REGULATION (EU) No 978/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 25 October 2012
applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (1),
Whereas:
(1)
Since 1971, the Community has granted trade preferences to developing countries under its scheme of generalised tariff preferences.
(2)
The Union’s common commercial policy shall be guided by the principles and pursue the objectives set out in the general provisions on the Union’s external action, laid down in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
(3)
The Union aims to define and pursue common policies and actions in order to foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty.
(4)
The Union’s common commercial policy is to be consistent with and to consolidate the objectives of the Union policy in the field of development cooperation, laid down in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular the eradication of poverty and the promotion of sustainable development and good governance in the developing countries. It is to comply with World Trade Organisation (WTO) requirements, in particular with the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the ‘Enabling Clause’), adopted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1979, under which WTO Members may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries.
(5)
The Commission Communication of 7 July 2004 entitled ‘Developing countries, international trade and sustainable development: the function of the Community’s generalised system of preferences (GSP) for the 10-year period from 2006 to 2015’ sets out the guidelines for the application of the scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 2006 to 2015.
(6)
Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2009 (2), as extended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 (3) provides for the application of the scheme of generalised tariff preferences (‘the scheme’) until 31 December 2013 or until the scheme under this Regulation is applied, whichever is the earlier. Thereafter, the scheme should continue to apply for a period of 10 years from the date of application of the preferences provided for in this Regulation, except for the special arrangement for the least-developed countries, which should continue to be applied without any expiry date.
(7)
By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be reinvested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme’s tariff preferences should focus on helping developing countries having greater development, trade and financial needs.
(8)
The scheme consists of a general arrangement, and two special arrangements.
(9)
The general arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common developing need and are in a similar stage of economic development. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme’s tariff preferences. Those countries include economies which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies. They do not share the same development, trade and financial needs as the remaining developing countries; they are at a different stage of economic development, i.e. they are not similarly-situated as the more vulnerable developing countries; and, in order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries increases the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and therefore could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The general arrangement takes account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensures that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.
For the sake of consistency, the tariff preferences granted under the general arrangement should not be extended to developing countries which are benefiting from a preferential market access arrangement with the Union, which provides at least the same level of tariff preferences as the scheme for substantially all trade. To provide a beneficiary country and economic operators with time for an orderly adaptation, the general arrangement should continue to be granted for two years as from the date of application of a preferential market access arrangement and this date should be specified in the list of beneficiary countries of the general arrangement.
(10)
Countries listed in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 and countries benefiting from autonomous preferential access to the Union market under Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, Council Regulation (EC) No 55/2008 of 21 January 2008 introducing autonomous trade preferences for the Republic of Moldova (4) and Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2000 of 18 September 2000 introducing exceptional trade measures for countries and territories participating in or linked to the European Union’s Stabilisation and Association process (5) should be considered eligible for the scheme. Overseas territories associated with the Union and overseas countries and territories of countries that are not listed in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 should not be considered eligible for the scheme.
(11)
The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, and the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system, are vulnerable, in order to help them assume the special burdens and responsibilities resulting from the ratification of core international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance as well as from the effective implementation thereof.
(12)
Preferences should be designed to promote further economic growth and, thereby, to respond positively to the need for sustainable development. Under the special incentive arrangement, the ad valorem tariffs should therefore be suspended for the beneficiary countries concerned. The specific duties should also be suspended, unless combined with an ad valorem duty.
(13)
Countries that fulfil the eligibility criteria for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be able to benefit from the additional tariff preferences if, upon their application, the Commission determines that the relevant conditions are met. It should be possible to submit applications as from the date of entry into force of this Regulation. Countries which benefit from the tariff preferences of the scheme under Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 should also submit a new application.
(14)
The Commission should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation, by examining the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions (the relevant monitoring bodies). Every two years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice.
(15)
For the purposes of the monitoring and the withdrawal of preferences, reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. However, such reports may be supplemented by other sources of information, provided that they are accurate and reliable. Without prejudice to other sources, this could include information from civil society, social partners, the European Parliament and the Council.
(16)
The special arrangement for the least-developed countries should continue to grant duty-free access to the Union market for products originating in the least-developed countries, as recognised and classified by the UN, except for trade in arms. For a country no longer classified by the UN as a least-developed country, a transitional period should be established, to alleviate any adverse effects caused by the removal of the tariff preferences granted under this arrangement. Tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries should continue to be granted for those least-developed countries, which benefit from another preferential market access arrangement with the Union.
(17)
To ensure coherence with the market access provisions for sugar in the Economic Partnership Agreements, imports of products under heading 1701 of the Common Customs Tariff should require an import licence until 30 September 2015.
