John Harsyani has argued that Bayesian decision theory and utilitarian welfare functions disprove this notion, while Samuelson extended this concept to von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
John Harsyani has argued that Bayesian decision theory and utilitarian welfare functions disprove this notion, while Samuelson extended this concept to von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Some alternative ways of proving this result have been offered by Barbera and Geanakoplos, who have simplified the proofs by changing "decisive voter" to the weaker "pivotal voter." This idea was proposed in a book that lays out its "Individualistic Assumptions" and "The Compensation Principle," a work that grew from the (*) PhD thesis of its namesake, who shared the Nobel with Hicks. Proposed in Social Choice and Individual Values, FTP, identify this theorem which shows that that no social preference order could satisfy a set of conditions like unanimity and non- dictatorship, a so-called "impossibility theorem" named for an American social choice theorist.
John Harsyani has argued that Bayesian decision theory and utilitarian welfare functions disprove this notion, while Samuelson extended this concept to von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
{Arrow’s} {Impossibility} Theorem [accept either answer before “impossibility”]