title: PREGUNTA ESCRITA P-1263/00 de Lord Inglewood (PPE-DE) a la Comisión. Adhesión de China a la OMC.

eurovoc_concepts:
China
Community budget
World Trade Organisation
accession to the European Union

text: C 53 E/114 Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas ES 20. 2. 2001 En lo que se refiere al ejemplo concreto del medicamento Xenical de los Laboratorios Roche, en la medida en que se trata de un medicamento cuya autorizaci(cid:243)n de puesta en el mercado fue concedida mediante el procedimiento centralizado, es decir, por la Comisi(cid:243)n previo dictamen del ComitØ Cient(cid:237)fico de la Agencia Europea para la Evaluaci(cid:243)n de Medicamentos, la Comisi(cid:243)n examinarÆ el problema planteado con el titular de la autorizaci(cid:243)n de puesta en el mercado y con las autoridades neerlandesas encargadas de controlar la publicidad en su territorio nacional. En efecto, el titular de la autorizaci(cid:243)n de puesta en el mercado es responsable de la publicidad de los medicamentos para los que ha recibido la autorizaci(cid:243)n correspondiente. La Comisi(cid:243)n adoptarÆ las medidas oportunas si se observa que no se cumplen las disposiciones de la Directiva 92/28/CEE. (1) Directiva 92/28/CEE del Consejo, de 31 de marzo de 1992, relativa a la publicidad de los medicamentos para uso humano, DO L 113 de 30. 4. 1992. (2001/C 53 E/144) PREGUNTA ESCRITA E-1260/00 de Alexander de Roo (Verts/ALE) y Marie Isler BØguin (Verts/ALE) a la Comisi(cid:243)n (19 de abril de 2000) Asunto: Expulsi(cid:243)n del oso pardo de los Pirineos franceses A finales de marzo de 2000, el parlamento francØs decidi(cid:243) que los osos pardos en los Pirineos (franceses) han de ser objeto de un traslado forzoso. En 1996 se importaron especialmente algunos osos pardos de Eslovenia para reforzar y revitalizar la poblaci(cid:243)n de osos pardos amenazados de extinci(cid:243)n en los Pirineos. ¿Comparte la Comisi(cid:243)n el punto de vista de que la captura de estos osos pardos y su traslado forzoso a Eslovenia o a parques zool(cid:243)gicos son contrarios a la directiva sobre los hÆbitats? En caso de que la Comisi(cid:243)n comparta esta opini(cid:243)n, ¿quØ gestiones piensa realizar para obtener que las autoridades francesas renuncien a este traslado forzoso de los osos? Respuesta de la Sra. Wallstr(cid:246)m en nombre de la Comisi(cid:243)n (9 de junio de 2000) Su Seæor(cid:237)a se refiere a una enmienda aprobada en primera lectura por la Asamblea Nacional francesa. Hasta ahora, la Comisi(cid:243)n no ha sido informada de ninguna decisi(cid:243)n definitiva, por parte de las autoridades francesas, de captura de osos reintroducidos en los Pirineos centrales o de sus oseznos. En caso de Francia decidiera finalmente proceder a tales capturas, Østas deber(cid:237)an respetar las disposiciones del art(cid:237)culo 16 de la Directiva 92/43/CEE del Consejo, de 21 de mayo de 1992, relativa a la conservaci(cid:243)n de los hÆbitats naturales y de la fauna y flora silvestres (1), es decir, la Directiva sobre HÆbitats. Por otro lado, la Comisi(cid:243)n no estÆ al corriente de que Eslovenia tenga la intenci(cid:243)n de recoger osos procedentes de los Pirineos. La Comisi(cid:243)n espera que pueda continuar la realizaci(cid:243)n del actual proyecto LIFE-Nature en los Pirineos con osos reintroducidos o nacidos en dichas montaæas, su zona reciente de reparto natural. (1) DO L 206 de 22. 7. 1992. (2001/C 53 E/145) PREGUNTA ESCRITA P-1263/00 de Lord Inglewood (PPE-DE) a la Comisi(cid:243)n (11 de abril de 2000) Asunto: Adhesi(cid:243)n de China a la OMC ¿Puede indicar la Comisi(cid:243)n, sobre la base de su actual posici(cid:243)n negociadora, cuÆles serÆn las posibles implicaciones presupuestarias de la adhesi(cid:243)n de China a la OMC, por una parte, en lo que respecta a los 20. 2. 2001 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas C 53 E/115 ingresos procedentes de los aranceles aduaneros y las exacciones reguladoras agr(cid:237)colas y, por otra, a los gastos, incluidas las restituciones previstas a las exportaciones agr(cid:237)colas, as(cid:237) como cualquier otra repercu- si(cid:243)n de importancia para los gastos presupuestarios, tanto en lo relativo al volumen como a la proporci(cid:243)n de las dotaciones presupuestarias anuales asignadas para la financiaci(cid:243)n de las operaciones externas de la Comunidad? Respuesta del Sr. Lamy en nombre de la Comisi(cid:243)n (11 de mayo de 2000) La Comunidad ya otorga un trato a China como miembro de la Organizaci(cid:243)n Mundial del Comercio (OMC) en la medida en que estÆ sujeto a aranceles de naci(cid:243)n mÆs favorecida en las exportaciones a la Comunidad. Por otra parte, la adhesi(cid:243)n de China a la OMC no alterarÆ los compromisos de la Comunidad propiamente dichos respecto del acceso al mercado, incluidos los (cid:237)ndices arancelarios, en la OMC. La adhesi(cid:243)n de China a la OMC es una negociaci(cid:243)n sobre los futuros compromisos de China, no sobre los de los actuales miembros de la OMC. Los niveles de ingresos por aranceles aduaneros, por lo tanto, estarÆn en funci(cid:243)n del nivel de importaciones. Suponiendo que la adhesi(cid:243)n de China a la OMC darÆ un impulso a sus exportaciones a la Comunidad, es de prever un aumento en los ingresos de derechos a mÆs largo plazo. China reducirÆ los aranceles agr(cid:237)colas para la importaci(cid:243)n de productos de todos los miembros de la OMC, incluida la Comunidad. Esto mejorarÆ las posibilidades de acceso al mercado de los productos comunitarios pero no alterarÆ los compromisos de exportaci(cid:243)n contra(cid:237)dos por la Comunidad en la Ronda Uruguay. Por lo tanto, el gasto presupuestario de la Comunidad tendrÆ que mantenerse dentro de los l(cid:237)mites comprometidos. (2001/C 53 E/146) PREGUNTA ESCRITA E-1266/00 de Christopher Huhne (ELDR) a la Comisi(cid:243)n (19 de abril de 2000) Asunto: MicrocrØditos para la reducci(cid:243)n de la pobreza ¿QuØ recursos ha destinado la Comisi(cid:243)n en los œltimos tres aæos a la expansi(cid:243)n del microcrØdito como medio para reducir la pobreza (apoyado en principio por la Comisi(cid:243)n en su Comunicaci(cid:243)n «Microfinan- ciaci(cid:243)n y reducci(cid:243)n de la pobreza», de abril de 1998)? ¿QuØ otros mØtodos estÆ empleando la Comisi(cid:243)n en favor de la eliminaci(cid:243)n de la pobreza en su pol(cid:237)tica de desarrollo y cooperaci(cid:243)n? Respuesta del Comisario Nielson en nombre de la Comisi(cid:243)n (19 de mayo de 2000) Durante los œltimos tres aæos la Comisi(cid:243)n ha comprometido aproximadamente 200 M€ para sistemas de microcrØditos, a travØs de diversos instrumentos (cofinanciaci(cid:243)n con ONG, proyectos de desarrollo rural, seguridad alimentaria, STABEX, apoyo a microempresas). La reducci(cid:243)n de la pobreza constituye el objetivo general de la cooperaci(cid:243)n al desarrollo europea. La pol(cid:237)tica comunitaria refleja el consenso internacional pero avanza en el planteamiento, reconociendo la desigualdad como obstÆculo para reducir el crecimiento y la pobreza, sugiriendo el regreso a una pol(cid:237)tica de crecimiento con distribuci(cid:243)n y poniendo de relieve los aspectos pol(cid:237)ticos de la estrategia de desarrollo. A nivel macroecon(cid:243)mico, los programas de ajuste estructural de «nueva generaci(cid:243)n» incluyen indicadores sociales (salud y educaci(cid:243)n) para la asignaci(cid:243)n de parte de los fondos, con el fin de estimular a los pa(cid:237)ses concernidos para lograr mejores resultados en estos sectores


title: EMP Ühiskomitee otsus nr 39/2000, 11. aprill 2000, millega muudetakse EMP lepingu protokolli nr 31 koostöö kohta teatavates valdkondades väljaspool nelja vabadust

eurovoc_concepts:
EU action
action programme
child
violence
woman
young person

formats: html pdf print

text: 130 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja 22000D0615(15) 15. 6. 2000 EUROOPA ÜHENDUSTE TEATAJA EMP ÜHISKOMITEE OTSUS nr 39/2000, 11. aprill 2000, 11/4. kd L 141/67 millega muudetakse EMP lepingu protokolli nr 31 koostöö kohta teatavates valdkondades väljaspool nelja vabadust EMP ÜHISKOMITEE, võttes arvesse Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut, mida on kohandatud Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut kohandava protokolliga, edaspidi “leping”, eelkõige selle artikleid 86 ja 98, ning arvestades järgmist: (1) (2) (3) Lepingu protokolli nr 31 muudeti EMP Ühiskomitee 28. oktoobri 1996. aasta otsusega nr 55/96 (1). Otstarbekas on laiendada lepinguosaliste riikide koostööd, hõlmamaks ühenduse tegevusprogrammi (Daphne programmi) (aastateks 2000–2003), mis käsitleb ennetusmeetmeid laste, noorte ja naiste vastase vägivalla vastu võitlemiseks (Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu nr. 293/2000/EÜ) (2). Lepingu protokolli nr 31 tuleks seetõttu muuta, võimaldamaks sellist laiendatud koostööd alates 1. jaanuarist 2000, ON VASTU VÕTNUD JÄRGMISE OTSUSE: Lepingu protokolli nr 31 artiklit 5 muudetakse järgmiselt. 1. Lõikele 8 lisatakse järgmine taane: Artikkel 1 “— 32000 D 0293: Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu otsus nr 293/2000/EÜ, 24. jaanuar 2000, millega võetakse vastu ühenduse tegevusprogramm (Daphne programm) (aastateks 2000–2003), mis käsit- leb ennetusmeetmeid laste, noorte ja naiste vastase vägivalla vastu võitlemiseks (EÜT L 34, 9. 2. 2000, lk 1). ” 2. Lõike 5 tekst asendatakse järgmiselt: EFTA riigid osalevad lõike 8 kahes esimeses taandes osutatud ühenduse programmides ja meet- “5. metes alates 1. jaanuarist 1996, kolmandas taandes osutatud programmis alates 1. jaanuarist 2000. ” Käesolev otsus jõustub järgmisel päeval pärast lepingu artikli 103 lõikes 1 ettenähtud viimase teate esita- mist EMP Ühiskomiteele. Artikkel 2 Otsust kohaldatakse alates 1. jaanuarist 2000. Käesolev otsus avaldatakse Euroopa Ühenduste Teataja EMP osas ja EMP kaasandes. Artikkel 3 Brüssel, 11. aprill 2000 EMP Ühiskomitee nimel eesistuja F. BARBASO (1) EÜT L 85, 27. 3. 1997, lk 64. (2) EÜT L 34, 9. 2. 2000, lk 1


title: SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL E-1125/00 af Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) til Kommissionen. Hvidbog om fødevaresikkerhed og en europæisk fødevaremyndighed.