(18)
As regards the general arrangement, the differentiation between tariff preferences for non-sensitive products and tariff preferences for sensitive products should be maintained, to take account of the situation of the sectors manufacturing the same products in the Union.
(19)
Common Customs Tariff duties on non-sensitive products should continue to be suspended, while duties on sensitive products should enjoy a tariff reduction, in order to ensure a satisfactory utilisation rate while at the same time taking account of the situation of the corresponding Union industries.
(20)
Such a tariff reduction should be sufficiently attractive, in order to motivate traders to make use of the opportunities offered by the scheme. Therefore, the ad valorem duties should generally be reduced by a flat rate of 3,5 percentage points from the ‘most favoured nation’ duty rate, while such duties for textiles and textile goods should be reduced by 20 %. Specific duties should be reduced by 30 %. Where a minimum duty is specified, that minimum duty should not apply.
(21)
Duties should be suspended totally, where the preferential treatment for an individual import declaration results in an ad valorem duty of 1 % or less or in a specific duty of EUR 2 or less, since the cost of collecting such duties might be higher than the revenue gained.
(22)
Graduation should be based on criteria related to sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff. Graduation should apply in respect of a section or subsection in order to reduce cases where heterogeneous products are graduated. The graduation of a section or a subsection (made up of chapters) for a beneficiary country should be applied when the section meets the criteria for graduation over three consecutive years, in order to increase predictability and fairness of graduation by eliminating the effect of large and exceptional variations in the import statistics. Graduation should not apply to the beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance and the beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for the least-developed countries as they share a very similar economic profile rendering them vulnerable because of a low, non-diversified export base.
(23)
In order to ensure that the scheme benefits only those countries it is intended to benefit, the tariff preferences provided for by this Regulation should apply, as well as the rules of origin of products, laid down in Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (6).
(24)
The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in certain international conventions concerning core human rights and labour rights, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union’s monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation.
(25)
Due to the political situation in Burma/Myanmar and in Belarus, the temporary withdrawal of all tariff preferences in respect of imports of products originating in Burma/Myanmar or Belarus should be maintained.
(26)
In order to achieve a balance between the need for better targeting, greater coherence and transparency on the one hand, and better promoting sustainable development and good governance through a unilateral trade preference scheme on the other hand, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amendments to the Annexes to this Regulation and temporary withdrawals of tariff preferences due to failure to adhere to the principles of sustainable development and good governance, as well as procedural rules regarding the submission of applications for the tariff preferences granted under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the conduct of a temporary withdrawal and safeguard investigations in order to establish uniform and detailed technical arrangements. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level. The Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the Council.
(27)
In order to provide a stable framework for economic operators, the power to adopt an act in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of repealing a decision on temporary withdrawal under the urgency procedure before that decision to temporarily withdraw tariff preferences takes effect, where the reasons justifying temporary withdrawal no longer apply.
(28)
In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for the control by the Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (7).
(29)
The advisory procedure should be used for the adoption of implementing acts on suspension from the tariff preferences of certain GSP sections in respect of beneficiary countries and on the initiation of a temporary withdrawal procedure, taking into account the nature and impact of those acts.
(30)
The examination procedure should be used for the adoption of implementing acts on safeguard investigations and on suspension of the preferential arrangements where imports may cause serious disturbance to Union markets.
(31)
In order to ensure the integrity and orderly functioning of the scheme, the Commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts where, in duly justified cases relating to temporary withdrawals due to non-compliance with customs-related procedures and obligations, imperative grounds of urgency so require.
(32)
In order to provide a stable framework for economic operators, upon conclusion of the maximum period of six months, the Commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts where, in duly justified cases relating to termination or extension of the temporary withdrawals due to non-compliance with customs-related procedures and obligations, imperative grounds of urgency so require.
(33)
The Commission should also adopt immediately applicable implementing acts where, in duly justified cases relating to safeguard investigations, imperative grounds of urgency relating to the deterioration of the economic and/or financial situation of Union producers which would be difficult to repair so require.
(34)
The Commission should report regularly to the European Parliament and to the Council on the effects of the scheme under this Regulation. Five years after its entry into force, the Commission should report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the application of this Regulation and assess the need to review the scheme, including the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance and temporary withdrawal provisions of tariff preferences, taking into consideration the fight against terrorism and the field of international standards on transparency and exchange of information in tax matters. In reporting, the Commission should take into account the implications for development, trade and financial needs of beneficiaries. The report should also include a detailed analysis of the impact of this Regulation on trade and on the Union’s tariff income, with particular attention to the effects on beneficiary countries. Where applicable, compliance with Union sanitary and phytosanitary legislation should also be assessed. The report should also include an analysis of the effects of the scheme with regard to imports of biofuels and sustainability aspects.
