Reification (fallacy)

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Reification (also known as concretism, hypostatization, or the fallacy of misplaced concreteness) is a fallacy of ambiguity, when an abstraction (abstract belief or hypothetical construct) is treated as if it were a concrete real event or physical entity.[1][2] In other words, it is the error of treating something which is not concrete, such as an idea, as a concrete thing. A common case of reification is the confusion of a model with reality: "the map is not the territory".

Reification is part of normal usage of natural language (just like metonymy for instance), as well as of literature, where a reified abstraction is intended as a figure of speech, and actually understood as such. But the use of reification in logical reasoning or rhetoric is misleading and usually regarded as a fallacy.[citation needed]


From Latin res ("thing") and -fication, a suffix related to facere ("to make").[3] Thus reification can be loosely translated as "thing-making"; the turning of something abstract into a concrete thing or object.


Reification takes place when natural or social processes are misunderstood and/or simplified; for example, when human creations are described as "facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will".[4] Reification can also occur when a word with a normal usage is given an invalid usage, with mental constructs or concepts referred to as live beings.[citation needed]

Reification may derive from an inborn tendency to simplify experience by assuming constancy as much as possible.[5]

Difference from hypostatization[edit]

Sometimes a distinction is drawn between reification and hypostatization based on the kinds of abstractions involved.[clarification needed] In reification, they are usually philosophical or ideological, such as existence, good, and justice.[2]

Fallacy of misplaced concreteness[edit]


[…] among the primary elements of nature as apprehended in our immediate experience, there is no element whatever which possesses this character of simple location. [… Instead,] I hold that by a process of constructive abstraction we can arrive at abstractions which are the simply located bits of material, and at other abstractions which are the minds included in the scientific scheme. Accordingly, the real error is an example of what I have termed: The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.[7]

Vicious abstractionism[edit]




Use of constructs in science[edit]


Stephen Jay Gould draws heavily on the idea of fallacy of reification in his book The Mismeasure of Man. He argues that the error in using intelligence quotient scores to judge people's intelligence is that, just because a quantity called "intelligence" or "intelligence quotient" is defined as a measurable thing does not mean that intelligence is real; thus denying the validity of the construct "intelligence."

Relation to other fallacies[edit]



Reification fallacy should not be confused with other fallacies of ambiguity:


As a rhetorical device[edit]

Reification is commonly found in rhetorical devices such as metaphor and personification. In those cases we are usually not dealing with a fallacy but with rhetorical applications of language. The distinction is that the fallacy occurs during an argument that results in invalid conclusions. This distinction is often difficult to make, particularly when the fallacious use is intentional.[2]

See also[edit]


  1. ^ Reification, Encyclopedia Britannica 
  2. ^ a b c Logical Fallacies, Formal and Informal
  3. ^ "reification, n." OED Online. Oxford University Press, September 2016. Web. 24 September 2016. Format
  4. ^ David K. Naugle (2002). Worldview: the history of a concept. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing. p. 178. ISBN 0-8028-4761-7. 
  5. ^ David Galin in B. Alan Wallace, editor, Buddhism & Science: Breaking New Ground. Columbia University Press, 2003, p. 132.
  8. ^ James, William, The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism', (1909/1979), Harvard University Press, pp. 135-136
  11. ^ pathetic fallacy. Retrieved on: October 9, 2012