A Survey on Privacy Frameworks for RFID Authentication
---
paper_title: A new framework for RFID privacy

paper_content:

Formal RFID security and privacy frameworks are fundamental to the design and analysis of robust RFID systems. In this paper, we develop a new definitional framework for RFID privacy in a rigorous and precise manner. Our framework is based on a zero-knowledge (ZK) formulation [8,6] and incorporates the notions of adaptive completeness and mutual authentication.We provide meticulous justification of the new framework and contrast it with existing ones in the literature. In particular, we prove that our framework is strictly stronger than the ind-privacy model of [18], which answers an open question posed in [18] for developing stronger RFID privacy models.We also clarify certain confusions and rectify several defects in the existing frameworks. Finally, based on the protocol of [20], we propose an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol and analyze its security and privacy. The methodology used in our analysis can also be applied to analyze other RFID protocols within the new framework.
---
paper_title: A New Formal Proof Model for RFID Location Privacy

paper_content:

The privacy and security problems in RFID systems have been extensively studied. However, less research has been done on formal analysis of RFID security. The existing adversarial models proposed in the literature have limitations for analyzing RFID location privacy. In this paper, we propose a new formal proof model based on random oracle and indistinguishability. It not only considers passive/active attacks to the message flows between RFID reader and tag, but also takes into account physical attacks for disclosing tag's internal state, thus making it more suitable for real RFID systems. We further apply our model to analyze location privacy of an existing RFID protocol.
---
paper_title: RFID security and privacy: a research survey

paper_content:

This paper surveys recent technical research on the problems of privacy and security for radio frequency identification (RFID). RFID tags are small, wireless devices that help identify objects and people. Thanks to dropping cost, they are likely to proliferate into the billions in the next several years-and eventually into the trillions. RFID tags track objects in supply chains, and are working their way into the pockets, belongings, and even the bodies of consumers. This survey examines approaches proposed by scientists for privacy protection and integrity assurance in RFID systems, and treats the social and technical context of their work. While geared toward the nonspecialist, the survey may also serve as a reference for specialist readers.
---
paper_title: Defining strong privacy for RFID

paper_content:

In this work, we consider privacy in Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems. Our contribution is twofold: (i) We propose a simple, formal definition of strong privacy useful for basic analysis of RFID systems, as well as a different (weaker) definition applicable to multiverifier systems; (ii) We apply our definition to reveal vulnerabilities in several proposed privacy-enhancing RFID protocols; and (iii) We formally analyze and suggest improvements to hash-locks, one of the first privacy-enhancing RFID protocols in the literature.
---
paper_title: Provably Secure Ubiquitous Systems: Universally Composable RFID Authentication Protocols

paper_content:

This paper examines two unlinkably anonymous, simple RFID identification protocols that require only the ability to evaluate hash functions and generate random values, and that are provably secure against Byzantine adversaries. The main contribution is a universally composable security model tuned for RFlD applications. By making specific setup, communication, and concurrency assumptions that are realistic in the RFID application setting, we arrive at a model that guarantees strong security and availability properties, while still permitting the design of practical RFID protocols. We show that two protocols are provably secure within the new security model. Our proofs do not employ random oracles - the protocols are shown to be secure in the standard model under the assumption of existence of pseudo-random function families
---
paper_title: Universally Composable RFID Identification and Authentication Protocols

paper_content:

As the number of RFID applications grows, concerns about their security and privacy become greatly amplified. At the same time, the acutely restricted and cost-sensitive nature of RFID tags rules out simple reuse of traditional security/privacy solutions and calls for a new generation of extremely lightweight identification and authentication protocols. This article describes a universally composable security framework designed especially for RFID applications. We adopt RFID-specific setup, communication, and concurrency assumptions in a model that guarantees strong security, privacy, and availability properties. In particular, the framework supports modular deployment, which is most appropriate for ubiquitous applications. We also describe a set of simple, efficient, secure, and anonymous (untraceable) RFID identification and authentication protocols that instantiate the proposed framework. These protocols involve minimal interaction between tags and readers and place only a small computational load on the tag, and a light computational burden on the back-end server. We show that our protocols are provably secure within the proposed framework.
---
paper_title: On Privacy Models for RFID

paper_content:

We provide a formal model for identification schemes. Under this model, we give strong definitions for security and privacy. Our model captures the notion of a powerful adversary who can monitor all communications, trace tags within a limited period of time, corrupt tags, and get side channel information on the reader output. Adversaries who do not have access to this side channel are called narrow adversaries. Depending on restrictions on corruption, adversaries are called strong, destructive, forward, or weak adversaries. We derive some separation results: strong privacy is impossible. Narrow-strong privacy implies key agreement. We also prove some constructions: narrow-strong and forward privacy based on a public-key cryptosystem, narrow-destructive privacy based on a random oracle, and weak privacy based on a pseudorandom function.
---
paper_title: Mutual authentication in RFID: security and privacy

paper_content:

In RFID protocols, tags identify and authenticate themselves to readers. At Asiacrypt 2007, Vaudenay studied security and privacy models for these protocols. We extend this model to protocols which offer reader authentication to tags. Whenever corruption is allowed, we prove that secure protocols cannot protect privacy unless we assume tags have a temporary memory which vanishes by itself. Under this assumption, we study several protocols. We enrich a few basic protocols to get secure mutual authentication RFID protocols which achieve weak privacy based on pseudorandom functions only, narrow-destructive privacy based on random oracles, and narrow-strong and forward privacy based on public-key cryptography.
---
paper_title: Revisiting unpredictability-based RFID privacy models

paper_content:

Recently, there have been several attempts in establishing formal RFID privacy models in the literature. These models mainly fall into two categories: one based on the notion of indistinguishability of two RFID tags, denoted as ind-privacy, and the other based on the unpredictability of the output of an RFID protocol, denoted as unp-privacy. Very recently, at CCS'09, Ma et al. proposed a modified unp-privacy model, referred to as un′-privacy. In this paper, we first revisit the existing RFID privacy models and point out their limitations. We then propose a new RFID privacy model, denoted as unp*-privacy, based on the indistinguishability of a real tag and a virtual tag. We provide justification for the new model and formally clarify its relationship with ind-privacy model. Finally, we modify Ma et al.'s 2-round RFID protocol to a 3-round mutual authentication RFID protocol and prove that it is of unp*-privacy.
---
paper_title: Universally composable and forward-secure RFID authentication and authenticated key exchange

paper_content:

Recently, a universally composable framework for RFID authentication protocols providing availability, anonymity, and authenticity was proposed. In this paper we extend that framework to address forward-security issues in the presence of key compromise.We also introduce new, provably secure, and highly practical protocols for anonymous authentication and key-exchange by RFID devices. The new protocols are lightweight, requiring only a pseudo-random bit generator. The new protocols satisfy forward-secure anonymity, authenticity, and availability requirements in the Universal Composability model.
---
paper_title: A new framework for RFID privacy

paper_content:

Formal RFID security and privacy frameworks are fundamental to the design and analysis of robust RFID systems. In this paper, we develop a new definitional framework for RFID privacy in a rigorous and precise manner. Our framework is based on a zero-knowledge (ZK) formulation [8,6] and incorporates the notions of adaptive completeness and mutual authentication.We provide meticulous justification of the new framework and contrast it with existing ones in the literature. In particular, we prove that our framework is strictly stronger than the ind-privacy model of [18], which answers an open question posed in [18] for developing stronger RFID privacy models.We also clarify certain confusions and rectify several defects in the existing frameworks. Finally, based on the protocol of [20], we propose an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol and analyze its security and privacy. The methodology used in our analysis can also be applied to analyze other RFID protocols within the new framework.
---
paper_title: Defining strong privacy for RFID

paper_content:

In this work, we consider privacy in Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems. Our contribution is twofold: (i) We propose a simple, formal definition of strong privacy useful for basic analysis of RFID systems, as well as a different (weaker) definition applicable to multiverifier systems; (ii) We apply our definition to reveal vulnerabilities in several proposed privacy-enhancing RFID protocols; and (iii) We formally analyze and suggest improvements to hash-locks, one of the first privacy-enhancing RFID protocols in the literature.
---
paper_title: A New Formal Proof Model for RFID Location Privacy

paper_content:

