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Whether the will is properly the subject of penance?  Objection
1: It would seem that the subject of penance is not properly the
will. For penance is a species of sorrow. But sorrow is in the
concupiscible part, even as joy is. Therefore penance is in the
concupiscible faculty.  Objection 2: Further, penance is a kind
of vengeance, as Augustine states in De Poenitentia [*De vera et
falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]. But
vengeance seems to regard the irascible faculty, since anger is
the desire for vengeance. Therefore it seems that penance is in
the irascible part.  Objection 3: Further, the past is the
proper object of the memory, according to the Philosopher (De
Memoria i). Now penance regards the past, as stated above (A[1],
ad 2, ad 3). Therefore penance is subjected in the memory.
Objection 4: Further, nothing acts where it is not. Now penance
removes sin from all the powers of the soul. Therefore penance
is in every powe