eurovoc_concepts:
European Food Safety Authority
interinstitutional relations (EU)
scientific committee (EU)

text: 13. 2. 2001 DA De Europ(cid:230)iske F(cid:230)llesskabers Tidende C 46 E/133 hvor EU forf(cid:230)gter en mere bred opfattelse af problemkomplekset med inddragelse af etiske og łkonomiske spłrgsm(cid:229)l, sundhed, dyrs velf(cid:230)rd og miljłet, mens andre lande łnsker at begr(cid:230)nse disse łvrige faktorer til god dyrl(cid:230)gepraksis eller landbrugspraksis og metoder til prłver og analyser. Denne debat har f(cid:229)et en endnu stłrre betydning i sammenh(cid:230)ng med anvendelsen af v(cid:230)ksthormoner (bovin somatropi), som F(cid:230)llesskabet har forbudt som fłlge af de negative virkninger p(cid:229) malkekv(cid:230)gs sundhed og velv(cid:230)re. EU mods(cid:230)tter sig en godkendelse i Codex Alimentarius af dette hormon bl. a. under henvisning til disse łvrige begrundede faktorer. Gennemsigtigheden i beslutningsprocessen begr(cid:230)nser sig ikke kun til det videnskabelige grundlag, som den lovgivende magt har benyttet. Det er naturligvis af meget stor vigtighed, at forbrugerne informeres klart og forst(cid:229)eligt om de videnskabelige udtalelser, der ligger til grund for disse beslutninger. Men ogs(cid:229) de łvrige betragtninger, som beslutningstagerne har taget hensyn til, bl. a. evalueringerne af fordele og ulemper ved forskellige former for risikostyring i form af de samlede udgifter for samfundet, skal ogs(cid:229) belyses grundigt, ligesom valget af en beslutning skal begrundes indg(cid:229)ende. I łvrigt har Domstolen flere gang fastsl(cid:229)et, at hensynet til menneskers sundhed skal veje tungere end łkonomiske overvejelser. (2001/C 46 E/151) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL E-1125/00 af Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) til Kommissionen (11. april 2000) Om: Hvidbog om fłdevaresikkerhed og en europ(cid:230)isk fłdevaremyndighed januar 2000 offentliggjorde Kommissionen sin hvidbog om fłdevaresikkerhed (KOM(1999) 719). I Kapitel 4 vedrłrer oprettelse af en europ(cid:230)isk fłdevaremyndighed. Kapitel 5 omhandler lovgivningen om fłdevaresikkerhed. Det videnskabelige samarbejde błr ifłlge Kommissionen styrkes og koordineres med de videnskabelige komitØers arbejdsprogram. Hidtil er der kun blevet afsat f(cid:229) bevillinger hertil. De gennemfłrte programmer afvikledes langsomt (punkt 20). Hvordan agter Kommissionen at forbedre det videnskabelige samarbejde og fremskynde procedurerne? Hvilke forslag herom er allerede udarbejdet? (2001/C 46 E/152) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL E-1133/00 af Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) til Kommissionen (11. april 2000) Om: Hvidbog om fłdevaresikkerhed og en europ(cid:230)isk fłdevaremyndighed I januar 2000 offentliggjorde Kommissionen sin hvidbog om fłdevaresikkerhed (KOM(1999) 719). Kapitel 4 vedrłrer oprettelse af en europ(cid:230)isk fłdevaremyndighed. Kapitel 5 omhandler lovgivningen om fłdevaresikkerhed. Mange EU-lande har foretaget en drastisk reducering i den offentlige finansiering af videnskabelig forskning i de forlłbne (cid:229)rtier. Dette har bevirket, at videnskabsm(cid:230)nd til finansieringen af deres forskning er delvis afh(cid:230)ngig af erhvervslivet. Denne afh(cid:230)ngighed kan f(cid:229) indflydelse p(cid:229) videnskabsm(cid:230)ndenes trov(cid:230)rdighed og p(cid:229) deres videnskabelige udtalelser (punkt 41). 1. P(cid:229) hvilken m(cid:229)de vil Kommissionen sikre de europ(cid:230)iske videnskabsm(cid:230)nds uafh(cid:230)ngighed? 2. Kan Kommissionen tilslutte sig forslaget om at fasts(cid:230)tte en maksimumt(cid:230)rskel for privat finansiering af videnskabelig forskning? I bekr(cid:230)ftende fald, p(cid:229) hvilken m(cid:229)de vil Kommissionen fasts(cid:230)tte en s(cid:229)dan maksimum- henholdsvis minimumt(cid:230)rskel for privat og offentlig finansiering? I ben(cid:230)gtende fald, er Kommissionen af den opfattelse, at privat finansiering ikke har nogen indvirkning p(cid:229) videnskabsm(cid:230)nds uafh(cid:230)ngighed?


title: Απόφαση αριθ. 3/2000 του Συμβουλίου Σύνδεσης ΕΚ-Τουρκίας, της 11ης Απριλίου 2000, σχετικά με τη σύσταση υποεπιτροπών της Επιτροπής Σύνδεσης

eurovoc_concepts:
Association Council (EU)
Türkiye
accession to the European Union
association agreement (EU)

text: L 138/28 EL Επίσηµη Εφηµερίδα των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων 9. 6. 2000 ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ αριθ. 3/2000 ΤΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ ΣΥΝ∆ΕΣΗΣ ΕΚ-ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑΣ της 11ης Απριλίου 2000 σχετικά µε τη σύσταση υποεπιτροπών της Επιτροπής Σύνδεσης (2000/378/ΕΚ) ΤΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟ ΣΥΝ∆ΕΣΗΣ ΕΚ-ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑΣ, Έχοντας υπόψη τη συµφωνία συνδέσεως µεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Οικονοµικής Κοινότητας και της Τουρκίας (1), και ιδίως το άρθρο 24, Εκτιµώντας τα ακόλουθα: (1) (2) (3) (4) Η Τουρκία είναι χώρα υποψήφια για προσχώρηση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Το Ευρωπαϊκό Συµβούλιο που συνήλθε στο Ελσίνκι, στις 11 και 12 ∆εκεµβρίου 1999, κάλεσε την Επιτροπή να προετοιµάσει µιαν εταιρική σχέση για την προσχώρηση για την Τουρκία και να δηµιουργήσει τον κατάλληλο µηχανισµό παρακολούθησης. Το Ευρωπαϊκό Συµβούλιο κάλεσε επίσης την Επιτροπή να εκπονήσει µια διαδικασία αναλυτικής εξέτασης του κοινοτικού κεκτηµένου. Στο πλαίσιο των Επιτροπών Σύνδεσης µε τις άλλες υποψήφιες χώρες έχουν συσταθεί υποεπιτροπές, οι οποίες αποσκοπούν, αφενός, στην παρακολούθηση της υλοποίησης των προτεραιοτήτων που θέτουν οι εταιρικές σχέσεις για την προσχώρηση και, αφετέρου, στην προσέγγιση των νοµοθεσιών. Παρόµοιες υποεπιτροπές θα πρέπει επίσης να συσταθούν, για να επικουρούν την Επιτροπή Σύνδεσης ΕΚ-Τουρκίας, που συγκροτήθηκε µε την απόφαση αριθ. 3/64 του Συµβουλίου Σύνδεσης, ΑΠΟΦΑΣΙΖΕΙ: Άρθρο µόνο Συγκροτούνται στο πλαίσιο της Επιτροπής Σύνδεσης ΕΚ-Τουρκίας, οι υποεπιτροπές που απαριθµούνται στο παράρτηµα. Οι υποεπιτροπές εργάζονται υπό την εποπτεία της Επιτροπής Σύνδεσης, στην οποία υποβάλλουν αναφορά µετά από κάθε συνεδρίασή τους. Το Συµβούλιο Σύνδεσης δύναται να αποφασίσει τη σύσταση άλλων υποεπιτροπών ή οµάδων, καταργώντας τις υφιστάµενες υποεπιτροπές ή οµάδες. Η Επιτροπή Σύνδεσης εγκρίνει την εντολή των υποεπιτροπών, λαµβάνει κάθε άλλο αναγκαίο µέτρο για τη διασφάλιση της καλής λειτουργίας τους και ενηµερώνει σχετικά το Συµβούλιο Σύνδεσης. Οι υποεπιτροπές δεν έχουν εξουσία λήψης αποφάσεων. Λουξεµβούργο, 11 Απριλίου 2000. Για το Συµβούλιο Σύνδεσης Ο Πρόεδρος I. CEM (1) ΕΕ 217 της 29. 12. 1964, σ. 3687/64. 9. 6. 2000 EL Επίσηµη Εφηµερίδα των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων L 138/29 ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑ ΣΥΝ∆ΕΣΗΣ ΕΚ-ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑΣ ΥΠΟΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΕΣ ΥΠΑΓΟΜΕΝΕΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΣΥΝ∆ΕΣΗΣ Ονοµασία Αρµοδιότητες 1. Γεωργία και αλιεία 2. Εσωτερική αγορά και ανταγωνισµός 3. Εµπόριο, βιοµηχανία και προϊόντα ΕΚΑΧ Γεωργικά προϊόντα και προϊόντα αλιείας. Γεωργική συνεργασία και αγροτική ανάπτυξη. Μεταποιηµένα γεωργικά προϊόντα. Κτηνιατρικά και φυτοϋγειονοµικά θέµατα. Νοµοθεσία η οποία επιβάλλεται στις συναλλαγές. Ελεύθερη κυκλοφορία των εµπορευµάτων, συµπεριλαµβανο- µένης της τυποποίησης, της πιστοποίησης, της αξιολόγησης, της πιστότητας και της εποπτείας της αγοράς, ∆ικαιώµατα πνευµατικής και βιοµηχανικής ιδιοκτησίας. ∆ηµόσιες συµβάσεις, προστασία των δεδοµένων και αστικό δίκαιο. Εταιρικό δίκαιο, λογιστική και ηλεκτρονικό εµπόριο. Προστασία των καταναλωτών. Ανταγωνισµός και κρατικές ενισχύσεις. Υπηρεσίες, συµπεριλαµβανοµένων των χρηµατοοικονοµικών υπηρεσιών (τράπεζες, ασφαλίσεις, επενδύσεις) και ταχυδροµι- κές υπηρεσίες. Κυκλοφορία των εργαζοµένων, µε εξαίρεση το συντονισµό της κοινωνικής ασφάλισης. ∆ίκαιο εγκατάστασης, παροχή υπηρεσιών. Συµµετοχή της Τουρκίας στα κοινοτικά προγράµµατα. Εµπορικά θέµατα. Προϊόντα ΕΚΑΧ. Προώθηση των επενδύσεων. Μικρές και µεσαίες επιχειρήσεις και συµµετοχή της Τουρκίας στα κοινοτικά προγράµµατα για τις ΜΜΕ. Βιοµηχανική πολιτική και συνεργασία, τουρισµός. 4. Οικονοµικά και νοµισµατικά θέµατα, κινήσεις κεφαλαίων Οικονοµικά και νοµισµατικά θέµατα. και στατιστικές 5. Καινοτοµία Τρέχουσες πληρωµές και κινήσεις κεφαλαίων, συµπεριλαµβα- νοµένης της προστασίας των επενδύσεων. Μεταρρύθµιση του χρηµατοπιστωτικού τοµέα. Στατιστική συνεργασία. Εκπαίδευση, περίοδοι άσκησης και νεολαία, καθώς και συµµε- τοχή της Τουρκίας στα κοινοτικά προγράµµατα. Επιστήµη, έρευνα και τεχνολογική ανάπτυξη, καθώς και συµµε- τοχή της Τουρκίας στα προγράµµατα έρευνας, τεχνολογικής ανάπτυξης και επίδειξης. Τηλεπικοινωνίες, τεχνολογίες πληροφοριών. Πολιτιστική συνεργασία και πολιτική του οπτικοακουστικού τοµέα, καθώς και συµµετοχή της Τουρκίας στα κοινοτικά προ- γράµµατα. L 138/30 EL Επίσηµη Εφηµερίδα των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων 9. 6. 2000 Ονοµασία Αρµοδιότητες 6. Μεταφορές, περιβάλλον και ενέργεια, συµπεριλαµβανο- Μεταφορές. µένων των διευρωπαϊκών δικτύων Περιβάλλον και συµµετοχή της Τουρκίας στα κοινοτικά προ- γράµµατα. Ενέργεια, συµπεριλαµβανοµένης της πυρηνικής ασφάλειας, και συµµετοχή της Τουρκίας στα κοινοτικά προγράµµατα. 7. Περιφερειακή ανάπτυξη, απασχόληση και κοινωνική πολι- τική Πολιτική απασχόλησης, κοινωνική πολιτική, συµµετοχή της Τουρκίας στα κοινοτικά προγράµµατα στον κοινωνικό τοµέα. Συντονισµός των κοινωνικών πολιτικών. Πολιτική περιφερειακής ανάπτυξης. 8. Τελωνεία, φορολογία, διακίνηση ναρκωτικών και νοµιµο- Τελωνειακή συνεργασία. ποίηση εσόδων από παράνοµες δραστηριότητες Έµµεση φορολογία και συµµετοχή της Τουρκίας στα προγράµ- µατα του φορολογικού τοµέα. Νοµιµοποίηση παράνοµων προσόδων. Ναρκωτικά. Λογιστικός και δηµοσιονοµικός έλεγχος


title: SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-1123/00 von Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) an die Kommission. Weißbuch zur Lebensmittelsicherheit und Europäische Lebensmittelbehörde.

