five P.M.
The enemy had now had seven hours in which to learn of the movement and prepare to meet it . General Johnston says : `` The Federal troops extended their intrenched line -LSB- we did not intrench -RSB- so rapidly to their left that it was found necessary to transfer Cleburne 's division to Hardee 's corps to our right , where it was formed on the prolongation of Polk 's line . '' General Hood , commanding the enemy 's right corps , says : `` On the morning of the 27th the enemy were known to be rapidly extending their left , attempting to turn my right as they extended . Cleburne was deployed to meet them , and at half-past five P.M. a very stubborn attack was made on this division , extending to the right , where Major-General Wheeler with his cavalry division was engaging them . The assault was continued with great determination upon both Cleburne and Wheeler . '' That , then , was the situation : a weak brigade of fifteen hundred men , with masses of idle troops behind in the character of audience , waiting for the word to march a quarter-mile up hill through almost impassable tangles of underwood , along and across precipitous ravines , and attack breastworks constructed at leisure and manned with two divisions of troops as good as themselves . True , we did not know all this , but if any man on that ground besides Wood and Howard expected a `` walkover '' his must have been a singularly hopeful disposition .