The privacy and security problems in RFID systems have been extensively studied. However, less research has been done on formal analysis of RFID security. The existing adversarial models proposed in the literature have limitations for analyzing RFID location privacy. In this paper, we propose a new formal proof model based on random oracle and indistinguishability. It not only considers passive/active attacks to the message flows between RFID reader and tag, but also takes into account physical attacks for disclosing tag's internal state, thus making it more suitable for real RFID systems. We further apply our model to analyze location privacy of an existing RFID protocol.
---
paper_title: RFID privacy: relation between two notions, minimal condition, and efficient construction

paper_content:

Privacy of RFID systems is receiving increasing attention in the RFID community. Basically, there are two kinds of RFID privacy notions: one based on the indistinguishability of two tags, denoted as ind-privacy, and the other based on the unpredictability of the output of a protocol, denoted as unp-privacy. In this paper, the definition of unp-privacy is refined and the relation between the two notions is clarified: it is proven that ind-privacy is weaker than unp-privacy. Moreover, the minimal (necessary and sufficient)condition on RFID tags to achieve unp-privacy is determined. It is shown that if an RFID system has strong (or weak) unp-privacy then the computational power of an RFID tag can be used to construct a pseudorandom function family provided that the RFID system is complete and sound. On the other hand, if each tag is able to compute a pseudorandom function, then the tags can be used to construct an RFID system with strong (or weak) unp-privacy. In this sense, a pseudorandom function family is the minimal requirement on an RFID tag's computational power for enforcing strong RFID system privacy. Finally, a new RFID protocol is proposed to satisfy the minimal requirement, which also outperforms the state-of-the-art RFID protocols in terms of computational cost and communication overhead.
---
paper_title: On Privacy Models for RFID

paper_content:

We provide a formal model for identification schemes. Under this model, we give strong definitions for security and privacy. Our model captures the notion of a powerful adversary who can monitor all communications, trace tags within a limited period of time, corrupt tags, and get side channel information on the reader output. Adversaries who do not have access to this side channel are called narrow adversaries. Depending on restrictions on corruption, adversaries are called strong, destructive, forward, or weak adversaries. We derive some separation results: strong privacy is impossible. Narrow-strong privacy implies key agreement. We also prove some constructions: narrow-strong and forward privacy based on a public-key cryptosystem, narrow-destructive privacy based on a random oracle, and weak privacy based on a pseudorandom function.
---
paper_title: Revisiting unpredictability-based RFID privacy models

paper_content:

Recently, there have been several attempts in establishing formal RFID privacy models in the literature. These models mainly fall into two categories: one based on the notion of indistinguishability of two RFID tags, denoted as ind-privacy, and the other based on the unpredictability of the output of an RFID protocol, denoted as unp-privacy. Very recently, at CCS'09, Ma et al. proposed a modified unp-privacy model, referred to as un′-privacy. In this paper, we first revisit the existing RFID privacy models and point out their limitations. We then propose a new RFID privacy model, denoted as unp*-privacy, based on the indistinguishability of a real tag and a virtual tag. We provide justification for the new model and formally clarify its relationship with ind-privacy model. Finally, we modify Ma et al.'s 2-round RFID protocol to a 3-round mutual authentication RFID protocol and prove that it is of unp*-privacy.
---
paper_title: A new framework for RFID privacy

paper_content:

Formal RFID security and privacy frameworks are fundamental to the design and analysis of robust RFID systems. In this paper, we develop a new definitional framework for RFID privacy in a rigorous and precise manner. Our framework is based on a zero-knowledge (ZK) formulation [8,6] and incorporates the notions of adaptive completeness and mutual authentication.We provide meticulous justification of the new framework and contrast it with existing ones in the literature. In particular, we prove that our framework is strictly stronger than the ind-privacy model of [18], which answers an open question posed in [18] for developing stronger RFID privacy models.We also clarify certain confusions and rectify several defects in the existing frameworks. Finally, based on the protocol of [20], we propose an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol and analyze its security and privacy. The methodology used in our analysis can also be applied to analyze other RFID protocols within the new framework.
---
paper_title: On Privacy Models for RFID

paper_content:

