Rust and the Future of Memory Corruption   Recently, Mozilla
announced that they were working on writing a modern web browser
in Rust, Servo. This might have been the first time security
researchers were exposed to Rust as a concept and I think that
very few people understand exactly what this development means
for security.  "They're All Turing Complete Languages"  A
sentiment I encounter a lot in the "ad-hoc computer security
research community" is that since every programming language is
(almost by definition) Turing-complete, there will be bugs, and
some of those bugs will always be security bugs, so we will
always have bugs. This is an attitude that I find really
annoying, both in its reductionism and its incorrectness.  An
especially pernicious class of security bugs come in the form of
memory corruption bugs, bugs which allow for the injection of
new low-level programs into an already executing low-level
application. These bugs are problematic because they violate so
many assumptions we make about cont