion in relation to the definition of the guidelines and the single block exemption regulation, on which the Committee will be consulted. 4. 7. The Committee will then have the opportunity to monitor how the Commission intends to regulate vertical agreements within a clearly defined legal framework, which must be hallmarked by its straightforwardness, transparency, legal certainty and support for SMEs if the expected benefits are to be fully passed on to consumers. The President of the Economic and Social Committee Beatrice RANGONI MACHIAVELLI Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Commission White Paper “Fair Payment for Infrastructure Use: A phased approach to a common transport infrastructure charging framework in the EU”’ (1999/C 116/07) On 31 July 1998 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 198 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the White Paper entitled ‘Fair Payment for Infrastructure Use: A phased approach to a common transport infrastructure charging framework in the EU’. The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 9 February 1999. The rapporteur was Mr Kielman. At its 361st plenary session (meeting of 24 February 1999) the Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 117 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions. 1. Introduction 1. 1. The present White Paper is a follow-up to the 1993 White Paper on the future development of the common transport policy(1) and the 1995 Green Paper entitled ‘Towards fair and efficient pricing in transport’(2). In the White Paper the Commission suggests that a harmonized Community approach, based on the ‘user pays’ principle, be adopted to transport charges and maintains that this will enhance both the efficiency and the sustainability of the transport system. 1. 1. 1. The great diversity of current infrastructure charging systems across modes of transport and Member States under- mines this efficiency and sustainability. 1. 1. 2. The variety of problems thrown up by the diversity of approaches to infrastructure charging cannot be adequately treated in isolation from each other. (1) OJ C 352, 30. 12. 1993, p. 11. (2) OJ C 56, 24. 2. 1997, p. 31. 1. 2. The Commission therefore thinks that a gradual and progressive harmonization of charging systems, based on the ‘user pays’ principle, is necessary throughout the European Union for all important commercial transport activities


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 397/98 by Nikitas KAKLAMANIS to the Commission. Laundering of Illegal Funds in Northern Cyprus

eurovoc_concepts:
Cyprus
arms trade
drug traffic
illegal migration
money laundering
occupied territory
organised crime

text: 2. 10. 98 FI Euroopan yhteiso¤jen virallinen lehti C 304/93 Markkinoiden avautumisen ja laajentumisen vaikutukset voivat tuntua nopeammin ja voimakkaammin niilla¤ alueilla, joilla on yhteinen ulkoraja KIE-maiden kanssa, kuin muilla alueilla, mutta raja-alueet myo¤s hyo¤tyva¤t uusien markkinoiden la¤heisyydesta¤, joka tarjoaa uusia mahdollisuuksia. Na¤iden uusien markkinoiden merkityk- sen yhteiso¤n tuottajille osoittaa yhteiso¤n ja KIE-maiden va¤lisen kaupan nopea kasvu seka¤ niiden ja yhteiso¤n va¤lisen kauppataseen kasvava ylija¤a¤ma¤. Vaikka palkat KIE-maissa ovat huomattavasti matalampia kuin Ita¤vallassa, ta¤ma¤ ei na¤y suoraan tuotteiden kustannuksissa, koska ita¤valtalaisten tyo¤ntekijo¤iden tuottavuutta pideta¤a¤n suurempana. Lisa¤ksi laajentumisen vaikutuksia pehmenneta¤a¤n siirtyma¤ajan ja¤rjestelyilla¤ erityisesti herkilla¤ alueilla. Useat raja-alueet saavat jo nyt tukea rakennerahastoista. Uudet Saksan osavaltiot ja Burgenland ovat ta¤lla¤ hetkella¤ ja todenna¤ko¤isesti myo¤s tulevaisuudessa tavoitteen 1 alueita. Suurin osa muista Saksan, Ita¤vallan ja Italian raja-alueista saa tavoitteen 5 b mukaista tukea. Koska uuden tavoitteen 2 yhteydessa¤ ja¤senvaltioille tarjotaan mahdollisuus soveltaa kansallisia valintaperusteita merkitta¤va¤a¤n osaan tuettuja alueita, ne voivat valita na¤ihin raja-alueita, jos katsovat niilla¤ ilmeneva¤n erityisia¤ ongelmia. Lisa¤ksi komissio ehdottaa yhteiso¤n Interreg-aloitteen sa¤ilytta¤mista¤. Interreg-aloite ja PHARE-ohjelmaan kuuluva raja-alueiden yhteistyo¤ ovat sopivia va¤lineita¤ sellaisten raja-alueiden ongelmien ratkaisemiseen, joilla on yhteinen ulkoraja KIE-maiden kanssa. Interregin erityisesta¤ rakenteesta uuden suunnitteluajanjakson aikana ei ole viela¤ tehty pa¤a¤to¤sta¤, mutta siihen tulee sisa¤ltyma¤a¤n riitta¤va¤a¤ joustavuutta raja-alueiden tarpeiden ta¤ytta¤miseksi, koska ja¤senvaltiot voivat tehda¤ ehdotuksia tukea saavista alueista ja tuettavista hankkeista. Vaikka yhteiso¤n laajentumisella tulee olemaan erityisia¤ vaikutuksia raja-alueilla, Agenda 2000 (cid:150)asiakirjassa (1) ehdotettujen rakennepolitiikan va¤lineiden ulottuvuus ja joustavuus on riitta¤va¤ na¤iden aiheiden ka¤sittelemiseen. (1) KOM (97)2000. (98/C 304/139) KIRJALLINEN KYSYMYS E-0397/98 komissiolle esitta¤ja¤(t): Nikitas Kaklamanis (UPE) (24. helmikuuta 1998) Aihe: Laittoman rahan peseminen Pohjois-Kyproksella Turkin miehitta¤ma¤ Pohjois-Kypros on muutettu kansainva¤lisen rikollisuuden rahoituskeskukseksi. Eurooppalai- sessa lehdisto¤ssa¤ julkistetut tiedot ja julkisesti esitetyt syyto¤kset todistavat selva¤sti, etta¤ miehitetty Kypros on huumeiden, kemiallisten ja¤tteiden, aseiden ja laittomien maahanmuuttajien salakuljettajien paratiisi. Pelka¤sta¤a¤n viimeisen puolentoista vuoden aikana 18 uutta kasinoa on aloittanut toimintansa Pohjois-Kyproksella. Lisa¤ksi viimeisten 3 › 4 vuoden aikana on perustettu 36 offshore-pankkia ja 29 tavallisten pankkien sivukonttoria. Na¤iden kautta pesta¤a¤n heroiinin, aseiden, kemiallisten ja¤tteiden ja laittomien maahanmuuttajien salakuljetusta Eurooppaan harjoittavien tahojen voitot. Komissiolta kysyta¤a¤n, kuinka se aikoo na¤ita¤ julkisuuteen tulleita tietoja hyo¤dynta¤en reagoida lakkauttaakseen ta¤ma¤n tilanteen, jota ka¤yta¤nno¤ssa¤ kontrolloi EU:hun tulliliiton kautta sidoksissa oleva valtio, nimitta¤in Turkki. Komission ja¤senen Hans van den Broekin komission puolesta antama vastaus (6. huhtikuuta 1998) Komissiolla ei ole tarkempia tietoja arvoisan parlamentin ja¤senen mainitsemista va¤itetyista¤ laittomuuksista. Komissio palauttaa mieliin, etta¤ se tukee pyrkimyksia¤ oikeudenmukaisen ja kesta¤va¤n ratkaisun lo¤yta¤miseksi Kyproksen kysymykseen seka¤ maan liittymiseksi yhteiso¤o¤n ja toivoo, etta¤ na¤in saataisiin aikaan olosuhteet, joissa ta¤llaisia ongelmia voitaisiin ka¤sitella¤ tehokkaasti


title: Förslag till rådets beslut om gemenskapens ståndpunkt i associeringsrådet beträffande Tjeckiska republikens deltagande i gemenskapens program för yrkesutbildning, ungdom och utbildning

eurovoc_concepts:
Czechia
EU programme
education
vocational training
