title: Communication from the Commission - Unbundled access to the local loop: Enabling the competitive provision of a full range of electronic communication services including broadband multimedia and high-speed internet

eurovoc_concepts:
competition law
new technology
single market
telecommunications
transmission network

text: COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Brussels, 26. 4. 2000 COM(2000) 237 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Unbundled Access to the Local loop: Enabling the competitive provision of a full range of electronic communication services including broadband multimedia and high-speed internet CONTENTS 1. Introduction 1. 1. 1. 2. Objectives Background 2. Means of access to the local loop 3. The competitive situation of markets 4. Application of competition rules 5. Application of Sector Specific Rules (ONP) 6. Duties of National Regulatory and competition Authorities 7. Conclusion Annex – Technical aspects of unbundled access to the local loop 2 1. INTRODUCTION 1. 1. Objectives The main policy objectives that underpin the existing regulatory framework, as set out in the Commission’s Communication on the 1999 Review,1 are: – To promote an open and competitive European market for communications services; – To benefit the European citizen in particular through creating new job opportunities; – To consolidate the internal market in a converging environment. The Commission Recommendation on unbundled access to the local loop2 fits into this framework and with the conclusions of the Lisbon Summit, of accelerating Europe’s transition to the new information society, in particular through the deployment of cheap internet services. It identifies actions that Member States are invited to take to address limited competition in the local access network where the incumbent continues to dominate both the provision of voice telephony and the development of higher bandwidth services. Providing access to the local loop to all new entrants will increase the level of competition and technological innovation in the local access network, which will in turn stimulate the competitive provision of a full range of telecommunication services from simple voice telephony to broadband services to the customer. The types of broadband technologies now available (see annex I) are well suited to providing cost-efficient leased circuits and high speed internet access to small and medium enterprises, and to the top end of the consumer market. As the market grows and economies of scale are realised, lower prices will make these broadband services accessible to a large part of the population. Experience shows how quickly demand can grow once the price is right. Several Member States have already mandated or have formally fixed dates for unbundling (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK, see Fifth implementation Report 3). 1. 2. Background The local loop refers to the physical circuit between the customer’s premises and the telecommunications operator’s local switch or equivalent facility. Traditionally it takes the form of pairs of copper wires (one pair per normal telephone line), but increasingly fibre optic cables are being deployed to connect large customers, and other technologies are also being rolled out in the local access network. 4 Local loop unbundling has been mandated in certain Member States and is used mainly for the connection of those customers for which the deployment of optical fibre is not an economically viable alternative, such as small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and residential customers. In its Communication on the 1999 Review, the Commission noted that the availability of unbundled access to the local loop increases competition and that it could in addition speed up 1 2 3 4 COM(1999) 539. See http://www. ispo. cec. be/infosoc/telecompolicy/review99/review99en. pdf. OJ …. (to be published). COM (1999)537, 11 November 1999, Fifth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package, see http://www. ispo. cec. be/infosoc/telecompolicy/5threport. html. Wireless local loops, power line networks etc, in addition to cable TV networks. 3 the introduction of high speed Internet access services. During the public consultation on the Review a broad consensus has emerged on the necessity of unbundled access to local loops for the emergence of advanced services in a competitive environment. 5 In addition, the ubiquity of This results from the fact that operators rolled out their local access networks over significant periods of time protected by exclusive rights and were able to fund its investment costs through monopoly rents. loop access infrastructure controlled by the incumbent operator is not in all circumstances economically feasible to duplicate, and alternative local access infrastructures (cable-TV, wireless local loops, satellite, etc) cannot usually be constructed with the same ubiquity and competitive conditions within a reasonable time. In the absence of technical and commercial viable alternatives refusal to supply access by a dominant company holding such an infrastructure may in the circumstances of the specific case and in the light of the case-law of the Community courts, constitute an infringement of Article 82 of the Treaty. the copper local 2. MEANS OFACCESS TO THE LOCAL LOOP To overcome the limited current competition in the local access network referred to above, three means of access to the local loop are considered: (1) Full unbundling of the local loop (unbundled access to the copper pair for the competitive provision of advanced services by third parties) In the case of full unbundling of the local loop, the copper pair is rented to a third party for its exclusive use. The lessee has full control of the relationship with its customer for the provision of a full range telecommunication services over the local loop, including deployment of digital subscriber line systems (DSL) for high speed data applications. (2) Shared use of the copper line (unbundled access to the high frequency spectrum of the local loop for the competitive provision of DSL systems and services by third parties) In this form of access, the incumbent operator continues to provide telephone service, while the new entrant delivers high speed data services over the same local loop using its own high- speed ADSL modems. Telephone traffic and the data traffic are separated by means of a splitter before the incumbent’s switch. The local loop remains connected to, and part of, the public switched telephone network. (3) High speed bit stream access (Provision of DSL services by incumbent) ‘High-speed bit stream access’ refers to the situation where the incumbent installs a high speed access link to the customers premises (e. g. , by installing its preferred ADSL equipment and configuration in its local access network) and then makes this access link available to third parties, to enable them to provide high speed services to customers. The incumbent may also provide transmission services to its competitors, to carry traffic to a ‘higher’ level in the network hierarchy where new entrants may already have a point of presence (e. g. a transit switch location). 5 Communication from the Commission on the results of the public consultation on the 1999 Communications Review (COM(2000)xxx). 4 This type of access does not actually entail any unbundling of the copper pair in the local loop (but it may use only the higher frequencies of the copper local loop as in (2) above). Further technical details can be found in the attached Annex. The Commission considers that these three means of access to the local loop should be seen as complementary. The availability of only some of these means of access is not enough. Together they serve to reinforce competition and improve choice for all users, by allowing the market to decide which offering best meets users needs, taking into account the evolving demands of users and the technical and investment requirements for market players. 3. THE COMPETITIVE SITUATION OF MARKETS This section examines the present competitive situation in local loop related markets and the economic rationale for unbundling the local loop. In spite of the liberalisation of voice telephony on 1. 1. 1998 in most Member States, the incumbent’s market power remains unchallenged on a significant part of telecommunications markets. One of the main reasons for this is the bottleneck situation on the local loop related markets, because the incumbent’s local loop is the key infrastructure providing incumbents with a privileged access to end-users for the delivery of retail telecom services. 3. 1. Incentive effects of economic efficiency local loop unbundling on increased competition and While commercial negotiation is the preferred method for reaching agreement on the price of local loop access, experience shows that in most cases regulatory intervention is necessary. The lack of competition in this area means that it is appropriate for the national regulatory authority (NRA) to impose obligations for pricing to be cost-oriented, based on specific principles and methods in order to achieve long-term sustainable and efficient competition and provide predictability to market players. In order to achieve the aim of increased consumer choice the economic incentives created by the policy framework, in particular the pricing methodology, must encourage all operators to make appropriate investments. Thus when priced at a level that does not distort the ‘make or buy’ decision of an entrant, local loop unbundling can encourage long term infrastructure competition by allowing entrants to test out the market before building their own infrastructure, and can encourage a more competitive and innovative market for simple voice telephony and the roll-out of local broadband (high speed) services. While it is possible that the incumbent will introduce these technologies in its own time, the speed of take-up is likely to be increased if entrants are also allowed to upgrade the incumbent’s local loops and offer broadband service directly to users. This freedom for new entrants to rollout services independently of the decisions of a dominant operators is a strong argument for local loop unbundling rather than resale because, with resale, entrants are constrained to offering similar services to those provided by the dominant provider. is important to establish the framework for any mandated access to local It loops of incumbents, and accompanying pricing controls, against a standard of promoting economic efficiency, enabling wider competition and maximising consumer and user welfare. 5 3. 2. Market analysis – Market power of incumbents - The local loop’s key rôle. In the Full Competition Directive6, the Commission distinguished various fixed telephony retail services: the initial connection, the monthly rental, local calls, regional calls and long distance calls. While categories of services have to be monitored closely, particularly given the speed of technological change, and regularly reassessed on a case-by-case basis, these services are presently normally not substitutable for one another, and would therefore be considered as forming different relevant markets. local The telecommunications services. Two main categories of retail services markets are involved : is primarily an infrastructure delivery of allowing loop the retail • • the first is the traditional fixed telephony retail services offered to residential users, to professionals and small firms and to large businesses. This market is already very well developed and mature; the second is a new emerging market and consists in high-speed telecommunication services which can be delivered on the local loop in the form of DSL services. Additionally, the local loop is a commodity which can be priced and rented to competitors: this means that as soon as access is given to this part of the incumbents’ network a new access market develops which is also a relevant market to take into consideration. As a result of the liberalisation of voice telephony services as of 1. 1. 1998 in most Member States, the service offerings of new entrants have developed quickly particularly in the international calls market and, to a lesser extent, the regional calls market. At the same time, given the cost of investment in local access network infrastructure and/or dependence of the service offerings of the incumbent, competition in provision of full voice telephony services (including the connection, monthly rental and local calls markets) is concentrated on business customers in urban areas. As a result each of these markets has a very different competitive situation and, whilst the market share of the incumbents has decreased in international and regional call markets, they still deliver the bulk of access services to end-users – the connection and the line rental - and hold a share of the local calls market which, except in the UK, is well above 90% and in most cases close to 100%. The incumbents’ local access network (ie the copper pairs connecting end-users to the closest distribution frames) is not the only technical infrastructure allowing for the provision of retail services to end-users. Other alternatives exist such as fibre optic networks, wireless loops or upgraded cable TV networks. However, none of these alternatives can be considered as an equivalent. Fibre optic networks are presently only competitive on upstream transmission links and, as concerns the retail distribution network, in special niches like networks connecting office buildings or a narrowly defined geographical area. Wireless loops appear in the near and medium term future most suitable to address the specific needs of professional clients and small firms, or individual end-users with particular needs, but would remain uneconomic for serving the large majority of the residential clientele. Cable networks which were designed for one-way TV need costly upgrades for the provision of two-way telecom services, and the provision of high speed services on cable involves customers sharing the capacity of a cable channel, which means that high speed data via cable modems does not offer the same capacity as the copper pair upgraded with DSL technologies, which is 6 Directive 96/19/EC, recital 20. OJ L 74, 22. 03. 1996, p. 13. 6 dedicated to every single end-user. Additionally cable networks do not normally, except maybe in a few countries where the situation would have to be assessed on its own merits, have a nation-wide coverage which would allow entrants to serve the same geographic markets as incumbents, whether for traditional voice telephony retail services or new DSL services. Other innovative technologies such as the use of electricity networks do not appear to be a technically or economically viable alternative solution at present. While this may over time change, at present none of these alternative networks, nor even their combined use, can for the purposes of delivering retail narrow and large bandwidth telecommunications services be considered as a nation-wide alternative to the incumbents’ copper pair. The incumbents’ local loop networks have been developed nation-wide in each of the Member States. New entrants have licences delivered by the national authorities and are also expected to compete on the national markets. Therefore the geographic market where competition would in the absence of a bottleneck situation normally develop is the national territory of each Member State: this is what already happens for international and long distance calls for which, owing to access via interconnection, no bottleneck situation impedes the deployment of nation-wide offers by new entrants. The bottleneck situation experienced so far for the provision of access and local calls services and now for the provision of high speed services does not prevent new entrants from developing local networks, at a more limited level, such as in densely populated urban areas, but with these networks they are normally unable to compete nation-wide on an equal footing with incumbents, providing the same whole range of services (see below). The Member States’ territory is, according to the existing case law, a substantial part of the common market. Thus, without unbundled access to the incumbents’ local loop, and despite recent major steps like the introduction of carrier preselection for telephone calls, new entrants are unable to compete on several markets including the provision of high speed services to most end-users. This situation may change over the long run. New developments shall have to be monitored closely. Incumbent operators enjoy a position of dominance on the traditional – narrowband – market for telephony services. This is clear from an examination of the market shares of incumbents - the most traditional way to assess dominance. The incumbent’s market share is in all circumstances well above 50%, even on the most competitive relevant market –international calls- in the most open geographical market, the United Kingdom, where liberalisation started already in the 1980s. As noted above in other markets, such as local calls the market shares of the incumbents is in the majority of cases well above 90%, and often close to 100%. While interconnection and carrier selection allow for an opening to competition of the long distance and international calls markets, the local loop is the key infrastructure for providing access services to end-users (i. e. the connection and line rental) and remains within the incumbents’ control. Although in some countries carrier preselection also allows the delivery of local call services (call origination) by alternative operators, where this is not yet the case the local loop is also a key infrastructure for providing local calls services. Therefore the local loop is a bottleneck infrastructure for the nation-wide distribution of retail access and also, in most cases, local call services, which form two relevant markets of non substitutable services. The situation in the new markets for high speed services is less obvious. Where new high speed services are offered the presence of incumbents is nevertheless already strong and they would under the present conditions be able to consolidate their dominant position on this new market as well, owing to their privileged access to end-users through the nation-wide existing copper pair networks. 7 Thus it appears that the control of the incumbent’s nation-wide local loop gives them a considerable leverage for maintaining their dominant positions on existing voice telephony retail markets, in spite of their liberalisation, or for establishing similar positions on new emerging markets for high bandwidth services. The incumbent’s copper pair is the key infrastructure for providing: i) access voice telephony retail services, which includes call termination; ii) local call (origination) services7; and iii) high bandwidth services to end-users. These services form three separate relevant markets. Given the size of investments required, the absolute cost of nation-wide duplication of the incumbents’ network with a similar population coverage is likely to be a barrier to entry for any competitor. This infrastructure appears to be with present technologies economically unfeasible8, or unreasonably difficult to duplicate at a nation-wide level9 in a reasonable time in particular period, even for the most incumbent operators from other Member States which develop their activities in neighbouring European countries, alone or in cooperation with others. important competitors of existing incumbents, A refusal from an incumbent to give access to competitors on its local loop is thus likely to eliminate the possibility for new entrants to compete at all on the nation-wide market10 for the three identified services, and they would be limited to regional and local markets where they succeed in building alternative networks. It is highly improbable that all those alternative networks put together will in a reasonable time period be able to match the incumbents’ nation-wide network of copper pairs and address the same entire customer population. It is therefore considered that the local loop is presently essential and thus access is necessary for competitors in order for them to be able to compete nation-wide on a level playing field with incumbents on the three identified retail services markets and to address the same customer population. Given the speed of technological change and market developments which influence the technical and economic assessment of alternatives to the copper pair, the present analysis may need to be reviewed and is without prejudice to individual case-related decisions. 4. 4. 1. APPLICATION OF COMPETITION RULES The duty of the dominant operator under competition rules to grant access to the local loop Refusing to grant access to the local loop to competitors requesting access is likely to imply various forms of abuses of dominant position under article 82 of the Treaty. • Refusal to deal: on the three relevant markets identified, where the incumbent is the only provider of services over the local loop, a refusal to let competitors have access to the incumbent’s local loop may under certain circumstances be contrary to Article 82, if it would is indispensable for the provision of nation-wide services to end-users as appears to be the prevent any competition on the relevant nation-wide markets and if it 7 8 9 10 Where carrier selection and preselection is not yet available for local call (origination) services. See Judgment of the E. C. J. of 26 November 1998. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. KG. Case C-7/97. , paragraph 44. Except maybe in the smallest of EU countries, Luxembourg. See Oscar Bronner Judgment, paragraph 38. 8 case at present. The dominant operator would have to provide local loop access to all its own downstream competitors on no less favourable conditions than those for operations. Under a certain set of conditions access to the local loop may be requested: - sufficient capacity must be available in the incumbent’s network to provide access; - a refusal of access would limit the emergence of new services or prevent any competition on the relevant markets as defined above; - the requesting party is ready to pay a non discriminatory price for the access; - and there is no objective justification for refusing access. • Discrimination: on the three relevant markets identified, where the incumbent is already providing local loop access to at least one operator, be it one of its own subsidiaries, a refusal of access may under certain circumstances amount to discrimination and constitute an abuse of dominant position. • Limitation of production, markets, or technical development to the prejudice of consumers. Refusal of access in the form of shared access or full unbundling may in certain circumstances limit the development of emerging markets like high speed telecom and internet services, or impede the development of competition on existing markets such as traditional voice telephony services. An incumbent, by making the shared access on high speed services (see section 2) conditional upon the continued provision of its own narrow bandwidth telecom services to the same end-users, and thereby refusing full local loop unbundling, may in certain circumstances behave in an abusive way. Such restriction would lead to a distortion of competition, by limiting the possibility of competitors to enter the markets or to develop their activities, and, given the fact that full unbundling has successfully been introduced in a number of countries, would need to be objectively justified. 4. 2. Dominant operators’ duties regarding the conditions of access and pricing Where dominant operators do not formally refuse upon request partial or full unbundling of the local loop, but define a set of conditions of access which restrict competition, other forms of abuse may occur which would as well constitute infringements of Article 82 of the treaty. • Delays. Access should normally be granted promptly. If granting access is delayed, the incumbents would in practice be able to reserve for themselves the emerging market for high speed services based on DSL technologies, thereby extending their dominant positions for the network into this new area of activity, or deferring the possibility for new entrants to compete on a level playing field on several voice telephony relevant markets. The effects of such delays without objective reasons could therefore be the same, at least in the short term, as an outright refusal to give access and be attacked under Article 82 on the same basis as a refusal. • Discrimination. Abusive discrimination can take many different such as discriminatory pricing, delays in granting access or delays in remedying technical problems related to the access, the technical configuration of the access and in the specific case of local loop access (e. g. if access does not include operating system and support services or other functions used by the incumbent to offer services via the local loop), discrimination in the terms on which collocation is (or is not) offered. Such practices could constitute discriminatory behaviour as caught by Article 82(c). forms, 9 • Price abuses. Prices may be another way for incumbents, while formally granting access to the local loop, to restrict competition. Three main categories of price abuses can potentially occur. Excessive access prices to the loop, predatory prices on services offered to end-users or margin squeezes between the two latter prices could all constitute infringements of article 82 of the Treaty. The scope for margin squeezes is likely to be higher where the incumbents’ tariffs have not been fully rebalanced on a cost recovery basis. 