Jerry Fodor's rejection of a theory of this property based on inferential roles led him to argue that lexical concepts are "informational atoms". A paper commonly referred to by the acronym PTQ posits that this property is a function of a sentence's syntactic constituents and their combinations; that paper was written by Richard Montague. Donald Davidson proposed a theory of this property in which every sentence in a language corresponds to a Tarskian (TAR-skee-in) T-sentence. Hilary Putnam imagined a "Twin Earth" containing a substance physically identical to water known as XYZ to argue that this property "ain't just in the head". In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues that this property is determined
Jerry Fodor's rejection of a theory of this property based on inferential roles led him to argue that lexical concepts are "informational atoms". A paper commonly referred to by the acronym PTQ posits that this property is a function of a sentence's syntactic constituents and their combinations; that paper was written by Richard Montague. Donald Davidson proposed a theory of this property in which every sentence in a language corresponds to a Tarskian (TAR-skee-in) T-sentence. Hilary Putnam imagined a "Twin Earth" containing a substance physically identical to water known as XYZ to argue that this property "ain't just in the head". In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues that this property is determined by a word's use. For 10 points, name this property studied in semantics.
Jerry Fodor's rejection of a theory of this property based on inferential roles led him to argue that lexical concepts are "informational atoms".