Is Pak nuclear arsenal safe?

April 14, 2013, 4:39 pm IST in Chanakya Code | World | TOI

The US Congressional Research Service’s recent (13th Feb. 2013) study entitled “Pak Nuclear Weapons, Proliferation and Security Issues” has examined various dimensions of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Important findings of this study deserve serious attention, which are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. The two important aspects highlighted are the production programme of nuclear weapons and safety of weapons.

The study has concluded that Pakistan nuclear arsenal probably consists of 90-110 nuclear warheads, which could even be larger. It also mentions that Pakistan is producing fissile material, adding to the related production facilities and deploying additional delivery vehicles. While the estimate of number of nuclear weapons produced each year is not in doubt as several other experts have also come to similar assessment, though the estimates vary; the issue of availability of fissile material has been the subject of debate. The moot question is how much uranium or plutonium Pakistan has or is acquiring from outside to produce nuclear weapons. In this context a very balanced and exhaustive study has been made by Tamara Patton in her desertion in US. She has pointed out possible various sources of uranium and plutonium and also has analysed how much of these elements is required to make all the reactors operational.

On the indigenous sources of fissile material, she pointed out that Pakistan’s Bagalchore mine was exhausted and was closed in 2000 and now uranium comes mainly from Qabul Khel mine (1992), the Nanganai deposits (1996) and Taunsa deposits (2002). Current estimates indicate that from these sources, Pakistan may be getting about 40 tonnes of uranium per year. A study in 2009 indicated that three reactors at Khushab would require 40 tonnes of uranium per year if they operate at 70% efficiency of their capacity. The fourth reactor would require additional 31 tonnes of uranium. It is assessed that all the four reactors would require 71 tonnes of uranium. Patton suggests that Pakistan may be extracting uranium from Rock Phosphate. This is used to manufacture fertilizer but uranium has to be removed before converting it into fertilizer. It may be mentioned that Pakistan has established a joint venture with Morocco to ensure uninterrupted supply of Rock Phosphate. However it cannot be a major source as the amount of uranium is very small. It contains between .005 and .04% of yellow cake from which uranium is to be extracted. A liberal estimate suggests that Pakistan could get up to 5 tonnes from this source. This suggest that Pakistan has to get about 26 tonnes of uranium through external clandestine sources.

Pakistan’s own resources for uranium and plutonium have been in the focus of experts, who have broadly come to the conclusion that Pakistan is acquiring clandestinely from other countries. The US intelligence sources as also of other nations have revealed the assistance given by China in nuclear field. Pakistan had been able to secure Chinese highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel assemblies for Chasma Nuclear power Plant and a limited stock of natural uranium fuel assemblies for Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANNUP). Reports indicate that China, which is importing uranium from other countries, is supplying uranium to Pakistan from its own sources. A Q Khan in a letter to his wife had admitted that Pakistan and China had been cooperating in nuclear field for the last several years. He also revealed that China gave Pakistan drawings of nuclear weapons and also 50 kgs of enriched uranium and 50 tonnes of natural uranium (UF6). A recent report of Washington Free Beacon quoting US intelligence sources has revealed that China and Pakistan have entered into a secret agreement for Chashma 3 reactor was signed in Beijing during the visit by a delegation of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission from February 15 to 18, 2013. This confirms the continuing nexus between China and Pakistan in nuclear and missile fields.

Chinese sources are not the only rote through which Pakistan is clandestinely procuring uranium. A report of ISI in September, 2011 pointed out that ‘Pakistan as an underdeveloped country with no industrial infrastructure had to buy and acquire every bit of material and piece of equipment surreptitiously from abroad from open market and had to establish a network of cover companies both within and outside the country to by-pass the embargoes to import (smuggle) all the necessary items for the production of nuclear weapons.’ Both the US officials as also experts have come to the conclusion that the so called ‘Khan Proliferation Network’ may still be functioning. An important think tank IISS has also concluded that at least some of Khan’s associates may have escaped the attention of law enforcement authorities and could have resumed black market business. It can be safely concluded that without proliferation activities, the Pak nuclear programme cannot continue at the current speed.   

 It is also assessed that Pakistan’s two reactors are devoted to plutonium. The fourth reactor at Khushab that came into notice in 2008-2009 is going to increase considerably the weapon grade plutonium production capability. Experts are giving different figures Pakistan’s capability to produce nuclear weapons per year with the operationalization of the fourth reactor. While some say that all four reactors can produce 19-26 weapons per year, others say that Pakistan would be in position to produce 50 weapons per year. It will depend how much emphasis Pakistan gives to the production of plutonium based weapons. The Global Fissile Material Report in 2007 stated that Pakistan was producing HEU for weapons at a rate of at least 100 kilograms per year. Pakistan was earlier reported to be making heavier bombs which required about 20-25 kgs of HEU. Plutonium based weapons require 4.5-6 kgs of plutonium per weapon. Pakistan is also reported to be using tritium to boost the explosive yield of nuclear weapons. Earlier reports had revealed that Pakistan had obtained through two German firms tritium purification and production facility, tritium precursor materials and small amount of pure tritium. Current reports suggest that tritium is being used at the Khushab complex. That Pakistan is going in for a new generation of lighter and more powerful nuclear weapons is not in doubt. Plutonium based weapons would have more explosive yield in smaller and lighter packages. Pakistan had been making assiduous attempts to have smaller warheads to fit into cruise missiles.