5. APPLICATION OF SECTOR SPECIFIC RULES (ONP) 5. 1. General The Open Network Provision (ONP) framework concerns the harmonisation of conditions for open and efficient access to, and use of, public telecommunications networks and, where applicable, public telecommunications services. The ONP Directives set out conditions for access to, and use of, specific types of networks and/or services; thus the Leased Lines Directive11 deals with access to and use of leased line transmission capacity, the Voice Telephony Directive12 deals with access to and use of public telephone networks and services, innovative access, and the Interconnection Directive13 deals with including special interconnection of and access to public telecommunications networks and services in general. ‘Network access’ as used in ONP Directives means making accessible some part or parts of an existing network for use by another party, but does not involve an interference with ownership of the network element(s). Obligations in sector specific Directives to deal with or meet requests for network access (which apply to operators notified as having significant market power) do not oblige incumbents to provide full unbundled access to local loops, although this is without prejudice to obligations to provide ‘access’ that may be imposed on dominant operators under competition rules. Only the leased line Directive mandates notified operators to lease transmission capacity under harmonised conditions to third parties for their exclusive use. 5. 2. Special network access Shared access to the high frequency spectrum of the local loop is covered by Article 16 of the Voice telephony Directive and Article 4 of the Interconnection Directive. High speed bit stream access services are covered by Article 16 of the Voice telephony Directive and the provision of associated transmission capacity (back-haul) by Article 10 of the Leased lines Directive. Full unbundled access to the local loop is not covered by the ONP Directives. 11 12 13 Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5th June 1992 on the Application of Open Network Provision to Leased Lines (OJ L 165, 19. 6. 1992, p. 27 ), as amended by Directive 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 6 October 1997 (OJ L 295, 29/10/1997 p 23), and Commission Decision 98/80/EC of 7 January 1998 (92/44/EEC OJ L 014 , 20/01/1998 p. 27). European Parliament and Council Directive 98/10/EC of 10 February 1998 on the application of open network provision to voice telephony (OJ L 101 , 01/04/1998 p. 24). Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), (OJ L 199/32 26. 7. 97, p. 32) , as amended by Directive 98/61/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 1998 with regard to operator number portability and carrier pre-selection (OJ L 268 , 03/10/1998 p. 37). 10 Where an operator notified as having significant market power under the Voice Telephony Directive provides shared access to the local loop for its own services, it is granting itself special network access, in that it is making use of the fixed public telephone network for providing publicly available telecommunications services. In these circumstances, the notified operator must apply similar conditions to other organisations providing similar services, and must provide special network access facilities and information to others under the same conditions and of the same quality as they provide for their own services or those of their subsidiaries or partners ( Directive 98/10/EC, Article 16(7)). Where a notified operator is not already providing itself with such access, it must at least deal14 with reasonable requests for special network access. Given that the majority of EU operators grant themselves shared access to the local loop for their own services, a request for such access from a new entrant cannot be considered to be an unreasonable request. Then, the obligation to deal with requests for access can only be refused if the two following conditions are both met (article 16(1)): – there are technically and commercially viable alternatives to the special access requested, and – the requested access is inappropriate in relation to the resources available to meet the request. Since shared access applies to existing local loops, it will only rarely be the case that resources are not available to meet the request, and so in most cases both conditions for refusal to provide access will not be met. Any such refusal would need to be justified on a line-by line basis. 5. 3. High speed bit stream services The provision of high speed bit stream services is not mandated under Community law, but where an incumbent operator provides bit-stream DSL services to its own services, subsidiary or third party, then, in accordance with Community law, it must also provide such forms of access under transparent and non-discriminatory terms or conditions to others (Directive 98/10/EC Article 16 (7). High speed bit stream access cannot be considered to be economically or technically equivalent to providing access to the copper pair in the local loop, since a high-speed bit stream service requires the new entrant to use the high-speed modems and other equipment provided by the incumbent, and that in turn affects the economics of the service and places restrictions on the type of modems that the customer of the new entrant can buy or rent. 15 5. 4. Leased line transmission capacity Those operators notified as having significant market power for the fixed public telephone network have also been notified as having significant market power under the Leased lines Directive16 92/44/EC. As such they have obligations to provide leased transmission capacity 14 15 16 Directive 98/10/EC imposes an obligation to ‘deal’ requests. Directive 97/33/EC imposes the stronger obligation to ‘meet’ requests. International standardisation has not yet reached a stage where inter-operability between DSL systems from different manufacturers can be guaranteed without involving significant loss of performance. See ISPO http://www. ispo. cec. be/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/comm-en. htm#misc 1 January 2000 - INFORMATION received from Member States concerning Organisations with Significant Market Power. 11 to others under the same conditions and of the same quality as they provide for their own services, or those of their subsidiaries or partners (Leased lines Directive Article 8(2) 92/44/EC). When a notified operator provides a high speed bit stream service, it typically conveys customer traffic to one or more points where service providers can interconnect, so that the service providers do not have to build out their network to all local exchanges equivalent facilities. Where leased transmission capacity is provided internally for this, the non- discrimination provision of Article 8(2) of Directive 92/44/EC applies. 5. 5. Collocation To be effective, providing rights for unbundled access to the local loop must be accompanied by provision of rights for collocation. National regulatory authorities need to take steps to ensure that third parties that are granted unbundled access to local loops are also able to collocate equipment on the premises of the Interconnection Directive 97/33/EC acknowledges the right of Member States to impose collocation arrangements. Where physical collocation is not possible due to space limitations, national ‘in-span’ interconnection (sometimes called virtual collocation), whereby third parties are able to interconnect equipment that has been installed in a nearby location. A study carried out for the Commission has provided a set of recommendations and practical guidelines for NRAs and operators on implementation of collocation. 17 regulatory authorities may require loop operator. Article 11 of that provision is made the local for Regulators will need to address both one-off provisioning costs and costs for collocation, since these are part of the total package for the new entrant seeking to benefit from the availability of unbundled local loops. The most appropriate way to recover such once-off costs is on the basis of up-front fixed charges. Alternatively if costs borne by the incumbent are recovered over a period, it would be normal to build a risk factor into the calculated charges. 6. DUTIES OF NATIONAL REGULATORY AND COMPETITION AUTHORITIES National regulatory authorities (NRAs), set up in all EU Member States by national legislation adopted in transposition of EC Directives, are entrusted with the application of sector-specific telecommunications regulation. is Community policy to encourage competition in infrastructure and competition in services, and NRAs must take this into account when acting. National regulatory authorities may also consider introducing a ‘fast- track’ dispute resolution procedure that will allow disputes about unbundled access to be settled promptly. It The NRAs have a particular role to play when defining the set of conditions and requirements applying to the incumbents’ offers of unbundled access to the local loop. As regards prices and costs, while implementing the principle of transparency and cost-orientation regarding access to the local loops of incumbent operators, they should respect the following principles: - 17 costing and pricing rules should be transparent and objectively based; See http://www. ispo. cec. be/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/Study-en. htm. January 1999 "Recommended Practices for Collocation and other Facilities Sharing for Telecommunications Infrastructure" - a study by Eutelis Consult/Horrocks Technology/Tera Consultants. 12 - - - pricing rules should ensure that the incumbent operator is able to cover its relevant costs plus a reasonable return; pricing of local loops should be compatible with the aim of fostering fair and sustainable competition, and providing efficient investment incentives in alternative local access network infrastructure18; pricing rules should ensure that there is no market distortion, in particular margin squeezes between the prices of wholesale and retail services offered by the incumbent. In some cases, these principles may conflict with each other, in particular in situations where incumbent’s retail tariffs remain distorted as a result of inherited tariff imbalances and continuing constraints on tariff re-balancing. In these circumstances, NRAs may have to consider transitional measures that avoid distorting competition in the short term while safeguarding competition in the long term. EU competition rules continue to apply beside the sector-specific regulation and the NRAs, like any other public authority, are bound to respect the provisions of the EC Treaty19. In the Access Notice20, the Commission has therefore stated that NRAs, when taking decisions on individual access agreements, have to respect both the sector-specific ONP-rules and the general competition rules. Decisions taken by NRAs in application of sector specific legislation can be subject to examination in the light of the EU competition rules. The same principles also apply as regards national competition authorities. As concerns public undertakings or undertakings to which the Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Article 86 of the Treaty specifically requires Member States neither to enact, nor to maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules of the Treaty, in particular competition rules. More broadly, as concerns all undertakings, Article 10 of the Treaty requires Member States to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty and to abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of its objectives. The Court has in particular ruled21 that that Article 10 (previously Article 5) and Article 86 (previously Article 90) of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted as : (i) (ii) prohibiting the national authorities from encouraging the conclusion of agreements on tariffs contrary to Article 81(1) or Article 82 of the Treaty, as the case may be; precluding the approval by those authorities of agreements. tariffs resulting from such This would also apply to any practice infringing article 82. The Commission will examine whether Member States, in particular NRAs or competition authorities, maintain or enact measures contrary to Community competition rules and thereby either infringe Article 86 of the Treaty, read in conjunction with Article 82, or article 10 of the Treaty, also read in conjunction with Article 82. In such an event, it shall take appropriate action. 18 19 20 21 This in principle may be provided by a pricing system based on current costs. Current costs are the costs of building an efficient modern equivalent infrastructure and providing such a service at today’s prices. See Case 66/86 (Ahmed Saeed). See Access Notice, paragraph 19. See above mentioned Case 66/86 (Ahmed Saeed), paragraph 58. 