@techreport{NBERw13371, title = "Dynamic Inefficiencies in
Employment-Based Health Insurance System Theory and Evidence",
author = "Hanming Fang and Alessandro Gavazza", institution =
"National Bureau of Economic Research", type = "Working Paper",
series = "Working Paper Series", number = "13371", year =
"2007", month = "September", doi = {10.3386/w13371}, URL =
"http://www.nber.org/papers/w13371", abstract = {We investigate
how the employment-based health insurance system in the U.S.
affects individuals' life-cycle health-care decisions. We take
the viewpoint that health is a form of human capital that
affects workers' productivities on the job, and derive
implications of employees' turnover on the incentives to
undertake health investment. Our model suggests that employee
turnovers lead to dynamic inefficiencies in health investment,
and particularly, it suggests that employment-based health
insurance system in the U.S. might lead to an inefficient low
level of individual health during individuals' working