(35)
Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 should therefore be repealed,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
1. The scheme of generalised tariff preferences (the ‘scheme’) shall apply in accordance with this Regulation.
2. This Regulation provides for the following tariff preferences under the scheme:
(a)
a general arrangement;
(b)
a special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+); and
(c)
a special arrangement for the least-developed countries (Everything But Arms (EBA)).
Article 2
For the purposes of this Regulation:
(a)
‘GSP’ means the Generalised Scheme of Preferences by which the Union provides preferential access to its market through any of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2);
(b)
‘countries’ means countries and territories possessing a customs administration;
(c)
‘eligible countries’ means all developing countries as listed in Annex I;
(d)
‘GSP beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the general arrangement as listed in Annex II;
(e)
‘GSP+ beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance as listed in Annex III;
(f)
‘EBA beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for least developed countries as listed in Annex IV;
(g)
‘Common Customs Tariff duties’ means the duties specified in Part Two of Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (8), except those duties established as part of tariff quotas;
(h)
‘section’ means any of the sections of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87;
(i)
‘chapter’ means any of the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87;
(j)
‘GSP section’ means a section listed in Annex V and established on the basis of sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff;
(k)
‘preferential market access arrangement’ means preferential access to the Union market through a trade agreement, either provisionally applied or in force, or through autonomous preferences granted by the Union;
(l)
‘effective implementation’ means the integral implementation of all undertakings and obligations undertaken under the international conventions listed in Annex VIII, thus ensuring fulfilment of all the principles, objectives and rights guaranteed therein.
Article 3
1. A list of eligible countries is established in Annex I.
2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 to amend Annex I to take account of changes in the international status or classification of countries.
3. The Commission shall notify an eligible country concerned of any relevant changes in its status under the scheme.
CHAPTER II
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
Article 4
1. An eligible country shall benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the general arrangement referred to in point (a) of Article 1(2) unless:
(a)
it has been classified by the World Bank as a high-income or an upper-middle income country during three consecutive years immediately preceding the update of the list of beneficiary countries; or
(b)
it benefits from a preferential market access arrangement which provides the same tariff preferences as the scheme, or better, for substantially all trade.
2. Points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 shall not apply to least-developed countries.
3. Without prejudice to point (b) of paragraph 1, point (a) of paragraph 1 shall not apply until 21 November 2014, for countries which by 20 November 2012 have initialled a bilateral preferential market access agreement with the Union, which provides the same tariff preferences as the scheme, or better, for substantially all trade, but which is not yet applied.
Article 5
1. A list of GSP beneficiary countries meeting the criteria laid down in Article 4 is established in Annex II.
2. By 1 January of each year following the entry into force of this Regulation the Commission shall review Annex II. To provide a GSP beneficiary country and economic operators with time for orderly adaptation to the change in the country’s status under the scheme:
(a)
the decision to remove a beneficiary country from the list of GSP beneficiary countries, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article and on the basis of point (a) of Article 4(1), shall apply as from one year after the date of entry into force of that decision;
(b)
the decision to remove a beneficiary country from the list of GSP beneficiary countries, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article and on the basis of point (b) of Article 4(1), shall apply as from two years after the date of application of a preferential market access arrangement.
3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex II on the basis of the criteria laid down in Article 4.
4. The Commission shall notify the GSP beneficiary country concerned of any changes in its status under the scheme.
Article 6
1. The products included in the general arrangement referred to in point (a) of Article 1(2) are listed in Annex V.
2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex V in order to incorporate changes made necessary by amendments to the Combined Nomenclature.
Article 7
1. Common Customs Tariff duties on products listed in Annex V as non-sensitive products shall be suspended entirely, except for agricultural components.
2. Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on products listed in Annex V as sensitive products shall be reduced by 3,5 percentage points. For products under GSP sections S-11a and S-11b of Annex V, this reduction shall be 20 %.
3. Where preferential duty rates calculated, in accordance with Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, on the Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties applicable on the date of entry into force of this Regulation provide for a tariff reduction of more than 3,5 percentage points for the products referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, those preferential duty rates shall apply.
4. Common Customs Tariff specific duties, other than minimum or maximum duties, on products listed in Annex V as sensitive products shall be reduced by 30 %.
5. Where Common Customs Tariff duties on products listed in Annex V as sensitive products include ad valorem duties and specific duties, the specific duties shall not be reduced.
6. Where duties reduced in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 4 specify a maximum duty, that maximum duty shall not be reduced. Where such duties specify a minimum duty, that minimum duty shall not apply.
Article 8
1. The tariff preferences referred to in Article 7 shall be suspended, in respect of products of a GSP section originating in a GSP beneficiary country, when the average value of Union imports of such products over three consecutive years from that GSP beneficiary country exceeds the thresholds listed in Annex VI. The thresholds shall be calculated as a percentage of the total value of Union imports of the same products from all GSP beneficiary countries.