We provide a formal model for identification schemes. Under this model, we give strong definitions for security and privacy. Our model captures the notion of a powerful adversary who can monitor all communications, trace tags within a limited period of time, corrupt tags, and get side channel information on the reader output. Adversaries who do not have access to this side channel are called narrow adversaries. Depending on restrictions on corruption, adversaries are called strong, destructive, forward, or weak adversaries. We derive some separation results: strong privacy is impossible. Narrow-strong privacy implies key agreement. We also prove some constructions: narrow-strong and forward privacy based on a public-key cryptosystem, narrow-destructive privacy based on a random oracle, and weak privacy based on a pseudorandom function.
---
paper_title: Mutual authentication in RFID: security and privacy

paper_content:

In RFID protocols, tags identify and authenticate themselves to readers. At Asiacrypt 2007, Vaudenay studied security and privacy models for these protocols. We extend this model to protocols which offer reader authentication to tags. Whenever corruption is allowed, we prove that secure protocols cannot protect privacy unless we assume tags have a temporary memory which vanishes by itself. Under this assumption, we study several protocols. We enrich a few basic protocols to get secure mutual authentication RFID protocols which achieve weak privacy based on pseudorandom functions only, narrow-destructive privacy based on random oracles, and narrow-strong and forward privacy based on public-key cryptography.
---
paper_title: A new framework for RFID privacy

paper_content:

Formal RFID security and privacy frameworks are fundamental to the design and analysis of robust RFID systems. In this paper, we develop a new definitional framework for RFID privacy in a rigorous and precise manner. Our framework is based on a zero-knowledge (ZK) formulation [8,6] and incorporates the notions of adaptive completeness and mutual authentication.We provide meticulous justification of the new framework and contrast it with existing ones in the literature. In particular, we prove that our framework is strictly stronger than the ind-privacy model of [18], which answers an open question posed in [18] for developing stronger RFID privacy models.We also clarify certain confusions and rectify several defects in the existing frameworks. Finally, based on the protocol of [20], we propose an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol and analyze its security and privacy. The methodology used in our analysis can also be applied to analyze other RFID protocols within the new framework.
---
paper_title: On Privacy Models for RFID

paper_content:

We provide a formal model for identification schemes. Under this model, we give strong definitions for security and privacy. Our model captures the notion of a powerful adversary who can monitor all communications, trace tags within a limited period of time, corrupt tags, and get side channel information on the reader output. Adversaries who do not have access to this side channel are called narrow adversaries. Depending on restrictions on corruption, adversaries are called strong, destructive, forward, or weak adversaries. We derive some separation results: strong privacy is impossible. Narrow-strong privacy implies key agreement. We also prove some constructions: narrow-strong and forward privacy based on a public-key cryptosystem, narrow-destructive privacy based on a random oracle, and weak privacy based on a pseudorandom function.
---
paper_title: Mutual authentication in RFID: security and privacy

paper_content:

In RFID protocols, tags identify and authenticate themselves to readers. At Asiacrypt 2007, Vaudenay studied security and privacy models for these protocols. We extend this model to protocols which offer reader authentication to tags. Whenever corruption is allowed, we prove that secure protocols cannot protect privacy unless we assume tags have a temporary memory which vanishes by itself. Under this assumption, we study several protocols. We enrich a few basic protocols to get secure mutual authentication RFID protocols which achieve weak privacy based on pseudorandom functions only, narrow-destructive privacy based on random oracles, and narrow-strong and forward privacy based on public-key cryptography.
---
paper_title: A new framework for RFID privacy

paper_content:

Formal RFID security and privacy frameworks are fundamental to the design and analysis of robust RFID systems. In this paper, we develop a new definitional framework for RFID privacy in a rigorous and precise manner. Our framework is based on a zero-knowledge (ZK) formulation [8,6] and incorporates the notions of adaptive completeness and mutual authentication.We provide meticulous justification of the new framework and contrast it with existing ones in the literature. In particular, we prove that our framework is strictly stronger than the ind-privacy model of [18], which answers an open question posed in [18] for developing stronger RFID privacy models.We also clarify certain confusions and rectify several defects in the existing frameworks. Finally, based on the protocol of [20], we propose an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol and analyze its security and privacy. The methodology used in our analysis can also be applied to analyze other RFID protocols within the new framework.
---
paper_title: On Privacy Models for RFID

paper_content:

