Strategic Campaigning with Vote and Turnout Buying: Theory and
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CASAS, Agustin 2012-07-12T14:54:07Z 2012-07-12T14:54:07Z 2012
dc.identifier.issn 1830-7728 dc.description.abstract In this
paper, I model the relationship between potential voters and a
politician, who can pay citizens to vote for him – vote buying –
or to show up to vote – turnout buying. This model is used to
explore the optimal budget allocation across districts, focusing
on single-member majoritarian elections in a multi-district
environment in which only the incumbent can engage in vote and
turnout buying. The results enrich the distributive politics
literature by showing that a campaign with direct voting is
optimally focused on the opposition strongholds, rather than on
swing or core states. I need strong evidence for this result
using Argentinian electoral data disaggregated at the booth
level, and spending data from a poverty relief program. I show
that in the month prior to the