108d4836_brary_of_Economics_and_Liberty__ast_Highlights_HIDE_HIGHLIGHTS
[Time] 58:07
Poll: $100 billion stimulus package. People will state an opinion. Any time a pollster asks you for something, you put yourself into the position and answer. Three months later, correlation really low. Prediction markets. Individuals don't have sufficient incentives to be honest. Betting market. New York Times. Congressional compensation: give Congressman a financial stake. What happens to the President sticks to the Congressmen. Clinton rewarded or not for what he did in 1995? Hoover, free-market ideologue reputation, historical legacy; didn't do very well. Bush, non-free market stuff, nice argument for people who want to blame free markets. Why are they doing that? Shows up more in hearings and eventually influences public opinion. If public opinion were very discerning, not a problem. Customer isn't very discerning. Betting markets say: listen to a betting market price. Impulse: encourage people to be skeptical. Could just say no to everything, don't impress friends and relatives. As an ordinary voter, don't affect anything, but can look with-it. Leaves us with ourselves. How important is our own honesty to us? If others out there who care about honesty, where are they and how can we get together or work together? Which is the least Quixotic strategy? Self-referential. Prediction markets versus people becoming skeptical of empirical studies? By definition, all theories are simplistic. Where does it kick in? 1000 people, whole town? Changing hearts and minds is inherently Quixotic.
Roberts (and Hanson) on Truth and Economics | EconTalk | Library of Economics and Liberty