13 7. CONCLUSION Providing access to the local loop to all new entrants will increase the level of competition and technological innovation in the local access network, which will in turn stimulate the competitive provision of a full range of telecommunication services from simple voice telephony to broadband multimedia and high speed internet services to the customer. These three means of access to the local loop identified in section 2 complement each other and should all be available as market offerings. Together they serve to reinforce competition and improve choice for all users, by allowing the market to decide which offering best meets users needs, the evolving demands of users and the technical and investment requirements for market players. This will stimulate the roll out of high speed internet access services to small business users and consumers, facilitating the growth of e- commerce and e-business. taking into account In all cases, competition rules apply, and refusals by dominant operators to open the local loop to competitors requesting access may imply various forms of abuses of dominant position under article 82 of the Treaty, such as refusals to deal and limitation of production, markets, or technical development to the prejudice of consumers. Where access is granted, fair and non discriminatory conditions of access are crucial for successfully opening the local loop on the development of a competitive market telecommunications services, in particular high speed services. This requires close monitoring of delays, prices and contractual arrangements between incumbents and new entrants. The Commission is confident that the recommended unbundling of the local loop will be a major new step towards more competitive and efficient telecommunications markets, and will facilitate the accelerated development of internet services. 14 Annex – Technical analysis on Access to the Local Loop 1 - MODALITIES FOR UNBUNDLED ACCESS TO THE LOCAL LOOP (1) Full Unbundling to the local loop In the case of full unbundling of the local loop, a copper pair is rented to a third party for its exclusive use. The lessor will lose control of the relationship with its customer for the provision of communications services, and any universal service obligations of the lessor will no longer apply with respect to that specific customer. Examples of use: Example i) The customer wishes to change telephone and/or leased line service supplier, and the new entrant uses an unbundled local loop to take over the subscriber from the incumbent and to provide competitive services. (As noted above, few new entrants now restrict themselves to a simple telephone service offering of this type; they prefer to provide broadband data services or a multi-service voice and data offering. ) (cid:1) Local loop Former link re-configured M D F Incumbent's local switch Phone network To New entrant's switch Phone network Example ii) The new entrant uses an unbundled local loop to provide high speed data service to a customer over a second line, using any type of DSL modems. The customer retains the incumbent as provider of telephone services on the first line. (cid:1) XDSL modem PC Local loop Incumbent's local switch Phone Network New entrant M D F New entrant's DSL access multiplexer (DSLAM) 15 Full unbundled access to the local loop will allow competitors to provide their customers with a variety of versatile and cost-efficient broadband services, based on innovative DSL technologies (e. g. HDSL for 2 Mbit/s leased lines, VDSL for high capacity circuits up to 50 Mbit/s, see Table 1). This will certainly contribute to improve the competitive situation of leased lines and broadband services in the European Union. Table 1 – Technologies available for the provision of broadband services (1 copper pair) DSL, or Digital Subscriber Line, is the umbrella term for a family of technologies that transform the copper local loop into a broadband line capable of delivering multiple video channels into the home. There are a variety of DSL technologies and these are generically known as xDSL. Each type of DSL technology has a unique set of characteristics in terms of performance (maximum broadband capacity), distance over which maximum performance is maintained (as measured from the switch), frequency of transmission, and cost. The main Digital Subscriber Loop (xDSL) technologies over one pair of copper wire and some of their technical characteristics and applications are: Asymmetric DSL (ADSL) – used for fast internet access Symmetric DSL, (SDSL) and High speed symmetric DSL (HDSL) – used for 2Mbit’s leased lines Very high-speed DSL (VDSL) – used for high capacity leased line and broad-band services Further information on DSL technologies can be found at < http://www. adsl. com/adsl_forum. html > (2) Shared Access to the Local loop In this form of access, the notified operator continues to provide telephone service, while the new entrant deliver high speed data services over the same local loop using its own high- speed ADSL modems. Telephone traffic and the data traffic are separated by means of a splitter before the incumbent’s switch. The local loop remains connected to, and part of, the notified switched network. Standardisation of ADSL systems have reached a level of maturity whereby international agreement exists on its secure deployment in the local loops of incumbents22. In addition, the 22 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has worked out technical specifications for ADSL full rate - with speeds up to 8 Mbit/s downstream and 1 Mbit/s upstream - in its Recommendation G. 992. 1 This includes a number of country-specific variants in order to accommodate regional local loop infrastructure differences. ADSL can achieve its highest speeds at a distance of 4km or less. The connection also allows the provision of voice phone service on the basic frequency band of the same line. In addition ITU has worked out a variant ADSL solution in its Recommendation G. 992. 2, also known as G. Lite, that is very easy to deploy in the customer premises because is ‘splitter-less’ (it needs a very simple serial filter that separates voice and data and does not call for any rewiring at the customer premises). Speeds are up to 1. 5 Mbit/s downstream to the user and 385 kbit/s upstream. Some PC 16 industry has also worked out commercial solutions for the interoperability of ADSL systems in a multi-vendor environment. 23 Example The new entrant supplies the customer with an ADSL modem for connection at his/her premises, and a installs a DSL access multiplexer or DSLAM (which combines ADSL modems and a network interface module) on the incumbent’s premises, under a collocation agreement. The interface between the incumbent’s system and the new entrant is at point C in the diagram (ie with in this case the splitter being installed by the incumbent). (cid:1) ADSL modem PC Local loop splitter tel data M D F C DSL access multiplexer (DSLAM) Incumbent's local switch Phone Network New entrant This type of access may provide the most cost effective solution for a user wishing to retain the telephone service being provided by the incumbent, but seeking a fast internet service from an Internet Service Providers (ISP) of his or her choice. The ISP has full control of the commercial and technical conditions of the ADSL service that it makes available to its users. (3) High speed bit stream access ‘High-speed bit stream access’ refers to the situation where the incumbent installs a high speed access link to the customers premises (e. g. , by installing its preferred ADSL equipment and configuration in its local access network) and then makes this access link available to third parties, to enable them to provide high speed services to customers. The incumbent may also provide transmission services to its competitors, using its ATM or IP network, to carry competitors traffic from the DSLAM to a ‘higher’ level in the network hierarchy where new entrants may already have a point of presence (e. g. a transit switch location). This type of access does not actually entail any third party access to the copper pair in the local loop (but the incumbent may use only the higher frequencies of the copper local loop in the same way as explained above). suppliers are already marketing PC equipment with integrated G. Lite-ADSL modems so that standard universal solutions can be rolled-out in a large scale in the residential market. See the works of the Universal ADSL Working Group (http://www. uawg. com). 23 17 For a new entrant, the problem in exploiting access to unbundled copper pairs is that it entails building out its core network to the incumbent’s local exchanges where the copper pairs are terminated; in a typical European country this could number several thousand sites. High speed access services, when combined with a transmission service that delivers traffic to the new entrant’s point of presence, can be attractive, in particular in the early stage of the new entrant’s network deployment, in that it allows the new entrant to deliver broadband service to customers in advance of its own network build-out. For the incumbent, provision of a high speed bit stream service is attractive in that it does not involve physical access to copper pairs, and so does not hinder the progressive modernisation of the local access network (ie replacing copper by fibre). Many incumbent operators are already providing such services24. However, on its own, a service of this type allows the incumbent to retain control of the rate of deployment of high speed access services, and the geographical regions in which these service are rolled out. The incumbent’s priorities may not match those of the new entrants. Such services should therefore be seen as complementing the other forms of unbundled access described above, but not substituting them. 2 – OTHER TECHNICAL ISSUES ON ACCESS TO THE LOCAL LOOP 2. 1. Transparency All the ONP directives contain generic obligations for notified operators to publish prices, terms and conditions for their network offerings in order to ensure market transparency and non-discrimination. The Recommendation proposes publication of a reference offer for unbundled access to the local loop, covering network elements to which access is offered, collocation services, operational support systems, supply conditions and prices. Reference access offerings need to be drawn up and published in a timely and detailed manner, under the supervision of the national regulatory authority. The Commission intends to publish, on a regular basis, prices in Member States for unbundled access to local loops, in the same way as it currently publishes interconnection prices. 25 2. 2. Industry co-operation and co-ordination Local loop unbundling raises a number of technical and operational issues that are best agreed between the parties involved, but under supervision of the national regulatory authority to ensure fair treatment. The Recommendation proposes that national regulatory authorities encourage the setting up of co-operation mechanisms at national level involving all interested parties, under the general supervision of the national regulatory authority, to address issues such as : – spectrum limitations and electromagnetic compatibility (EMC), to avoid interference between the various systems being used on local loops, and interference between local loop systems and radio systems; in order 24 25 indicative See operator offers ’http://www. ispo. cec. be/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/comm-en. htm#misc’. See http://www. ispo. cec. be/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/comm-en. htm#misc. from notified ADSL in Member States at 18 – operational aspects linked to provision of unbundled local loops (ordering and provisioning procedures and time-scales, technical qualification of loops, service level agreements, maintenance procedures, problem escalation procedures, etc); – access to operational support systems of the local loop provider; – codes of practice for collocation; – the content of access offerings (ie, technical product descriptions, line coding certification, prices of loops, list of MDF sites, collocation prices, one-stop shopping ordering and maintenance – as indicated in Annex I of the Recommendation). 2. 3 International co-ordination Many of the problems faced in individual Member States are similar across the Community, and there is scope of interchange of information to ensure that experience and good practice is passed on. The European Telecommunications Platform is addressing these issues (see http://www. etp-online. org/). The Recommendation encourages such interaction e. g. by recommending that national regulatory authorities publicise national activities in this area, and encourage co-ordination and information inter-change with interested parties in other Member States. 19


