@techreport{NBERw14470, title = "Are Mixed Neighborhoods Always
Unstable? Two-Sided and One-Sided Tipping", author = "David Card
and Alexandre Mas and Jesse Rothstein", institution = "National
Bureau of Economic Research", type = "Working Paper", series =
"Working Paper Series", number = "14470", year = "2008", month =
"November", doi = {10.3386/w14470}, URL =
"http://www.nber.org/papers/w14470", abstract = {A great deal of
urban policy depends on the possibility of creating stable,
economically and racially mixed neighborhoods. Many social
interaction models - including the seminal Schelling (1971)
model -- have the feature that the only stable equilibria are
fully segregated. These models suggest that if home-buyers have
preferences over their neighborhoods' racial composition, a
neighborhood with mixed racial composition is inherently
unstable, in the sense that a small change in the composition
sets off a dynamic process that converges to either 0% or 100%
minority share. Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) o