December 2008  
  
For nearly all of history the success of a society was proportionate to its
ability to assemble large and disciplined organizations. Those who bet on
economies of scale generally won, which meant the largest organizations were
the most successful ones.  
  
Things have already changed so much that this is hard for us to believe, but
till just a few decades ago the largest organizations tended to be the most
progressive. An ambitious kid graduating from college in 1960 wanted to work
in the huge, gleaming offices of Ford, or General Electric, or NASA. Small
meant small-time. Small in 1960 didn't mean a cool little startup. It meant
uncle Sid's shoe store.  
  
When I grew up in the 1970s, the idea of the "corporate ladder" was still very
much alive. The standard plan was to try to get into a good college, from
which one would be drafted into some organization and then rise to positions
of gradually increasing responsibility. The more ambitious merely hoped to
climb the same ladder faster. [1]  
  
But in the late twentieth century something changed. It turned out that
economies of scale were not the only force at work. Particularly in
technology, the increase in speed one could get from smaller groups started to
trump the advantages of size.  
  
The future turned out to be different from the one we were expecting in 1970.
The domed cities and flying cars we expected have failed to materialize. But
fortunately so have the jumpsuits with badges indicating our specialty and
rank. Instead of being dominated by a few, giant tree-structured
organizations, it's now looking like the economy of the future will be a fluid
network of smaller, independent units.  
  
It's not so much that large organizations stopped working. There's no evidence
that famously successful organizations like the Roman army or the British East
India Company were any less afflicted by protocol and politics than
organizations of the same size today. But they were competing against
opponents who couldn't change the rules on the fly by discovering new
technology. Now it turns out the rule "large and disciplined organizations
win" needs to have a qualification appended: "at games that change slowly." No
one knew till change reached a sufficient speed.  
  
Large organizations _will_ start to do worse now, though, because for the
first time in history they're no longer getting the best people. An ambitious
kid graduating from college now doesn't want to work for a big company. They
want to work for the hot startup that's rapidly growing into one. If they're
really ambitious, they want to start it. [2]  
  
This doesn't mean big companies will disappear. To say that startups will
succeed implies that big companies will exist, because startups that succeed
either become big companies or are acquired by them. [3] But large
organizations will probably never again play the leading role they did up till
the last quarter of the twentieth century.  
  
It's kind of surprising that a trend that lasted so long would ever run out.
How often does it happen that a rule works for thousands of years, then
switches polarity?  
  
The millennia-long run of bigger-is-better left us with a lot of
[traditions](credentials.html) that are now obsolete, but extremely deeply
rooted. Which means the ambitious can now do arbitrage on them. It will be
very valuable to understand precisely which ideas to keep and which can now be
discarded.  
  
The place to look is where the spread of smallness began: in the world of
startups.  
  
There have always been occasional cases, particularly in the US, of ambitious
people who grew the ladder under them instead of climbing it. But till
recently this was an anomalous route that tended to be followed only by
outsiders. It was no coincidence that the great industrialists of the
nineteenth century had so little formal education. As huge as their companies
eventually became, they were all essentially mechanics and shopkeepers at
first. That was a social step no one with a college education would take if
they could avoid it. Till the rise of technology startups, and in particular,
Internet startups, it was very unusual for educated people to start their own
businesses.  
  
The eight men who left Shockley Semiconductor to found Fairchild
Semiconductor, the original Silicon Valley startup, weren't even trying to
start a company at first. They were just looking for a company willing to hire
them as a group. Then one of their parents introduced them to a small
investment bank that offered to find funding for them to start their own, so
they did. But starting a company was an alien idea to them; it was something
they backed into. [4]  
  
Now I would guess that practically every Stanford or Berkeley undergrad who
knows how to program has at least considered the idea of starting a startup.
East Coast universities are not far behind, and British universities only a
little behind them. This pattern suggests that attitudes at Stanford and
Berkeley are not an anomaly, but a leading indicator. This is the way the
world is going.  
  
Of course, Internet startups are still only a fraction of the world's economy.
Could a trend based on them be that powerful?  
  
I think so. There's no reason to suppose there's any limit to the amount of
work that could be done in this area. Like science, wealth seems to expand
fractally. Steam power was a sliver of the British economy when Watt started
working on it. But his work led to more work till that sliver had expanded
into something bigger than the whole economy of which it had initially been a
part.  
  
The same thing could happen with the Internet. If Internet startups offer the
best opportunity for ambitious people, then a lot of ambitious people will
start them, and this bit of the economy will balloon in the usual fractal way.  
  
Even if Internet-related applications only become a tenth of the world's
economy, this component will set the tone for the rest. The most dynamic part
of the economy always does, in everything from salaries to standards of dress.
Not just because of its prestige, but because the principles underlying the
most dynamic part of the economy tend to be ones that work.  
  
For the future, the trend to bet on seems to be networks of small, autonomous
groups whose performance is measured individually. And the societies that win
will be the ones with the least impedance.  
  
As with the original industrial revolution, some societies are going to be
better at this than others. Within a generation of its birth in England, the
Industrial Revolution had spread to continental Europe and North America. But
it didn't spread everywhere. This new way of doing things could only take root
in places that were prepared for it. It could only spread to places that
already had a vigorous middle class.  
  
There is a similar social component to the transformation that began in
Silicon Valley in the 1960s. Two new kinds of techniques were developed there:
techniques for building integrated circuits, and techniques for building a new
type of company designed to grow fast by creating new technology. The
techniques for building integrated circuits spread rapidly to other countries.
But the techniques for building startups didn't. Fifty years later, startups
are ubiquitous in Silicon Valley and common in a handful of other US cities,
but they're still an anomaly in most of the world.  
  
Part of the reason—possibly the main reason—that startups have not spread as
broadly as the Industrial Revolution did is their social disruptiveness.
Though it brought many social changes, the Industrial Revolution was not
fighting the principle that bigger is better. Quite the opposite: the two
dovetailed beautifully. The new industrial companies adapted the customs of
existing large organizations like the military and the civil service, and the
resulting hybrid worked well. "Captains of industry" issued orders to "armies
of workers," and everyone knew what they were supposed to do.  
  
Startups seem to go more against the grain, socially. It's hard for them to
flourish in societies that value hierarchy and stability, just as it was hard
for industrialization to flourish in societies ruled by people who stole at
will from the merchant class. But there were already a handful of countries
past that stage when the Industrial Revolution happened. There do not seem to
be that many ready this time.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
**Notes**  
  
[1] One of the bizarre consequences of this model was that the usual way to
make more money was to become a manager. This is one of the things startups
fix.  
  
[2] There are a lot of reasons American car companies have been doing so much
worse than Japanese car companies, but at least one of them is a cause for
optimism: American graduates have more options.  
  
[3] It's possible that companies will one day be able to grow big in revenues
without growing big in people, but we are not very far along that trend yet.  
  
[4] Lecuyer, Christophe, _Making Silicon Valley_ , MIT Press, 2006.  
  
**Thanks** to Trevor Blackwell, Paul Buchheit, Jessica Livingston, and Robert
Morris for reading drafts of this.  
  

