Put your J-20s and DF-21ds away and listen as I explain the
mystery of “anti-access.” It’s actually simpler than it looks. 
The term anti-access,  while also referring to state-sponsored
proxy forces and middle powers using standoff weaponry,
predominately is used in reference to Chinese shore-based anti-
ship missiles, fighter craft, and submarines.  Of course, the
specific operational technique in question is nothing new: any
visitor to San Francisco Bay can observe the antique shore
batteries the US Army once constructed to dominate approaches to
the Bay. The problem with anti-access, or at least the way it is
discussed, is precisely in its predominately operational and
technocratic character. If the problem is deadly weapons or an
integrated operational approach incorporating a battle network,
the answer can lie in a different operational approach or weapon
system. This is broadly what commentators discussing Air-Sea
Battle (ASB) have advocated–longer-range weapons, more
coordination across the joint commu