Two possible solutions to this paradox include finding some sort of commonality amongst individual preferences, or determining single-peakedness, if there is any; these solutions were advanced by Duncan Black.
One proof of it proved the strict neutrality lemma whereby all binary social rankings are made the same way; that proof was published by John Geankopolos. Two possible solutions to this paradox include finding some sort of commonality amongst individual preferences, or determining single-peakedness, if there is any; these solutions were advanced by Duncan Black. The theorem itself can be constructed under assumptions which include independence of irrelevant alternatives, monotonicity, and citizen sovereignty, the latter two of which may be substituted with an assumption of Pareto efficiency. For 10 points, name this eponymous economic theory that demonstrates the failure of voting systems based on individual preference to construct a social preference.
One proof of it proved the strict neutrality lemma whereby all binary social rankings are made the same way; that proof was published by John Geankopolos.
{Arrow's Impossibility} Theorem [or {Arrow's} paradox]