eurovoc_concepts:
European Food Safety Authority
food safety
powers of the institutions (EU)
precautionary principle

text: C 46 E/132 Amtsblatt der Europ(cid:228)ischen Gemeinschaften DE 13. 2. 2001 Gemeinsame Antwort von Herrn Byrne im Namen der Kommission auf die Schriftlichen Anfragen E-1121/00, E-1124/00, E-1126/00, E-1129/00, E-1130/00, E-1131/00, E-1132/00, E-1135/00, E-1136/00, E-1137/00, E-1138/00 und E-1139/00 (8. Juni 2000) Im Wei(cid:223)buch zur Lebensmittelsicherheit (1) hat die Kommission die allgemeinen Leitlinien dargelegt, nach denen sie sich bei der Schaffung der Europ(cid:228)ischen Lebensmittelbeh(cid:246)rde richten wird, und alle Betroffenen aufgefordert, w(cid:228)hrend der Konsultationsfrist zu reagieren und ihren Diskussionsbeitrag zu liefern. Zu mehreren der von dem Herrn Abgeordneten angesprochenen Punkte hat die Kommission ihre Vorschl(cid:228)ge noch nicht genau formuliert und die Einzelheiten der Arbeitsweise noch nicht festgelegt, da sie die w(cid:228)hrend der Konsultation vorgebrachten Positionen noch nicht pr(cid:252)fen konnte. Bez(cid:252)glich der Befugnisse wird im Wei(cid:223)buch jedoch genau ausgef(cid:252)hrt, da(cid:223) Aufgabe der Europ(cid:228)ischen Lebensmittelbeh(cid:246)rde die Risikobewertung, die Datenerhebung und die Information der Verbraucher in den Bereichen ihrer Zust(cid:228)ndigkeit sein sollte. Aus rechtlichen Gr(cid:252)nden und aus Gr(cid:252)nden der demokratischen Verantwortung h(cid:228)lt die Kommission unter den derzeitigen Bedingungen eine (cid:220)bertragung von Rechts- etzungsbefugnissen an eine unabh(cid:228)ngige Beh(cid:246)rde f(cid:252)r nicht zu rechtfertigen. Gleichwohl sollte eine k(cid:252)nftige Ausweitung ihrer Zust(cid:228)ndigkeiten in Betracht gezogen werden, wobei die bis dahin mit der Arbeit der Beh(cid:246)rde gemachten Erfahrungen und das neu geschaffene Vertrauen in Rechnung zu stellen sind und nicht auszuschlie(cid:223)en ist, da(cid:223) m(cid:246)glicherweise ˜nderungen am Vertrag vorgenommen werden m(cid:252)ssen. (1) KOM(1999) 719 endg. (2001/C 46 E/150) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-1123/00 von Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) an die Kommission (11. April 2000) Betrifft: Wei(cid:223)buch zur Lebensmittelsicherheit und Europ(cid:228)ische Lebensmittelbeh(cid:246)rde Im Januar 2000 erschien das Wei(cid:223)buch zur Lebensmittelsicherheit (KOM(1999) 719/endg. ). In Kapitel 4 wird die Einrichtung einer Europ(cid:228)ischen Lebensmittelbeh(cid:246)rde behandelt. In Kapitel 5 wird auf die rechtlichen Aspekte der Lebensmittelsicherheit eingegangen. Die Kommission will das Vorsorgeprinzip uneingeschr(cid:228)nkt anwenden. Es sollen auch weitere berechtigte Anliegen Ber(cid:252)cksichtigung finden, die f(cid:252)r den Gesundheitsschutz und die F(cid:246)rderung eines fairen Gesch(cid:228)fts- gebarens im Lebensmittelhandel relevant sind (Punkt 14 und 15). 1. Welche Gew(cid:228)hr hat die Kommission daf(cid:252)r, da(cid:223) das Vorsorgeprinzip von allen Beteiligten eindeutig ausgelegt wird? 2. Wie wird die Kommission feststellen, da(cid:223) andere Anliegen f(cid:252)r den Gesundheitsschutz und die F(cid:246)rderung eines fairen Gesch(cid:228)ftsgebarens im Handel berechtigt sind? An welche Anliegen denkt die Kommission konkret (bitte Beispiele)? 3 Wie wird die Kommission verhindern, da(cid:223) die Beschlu(cid:223)fassung aufgrund dieser weiteren berechtigten Anliegen undurchsichtig wird? Antwort von Herrn Byrne im Namen der Kommission (9. Juni 2000) Seit dem Erscheinen des Wei(cid:223)buchs zur Lebensmittelsicherheit hat die Kommission eine Mitteilung (cid:252)ber die Anwendbarkeit des Vorsorgeprinzips angenommen. Deren Ziel ist eben die F(cid:246)rderung eines gemein- samen Verst(cid:228)ndnisses dieses Prinzips und seiner Anwendung. Die Mitteilung wird gegenw(cid:228)rtig von den Organen der Gemeinschaft und im Rahmen des Codex Alimentarius gepr(cid:252)ft; in dieser internationalen Organisation bem(cid:252)ht sich die Gemeinschaft um einen Konsens mit den anderen Mitgliedern in der Frage der Anwendung des Vorsorgeprinzips auf die Standardisierung von Lebensmitteln. Die Diskussion um die M(cid:246)glichkeit, auch weitere berechtigte Anliegen im Entscheidungsproze(cid:223) zu ber(cid:252)cksichtigen, stammt ebenfalls aus dem Codex Alimentarius, der dies in seinem Verfahrenshandbuch vorsieht, ohne jedoch im 13. 2. 2001 DE Amtsblatt der Europ(cid:228)ischen Gemeinschaften C 46 E/133 einzelnen zu erl(cid:228)utern, was unter diesen berechtigten Anliegen zu verstehen sei. Dieses Thema wird in breiten Kreisen er(cid:246)rtert, wobei die Gemeinschaft f(cid:252)r eine gro(cid:223)z(cid:252)gige Auslegung des Konzepts eintritt, die ethische und wirtschaftliche Gesichtspunkte, Erw(cid:228)gungen zu Tiergesundheit und Tierschutz sowie zum Umweltschutz einbezieht; demgegen(cid:252)ber wollen andere Staaten diese Anliegen auf die gute Veterin(cid:228)r- oder Agrarpraxis und auf die Probenahme- und Analysemethoden beschr(cid:228)nken. Diese Diskussion hat vor dem Hintergrund der Verwendung von Rindersomatotropin an Bedeutung gewonnen, als die Gemeinschaft dieses Hormon wegen seiner sch(cid:228)dlichen Wirkung auf Gesundheit und Wohlergehen von Milchk(cid:252)hen verboten hat. Die Gemeinschaft widersetzt sich der Zulassung dieses Hormons durch den Codex Alimentarius und st(cid:252)tzt sich dabei unter anderem auf die besagten (cid:132)weiteren berechtigten Anliegen(cid:147). Die Transparenz des Entscheidungsprozesses bezieht sich nicht allein auf die vom Rechtsetzer herange- zogene wissenschaftliche Grundlage. Zwar ist es von besonderer Wichtigkeit, da(cid:223) die Verbraucher klar und verst(cid:228)ndlich (cid:252)ber die wissenschaftlichen Gutachten informiert werden, auf die die Entscheidungen sich st(cid:252)tzen. Aber auch die sonstigen Erw(cid:228)gungen, die die Entscheidungstr(cid:228)ger ber(cid:252)cksichtigen (cid:129) vor allem die Abw(cid:228)gung der Vor- und Nachteile verschiedener M(cid:246)glichkeiten des Risikomanagements im Hinblick auf die Gesamtkosten f(cid:252)r die Gesellschaft (cid:129) m(cid:252)ssen deutlich dargelegt und die getroffenen Entscheidungen vollst(cid:228)ndig begr(cid:252)ndet werden. Auf jeden Fall hat der Gerichtshof bereits mehrfach festgestellt, da(cid:223) der Gesichtspunkt des Gesundheitsschutzes Vorrang vor wirtschaftlichen Erw(cid:228)gungen genie(cid:223)en mu(cid:223). (2001/C 46 E/151) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-1125/00 von Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) an die Kommission (11. April 2000) Betrifft: Wei(cid:223)buch zur Lebensmittelsicherheit und Europ(cid:228)ische Lebensmittelbeh(cid:246)rde Im Januar 2000 erschien das Wei(cid:223)buch zur Lebensmittelsicherheit (KOM(1999) 719/endg. ). In Kapitel 4 wird die Einrichtung einer Europ(cid:228)ischen Lebensmittelbeh(cid:246)rde behandelt. In Kapitel 5 wird auf die rechtlichen Aspekte der Lebensmittelsicherheit eingegangen. Die wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeit sollte der Kommission zufolge verst(cid:228)rkt und mit dem Arbeits- programm der wissenschaftlichen Aussch(cid:252)sse koordiniert werden. Bisher wurden daf(cid:252)r nur geringe Mittel bereitgestellt. Die Ausf(cid:252)hrung der Programme verlief tr(cid:228)ge (Punkt 20). Wie will die Kommission die wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeit verbessern und die Verfahren beschleu- nigen? Welche Vorschl(cid:228)ge wurden diesbez(cid:252)glich bereits entwickelt? (2001/C 46 E/152) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-1133/00 von Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) an die Kommission (11. April 2000) Betrifft: Wei(cid:223)buch (cid:252)ber die Lebensmittelsicherheit und die Europ(cid:228)ische Lebensmittelbeh(cid:246)rde Im Januar 2000 wurde das Wei(cid:223)buch (cid:252)ber die Lebensmittelsicherheit ver(cid:246)ffentlicht (KOM(1999) 719 endg. ). Kapitel 4 behandelt die Einrichtung einer Europ(cid:228)ischen Lebensmittelbeh(cid:246)rde. In Kapitel 5 wird auf die rechtlichen Aspekte der Lebensmittelsicherheit eingegangen. Viele EU-Mitgliedstaaten haben die staatliche Finanzierung wissenschaftlicher Forschung in den vergange- nen Jahrzehnten stark abgebaut. Deshalb sind Forscher zur Finanzierung ihrer Untersuchungen teilweise von der Wirtschaft abh(cid:228)ngig. Diese Abh(cid:228)ngigkeit kann die Glaubw(cid:252)rdigkeit der Forscher und der von ihnen abgegebenen Stellungnahmen beeinflussen (Punkt 41). 1. In welcher Weise will die Kommission die Unabh(cid:228)ngigkeit der europ(cid:228)ischen Forscher gew(cid:228)hrleisten? 2. Kann die Kommission sich dem Vorschlag anschlie(cid:223)en, einen h(cid:246)chstzul(cid:228)ssigen Anteil f(cid:252)r die Privat- finanzierung wissenschaftlicher Forschung festzulegen? Falls ja, in welcher Weise wird die Kommission eine solche Ober- bzw. Untergrenze f(cid:252)r private und staatliche Finanzierung festlegen? Falls nein, ist die Kommission der Ansicht, da(cid:223) die private Finanzierung keinerlei Auswirkungen auf die Unabh(cid:228)ngigkeit von Wissenschaftlern hat?


title: SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL E-1153/00 af Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) til Kommissionen. Hvidbog om fødevaresikkerhed og en europæisk fødevaremyndighed.

