about
two to one
Could the rest of the army live up to the Guard , for instance ? Yes , that was the grave , the all-important question . There was an enormous disparity in numbers between the French army -- or it would better be called Napoleon 's army -- and that of the allies he purposed to attack . The allies were to the French in the ratio of about two to one . Whatever else was lacking , Napoleon had not lost his audacity , nor when his intentions are disclosed by a study of his plans , can it be argued that his strategic intention was lacking in brilliancy or daring . He determined with his smaller but compact and manageable army to thrust himself between the two wings of the somewhat loosely coherent enemy under its divided command ; to hold off one while he smashed the other and then to concentrate upon the surviving half and mete out to it the same hard fortune . In other words , trusting to his ability , he deliberately placed his own army between two others , each of which practically equaled his own .