43049a13_nd_Network_Companies_Bill_2011__4
[0] (C) Include a requirement in NBN Co’s constitution for NBN Co to seek approval from its shareholders before investing in a retail provider or selling any shares in a subsidiary. [1] Quasi-regulation [2] No. Shareholder Ministers would assume responsibility for determining if an acquisition or disposal should take place, rather than the Board. Removes flexibility from NBN Co and introduces additional (new) role for shareholder Ministers. [3] Partial This option requires NBN Co to seek approval from shareholders prior to acquiring shares in a retail provider or selling shares in a subsidiary. This option would become ineffective as the Commonwealth sells down its shares, and possibly on a change in Shareholder Ministers (as shareholders have the power to change the company’s Constitution) The effectiveness of this mechanism depends on the judgment of shareholders. [5] Approach likely to be seen as lacking transparency by industry, and also ineffective on privatisation (therefore, requiring some other mechanism). May provide an effective transition mechanism, until Option D is implemented. [4] 
Allows NBN Co to purchase retail providers to reduce the overall cost of the NBN build (provided it is not disallowed by Shareholder Ministers or the ACCC). Additional processes would be required within Government, meaning there would be a related cost to the Commonwealth. These costs are impossible to quantify, but would involve increased resourcing required to consider all NBN Co’s transactions and provide advice (including legal and economic advice). Delays arising from the approval process could lead to NBN Co incurring increased costs, which would be passed on to access seekers and ultimately to end-users.
ParlInfo - National Broadband Network Companies Bill 2011