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Welcome to Nolte’s Service & 24 Hour Towing LLC

Proudly Serving Oshkosh & Appleton, WI & the Surrounding Areas

Nolte’s Service & 24 Hour Towing LLC is a full-service auto repair company with locations in Oshkosh & Appleton, WI. We’ve been family-owned and operated since 1970 and offer our customer a comprehensive list of auto repair services. We are a NAPA Auto Care and AAA-Approved Auto Repair Center, and our highly trained team is proficient with any make or model vehicle. We understand that many of our calls occur during stressful situations. However, we rise to the challenge and aim to ease any frustrations by providing quality car repair services.

We Serve The Following Communities

Oshkosh · Neenah · Menasha · Appleton · Grand Chute · Little Chute · Kimberly · Kaukauna · Omro · Winneconne · Ripon · Fox Valley

Allow Nolte’s to be the first and last call you make for all your towing and auto repair needs. We work hard to ensure complete customer satisfaction. Rest assured, we can take care of your situation regardless of the size. Check out our gallery to see previous projects we’ve worked on.

auto service coupon in appleton, wi


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$3 Billion in Airport Improvements Exempt from Federal Budget Cuts

CalPilots Editor: If you have had enough of the Sequester politics, skip this article. If you want to understand just how political it is in targeting GA airports, read the article.

As budget cuts force the Federal Aviation Administration to carve chunks out of the nation’s air traffic control system, the agency cannot touch a program that allocated $17.9 million for airport improvements on the Pacific island of Saipan or $9.4 million for soundproofing two elementary schools near Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport.

Those projects are exempt from the federally mandated budget cuts known as sequestration because they are part of the Airport Improvement Program that in 2012 designated more than $3 billion for projects around the globe, from $23 million for a new airport in Kaktovik, Alaska (population 239), to tens of millions of dollars for projects at airports in, yes, Wisconsin. The Airport Improvement Program was not included among the sequestration cuts.

Yet, now air traffic controllers are being furloughed and 149 control towers, including eight in Wisconsin, are being closed – compromising air safety, some airport officials say.

The situation gets to the heart of the difficulty of cleaning up the nation’s fiscal mess: One person’s spending boondoggle is a crucial piece of someone else’s safety, quality of life or economic well-being.

“We’ve met the enemy and it’s us,” said Jeff Baum, CEO of Wisconsin Aviation, based in Watertown, who is also a pilot and vice chairman of the Air Charter Safety Foundation. “We want everything and we don’t want to pay for it.”

Says economist David J. Ward of NorthStar Consulting Group in Madison: “It’s not like everybody can look around and say it’s somebody else’s fault. The public has to decide which way we are going.

“In the last election, we decided to put the current (Democratic) administration back in the White House and the Republicans back in control of the House. That must mean something,” he said.

For now, it means we’re in for more political theater in Washington, D.C., while the nation’s air traffic control system shrinks as part of the FAA’s plan to meet the $637 million in cuts it’s been told to make under sequestration.

The U.S. air travel system is the safest anywhere. Baum said there are about 14,000 landing sites in the United States. Of those, about 5,000 are paved runways open for public use. About 500 of those have operating control towers.

The towers being eliminated are operated by private contractors.

“The vast majority of airports in America never had a control tower,” Baum said. “Can (small airports) operate without them? Absolutely.”

But the sequestration cuts would remove a layer of safety at airports where tower staffing is being eliminated.

At Waukesha County Airport, for example, student pilots are flying and landing in the same airspace as charter jets that are capable of cruising speeds approaching Mach 1, said airport director Kurt Stanich. He’s perplexed by the FAA decision to close towers, including his.

“It just doesn’t make sense to us, looking at the FAA the way we do as the ones who regulate safety and operations and pilot certifications, for them to go through and just cut a program like this,” he said. “An airport with an air traffic control tower provides a level of safety that you don’t get at an airport that’s without a control tower. We think that the FAA can make smarter cuts that don’t affect the safety of airplanes and navigation across the country. It doesn’t make sense.”

Peter Moll, airport director at Wittman Regional Airport in Oshkosh, said taking away his airport’s control tower “is almost like taking all the traffic signals away in town. Every intersection becomes uncontrolled and you have to slow down at least or stop and check for traffic. It just makes it a lot more difficult.”

The airport’s air traffic controllers, Moll said, are relied on to provide “that second set of eyes, even though pilots and ground vehicles have to keep an eye out for aircraft.”

Wittman is the site of the EAA AirVenture, which will take place from July 29 to Aug. 4. The event will draw thousands of people and activity at the airport will make it among the busiest in the world. The EAA issued a statement Friday saying the event “will not be adversely affected” by the FAA decision.

Besides Wittman and Waukesha, control towers are to be eliminated at Timmerman Field in Milwaukee; Kenosha Regional Airport; Southern Wisconsin Regional Airport in Janesville; La Crosse Municipal Airport; Central Wisconsin Airport in Mosinee; and Chippewa Valley Regional Airport in Eau Claire.

The agency is still considering eliminating overnight shifts at 72 air traffic facilities, including at major airports such as Chicago’s Midway International and Mitchell International Airport in Milwaukee. There was no word Friday on when that decision will come.

Timmerman has 31,000 takeoffs and landings a year, while Waukesha County Airport has 57,000. Airports with fewer than 150,000 operations a year were targeted for tower closures. The six air traffic controllers at Timmerman and six at Waukesha County Airport face layoffs under the tower closing order.

The whole thought process that led to the cuts is messed up, Baum said.

“Clearly, no one is saying ‘OK, our funding is going to be cut by millions of dollars,’ ” he said. “ ’Where can we become more efficient? Which programs do we really not need to be doing anymore?’ ”

The elimination of towers won’t put airports out of business, nor is it likely to prevent aircraft from using them.

“We can operate if this happens,” said Harry Becker, general manager of Atlantic Aviation in Waukesha. “Is it going to affect us? Yes. It’s a safety factor.”

Yet in Congress, the polarized political attitudes that led to sequestration remain.

Asked whether the Airport Improvement Program should be trimmed to preserve air traffic control operations, U.S. Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner of Menomonee Falls responded, “Absolutely.”

Sensenbrenner’s district includes the Waukesha County Airport.

“The first thing we have to do is we have to make sure existing air traffic is safe,” he said. “Why improve an airport if you don’t have people in the control tower to control the planes that take off and land there? That makes no sense at all.”

Sensenbrenner said in a statement that he intends to write FAA Administrator Michael Huerta to question the closures and inquire “how much taxpayer money is being spent on the FAA’s Airport Improvement Program, which funnels money to remote airports, like the one in Saipan, while towers around the country are being shut down.”

U.S. Rep. Gwen Moore of Milwaukee, whose congressional district includes Mitchell International and Timmerman Airport in Milwaukee, sees things from a different perspective.

“What others call spending, I call investment,” Moore said in an emailed response to questions about aviation spending and the Airport Improvement Program. “The projects and infrastructure these funds go toward are necessary to rebuild our economy. We should not be picking and choosing between the different sectors of government.

“We didn’t cut our way out of the Great Depression and we won’t cut our way out of the Great Recession. Greater investment is needed in all sectors,” Moore said.

The circumstances that led to the control tower cuts are hindering the nation’s economy, said Ward, the economist.

“There was never a thought that the federal government was particularly efficient at pointing out high-return investments,” he said. “But it’s very clear now that we’re getting a situation where the federal money is not being funneled to where it is most efficient.

“All the clutter and disputes aside, that’s the real economic problem,” Ward added. “If you keep doing this, it creates a drag on the economy. It’s irrational and . . . it leads to the inefficient use of scarce resources. Neither side seems to be willing to budge. That’s where we are.”

Even as it shuts down eight control towers in Wisconsin, the federal government is providing millions of dollars for airport improvements in the state. A sampling:

•  $25.1 million for runway rehabilitation, noise mitigation, road construction and safety equipment at Mitchell International.

•  $9 million to build a snow removal equipment building at Dane County Regional Airport.

•  $6.9 million for Outagamie Regional Airport in Appleton to cover road construction, runway rehabilitation, construction of a taxiway, runway safety area improvements and pavement sensors.

•  $6.5 million for airport terminal improvements at Central Wisconsin Airport in Mosinee.

•  $2.66 million for Austin Straubel International in Green Bay to acquire snow removal equipment and rehabilitate the terminal apron. (An airport apron is where planes park.)

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WWE | Pro Wrestling

WWE Hell in a Cell 2015: General Thoughts Leading up to the PPV

WWE is doing the right thing at Hell in a Cell when John Cena issues his final United States Open Challenge before he takes time off until the end of the year. The premise behind Cena’s title reign has been to make the belt, which has become “The People’s Championship,” the most important in WWE. To have the company’s top draw wear the red, white and blue on a weekly basis, it has opened the door for many WWE superstars to come from the back and try to unseat The Champ.

So far, we all know the only one who has been able to do that since SummerSlam has been Seth Rollins, thanks in part to Jon Stewart. That however could change Sunday night at the pay-per-view event. The question now becomes who can unseat Cena, and furthermore, how will the loss affect him once he comes back from his hiatus?

Maybe more importantly, who will be the one to do the honors? Beating Cena isn’t just an event, it has become an epic moment in the promotion. When Kevin Owens beat Cena in their first encounter, it shocked the wrestling world and set the current Intercontinental Champion on a course for greatness. He lost the war, but that did not stop the former NXT champion from remaining a top draw as a fresh face in an otherwise flaccid company.

Can the same be said if another newcomer does the same thing, and if that were to occur, why wouldn’t WWE creative out the strap on Owens to begin with? Those kinds of questions may never be answered, but fans and writers like myself may always wonder what was the mindset behind keeping a the title off Owens in the first place.

WWE pulled out the big guns on Monday night, bringing back key veterans to help promote Hell in a Cell and to gear up for upcoming ticket sales for WrestleMania 32. Everything is bigger in Dallas and Triple H and company had no problems bringing in The Undertaker, Shawn Michaels and Mark Henry – all Texas natives – to help do the bidding. Add Brock Lesnar and Ric Flair and the reunion of The Shield, and you got one big happy party.

Sort of.

The show looked more like a window dressing of sorts, oversold and overplayed in an attempt to sell a show that is solid from top to bottom, but has not been promoted like it should. There is plenty to be excited about, as well as plenty to be disappointed at.

Hopefully, the show delivers. There has been a long enough lapse in time to make sure there has been plenty of hype.

The problem with bringing back the past to help sell the present, in my opinion, is we see how really good the performers were back in the day. The mic work is better, the sales pitch is crisper and the wrestlers understand the craft put into making the promotion work. Shawn Michaels has no problem selling a show like it’s selling peanuts to an elephant. Even Ric Flair, talking about Dallas and his memories of the Von Erich’s was spot on. And to top everything off Stone Cold Steve Austin selling not only Undertaker and the upcoming match with Brock Lesnar, but his podcast with The Beast Incarnate immediately after the show.

Spot on perfection.

I hope the current and future stars on the roster watched and learned a thing or to. There will never be an ensemble of talent in the Attitude Era as there was back then.

There never will be again, period.

Ric Flair was on the show to promote his “main man” Roman Reigns. Sorry, Naitch, but it just doesn’t work. And the psychological angle the former Shield member might have worked with a more charismatic wrestler, but Reigns’ demeanor won’t allow that to happen.

Don’t get me wrong, I liked the premise, I thought the idea was worth a shot, but unless Reigns shows a reign of terror and turns heel, he will never get over as the new champion of WWE. And the way the company is promoting Dean Ambrose as a face the company needs, there is no chance of him turning heel, which might help Reigns get over as a sympathetic face champion.

Bad booking, bad story writing, if you ask me.

Ambrose is as close to Roddy Piper and Brian Pillman as the company has had in a long time. He should be the heel champion Triple H, Vince McMahon and creative pushes after the new the TLC pay-per-view.

%3A%20Sting%20-%20Into%20the%20Light&linkCode=ur2&rh=n%3A2625373011%2Ck%3AWWE%3A%20Sting%20-%20Into%20the%20Light&tag=prowrerad-20&url=search-alias%3Dmovies-tv&linkId=YCO4ZTSU5P7WDRCY” target=”_blank”>WWE: Sting – Into the Light on Amazon.com

WWE: Daniel Bryan: Just Say Yes! Yes! Yes! on Amazon.com

Grab discounted WWE DVDs, merchandise, t -shirts, figures, and more from the WWE Shop on Amazon.com

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Welcome to the Camel Clutch Blog. The CCB was born in 2007 and features blogs from over 50 different writers. Articles from the Camel Clutch Blog have been featured by some of the world's most respected websites including; CNNSI.com, Foxsports.com, Yahoo News, Business Insider, MSNBC, NBCsports.com, and more.

Writers Wanted

Do you have a passion for blogging? The Camel Clutch Blog is proud to have featured over 50 guest bloggers and contributors since its inception. The CCB is a great outlet for your blogging or a great way to promote your own site, blog, and/or podcast through Guest Blogging. The CCB reaches millions of people per year and you can be sure you will be read when you post on the CCB. Email Eric Gargiulo at [email protected] if you are interested.

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Rose Sabitova married to the foreman

Роза Сябитова сыграет свадьбу с прорабом
TV presenter decided on the choice of her future husband.

Rose Sabitova

Photo: @Instagram syabitova_roza Roses Sabitova

Rose Sabitova became the heroine of the program “a Perfect repair”, during the filming of which openly spoke about his personal life. Teleshko admitted she’s looking for a husband a real “man”. He should be able to do something with their hands, and to cope with all the everyday problems.

Ideally, for the recognition of Rose, her future spouse should be the owner of a construction company or architect. She recently got a cottage that requires the participation of a representative of the stronger sex. Sabitova plans to build on a plot of several buildings, to establish the sewer… For all this she needs men anyway associated with construction. Leading a “Perfect repair” suggested that rose is looking for a superintendent, and she accepted it.

“Now we need to build a house, sewer dig… a Man has to control everything, I don’t understand!” — said rose.

Recall that Sabitova was married twice. The first husband of TV star Michael died of a heart attack. Her second husband was Yuri Andreev. In 2011, the couple there was a loud divorce. By the way, the marriage of a daughter of Roses — Xenia, as it became known, also collapsed.


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Antónia Gertrudes Pusich: The First Cabo Verdean Woman Poet, Author, Journalist and Newspaper Editor

This incredible Criola’s story starts with the meeting of her father António Vicko Pusich and her mother Ana Maria Isabel Nunes at a reception at the Palace of Queluz. Ana Maria Isabel Nunes was the daughter of Manuel Nunes, and important character in the Court of D. Maria I of Portugal.  On August 25th, 1791, the parents of Antónia Gertrudes Pusich were married at the Chapel of Paço de Queluz.

António Pusich was accumulating up the distinctions and ranks regularly. In 1798, He is responsible for the brig Dragon [Dragão]. By the following year, already commands a brigantine named Balão that stops in the ports of the islands of Cabo Verde. On March 18th, 1801, António Pusich was appointed quartermaster of Cabo Verde’s Navy and also a Frigate Captain. António Pusich will later be named Governor of the islands, he was the only Intendant of the Navy of the Cape Verde Islands, a position he held for eight years.

In 1805, on the island of São Nicolau, Antónia Gertrudes Pusich was born. To mark the birth of his daughter, António Pusich erected the chapel of Santo António dos Navegantes [Saint Antony of the Navigators] in Porto Preguiça, São Nicolau. The Pusich family had four other children besides Antónia Gertrudes Pusich and they were João Antonio Pusich; Jerolim/Jeronymo Antonio Pusich; Ana Isabel Pusich and Pedro Antonio Pusich.

