Battle of Sinop

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Battle of Sinop
Part of the Crimean War
Battle of Sinop.jpg
The Battle of Sinop, by Ivan Aivazovsky. Oil on Canvas.
Date 30 November 1853 (18 November O.S.)
Location Sinop, Ottoman Empire
Result Decisive Russian victory
Russia Russian Empire  Ottoman Empire
Commanders and leaders
Russian Empire Pavel Nakhimov Ottoman Empire Osman Pasha
Ottoman Empire Adolphus Slade
6 ships of the line,
2 frigates,
3 steamers
unknown land forces
7 frigates,
3 corvettes,
2 steamers
Casualties and losses
37 killed,
233 wounded,
~3 ships of the line damaged
~3,000 killed or wounded,
1 frigate sunk,
1 steamer sunk,
6 frigates grounded,
3 corvettes grounded,
~2 shore batteries destroyed

The Battle of Sinop, or the Battle of Sinope, took place on 30 November 1853 at Sinop, a sea port in northern Anatolia, when Imperial Russian warships struck and annihilated a patrol force of Ottoman ships anchored in the harbor. The battle was part of the Crimean War, and a contributory factor in bringing France and Britain into the conflict.


The Battle of Sinop was a direct result of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the loss of Ottoman force projection into the Black Sea. By 1850, the Ottoman Empire was deeply in debt and relied exclusively on British and French loans as a means of support. As a result, Ottoman leaders had no choice but to agree to drastic force reductions in both Army and Navy force tables. By 1853, Tsar Nicholas I saw the reductions as an opportunity to press Russian claims in the Trans-Cacasus and along the Danube River.[1] In July 1853, Russian forces occupied several Ottoman principalities along the Danube, as well as forts. When mediation broke down Sultan Abdul Mejd I responded with a declaration of war. Fearing Russian expansion, the Anglo-French issued a concurrent ultimatum: Russia was to fight only defensively. As long as Russia stayed on the defensive the Anglo-French would remain neutral, but if Russia acted "aggressively" the Western Powers reserved the right to get involved.[2]

Hostilites began officially on 4 October, with a principal theater in Europe and another in the Caucasus. Sultan Mejd ordered an immediate offensive to drive back the Russians and demonstrate Ottoman might before Ottoman finances totally collapsed.[3] The offensive along the Danube met with mixed success, but the Ottoman attack into the Russian Cacasus was relatively successful. By the end of October, the Russian Cacasus Corps was in danger of being surrounded.



On 30 November, Vice Admiral Novosiliski rallied six more ships to Nakhimov, completing the blocade force in a loose semi-circle. Additional steamers were expected, but Nakhimov decided to act before the Ottomans could be reinforced by additional ships. Osman for his part had been well aware of the Russian presence since 23 November, but felt his ships were safe in harbor. Sinope had substantial harbor defenses and forts with interlocking fields of fire and ample cannon.[5] Moreover, it was technically against the established rules of war to attack ships at anchor or for upper class ships to attack ships of a lower class and displacement. In a stunning command decision, Osman did little to break the weak Russian blockade, even allowing many of his crews to disembark.[5]


Russian Admiral Pavel Nakhimov, hero of Battle of Sinop and Siege of Sevastopol
Aivasovsky Ivan Constantinovich sinop 1853



Only one Ottoman vessel, the twelve gun steamer Taif, managed to escape the battle while all the others were either sunk or purposely run ashore to prevent sinking. She fled to Constantinople and arrived on 2 December where she informed the Ottoman government of the defeat at Sinop. Once the enemy fleet was destroyed the Russians engaged Ottoman shore batteries and destroyed them. During the fighting a reported 37 Russians were killed and 233 were wounded, although one source says that a total of 266 Russian officers and crewmen perished;[6] at least three of the ships of the line were damaged. Ottoman forces lost over 3,000 men killed or wounded and their leader Osman Pasha was captured.


When telegraphs of the battle reach Russian authorities in St. Petersburg the reaction was jubilant. The untested and widely hated Russian Navy had proved victorious and the recent expenditure in its development seemed warranted. Several balls were held to celebrate the victory and a state funded parade was held. The affair was rather grand involving dancers, bands, parading troops that had not taken part in the battle and criminals dressed up in Ottoman uniforms. Military advisors saw the battle as a turning point and pushed for shell firing guns to be installed on all Russian ships.[7]

The reaction in Istanbul was less enthusiastic with Ottoman reaction ranging from concern to total panic. Russia had annihilated a vital convoy and now had operation control over the Black Sea. The destruction of the Harbor defenses opened the door to Russian multi stage invasion and suddenly the entire Samsun and Trabzon Coast was now at risk. Moreover, the Russian violation of the British/French mandate for the war meant that the actions of Russia could no longer be predicted and Russia might not be fighting with one hand tied behind its back.[7] Subsequent policy was directed toward the Anglo-French and the comprehensive military agreement that Istanbul had been trying to avoid.


Importance to naval warfare[edit]

Sinope was not so much a battle as an ambush, but its results were nonetheless important to the practice of 19th Century warfare and the evolution of naval doctrine. Prior to Sinope the standard naval armament were smoothbores that fired cannon balls, shot, shrapnel or other projectiles. Paixhans guns or regional equivalents were slowly being upgraded into navies but only the French, Russia and American navies had made a comprehensive effort. These batteries represented a clear evolution in Naval technology that broke through the final ceiling of the Age of Sail.[9] Unlike previous smoothbore ordinance, Paixhan guns fired explosive shells and not mere metal projectiles. The shells themselves did both kinetic and explosive damage, causing fires. In addition, the new guns were heavier, could engage at a higher range, and possessed far greater penetrating power.[9]

But until 1853, no navy had made comprehensive use of shell firing guns in a live combat environment. Indeed, many experts shamed the new weapons and the larger ships required to carry them as too heavy for naval warfare. The results of Sinope were clear and showed that the new weapons were effective. As a result an arms race ensued with participant nations desperately looking for ways to up-gun existing ships and incorporate the shell firing guns into new launches.[9]

Order of battle[edit]

Russian Empire[edit]

  • Veliky Knyaz Konstantin, ship of the line, 120 guns
  • Tri Sviatitelia, ship of the line, 120 guns
  • Chesma, ship of the line, 84 guns
  • Rostislav, ship of the line, 84 guns
  • Kulevtcha, frigate, 54 guns
  • Kagul, frigate, 44 guns
  • Odessa, steamer, 4 guns
  • Krym, steamer, 4 guns
  • Khersones, steamer, 4 guns

Ottoman Empire[edit]

  • Avni Illah, frigate, 44 guns (grounded)
  • Navek Bahri, frigate, 58 guns (exploded)
  • Kaid Zafer, frigate, 54 guns (grounded)
  • Nejm Fishan, corvette, 24 guns
  • Feyz Mabud, corvette, 24 guns (grounded)
  • Kel Safid, corvette, 22 guns (exploded)
  • Taif, steamer, 12 guns (retreated to Istanbul)
  • Erkelye, steamer, 10 guns


  2. ^ Small 2014, p. 17
  3. ^ Small 2014, pp. 5–7
  6. ^ a b c "Chapter 8: Sinop". History of the Russian Navy. RUSnet. 1996. 
  7. ^ a b Small 2014, pp. 45–47
  8. ^ Marjie Bloy Ph.D. "The Crimean War: Immediate Causes". 
  9. ^ a b c Sondhaus, Lawrence (2000). Naval Warfare, 1815–1914. New York: Routledge. 
  • Istanbul Naval Museum k.

External links[edit]