This is the second title concept of an article that dismisses the intuitionist criticisms of Benno Kerry, and asserts that the proper names of these things cannot function as grammatical predicates. That work by Gottlob Frege distinguishes between "concept" and this other entity. Concerns about intentionality led Alexius Meinong to claim there are non-existent types of these entities, which Russell rejected in "On Denoting." Quine distinguished between concrete and abstract types of these. This is the second title concept of a book that uses the example of a pointing at a rabbit and saying gavagai to illustrate the indeterminacy of translation. For 10 points, Quine wrote about "Word" and what concept, which is often contrasted with "the subject?"
This is the second title concept of an article that dismisses the intuitionist criticisms of Benno Kerry, and asserts that the proper names of these things cannot function as grammatical predicates. That work by Gottlob Frege distinguishes between "concept" and this other entity. Concerns about intentionality led Alexius Meinong to claim there are non-existent types of these entities, which Russell rejected in "On Denoting." Quine distinguished between concrete and abstract types of these. This is the second title concept of a book that uses the example of a pointing at a rabbit and saying gavagai to illustrate the indeterminacy of translation. For 10 points, Quine wrote about "Word" and what concept, which is often contrasted with "the subject?"
This is the second title concept of an article that dismisses the intuitionist criticisms of Benno Kerry, and asserts that the proper names of these things cannot function as grammatical predicates.
objects