While still young Antónia Pusich collaborated with her parents in supporting populations of Cabo Verde, so many times plagued by disease and hardship due to protracted and cyclical droughts. She claims that her father did away in Cabo Verde with barbarous customs, such as corporal punishment in public that the former governor committed against the population, which according to Antónia Pusich, were virtually enslaved.

From an early age, Antonia Gertrudes accompanied her father on his trips throughout the islands of Cabo Verde. She also at times served as his secretary to draft certain documents.

Antónia Gertrudes Pusich married for the first time very young, in 1820 at the age of 15, with Judge João Cardoso de Almeida Amado Viana Coelho, a Delegate to the Parliamentary Courts of 1820, and had six children: João António Pusich Viana Coelho, Antónia Pusich Viana Coelho, Alfredo Pusich Viana Coelho, Maria Pusich Viana Coelho, Ana Pusich Viana Coelho e Ema Pusich Da Costa Freire E Oliveira (Viana Coelho).

The second marriage of Antónia Pusich was in 1830, with Commander Francisco Henriques Teixeira. From this marriage a son is born named Miguel Pusich Henriques Teixeira. Having become a widow for a second time, Antonia Gertrudes Pusich marries for a third time on April 16, 1836, in the Church of Santa Isabel, in Lisbon, with Captain José Roberto de Melo Fernandes e Almeida. They had several children, and their names were António (Melo Pusich), Antónia Gertrudes Andrade E Albuquerque (Pusich de Melo), Ana Isabel Filomena (Pusich de Melo) and Maria Amélia Carvalho (Pusich de Melo).

She was thought to read and write-through the education provided to her by her father and she practiced her reading skills with the many books that surrounded her at her home. She also had knowledge of several languages and began to write at a very early age. But the married life of a 19th century woman and her three marriages, as well as the adversities of life, only allowed her to publish for the first time in 1841. Antónia Gertrudes Pusich best known work is Olinda ou a Abadia de Comnor Place, published in 1848.”> Antónia Gertrudes Pusich
B. 10/01/1805 in São Nicolau, Cabo Verde D. 10/06/1883 in Lisboa, Portugal[/caption]Antó

Antónia Gertrudes Pusich also wrote about members the royal family, whom always devoted to her family and herself a great friendship, and she was even a close friend of the Infanta Maria Isabel. The longevity of the author allowed her career to span several reigns – from D. Maria I until the reign of King Luís I of Portugal.

Her literary work is extensive and it is known that Antónia Gertrudes Pusch turned to writing in order to provide for her large family. Although many of her books seem relevant only to researchers and scholars, her writing as a journalist and as a founder of three journals [newspapers, periodicals] are to this day read with interest and pleasure. Antónia Pusich founded A Cruzada, A Beneficência and A Assembleia Literária and they stand as testimony of one facet of a pedagogue and a full participant in social and political life. She also had great success at the Teatro Normal, with the presentation of her piece entitled Constança ou o Amor Maternal, which was an autobiographical drama.

At a time when women were confined to the family, to music and embroidery, Antónia Pusich argued that they should also learn to read and write in order to fully participate in the social and political life of the country. Through the newspapers that she founded she aroused in the 19th century Portuguese and Cabo Verdean women the civic sense that would be a reality in the centuries that followed.

Antónia Gertrudes Pusich should be placed in the Cabo Verdean Literary Hall of Fame for her writing and accomplishments alongside the Early Writers [Antonio Januario Leite, Guilherme Ernesto, Custodio Duarte, Jose Lopes, Pedro Cardoso (Afro), Eugenio Tavares] and the Writers of the Claridade Movement [Baltasar Lopes da Silva (Osvaldo Alcântara), Jorge Barbosa, Manuel Lopes, António Aurélio Gonçalves, Jaime Figueiredo, Joao Lopes].

To know her is to admire her.

Street named after Antónia Pusich located in Bairro de Alvalade, Lisbon, Portugal. Her last residence was on this street as well.”> Street named after Antónia Pusich located in Bairro de Alvalade, Lisbon, Portugal. Her last residence was on this street as well.

Faria, Luis António, Suzana Abreu, and Américo C. Araújo. Cabo Verde Terra de Morabeza: Uma Viagem Atraves de Sua Historia e Cultura. Valrico: LAF Enterprises, 2012.

O Leme –


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Technology Solutions for Businesses

For every type of application, different ID badge accessories are sometimes needed. From ID cards of all types, to lanyards and card holders, we carry the accessories you’ll need.

We also carry each product in a variety of colors and sizes, so you can have the exact look and feel that you want. Our badge accessories can help you to more properly identify visitors, staff members, clients, or others. With clips, lanyards and badge reels, we can help to make sure identification is shown and worn in comfort.

Choose from a wide variety of:

  • Lanyards
  • Badge/Card Holders
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  • Strap Clips
  • Slot Punches
  • Neck Chains
  • Luggage Accessories

Contact our Inside Sales team today:

Request a quick quote, shop online, or view our online catalog.


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Technology Solutions for Businesses

OneCard Campus Solution

Capture Technologies has one card solutions for all of your campus applications. These solutions include a modular campus card system that allows colleges and universities to easily identify, validate and track students and faculty members. Students can use their ID cards for a variety of things both on and off campus including purchases, utilizing meal plans, attending events, accessing dorm rooms and other campus facilities, tracking attendance in class and more.

One Card Campus Card Solutions

Photo ID
Access Control
Dining & Meal Plan
Student Attendance
Event Tracking
Copy Control
Key Management
Time & Attendance
Visitor Check-In


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Toyota Prepares For 2012 Return To Le Mans

Many think Toyota retired from endurance racing too soon. Now they plan to return, and we're excited.

For endurance racing enthusiasts, the 1999 running of the 24 Hours of Le Mans is a particularly memorable one. It was the year that Peter Dumbreck famously became airborne in his CLR, causing Mercedes-Benz to once again withdraw from Le Mans. It was Audi's first year at La Sarthe, but it was also the year that one of Toyota's excellent GT-One prototype racers very nearly became the second Japanese car to ever score a win.

A flat tire right near the end of the race knocked Toyota out of first, but it was believed by many that Toyota's machine was in fact superior to the BMW that actually won. Toyota hasn't raced at Le Mans since, but they have now announced that they will return for 2012, as part of the FIA World Endurance Championship. Toyota Motorsport GmbH, based out of Germany, is developing an LMP1 car with a hybrid drivetrain for use in the championship. A hybrid is a bold move in a series utterly dominated by diesel cars, and where no hybrid LMP1 prototype has yet made it all the way through the 24 hour race.

Bold though it may be, Porsche is reported to have similar plans for 2014, so we can expect to see some serious money being put into hybrid sports car development in the near future. We're looking forward to seeing how this turns out.

Latest News


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• Technical Lead

    Job Locations US-VA-Chantilly
    Job ID 2018-1582
  • Overview

    AbleVets, LLC is a fast-growing Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) providing healthcare information technology services and resources to help the VA and DoD improve the lives of the people they serve. AbleVets has an opportunity for an experienced, motivated Technical Lead to support healthcare information technology projects for our customers.

    Essential Functions and Job Responsibilities

    This position is for an experienced Technical Lead to work in a fast-paced, Agile environment. The successful candidate will be responsible for providing technical leadership, architecture guidance, and hands-on development for web and mobile health applications using HTML5, JavaScript, and CSS. The successful candidate will participate in the full system lifecycle including analysis, planning, implementation, testing, documentation, and operations. The Technical Lead is assigned to the most complex independent technical tasks or performs as a team lead, architecting, directing and coordinating the technical work of all scrum team members to complete projects successfully.