title: Proposta di decisione del Consiglio relativa alla conclusione di un accordo tra la Comunità e Cipro sull'istituzione di una cooperazione nel campo delle piccole e medie imprese nel quadro del Terzo Programma Pluriennale per le piccole e medie imprese (PMI) nell'Unione europea (1997-2000)

eurovoc_concepts:
Cyprus
EU programme
cooperation agreement (EU)
small and medium-sized enterprises

formats: html pdf print

text: 26. 9. 2000 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:224) europee C 274 E/109 Proposta di decisione del Consiglio relativa alla conclusione di un accordo tra la Comunit(cid:224) e Cipro sull’istituzione di una cooperazione nel campo delle piccole e medie imprese nel quadro del Terzo Programma Pluriennale per le piccole e medie imprese (PMI) nell’Unione europea (1997-2000) (2000/C 274 E/12) COM(2000) 242 def. (cid:151) 2000/0099(CNS) (Presentata dalla Commissione il 26 aprile 2000) IL CONSIGLIO DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA, DECIDE: Visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunit(cid:224) europea, in partico- lare l’art. 157(3), in collegamento con l’art. 300(2) e il primo sottoparagrafo dell’art. 300(3) del suddetto trattato, Vista la proposta della Commissione, Visto il parere del Parlamento europeo, Articolo 1 L’accordo tra la Comunit(cid:224) europea e la Repubblica di Cipro che istituisce una cooperazione nel campo delle piccole e medie imprese nel quadro del Terzo Programma Pluriennale per le piccole europea (1997-2000) viene approvato a nome della Comunit(cid:224) europea. nell’Unione e medie imprese (PMI) Considerando quanto segue: Il testo dell’accordo Ł allegato alla presente Decisione. (1) La risoluzione del Consiglio di associazione CE/Cipro del 12 giugno 1995 e le conclusioni del Consiglio europeo di Lussemburgo del 12-13 dicembre 1997 hanno stabilito al- cuni elementi della strategia di pre-adesione, fra cui figura la partecipazione di Cipro ai programmi della Comunit(cid:224), come Ł stato confermato dalle conclusioni del Consiglio europeo di Helsinki del 10 e 11 dicembre 1999. (2) La decisione 97/15/CE del Consiglio del 9 dicembre 1996 che istituisce un Terzo Programma Pluriennale per le pic- europea cole (1997-2000) in appresso denominato «il programma», sta- bilisce, all’art. 7(2), che questo programma dovr(cid:224) essere aperto alla partecipazione di Cipro. nell’Unione e medie imprese (PMI) Articolo 2 La Commissione rappresenter(cid:224) la Comunit(cid:224) nel Comitato con- giunto di cui all’art. 6 dell’accordo. Articolo 3 Il Presidente del Consiglio Ł autorizzato a designare la persona (o le persone) autorizzata(e) a firmare l’accordo che vincoler(cid:224) la Comunit(cid:224). Articolo 4 Il Presidente del Consiglio prevede, a nome della Comunit(cid:224), la notifica di cui all’art. 13 dell’accordo. (3) La Commissione ha negoziato, a nome della Comunit(cid:224) europea, un accordo che prevede la partecipazione di Cipro al programma. Articolo 5 (4) ¨ opportuno approvare questo accordo, La presente Decisione Ł pubblicata nella Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:224) europee. C 274 E/110 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:224) europee 26. 9. 2000 Proposta di accordo tra la Comunit(cid:224) europea e la Repubblica di Cipro che istituisce una coopera- zione nel campo delle piccole e medie imprese nel quadro del Terzo Programma Pluriennale per le piccole e medie imprese (PMI) nell’Unione europea (1997-2000) LA COMUNIT(cid:192) EUROPEA, in appresso denominata «Comunit(cid:224)» da un lato, e LA REPUBBLICA DI CIPRO, in appresso denominata «Cipro» dall’altro, considerando che, in conformit(cid:224) con la Decisione del Consiglio 97/15/CE del 9 dicembre 1996 (1), Ł stato istituito un Terzo Programma Pluriennale per le piccole e medie imprese (PMI) nell’Unione europea (1997-2000) in appresso denominato «il Programma»; considerando che la Decisione 97/15/CE stabilisce al suo art. 7 (2), che il programma Ł aperto a Cipro; considerando che la partecipazione di Cipro al Terzo Programma Pluriennale costituisce un elemento importante nella strategia di pre-adesione di Cipro; considerando che le parti contraenti hanno un interesse comune in una cooperazione nel campo delle piccole e medie imprese quale parte di una piø ampia cooperazione tra la Comunit(cid:224) e Cipro, al fine di contribuire ad uno sviluppo dinamico ed omogeneo in questo campo; considerando che, in particolare, che la cooperazione tra la Comunit(cid:224) e Cipro al fine di conseguire gli obiettivi fissati nel programma nell’ambito delle attivit(cid:224) transnazionali di cooperazione cui partecipano la Comunit(cid:224) e Cipro rafforza per la sua natura l’impatto delle varie azioni intraprese nel quadro di questo programma e rafforza la competitivit(cid:224) delle piccole e medie imprese nella Comunit(cid:224) e a Cipro; considerando pertanto che le parti contraenti si attendono di ottenere reciproci vantaggi dalla partecipa- zione di Cipro al programma; considerando che una proficua cooperazione in questo campo comporta un impegno generale delle parti contraenti ad adoperarsi ulteriormente per promuovere la dimensione europea nel campo delle piccole e medie imprese; HANNO CONVENUTO QUANTO SEGUE: Articolo 1 Ambito di cooperazione sione del Consiglio 97/15/CE, in particolare l’art. 2, l’art. 7 e l’Allegato. Cipro partecipa al Terzo Programma Pluriennale in conformit(cid:224), se non stabilito diversamente dal presente accordo, con gli obiettivi, i criteri, le procedure e le scadenze fissati dalla Deci- sione del Consiglio 97/15/CE del 9 dicembre 1996, in partico- lare dall’art. 2, dall’art. 7 e dall’allegato che costituisce parte integrante del presente accordo. In particolare, Cipro partecipa alle seguenti azioni: C. «Aiutare le PMI a rendere europee e internazionali le proprie strategie, in particolare grazie a mi- gliori servizi di informazione e di cooperazione» ed E. «Pro- muovere l’imprenditorialit(cid:224) e sostenere particolari gruppi de- stinatari». Articolo 2 Istituzioni, organizzazioni e cittadini beneficiari L’ammissibilit(cid:224) di istituzioni, organizzazioni e cittadini con sede a Cipro Ł disciplinata da norme che poggiano sulla Deci- (1) GU L 6, 10. 1. 1997, pag. 25. Articolo 3 Procedure Le istituzioni, organizzazioni, e i cittadini aventi i requisiti richiesti e con sede a Cipro partecipano al programma in conformit(cid:224) alle condizioni e regole definite nella Decisione 97/15/CE, in particolare nell’art. 2, nell’art. 7 e nell’Allegato. Le modalit(cid:224) e le condizioni per la presentazione, valutazione e selezione delle candidature e delle proposte di progetti pilota, dei programmi di qualunque altro atto sono identiche a quelle applicabili alle istituzioni, alle organizzazioni e ai cittadini della Comunit(cid:224). Non saranno ammessi a beneficiare dell’aiuto finanziario della Comunit(cid:224) progetti e attivit(cid:224) svolti unicamente tra Cipro e Stati EFTA/SEE o con un altro paese terzo, compresi gli Stati con un accordo di associazione con la Comunit(cid:224), per i quali Ł possibile la partecipazione al programma. 26. 9. 2000 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:224) europee C 274 E/111 Articolo 4 Strutture nazionali tutte le persone beneficiarie che si spostano tra Cipro e la Comunit(cid:224) al fine di partecipare alle attivit(cid:224) contemplate dal presente accordo. Cipro predispone, ove necessario, strutture e meccanismi ade- guati a livello nazionale e adotta tutte le altre misure necessarie per garantire la coordinazione e l’organizzazione a livello na- zionale dell’attuazione del programma, in conformit(cid:224) all’art. 7 (2) della Decisione del Consiglio 97/15/CE. Articolo 5 Condizioni finanziarie A copertura dei costi derivanti dalla sua partecipazione al pro- gramma, Cipro verser(cid:224) ogni anno un contributo al bilancio generale dell’Unione europea, secondo le modalit(cid:224) e le condi- zioni indicate nell’Allegato, che costituisce parte integrante del presente accordo. Articolo 6 Comitato congiunto Viene istituito un Comitato congiunto. Il Comitato congiunto Ł composto, da un lato, da rappresen- tanti della Comunit(cid:224) e, dall’altro, da rappresentanti di Cipro. Il Comitato congiunto Ł responsabile dell’attuazione del pre- sente accordo. Su richiesta di una parte, le parti contraenti scambiano infor- mazioni e si consultano con il Comitato congiunto sulle attivit(cid:224) coperte dal presente accordo e collegate ad aspetti finanziari. Il Comitato congiunto opera di comune accordo. Il Comitato congiunto si riunisce a richiesta di una parte con- traente, in conformit(cid:224) alle condizioni da definire nel suo rego- lamento interno. Articolo 7 Riunioni di coordinamento I rappresentanti della Comunit(cid:224) nel Comitato congiunto adot- teranno i provvedimenti necessari per assicurare il coordina- mento tra l’attuazione dell’accordo e le decisioni prese dalla Comunit(cid:224) nel rispetto dell’attuazione del programma. Per facilitare questo coordinamento e senza pregiudicare le procedure di cui all’art. 4 della Decisione 97/15/CE, i rappre- sentanti di Cipro saranno invitati alle riunioni di coordina- mento su qualsiasi aspetto riguardante l’attuazione del presente accordo prima delle assemblee ordinarie del Comitato del pro- gramma. La Commissione informer(cid:224) Cipro sui risultati di tali assemblee ordinarie. Articolo 9 Verifica, valutazione e relazioni Restando impregiudicate le responsabilit(cid:224) della Commissione e della Corte dei conti della Comunit(cid:224) per quanto riguarda la verifica e la valutazione del programma in conformit(cid:224) all’art. 5 e all’art. 6 della Decisione 97/15/CE, la partecipazione di Cipro al Terzo Programma Pluriennale sar(cid:224) verificata e valutata nell’ambito di una partnership che coinvolge sia la Commis- sione che Cipro. Su tale base, Cipro trasmette le debite rela- zioni alla Commissione e partecipa a qualsiasi altra attivit(cid:224) prevista dalla Commissione o adotta qualsiasi altro provvedi- mento ai sensi dell’art. 7 (2). Articolo 10 Regime linguistico La lingua da impiegare per la procedura di candidatura, per i contratti e le relazioni da presentare e per altri atti ammini- strativi nel quadro del programma deve essere una delle lingue ufficiali della Comunit(cid:224). Articolo 11 Territori Il presente accordo si applica, da un lato, ai territori in cui trova applicazione il trattato istitutivo della Comunit(cid:224) europea e alle condizioni definite in detto trattato e, dall’altro, al terri- torio di Cipro. Articolo 12 Durata Il presente Accordo Ł concluso per la durata del programma (fino al 31 dicembre 2000). Qualora il Terzo Programma Pluriennale sia modificato, il pre- sente accordo pu(cid:242) essere rinegoziato o rescisso. Cipro sar(cid:224) informato riguardo al programma modificato entro un mese dalla sua adozione. Entro altri due mesi una delle parti con- traenti pu(cid:242) chiedere una rinegoziazione o una rescissione del presente Accordo. In caso di una rescissione le modalit(cid:224) prati- che per definire gli impegni in sospeso sono oggetto di nego- ziati tra le parti contraenti. Articolo 8 Libera circolazione Le parti contraenti si adoperano nel quadro delle disposizioni esistenti per facilitare la libera circolazione e la residenza di Ad ogni momento una delle parti contraenti pu(cid:242) chiedere una revisione del presente Accordo. A tal fine essa presenta una richiesta all’altra parte contraente. Le parti contraenti possono incaricare il Comitato congiunto di esaminare detta richiesta e, se del caso, trasmettergli raccomandazioni, segnatamente in vista dell’apertura di negoziati. C 274 E/112 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:224) europee 26. 9. 2000 Se la Comunit(cid:224) dovesse adottare un nuovo programma plu- riennale a favore delle PMI, il presente Accordo pu(cid:242) essere rinegoziato o rinnovato alle condizioni concordate tra le parti contraenti. Articolo 13 Entrata in vigore Il presente Accordo entra in vigore il primo giorno del mese successivo alla notifica delle parti contraenti sull’espletamento delle rispettive procedure. Articolo 14 Lingue dell’Accordo inglese, Il presente Accordo Ł redatto in duplice copia in danese, olan- italiano, finlandese, dese, portoghese, spagnolo e svedese, ciascuno di questi testi facente fede. tedesco, greco, francese, ALLEGATO Condizioni finanziarie 1. Cipro corrisponde ogni anno un contributo al bilancio generale dell’Unione europea a copertura dei sussidi o di altri aiuti finanziari nell’ambito del programma erogati ai beneficiari ciprioti. Questo contributo ammonta a: i) 40 000 EUR per l’azione C. «Aiutare le PMI a rendere europee ed internazionali le proprie strategie, in particolare a migliori servizi di informazione»; ii) 110 000 EUR per l’azione E. «Promuovere l’imprenditoriet(cid:224) e sostenere particolari gruppi destinatari». Il contributo annuo minimo di Cipro per l’anno 2000 sar(cid:224) di 150 000 EUR. Per l’esercizio di bilancio del 2000, l’importo aggregato dei sussidi o di altri aiuti finanziari percepiti dal programma dai beneficiari ciprioti non pu(cid:242) eccedere il contributo sopraindicato. Qualora l’importo aggregato dei sussidi o degli aiuti finanziari ricevuto dai beneficiari ciprioti dal programma sia inferiore al contributo, e tenuto conto che il 2000 Ł l’ultimo anno possibile di partecipazione, la Commissione delle Comunit(cid:224) europee rimborser(cid:224) l’importo rimanente a Cipro. 2. Oltre al contributo di cui al punto 1, nel 2000 Cipro verser(cid:224) il 7 % del contributo minimo annuo (150 000 EUR) pari a 10 500 EUR, a copertura dei costi amministrativi supplementari connessi con la gestione del programma da parte della Commissione risultanti dalla partecipazione di Cipro. Questi importi non sono soggetti alle disposizioni di cui all’ultimo paragrafo del punto 1. 3. Il regolamento finanziario applicabile al bilancio generale dell’Unione europea trova applicazione in particolare alla gestione del contributo di Cipro. Dopo l’entrata in vigore del presente accordo, la Commissione trasmette a Cipro una richiesta di fondi per l’importo del suo contributo di cui ai precedenti punti 1 e 2. Questo contributo Ł espresso in EUR e versato su un conto bancario in EUR della Commissione. Cipro deve versare il suo contributo entro tre mesi dalla richiesta di fondi. Ogni ritardo nel versamento del contributo comporter(cid:224) il pagamento di interessi da parte di Cipro sull’importo arretrato a partire dalla data dovuta. Il tasso di interesse corrisponde al tasso applicato dalla Banca centrale europea per il mese della scadenza, per le sue operazioni in EUR (1), aumentato dell’1,5 punti percentuali. 4. Qualora risulti necessario tenere conto di modifiche del programma, il contributo di Cipro di cui ai punti 1 e 2 pu(cid:242) essere adattato dal Comitato congiunto. (1) Tassi pubblicati nella Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:224) europee (cid:151) serie C


title: SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL P-1373/00 af Sérgio Marques (PPE-DE) til Kommissionen. Frizonen på Madeira.

