Friday, November 5, 2010

What's the "Target" of Runeson's Smart-Rote Distinction

In posts on this topic a week or so ago, I was harping on what appears to me to be the messiness of this smart-rote distinction.  It is not clear to me how particular cases are supposed to be classified.  There seem to me to be cases that have both features of rote mechanisms and features of smart mechanisms.  So, this seems to me to be an expository issue.
  Rote instruments consist of large numbers of a few types of basic components, each of which performs a rather simple task. The accomplishment of complex tasks is possible through intricate interconnections (programming) between the components. The important principles of operation reside in the program, and by changing the program the instrument can be put to different uses. New problems can be approached in a straightforward, intellectual, bureaucratic, "systems", manner. The solutions will be elementaristic and often a bit clumsy.
     Smart instruments are specialized on a particular (type of) task in a particular (type of) situation and capitalize on the peculiarities of the situation and the task, i.e. use shortcuts, etc. They consist of few but specialized components. For solving problems which are repeated very often, smart instruments, if they exist, are more efficient and more economical. They are also likely to be more reliable and durable. Solution of a new problem requires the invention of a new instrument. A straightforward and bureaucratic procedure is not likely to achieve that, since the task is creative and just as much intuitive as intellectual. (Runeson, 1977, pp. 173-4).
But, I also am very unsure what Runeson takes to be the "targets" of his exposition.  When I look at the anatomy and physiology of human beings, I see structures, namely, neural networks, that seem to me to consist of many parts that are "programmable".  But, I don't see what structure Runeson takes to "consist of few but specialized components".  This is not to say that there aren't or couldn't be.  It's that I am unsure what he is talking about.  Is the retina one of the few, but specialized components?  Is the lateral geniculate nucleus another?  And area V1 another?  I don't know.  This, too, is an expository issue.


  1. The hand is certainly one. Andy Clark sent me a paper ages ago about how the structure of the hand implements some of the suggested computations required to control the hand; a nice example of literal embodied cognition. I cannot, however, find this paper for the life of me - I will keep looking (it exists, I promise!)

    I'll guess this isn't the kind of thing you're looking for, though. Given you like your psychology experimental, maybe this will help?

    Zhu & Bingham (2010) Learning To Perceive the Affordance for Long-Distance Throwing: Smart Mechanism or Function Learning? JEP:HPP 36(4), 862-875 (

  2. I haven't had a chance to really read the Zhu & Bingham, but one nice feature of this is that they apparently have a "cleaner" account of what they mean by a "smart" mechanism.

    They write, "According to Runeson, (1977), perception might be smart by taking advantage of particular circumstances in a task that simplify the perceptual problems by providing access to a single information variable that specifies the perceived property." They drop the part about few and specialized components. They also drop the specialized stuff.