, Volume 14, Issue 1, pp 23-34  How do electoral competition and
special interests shape the stringency of renewable energy
standards?  Purchase on Springer.com  $39.95 / €34.95 / £29.95*
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may vary according to local VAT.  Get Access   In this article,
I provide a new political rationale for stringent renewable
energy standards, such as portfolio requirements and feed-in
tariffs. A game-theoretic analysis demonstrates that if a green
politician (concerned about environmental quality) adopts a
stringent renewable energy standard, thus creating artificial
profits for the renewables industry, she can induce the industry
to support her in elections. This political mobilization
improves the green politician’s electoral fortunes, and thus
increases the probability that the renewable energy standard
will be implemented. In contrast to previous arguments for
renewable energy standards, my argument applies even when the
renewables industry is disorganized