In a 1978 article, Daniel Dennett concluded that our concept of this phenomenon was incoherent and argued against the possibility of implementing this phenomenon as a computer program. In Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke argued that this phenomenon was not "picked out by one of its accidental properties," but rather "by its immediate phenomenological quality," and that it was absurd to suggest that it could exist without being a mental state. An article by David Lewis drew on a theory by David Armstrong to characterize
In a 1978 article, Daniel Dennett concluded that our concept of this phenomenon was incoherent and argued against the possibility of implementing this phenomenon as a computer program. In Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke argued that this phenomenon was not "picked out by one of its accidental properties," but rather "by its immediate phenomenological quality," and that it was absurd to suggest that it could exist without being a mental state. An article by David Lewis drew on a theory by David Armstrong to characterize this phenomenon as "a state that occupies a certain causal role;" that paper called it a "non-rigid" concept and argued that "a credible theory of mind needs to make a place for both"  the "mad" and the "Martian" varieties of this phenomenon. Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature imagines beings called Antipodeans who speak of this sensation in terms of the firing of C-fibers. For 10 points, identify this bodily sensation which you might get if you prick your finger.
In a 1978 article, Daniel Dennett concluded that our concept of this phenomenon was incoherent and argued against the possibility of implementing this phenomenon as a computer program.
pain