Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.

Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement.  Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest.  In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.

Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions).  The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.

Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.

Security: CVE-2014-0064
bittoint4(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
	VarBit	   *arg = PG_GETARG_VARBIT_P(0);
	uint32		result;
	bits8	   *r;

	/* Check that the bit string is not too long */
	if (VARBITLEN(arg) > sizeof(result) * BITS_PER_BYTE)
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_NUMERIC_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
				 errmsg("integer out of range")));

	result = 0;
	for (r = VARBITS(arg); r < VARBITEND(arg); r++)
	{
		result <<= BITS_PER_BYTE;
		result |= *r;
	}
	/* Now shift the result to take account of the padding at the end */
	result >>= VARBITPAD(arg);

	PG_RETURN_INT32(result);
}

bittoint4(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
	VarBit	   *arg = PG_GETARG_VARBIT_P(0);
	uint32		result;
	bits8	   *r;

	/* Check that the bit string is not too long */
	if (VARBITLEN(arg) > sizeof(result) * BITS_PER_BYTE)
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_NUMERIC_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
				 errmsg("integer out of range")));

	result = 0;
	for (r = VARBITS(arg); r < VARBITEND(arg); r++)
	{
		result <<= BITS_PER_BYTE;
		result |= *r;
	}
	/* Now shift the result to take account of the padding at the end */
	result >>= VARBITPAD(arg);

	PG_RETURN_INT32(result);
}
