This work opens by asserting that the "original thesis" of philosophy is nothing more than a "category-mistake" that results from erroneously distinguishing mental processes from their physical origins and from relying on a "ghost in the machine".
Daniel Dennett compared re-reading this work to Pierre Menard's new writing of Don Quixote and claims it is "wonderfully, importantly shallow" in an essay titled "Reintroducing" this work. This work claims that language referring to the self is just public language reversed in the section "The Systematic Elusiveness of I". This book uses the example of a cigarette smoker to distinguish between "episodes" and "dispositions" in a chapter that claims that learning only implies the ability to do things. That chapter also outlines the difference between the capacity to be right and the tendency to act a certain way, or (*) knowing and believing in the section "Knowing How and Knowing That". This work opens by asserting that the "original thesis" of philosophy is nothing more than a "category-mistake" that results from erroneously distinguishing mental processes from their physical origins and from relying on a "ghost in the machine". For 10 points, name this work that attacks Cartesian dualism, a book by Gilbert Ryle.
Daniel Dennett compared re-reading this work to Pierre Menard's new writing of Don Quixote and claims it is "wonderfully, importantly shallow" in an essay titled "Reintroducing" this work.
The {Concept} of {Mind}