We provide a formal model for identification schemes. Under this model, we give strong definitions for security and privacy. Our model captures the notion of a powerful adversary who can monitor all communications, trace tags within a limited period of time, corrupt tags, and get side channel information on the reader output. Adversaries who do not have access to this side channel are called narrow adversaries. Depending on restrictions on corruption, adversaries are called strong, destructive, forward, or weak adversaries. We derive some separation results: strong privacy is impossible. Narrow-strong privacy implies key agreement. We also prove some constructions: narrow-strong and forward privacy based on a public-key cryptosystem, narrow-destructive privacy based on a random oracle, and weak privacy based on a pseudorandom function.
---
paper_title: Mutual authentication in RFID: security and privacy

paper_content:

In RFID protocols, tags identify and authenticate themselves to readers. At Asiacrypt 2007, Vaudenay studied security and privacy models for these protocols. We extend this model to protocols which offer reader authentication to tags. Whenever corruption is allowed, we prove that secure protocols cannot protect privacy unless we assume tags have a temporary memory which vanishes by itself. Under this assumption, we study several protocols. We enrich a few basic protocols to get secure mutual authentication RFID protocols which achieve weak privacy based on pseudorandom functions only, narrow-destructive privacy based on random oracles, and narrow-strong and forward privacy based on public-key cryptography.
---
paper_title: Practical RFID ownership transfer scheme

paper_content:

When an RFID tag changes hand, it is not as simply as handing over the tag secret to the new owner. Privacy is a concern if there is no secure ownership transfer scheme to aid the transfer. After sales service and temporary tag delegation are also features commonly seen in such applications. In this paper, we proposed a new RFID ownership transfer scheme that achieves the most security protections and properties in comparison to most of the previous schemes. We also introduced four new security properties that have not been considered before. This opens up new research directions for further development of RFID ownership transfer.
---
paper_title: A new framework for RFID privacy

paper_content:

Formal RFID security and privacy frameworks are fundamental to the design and analysis of robust RFID systems. In this paper, we develop a new definitional framework for RFID privacy in a rigorous and precise manner. Our framework is based on a zero-knowledge (ZK) formulation [8,6] and incorporates the notions of adaptive completeness and mutual authentication.We provide meticulous justification of the new framework and contrast it with existing ones in the literature. In particular, we prove that our framework is strictly stronger than the ind-privacy model of [18], which answers an open question posed in [18] for developing stronger RFID privacy models.We also clarify certain confusions and rectify several defects in the existing frameworks. Finally, based on the protocol of [20], we propose an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol and analyze its security and privacy. The methodology used in our analysis can also be applied to analyze other RFID protocols within the new framework.
---
paper_title: Universally composable security: a new paradigm for cryptographic protocols

paper_content:

We propose a new paradigm for defining security of cryptographic protocols, called universally composable security. The salient property of universally composable definitions of security is that they guarantee security even when a secure protocol is composed with an arbitrary set of protocols, or more generally when the protocol is used as a component of an arbitrary system. This is an essential property for maintaining security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such as the Internet. In particular, universally composable definitions guarantee security even when an unbounded number of protocol instances are executed concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner, they guarantee non-malleability with respect to arbitrary protocols, and more. We show how to formulate universally composable definitions of security for practically any cryptographic task. Furthermore, we demonstrate that practically any such definition can be realized using known techniques, as long as only a minority of the participants are corrupted. We then proceed to formulate universally composable definitions of a wide array of cryptographic tasks, including authenticated and secure communication, key-exchange, public-key encryption, signature, commitment, oblivious transfer, zero knowledge and more. We also make initial steps towards studying the realizability of the proposed definitions in various settings.
---
paper_title: A note on the feasibility of generalised universal composability

paper_content:

In this paper we study (interpret) the precise composability guarantee of the generalised universal composability (GUC) feasibility with global setups that was proposed in the recent paper Canetti et al. (2007) from the point of view of full universal composability (FUC), that is, composability with arbitrary protocols, which was the original security goal and motivation for UC. By observing a counter-intuitive phenomenon, we note that the GUC feasibility implicitly assumes that the adversary has limited access to arbitrary external protocols. We then clarify a general principle for achieving FUC security, and propose some approaches for fixing the GUC feasibility under the general principle. Finally, we discuss the relationship between GUC and FUC from both technical and philosophical points of view. This should be helpful in gaining a precise understanding of the GUC feasibility, and for preventing potential misinterpretations and/or misuses in practice.
---
paper_title: Provably Secure Ubiquitous Systems: Universally Composable RFID Authentication Protocols

paper_content:

