Mechanisms can be characterized as having ex-ante, interim, or ex-post individual forms of this property. The weak axiom of revealed preference is a consequence of assuming this type of preference relation, which is defined to be complete and transitive. A good whose current utility depends upon past consumption was modeled in a paper about this type of addiction by Kevin Murphy and Gary (*) Becker. A common modeling assumption states that an individual's forecasts are equal to the expectation conditional on present information, which is a hypothesis named for this type of "expectations." For 10 points, game theory ty
Mechanisms can be characterized as having ex-ante, interim, or ex-post individual forms of this property. The weak axiom of revealed preference is a consequence of assuming this type of preference relation, which is defined to be complete and transitive. A good whose current utility depends upon past consumption was modeled in a paper about this type of addiction by Kevin Murphy and Gary (*) Becker. A common modeling assumption states that an individual's forecasts are equal to the expectation conditional on present information, which is a hypothesis named for this type of "expectations." For 10 points, game theory typically assumes what type of utility-maximizing behavior in which people act reasonably?
Mechanisms can be characterized as having ex-ante, interim, or ex-post individual forms of this property.
rational [or rationality; or word forms]