CNET is applicable to a number of different consciousness models as a binding or action selection mechanism, such as Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Sensorimotor Theory (SMT). It is noted that many existing models of consciousness fail to specifically address action selection or binding. For example, O’Regan and Noë call binding a “pseudo problem,” but also state that “the fact that object attributes seem perceptually to be part of a single object does not require them to be ‘represented’ in any unified kind of way, for example, at a single location in the brain, or by a single process. They may be so represented, but there is no logical necessity for this.” Simply because there is no “logical necessity” for a physical phenomenon does not mean that it does not exist, or that once it is identified that it can be ignored. Likewise, global workspace theory (GWT) models appear to treat dopamine as modulatory, based on the prior understanding of those neurons from predictive reward dopamine signaling research, but GWT models could be adapted to include modeling of moment-by-moment activity in the striatum to mediate action selection, as observed by Kaiser. CNET is applicable to those neurons as a selection mechanism for that function, as otherwise that function could result in seizures from simultaneous actuation of competing sets of neurons. While CNET by itself is not a model of consciousness, it is able to integrate different models of consciousness through neural binding and action selection. However, a more complete understanding of how CNET might relate to consciousness would require a better understanding of strong electron-electron interactions in ferritin arrays, which implicates the many-body problem.