@techreport{NBERw6802, title = "The Case for a Populist Banker",
author = "Andres Velasco and Vincenzo Guzzo", institution =
"National Bureau of Economic Research", type = "Working Paper",
series = "Working Paper Series", number = "6802", year = "1998",
month = "November", doi = {10.3386/w6802}, URL =
"http://www.nber.org/papers/w6802", abstract = {We present a
general equilibrium optimizing model in which we study the joint
effects of centralization of wage setting and central bank
conservatism on economic performance. Several striking
conclusions emerge. In relatively centralized labor markets
employment and output are decreasing and inflation is initially
increasing and then decreasing in the degree of central bank
conservatism. A radical-populist central banker who cares not at
all about inflation (alternatively, who is not conservative)
maximizes social welfare. Economic performance is not U-shaped
in the degree of centralization of the labor market, in contrast
to conventional wisdom.}, }