eurovoc_concepts:
drafting of EU law
food safety
protective clause

text: C 53 E/86 De Europ(cid:230)iske F(cid:230)llesskabers Tidende DA 20. 2. 2001 (2001/C 53 E/110) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL E-1152/00 af Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) til Kommissionen (11. april 2000) Om: Hvidbog om fłdevaresikkerhed og en europ(cid:230)isk fłdevaremyndighed I januar 2000 offentliggjorde Kommissionen sin hvidbog om fłdevaresikkerhed (KOM(1999) 719 endelig). Kapitel 4 vedrłrer oprettelse af en europ(cid:230)isk fłdevaremyndighed. Kapitel 5 omhandler lovgivningen om fłdevaresikkerhed. Kommissionen har tilhensigt at udarbejde et direktiv om naturligt mineralvands bestanddele og om betingelserne for at behandle naturligt mineralvand med ozonberiget luft. Vil gr(cid:230)nsev(cid:230)rdierne for potentielt skadelige stoffer, der er fastlagt for drikkevand, ogs(cid:229) g(cid:230)lde for naturligt mineralvand? I ben(cid:230)gtende fald, hvorfor ikke? (2001/C 53 E/111) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL E-1153/00 af Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) til Kommissionen (11. april 2000) Om: Hvidbog om fłdevaresikkerhed og en europ(cid:230)isk fłdevaremyndighed I januar 2000 offentliggjorde Kommissionen sin hvidbog om fłdevaresikkerhed (KOM(1999) 719 endelig). Kapitel 4 vedrłrer oprettelse af en europ(cid:230)isk fłdevaremyndighed. Kapitel 5 omhandler lovgivningen om fłdevaresikkerhed. Kommissionen har ikke p(cid:229) indev(cid:230)rende tidspunkt en retsakt, som głr det muligt p(cid:229) eget initiativ at vedtage en sikkerhedsforanstaltning for foder eller forarbejdede fłdevarer af ikke-animalsk oprindelse fra Øn af medlemsstaterne (jf. pkt. 80). Mener Kommissionen, at den ovenn(cid:230)vnte mangel kan afhj(cid:230)lpes med Øn enkelt nłdprocedure, som g(cid:230)lder alle former for fłdevarer og foder? I bekr(cid:230)ftende fald, agter Kommissionen at indfłre en s(cid:229)dan mekanisme? I ben(cid:230)gtende fald, hvorfor ikke og hvilke alternativer foresl(cid:229)r Kommissionen, der głr det muligt p(cid:229) eget initiativ at vedtage sikkerhedsforanstaltninger for foder eller forarbejdede fłdevarer af ikke- animalsk oprindelse fra Øn af medlemsstaterne? (2001/C 53 E/112) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL E-1155/00 af Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) til Kommissionen (11. april 2000) Om: Hvidbog om fłdevaresikkerhed og en europ(cid:230)isk fłdevaremyndighed I januar 2000 offentliggjorde Kommissionen sin hvidbog om fłdevaresikkerhed (KOM(1999) 719 endelig). Kapitel 4 vedrłrer oprettelse af en europ(cid:230)isk fłdevaremyndighed. Kapitel 5 omhandler lovgivningen om fłdevaresikkerhed. Det er nłdvendigt at tydeliggłre og ajourfłre de g(cid:230)ldende bestemmelser om fłdevarekontrol og sikre, at bestemmelserne d(cid:230)kker alle led i produktionen. Endvidere er det nłdvendigt at revidere visse mere pr(cid:230)cise krav om kłdinspektion (jf. pkt. 85). Agter Kommissionen at flytte tyngdepunktet i forbindelse med kłdinspektion fra den rutinem(cid:230)ssige kontrol af det endelige produkt til kontrol under produktionsprocessen? Har Kommissionen i bekr(cid:230)ftende fald allerede taget skridt i den retning? I ben(cid:230)gtende fald, hvorfor forholder Kommissionen sig afvisende til en s(cid:229)dan oml(cid:230)gning?


title: INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA E-1116/00 di Theresa Villiers (PPE-DE) alla Commissione. Banca europea per la ricostruzione e lo sviluppo e imprese russe.

eurovoc_concepts:
Community loan
EBRD
Russia
aid to undertakings

text: C 53 E/78 Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:224) europee IT 20. 2. 2001 (2001/C 53 E/094) INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA E-1116/00 di Theresa Villiers (PPE-DE) alla Commissione (11 aprile 2000) Oggetto: Banca europea per la ricostruzione e lo sviluppo e imprese russe E(cid:146) convinta la Commissione che la BERS si mantenga nei 1. orientamenti nella sua politica di prestiti a favore delle imprese russe? limiti del suo accordo e dei suoi Quali controlli sono effettuati per accertare che la BERS si mantiene entro tali limiti nella sua politica 2. di prestiti alle imprese russe? Prevede la Commissione di controllare il funzionamento dell(cid:146)accordo e degli orientamenti BERS in 3. relazione ai prestiti a favore delle societ(cid:224) russe? Sono stati segnalati all(cid:146)attenzione della Commissione casi comprovanti una violazione dell(cid:146)accordo e 4. degli orientamenti BERS per quanto concerne i suoi prestiti a societ(cid:224) russe? Quali azioni adotterebbe eventualmente la Commissione qualora fosse dimostrato che la BERS ha 5. effettivamente violato il suo accordo e i suoi orientamenti in tale contesto? Risposta data dal sig. Solbes Mira a nome della Commissione (9 giugno 2000) Nella sua politica di prestiti a singoli paesi, progetti o societ(cid:224) che operano in loco, la Banca europea 1. per la ricostruzione e lo sviluppo (BERS) agisce nei limiti definiti dal suo statuto. Gli articoli 1 e 2 dello statuto illustrano gli obiettivi e le funzioni della BERS nonchØ le politiche stabilite dal consiglio di amministrazione. L(cid:146)articolo 11. 2 prevede che il consiglio confermi che tali finalit(cid:224) e funzioni vengano pienamente realizzate nelle attivit(cid:224) della BERS in ciascun paese prescelto. Tale conferma Ł ratificata mediante l(cid:146)adozione di strategie nazionali. Tali strategie sono adottate o aggiornate annualmente in base alle disposizioni dell(cid:146)articolo 11. 2 dello statuto della BERS, che prevede un esame dei progetti BERS e fissa le priorit(cid:224) operative nei paesi interessati. Le strategie vengono approvate dal consiglio di amministrazione. La BERS sta preparando la strategia nazionale 2000 per la Federazione russa che sar(cid:224) presentata a breve termine al consiglio di amministrazione. La BERS deve svolgere tutte le sue attivit(cid:224) operative in Russia nel quadro dei documenti sopra menzionati in linea con l(cid:146)accordo che istituisce la BERS. La Commissione, nella sua qualit(cid:224) di che sono tutti rappresentante della Comunit(cid:224) nel consiglio di amministrazione della BERS, ha approvato, in stretto coordinamento con gli Stati membri e i rappresentanti della Banca europea per gli investimenti (BEI), le precedenti strategie nazionali per la Russia e ha motivo di credere che la BERS abbia finora operato validamente in Russia. La Commissione rinvia in proposito l(cid:146)onorevole parlamentare alla sua risposta all(cid:146)interrogazione scritta E-1665/99 dell(cid:146)onorevole Manisco (1). 2. Il capitolo VI dello statuto della BERS stabilisce la struttura di governo societario della banca stessa. In particolare, l(cid:146)articolo 27 punto 2 prevede che il consiglio di amministrazione «stabilisca le politiche e prenda le decisioni relative ai prestiti, alle garanzie e agli investimenti di capitale netto, ai prestiti da parte della banca, alla fornitura di assistenza tecnica e alle altre operazioni della banca». Tali politiche e decisioni includono, evidentemente, anche quelle relative alla Russia. Pertanto, il consiglio di amministrazione non solo sovrintende a tali attivit(cid:224), ma esercita su di esse un controllo diretto. I direttori nominati dalla Commissione(a nome della Comunit(cid:224)), dalla BEI e dagli Stati membri formano il consiglio di ammini- strazione della BERS. Oltre a tale struttura di governo societario, il paragrafo 1 dell(cid:146)articolo 35 dello statuto della BERS prevede «la pubblicazione di una relazione annuale contenente un bilancio certificato da far circolare tra i membri almeno ogni tre mesi, una dichiarazione sintetica sulla sua posizione finanziaria e sul conto perdite e profitti che illustri l(cid:146)esito dei progetti. » Il paragrafo 3 dell(cid:146)articolo 35 prevede la distribuzione ai membri delle copie di tutte le relazioni, dichiarazioni e pubblicazioni realizzate ai sensi di tale articolo. La relazione annuale del 1999 della BERS Ł stata esaminata dal consiglio dei governatori nella riunione di Riga del maggio 2000. 20. 2. 2001 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:224) europee C 53 E/79 Nell(cid:146)approvare la strategia nazionale per confermato che i progetti relativi a tale paese sono coerenti con le finalit(cid:224) e le funzioni della BERS. il consiglio di amministrazione ha la Federazione russa, Come indicato nella risposta alla domanda 1, 3. la BERS sta attualmente preparando la strategia nazionale 2000 per la Federazione russa. Rientra in tale operazione la riunione speciale del comitato esecutivo della BERS svoltasi il 16 febbraio 2000 e la riunione amministrativa del 5 aprile 2000 in cui Ł stato discusso un documento che sintetizza i problemi chiave da includere nel progetto di strategia nazionale. L(cid:146)approvazione finale da parte del consiglio di amministrazione della nuova strategia per la Russia Ł prevista entro la fine del luglio 2000. 4. Negli studi e nelle valutazioni di cui alla risposta alla domanda 3, sia il consiglio dei governatori che quello di amministrazione e il Presidente hanno concluso che non vi Ł stata alcuna violazione dello statuto della BERS nØ alcuna violazione di nessuna delle politiche della BERS relative ai prestiti alle imprese russe. 5. Se fosse dimostrato alla Commissione che la gestione della BERS ha violato i principi di funziona- mento e le politiche della BERS in materia di prestiti a imprese russe, il problema sarebbe affrontato internamente e con gli altri direttori prima della presentazione ai fori competenti (segnatamente il consiglio di amministrazione della BERS e, ove necessario, il suo consiglio dei governatori) cui spetterebbe decidere le sanzioni adeguate. (1) GU C 170 E del 20. 6. 2000, pag. 68. (2001/C 53 E/095) INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA E-1118/00 di Luis Berenguer Fuster (PSE) alla Commissione (11 aprile 2000) Oggetto: Concentrazioni nel settore elettrico Di recente, la Commissione ha espresso le sue reticenze in merito alla limitata indipendenza delle autorit(cid:224) spagnole in materia di concorrenza. Questa mancanza di indipendenza si avverte in particolare nel campo delle concentrazioni. In questo caso, la pratica viene inoltrata al Servicio de Defensa de la Competencia (Servizio di difesa della concorrenza), che dipende dal Ministero delle finanze, e l(cid:146)approvazione del dossier viene effettuata dal governo stesso, mentre il Tribunal de defensa de la Competencia (Tribunale di difesa della concorrenza) si limita ad emettere un parere. Di recente, alcune fonti del partito di governo in Spagna hanno annunciato un(cid:146)offerta pubblica d(cid:146)acquisto di azioni della societ(cid:224) HidrocantÆbrico da parte dell(cid:146)Uni(cid:243)n Fenosa. Con la conclusione di questa operazione, la concorrenza nel settore elettrico si ridurr(cid:224) e aumenter(cid:224) il potere della terza societ(cid:224) operante nel settore in Spagna. A ci(cid:242) si aggiungono le voci di una fusione tra Endesa, Fecsa e Sevilla de Electricidad, senza che alcun dossier sia stato presentato alle autorit(cid:224) nazionali preposte alla concorrenza. Date le circostanze, dal momento che non si prevede l(cid:146)adozione di misure di controllo delle concentrazioni nel settore elettrico da parte delle autorit(cid:224) spagnole, non ritiene opportuno la Commissione prendere alcune misure volte a controllare i processi di concentrazione nel settore elettrico spagnolo? Risposta data dal sig. Monti a nome della Commissione (8 giugno 2000) Nella raccomandazione relativa agli indirizzi di massima del 2000 per le politiche economiche degli Stati membri e della Comunit(cid:224) (1), la Commissione ha affermato che Ł prioritario che la Spagna prosegua nella tale riforma dedichi riforma della normativa sulla concorrenza avviata nel 1999 e nel contesto di particolare attenzione al rafforzamento dei poteri d(cid:146)indagine dell(cid:146)autorit(cid:224) indipendente di tutela della concorrenza. Alla Commissione spetta solo il controllo delle operazioni di concentrazione che hanno dimensione comunitaria ai sensi del regolamento sulle concentrazioni (2)


title: WRITTEN QUESTION E-1145/00 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. White Paper on Food Safety and the European Food Authority.