    Duties and responsibilities will include, but are not limited to:

    • Effectively leading a cross-functional scrum team, including supporting engineering and development delivery, technical deliverables/artifacts (architecture, installation instructions), and release activities (running fortify scans, building in Jenkins)
    • Helping to establish technical standards, approaches and architectures across the project
    • Identifying and mitigating technical risks to the project
    • Ensuring execution of quality technical deliverables within established schedules

    • Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Engineering, Math and minimum of 7 years related experience; 6 years of additional relevant experience may be substituted for education
    • 5+ years’ experience overall experience analyzing, designing, and implementing integration solutions using Java and related technologies
    • Familiar with Agile incremental delivery approach which supports incremental development of high-quality, fully tested application component delivery every 2 weeks
    • Strong understanding of object-oriented and domain-driven development principles
    • 4+ years’ experience developing technical architecture
    • 3+ years hands-on experience in developing Rest Services
    • 3+ years hands-on experience with the following technologies:
      • Frontend, UI – Javascript/HTML5, Angular, Backbone, Twitter Bootstrap, jQuery Mobile, CSS
      • Backend, Services – Java, NodeJS, Javax, Jersey, Jackson, Jetty, Tomcat
      • Cluster/High Performance Computing – Python
      • Mobile – iOS (Xcode/Obj C), Android
      • Continuous Integration/DevOps – Docker and Gradle
    • Experience with MongoDB
    • Excellent written and oral communication skills
    • Ability to obtain a Public Trust

    Additional Desired Qualifications:

    • Experience with VA Mobile Application Environment
    • Experience with Atlassian Suite (JIRA, Wiki) experience
    • Self-starter that can work under general direction

    EEO Statement

    AbleVets LLC appreciates your interest in our company as a place of employment.  We are proud to be an equal opportunity/affirmative action employer and are committed to hiring and retaining a diverse workforce.  All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, age, marital status, genetic information, disability, veteran status, or any other protected class.  AbleVets is a VEVRAA Federal Contractor.

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• Experienced Used Car Recon Technician ( 4 Day Work Week) -World Ford

    Job Locations US-FL-Pensacola
    Job ID
    Automotive Repair
    Regular Full-Time
  • Overview

    World Ford is part of fast growing Group 1 Automotive , a leader in automotive retail and we are looking to add qualified EXPERIENCED USED CAR RECON TECHNICIAN to our team. Group 1 is a Fortune 500 company that offers a team environment, great benefits and ongoing training and support for its associates. If you’ve got the horsepower to join a fast paced environment and hit our high standards - apply today!

    Benefits and opportunities:

    4 Day Work Week!

    • Job training and career advancement opportunities
    • Health, Dental, Vision, Life and Disability Insurance
    • 401(k) with company match
    • Paid Time-off
    • Student Loan Tuition Reimbursement (subject eligibility and plan provisions)
    • $2,000 Tool Reimbursement (subject eligibility and plan provisions)
    • Employee stock purchase plan
    • Employee vehicle purchase program
    • Performance / longevity bonuses

    • Efficient and accurate work in accordance with dealership’s and factory standards
    • Complete system diagnostics and full automotive troubleshooting and testing
    • Maintain an organized shop area
    • Road-test vehicles to ensure quality work
    • Comply with company safety policies and procedures
    • Communicate directly with service advisors regarding the status of the service work
    • Continuously learn new technical information and techniques
    • Adhere to our values: Integrity, Transparency, Professionalism and Teamwork

    • Several years of automotive technician or mechanic experience
    • Automotive technical or trade school degree
    • National Institute of Automotive Service Excellence (ASE) certification(s) or certification(s) in: brakes, electrical/electronic systems or engine performance preferred.
    • High school diploma or equivalent
    • Valid driver’s license in the state and good driving record

    *All applicants must pass pre-employment testing to include: background checks, MVR, and drug testing in order to qualify for employment*

    Group 1 Automotive is an Equal Employment Opportunity employer

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    Connect With Us!

    Not ready to apply to a position? Sign-up to let us know about your interest in a career with Group 1 Automotive.


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Tag Archives: UN

Global Goals

Last year I did a voice over for the excellent project that is the UN’s Global Goals. They’ve done a Part Two, written by Sir Ken Robinson, animated by Aardman and voiced by me. It’s very lovely and inspiring, if … Continue reading

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above average
21 Miles

Vehicle Details

Mileage: 21
Body Style: Hatchback
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Hyundai is AWESOME!

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Hyundai is awesome! The Elantra is great, I guess you can say I put it through the safety test and it passed with flying colors. Hyundai put me into another one of their Elantra's and I drove off just as happy if not happier the 2nd time.

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first of all,stay away from the dual clutch transmission,as i had in my 2016 veloster turbo..it's horrible.the ride of the elantra sport is just the icing on the cake.mine is a 6-speed manual with the tech package..enough said..you must drive this car..gas mileage is much higher than hyundai says,too.

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United States Court of Appeals,Tenth Circuit.

John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark SHURTLEFF, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Utah, in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 09-4162.

    Decided: October 26, 2010

Before GORSUCH, McKAY, and CUDAHY*, Circuit Judges.Elizabeth G. Eager (Emmet J. Bondurant, II, and Nicole G. Iannarone with her on the briefs), of Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Nancy L. Kemp, Assistant Utah Attorney General (Sharel S. Reber, Assistant Utah Attorney General, and Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, with her on the brief), Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant-Appellee.

In this case John Doe, a registered sex offender living in the state of Utah, appeals the district court's decision to allow enforcement of a Utah statute requiring all sex offenders living in Utah to register their “internet identifiers” and the corresponding websites with the state. We now uphold that decision based on our conclusion that the statute does not violate the First or Fourth Amendments or the Ex-Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, made applicable to Utah through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Appellant, proceeding anonymously as Mr. John Doe, was convicted by the United States military court system of sex offenses involving a minor and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment. After serving thirteen months of this sentence, Mr. Doe was released without being placed on probation or supervised release. However, as a resident of Utah and a convicted sex offender, Mr. Doe was still required to register with the Utah Department of Corrections, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5 (West 2008). Among its many provisions, this registry law required Mr. Doe to provide all “Internet identifiers1 and the addresses [he] uses for routing or self-identification in Internet communications or postings.” Id. § 77-27-21.5(14)(i).2 The statute also required that Mr. Doe provide “all online identifiers and passwords used to access” websites where he was using an online identifier, with the exception of identifiers used for employment or financial accounts. Id. § 77-27-21.5(12)(j) & (29).

Believing that these requirements violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights as well as the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, Mr. Doe refused to provide the requested information and brought a lawsuit challenging the law. Upon Mr. Doe's motion for summary judgment, the district court invalidated the statute based on its conclusion that the statute, which provided “no restrictions on how the [State] c[ould] use or disseminate registrants' internet information,” improperly infringed on Mr. Doe's First Amendment right to anonymous speech. (Appellant's App. at 208.) Shortly after this ruling, the Utah legislature amended the statute. First, the legislature removed any requirement that offenders disclose their passwords, and second, it placed some limits on how a state official can use identifiers provided by an offender. Specifically, the statute now3 provides that

The [state], to assist in investigating kidnapping and sex-related crimes, and in apprehending offenders, shall:

(a) develop and operate a system to collect, analyze, maintain, and disseminate information on offenders and sex and kidnap offenses;

(b) make information listed in Subsection (27) available to the public; and

(c) share information provided by an offender under this section that may not be made available to the public under Subsection (27), but only:

(i) for the purposes under this Subsection (2); or

(ii) in accordance with [the Government Records

Access and Management Act].

Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5(2) (West Supp.2010). Additionally, the legislature amended Utah's Government Records Access and Management Act, or GRAMA, to designate certain information provided by an offender, including internet identifiers, as private.4 See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-302(1)(m) (West Supp.2010).

Following these amendments, the State filed a motion for the district court to vacate its earlier order pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After considering the briefs, the district court granted the motion, holding that the new restrictions “diminished” the chilling effect on Doe's speech so that his First Amendment right to anonymous speech was no longer “significantly threatened.” (Appellant's App. at 292.) The court then concluded that the statute did not violate the Fourth Amendment because Mr. Doe had failed to show he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his internet identifiers, which are communicated to a third party. Finally, the court held, relying on our earlier decision in Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir.2000), that the registry statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Mr. Doe now appeals each of these rulings.

