Ideas of William Lycan, by Theme

[American, b.1945, Professor at the University of North Carolina.]

Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens
Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events
Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects
Intentionality comes in degrees
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing
Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones
A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 2. Reduction of Mind
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws
Meaning must be known before we can consider verification
It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name
Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it?
The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation
Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate'
19. Language / C. Semantics / 5. Possible Worlds Semantics
A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true
Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation
People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees