Notes to The Problem of Evil   2. One feature of the above
formulation of the argument should be noted, namely, that the
predicate ‘x prevents the existence of y’ introduces an
intensional context; the fact that x prevents the existence of y
entails the non-existence of y. Since intensional contexts are
rather puzzling from a logical point of view, one might very
well prefer to avoid this. This could be done by recasting the
argument so that one talks instead of preventing the existence
of states of affairs of a given type. See the supplementary
document An Alternative Formulation of the Argument   4. Draper
himself formulates his argument in terms of epistemic
probability, which he explains as follows: “Relative to K, p is
epistemically more probable than q, where K is an epistemic
situation and p and q are propositions, just in case any fully
rational person in K would have a higher degree of belief in p
than in q.” (27) For those who hold, as I do, that the concept
of logical probability is acceptable, the