The last section of this work concludes with the remark that its vision of the "good" society resembles  that of the Enlightenment philosophers, and that the ideal is approached when the recognition that  "man's reason is slave to his passion," leads to improved organization. The sixth chapter of this work  introduces the "external-costs function," and the "decision-making-costs function," and one of the  arguments of this work is that if side-payments are al owed, the results wil be Pareto-optimal for any  decision-making rule for col ective a
The last section of this work concludes with the remark that its vision of the "good" society resembles  that of the Enlightenment philosophers, and that the ideal is approached when the recognition that  "man's reason is slave to his passion," leads to improved organization. The sixth chapter of this work  introduces the "external-costs function," and the "decision-making-costs function," and one of the  arguments of this work is that if side-payments are al owed, the results wil be Pareto-optimal for any  decision-making rule for col ective action. This work begins by claiming to give a theory of "what we think the State ought to be," and argues for a "methodological y individualistic" model for analyzing col ective  behavior. Its third part is an application of game theory to voting structures, such as unanimity and  majority rule, and is third chapter is an attempt to reconcile political theory's emphasis on "public  interest" with economic behavior. For 10 points, identify this seminal work of public choice theory,  written by Gordon Tul ock and James Buchanan.
The last section of this work concludes with the remark that its vision of the "good" society resembles  that of the Enlightenment philosophers, and that the ideal is approached when the recognition that  "man's reason is slave to his passion," leads to improved organization.
The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy