xen/netback: shutdown the ring if it contains garbage.

A buggy or malicious frontend should not be able to confuse netback.
If we spot anything which is not as it should be then shutdown the
device and don't try to continue with the ring in a potentially
hostile state. Well behaved and non-hostile frontends will not be
penalised.

As well as making the existing checks for such errors fatal also add a
new check that ensures that there isn't an insane number of requests
on the ring (i.e. more than would fit in the ring). If the ring
contains garbage then previously is was possible to loop over this
insane number, getting an error each time and therefore not generating
any more pending requests and therefore not exiting the loop in
xen_netbk_tx_build_gops for an externded period.

Also turn various netdev_dbg calls which no precipitate a fatal error
into netdev_err, they are rate limited because the device is shutdown
afterwards.

This fixes at least one known DoS/softlockup of the backend domain.

Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
static void xenvif_get_strings(struct net_device *dev, u32 stringset, u8 * data)
{
	int i;

	switch (stringset) {
	case ETH_SS_STATS:
		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xenvif_stats); i++)
			memcpy(data + i * ETH_GSTRING_LEN,
			       xenvif_stats[i].name, ETH_GSTRING_LEN);
		break;
	}
}

static void xenvif_get_strings(struct net_device *dev, u32 stringset, u8 * data)
{
	int i;

	switch (stringset) {
	case ETH_SS_STATS:
		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xenvif_stats); i++)
			memcpy(data + i * ETH_GSTRING_LEN,
			       xenvif_stats[i].name, ETH_GSTRING_LEN);
		break;
	}
}