young person

text: 16. 4. 98 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 116/21 F‰rslag till r¿dets beslut om gemenskapens st¿ndpunkt i associeringsr¿det betr…ffande Tjeckiens deltagande i gemenskapens program f‰r yrkesutbildning, ungdom och utbildning (98/C 116/11) KOM(98) 93 slutlig - 98/0067(CNS) (Framlagt av kommissionen den 24 februari 1998) EUROPEISKA UNIONENS R¯D HAR BESLUTAT FˆLJANDE med beaktande av F‰rdraget om uppr…ttandet av Europeiska gemenskapen, s…rskilt artik(cid:220) larna 126 och 127 j…mf‰rda med artikel 228. 3 f‰rsta stycket i detta, med beaktande av kommissionens f‰rslag, med beaktande av Europaparlamentets yttrande, och med beaktande av f‰ljande: Genom r¿dets och kommissionens beslut av den 4 december 1995 antogs till…ggsprotokollet till Europaavtalet om uppr…ttandet av en associering mellan Europeiska gemenskaperna och deras medlemsstater, ¿ ena sidan, och Tjeckiska republiken, ¿ andra sidan. Enligt artikel 1 i till…ggsprotokollet f¿r Tjeckien delta i gemenskapens ramprogram, s…rskilda program, projekt eller andra ¿tg…rder inom bland annat omr¿dena yrkesutbildning, ungdoms(cid:220) fr¿gor och utbildning, och enligt artikel 2 skall associeringsr¿det best…mma villkoren f‰r Tjeckiens deltagande i de verksamheter som anges i artikel 1. Enligt r¿dets beslut 94/819/EG av den 6 december 1994 om uppr…ttande av ett ¿tg…rdspro(cid:220) gram f‰r genomf‰randet av en yrkesutbildningspolitik f‰r Europeiska gemenskapen(cid:216)(˛) (nedan kallat ’’Leonardo da Vinci’’), s…rskilt artikel 9. 1 i detta, Europaparlamentets och r¿dets beslut nr 818/95/EG av den 14 mars 1995 om antagande av tredje fasen av Ungdom f‰r Europa(cid:220)pro(cid:220) grammet(cid:216)(ˇ), s…rskilt artikel 7. 4 i detta, samt Europaparlamentets och r¿dets beslut nr 819/95/EG av den 14 mars 1995 om fastst…llande av gemenskapens ¿tg…rdsprogram p¿ utbild(cid:220) ningsomr¿det (nedan kallat ’’Sokrates’’(cid:216)(—)), s…rskilt artikel 7. 3 i detta, skall dessa program vara ‰ppna f‰r deltagande av de associerade l…nderna i Central(cid:220) och ˆsteuropa i enlighet med de villkor betr…ffande deltagande i gemenskapsprogram som fastst…lls i till…ggsprotokollen till as(cid:220) socieringsavtalen. I Associeringsr¿dets EG(cid:220)Tjeckien beslut av den 30 september 1997 fastst…lls villkoren och s…ttet f‰r Tjeckiens deltagande i gemenskapsprogrammen f‰r yrkesutbildning, ungdom och utbild(cid:220) ning(cid:216)((cid:209)). (˛)(cid:217)EGT L 340, 29. 12. 1994. (ˇ)(cid:217)EGT L 87, 20. 4. 1995. (—)(cid:217)EGT L 87, 20. 4. 1995. ((cid:209))(cid:217)EGT L 277, 10. 10. 1997. C 116/22 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 16. 4. 98 H´RIGENOM FˆRESKRIVS FˆLJANDE. Bifogade utkast till associeringsr¿dets beslut skall utg‰ra gemenskapens st¿ndpunkt i det asso(cid:220) cieringsr¿d som uppr…ttats genom Europaavtalet mellan Europeiska gemenskaperna och deras medlemsstater, ¿ ena sidan, och Tjeckiska republiken, ¿ andra sidan, betr…ffande Tjeckiens deltagande i gemenskapsprogrammen f‰r yrkesutbildning, ungdom och utbildning fr¿n och med 1998. Utkast till beslut av Associeringsr¿det EG(cid:220)Tjeckien om …ndring av beslut nr 2/97 av Associe(cid:220) ringsr¿det mellan Europeiska gemenskaperna och deras medlemsstater, ¿ ena sidan, och Tjeckiska republiken, ¿ andra sidan, av den 30 september 1997 om antagande av villkor och s…tt f‰r Tjeckiska republikens deltagande i gemenskapens