@techreport{NBERw14329, title = "Wage Formation between Newly
Hired Workers and Employers: Survey Evidence", author = "Robert
E. Hall and Alan B. Krueger", institution = "National Bureau of
Economic Research", type = "Working Paper", series = "Working
Paper Series", number = "14329", year = "2008", month =
"September", doi = {10.3386/w14329}, URL =
"http://www.nber.org/papers/w14329", abstract = {Some workers
bargain with prospective employers before accepting a job.
Others could bargain, but find it undesirable, because their
right to bargain has induced a sufficiently favorable offer,
which they accept. Yet others perceive that they cannot bargain
over pay; they regard the posted wage as a take-it-or-leave-it
opportunity. Theories of wage formation point to substantial
differences in labor-market equilibrium between bargained and
posted wages. The fraction of workers hired away from existing
jobs is another key determinant of equilibrium, because a worker
with an existing job has a better outside option in