tcp: make challenge acks less predictable

Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.

This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.

Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.

Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.

v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.

Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
static void tcp_update_rtt_min(struct sock *sk, u32 rtt_us)
{
	const u32 now = tcp_time_stamp, wlen = sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen * HZ;
	struct rtt_meas *m = tcp_sk(sk)->rtt_min;
	struct rtt_meas rttm = {
		.rtt = likely(rtt_us) ? rtt_us : jiffies_to_usecs(1),
		.ts = now,
	};
	u32 elapsed;

	/* Check if the new measurement updates the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd choices */
	if (unlikely(rttm.rtt <= m[0].rtt))
		m[0] = m[1] = m[2] = rttm;
	else if (rttm.rtt <= m[1].rtt)
		m[1] = m[2] = rttm;
	else if (rttm.rtt <= m[2].rtt)
		m[2] = rttm;

	elapsed = now - m[0].ts;
	if (unlikely(elapsed > wlen)) {
		/* Passed entire window without a new min so make 2nd choice
		 * the new min & 3rd choice the new 2nd. So forth and so on.
		 */
		m[0] = m[1];
		m[1] = m[2];
		m[2] = rttm;
		if (now - m[0].ts > wlen) {
			m[0] = m[1];
			m[1] = rttm;
			if (now - m[0].ts > wlen)
				m[0] = rttm;
		}
	} else if (m[1].ts == m[0].ts && elapsed > wlen / 4) {
		/* Passed a quarter of the window without a new min so
		 * take 2nd choice from the 2nd quarter of the window.
		 */
		m[2] = m[1] = rttm;
	} else if (m[2].ts == m[1].ts && elapsed > wlen / 2) {
		/* Passed half the window without a new min so take the 3rd
		 * choice from the last half of the window.
		 */
		m[2] = rttm;
	}
}

static void tcp_update_rtt_min(struct sock *sk, u32 rtt_us)
{
	const u32 now = tcp_time_stamp, wlen = sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen * HZ;
	struct rtt_meas *m = tcp_sk(sk)->rtt_min;
	struct rtt_meas rttm = {
		.rtt = likely(rtt_us) ? rtt_us : jiffies_to_usecs(1),
		.ts = now,
	};
	u32 elapsed;

	/* Check if the new measurement updates the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd choices */
	if (unlikely(rttm.rtt <= m[0].rtt))
		m[0] = m[1] = m[2] = rttm;
	else if (rttm.rtt <= m[1].rtt)
		m[1] = m[2] = rttm;
	else if (rttm.rtt <= m[2].rtt)
		m[2] = rttm;

	elapsed = now - m[0].ts;
	if (unlikely(elapsed > wlen)) {
		/* Passed entire window without a new min so make 2nd choice
		 * the new min & 3rd choice the new 2nd. So forth and so on.
		 */
		m[0] = m[1];
		m[1] = m[2];
		m[2] = rttm;
		if (now - m[0].ts > wlen) {
			m[0] = m[1];
			m[1] = rttm;
			if (now - m[0].ts > wlen)
				m[0] = rttm;
		}
	} else if (m[1].ts == m[0].ts && elapsed > wlen / 4) {
		/* Passed a quarter of the window without a new min so
		 * take 2nd choice from the 2nd quarter of the window.
		 */
		m[2] = m[1] = rttm;
	} else if (m[2].ts == m[1].ts && elapsed > wlen / 2) {
		/* Passed half the window without a new min so take the 3rd
		 * choice from the last half of the window.
		 */
		m[2] = rttm;
	}
}