eurovoc_concepts:
animal disease
bovine spongiform encephalopathy
drafting of EU law
food safety

text: 20. 2. 2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 53 E/83 (2001/C 53 E/103) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1144/00 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Commission (11 April 2000) Subject: White Paper on Food Safety and the European Food Authority The White Paper on Food Safety (COM(1999) 719 final) was published in January 2000. Chapter 4 is concerned with establishing a European Food Authority (EFA). Chapter 5 considers legislation on food safety. Pathogens which are passed on by animal products (zoonoses) can have a serious impact on public health. Correct information on the presence of zoonoses is a prerequisite for taking action (section 70). A few years ago the EU sought, via the (cid:145)zoonoses(cid:146) directive, to enable Member States to take action to combat zoonoses. Experience has shown that this problem is very complex and that Member States do not have adequate resources to carry out preventive measures. 1. What (cid:145)more effective measures(cid:146) referred to in the White Paper will the Commission draws up? 2. What action programmes does the Commission have in mind for combating zoonoses? (2001/C 53 E/104) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1145/00 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Commission (11 April 2000) Subject: White Paper on Food Safety and the European Food Authority The White Paper on Food Safety (COM(1999) 719 final) was published in January 2000. Chapter 4 is concerned with establishing a European Food Authority (EFA). Chapter 5 considers legislation on food safety. The Commission has submitted to the Council and the European Parliament a comprehensive proposal which summarises the measures needed to control BSE and other TSEs (section 71). The Commission is to draw up proposals for suitable test programmes. 1. Will the Commission replace the ad hoc measures on BSE and other TSEs with comprehensive legislation in order to create clarity? If not, in what way will the Commission create clarity in respect of BSE and TSEs? 2. Will the Commission apply the improved Swiss methods for detecting BSE in the EU? If not, why not? (2001/C 53 E/105) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1146/00 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Commission (11 April 2000) Subject: White Paper on Food Safety and the European Food Authority The White Paper on Food Safety (COM(1999) 719 final) was published in January 2000. Chapter 4 is concerned with establishing a European Food Authority (EFA). Chapter 5 considers legislation on food safety


title: QUESTION ÉCRITE P-1265/00 posée par Hugues Martin (PPE-DE) à la Commission. Précisions sur la compatibilité d'une aide exceptionnelle à l'exportation avec le droit communautaire.

eurovoc_concepts:
France
aid to disaster victims
application of EU law
bad weather
control of State aid
export aid
wood product

text: 13. 2. 2001 FR Journal officiel des CommunautØs europØennes C 46 E/161 (2001/C 46 E/185) QUESTION (cid:201)CRITE P-1265/00 posØe par Hugues Martin (PPE-DE) (cid:224) la Commission (11 avril 2000) Objet: PrØcisions sur la compatibilitØ d(cid:146)une aide exceptionnelle (cid:224) l(cid:146)exportation avec le droit communautaire La tempŒte qui s(cid:146)est abattue dans l(cid:146)Ouest de l(cid:146)Europe en dØcembre 1999 a provoquØ des ravages sans prØcØdent pour la filiŁre sylvicole. Les institutions de l(cid:146)Union semblent ne pas avoir mesurØ l(cid:146)impact Øconomique, social et culturel des dØvastations causØes, ni les risques aggravØs d(cid:146)incendies (cid:224) l(cid:146)approche de la saison estivale, malgrØ les dØbats qui se sont dØroulØs dans l(cid:146)enceinte du Parlement europØen. Pour faire face (cid:224) l(cid:146)urgence, le gouvernement fran(cid:231)ais a notamment dØcidØ d(cid:146)allouer une somme de FRF 50 par tonne pour le transport de bois destinØ (cid:224) l(cid:146)exportation dans les (cid:201)tats membres de l(cid:146)Union europØenne ainsi que dans les pays tiers. Les rŁgles de concurrence de la CommunautØ, et en particulier l(cid:146)obligation de prØfØrence communautaire, interdisent (cid:224) juste titre de telles aides, sauf quand elles visent (cid:224) remØdier (cid:224) une situation exceptionnelle, comme le prØvoit l(cid:146)article 87, paragraphe 2. b) du TUE, libellØ comme suit: «Sont compatibles avec le marchØ commun: [(cid:133). ] les aides destinØes (cid:224) remØdier aux dommages causØs par les calamitØs naturelles ou par d(cid:146)autres ØvØnements extraordinaires». La Commission prendra-t-elle en compte ce caractŁre exceptionnel, comme elle l(cid:146)a fait notamment aprŁs la grande sØcheresse qu(cid:146)a connu le Portugal en 1993-1994 et autorisera-t-elle les aides mises en place par la France? RØponse donnØe par M. Fischler au nom de la Commission (3 mai 2000) Les aides notifiØes par les autoritØs fran(cid:231)aises sont, (cid:224) prØsent, examinØes par la Commission (cid:224) la lumiŁre de l(cid:146)article 87 (ex article 92, paragraphe 2, point b), du traitØ CE. La Commission met tout en (cid:156)uvre afin qu(cid:146)une dØcision rapide puisse Œtre adoptØe dans le cas d(cid:146)espŁce. (2001/C 46 E/186) QUESTION (cid:201)CRITE E-1276/00 posØe par Jan Andersson (PSE) (cid:224) la Commission (19 avril 2000) Objet: Projets de la Commission visant (cid:224) promouvoir la conclusion d(cid:146)accords sur la formation tout au long de la vie (cid:192) plusieurs reprises, le Parlement europØen a invitØ la Commission (cid:224) promouvoir la conclusion, entre les partenaires sociaux europØens, d(cid:146)accords sur la formation tout au long de la vie. Les conclusions du Conseil europØen de Lisbonne ont recommandØ qu(cid:146)une plus large prioritØ soit accordØe (cid:224) «la formation tout au long de la vie, composante essentielle du modŁle social europØen, notamment en encourageant les partenaires sociaux (cid:224) conclure des accords sur l(cid:146)innovation et sur la formation tout au long de la vie» (conclusion 29). Dans le cadre des efforts consentis par la Commission afin de promouvoir la conclusion d(cid:146)accords entre les partenaires sociaux, celle-ci pourrait indiquer quelles initiatives lØgislatives elle compte mettre en (cid:156)uvre afin de favoriser la formation tout au long de la vie. Quelles initiatives la Commission a-t-elle prises ou envisage-t-elle de prendre en vue de promouvoir la conclusion, entre les partenaires sociaux europØens, d(cid:146)accords concernant la formation tout au long de la vie?


title: SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-1118/00 von Luis Berenguer Fuster (PSE) an die Kommission. Fusionen im Elektrizitätssektor.

eurovoc_concepts:
EU control
Spain
electrical industry
merger control

text: 20. 2. 2001 DE Amtsblatt der Europ(cid:228)ischen Gemeinschaften C 53 E/79 Durch Genehmigung der L(cid:228)nderstrategie f(cid:252)r die Russische F(cid:246)deration hat das Direktorium (cid:252)ber einen l(cid:228)ngeren Zeitraum best(cid:228)tigt, da(cid:223) die Gesch(cid:228)ftst(cid:228)tigkeit in diesem Land dem Zweck und den Aufgaben der EBWE entspricht. 3. Wie in der Antwort auf die erste Frage schon erw(cid:228)hnt, bereitet die EBWE derzeit die L(cid:228)nderstrategie In diesem Zusammenhang fand am 16. Februar 2000 eine 2000 f(cid:252)r die Russische F(cid:246)deration vor. Sondersitzung des Exekutivausschusses und am 5. April 2000 eine Arbeitstagung des Direktoriums statt, auf denen ein Papier mit der Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Punkte diskutiert wurde, die in den Entwurf des L(cid:228)nderstrategiepapiers aufgenommen werden sollen. Man geht davon aus, da(cid:223) das Direkto- rium die neue russische Strategie bis Ende Juli 2000 genehmigt. 4. In den (cid:220)berpr(cid:252)fungen und Bewertungen, die in der Antwort auf Frage 3 beschrieben werden, sind weder der Gouverneursrat noch das Direktorium oder der Pr(cid:228)sident zu dem Schlu(cid:223) gelangt, da(cid:223) gegen irgendwelche Vorschriften des (cid:220)bereinkommens oder die gesch(cid:228)ftspolitischen Grunds(cid:228)tze der EBWE f(cid:252)r die Darlehensvergabe an russische Unternehmen versto(cid:223)en worden ist. 5. Sollte der Kommission nachgewiesen werden, da(cid:223) das Management der EBWE bei der Darlehens- vergabe an russische Unternehmen gegen vereinbarte Gesch(cid:228)ftsgrunds(cid:228)tze und Gesch(cid:228)ftspolitik der EBWE versto(cid:223)en hat, so w(cid:252)rde man zun(cid:228)chst intern und mit den anderen Direktoren (cid:220)bereinstimmung in dieser Angelegenheit herbeif(cid:252)hren und dann die zust(cid:228)ndigen Gremien (so das Direktorium der EBWE und erforderlichenfalls den Gouverneursrat) einschalten, die (cid:252)ber die Verh(cid:228)ngung geeigneter Sanktionen entscheiden w(cid:252)rden. (1) ABl. C 170 E vom 20. 6. 2000, S. 68. (2001/C 53 E/095) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-1118/00 von Luis Berenguer Fuster (PSE) an die Kommission (11. April 2000) Betrifft: Fusionen im Elektrizit(cid:228)tssektor Die Kommission hat k(cid:252)rzlich Zweifel an der Unabh(cid:228)ngigkeit der f(cid:252)r Wettbewerbskontrolle zust(cid:228)ndigen spanischen Beh(cid:246)rden ge(cid:228)u(cid:223)ert. Da(cid:223) diese Zweifel begr(cid:252)ndet sind, wird im Fall von Unternehmenszusam- menschl(cid:252)ssen besonders deutlich. Die betreffenden Verfahren werden (cid:252)ber ein Amt f(cid:252)r die Sicherstellung des Wettbewerbs abgewickelt (cid:129) das dem Finanzministerium untersteht (cid:129), und die Genehmigung des Vorgangs erfolgt durch die Regierung selbst, w(cid:228)hrend das f(cid:252)r Wettbewerbsfragen zust(cid:228)ndige Gericht lediglich eine Stellungnahme abgibt. ist die Durchf(cid:252)hrung eines Wie k(cid:252)rzlich aus Kreisen der spanischen Regierungspartei selbst verlautete, (cid:246)ffentlichen Angebots zur (cid:220)bernahme von Aktien der Gesellschaft HidrocantÆbrico durch die Uni(cid:243)n Fenosa geplant. Wenn dieses Vorhaben realisiert wird, wird dies zu einer weiteren Schw(cid:228)chung des Wettbewerbs im Elektrizit(cid:228)tssektor und St(cid:228)rkung der Position des drittgr(cid:246)(cid:223)ten Betreibers in Spanien f(cid:252)hren. Hinzu kommen Ger(cid:252)chte (cid:252)ber die Fusion von ENDESA, Fecsa und Sevilla de Electricidad, wobei die f(cid:252)r Wettbewerb zust(cid:228)ndigen nationalen Beh(cid:246)rden nicht einmal mit diesem Vorgang befa(cid:223)t wurden. Unter diesen Umst(cid:228)nden erscheint es unwahrscheinlich, da(cid:223) die spanischen Beh(cid:246)rden Ma(cid:223)nahmen zur Kontrolle der Unternehmenszusammenschl(cid:252)sse im Elektrizit(cid:228)tssektor ergreifen. Beabsichtigt die Kommis- sion, Ma(cid:223)nahmen zur (cid:220)berwachung dieser im spanischen Elektrizit(cid:228)tssektor zu verzeichnenden Konzentra- tionsentwicklungen zu ergreifen? Antwort von Herrn Monti im Namen der Kommission (8. Juni 2000) In der Empfehlung f(cid:252)r die Grundz(cid:252)ge der Wirtschaftspolitik der Mitgliedstaaten und der Gemeinschaft im Jahr 2000 (1) stellt die Kommission fest, da(cid:223) Spanien vorrangig die 1999 angelaufene Reform des Wettbe- werbsrechts weiterf(cid:252)hren und insbesondere die Untersuchungsbefugnisse der unabh(cid:228)ngigen Wettbewerbs- beh(cid:246)rde verst(cid:228)rken sollte. Die Kommission ist nur zur Kontrolle von Unternehmenszusammenschl(cid:252)ssen berechtigt, die im Sinne der Fusionskontrollverordnung gemeinschaftsweite Bedeutung haben. (2) C 53 E/80 Amtsblatt der Europ(cid:228)ischen Gemeinschaften DE 20. 2. 2001 Nach den vorliegenden Informationen haben die in der Anfrage genannten Zusammenschl(cid:252)sse keine gemeinschaftsweite Bedeutung und wurden bzw. werden von den spanischen Wettbewerbsbeh(cid:246)rden beurteilt. (1) Ecfin 209/00, http://europa. eu. int/comm/economy_finance/document/econeur/berg/gope2000_en. pdf. (2) Ein Zusammenschlu(cid:223) hat gemeinschaftsweite Bedeutung, wenn folgende Ums(cid:228)tze erzielt werden: a) ein weltweiter Gesamtumsatz aller beteiligten Unternehmen zusammen von mehr als 5 Mrd. EUR und b) ein gemeinschaftsweiter Gesamtumsatz von mindestens zwei beteiligten Unternehmen von jeweils mehr als 250 Mrd. EUR; dies gilt nicht, wenn die am Zusammenschlu(cid:223) beteiligten Unternehmen jeweils mehr als zwei Drittel ihres gemeinschaftsweiten Gesamtumsatzes in einem und demselben Mitgliedstaat erzielen. Ein Zusammenschlu(cid:223), der die vorgesehenen (a) der weltweite Gesamtumsatz aller Schwellen nicht erreicht, beteiligten Unternehmen zusammen mehr als 2,5 Mrd. EUR betr(cid:228)gt; (b) der Gesamtumsatz aller beteiligten Unternehmen in mindestens drei Mitgliedstaaten jeweils 100 Mio. EUR (cid:252)bersteigt; (c) in jedem von mindestens drei von Buchstabe b) erfa(cid:223)ten Mitgliedstaaten der Gesamtumsatz von mindestens zwei beteiligten Unternehmen jeweils mehr als 25 Mio. EUR betr(cid:228)gt und (d) der gemeinschaftsweite Gesamtumsatz von mindestens zwei beteiligten Unternehmen jeweils 100 Mio. EUR (cid:252)bersteigt; dies gilt nicht, wenn die beteiligten Unternehmen jeweils mehr als zwei Drittel ihres gemeinschaftsweiten Gesamtumsatzes in ein und demselben Mitgliedstaat erzielen. ist von gemeinschaftsweiter Bedeutung, wenn: (2001/C 53 E/096) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-1122/00 von Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) an die Kommission (11. April 2000) Betrifft: Wei(cid:223)buch zur Lebensmittelsicherheit und Europ(cid:228)ische Lebensmittelbeh(cid:246)rde Im Januar 2000 erschien das Wei(cid:223)buch zur Lebensmittelsicherheit (KOM(1999) 719/endg. ). In Kapitel 4 wird die Einrichtung einer Europ(cid:228)ischen Lebensmittelbeh(cid:246)rde behandelt. In Kapitel 5 wird auf die rechtlichen Aspekte der Lebensmittelsicherheit eingegangen. Die Kommission erkl(cid:228)rt in ihrem Wei(cid:223)buch, da(cid:223) sie ein hohes Niveau der Nahrungsmittelsicherheit und des Verbraucherschutzes anstrebt. Dieses Ziel betrifft die gesamte Nahrungskette einschlie(cid:223)lich der Ein- fuhren aus Drittl(cid:228)ndern in Verbindung. Daher dr(cid:228)ngt sich ein integriertes Konzept der Lebensmittelsicher- heit auf. Das Wei(cid:223)buch enth(cid:228)lt 117 Punkte, und es werden 84 gesetzgeberische Ma(cid:223)nahmen darin aufgef(cid:252)hrt, die innerhalb von drei Jahren vorrangig ausgef(cid:252)hrt werden sollen (Punkt 7). Erkennt die Kommission an, da(cid:223) das Verfahren zur Annahme von Rechtsvorschriften in der Vergangenheit meist Jahre dauerte? a) Falls ja, wie wird es der Kommission dann gelingen, die vorgeschlagene Frist einzuhalten? Werden daf(cid:252)r Verfahrens(cid:228)nderungen erforderlich sein? l(cid:228)nger als drei (2001/C 53 E/097) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-1127/00 von Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) an die Kommission (11. April 2000) Betrifft: Wei(cid:223)buch zur Lebensmittelsicherheit und Europ(cid:228)ische Lebensmittelbeh(cid:246)rde Im Januar 2000 erschien das Wei(cid:223)buch zur Lebensmittelsicherheit (KOM(1999) 719 endg. ). In Kapitel 4 wird die Einrichtung einer Europ(cid:228)ischen Lebensmittelbeh(cid:246)rde behandelt. In Kapitel 5 wird auf die rechtlichen Aspekte im Bereich der Lebensmittelsicherheit eingegangen. Die Kommission will ein hohes Verbraucherschutzniveau gew(cid:228)hrleisten und das Vertrauen der Verbraucher wiederherstellen und aufrechterhalten (Punkt 29 ff). Die Einrichtung einer Europ(cid:228)ischen Lebensmittel- beh(cid:246)rde soll dazu beitragen. Die Kommission entscheidet sich nicht f(cid:252)r eine Agentur nach amerikanischen Vorbild. Die Regelungsaussch(cid:252)sse mit Vertretern der Mitgliedstaaten bleiben daf(cid:252)r verantwortlich, Beschl(cid:252)sse vorzubereiten und zu fassen. Die Beschlu(cid:223)fassung (cid:252)ber die Lebensmittelsicherheit wird dem- nach weiterhin durch andere als wissenschaftliche (cid:220)berlegungen beeinflu(cid:223)t


