Epistemic Game Theory: An Overview ∗
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paper_title: Theory of Games and Economic Behavior

paper_content:

This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior." In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.
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Title: Epistemic Game Theory: An Overview ∗

Section 1: Introduction
Description 1: Introduce the foundational aspects of non-cooperative game theory and the goal of examining the basic ingredients of game analysis.

Section 2: Solution Concepts
Description 2: Discuss traditional solution concepts such as Nash Equilibrium, backward induction, and iterated dominance, and their role in game analysis.

Section 3: Rational and Irrational Behavior
Description 3: Explain the formalization of rational and irrational behavior in game theory and its significance.

Section 4: Belief Formation
Description 4: Explore how players form beliefs about the game and the rationality of other players, including higher-order beliefs and their impact.

Section 5: Investigating Existing Solution Concepts
Description 5: Investigate the basis of existing solution concepts and how foundational work has contributed to this understanding.

Section 6: New Solution Concepts
Description 6: Describe new solution concepts uncovered by foundational work and their useful properties.

Section 7: Variations in Decision-Making Models
Description 7: Consider changes to the basic model of decision-making by players, including departures from the expected utility model and reasoning in various formal logics.

Section 8: Types Formalism
Description 8: Describe the "types" formalism introduced by Harsanyi and how it is used to model players' beliefs about the structure and play of the game.

Section 9: Uncertainty about Strategies
Description 9: Discuss the case where players know the matrix or tree but are uncertain about the actual strategies chosen by the players.

Section 10: Uncertainty about the Game
Description 10: Cover the case of uncertainty about the game itself, particularly focusing on uncertainties about payoff functions.

Section 11: Interaction between Complete and Incomplete Information
Description 11: Analyze how both complete and incomplete information environments can give rise to similar phenomena and their importance in game theory foundations.

Section 12: Conclusion
Description 12: Summarize the comprehensive treatment of all ingredients of a game as aimed by the foundations program in epistemic game theory.