We generally review a decision to grant a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. See Stubblefield v. Windsor Capital Grp., 74 F.3d 990, 994 (10th Cir.1996). Nevertheless, we review the district court's decision de novo where, as here, the district court granted relief as a matter of law. See Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 727 (10th Cir.1993) (“A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its rulings on an erroneous view of the law․”).

1. Mr. Doe's claim under the First Amendment

We first consider Mr. Doe's contention that Utah's registration statute violates his First Amendment right to engage in anonymous speech. That the First Amendment guarantees a right to anonymous speech is beyond question. As the Supreme Court explained in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, “Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant society.” 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (citation omitted). That the right to engage in anonymous speech should extend fully to communications made through the medium of the internet is equally clear. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (explaining that the internet allows “any person with a phone line [to] become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox” and that “our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium”). In spite of these protections, however, a state may permissibly infringe upon this right when its interest is important enough and the law is appropriately tailored to meet the stated interest. See Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1102 (10th Cir.1997).

According to Mr. Doe, we should view Utah's statute as a content-based restriction, subject to the strictest of scrutiny, because it has the effect of taking “away [Mr.] Doe's right to choose whether to speak anonymously or under a pseudonym.” (Appellant's Br. at 10.) We are not persuaded. “The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” Am. Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).

As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of ideas or views expressed are content based. By contrast, laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content neutral.

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (citation omitted). Simply because an otherwise content-neutral law has “an incidental effect on some speakers or messages” does not change its classification so long as it “serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression.” Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1083 (10th Cir.2010). On its face, section 77-27-21.5 is a content-neutral regulation. The law says nothing about the ideas or opinions that Mr. Doe may or may not express, anonymously or otherwise. Neither is it aimed at “supress[ing] the expression of unpopular views,” Am. Target, 199 F.3d at 1247, but rather it is directed towards aiding the police in solving crimes. We will therefore examine the State's law as a content-neutral regulation.

As a content-neutral regulation, Utah's reporting law is subject to intermediate scrutiny, meaning that the law will be upheld if “the Act (1) serves a substantial government interest and (2) is ‘narrowly drawn’ to serve that interest ‘without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.’ “ Id. (quoting Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980)). Both sides have agreed that Utah has a compelling interest in protecting the public from kidnapping and sex-related crimes, and we conclude that the reporting statute serves that interest. Thus, our consideration of this statute must focus on whether it unnecessarily interferes with Mr. Doe's First Amendment freedoms. In reviewing state statutes challenged on First Amendment grounds, we will uphold a law if it is “readily susceptible to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional.” ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir.1999). Nevertheless, “[t]he key to application of this principle is that the statute must be readily susceptible to the limitation; we will not rewrite a state law to conform it to constitutional requirements.” Id.

Mr. Doe argues that the statute is unconstitutional because the required disclosure of internet identifiers to state officials, as well as the possibility of disclosure of those identifiers to the public, chills his speech.5 Turning first to the possibility of disclosure to the public, Mr. Doe focuses on the language of section 77-27-21.5(2)(c), which allows the state to “share information provided by an offender under this section that may not be made available to the public [on the sex-offender notification and registration website], but only: (i) for the purposes under this Subsection (2); or (ii) in accordance with Section 63G-2-206.” (emphasis added). According to Mr. Doe, the “or” in this statute means that the government may choose to share information with the public, free from the privacy safeguards contained in section 63G-2-206, so long as it is “to assist in investigating kidnapping and sex-related crimes.” § 77-27-21.5(2). Thus, Mr. Doe argues, the statute allows for the possibility of forced public disclosure of what would otherwise be anonymous speech.

Despite Mr. Doe's arguments, however, we conclude that Utah's law provides sufficient safeguards so as to negate any potential fears of public disclosure. While Mr. Doe is correct that the language of subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) allows law enforcement to share information under either condition, he is not correct that information shared under subsection 21.5(c)(i) loses its privacy protection. Rather, as we discussed infra, under Utah's GRAMA statute, Mr. Doe's online identifiers are classified as private records and may not be disclosed except under the limited circumstances allowed by sections 63G-2-202, 63G-2-206, or 63G-2-303. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-201(5)(a) (West Supp.2010). Thus, even if information shared under section 77-27-21.5(2)(c)(i) is not subject to the protections of section 63G-2-206, it is nevertheless protected by and subject to the disclosure and privacy requirements of section 63G-2-201(5) and its related provisions, which include criminal penalties accompanying an unauthorized disclosure. See id. § 63G-2-801(1)(a).

As for Mr. Doe's arguments concerning the potential chilling effect of disclosure to state officials, we also hold that the statute includes sufficient restrictions so as not to unnecessarily chill Mr. Doe's speech. Mr. Doe argues that the language of section 77-27-21.5(2) is broad enough to allow the state to monitor his communications at any time, which in turn may chill any anonymous criticisms of oppressive laws or state practices he might otherwise make via the internet. However, while this section, which allows the State to use an offender's internet identifiers “to assist in investigating kidnapping and sex-related crimes, and in apprehending offenders,” § 77-27-21.5(2), can be read broadly, we conclude that it is also readily susceptible to a narrowing construction. Accordingly, we read this language, as did the district court, as only allowing state actors to look beyond the anonymity surrounding a username in the course of an investigation after a new crime has been committed.

Although this narrow interpretation may still result in the disclosure of Mr. Doe's online identifiers to state officials, such identification will not unnecessarily interfere with his First Amendment freedom to speak anonymously because such a disclosure would occur, if at all, at some time period following Mr. Doe's speech and not at the moment he wished to be heard. As the Fourth Circuit has explained, “Speech is chilled when an individual whose speech relies on anonymity is forced to reveal his identity as a pre-condition to expression. In other words, the First Amendment protects anonymity where it serves as a catalyst for speech.” Peterson v. Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., 478 F.3d 626, 632 (4th Cir.2007) (citation omitted); see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 199-200 (1999) (holding that a law requiring petition circulators to attach an affidavit with personal information to completed petitions was constitutional but invalidating a requirement that the circulators wear name badges at the time they gathered petition signatures because it “compelled ․ identification at the precise moment when the circulator's interest in anonymity [was] greatest”).

As a final First Amendment consideration, Mr. Doe alleges that Utah's statute is overbroad. Specifically, Mr. Doe argues that the law is unconstitutional because it allows the state to collect the internet identifiers of individuals who are required to register under the reporting statute because of their involvement with a kidnapping offense. According to Mr. Doe, because these offenders' “underlying offenses are not sex-related crimes,” the statute is not narrowly drawn to serve the stated purpose of investigating sex-related crimes. (Appellant's Reply Br. at 18.) However, the most recent enactment of the statute allows state officials to access online identifiers “to assist in investigating kidnapping and sex-related crimes,” § 77-27-21.5(2) (emphasis added), and we are not persuaded that individuals convicted of kidnapping offenses constitute “third parties whose speech is more likely to be protected by the First Amendment than the plaintiff's speech,” D.L.S. v. Utah, 374 F.3d 971, 976 (10th Cir.2004); see also Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 802 (1984) (“[I]f the ordinance may be validly applied to [the plaintiff], it can validly be applied to most if not all ․ parties not before the Court.”).

2. Mr. Doe's claims under the Fourth Amendment and Ex Post Facto Clause

We now consider Mr. Doe's claim that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his online identifiers and that requiring him to report these identifiers to the state of Utah violates his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. We touched on this issue in United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir.2008). In Perrine, Pennsylvania police officers obtained, without a warrant, subscriber information-including the IP address-associated with the unique Yahoo! online identifier “stevedragonslayer” from Yahoo! (after an individual using that identifier showed pornographic videos of underage girls to another visitor in a Yahoo! chatroom). Id. at 1199. Using that IP address, the officers were then able to ascertain the defendant's name and residential address from Cox Communications, the internet service provider that had issued the IP address. Id. at 1199-1200. Following his conviction, the defendant challenged the officer's actions based, in part, on his argument that the police had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We rejected this argument and held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in “information that he voluntarily transmitted to the third-party internet providers, Cox and Yahoo!” Id. at 1204.