2. Prior to the application of the tariff preferences provided for in this Regulation, the Commission shall adopt an implementing act establishing, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), a list of GSP sections for which the tariff preferences referred to in Article 7 are suspended in respect of a GSP beneficiary country. That implementing act shall apply as from 1 January 2014.
3. The Commission shall, every three years, review the list referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article and adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), in order to suspend or to re-establish the tariff preferences referred to in Article 7. That implementing act shall apply as of 1 January of the year following its entry in force.
4. The list referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall be established on the basis of the data available on 1 September of the year in which the review is conducted and of the two years preceding the review year. It shall take into account imports from GSP beneficiary countries listed in Annex II as applicable at that time. However, the value of imports from GSP beneficiary countries, which upon the date of application of the suspension, no longer benefit from the tariff preferences under point (b) of Article 4(1) shall not be taken into account.
5. The Commission shall notify the country concerned of the implementing act adopted in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3.
6. Where Annex II is amended in accordance with the criteria laid down in Article 4, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 to amend Annex VI in order to adjust the modalities listed in that Annex so as to maintain proportionally the same weight of the graduated product sections as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article.
CHAPTER III
SPECIAL INCENTIVE ARRANGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
Article 9
1. A GSP beneficiary country may benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in point (b) of Article 1(2) if:
(a)
it is considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system, as defined in Annex VII;
(b)
it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VIII (the ‘relevant conventions’) and the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions (the ‘relevant monitoring bodies’) do not identify a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;
(c)
in relation to any of the relevant conventions, it has not formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of those conventions or which is for the purposes of this Article considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention.
For the purposes of this Article, reservations shall not be considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of a convention unless:
(i)
a process explicitly set out for that purpose under the convention has so determined; or
(ii)
in the absence of such a process, the Union where a party to the convention, and/or a qualified majority of Member States party to the convention, in accordance with their respective competences as established in the Treaties, objected to the reservation on the grounds that it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention and opposed the entry into force of the convention as between them and the reserving state in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties;
(d)
it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof;
(e)
it accepts without reservation the reporting requirements imposed by each convention and gives a binding undertaking to accept regular monitoring and review of its implementation record in accordance with the provisions of the relevant conventions; and
(f)
it gives a binding undertaking to participate in and cooperate with the monitoring procedure referred to in Article 13.
2. Where Annex II is amended, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 to amend Annex VII in order to review the vulnerability threshold listed in point 1(b) of Annex VII so as to maintain proportionally the same weight of the vulnerability threshold as calculated in accordance with Annex VII.
Article 10
1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be granted if the following conditions are met:
(a)
a GSP beneficiary country has made a request to that effect; and
(b)
examination of the request shows that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9(1).
2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1).
3. After receiving a request, the Commission shall notify the European Parliament and the Council thereof.
4. After examining the request, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to establish or to amend Annex III in order to grant a requesting country the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance by adding that country to the list of GSP+ beneficiary countries.
5. Where a GSP+ beneficiary country no longer fulfils the conditions referred to in points (a) or (c) of Article 9(1), or withdraws any of its binding undertakings referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), the Commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated act, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex III in order to remove that country from the list of GSP+ beneficiary countries.
6. The Commission shall notify the requesting country of a decision taken in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article after Annex III is amended and published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Where the requesting country is granted the special incentive arrangement, it shall be informed of the date on which the respective delegated act enters into force.
7. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to establish rules related to the procedure for granting the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance in particular with respect to deadlines and the submission and processing of requests.
Article 11
1. The products included in the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance are listed in Annex IX.
2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex IX to take into account amendments to the Combined Nomenclature affecting the products listed in that Annex.
Article 12
1. The Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex IX which originate in a GSP+ beneficiary country shall be suspended.
2. Common Customs Tariff specific duties on products referred to in paragraph 1 shall be suspended entirely, except for products for which the Common Customs Tariff duties include ad valorem duties. For products with Combined Nomenclature code 1704 10 90, the specific duty shall be limited to 16 % of the customs value.
Article 13
1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall keep under review the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and shall monitor their effective implementation, as well as cooperation with the relevant monitoring bodies, by examining the conclusions and recommendations of those monitoring bodies.
2. In this context, a GSP+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the Commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of binding undertakings referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1) and its situation as regards point (c) of Article 9(1).
Article 14
1. By 1 January 2016, and every two years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof.
2. That report shall include:
(a)
the conclusions or recommendations of relevant monitoring bodies in respect of each GSP+ beneficiary country; and
(b)
the Commission’s conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof.
The report may include any information the Commission considers appropriate.
3. In drawing its conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by third parties, including civil society, social partners, the European Parliament or the Council.
Article 15
1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where in practice that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in point (c) of Article 9(1).
2. The burden of proof for compliance with its obligations resulting from binding undertakings as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), and its situation as referred to in point (c) of Article 9(1), shall be on the GSP+ beneficiary country.
3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in point (c) of Article 9(1), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.
4. The Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union and notify the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned thereof. The notice shall:
(a)
state the grounds for the reasonable doubt as to the fulfilment of the binding undertakings made by the GSP+ beneficiary country as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), or as to the existence of a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in point (c) of Article 9(1), which may call into question its right to continue to enjoy the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance; and
(b)
specify the period, which may not exceed six months from the date of publication of the notice, within which a GSP+ beneficiary country shall submit its observations.
5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the period referred to in point (b) of paragraph 4.
6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information.
7. Within three months after expiry of the period specified in the notice, the Commission shall decide:
(a)
to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure; or
(b)
to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance.
8. Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based, inter alia, on evidence received.
9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall be empowered, in accordance with Article 36, to adopt delegated acts to amend Annex III in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in point (b) of Article 1(2).
10. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall take effect six months after its adoption.
11. Where the reasons justifying temporary withdrawal no longer apply before the delegated act referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article takes effect, the Commission shall be empowered to repeal the adopted act to temporarily withdraw tariff preferences in accordance with the urgency procedure referred to in Article 37.
12. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to establish rules related to the procedure for temporary withdrawal of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance in particular with respect to deadlines, rights of parties, confidentiality and review.
Article 16
Where the Commission finds that the reasons justifying a temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences, as referred to in Article 15(1), no longer apply, it shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex III in order to reinstate the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance.
CHAPTER IV
SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT FOR THE LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Article 17
1. An eligible country shall benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries referred to in point (c) of Article 1(2), if that country is identified by the UN as a least-developed country.
2. The Commission shall continuously review the list of EBA beneficiary countries on the basis of the most recent available data. Where an EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex IV in order to remove the country from the list of EBA beneficiary countries following a transitional period of three years as from the date on which the delegated act entered into force.
3. Pending the identification by the UN of a newly independent country as a least-developed country, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex IV as an interim measure so as to include such a country in the list of EBA beneficiary countries.
If such a newly independent country is not identified by the UN as a least-developed country during the first available review of the category of least-developed countries, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts forthwith, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex IV in order to remove such a country from that Annex, without granting the transitional period referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. The Commission shall notify the EBA beneficiary country concerned of any changes in its status under the scheme.
Article 18
1. The Common Customs Tariff duties on all products that are listed in Chapters 1 to 97 of the Combined Nomenclature, except those in Chapter 93, originating in an EBA beneficiary country, shall be suspended entirely.
2. From 1 January 2014 until 30 September 2015, imports of products under tariff heading 1701 of the Common Customs Tariff shall require an import licence.
3. The Commission shall, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 39(3), adopt detailed rules for implementing the provisions referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 195 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) (9).
CHAPTER V
TEMPORARY WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS COMMON TO ALL ARRANGEMENTS
Article 19
1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:
(a)
serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Part A of Annex VIII;
(b)
export of goods made by prison labour;
(c)
serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or failure to comply with international conventions on anti-terrorism and money laundering;
(d)
serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the competent WTO body;
(e)
serious and systematic infringement of the objectives adopted by Regional Fishery Organisations or any international arrangements to which the Union is a party concerning the conservation and management of fishery resources.
2. The preferential arrangements provided for in this Regulation shall not be withdrawn under point (d) of paragraph 1 in respect of products that are subject to anti-dumping or countervailing measures under Council Regulation (EC) No 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community (10) or Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (11), for the reasons justifying those measures.
3. Where the Commission considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of that implementing act.
4. The Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union announcing the initiation of a temporary withdrawal procedure, and shall notify the beneficiary country concerned thereof. The notice shall:
(a)
provide sufficient grounds for the implementing act to initiate a temporary withdrawal procedure, referred to in paragraph 3; and
(b)
state that the Commission will monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned for six months from the date of publication of the notice.
5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the monitoring and evaluation period.
6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary, inter alia, the available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, as appropriate. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information.
7. Within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in point (b) of paragraph 4, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month.
8. Within six months from the expiry of the period referred to in point (b) of paragraph 4 the Commission shall decide:
(a)
to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure; or
(b)
to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).
9. Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), on the termination of the temporary withdrawal procedure.
10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall be empowered, in accordance with Article 36, to adopt delegated acts to amend Annexes II, III or IV, whichever is applicable, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).
11. For either of the cases referred to in paragraphs 9 and 10, the adopted act shall be based, inter alia, on evidence received.
12. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall take effect six months after its adoption.
13. Where the reasons justifying temporary withdrawal no longer apply before the delegated act referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article takes effect, the Commission shall be empowered to repeal the adopted act to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences in accordance with the urgency procedure referred to in Article 37.
14. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to establish rules related to the procedure for temporary withdrawal of all arrangements in particular with respect to deadlines, rights of parties, confidentiality and review.
Article 20
Where the Commission finds that the reasons justifying a temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences as referred to in Article 19(1) no longer apply, it shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36 to amend Annexes II, III or IV, whichever is applicable, in order to reinstate the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).
Article 21
1. The preferential arrangements provided for in this Regulation may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, in cases of fraud, irregularities or systematic failure to comply with or to ensure compliance with the rules concerning the origin of the products and with the procedures related thereto, or failure to provide administrative cooperation as required for the implementation and policing of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).
2. The administrative cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 requires, inter alia, that a beneficiary country:
(a)
communicate to the Commission and update the information necessary for the implementation of the rules of origin and the policing thereof;
(b)
assist the Union by carrying out, at the request of the customs authorities of the Member States, subsequent verification of the origin of the goods, and communicate its results in time to the Commission;
(c)
assist the Union by allowing the Commission, in coordination and close cooperation with the competent authorities of the Member States, to conduct the Union administrative and investigative cooperation missions in that country, in order to verify the authenticity of documents or the accuracy of information relevant for granting the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2);
(d)
carry out or arrange for appropriate inquiries to identify and prevent contravention of the rules of origin;
(e)
comply with or ensure compliance with the rules of origin in respect of regional cumulation, within the meaning of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93, if the country benefits therefrom; and
(f)
assist the Union in the verification of conduct where there is a presumption of origin-related fraud, whereby the existence of fraud may be presumed where imports of products under the preferential arrangements provided for in this Regulation massively exceed the usual levels of the beneficiary country’s exports.
3. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, it shall decide in accordance with the urgency procedure referred to in Article 39(4) to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2), in respect of all or certain products originating in a beneficiary country.
4. Before taking such decision, the Commission shall first publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, stating that there are grounds for reasonable doubt about compliance with paragraphs 1 and 2 which may call into question the right of the beneficiary country to continue to enjoy the benefits granted by this Regulation.
5. The Commission shall inform the beneficiary country concerned of any decision taken in accordance with paragraph 3, before it becomes effective.
6. The period of temporary withdrawal shall not exceed six months. At the latest on the conclusion of that period, the Commission shall decide in accordance with the urgency procedure referred to in Article 39(4) either to terminate the temporary withdrawal or to extend the period of temporary withdrawal.
7. Member States shall communicate to the Commission all relevant information that may justify temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences or its extension.
CHAPTER VI
SAFEGUARD AND SURVEILLANCE PROVISIONS
SECTION I
General Safeguards
Article 22
1. Where a product originating in a beneficiary country of any of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2), is imported in volumes and/or at prices which cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties to Union producers of like or directly competing products, normal Common Customs Tariff duties on that product may be reintroduced.
2. For the purpose of this Chapter, ‘like product’ means a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects, to the product under consideration, or, in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.
3. For the purpose of this Chapter, ‘interested parties’ means those parties involved in the production, distribution and/or sale of the imports mentioned in paragraph 1 and of like or directly competing products.
4. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to establish rules related to the procedure for adopting general safeguard measures in particular with respect to deadlines, rights of parties, confidentiality, disclosure, verification, visits and review.
Article 23
Serious difficulties shall be considered to exist where Union producers suffer deterioration in their economic and/or financial situation. In examining whether such deterioration exists, the Commission shall take account, inter alia, of the following factors concerning Union producers, where such information is available:
(a)
market share;
(b)
production;
(c)
stocks;
(d)
production capacity;
(e)
bankruptcies;
(f)
profitability;
(g)
capacity utilisation;
(h)
employment;
(i)
imports;
(j)
prices.
Article 24
1. The Commission shall investigate whether the normal Common Customs Tariff duties should be reintroduced if there is sufficient prima facie evidence that the conditions of Article 22(1) are met.
2. An investigation shall be initiated upon request by a Member State, by any legal person or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of Union producers, or on the Commission’s own initiative if it is apparent to the Commission that there is sufficient prima facie evidence, as determined on the basis of factors referred to in Article 23, to justify such initiation. The request to initiate an investigation shall contain evidence that the conditions for imposing the safeguard measure set out in Article 22(1) are met. The request shall be submitted to the Commission. The Commission shall, as far as possible, examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the request to determine whether there is sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.