title: 2001/274/EC: Commission Decision of 11 April 2000 on the measure implemented by EDF for certain firms in the paper industry (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2000) 1061)

eurovoc_concepts:
France
aid system
application of EU law
electrical industry
pulp and paper industry
tariff preference

text: L 95/18 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 5. 4. 2001 II (Acts whose publication is not obligatory) COMMISSION COMMISSION DECISION of 11 April 2000 on the measure implemented by EDF for certain firms in the paper industry (notified under document number C(2000) 1061) (Only the French text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance) (2001/274/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 88(2) thereof, Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof, Having called on interested parties to submit their comments pursuant to those provisions (1), Whereas: 1. PROCEDURE (1) (2) By letter of 13 June 1996, registered on 14 June 1996, the Commission received a complaint concerning the preferential terms on which Electricité de France (herein- after ‘EDF’) apparently supplied electricity to paper mills which agreed to purchase electrical infrared drying equipment. According to the complainant, EDF took advantage of its absolute control of the French electricity market by endeavouring to influence paper mills' choice of infrared technology by offering preferential rates for electricity, to the detriment of systems operating with other energy sources, in particular natural gas. By letters dated 10 July 1996, 24 July 1996, 4 November 1997, 4 December 1997 and 12 January 1998, the Commission asked the French authorities for more detailed information. This reached the Commis- sion on 18 July 1996, 28 August 1996, 25 November 1997 and 22 January 1998. The Commission sent the (1) OJ C 70, 13. 3. 1999, p. 10. complainant a summary of the information by letters dated 10 July 1996, 29 October 1996, 14 November 1996 and 13 November 1997. The complainant's replies reached the Commission on 31 October 1996, 21 November 1996, 10 December 1996, 25 February 1997, 22 May 1997 and 12 September 1997. (3) (4) On 20 May 1998 the Commission decided to initiate the the EC Treaty in procedure under Article 88(2) of respect of the measure. This decision was notified to the French Government by letter No SG(98) D/5741 of 14 July 1998 requesting the French authorities to submit their comments within one month, i. e. by 14 August 1998. By letters dated 28 July 1998, 11 September 1998, 7 October 1998, 24 December 1998 and 19 January 1999, the French authorities asked the Commission not to publish certain information contained in the decision to initiate the procedure under Article 88(2). The Commission replied by letters dated 10 August 1998, 6 October 1998, 22 October 1998, 14 December 1998, 12 January 1999 and 19 February 1999. At meetings held on 21 September and 1 December 1998 the French authorities withdrew their request not to publish infor- mation, which in any case had been partly rejected because of the public nature of the matter at issue. (5) By letter of 2 September 1998, registered on 7 September 1998, EDF asked for access to the file. The request was rejected by letter of 17 September as all the documents requested fell within the list of exceptions under the policy on access to documents. 5. 4. 2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 95/19 On 31 July 1998 the French authorities asked for a one-month extension of the deadline for their reply. Their request was accepted by the Commission on 5 August 1998. By letter of 4 September 1998, registered on 7 September 1998, the French authorities submitted their comments. (13) (6) (7) (8) The Commission notice to interested parties asking them to submit their observations on the measure in question was published on 13 March 1999 in the Official Journal of the European Communities (2). By 13 April 1999, the deadline given in the notice, the interested parties had submitted two observations. By letters dated 4 June and 9 June, these were forwarded to the French authorities, which had the opportunity to comment on them. In the same letter, the Commission also asked for additional information. (9) At a meeting held on 28 May 1999 and by letter of 28 June 1999, registered on 29 June, the French authorities supplied the information requested. 2. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURE 2. 1. Introduction (10) (11) EDF, which is wholly controlled by the French State, is the dominant electricity producer in France, where it used to have a vertically integrated monopoly, both in law (3) and in fact. Electricity prices are fixed by EDF following approval by the Finance Ministry. For at least the last 10 years, EDF has announced consid- erable unutilised capacity. It had initially estimated that this overcapacity would be absorbed by the market by 1997/1998. Recently, however, it has modified its own estimates and now believes that the overcapacity will last until at least 2010, the growth in the French economy being less buoyant than expected. (12) to dispose of In order its surplus, EDF grants its customers in certain industrial sectors commercial hold- ings for extra consumption resulting from ‘efficient and innovatory’ applications of electricity. The electrical technologies and industrial sectors enjoying these bene- (2) See footnote 1. (3) Before Law No 2000-108 of 10 February 2000 on the modernisa- the public electricity service (Official tion and development of Gazette of the French Republic of 11 February 2000, p. 2143). fits are the following: reversible air conditioning; radiant panels, membrane technology; CMB, electrolysis, high- efficiency electric motors and electronic speed variation (all sectors); electrical tubing (chemicals); ohmic heating (chemicals, induction (metal-working and chemicals), infrared and other radiation techniques (paper, textiles and food). food and glass); In the [. ] (*) and [. ] industries, these practices resulted in electricity supply contracts being concluded, in partic- ular with [. ] and [. ]; these are also under examination by the Commission. In the paper industry, the commer- cial policy conducted by EDF took the form of some 10 ‘commercial holding’ projects between 1990 and 1996 aimed, in particular, at encouraging the installation of infrared drying equipment. EDF granted subsidies in this way to the Condat, Cascades, Lancey, Gromelle and Sibille Stenay (‘Sibille’) paper mills. 2. 2. Recipients and detailed description of the measures (14) When the paper mills concerned purchase the drying equipment, EDF gives them an advance corresponding to the discount on the quantity of electricity which the dryers, according to the mills' estimates, will use during the life of the supply contract, which is usually six years. EDF thus calculates the discount in order to spread the initial holding over the presumed annual additional consumption of electricity by the dryers and over the lifetime of the supply contracts. However, the calcula- tion does not take account of interest on the advance in question and on consumption. The discounts given below are expressed at their present (discounted) 1999 value (4). electrical acquired three (15) Condat: in June 1989, October 1990 and April 1995 the mill infrared drying machines with an additional consumption of 9, 21 and 18 GWh a year respectively (5). It received from EDF a total of FRF 15,8 million (EUR 2,41 million) for addi- tional electricity consumption over six years, of which FRF 10,5 million (EUR 1,6 million) was in the form of an advance and FRF 5,3 million (EUR 0,81 million) in the form of an operating grant paid annually to the customer. The actual discount amounts to 6,2 c/kWh (EUR 0,95/kWh) or 27 % of the average price of 22,8 c/kWh (EUR 3,48/kWh). The present value of the discount is FRF 22,6 million (EUR 3,45 million). (16) Cascades: in April 1992 EDF granted FRF 250 000 (EUR 38 112) for the development of a new membrane technology aimed at the recycling of coating effluent, involving additional annual consumption of 0,75 GWh (*) Business secret. (4) The reference rate used by the Commission in order to measure the aid element of subsidies is 4,76 % as at 1 August 1999. (5) On the basis of the information provided by the French authorities the Commission included in its decision to on 21 Januay 1998, initiate the procedure a commercial incentive of FRF 6,6 million (EUR 1,01 million) for the installation of a fourth drying machine. In their letter of 28 June 1999 the French authorities provided proof that the fourth machine had not been installed. The Commis- sion therefore removed the incentive for that machine from the calculation of the discount. L 95/20 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 5. 4. 2001 over three years. The real value of the discount amounts to 11,6 c/kWh (EUR 1,77/kWh) or 59 % of the average price of 19,6 c/kWh (EUR 2,99/kWh). The present value of the discount is FRF 346 185 (EUR 52 775). regard to preferential tariffs granted to certain paper mills and (b) the commercial logic of the loan granted by EDF to IRS. (17) Lancey: in March 1996 it acquired two electrical infrared drying units and an effluent treatment unit. It incentive from therefore benefited from a commercial EDF of FRF 2,25 million (EUR 0,34 million) for an annual additional consumption of 15 GWh over six years. This amounts to a real discount of 2,7 c/kWh (EUR 0,41/kWh) or 15 % of the average price of 17,8 c/kWh (EUR 2,71/kWh). The present value of the discount is FRF 2,87 million (EUR 0,44 million). (18) Gromelle: in March 1993 EDF granted it a holding of FRF 130 000 (EUR 19 818) for an electric drying unit with an annual additional consumption of 0,8 GWh over six years. The real average discount is 3,0 c/kWh (EUR 0,46/kWh) or 8 % of the average price of 37,8 c/kWh (EUR 5,76/kWh). The present value of the discount is FRF 171 840 (EUR 26 196). (19) Sibille: for installing an electric dryer, EDF granted it (i) in July 1992 the sum of FRF 1,35 million (EUR 0,21 million) for an annual additional consumption of 7 GWh, (ii) in April 1996 the sum of FRF 283 000 (EUR 43 143) for reconditioning and (iii) again in April 1996 a further commercial incentive of FRF 230 000 (6) (EUR 35 063) for further additional consumption of 1,2 GWh over a period of six years. The real average discount amounts to 4,6 c/kWh (EUR 0,70/kWh) or 19 % of 24,2 c/kWh (EUR 3,69/kWh) for an annual additional consumption of 8,2 GWh. The present value of is FRF 2,72 million (EUR 0,41 million). the discount average price the of (20) in order IRS: to help finance the development of infrared drying technology, EDF granted InfraRouge- System (‘IRS’) a loan of FRF 3 million (EUR 0,46 million) in 1996. The loan was apparently to be repaid over five years depending on the firm's turnover in France and abroad. The present value of the loan is FRF 3,45 million (EUR 0,53 million). (21) The present value of FRF 32,2 million (EUR 4,9 million). the discounts and the loan is 3. PRINCIPAL REASONS WHICH LED TO THE DECISION TO INITIATE THE PROCEDURE (22) The Commission decision to initiate the procedure under Article 88(2) was based on (a) suspected aid with (6) In their letter of 4 September 1998 the French authorities stated that EDF had demanded reimbursement of the sums for the paper machine and the infrared equipment generating additional consump- tion of 1,2 GWh which had been out of use since the end of 1997. Since they acknowledge in their letter of 28 June 1999 that the incentive has not been paid back, the Commission is including the sum of FRF 230 000 (EUR 35 063) in the calculation. 3. 1. Preferential tariffs for certain paper mills (23) The Commission considers that preferential tariffs are caught by the ban in Artic1e 87(1) of the EC Treaty if they meet the following three conditions: (a) they are granted by the State or through State resources; (b) they favour certain firms or the production of certain goods; and (c) they distort competition between the favoured firms and similar in other Member States, the products concerned being traded between Member States. firms and/or products (24) As to the second condition, there was doubt whether the fact that certain paper mills benefited from a preferential electricity tariff was tantamount to granting them an advantage. (25) At first sight, EDF did not appear to cover the marginal cost and at least a proportion of its fixed costs. Where long-term electricity supply contracts are concerned, a generator must take account of a significant proportion of its fixed costs even if it has surplus capacity. (26) What is more, it did not appear that EDF had any need to grant price discounts in order to compete, as there are no competitors at present on the French electricity market, or to keep customers it might lose without offering such discounts (7). (27) Lastly, the preferential prices granted to the paper mills concerned appeared to discriminate against other elec- tricity consumers in a comparable situation. 3. 2. Loan granted by EDF to IRS (28) Without more detailed information and in view of the difficult financial position of IRS, there is some doubt as logic of the loan granted by EDF. to the commercial 4. OBSERVATIONS BY THE INTERESTED PARTIES (29) its decision to initiate the Following publication of the EC Treaty in procedure under Article 88(2) of respect of the aid in question, the Commission received observations from two interested parties, namely an aid recipient (Cascades) and EDF. (7) Joined Cases 67, 68, and 70/85 Van der Kooy [1988] ECR 219. (30) (31) (32) (33) 5. 4. 2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 95/21 4. 