They are absorbing states for learning via fictitious play, but Shapley showed in 1964 that convergence to these does not always occur. Dynamic programming and self-generation techniques were used by Fudenberg, Maskin, and Levine to establish the exi
They are absorbing states for learning via fictitious play, but Shapley showed in 1964 that convergence to these does not always occur. Dynamic programming and self-generation techniques were used by Fudenberg, Maskin, and Levine to establish the existence of its public perfect refinement when players only use publicly available historical information. While it is the best result that can be supported in one-shot games, the folk theorem implies that it can be improved for repeated games. FTP, name this game theoretical situation in which when all players are best-responding to their opponents' play.
They are absorbing states for learning via fictitious play, but Shapley showed in 1964 that convergence to these does not always occur.
{Nash equilibrium}