3. Where it is apparent that there is sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the initiation of proceedings the Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. Initiation shall take place within one month of the request received pursuant to paragraph 2. Should an investigation be initiated, the notice shall provide all necessary details about the procedure and deadlines, including recourse to the Hearing Officer of the Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission.
4. An investigation, including the procedural steps referred to in Articles 25, 26 and 27, shall be concluded within 12 months from its initiation.
Article 25
On duly justified grounds of urgency relating to deterioration of the economic and/or financial situation of Union producers, and where delay might cause damage which would be difficult to repair, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the urgency procedure referred to in Article 39(4) to reintroduce normal Common Customs Tariff duties for a period of up to 12 months.
Article 26
Where the facts as finally established show that the conditions set out in Article 22(1) are met, the Commission shall adopt an implementing act to reintroduce the Common Customs Tariff duties in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 39(3). That implementing act shall enter into force within one month from the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Article 27
Where the facts as finally established show that the conditions set out in Article 22(1) are not met, the Commission shall adopt an implementing act terminating the investigation and proceedings in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 39(3). That implementing act shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The investigation shall be deemed terminated, if no implementing act is published within the period referred to in Article 24(4) and any urgent preventive measures shall automatically lapse. Any Common Customs Tariff duties collected as a result of those provisional measures shall be refunded.
Article 28
Common Customs Tariff duties shall be reintroduced as long as necessary to counteract the deterioration in the economic and/or financial situation of Union producers, or as long as the threat of such deterioration persists. The period of reintroduction shall not exceed three years, unless it is extended in duly justified circumstances.
SECTION II
Safeguards in the Textile, Agriculture and Fisheries Sectors
Article 29
1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections S-11a and S-11b of Annex V or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, and 3824 90 97 where imports of such products, listed respectively in Annexes V or IX, whichever is applicable, originate in a beneficiary country and their total:
(a)
increases by at least 13,5 % in quantity (by volume), as compared with the previous calendar year; or
(b)
for products under GSP sections S-11a and S-11b of Annex V, exceeds the share referred to in point 2 of Annex VI of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-11a and S-11b of Annex V from all countries and territories listed in Annex II during any period of 12 months.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to EBA beneficiary countries, nor shall it apply to countries with a share for the relevant products referred to in Article 29(1) not exceeding 6 % of total Union imports of the same products listed in Annexes V or IX, whichever is applicable.
3. The removal of the tariff preferences shall take effect two months after the date of publication of the Commission’s act to that effect in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Article 30
Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, where imports of products included in Annex I to the TFEU cause, or threaten to cause, serious disturbance to Union markets, in particular to one or more of the outermost regions, or these markets’ regulatory mechanisms, the Commission, on its own initiative or at the request of a Member State, after consulting the committee for the relevant agriculture or fisheries common market organisation, shall adopt an implementing act in order to suspend the preferential arrangements in respect of the products concerned in accordance with examination procedure referred to in Article 39(3).
Article 31
The Commission shall inform the beneficiary country concerned as soon as possible of any decision taken in accordance with Articles 29 or 30 before it becomes effective.
SECTION III
Surveillance in the Agricultural and Fisheries Sectors
Article 32
1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, products from Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, originating in beneficiary countries, may be subject to a special surveillance mechanism, in order to avoid disturbances to Union markets. The Commission, on its own initiative or at the request of a Member State, after consulting the committee for the relevant agriculture or fisheries common market organisation, shall adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 39(3), on whether to apply this special surveillance mechanism, and shall determine the products to which this surveillance mechanism is to be applied.
2. Where Section I of this Chapter is applied to products in Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, originating in beneficiary countries, the period referred to in Article 24(4) of this Regulation shall be reduced to two months in the following cases:
(a)
when the beneficiary country concerned does not ensure compliance with the rules of origin or does not provide the administrative cooperation referred to in Article 21; or
(b)
when imports of products from Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, under the preferential arrangements granted under this Regulation massively exceed the usual levels of exports from the beneficiary country concerned.
CHAPTER VII
COMMON PROVISIONS
Article 33
1. To benefit from the tariff preferences, the products for which the tariff preferences are claimed shall originate in a beneficiary country.
2. For the purposes of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) of this Regulation, the rules of origin concerning the definition of the concept of originating products, the procedures and the methods of administrative cooperation related thereto shall be those laid down in Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93.
Article 34
1. Where the rate of an ad valorem duty for an individual import declaration is reduced in accordance with this Regulation to 1 % or less, that duty shall be suspended entirely.
2. Where the rate of a specific duty for an individual import declaration is reduced in accordance with this Regulation to EUR 2 or less per individual euro amount, that duty shall be suspended entirely.
