The collaborative innovation of Low Carbon Environmental Friendly Technology (LCEFT) takes an important role in coping with climate change for developing countries. Because of the high innovation cost, high risk and uncertainty of revenues, financial institutions are introduced in. And the model's basic hypothesis is the cooperative relationship with enterprises. Then we can build an evolutionary game model of LCEFT collaborative innovation with muti-subjects of government, enterprises, financial institutions and research institutions. Thus we can explore the decision-making conditions of independent innovation and collaborative innovation of enterprises supported by green finance. And a conclusion through an analog simulation of the influence of pledge of carbon right, credit rating, penalty and subsidies by Matlab model. Then conclusions are: (1) the green support strategy from financial institutions can promote the collaborative innovation of enterprises, but the effectiveness of the green support strategy is not only affected by the government subsidies and punishment mechanism, but also affected by the profitability and risk of green credit projects. (2) The complementarity of multi-subjects in resources and capabilities is key force for the formation of LCEFT collaborative innovation alliance and an important source of additional benefits for innovation subjects. (3) Subsidy and punishment mechanisms implemented by government will also actively promote multi-subject cooperation, which is conducive to collaborative innovation of LCEFT, but not an overall optimal strategy. The key to achieve overall optimal result is to effectively play the role of guidance from government and lever from financial institutions.
Xiao, HJ; Tang, HL; Zhou, JH
On the LCEFT Multi-player Collaborative Innovation Evolutionary Game with the Support of Green Finance
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