For 10 points, name this coordination game first described by Rousseau, in which a player can choose to go after a hare alone or try to collaborate to pursue the namesake beast.
Ondrej Rydval argued that rational behavior in this scenario is best framed using the principle of loss avoidance. This situation is theoretically equivalent to the problems of draining a meadow and crossing a river that are presented in Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature. Brian Skryms argued that it appropriately models social contract theory in a book about it and the evolution of social structure. This scenario was first introduced in the book (*) Discourse on Inequality and features a risk-dominant equilibrium and a payoff-dominant equilibrium which are non-identical, thus making it have two Nash equilibria. For 10 points, name this coordination game first described by Rousseau, in which a player can choose to go after a hare alone or try to collaborate to pursue the namesake beast.
Ondrej Rydval argued that rational behavior in this scenario is best framed using the principle of loss avoidance.
stag hunt