On appeal, we see no reason why we are not bound by our earlier decision in Perrine. See In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir.1993) (“We are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superceding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.”). Although Mr. Doe now argues that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in online identifiers because it is not always the case that an individual can be identified from his identifier, even if police are in possession of the associated IP address, he has raised these arguments for the first time on appeal. “Generally, we do not consider issues not presented to, considered and decided by the trial court, because an appellant's new argument gives rise to a host of new issues, and Appellee had no opportunity to present evidence it may have thought relevant on these issues.” Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Russell, 518 F.3d 817, 828-29 (10th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Such is the case here; Mr. Doe's arguments raise a slew of new issues and evidentiary questions to which the State did not have a fair opportunity to respond.6 However, even if Mr. Doe's arguments were not forfeited, as the district court correctly observed, “there are no facts [in the record] from which the court can conclude that [Mr. Doe's] identities are shielded from [his] Internet service provider.” (Appellant's App. at 293.) Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's ruling on Mr. Doe's Fourth Amendment claim.

Finally, we consider Mr. Doe's contention that the district court erred by holding that Utah's statute is not an impermissible ex post facto law. “[T]he threshold inquiry for assessing a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause in the present case is whether Utah's ․ program constitutes additional criminal punishment for the crimes previously committed by those subject to its provisions.” Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir.2000). Thus, “[i]f the notification measures are deemed civil rather than criminal in nature, they present no ex post facto violation.” Id. Even where, as here, neither party contests that the legislature intended to establish a civil remedy, we must still consider whether “the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). However, “[o]nly the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Id. at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Femedeer v. Haun, after examining the same Utah statute at issue in this case-absent the requirement that an offender disclose his or her internet identifiers-we stated that the evidence did “not come even close to the ‘clearest proof’ necessary to overcome the civil intent of Utah's legislature.” 227 F.3d at 1253. We then held that “Utah's notification scheme imposes only a civil burden upon sex offenders and therefore does not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id. Nevertheless, on appeal Mr. Doe argues that this new disclosure requirement provides “ ‘the clearest proof’ that the notification scheme is an ex post facto law that is punitive in purpose and effect.” (Appellant's Br. at 45.) Looking closely at Mr. Doe's argument on this issue, it seems clear that his contentions depend entirely upon his argument that the Utah statute would allow impermissible public disclosure of his internet identifiers, thereby destroying his right to anonymous speech. However, because we conclude that Utah's registration statute does not violate the First Amendment, we hold that the effect of the new disclosure requirements is not substantial enough to alter our original analysis of the statute in Femedeer. Thus, we hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Mr. Doe's claim under the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Therefore, for these and the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's ruling vacating its earlier orders enjoining enforcement of the statute.

1.  The statute defined “online identifier” as “any electronic mail, chat, instant messenger, social networking, or similar name used for Internet communication.” Id. § 77-27-21.5(1)(j).

2.  This provision is now located in subsection (14)(i), pursuant to changes in the statutory structure made shortly after the district court's ruling.

3.  In addition to the amendment made shortly after the district court's ruling, the Utah legislature has made several more recent changes to section 77-27-21.5, including changes that went into effect after the parties had filed their briefs. Accordingly, we here cite to Utah's current code, and not to the statute as it existed at the time the parties submitted their arguments.

4.  Information designated as “private” by GRAMA may only be disclosed in limited circumstances such as when requested by the subject of the record, or pursuant to a court order or legislative subpoena. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-2-201(5) (West Supp.2010); id. § 63G-2-202. Additionally, the statute permits information sharing between different government entities and their agents but places “an entity receiving the record” under “the same restrictions on disclosure of the record as the originating entity.” Id. § 63G-2-206.

5.  Mr. Doe also alleges that the law is improper because it is not the least restrictive means of addressing the state's interest. However, under intermediate scrutiny “a regulation need not be the least speech-restrictive means of advancing the Government's interests. Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 662 (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).

6.  Indeed, as illustrative of the new evidence needed to support Mr. Doe's arguments, he has asked this court to take judicial notice of facts that were not presented in the district court but are, according to Mr. Doe, “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonabl[y] be questioned.” (Appellant's Br. at 37 n. 70; see also id. at 38 n. 71.)

McKAY, Circuit Judge.

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United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.

IN RE: David O'DONNELL, Debtor. Thomas A. Toye III, Appellee, v. David O'Donnell, Appellant.

No. 13–9001.

    Decided: August 26, 2013

Before TORRUELLA, SELYA and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.James F. Molleur, with whom Molleur Law Office was on brief, for appellant. Kelly W. McDonald, with whom Murray, Plumb & Murray was on brief, for appellee.

David O'Donnell wants what every debtor in bankruptcy wants—a fresh start. You see, a debtor generally gets a discharge from debts owed at the time he files his bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). But this fresh-start opportunity is only for “the honest but unfortunate debtor.” Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). And that is why Congress enacted a number of exceptions to discharge. One makes debts for money procured by use of a written statement nondischargeable-provided that that statement was “materially false,” related to the “debtor's ․ financial condition,” and “reasonably relied” on by the creditor, and provided also “that the debtor caused [it] to be made or published with intent to deceive․” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B). An honest but unfortunate debtor O'Donnell is not-or so a bankruptcy judge, relying on this exception, ruled after a trial in a proceeding between O'Donnell and one of his creditors, Thomas Toye III. The bankruptcy appellate panel (“BAP,” for short) later affirmed. Now O'Donnell asks us to hold that the bankruptcy judge got it all wrong. What follows is our explanation of why this ruling must stand.

How the Case Got Here1

Fishy Financials

O'Donnell is an experienced real estate developer, jumping into the field in the late 1990s. Eventually he teamed up with Rudy Ferrante (a childhood friend), and the two began acquiring real estate together, apparently through “LLCs” (limited-liability companies, for the uninitiated). The pair were quite busy in the late 2000s, doing multiple deals. We discuss three—including the one that landed O'Donnell in this mess—to give a sense of what the trial was about. All three occurred within months of each other and featured Kevin Smith in a starring role. A longtime acquaintance of Ferrante (they had once worked together as brokers at the Lenders Network), Smith's supposed forte is real-estate financing.

The first deal involved team O'Donnell/Ferrante's bid to refinance a piece of commercial property already in their portfolio. The second involved their attempt to acquire more commercial property. For the first transaction, O'Donnell and Ferrante asked Smith to prepare the financial paperwork. For the second, O'Donnell asked Smith to help arrange the financing. “I didn't ask him to help do the paperwork,” O'Donnell added, that just came “with the job.” Smith said yes both times. And, among other things, he ended up preparing various financial documents, including O'Donnell's personal financial statements (“PFSs,” from here on out).

O'Donnell was no stranger to PFSs. He knew from past deals that lenders wanted them, usually along with personal guaranties. And he gave Smith some pertinent financial information to prepare PFSs for both undertakings. Smith got other important data from documents he had gathered. O'Donnell had what seemed to be a hands-off attitude when it came to putting financials together, “delegating” the bulk of the paperwork to Smith and relying on him “to know what to do and how to do it”—an arrangement O'Donnell was “very comfortable with.” Smith sent O'Donnell's PFS to the lender in the first deal. How the lender in the second deal got O'Donnell's PFS is unclear on this record.

