Dealing with a volatile Asia
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Dec 19, 2012  |  Vote 0    0

Dealing with a volatile Asia

Guelph Mercury

Stephen Harper’s government is actively seeking to build links with China and India, and it recognizes the growing importance of Asia for Canadian trade interests and as a source of immigration, but how ready is it to deeply engage a rapidly changing Asia?

The Asian landscape is dominated by many dangerous issues. North Korea remains a high-profile nuclear and missile proliferation threat to the region. Its recent rocket test shows a growing capacity to send nuclear-capable missiles into South Korea, Japan and possibly the U.S. Pacific coast. There is a constant fear that Pakistani nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of the Taliban and al-Qaida and menace the region. Iran’s nuclear development remains a matter of serious concern for Middle Eastern stability.

Secondly, Asia has many long-standing territorial disputes. China and India have a 2,000-mile border in the Himalayas where the dispute led to a war in 1962 that remains unresolved. Japan and China have made warlike moves over their dispute with the islands called Senkaku by Japan and Daioyo by China. China is at odds with the Philippines and Vietnam over territorial claims in the South China Sea, which contains valuable oil and mineral resources that require the use of the latest deep sea drilling technology.

Forty per cent of the world trade goes through the Pacific and Indian oceans, and the South China Sea is a critical part of the passageway. China claims this as its own and is establishing its maritime presence in the area, and it does not wish to discuss the contentious issues in a multilateral way as the Southeast Asian countries want.

Each territorial dispute has the potential to lead to war. At present, the U.S. has a formidable naval presence in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and India’s navy is now the second one in the Indian Ocean, but China’s military and naval power is rising. The U.S. is increasing bogged down with internal politics and economic problems and its capacity to referee these territorial disputes is shrinking.

The West has been the guardian of the sea lanes since the 1800s, and its naval strength remains the basis of global commerce in the Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean world. But western control over key regions in Asia is slipping and non-state actors such as the Taliban and al-Qaida remain embedded in Pakistan, Yemen and North Africa and their reach into Libya and Syria — and Iran’s reach into Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza — shows the growing instability in the world between the Mediterranean and South Asia.

In Asia and the two oceans the footprint of Asian powers is increasing. China now is the second largest world economy and other Asian economies have respectable growth rates. Bangladesh, a small nation, has a five per cent growth rate and southeast Asian nations such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have grown into attractive investment destinations.

Last but not least, Asian countries are forming trading blocs in East and Southeast Asia. China-India trade has crossed the $100-billion mark and China has strong trade links with Australia and southeast Asian countries as well as the U.S. and Europe. In short, the Asians, Europeans and Americans have already rebalanced their economic and military alignments to correspond to their national interests.

But where is Canada in the massive rebalancing process in Asia?

Since the end of the Second World War, Canada has fashioned its diplomacy on the coattails of the United States. During the Cold War, the U.S. shaped the security architecture of the Asia Pacific region through a pattern of regional alliances, and her economic and diplomatic activity kept the Soviets in check. As well, the U.S. projected a euro-atlantic-centric view of the importance of shared values, democracy, pluralism, and multilateralism in Asian affairs, and American allies adopted this approach.

But now, two changes are altering the American and the western strategic footprint in Asia.

First, the U.S. itself is under internal economic pressure, its public is tired of foreign entanglements after prolonged American military campaigns in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, and China’s rising military power means that the U.S. alone can no longer police the region.

Secondly, Asian countries do not share western ideas about shared values and do not take them seriously because the western countries are selective about the use of such values. Often, commercial and strategic interests trump human rights and democratic values in the conduct of western nations.

The 21st century is a period of profound transformation in Asia where the Asians themselves are interested in shaping their security architecture, and they have developed economic and military methods to pursue their interests.

Canada has been a laggard in creating a Canadian footprint in Asia. Its diplomats and businesses have not developed distinct Canadian brands, barring a few successes. Sun Life sells life insurance in India; Bombardier is active in rail and aerospace in China; Manulife sells insurance in parts of Asia; and now the Harper government has signalled an interest in building energy ties with China with its approval of the China National Offshore Oil Corp.-Nexen deal.

But Canada also has baggage, which it is now unwinding. It used to press India on Kashmir and nuclear affairs. But now India is America’s strategic partner and the Harper government (but not the Liberal party) accepts that point. But they are not in the game because much diplomatic work is required to reset relations.

Canada’s China policy is another example of poor diplomatic preparation. Since the days of Jean Chrétien, Bo Xilai, the head of the southern Chinese city of Chongquing, was Canada’s main interlocutor in China. He was the must-see person for Canadian leaders and officials. But his wife was implicated in the murder of a British businessman, and her husband, a rising star, is in disgrace. Canada’s main political asset was lost and now the Harper government must rebuild its constituency in China.

Ottawa’s Asia diplomacy is unbalanced. One example will suffice. Several years ago, Immigration Minister Jason Kenney wanted to bring Tibetan immigrants into Canada out of Indian refugee camps. The pro-China Department of Foreign Affairs had reservations: what will Beijing think?

Bringing the Tibetans into Canada is good immigration policy because they are used to harsh winter conditions and are motivated to work. It also gives some substance to Canada’s proclaimed support of human rights. Kenney won eventually won the debate, and now 1,000 Tibetans have been chosen as immigrants.

But if Canadians expect to make an impression in Asia, they will need to join the economic and strategic conversations of Asian countries and be seen as engaged world citizens.


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