1. Observations by Cascades it Cascades states that is equipped solely with gas infrared systems by the firm Solaronics and has no electrical infrared equipment; EDF therefore did not influence its choice. However, EDF did grant the sum of FRF 250 000 for the development of a new membrane technology aimed at the recycling of coating effluent. The discount in question was not spread over three years. Lastly, electricity consumption corresponded to the motor of the pump feeding the installation, which, according to Cascades, could not be powered in any other way, and so this in no way penalised or discrimi- nated against either another equipment provider or another energy provider. 4. 2. Observations by EDF EDF considers that neither the discount granted to the paper mills nor the contract with IRS contains elements of State aid and that the interpretation of Articles 87 and 88, as proposed by the Commission in this case, may discriminate against public electricity companies in favour of private electricity companies by denying the former the commercial freedom which all companies may enjoy under the Treaty. sum of FRF 500 000 to contribute to the development of commercial communication and the sum of FRF 2,5 million to be repaid over five years on the basis of IRS's annual turnover. (35) Under the contract, IRS must each year repay 4 % of its turnover generated by the sale of electrical infrared equipment. However, following a downturn in its busi- ness, it did not keep to this commitment. At the request of EDF, the Paris commercial court issued an interim order against IRS on 11 February 1999. IRS has three months in which to pay off its debt by making an interim payment of FRF 870 769,39. If it fails to do so, the entire debt will be immediately payable. (36) Finally, EDF points out that the Commission interprets Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty in a way which restricts the commercial freedom of public electricity companies in favour of private companies. If EDF were a private company, the market behaviour which is being chal- lenged would be perfectly permissible. 5. COMMENTS BY FRANCE (37) The French authorities replied to the Commission decision to initiate the Article 88(2) procedure by two letters, dated 4 September 1998 and 29 June 1999, which are summarised below. Firstly, EDF maintains that the discount covers all vari- able costs and a very substantial proportion of the company's fixed costs. According to a study carried out by the consultant Hagler-Bailly, the prices offered by EDF for additional consumption by paper mills linked to new equipment cover all variable costs and, on average, 57 % of fixed costs. (38) Furthermore, in order to gauge the real impact of the discount on competition and intra-Community trade, EDF considers that it should be calculated in relation to the average price paid by a paper mill for the total energy consumption of its site. According to EDF, the discount for Condat, Lancey and Sibille, expressed as a percentage of consumption (in 1996), amounted to 0,8 %, 3,4 % and 1,3 % respectively. Given that the effect of the cost of electricity on the cost of paper ranges from 5 % to 10 % depending on the quality of the paper, the ‘advantage’ which the discount repre- sents in terms of electricity costs is, according to EDF, between 0,04 % and 0,08 % for Condat, between 0,17 % and 0,34 % for Lancey and between 0,065 % and 0,13 % for Sibille. total site (34) Furthermore, EDF states that the agreement concluded in 1996 with IRS does not constitute a simple loan but a particular kind of partnership. Under the terms of the agreement, IRS undertook to develop electrical infrared applications. In exchange, EDF made available to IRS the 5. 1. Letter of 4 September 1998 the procedure, In their reply of 4 September 1998 concerning the the French authorities initiation of firms observed that concerned in the paper industry did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty, for the following reasons: the discount granted to the (39) According to them, the commercial strategy at issue stemmed from a decision taken by the company itself and was not dictated by any measure, decision or incen- tive originating from them. The fact that EDF is wholly owned by the French State does not ipso facto make the State responsible for commercial measures of limited scope such as the one in question. (40) The French authorities state that, like any other elec- tricity company, public or private, EDF has a legitimate commercial interest in encouraging the development of technologies and equipment likely to stimulate the demand for electricity and create new outlets for the company's product. The additional consumption could not be called a preferential tariff. According to the French authorities, it constituted estab- lished, legitimate commercial practice based on objec- tive, non-discriminatory criteria. discount for L 95/22 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 5. 4. 2001 (41) Furthermore, the French authorities point out that the prices charged for overall consumption of the industrial sites concerned are calculated so as to cover, and to cover effectively, all the costs of the contracts in ques- tion. The Commission simply calculates the effect of the discount on additional consumption alone. According to the French authorities, this approach does not appear to be in line with the principle of the market economy operator. They consider that the Commission cannot establish that an operator in a market economy, put in EDF's position, would make sure of the profitability of each of the elements of a given commercial relationship with an industrial consumer. In any case, since the prices at issue relate to additional consumption, the French authorities maintain that the discount was calculated so as to arrive at a price which covers not only all the variable costs but also around 50 % of fixed costs. (42) consider Furthermore, that, the French authorities although the commercial practice set in place normally lasts for six years, the beneficial effects it has on elec- tricity consumption last well beyond the incentive period, in fact throughout the life of the equipment, i. e. between 12 and 15 years. This means that the extra electricity consumption and the revenue it generates may be calculated over a much longer period than the period for which the discount is granted. (43) With regard to its overcapacity, the French authorities confirm that EDF has a surplus of energy from nuclear sources. They claim that the NERA study shows that EDF did not knowingly arrange this overcapacity and that its commercial policy towards customers allowing it to absorb the surplus is carried on under pricing condi- tions which cover all variable costs and a large propor- tion of fixed costs. (48) (49) for They go on to stress that the discount is not applied in a discriminatory manner. They point out that the tariff [. ] and [. ] have a fundamentally conditions different background from the case in question, linked mainly to the electricity-intensive nature of the industrial activities concerned, which exceeds 50 %. Given that energy costs account for only 5 % to 10 % of the total cost of paper manufacture, the paper industry is not an electricity-intensive sector. (44) (45) (46) end their the introduction of the French authorities letter by Lastly, explaining that, at the time of the negotiations for the EDF/IRS contract in 1996, EDF could, on the contrary, expect an increase in electricity consumption as a result of infrared technology in many industrial sectors in which IRS is active. Sales of elec- trical infrared equipment by IRS in 1996 and 1997 realised FRF 18 million. According to the French authorities, such prospects should lead to additional income. (47) According to the French authorities, EDF estimates that infrared equipment with a total power of 300 MW was installed in industry in France in 1996. According to EDF, annual electricity consumption generated by such is over 720 GWh, representing estimated equipment annual In the paper industry alone, infrared technology generates consump- tion of 120 GWh. In view of the number of machines not yet equipped with this technology, EDF estimates that is 125 GWh, representing estimated potential annual income of FRF 30 million. income of FRF 200 million. consumption still the pool of accessible 5. 2. Letter of 29 June 1999 By letter of 4 June 1999, the Commission asked the French authorities to reply to the questions in its decision to initiate the procedure which still remained unanswered and to a number of other questions arising from the observations made by third parties. In response to this request, the French authorities supplied calculation sheets concerning the rate of fixed costs for additional consumption coverage of infrared resulting from the installation of electrical drying equipment. According to them, these calculations were made and endorsed by the independent consultant Hagler-Bailly. additional indicate consumption generated by the infrared installations, the terms cover all variable costs and, on commercial average, 57 % of fixed costs. They that, for (50) They point out in this connection that the commercial incentives introduced for new consumption do not lead to lower tariffs but, through increased sales, make it possible to cover more of the fixed costs of EDF's generation system, thereby directly benefiting all of its customers. The French authorities believe that the Commission overestimates the importance of the discount for the competitive position of EDF's industrial customers. In their view, the effect of the discount on the average price charged by the paper firms is minimal. In the same way, they emphasise that it would be wrong to maintain that EDF's practice of giving commercial incentives has ‘diverted’ the market from its natural course of using gas, since electrical equipment is a more attractive option. (51) As regards the comparison between the tariff terms in the case in question and those of [. ] and [. ], the French authorities state that the two situations are not in fact comparable. For [. ] and [. ] electricity accounts for over 50 % of the cost of manufacturing the final product, while in the paper industry it accounts for less than 5 %. According to a statistical study by VDEW based on data supplied by the German Statistisches Bundesamt, DIW 5. 4. 2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 95/23 and Unipede, electricity accounts for 2,4 % of the cost of paper production. Similarly, a study of the 1997 report by SESSI (statistics department of the French Economics Ministry) gives a figure of 4,3 %. The real percentages of electricity intensity for paper manufacture are ten times lower than the figures put forward by the complainant in this case. (52) As regards real additional consumption linked to the operation of drying machinery, the authorities explain that this was not measured specifically. The discount was therefore calculated and granted on the basis of the additional consumption generated by this equipment and provided for in the relevant agreements. (53) In their letter, the French authorities also confirm that the additional commercial incentive of FRF 230 000 for Sibille has not been repaid. (54) With regard to the loan to IRS, the French authorities maintain that the agreement concluded between EDF and IRS on 29 March 1996 is in fact a contract for the services and not a loan agreement. provision of According to them, at the time the contract was signed, IRS was indeed the only manufacturer capable of offering innovatory electrical infrared drying equipment. On the basis of EDF's marketing platform, IRS was therefore chosen since it could provide the services which EDF wanted in the market segment of electrical infrared drying. (55) With regard to Condat, one of the recipients of the aid, the French authorities confirm that only three electrical infrared machines were installed by the company and that the fourth, planned at one time, had not been installed since in the end the firm chose a gas-powered infrared machine. (56) Lastly, the French authorities explain that the difference between the Commission's and EDF's calculations is due to the fact that the NERA study greatly overestimates the variable cost of a nuclear unit in EDF's generation system. For French nuclear power stations, as in almost all other countries, operating and maintenance costs are fixed costs. This means that the variable cost of nuclear power is basically the cost of the fuel, evaluated for France in the OECD report at USD 0,0083 and 0,0092/kWh as at 1 July 1991, i. e. around FRF 0,05 to 0,06 per kWh in the mid-1990s. generation system, that the short-term marginal cost of supply is [. ]. 6. ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURE 6. 1. Preferential tariffs for certain paper mills (58) (59) (60) (61) 6. 1. 