sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]

Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
void sock_diag_unregister_inet_compat(int (*fn)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh))
{
	mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
	inet_rcv_compat = NULL;
	mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
}

void sock_diag_unregister_inet_compat(int (*fn)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh))
{
	mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
	inet_rcv_compat = NULL;
	mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
}
