Subject: Re: encrypted swap? To: None <,> From: None <> List:
tech-kern Date: 06/04/2001 14:25:56         I think the zero-out
the swap on shutdown is more important than the
encryption while running, and should be a lot easier and less
painful on          cpu. if someone can compromise the system
enough to get permissions to          read the swap device
directly (if it's properly protected to begin with)
then he can directly read kmem or do anything else he wishes
with the          system anyhow. however, i would say thiat an
attack on a swap device is most         likely and serious when
a machine is offline and the device can be physically
manipulated- and there, zeroing out at shutdown is a pretty
cheap way to         defeat that. that would be a very useful
thing to have. actually it could          also be done bu just
dd'ing /dev/zero to the swap devices listed in
/etc/fstab, from the shutdown or halt commands...   In most
cases if someone has physical access to the swap partition he
also has physical access to the root partition with the encr