program f‰r yrkesutbildning, ungdom och utbildning ASSOCIERINGSR¯DET HAR BESLUTAT FˆLJANDE med beaktande av Europaavtalet om uppr…ttandet av en associering mellan Europeiska gemen(cid:220) skaperna och deras medlemsstater, ¿ ena sidan, och Tjeckien, ¿ andra sidan(cid:216)(˛), med beaktande av till…ggsprotokollet till Europaavtalet om uppr…ttandet av en associering mel(cid:220) lan Europeiska gemenskaperna och deras medlemsstater, ¿ ena sidan, och Tjeckiska repub(cid:220) liken, ¿ andra sidan, r‰rande Tjeckiska republikens deltagande i gemenskapens program, s…r(cid:220) skilt artiklarna 1 och 2 i detta(cid:216)(ˇ), med beaktande av beslut nr 2/97 av Associeringsr¿det mellan Europeiska gemenskaperna och deras medlemsstater, ¿ ena sidan, och Tjeckiska republiken, ¿ andra sidan, av den 30 september 1997 om antagande av villkor och s…tt f‰r Tjeckiska republikens deltagande i gemenskapens program f‰r yrkesutbildning, ungdom och utbildning(cid:216)(—), och med beaktande av f‰ljande: Enligt artikel 1 i till…ggsprotokollet f¿r Tjeckien delta i gemenskapens ramprogram, s…rskilda program, projekt eller andra ¿tg…rder inom bland annat omr¿dena yrkesutbildning, ungdoms(cid:220) fr¿gor och utbildning. Enligt artikel 2 i till…ggsprotokollet skall associeringsr¿det best…mma villkoren och s…ttet f‰r Tjeckiens deltagande i de verksamheter som anges i artikel 1. (˛)(cid:217)EGT L 347, 31. 12. 1993. (ˇ)(cid:217)EGT L 317, 30. 12. 1995. (—)(cid:217)EGT L 277, 10. 10. 1997. 16. 4. 98 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 116/23 Det kr…vs en anpassning av best…mmelserna om Tjeckiska republikens finansiella bidrag i punkt 5 i bilaga I samt i punkt 7 i bilaga II till beslut nr 2/97 av Associeringsr¿det mellan Europeiska gemenskaperna och deras medlemsstater, ¿ ena sidan, och Tjeckiska republiken, ¿ andra sidan, av den 30 september 1997 om antagande av villkor och s…tt f‰r Tjeckiska republikens delta(cid:220) gande i gemenskapens program f‰r yrkesutbildning, ungdom och utbildning. H´RIGENOM FˆRESKRIVS FˆLJANDE. Artikel 1 Beslut nr 2/97 av Associeringsr¿det mellan Europeiska gemenskaperna och deras medlemssta(cid:220) ter, ¿ ena sidan, och Tjeckiska republiken, ¿ andra sidan, av den 30 september 1997 om anta(cid:220) gande av villkor och s…tt f‰r Tjeckiska republikens deltagande i gemenskapens program f‰r yrkesutbildning, ungdom och utbildning skall …ndras p¿ f‰ljande s…tt: Punkt 7 i bilaga II skall ers…ttas med f‰ljande: ’’7. (cid:217)Tjeckiska republiken skall betala de ytterligare administrativa kostnader som avses i punkterna 3(cid:134)5 ur sin egen statsbudget. Tjeckiska republiken skall dessutom ur den nationella budgeten betala 50(cid:216)% av det resterande ¿rliga bidraget till programmet Leonardo da Vinci enligt punkt 3, samt 67(cid:216)% av det resterande ¿rliga bidraget till Sokrates och Ungdom f‰r Europa enligt punkterna 4 och 5. Med f‰rbeh¿ll f‰r de ¿terkommande programplaneringsf‰rfarandena f‰r Phare skall resterande 50(cid:216)% av bidraget till Leonardo samt 33(cid:216)% av bidragen till Sokrates och Ungdom f‰r Europa betalas ur Tjeckiska republikens ¿rliga nationella v…gledande program f‰r Phare. ’’ Detta beslut skall g…lla under giltighetstiden f‰r programmen Leonardo da Vinci, Ungdom f‰r Europa och Sokrates (till och med 31 december 1999). Artikel 2 Detta beslut tr…der i kraft samma dag som det antas av associeringsr¿det. Artikel 3