Now we come to the transaction that sparked this litigation. Hard on the heels of these two earlier deals, O'Donnell and Ferrante, through an LLC called Alder Street Properties, LLC, agreed to buy some more property from another party. As part of this transaction, they had to come up with a $350,000 down payment at closing. Once again, they recruited Smith to help secure the financing. And Smith asked Thomas Toye to loan the O'Donnell/Ferrante LLC the money. A highflyer in the local-business community who had known Smith for years (Smith had hooked him up three or four times with similar loan deals before), Toye said yes, but he wanted (among other things) O'Donnell's and Ferrante's personal guaranties for the loan's repayment. No problem, O'Donnell and Ferrante essentially said.

So Smith set about preparing PFSs for both. O'Donnell collected documents showing what stocks he owned and how much money he had in the bank and gave them to Smith. No one disputes the accuracy of this financial information. Smith also managed to get other relevant data from other documents (credit reports, mortgage statements, tax-assessment records, etc.) he already had on file or had dug up through public-record searches he had conducted for this deal. He cannot definitively say how he got some of the documents, however. Nor can he say for sure whether he sent O'Donnell a copy of the PFS, whether he reviewed every aspect of the PFS with him, or whether he saw him sign the PFS. But he does remember emailing a signed copy of O'Donnell's PFS, along with Ferrante's, to Toye. For his part, O'Donnell insists that he never reviewed the PFS, that the signature on the PFS is not his, and that he never authorized anyone to send the PFS to Toye. What everyone now agrees on, however, is that O'Donnell's PFS was “materially false,” containing serious misrepresentations and omissions regarding his income and assets.

Wowed by O'Donnell's (supposed) net worth, Toye lent the O'Donnell/Ferrante LLC the $350,000, receiving a promissory note in that amount (at 13.50% interest) from the LLC secured by a mortgage on some property and by O'Donnell's and Ferrante's personal guaranties. Unfortunately, the LLC did not pay the loan as required. And Toye ended up turning to O'Donnell, who, also unfortunately, defaulted on his personal-guaranty obligations.

A Wave of Litigation

Unwilling to take this lying down, Toye sued O'Donnell in state court on the personal guaranty. O'Donnell (supposedly) first saw the false PFS here, in state court. Eventually that court granted Toye summary judgment and entered a $417,974 judgment against O'Donnell.

Later, O'Donnell sought bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Toye responded by initiating this adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, alleging most relevantly here that O'Donnell's debt to him was nondischargeable per section 523(a)(2)(B). Under this provision (the reader will recall), if a statement about a debtor's “financial condition” is in a “writing” that is “materially false” and is “reasonably relied” on by the creditor, and if the debtor “caused [that statement] to be made or published with intent to deceive,” then the debt cannot be discharged. Of course, Toye had to prove nondischargeability by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Sharfarz v. Goguen (In re Goguen), 691 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir.2012).

Highlighting only what is needed to understand the issues before us, we note that the parties basically stipulated to everything pretrial except whether O'Donnell had “caused [the PFS] to be made or published with intent to deceive.” At trial, Toye, Smith, and O'Donnell took the stand. And after hearing their testimony and examining the exhibits, the bankruptcy judge refused to discharge O'Donnell's debt to Toye.

The judge began his reasoning this way: Contrary to O'Donnell's contention, Smith had acted as his-not Toye's-agent for this transaction. O'Donnell needed a $350,000 loan, and Smith said he could make it happen. “O'Donnell said to Smith, go ahead and give [Toye] what he needs” to make the loan, the judge wrote, so Smith prepared the PFS “on the authority and at the instruction of” O'Donnell, “and no one else.” In other words, O'Donnell (to quote the judge again) “set” the wheels “in motion” for Smith to prepare and send the PFS to Toye.

True, O'Donnell did not “review and sign” the PFS, the judge added. But, the judge ruled, nondischargeability under section 523(a)(2)(B) lies “whether the debtor intentionally did exactly what was done” or whether he was “reckless [ly]” indifferent to “the propositions asserted in the [PFS].” And here, according to the judge, the evidence showed that O'Donnell “willfully turned a blind eye” to what the PFS said.2 And, the judge concluded, O'Donnell did “not car[e]” what the PFS said, only that it said whatever Toye needed to hear to make the loan.

An unhappy O'Donnell appealed. But the BAP affirmed the judgment, ruling (pertinently for our situation) that the evidence amply demonstrated that Smith was O'Donnell's agent and that by having his agent prepare and send the PFS O'Donnell had (in the lingo of section 523(a)(2)(B)) “caused [the PFS] to be made or published․” Turning to the question of intent, the BAP said that a debtor's reckless indifference to the accuracy of the submitted PFS satisfies the intent-to-deceive element of section 523(a)(2)(B). And, the BAP stressed, the evidence of O'Donnell's turning a blind eye here proved his intent to deceive.

Which brings us to today, with a still unhappy O'Donnell asking us to undo this result.

Our Take on the Case

Background Legal Principles

Before we go any further, a few reminders are in order. We are the second set of reviewers here—the BAP was the first, obviously. But we give the BAP's decision no special deference. See, e.g., Goguen, 691 F.3d at 68. Rather, we focus on the bankruptcy judge's ruling, giving clear-error review to factfindings and fresh review to legal conclusions. Id. Of course, if there are a couple of plausible ways to view the evidence, the judge's preference for one over the other cannot be clear error. See, e.g., Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Sullivan), 674 F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir.2012). And to find clear error, a finding must hit us as more than probably wrong-it must prompt “a strong, unyielding belief, based on the whole of the record,” that the judge made a mistake. Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bah.) Ltd. v. Harper (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 545 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir.2008); accord Goguen, 691 F.3d at 69. The case for deferring to the bankruptcy judge's factfinding is “particularly strong” when intent is at issue—since an intent finding depends heavily on the debtor's credibility, and the bankruptcy judge is uniquely qualified to make that call. See, e.g., Palmacci v. Umpierrez, 121 F.3d 781, 785 (1st Cir.1997). And finally, because a principal goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide deserving debtors with a fresh start, we read exceptions to dischargeability narrowly. See, e.g., Goguen, 691 F.3d at 68. Consequently, a person in Toye's position must show that his claim fits snugly within an exception contained in the Code. See, e.g., id.

Now on to the issues in play.

Issues Presented

As framed by the parties, the case turns entirely on the final element of section 523(a)(2)(B): whether O'Donnell “caused [the “writing,” i.e., the PFS] to be made or published with intent to deceive.” See § 523(a)(2)(B)(iv).3 The gist of O'Donnell's argument is straightforward enough: Despite what the bankruptcy judge thought, one cannot conclude that O'Donnell “caused” the PFS—which he neither reviewed nor signed—“to be made or published,” because Smith was functioning as Toye's agent. And with this PFS the work of a runaway Smith, one also cannot conclude that O'Donnell intended to deceive Toye with a shady PFS. Toye disagrees, naturally. And we do too.

Take the agency issue. To give his claim about Smith's being Toye's agent an aura of plausibility, O'Donnell plays up how Smith and Toye had known each other for years and how Smith had made Toye money three or four times by helping him lend others money before this deal went south. But the problem for O'Donnell is that other evidence cuts against him. Recall how Smith had helped O'Donnell and Ferrante on some deals right before the deal at issue, then how the duo had enlisted his help in getting the $350,000 loan, and finally how they had relied on him to prepare the necessary documents for all three transactions. The bankruptcy judge chose to accept this evidence in deeming Smith O'Donnell's agent on this loan. And the judge's view seems entirely plausible, certainly not “wrong with the force of a 5 week old, unrefrigerated, dead fish,” which is what O'Donnell had to—but did not—show to get anywhere. See S Indus., Inc. v. Centra 2000, Inc., 249 F.3d 625, 627 (7th Cir.2001). Ultimately, then, we are in no position to undo the judge's agency determination. See Goguen, 691 F.3d at 69.

