sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()

We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).

This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.

Found using kmemcheck + trinity.

Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
static int sched_copy_attr(struct sched_attr __user *uattr,
			   struct sched_attr *attr)
{
	u32 size;
	int ret;

	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uattr, SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0))
		return -EFAULT;

	/*
	 * zero the full structure, so that a short copy will be nice.
	 */
	memset(attr, 0, sizeof(*attr));

	ret = get_user(size, &uattr->size);
	if (ret)
		return ret;

	if (size > PAGE_SIZE)	/* silly large */
		goto err_size;

	if (!size)		/* abi compat */
		size = SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0;

	if (size < SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0)
		goto err_size;

	/*
	 * If we're handed a bigger struct than we know of,
	 * ensure all the unknown bits are 0 - i.e. new
	 * user-space does not rely on any kernel feature
	 * extensions we dont know about yet.
	 */
	if (size > sizeof(*attr)) {
		unsigned char __user *addr;
		unsigned char __user *end;
		unsigned char val;

		addr = (void __user *)uattr + sizeof(*attr);
		end  = (void __user *)uattr + size;

		for (; addr < end; addr++) {
			ret = get_user(val, addr);
			if (ret)
				return ret;
			if (val)
				goto err_size;
		}
		size = sizeof(*attr);
	}

	ret = copy_from_user(attr, uattr, size);
	if (ret)
		return -EFAULT;

	/*
	 * XXX: do we want to be lenient like existing syscalls; or do we want
	 * to be strict and return an error on out-of-bounds values?
	 */
	attr->sched_nice = clamp(attr->sched_nice, -20, 19);

out:
	return ret;

err_size:
	put_user(sizeof(*attr), &uattr->size);
	ret = -E2BIG;
	goto out;
}

static int sched_copy_attr(struct sched_attr __user *uattr,
			   struct sched_attr *attr)
{
	u32 size;
	int ret;

	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uattr, SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0))
		return -EFAULT;

	/*
	 * zero the full structure, so that a short copy will be nice.
	 */
	memset(attr, 0, sizeof(*attr));

	ret = get_user(size, &uattr->size);
	if (ret)
		return ret;

	if (size > PAGE_SIZE)	/* silly large */
		goto err_size;

	if (!size)		/* abi compat */
		size = SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0;

	if (size < SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0)
		goto err_size;

	/*
	 * If we're handed a bigger struct than we know of,
	 * ensure all the unknown bits are 0 - i.e. new
	 * user-space does not rely on any kernel feature
	 * extensions we dont know about yet.
	 */
	if (size > sizeof(*attr)) {
		unsigned char __user *addr;
		unsigned char __user *end;
		unsigned char val;

		addr = (void __user *)uattr + sizeof(*attr);
		end  = (void __user *)uattr + size;

		for (; addr < end; addr++) {
			ret = get_user(val, addr);
			if (ret)
				return ret;
			if (val)
				goto err_size;
		}
		size = sizeof(*attr);
	}

	ret = copy_from_user(attr, uattr, size);
	if (ret)
		return -EFAULT;

	/*
	 * XXX: do we want to be lenient like existing syscalls; or do we want
	 * to be strict and return an error on out-of-bounds values?
	 */
	attr->sched_nice = clamp(attr->sched_nice, -20, 19);

out:
	return ret;

err_size:
	put_user(sizeof(*attr), &uattr->size);
	ret = -E2BIG;
	goto out;
}