3. Subject to paragraphs 1 and 2, the final rate of the preferential duty calculated in accordance with this Regulation shall be rounded down to the first decimal place.
Article 35
1. The statistical source to be used for the purpose of this Regulation shall be the external trade statistics of the Commission (Eurostat).
2. Member States shall send the Commission (Eurostat) their statistical data on products placed under the customs procedure for release for free circulation under the tariff preferences according to Regulation (EC) No 471/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on Community statistics relating to external trade with non-member countries (12). Those data, supplied by reference to the Combined Nomenclature codes and, where applicable, the TARIC codes, shall show, by country of origin, the values, quantities and any supplementary units required in accordance with the definitions in that Regulation. In accordance with Article 8(1) of that Regulation, Member States shall transmit those statistical data no later than 40 days after the end of each monthly reference period. In order to facilitate information and increase transparency, the Commission shall also ensure that the relevant statistical data for the GSP sections are regularly available in a public database.
3. In accordance with Article 308d of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93, Member States shall forward to the Commission, at its request, details of the quantities and values of products released for free circulation under the tariff preferences, during the previous months. Those data shall include the products referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article.
4. The Commission shall, in close cooperation with Member States, monitor the imports of products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 0603, 0803 90 10, 1006, 1604 14, 1604 19 31, 1604 19 39, 1604 20 70, 1701, 1704, 1806 10 30, 1806 10 90, 2002 90, 2103 20, 2106 90 59, 2106 90 98, 6403, 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00 and 3824 90 97, in order to determine whether the conditions referred to in Articles 22, 29 and 30 are fulfilled.
Article 36
1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article.
2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 22 shall be conferred to the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from 20 November 2012.
3. The delegation of powers referred to in Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 or 22 may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision of revocation shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.
4. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council.
5. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 or 22 shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by either the European Parliament or the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council.
Article 37
1. Delegated acts adopted under this Article shall enter into force without delay and shall apply as long as no objection is expressed in accordance with paragraph 2. The notification of a delegated act adopted under this Article to the European Parliament and to the Council shall state the reasons for the use of the urgency procedure.
2. Either the European Parliament or the Council may object to a delegated act in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 36(5). In such a case, the Commission shall repeal the act without delay following the notification of the decision to object by the European Parliament or the Council.
Article 38
1. Information received pursuant to this Regulation shall be used only for the purpose for which it was requested.
2. Neither information of a confidential nature nor any information provided on a confidential basis received pursuant to this Regulation shall be disclosed without specific permission from the supplier of such information.
3. Each request for confidentiality shall state the reasons why the information is confidential. However, if the supplier of the information wishes neither to make it public nor to authorise its disclosure in general terms or in the form of a summary and if it appears that the request for confidentiality is unjustified, the information concerned may be disregarded.
4. Information shall in any case be considered to be confidential if its disclosure is likely to have a significantly adverse effect upon the supplier or the source of such information.
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not preclude reference by the Union authorities to general information and in particular to reasons on which decisions taken pursuant to this Regulation are based. Those authorities shall, however, take into account the legitimate interests of natural and legal persons concerned so that their business secrets shall not be divulged.
Article 39
1. The Commission shall be assisted by the Generalised Preferences Committee established by Regulation (EC) No 732/2008. That Committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. The Committee may examine any matter relating to the application of this Regulation, raised by the Commission or at the request of a Member State.
2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.
3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.
4. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply in conjunction with Article 5 thereof.
Article 40
By 1 January 2016 and every two years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the effects of the scheme covering the most recent two-year period and all of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).
By 21 November 2017, the Commission shall submit, to the European Parliament and to the Council, a report on the application of this Regulation. Such a report may, where appropriate, be accompanied by a legislative proposal.
Article 41
Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 is repealed with effect from 1 January 2014.
References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as references to this Regulation in accordance with the correlation table set out in Annex X.
CHAPTER VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 42
1. Any investigation or temporary withdrawal procedure initiated and not terminated under Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 shall be reinitiated automatically under this Regulation, except in respect of a beneficiary country of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance under that Regulation if the investigation concerns only the benefits granted under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. However, such investigation shall be reinitiated automatically if the same beneficiary country applies for the special incentive arrangement under this Regulation before 1 January 2015.
2. The information received in the course of an investigation initiated and not terminated under Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 shall be taken into account in any reinitiated investigation.
Article 43
1. This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
2. It shall apply from 20 November 2012.
However, the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) shall apply from 1 January 2014.
3. The scheme shall apply until 31 December 2023. However, the expiry date shall neither apply to the special arrangement for the least-developed countries, nor, to the extent that they are applied in conjunction with that arrangement, to any other provisions of this Regulation.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Strasbourg, 25 October 2012.