Wait a second, O'Donnell says. Smith had “acted on his own” in drafting up the false PFS, which means that the bankruptcy judge clearly stumbled in finding that O'Donnell had “caused” that document “to be made or published” to Toye—at least that is what O'Donnell writes. But what dooms this theory is that the judge expressly found that Smith had acted on O'Donnell's “authority” and “instruction.” And our patient review of the record leaves us convinced that the judge's view of the evidence is a permissible one: Keep in mind that O'Donnell is a savvy businessman. He knew that Toye needed a personal guaranty. He knew too that that would require a PFS without (he must have known) omissions. So O'Donnell gave Smith some financial information for the PFS, tasking him with doing whatever was necessary to get the loan done (more on this in a moment). And he knew from past experience that that would result in Smith's preparing the PFS and sending it to Toye—or so at least a factfinder could infer. Ever mindful that the clear-error standard leaves us no room to second-guess the trier's choices among plausible inferences, we easily reject O'Donnell's Smith—went-rogue thesis, which necessarily means that the rest of his argument on this score fails. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (holding that if, on whole-record review, the lower court's “account of the evidence is plausible,” then we “may not reverse it even though convinced that had [we] been sitting as the trier of fact, [we] would have weighed the evidence differently”).

That leaves the “intent to deceive” issue, with O'Donnell protesting that the bankruptcy judge rested the intent-to-deceive findings on air, basically. He reminds us, for starters, that he had neither reviewed nor signed the false PFS before Smith emailed it to Toye. Yes, but intent to deceive under section 523(a)(2)(B) may be demonstrated by the debtor's knowledge of, reckless indifference to, or reckless disregard for the written statement's falsity. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Bonnanzio (In re Bonnanzio), 91 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir.1996); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108, 1118–19 (3d Cir.1995) (citing additional cases from the 6th, 10th, and 11th Circuits); Morrison v. W. Builders of Amarillo, Inc. (In re Morrison), 555 F.3d 473, 482 (5th Cir.2009).4 Our caselaw holds that recklessness can suffice to prove the intent element under section 523(a)(2)(A)—section 523(a)(2)(B)'s statutory sidekick, see Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 66, 116 S.Ct. 437, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995)—which (at the risk of oversimplification) makes nondischargeable any debt for money obtained by fraud, “other than a statement respecting the debtor's ․ financial condition.” Palmacci, 121 F.3d at 785–86, 788–89 (quoting § 523(a)(2)(A)). And today we join our sibling circuits and hold that recklessness can suffice under section 523(a)(2)(B) too. Anyway, recklessness is where O'Donnell gets tripped up. We explain.

Because it would be a rare debtor who would concede that “deception was his purpose,” courts can take account of the totality of the circumstances, including (as we just said) a debtor's recklessness. Cohn, 54 F.3d at 1118–19; see also 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, ¶ 523.08[2][e][ii]. And that review reveals plenty of evidence from which a factfinder could infer recklessness on O'Donnell's part.

Once again, O'Donnell is no babe in the woods when it comes to real-estate financing. Far from it. He knew that Toye wanted a personal guaranty. And because a guaranty is only worth something if the lender knows the borrower's financial status, he knew (and this is easily inferable) that Toye would want a comprehensive PFS providing the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth—otherwise, why ask for one? “[G]o ahead and give [Toye] what he needs,” were O'Donnell's marching orders to Smith, the judge found, which suggests that O'Donnell took a hands-off approach to the PFS (just like he had before). True, he did give Smith some financial items. But, as his lawyer candidly conceded at oral argument, O'Donnell did not give Smith enough data to produce a complete PFS, which meant (and this is easily inferable too) that Smith had to come up with the missing information. Also, a trier could draw a strong inference—as this one did—that O'Donnell knew that Toye had gotten the PFS. O'Donnell knew this (at least inferentially) probably by the time Toye had approved the loan, and certainly by the time Toye had dispersed the loan proceeds (remember, Toye wanted O'Donnell's PFS before making the loan). And yet O'Donnell never even tried to check his agent's work at any point, bolstering the judge's finding that he had “willfully turned a blind eye,” “not caring” what the PFS said—though he clearly cared a lot about getting his hands on Toye's money, which he “happily” took after “set[ting]” the false PFS “in motion.”

Searching for a way out, O'Donnell complains that there is zero evidence of his giving Smith carte blanche, which, he argues, undercuts the intent-to-deceive findings. Hardly. A factfinder could infer—as this one apparently did—that O'Donnell's directing Smith to do the paperwork and then not ever asking to see it shows a carte-blanche attitude. O'Donnell also grumbles that he gave Smith accurate information, which, he maintains, cripples the intent-to-deceive findings. Not at all. What O'Donnell ignores is that his disclosure was so lacking in required information that Smith could not do a complete PFS. That is the rub. And a factfinder could infer—like this one basically did—that someone with O'Donnell's résumé should have known that and did know that.

The bottom line here is this: Given these particular circumstances, and knowing how famously deferential clear-error review is, see, e.g., Goguen, 691 F.3d at 69, especially when it comes to intent findings, see, e.g., Palmacci, 121 F.3d at 785, we simply are in no position to upset the bankruptcy judge's intent conclusion. See FDIC v. Reisman (In re Reisman), 149 B.R. 31, 38 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1993) (rejecting a debtor's ostrich tactics, the court found an intent to deceive where the debtor knew that the bank required a PFS as a condition of a loan and that his accountant had submitted the PFS to the bank, and yet “did not review [the PFS] or inquire as to [its] accuracy”); see also Citizens Bank of Washington Cnty. v. Wright (In re Wright), 299 B.R. 648, 660–61 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.2003) (finding a “claim of ignorance” concerning the falsity of financial papers “unpersuasive because, if true, it was by [d]ebtor's own design” and so constituted recklessness on the debtor's part); First Commercial Bank v. Robinson (In re Robinson), 192 B.R. 569, 578 (N.D.Ala.1996) (similar). And that is that.

Summing Up

We see no clear error in the bankruptcy judge's conclusion that Toye had satisfied his burden of proving that O'Donnell's debt is not dischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(B). Consequently, we uphold the judge's decision and the BAP's affirmance of that decision.

Affirmed, with Toye awarded his costs on appeal.

1.  The facts recounted are either undisputed or based on the bankruptcy judge's not-clearly-erroneous findings. The parties spar over the effect of certain documents marked for identification at trial but not introduced, though they agree that the bankruptcy judge did not rely on them. We do not rely on them either. But O'Donnell did testify—without objection—from his personal knowledge about the documents, and under these circumstances, that testimony is fair game for us to consider. See United States v. Rodríguez–Durán, 507 F.3d 749, 774–75 (1st Cir.2007) (concluding that a witness's testimony touching on the content of a document marked as an exhibit but not admitted into evidence sufficed to support the lower court's decision).

2.  For those curious about the fate of O'Donnell's cohort, we see that the same bankruptcy judge had (in an earlier proceeding) also declared Ferrante's debt to Toye nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(B). There is nothing indicating that Ferrante appealed that ruling.

3.  Relying on Kaspar v. Bellco First Fed. Credit Union (In re Kaspar), 125 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir.1997), among other sources, O'Donnell floats the suggestion that the PFS is not a “writing” under section 523(a)(2)(B). See 125 F.3d at 1359 (holding that “a computer generated statement of financial condition given in an application for credit neither seen nor signed by the debtor” is not “ ‘a writing’ within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)(B)”); see also Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 523.08[2][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.2013) (discussing “[e]lement [n]o. 1 under [s]ection 523(a)(2)(B)”-“[s]tatement in [w]riting”—and noting that “the statement, to be ‘in writing,’ must have been either written by the debtor, signed by the debtor, or written by someone else but adopted and used by the debtor”). But he stipulated below that the dispute pivots “on the fourth prong of [s]ection 523(a)(2)(B)”—i.e., the made-or-published-with-intent-to-deceive prong—so his Kaspar-based argument is off the table. See, e.g., Rodríguez v. Señor Frog's de la Isla, Inc., 642 F.3d 28, 34–35 (1st Cir.2011) (discussing a stipulation's effect on litigation).

4.  That is six circuits, for those keeping count.

THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

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