1. De minimis rule The French authorities initially argued that the discounts granted to the Cascades and Gromelle paper mills in 1992 and 1993 respectively were covered by the de minimis rule. It should be pointed out here that the ceiling applicable in this case is given in the Community guidelines on State aid for small and medium-sized enterprises of 1992 (8) (hereinafter ‘the guidelines’), i. e. ECU 50 000, this being the only rule which France could rely on in 1992 and 1993. The guidelines state that the de minimis rule applies to ‘aid up to a certain absolute amount, below which Article 92(1) can be said not to apply’ and that one-off payments of aid of up to ECU 50 000, in respect of a given type of expenditure ard schemes under which the amount of aid a given firm may receive in respect of a given type of expenditure over a three year period is limited to that figure, will no longer be considered noti- fiable under Article 93(3), provided that it is an express condition of the award or scheme that any further aid the same firm may receive in respect of the same type of expenditure from other sources or under other schemes does not take the total aid the firm receives above the ECU 50 000 limit. The value of the discount granted to Cascades in April 1992 was, at the time, FRF 250 000 (ECU 36 000), while that of the discount granted to Gromelle in March 1993 was FRF 130 000 (ECU 18 700). The French authorities have confirmed that Cascades and Gromelle did not receive, under the de minimis rule, any other aid and that the ceiling was not therefore exceeded. Conse- leaving aside the question of whether or not quently, they qualify as aid, the discounts do not exceed the de minimis therefore threshold. Article 87(1) does not apply. 6. 1. 2. State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty (57) According to the French authorities, this difference between the variable cost calculated by the NERA study [. ] and the real variable cost of French nuclear power stations as evaluated in the OECD's 1992 report [. ] suffices to demonstrate, given the structure of the French (62) The question is whether the discounts granted to Condat, Lancey and Sibille constitute preferential tariffs caught by the ban in Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. (8) OJ C 213, 19. 8. 1992, p. 2. L 95/24 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 5. 4. 2001 (63) Under that Article, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, incompatible with the common market. (64) Thus, preferential tariffs are caught by the ban in Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty if they meet the following three conditions: 1. they are granted by the State or through State resources; 2. they favour certain firms or the production of certain goods; 3. they distort competition between the favoured firms and similar firms and/or products in other Member States, the products concerned being traded between Member States. 6. 1. 2. 1. G r a n t e d b y t h e S t a t e o r t h r o u g h S t a t e r e s o u r c e s (65) As regards the first point, i. e. aid granted through State resources, the French State wholly owns EDF. Electricity prices are fixed by EDF after approval by the Finance Ministry. Although the company has some freedom as it must nevertheless be regards its discount policy, concluded that the State, through EDF, has the final say as to the advantages enjoyed by the paper mills concerned. (66) The French authorities' claim that the commercial meas- ures are ‘limited in scope’ (9) must be refuted. They in fact themselves confirm that such measures are part of ‘a commercial policy which aims to encourage industrial consumers to develop and use technologies which ensure innovatory, effective and rational use of electri- city’ (10). Being part of a ‘commercial policy’, these commercial measures can hardly be said to be ‘limited in scope’. (67) Therefore, since they are granted by EDF and thus indir- ectly by the French State, the preferential tariffs for certain paper mills constitute a State measure, with the result that the first condition under Article 87(1) is met. (9) Letter of 4 September 1998, p. 3. (10) See footnote 9. 6. 1. 2. 2. A d v a n t a g e t o c e r t a i n p a p e r m i l l s (68) As regards the second point, i. e. the favouring of certain firms or goods, the fact that certain paper mills benefit from a preferential electricity tariff is tantamount to granting them an advantage. In the present case, the advantage consists in the following real average prices for electricity and discounts: Condat: 16,6 c/kWh (EUR 2,5/kWh) (EUR 3,45 million); Lancey: 15,1 c/kWh (EUR 2,3/kWh) or FRF 2,87 million (EUR 0,44 million); and Sibille: 19,6 c/kWh (EUR 3,0/kWh) or FRF 2,72 million (EUR 0,41 million). The total value of advantages in the form of discounts is FRF 28,2 million (EUR 4,3 million). FRF 22,6 million or (69) (70) In principle, a private or public enterprise can charge different prices according to the use made of the prod- ucts it sells; however, such differences must be justified the on commercial grounds, marginal cost and at least a proportion of the fixed costs. they must cover i. e. Experts given the task by the Commission of analysing EDF's surplus capacity and its pricing system (11) esti- mate the marginal cost to EDF of producing an addi- tional unit of nuclear-generated electricity would be about [. ], whereas that produced from fossil fuels (coal and oil) would range from [. ]. Where long-term elec- tricity supply contracts are concerned, a generator must take account of a significant proportion of its fixed costs, even if it has a surplus. This would bring the price charged to major industrial consumers to an average of some [. ], which would appear to correspond to that invoiced by EDF to its largest customers on the basis of the tariff in force. (71) By referring to the OECD's 1992 report, which assesses the variable cost of nuclear energy for EDF at 5 to 6 c/kWh (EUR 1/kWh), the French authorities have shown that the NERA study overestimated the variable cost of a unit of nuclear-generated electricity by EDF's generation system. On the basis of this information, they confirm that the short-term marginal cost of supply is [. ]. (72) On the basis of a short-term marginal cost of [. ], the French authorities have established that the price offered by EDF for this additional consumption covered its vari- able cost and at least 35 % and, on average, 57 % of its fixed costs. The average rate of cover of fixed costs is 50 % for Condat, 66 % for Lancey and 62 % for Sibille. (11) Study IV/96/1178/ETD/01 ‘Tariffs and cost consequences of the EDF monopoly’, carried out by National Economic Research Asso- ciates (NERA), February 1997. 5. 4. 2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 95/25 (73) (74) that The French authorities confirm that EDF has a surplus of energy from nuclear sources (12). It should be pointed out this overcapacity was created in a lawful monopoly situation, well before the current ongoing liberalisation of the electricity market. The Commission's analysis therefore focuses on the particular circum- stances of the present case. Consequently, this decision in no way prejudges the conclusions which, against the background of the the opening up of Commission could reach when it examines the problems posed by the creation of such overcapacity by EDF in the past. the market, Commercial logic dictates that, where there is overca- pacity, an operator in a market economy would natu- rally have been led by the need to maximise profits to sell an additional quantity of his product without covering all the costs for that additional quantity. If he the corresponding quantities which were did not, produced and could not be stored would remain unsold. Furthermore, there is nothing in the case file to show that EDF would have been able to obtain a better price elsewhere. However, the alternative would have been for the paper mills to install gas-powered drying equipment. In this context, obtaining for the additional consump- tion resulting from the choice of an additional electrical drying machine a price which covers variable costs and at least 35 % and, on average, 57 % of fixed costs must be regarded as a commercially acceptable practice. (75) Therefore, in view of the particular circumstances in this case, the preferential electricity tariffs granted by EDF to Condat, Lancey and Sibille must be regarded as being justified on commercial grounds. 6. 1. 2. 3. D i s t o r t i n g c o m p e t i t i o n a n d a f f e c t i n g t r a d e b e t w e e n M e m b e r S t a t e s (76) Given that a measure cannot be regarded as aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty unless all three conditions are met, and given that the second condition (aid favouring certain firms or the production of certain goods) is not met, there is no need to examine the third condition. (77) In conclusion, the preferential electricity tariffs granted by EDF to the Condat, Lancey and Sibille paper mills do not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. certain undertakings or the production of certain goods constitutes aid within the meaning of the Article in so far as it affects trade. (79) As demonstrated in recitals 58 to 77 regarding preferen- tial tariffs, the loan granted by EDF to IRS is caught by the ban in Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty only if it favours certain undertakings and if the advantage it confers is not justified on commercial grounds, provided that the other conditions are met. (80) The Commission would point out that, according to the principle of the private investor acting in a market economy, as set out in the Commission communication to the Member States on application of Articles 92 and 93 (now Articles 87 and 88) of the EC Treaty and of Article 5 of Commission Directive 80/723/EEC to public undertakings in the manufacturing sector (13) (hereinafter ‘the communication’), ‘only projects where the Commis- sion considers that there were no objective or bona fide grounds to reasonably expect an adequate return in a comparable private undertaking at the investment/financing decision is made can be treated as State aid’ (point 28). the moment (81) In the case in point, with regard to the decision taken by EDF in 1996 to invest in IRS, the rate of return can be calculated in two ways. (82) Firstly, there is the repayment of the investment at a rate of 4 % per year of IRS's turnover generated by the sale of electrical infrared equipment. According to EDF, IRS's turnover was FRF 18 million in 1996. Given that IRS was experiencing financial difficulties at the time the investment decision was taken, only a high rate of return would have attracted a private investor. In line with its standard practice, the Commission applies an interest rate of 12 % for high-risk projects. The present value of 4 % of FRF 18 million over five years — the turnover having been adjusted for the inflation rate in France in 1996, i. e. 2 % — is FRF 3 012 024. (83) the development of Furthermore, EDF estimates that infrared technology and its application in electrical industry could, in the paper industry alone, generate consumption of 125 GWh, i. e. an estimated potential annual income of FRF 30 million. 6. 2. Loan granted by EDF to IRS (78) The Commission examined the loan granted by EDF to IRS in the light of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. Under that Article, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring (84) Given that, when EDF decided to invest in IRS, it reck- oned not only to recover the sum invested, with 12 % interest, but also to establish infrared technology in the paper industry, representing potential annual income of FRF 30 million, it may be supposed that it reasoned in the same way as a private investor and that the loan is therefore not to be regarded as State aid. (12) See recital 43. (13) OJ C 307, 13. 11. 1993, p. 3. L 95/26 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 5. 4. 2001 (85) return actually Finally, with regard to the rate of obtained, the communication states that, ‘there is no question of the Commission using the benefit of hind- sight to state that the provision of public funds consti- tuted State aid on the sole basis that the out-turn rate of return was not adequate’ (point 28). (86) Accordingly, the fact that IRS sufered a downturn in business and did not fulfil its commitment does not alter the nature of the investment at the time of the decision in 1996. In fact, it transpires from information available that in 1996, at the time EDF granted the loan, there was nothing which would have enabled an ‘informed’ analyst to predict that IRS was likely to suffer a business downturn such that the prospects would be any other than those expected. (87) Furthermore, like a private investor concerned to protect his investment, EDF took legal action against IRS, with the result that on 11 February 1999 the Paris commer- cial court issued an interim order against IRS. The latter has three months in which to pay off its debt by making an interim payment of FRF 870 769,39. If it fails to do so, the entire debt will be immediately payable. (88) In conclusion, the loan granted by EDF to IRS does not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. (89) In the light of the above and given that: 7. CONCLUSIONS 1. the preferential electricity tariffs granted to the Cascades and Gromelle paper mills fall within the scope of the de minimis rule, 2. in view of the surplus of energy from nuclear sources at EDF and since for additional consumption EDF is covering its variable costs and, on average, 57 % of the preferential electricity tariffs its fixed costs, granted to the Condat, Lancey and Sibille are justified on commercial grounds, and 3. at the time EDF took the investment decision, the loan granted by EDF to IRS was justified on commer- cial grounds, the Commission finds that neither the preferential elec- tricity tariffs granted to the Cascades, Gromelle, Condat, Lancey and Sibille paper mills nor the loan to IRS constitute aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The preferential electricity tariffs granted by EDF, and thus indirectly by France, to the Condat, Cascades, Lancey, Gromelle and Sibille paper mills and the loan granted by EDF to IRS, with a present value of FRF 32,2 million (EUR 4,9 million), do not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the French Republic. Done at Brussels, 11 April 2000. For the Commission Mario MONTI Member of the Commission