Click here for search results When do special interests run
rampant ? disentangling the role in banking crises of elections,
incomplete information, and checks and balances, Volume 1
Author:Keefer, Philip; Collection Title:Policy, Research working
paper ; no. WPS 2543 Document Type:Policy Research Working
PaperLanguage:English Major Sector:Public Administration, Law,
and JusticeReport Number:WPS2543 Sub Sectors:Other Public Sector
ManagementVolume No:1  Summary: The author investigates the
political determinants of government decisions that benefit
special interest groups - especially government decisions to
deal with banking crises. He finds that the better informed the
voters, the more proximate elections, and the larger the number
of political veto players ( conditional on the costs to voters
of relevant policy decision), the smaller the government's
fiscal transfer are to the financial sector and the less likely
the government is to exercise forbearance in dealing with
insolvent financial institutions. Th