eurovoc_concepts:
Madeira
Portugal
common commercial policy
control of State aid
industrial free zone
regional aid

text: C 46 E/180 De Europ(cid:230)iske F(cid:230)llesskabers Tidende DA 13. 2. 2001 (2001/C 46 E/211) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL P-1373/00 af SØrgio Marques (PPE-DE) til Kommissionen (26. april 2000) Om: Frizonen p(cid:229) Madeira Frizonen p(cid:229) Madeira (ZFM) blev oprettet i 1980(cid:146)erne med henblik p(cid:229) at bidrage til Madeiras łkonomiske og sociale udvikling. For at udstyre frizonen med de nłdvendige midler til at kunne h(cid:230)vde sig p(cid:229) de internationale markeder blev der indfłrt en ordning med finansielle og fiskale incitamenter, der skulle fremme og tiltr(cid:230)kke nye investeringer, og som skulle g(cid:230)lde i mindst 25 (cid:229)r, indtil 2011, et tidsrum, der var nłdvendigt, for at frizonen kunne f(cid:229) fodf(cid:230)ste p(cid:229) de internationale markeder og opbygge et trov(cid:230)rdigheds- og p(cid:229)lidelighedsimage. Kommissionen fik meddelelse om denne ordning i 1986 i overensstemmelse med EF(cid:146)s konkurrenceregler. Ordningen er senere blevet taget op til nyvurdering gentagne gange og er hver gang blevet forl(cid:230)nget. I forbindelse med den seneste nyvurdering gav Kommissionen tilladelse til, at den fandt anvendelse indtil 31. december 2000, og betegnede den i den forbindelse som et af de mest dynamiske elementer i den regionale łkonomi. For nylig blev ordningen analyseret af gruppen vedrłrende en adf(cid:230)rdskodeks for erhvervsbeskatning, som uden at tage behłrigt hensyn til punkt G i adf(cid:230)rdskodeksen konkluderede, at de fiskale incitamenter til den łkonomiske sektor i frizonen var skadelige, hvilket kan fłre til afvikling af dem; endvidere blev ordningen analyseret i forbindelse med Kommissionens nye retningslinjer for statsstłtte med regionalt sigte, som for frizonens vedkommende medfłrer begr(cid:230)nsning af ordningens varighed og nedtrapning af stłtten til virksomheder, der har f(cid:229)et bevilling efter 1. januar 2000. I det hele taget er det i łjeblikket usikkert, hvordan ordningen vil blive fremover. Til trods for de s(cid:230)rlige foranstaltninger, som de regionale og nationale myndigheder samt EF har truffet, og som har resulteret i, at Madeira nu ligger n(cid:230)rmere EF-gennemsnittet, er łen fortsat en af de ti mest ugunstigt stillede regioner i EU, og de industrielle, handelsm(cid:230)ssige og finansielle aktiviteter i frizonen spiller sammen med turismen en afgłrende rolle for regionens udvikling. Kan Kommissionen p(cid:229) den baggrund oplyse fłlgende: 1. Hvordan kan de nye foranstaltninger forenes med artikel 299, stk. 2, i traktaten, der omhandler s(cid:230)rbehandling for regioner i den yderste periferi, navnlig med hensyn til finanspolitik, frizoner og statsstłtte? 2. Af hvilke grunde głres der da alvorligt indgreb i den g(cid:230)ldende form for statsstłtte til frizonen, som tydeligt har bidraget til regionens łkonomiske og sociale udvikling, navnlig ved at (cid:229)bne mulighed for nye investeringsprojekter, diversificering af produktionsstrukturen, tilegnelse af knowhow og kvalifice- ring af den lokale arbejdskraft samt oprettelse af arbejdspladser og fremme af Madeira i udlandet? 3. Vil inddragelsen af ordningen ikke f(cid:229) drastiske konsekvenser for en vektor, der er af afgłrende betydning for Madeira, og stille Madeira d(cid:229)rligere end andre łer, europ(cid:230)iske omr(cid:229)der og territorier, der henhłrer under eller er associeret med medlemsstaterne, og som igennem mange (cid:229)r har haft eller endnu har mulighed for at głre fremskridt p(cid:229) grundlag af lignende ordninger, hvoraf mange endnu g(cid:230)lder i hłjt udviklede omr(cid:229)der? 4. Er Kommissionen klar over, hvilke skadelige virkninger den store uvished om frizonens fremtid har for omr(cid:229)det, en uvished, som har negativ indflydelse p(cid:229) det trov(cid:230)rdighedsimage, som det efter mange (cid:229)r har f(cid:229)et opbygget? Svar afgivet p(cid:229) Kommissionens vegne af Frederik Bolkestein (16. juni 2000) Kommissionen henviser til sin rapport af 14. marts 2000 (1), som skitserer de foranstaltninger, der vil 1. blive iv(cid:230)rksat til gennemfłrelse af EF-traktatens artikel 299, stk. 2, (tidl. artikel 227) p(cid:229) de omr(cid:229)der, som det (cid:230)rede medlem n(cid:230)vner. For s(cid:229) vidt ang(cid:229)r statsstłtte, oplyser Kommissionen i rapporten, at den vil fortage en (cid:230)ndring af sine retningslinjer for statsstłtte med regionalt sigte (2), s(cid:229)ledes at det vil blive muligt 13. 2. 2001 DA De Europ(cid:230)iske F(cid:230)llesskabers Tidende C 46 E/181 at yde ikke-degressiv og tidsubegr(cid:230)nset driftstłtte i fjerntliggende regioner, n(cid:229)r stłtten har til form(cid:229)l at nedbringe de meromkostninger ved udłvelsen af en łkonomisk aktivitet, der fłlger af de i EF-traktatens artikel 299, stk. 2, n(cid:230)vnte ulemper, idet der vil blive taget hensyn til stłttens bidrag til regionens fremtidige udvikling og de s(cid:230)rlige betingelser i visse łkonomiske sektorer. Hvad ang(cid:229)r direkte skatter vil det v(cid:230)re op til Kommissionen at tr(cid:230)ffe beslutning om, hvilke retningslinjer der skal v(cid:230)lges, blandt andet p(cid:229) grundlag af resultaterne af arbejdet i »adf(cid:230)rdkodeksgruppen« i R(cid:229)det. Dette indskr(cid:230)nker dog ikke Kommissionens befłjelser til at vurdere de eksisterende stłtteordninger. Det er p(cid:229) ingen m(cid:229)de Kommissionens hensigt at skade udviklingen i regionen Madeira. Tv(cid:230)rtimod 2. har den gentagne gange taget specielle hensyn til de s(cid:230)rlige forhold, der głr sig g(cid:230)ldende i regionerne i den yderste periferi. Kommissionen głr dog opm(cid:230)rksom p(cid:229), at den ved skrivelse af 24. februar 1998, som fłlge af indfłrelsen af retningslinjerne for statsstłtte med regionalt sigte, foreslog alle medlemsstaterne at (cid:230)ndre alle stłtteordninger med regionalt sigte, som var i kraft den 1. januar 2000, for at głre dem forenelige med bestemmelserne i retningslinjerne fra denne dato. Kommissionen bad ligeledes medlems- staterne om at give den meddelelse om de p(cid:229)t(cid:230)nkte (cid:230)ndringer af de p(cid:229)g(cid:230)ldende ordninger inden for en frist p(cid:229) seks m(cid:229)neder. Hvad ang(cid:229)r den skattem(cid:230)ssige stłtte, der er blevet indrłmmet frizonen Madeira, indeb(cid:230)rer dette is(cid:230)r, som det (cid:230)rede medlem n(cid:230)vner, at driftstłtte, der bevilges efter 1. januar 2000, bliver gjort tidsbegr(cid:230)nset og degressiv. Det vil endvidere v(cid:230)re en betingelse for, at stłtten fortsat kan ydes, at den bidrager til den regionale udvikling og har et rimeligt omfang i forhold til de ulemper, som den skal opveje. Disse betingelser skal under alle omst(cid:230)ndigheder v(cid:230)re opfyldt ved vurderingen af foranstaltninger til driftsstłtte i forbindelse med gennemfłrelsen af traktatens artikel 299, stk. 2. Kommissionen m(cid:229) konstatere, at nogle af de omr(cid:229)der, der hłrer ind under medlemsstaterne, 3. unddrager sig F(cid:230)llesskabets konkurrencekontrol. Enhver forskelsbehandling af de omr(cid:229)der, der er underlagt bestemmelserne i EF-traktatens artikel 87 til 89 (tidl. artikel 92 til 94), er imidlertid udelukket, da der anvendes klare og gennemsigtige kriterier til vurdering af, om statsstłtten er forenelig med f(cid:230)llesmarkedet, I denne idet Kommissionen har ladet sine egne rammebestemmelser og retningslinjer offentliggłre. forbindelse m(cid:229) Kommissionen ogs(cid:229) konstatere, at skłnt de portugisiske myndigheder har godkendt Kommissionens henstillinger (»egnede foranstaltninger«), har de endnu ikke indfłrt alle de (cid:230)ndringer i ordningen om frizonen Madeira, der er nłdvendige for at bringe den i overensstemmelse med de relevante bestemmelser i retningslinjerne. 4. Kommissionen beklager, at der hersker usikkerhed med hensyn til fremtidsperspektiverne for fri- zonen Madeira. Den głr imidlertid opm(cid:230)rksom p(cid:229), at Kommissionen kun har godkendt anvendelsen af denne ordning indtil 31. december 2000, og at de eventuelle bestemmelser om dens fortsatte anvendelse skal meddeles Kommissionen og undersłges af denne. (1) KOM(2000) 147 endelig udg. (2) EFT C 74 af 10. 3. 1998. (2001/C 46 E/212) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL P-1374/00 af Luis Berenguer Fuster (PSE) til Kommissionen (26. april 2000) Om: Fortrolige oplysninger i sagsakterne vedrłrende statsstłtte til elektricitetssektoren i Spanien Som svar p(cid:229) gentagne forespłrgsler fra undertegnede og andre parlamentsmedlemmer om visse punkter i sagsakterne vedrłrende statsstłtte til omkostningerne ved de spanske elektricitetsselskabers overgang til fri konkurrence (costes de transici(cid:243)n a la competencia (cid:129) CTC) har Kommissionen erkl(cid:230)ret, at sagsakterne indeholder fortrolige oplysninger og derfor ikke kan udleveres hverken til Parlamentet eller til den i sagsakterne n(cid:230)vnte forbrugerrepr(cid:230)sentation. I dag har den spanske presse (El Mundo og Expansi(cid:243)n fra den 17. 4. 2000) offentliggjort den nyhed, at der findes en teknisk rapport, som belyser denne statsstłtte, og der citeres endog visse afsnit fra rapporten