This paper examines two unlinkably anonymous, simple RFID identification protocols that require only the ability to evaluate hash functions and generate random values, and that are provably secure against Byzantine adversaries. The main contribution is a universally composable security model tuned for RFlD applications. By making specific setup, communication, and concurrency assumptions that are realistic in the RFID application setting, we arrive at a model that guarantees strong security and availability properties, while still permitting the design of practical RFID protocols. We show that two protocols are provably secure within the new security model. Our proofs do not employ random oracles - the protocols are shown to be secure in the standard model under the assumption of existence of pseudo-random function families
---
paper_title: Universally Composable RFID Identification and Authentication Protocols

paper_content:

As the number of RFID applications grows, concerns about their security and privacy become greatly amplified. At the same time, the acutely restricted and cost-sensitive nature of RFID tags rules out simple reuse of traditional security/privacy solutions and calls for a new generation of extremely lightweight identification and authentication protocols. This article describes a universally composable security framework designed especially for RFID applications. We adopt RFID-specific setup, communication, and concurrency assumptions in a model that guarantees strong security, privacy, and availability properties. In particular, the framework supports modular deployment, which is most appropriate for ubiquitous applications. We also describe a set of simple, efficient, secure, and anonymous (untraceable) RFID identification and authentication protocols that instantiate the proposed framework. These protocols involve minimal interaction between tags and readers and place only a small computational load on the tag, and a light computational burden on the back-end server. We show that our protocols are provably secure within the proposed framework.
---
paper_title: Universally composable and forward-secure RFID authentication and authenticated key exchange

paper_content:

Recently, a universally composable framework for RFID authentication protocols providing availability, anonymity, and authenticity was proposed. In this paper we extend that framework to address forward-security issues in the presence of key compromise.We also introduce new, provably secure, and highly practical protocols for anonymous authentication and key-exchange by RFID devices. The new protocols are lightweight, requiring only a pseudo-random bit generator. The new protocols satisfy forward-secure anonymity, authenticity, and availability requirements in the Universal Composability model.
---
paper_title: A new framework for RFID privacy

paper_content:

Formal RFID security and privacy frameworks are fundamental to the design and analysis of robust RFID systems. In this paper, we develop a new definitional framework for RFID privacy in a rigorous and precise manner. Our framework is based on a zero-knowledge (ZK) formulation [8,6] and incorporates the notions of adaptive completeness and mutual authentication.We provide meticulous justification of the new framework and contrast it with existing ones in the literature. In particular, we prove that our framework is strictly stronger than the ind-privacy model of [18], which answers an open question posed in [18] for developing stronger RFID privacy models.We also clarify certain confusions and rectify several defects in the existing frameworks. Finally, based on the protocol of [20], we propose an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol and analyze its security and privacy. The methodology used in our analysis can also be applied to analyze other RFID protocols within the new framework.
---
paper_title: RFID privacy: relation between two notions, minimal condition, and efficient construction

paper_content:

Privacy of RFID systems is receiving increasing attention in the RFID community. Basically, there are two kinds of RFID privacy notions: one based on the indistinguishability of two tags, denoted as ind-privacy, and the other based on the unpredictability of the output of a protocol, denoted as unp-privacy. In this paper, the definition of unp-privacy is refined and the relation between the two notions is clarified: it is proven that ind-privacy is weaker than unp-privacy. Moreover, the minimal (necessary and sufficient)condition on RFID tags to achieve unp-privacy is determined. It is shown that if an RFID system has strong (or weak) unp-privacy then the computational power of an RFID tag can be used to construct a pseudorandom function family provided that the RFID system is complete and sound. On the other hand, if each tag is able to compute a pseudorandom function, then the tags can be used to construct an RFID system with strong (or weak) unp-privacy. In this sense, a pseudorandom function family is the minimal requirement on an RFID tag's computational power for enforcing strong RFID system privacy. Finally, a new RFID protocol is proposed to satisfy the minimal requirement, which also outperforms the state-of-the-art RFID protocols in terms of computational cost and communication overhead.
---
paper_title: A new framework for RFID privacy

paper_content:

Formal RFID security and privacy frameworks are fundamental to the design and analysis of robust RFID systems. In this paper, we develop a new definitional framework for RFID privacy in a rigorous and precise manner. Our framework is based on a zero-knowledge (ZK) formulation [8,6] and incorporates the notions of adaptive completeness and mutual authentication.We provide meticulous justification of the new framework and contrast it with existing ones in the literature. In particular, we prove that our framework is strictly stronger than the ind-privacy model of [18], which answers an open question posed in [18] for developing stronger RFID privacy models.We also clarify certain confusions and rectify several defects in the existing frameworks. Finally, based on the protocol of [20], we propose an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol and analyze its security and privacy. The methodology used in our analysis can also be applied to analyze other RFID protocols within the new framework.
---
paper_title: On Privacy Models for RFID

paper_content:

We provide a formal model for identification schemes. Under this model, we give strong definitions for security and privacy. Our model captures the notion of a powerful adversary who can monitor all communications, trace tags within a limited period of time, corrupt tags, and get side channel information on the reader output. Adversaries who do not have access to this side channel are called narrow adversaries. Depending on restrictions on corruption, adversaries are called strong, destructive, forward, or weak adversaries. We derive some separation results: strong privacy is impossible. Narrow-strong privacy implies key agreement. We also prove some constructions: narrow-strong and forward privacy based on a public-key cryptosystem, narrow-destructive privacy based on a random oracle, and weak privacy based on a pseudorandom function.
---
paper_title: Mutual authentication in RFID: security and privacy

paper_content:

In RFID protocols, tags identify and authenticate themselves to readers. At Asiacrypt 2007, Vaudenay studied security and privacy models for these protocols. We extend this model to protocols which offer reader authentication to tags. Whenever corruption is allowed, we prove that secure protocols cannot protect privacy unless we assume tags have a temporary memory which vanishes by itself. Under this assumption, we study several protocols. We enrich a few basic protocols to get secure mutual authentication RFID protocols which achieve weak privacy based on pseudorandom functions only, narrow-destructive privacy based on random oracles, and narrow-strong and forward privacy based on public-key cryptography.
---

Title: A Survey on Privacy Frameworks for RFID Authentication

Section 1: Introduction
Description 1: Overview of RFID systems, their applications, and the necessity of privacy in RFID authentication protocols.

Section 2: Related Works
Description 2: Summary of past research on RFID privacy-preserving protocols and models.

Section 3: Our Contributions
Description 3: Summary of the contributions made by this paper in the context of RFID privacy and authentication models.

Section 4: Preliminaries
Description 4: Explanation of foundational concepts and definitions relevant to RFID systems and privacy frameworks.

Section 5: RFID System Modeling
Description 5: Description of the structure and components involved in an RFID system and how these are modeled.

Section 6: Adversary Modeling and Security Proof
Description 6: Details on how adversaries are modeled and how the security of RFID systems is proven.

Section 7: Privacy Frameworks Based on Four Oracles
Description 7: Discussion of privacy frameworks that utilize four oracles to model adversary capabilities.

Section 8: Indistinguishability-Based Privacy Model
Description 8: Examination of the privacy model based on indistinguishability and its attack scenarios.

Section 9: Unpredictability Privacy Model
Description 9: Presentation of the unpredictability-based privacy model and its application to RFID privacy.

Section 10: Extended Unpredictability-Based Privacy Model
Description 10: Introduction to the extended model of unpredictability privacy, allowing multiple test messages.

Section 11: Zero-Knowledge Based Model
Description 11: Overview of the zero-knowledge privacy model and its implications for RFID systems.

Section 12: Privacy Frameworks Based on Eight Oracles
Description 12: Exploration of privacy frameworks that use eight oracles to define adversaries' capabilities.

Section 13: The PV Model
Description 13: A detailed look at the Paise-Vaudenay model, its oracles, and privacy levels.

Section 14: Untraceability Model
Description 14: Discussion on the untraceability model and its approach to maintaining RFID tag privacy.

Section 15: Universal Composability Based Framework
Description 15: Analysis of the universal composability framework for secure RFID authentication in composite settings.

Section 16: Conclusion and Comparisons
Description 16: Comparative analysis of different RFID privacy models and their respective strengths and weaknesses.