Wrong signals

Confusing laws hamper international naval efforts to fight piracy

InternationalMay 9th 2009 edition

WHEN pirates attacked the MV Kition, a Greek tanker, late at night in the Gulf of Aden on May 1st, a Portuguese helicopter scared off the assailants and tracked their skiff to its “mother ship”. Portuguese special forces boarded the vessel and found dynamite, automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). That was plenty of evidence, but the pirates went free (after being disarmed). Other countries, including Canada and the Netherlands, have acted similarly. America says such leniency sends “the wrong signal”.

Elsewhere in the lawless waters off Somalia, European navies have been more robust. French commandos have used lethal force to free hostages. Other navies have arrested dozens of suspected pirates and sent them for trial in nearby countries. On April 26th, a Spanish warship helped the Seychelles authorities detain nine Somalis linked to an attack on an Italian cruise liner, the MSC Melody, a day earlier. Sailors and security guards had fought them off; a passenger who saw them coming hurled a deckchair down at them.

The difference in outcomes is odd. The requirement to fight piracy is one of the oldest bits of international law. The idea that any country may take action against pirates is the precursor to the idea of “universal jurisdiction” used to prosecute heinous crimes such as genocide. In Latin legalese, pirates are termed hostis humani generis (an “enemy of mankind”). Moreover, the UN's Convention on the Law of the Sea stretches the definition to include crewing a pirate ship and inciting or “intentionally facilitating” attacks. Surely sailing with RPGs, long ladders and grappling hooks should fall within this definition?


Gotcha! But what next?

But many countries have not fully incorporated all this into their national legislation. Some make arrests only if their own nationals or ships are attacked; the Portuguese navy said this was why it released the pirates who attacked the Kition. Britain's Royal Navy usually requires clear evidence of an actual attack. Just owning piratical kit may not be enough. It is not illegal to bear arms on the high seas.

Coalition politics are also awkward. Navies taking part in the European Union's Operation Atalanta have an agreement to hand over captured pirates to Kenya. But NATO doesn't. So vessels under the alliance's command (except British and American ones) can only “protect and deter”.

Practical considerations count too. Naval cover is stretched thinly over a vast tract of ocean, so delivering suspects to Kenya, say, would take a valuable warship off patrol. Worse, cumbersome court procedures there tie up sailors onshore. Faced with that, some officers reckon it is better to chuck captured weapons overboard but let the people go.

A new international court for pirates, as proposed by Russia, is one idea, but would take a lot of time and money. Douglas Guilfoyle, a law don at University College London, says efforts would be best aimed at boosting the legal systems of Kenya and other countries. The real answer is to sort out Somalia. And navies can't do that.

This article appeared in the International section of the print edition under the headline "Wrong signals"

Reuse this contentThe Trust Project
The Economist Today

Hand-picked stories, in your inbox

A daily email with the best of our journalism