title: Proposta de regulamento do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera o Regulamento (CE) n.° 2223/96 no que diz respeito à reclassificação dos pagamentos ao abrigo de acordos de swap e de contratos de garantia de taxas[COM(1999) 749 final — 2000/0019(COD)]

eurovoc_concepts:
EU statistics
European accounting system
capital movement
insurance contract
interest

formats: pdf print

text: 26. 4. 2000 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias C 116 E/63 Proposta de regulamento do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera o Regulamento (CE) n. o 2223/96 no que diz respeito (cid:224) reclassifica(cid:231)ªo dos pagamentos ao abrigo de acordos de swap e de contratos de garantia de taxas (2000/C 116 E/14) COM(1999) 749 final (cid:151) 2000/0019(COD) (Apresentada pela Comissªo em 10 de Janeiro de 2000) O PARLAMENTO EUROPEU E O CONSELHO DA UNIˆO EUROPEIA, Tendo em conta o Tratado que institui a Comunidade Econ(cid:243)- mica Europeia e, nomeadamente, o seu artigo 285. o, Tendo em conta a proposta da Comissªo, Tendo em conta o parecer do Banco Central Europeu, Deliberando nos termos do procedimento previsto no artigo 251. o do Tratado, Considerando: (1) Que o Regulamento (CE) n. o 2223/96 do Conselho, de 25 de Junho de 1996, relativo ao Sistema Europeu de Contas Nacionais e Regionais na Comunidade (1) contØm o quadro de referŒncia dos padrıes comuns, defini(cid:231)ıes, classifica(cid:231)ıes e regras contabil(cid:237)sticas para a elabora(cid:231)ªo das contas dos Estados-Membros de acordo com os requisitos estat(cid:237)sticos da Comunidade Europeia, a fim de se obterem resultados comparÆveis entre os Estados-Membros. tipo de swaps e de contratos de garantia de taxas (forward rate agreements) foram considerados como transac(cid:231)ıes nªo-financeiras, inscritas nos rendimentos de propriedade, sob a rubrica «juros». (4) Os problemas suscitados por esta disposi(cid:231)ªo e que a Co- missªo considera, pois, como necessÆrio excluir tais fluxos de juros dos rendimentos de propriedade, (cid:224) semelhan(cid:231)a do SCN 93 revisto. (5) Que, por conseguinte, Ø adequado registar os referidos flu- xos nas transac(cid:231)ıes financeiras, sob a rubrica dos derivados financeiros, inclu(cid:237)da no SEC 95 em F3 «T(cid:237)tulos excepto Ac(cid:231)ıes». (6) Que o ComitØ do Programa Estat(cid:237)stico das Comunidades Europeias, institu(cid:237)do pela Decisªo 89/382/CEE, do Eura- tom (2), e o ComitØ de Estat(cid:237)sticas ComunitÆrias, Financeiras institu(cid:237)do pela Decisªo e de Balan(cid:231)as de Pagamentos, 91/115/CEE (3), respectivamente, em conformidade com o artigo 3. o de cada uma das decisıes citadas, foram consultados, ADOPTARAM O PRESENTE REGULAMENTO: Artigo 1. o (2) Que, no SEC 95, como no SCN 93, os swaps sªo definidos (5. 67) como «acordos contratuais entre duas partes que acordam na troca, ao longo do tempo e segundo regras prØ-determinadas, de uma sØrie de pagamentos correspon- dentes ao montante exacto da d(cid:237)vida», sendo especificado que «as duas variedades mais frequentes sªo os swaps de taxas de juro e os swaps de divisas». O anexo A do Regulamento do Conselho (CE) n. o 2223/96 Ø alterado nos termos do anexo do presente regulamento. Artigo 2. o Este regulamento entrarÆ em vigor no dia em que for publicado no Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias. (3) Que, nas versıes originais do SEC 95 e do SCN, os fluxos de juros trocados entre duas partes ao abrigo de qualquer O presente regulamento Ø obrigat(cid:243)rio em todos os seus ele- mentos e directamente aplicÆvel em todos os Estados-Membros. (1) JO L 310 de 30. 1. 1996, p. 1. (2) JO L 181 de 28. 6. 1989, p. 47. (3) JO L 59 de 6. 3. 1991, p. 19. Decisªo alterada pela Decisªo 96/174/CE (JO L 51 de 1. 3. 1996, p. 48). C 116 E/64 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias 26. 4. 2000 ANEXO O Anexo A do Regulamento (CE) n. o 2223/96 do Conselho Ø alterado do seguinte modo: 1. No Cap(cid:237)tulo 4, o n. o 4. 47 serÆ substitu(cid:237)do pelo seguinte: «4. 47. Nenhum pagamento resultante de qualquer tipo de acordo de swap deve ser considerado como juros e contabilizado nos rendimentos de propriedade (ver al(cid:237)nea d) do n. o 5. 67 e al(cid:237)nea c) do n. o 5. 139 relativos aos derivados financeiros). Do mesmo modo, as transac(cid:231)ıes efectuadas ao abrigo de contratos de garantia de taxas nªo devem ser inscritas enquanto rendimentos de propriedade (ver al(cid:237)nea e) do n. o 5. 67). » 2. No Cap(cid:237)tulo 5: a) As al(cid:237)neas d) e e) do n. o 5. 67 serªo substitu(cid:237)das pelas seguintes: «d) Contratos de troca (swaps), mas apenas no caso de terem um valor de mercado em virtude de serem negociÆveis ou poderem ser objecto de compensa(cid:231)ªo. Os swaps sªo acordos contratuais entre duas partes que acordam na troca, ao longo do tempo e segundo regras predeterminadas, de uma sØrie de pagamentos correspondentes ao montante exacto da d(cid:237)vida. As duas variedades mais frequentes sªo os swaps de taxas de juro e de divisas (tambØm designados cross-currency interest swaps). Os swaps de taxas de juro envolvem a troca de pagamentos de juros de diferente carÆcter, por exemplo, taxa fixa contra taxa flutuante, duas taxas flutuantes diferentes, taxa fixa numa moeda e taxa flutuante noutra, etc. Os swaps de divisas (incluindo todos os contratos de garantia) sªo transac(cid:231)ıes em divisas estrangeiras a uma taxa de ca(cid:136)mbio definida previamente. Os swaps de divisas envolvem a troca de determinados montantes de duas moedas diferentes com os reem- bolsos subsequentes, ao longo do tempo e segundo regras prØ-determinadas. Nenhum dos pagamentos resul- tantes Ø considerado como rendimento de propriedade no sistema e todos os pagamentos devem ser registados na conta financeira; e) Contratos de garantia de taxas (forward rate agreements (cid:151) FRA), mas apenas no caso de terem um valor de mercado em virtude de serem negociÆveis ou poderem ser reembolsados. Os FRA sªo acordos contratuais em que duas partes, com vista a prevenirem-se contra varia(cid:231)ıes das taxas de juro, acordam numa taxa de juro a pagar, numa data de liquida(cid:231)ªo indicada, relativamente a um montante hipotØtico de capital, que nunca Ø trocado entre elas. Os pagamentos referem-se (cid:224) diferen(cid:231)a entre a taxa acordada no contrato (forward rate agreement) e a taxa de mercado em vigor no momento da liquida(cid:231)ªo. No sistema, nªo sªo considerados como rendimentos de propriedade, mas devem ser registados na rubrica dos derivados financeiros. » b) As al(cid:237)neas c) e d) do n. o 5. 139 sªo alteradas do seguinte modo: «c) Todas as comissıes expl(cid:237)citas pagas ou recebidas dos corretores ou de outros intermediÆrios pela prepara(cid:231)ªo das op(cid:231)ıes, futuros, swaps e outros contratos de derivados sªo tratadas como pagamentos de servi(cid:231)os nas respectivas contas. Considera-se que os participantes num swap nªo prestam servi(cid:231)os entre si, mas qualquer pagamento a terceiros pela prepara(cid:231)ªo do swap deve ser tratado como pagamento de um servi(cid:231)o. Num acordo de swap, em que se trocam montantes de capital, os fluxos correspondentes devem ser registados como transac(cid:231)ıes no instrumento subjacente; os fluxos de outros pagamentos (excluindo comissıes) devem ser registados na rubrica dos derivados financeiros (F34). Embora se possa considerar que, teoricamente, o prØmio pago ao vendedor de uma op(cid:231)ªo inclui uma taxa de servi(cid:231)o, na prÆtica nªo Ø, normalmente, poss(cid:237)vel distinguir a componente de servi(cid:231)o. Assim, o pre(cid:231)o total deve ser registado como aquisi(cid:231)ªo de um activo financeiro pelo comprador e como contrac(cid:231)ªo de um passivo pelo vendedor. d) Quando os contratos de swap envolvem uma troca de montantes de capital, como acontece, por exemplo, com os swaps de divisas, a troca inicial deve ser registada como uma opera(cid:231)ªo no instrumento subjacente trocado, e nªo como uma opera(cid:231)ªo em derivados financeiros (F. 34). Sempre que os contratos nªo implicam um troca de montantes de capital, nªo se regista nenhuma transac(cid:231)ªo no in(cid:237)cio. Em ambos os casos, implicitamente, um derivado financeiro com valor inicial igual a zero Ø criado nesse momento. Subsequentemente, o valor do derivado incluirÆ, no m(cid:237)nimo, as seguintes componentes: 1. para os montantes de capital, o valor de mercado corrente da diferen(cid:231)a entre os valores de mercado futuros esperados no que respeita aos montantes de capital a retrocar e os montantes de capital especificados no contrato, e 2. para outros pagamentos, o valor de mercado corrente da futura sØrie de quaisquer juros e outros fluxos de tesouraria especificados no contrato. As varia(cid:231)ıes de valor do derivado ao longo do tempo devem ser registadas na conta de reavalia(cid:231)ªo. 26. 4. 2000 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias C 116 E/65 Subsequentes retrocas de capital regular-se-ªo pelos termos e condi(cid:231)ıes do contrato de swap e podem implicar a troca de activos financeiros a um pre(cid:231)o diferente do pre(cid:231)o prevalecente no mercado para esses activos. O pagamento de contrapartida entre as partes do contrato de swap serÆ o especificado no contrato. A diferen(cid:231)a entre o pre(cid:231)o de mercado e o pre(cid:231)o do contrato Ø, entªo, igual, ao valor de liquida(cid:231)ªo do activo/passivo a aplicar na data devida e deve ser registada como uma opera(cid:231)ªo de derivados financeiros (F. 34). Pelo contrÆrio, outros fluxos ao abrigo de um acordo de swap sªo registados como uma transac(cid:231)ªo em derivados financeiros pelos montantes efectivamente trocados. Todas as transac(cid:231)ıes em derivados financeiros devem corresponder aos ganhos ou perdas totais de reavalia(cid:231)ªo ao longo de toda a dura(cid:231)ªo do contrato de swap. Este tratamento Ø anÆlogo ao estabelecido no que respeita (cid:224)s op(cid:231)ıes exercidas no momento da entrega [ver al(cid:237)nea a) acima]. Para uma unidade institucional, um swap ou um contrato de garantia de taxas Ø registado na rubrica dos derivados financeiros no lado dos activos financeiros, quando possua um valor de activo l(cid:237)quido, aumentando os pagamentos l(cid:237)quidos positivos o valor l(cid:237)quido (e vice-versa). Quando o swap tiver um valor de passivo l(cid:237)quido, serÆ registado do lado do passivo, aumentando os pagamentos l(cid:237)quidos negativos esse valor l(cid:237)quido (e vice-versa). »


title: PREGUNTA ESCRITA P-1372/00 de Marianne Thyssen (PPE-DE) a la Comisión. Propuesta de directiva sobre suplementos alimenticios.

eurovoc_concepts:
European social policy
food supplement
free movement of goods

text: 28. 12. 2000 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas C 374 E/217 La Comisi(cid:243)n estÆ convencida de que aœn pueden encontrarse soluciones satisfactorias para todos. En los futuros debates harÆ hincapiØ en la importancia de que las autoridades francesas consulten a las partes interesadas, incluidos los demandantes. Los debates precisamente tienen por objeto encontrar respuestas proporcionadas respecto al Derecho comunitario y a los objetivos de salud pœblica que persigue la normativa objeto de discusi(cid:243)n. La Comisi(cid:243)n es consciente de las consecuencias de dicha normativa, especialmente para los productores de tamaæo medio, como los productores de vino. Los efectos de la legislaci(cid:243)n se situarÆn en el centro de los debates. Un c(cid:243)digo de conducta puede ofrecer soluciones rÆpidas y satisfactorias a los problemas planteados siempre que se cumplan determinadas condiciones, por lo que respecta a la consulta a las partes interesadas, el contenido, la transparencia y la difusi(cid:243)n. Con el fin de garantizar la mÆxima seguridad jur(cid:237)dica, la Comisi(cid:243)n considera en concreto que cualquier interesado (anunciante, difusor, etc. ) en cada caso preciso deber(cid:237)a poder obtener rÆpidamente de las autoridades francesas indicaciones claras y espec(cid:237)ficas sobre la situaci(cid:243)n de una prueba deportiva determinada en relaci(cid:243)n con las distinciones que establece el c(cid:243)digo. (2000/C 374 E/257) PREGUNTA ESCRITA E-1339/00 de Glyn Ford (PSE) a la Comisi(cid:243)n (4 de mayo de 2000) Asunto: Legislaci(cid:243)n sobre consulta de los empleados ¿Considera la Comisi(cid:243)n que el anuncio realizado el 6 de marzo por Commercial Hydraulics Ultra Division de que cerrarÆ su factor(cid:237)a de Cheltenham (RU), con la consiguiente pØrdida de 252 puestos de trabajo, y de que iniciarÆ consultas despuØs de realizar el anuncio es conforme con el esp(cid:237)ritu de la legislaci(cid:243)n sobre consulta de los empleados? Respuesta de la Sra. Diamantopoulou en nombre de la Comisi(cid:243)n (5 de junio de 2000) Se ruega a Su Seæor(cid:237)a se refiera a la respuesta de la Comisi(cid:243)n a su pregunta escrita E-0883/00 (1). (1) Ver pÆgina 178. (2000/C 374 E/258) PREGUNTA ESCRITA P-1372/00 de Marianne Thyssen (PPE-DE) a la Comisi(cid:243)n (26 de abril de 2000) Asunto: Propuesta de directiva sobre suplementos alimenticios En estos momentos no existe en la Uni(cid:243)n Europea una legislaci(cid:243)n armonizada en materia de suplementos alimenticios. Ello tiene consecuencias graves y persistentes para la libre circulaci(cid:243)n de estos productos en la Uni(cid:243)n Europea. En su Libro Blanco sobre seguridad alimentaria, la Comisi(cid:243)n anuncia su intenci(cid:243)n de presentar al Consejo y al Parlamento una propuesta de directiva en materia de suplementos alimenticios en marzo de 2000. Esa medida de armonizaci(cid:243)n solucionar(cid:237)a el problema arriba mencionado. ¿Puede indicar la Comisi(cid:243)n en quØ fase se halla la preparaci(cid:243)n de la propuesta de directiva y cuÆndo se propone presentarla al Consejo y al Parlamento? C 374 E/218 Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas ES 28. 12. 2000 Respuesta del Sr. Byrne en nombre de la Comisi(cid:243)n (26 de mayo de 2000) La propuesta de Directiva del Parlamento y del Consejo sobre suplementos alimenticios, que se anunci(cid:243) en el apartado 105 del Libro Blanco sobre seguridad alimentaria, fue adoptada por la Comisi(cid:243)n el 8 de mayo de 2000. Pr(cid:243)ximamente se transmitirÆ al Consejo y al Parlamento, y se publicarÆ en el Diario Oficial. (2000/C 374 E/259) PREGUNTA ESCRITA P-1378/00 de Reinhold Messner (Verts/ALE) a la Comisi(cid:243)n (27 de abril de 2000) Asunto: Enlace de autopista Asti-Cœneo Al parecer, el Gobierno italiano tiene la intenci(cid:243)n de iniciar la construcci(cid:243)n del enlace piamontØs de autopista Asti-Cœneo y de renovar la concesi(cid:243)n a la Satap (sociedad an(cid:243)nima autopista Tur(cid:237)n-Alessandria- Piacenza), concecionaria de la autopista Tur(cid:237)n-Piacenza as(cid:237) como de la autopista Asti-Cœneo, sin licitaci(cid:243)n pœblica. AdemÆs, mediante decreto ministerial, el Gobierno aprob(cid:243) los 19 convenios con las correspon- dientes empresas concesionarias con otros tantos decretos ministeriales. El Tribunal de Cuentas italiano, que ha desbloqueado siete de los diecinueve convenios entre Anas (empresa nacional aut(cid:243)noma de carreteras) y otras tantas empresas concesionarias, todav(cid:237)a no se ha pronunciado sobre la pr(cid:243)rroga de la concesi(cid:243)n a Satap. No obstante, existe una carta dirigida al Gobierno italiano en el mes de septiembre de 1999 por el consejero delegado del Tribunal responsable del control de Anas, en la que sostiene que la concesi(cid:243)n expedida en 1991 por el Gobierno a la Satap es ileg(cid:237)tima puesto que es resultado de una negociaci(cid:243)n privada, a pesar de que ya estuviera vigente la Directiva 89/440/CEE (1) que exige una licitaci(cid:243)n pœblica europea. AdemÆs, en 1993, el proyecto Asti-Cœneo recibi(cid:243) el dictamen negativo de la comisi(cid:243)n para la evaluaci(cid:243)n del impacto ambiental del Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, posteriormente desestimado por una votaci(cid:243)n del Consejo de Ministros en 1994 y 1999, pero con un proyecto modificado, sin un nuevo procedimiento de evaluaci(cid:243)n del impacto ambiental, sin la nueva publicaci(cid:243)n del proyecto y, en consecuencia, sin la posibilidad para los ciudadanos afectados por el trazado de presentar sus observaciones. En el caso espec(cid:237)fico del enlace Asti-Cuneo, existe un recurso pendiente ante el Tribunal Administrativo del Lacio sobre el proyecto del tramo Massimini-Cœneo y, por œltimo, una investigaci(cid:243)n judicial sobre los balances de la Satap, con 33 solicitudes de encausamiento por falsificaci(cid:243)n contable contra sus adminis- tradores. A la vista de estos hechos, ¿no considera la Comisi(cid:243)n que la pr(cid:243)rroga de la concesi(cid:243)n de autopistas por parte del Gobierno italiano sin licitaci(cid:243)n pœblica es contraria a la legislaci(cid:243)n comunitaria, en particular a las Directivas 92/50/CEE (2), 93/36/CEE (3) y 93/37/CEE (4), as(cid:237) como poco oportuna, vistas las diferentes investigaciones judiciales que afectan a la empresa concesionaria italiana? AdemÆs, ¿no cree la Comisi(cid:243)n que el nuevo proyecto se ha de someter a la evaluaci(cid:243)n del impacto ambiental? (1) DO L 210 de 21. 7. 1989, p. 1. (2) DO L 209 de 24. 7. 1992, p. 1. (3) DO L 199 de 9. 8. 1993, p. 1. (4) DO L 199 de 9. 8. 1993, p. 54. Respuesta del Sr. Bolkestein en nombre de la Comisi(cid:243)n (29 de mayo de 2000) La Comisi(cid:243)n desea solicitar a las autoridades italianas toda la informaci(cid:243)n necesaria para evaluar la compatibilidad con el derecho comunitario de los contratos pœblicos de la construcci(cid:243)n del nuevo enlace de autopista Asti-Cuneo, as(cid:237) como de la ampliaci(cid:243)n de la concesi(cid:243)n a la sociedad Satap, seæalados por su Seæor(cid:237)a. En caso de que, a ra(cid:237)z del examen de esta informaci(cid:243)n, se observara que los procedimientos efectuados fueran incompatibles con el derecho comunitario antes indicado, la Comisi(cid:243)n podr(cid:237)a incoar el recurso por incumplimiento previsto en el art(cid:237)culo 226 del Tratado CE (antiguo art(cid:237)culo 169)