In view of the above, experts have pointed out that Pakistan is producing nuclear weapons at a rapid speed and its tally could significantly increase in the couple of years. A recent book written by Brig. Feroz H. Khan entitled, “Eating Grass- The Insider Story of Pakistani Bomb” also suggests that Pakistan has significantly increased its nuclear weapon arsenal.

An aspect that requires attention is not the increase in the number of nuclear weapons by Pakistan but the vulnerability to Pakistani nuclear weapons as indicated in the US Congressional publication. While noting that Pakistan had assured that they have taken a number of steps for the safety of its nuclear weapons, the fear of these falling into wrong hands has been expressed by several US officials. Lt. Gen. L. Burgess, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency noting that Pakistan nuclear weapons are safe but pointed out that vulnerability still exists. General David H. Patraeus, former Commander of US Central Command had stated, “Pakistani State failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organisation an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks. Former Pakistan President and Army Chief General Musharraf had himself pointed out in 2011 that in case Pakistan disintegrates, the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into wrong hands cannot be ruled out.

How real is the threat of Pak nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of terrorists needs to be examined objectively. The Pakistani authorities have emphasised that they have secured codes (PALs) to ensure that unauthorised persons cannot use the weapons and these are in line with the US system. The second argument they advance is that the nuclear weapons have not been kept in mated position and the delivery systems and weapons are kept separately and therefore the chances of their possession by one group of terrorists is not possible. The third argument is that about 20,000 personnel are protecting the complexes where nuclear facilities are kept. These arguments certainly project the image that Pak nuclear arsenal is safe. Yet as suggested above, the experts both in Pakistan and outside have expressed time and again their apprehensions of these weapons falling into the hands of into wrong hands.

There are several reasons for this thinking. First is the growing radicalisation of the Pak Army that suggests that the codes may not be safe even if there are a number of persons involved in the operation. This suspicion gets further strengthened by the close relationship between ISI/Pak Army and the terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e- Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad etc. Musharraf himself had admitted that at least in two attacks on his life “junior” Pak Army officials having links with Al Qaeda were involved. The links between Hafiz Md. Ibrahim and Pak Army are well documented. Osama bin Laden’s stay  for several years in the Pak Army area itself is a testimony of growing nexus between the Pak Army and Al Qaeda linked terrorist outfits. A Pak journalist Farooq Suldheria has summed up the fears in the following words, “The Talibanisation of the Pak military is something we can’t overlook. What if internal Taliban take over nuclear assets?”

Second, the more worrisome reason is the links between the Pak nuclear scientists and terrorists. Several Pak nuclear scientists were reported to have close links with Al Qaeda and LeT. The groups like Al Qeada and LeT have shown interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Al Qaeda had links with well-known Pak Nuclear scientists like Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmoud and Abdul Majid. George Tenet, a former CIA Director, in his book has mentioned that Sultan Mahmoud had met Osama bin Laden in August, 2001 and had provided the rough design of a bomb to the Al Qaeda in August 2001. David Albright a former UN inspector and a well-known expert had also concluded that Abdul Majid and Sultan Mahmoud had provided significant assistance to Al Qaeda. Recent reports reveal that both Al Qaeda and LeT have employed specialists for developing “dirty bombs”. A notorious organisation called Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN), which was suspected to have interest in Pak nuclear assets for use by terrorist organisation, had also links with two Pak nuclear scientists- Muhammad Ali Mukhtar of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and Suleiman Assad of AQ Khan Lab. Had links with UTN. Significantly, Hamid Gul former DG ISI is the honorary patron of this organisation revealing its nexus with ISI.

The third reason is that several attacks on the sensitive armed forces installation reflect the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the Pak Army to protect its vital installations. At least six facilities widely believed to be associated with Pakistan’ nuclear programme have been successfully targeted by the terrorist groups. These include a suicide bomber attack on a bus carrying workers to Sargodha air base in Nov.2007, attack on a bus outside Kamara air base in Dec.2007, attack by Pakistani Taliban suicide bombers in Wah cantonment what experts believe to be Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly depot in Aug, 2008, attack on Karachi Army Headquarters in 2009, assault on the naval base in Karachi in 2011, and the attack on Minhas air force base in Kamara in August 2012. Such bold attacks in the well protected areas raise serious doubts about capabilities of the Pak Army to guard nuclear installations from the terrorists.

The fourth reason is the Pak decision to go in for tactical weapons which is clear from the acquisition of Nasr (Hatf IX) missile. The tactical nuclear assets have to be kept in readiness to be able to use them at a short notice; otherwise, they would not have sufficient deterrence. Such weapons are also to be deployed around the borders and the possibility of such places being attacked by terrorist outfits in connivance with the internal personnel to control nuclear weapons becomes distinct. Pak expert Pervez Hoodbhoy has aptly stated that the growing radicalisation within the military, given attacks on its own internal bases could lead to those nuclear weapons being hijacked by radical elements.

The fifth reason is that Pakistan authorities are acquiring fissile material clandestinely and therefore the possibility of such material falling into the hands of terrorists cannot be ruled out. The Act of 2004 prohibiting acquisition of banned items is not of any help as the government sources are involved in the process.

The above brings three possible dangers that need to be addressed. First is the terrorists and their supporters may cause radioactive leakage causing damage to the Pak Army and the civilians in the area. Second is that the terrorists may obtain fissile material to make “dirty bomb”, which can be used against anyone including the Pak Army or the US interests in the regions . An expert Elaine M Grossin has pointed out that Al Qaeda operatives have stated that they could use the Pakistani bomb to attack the US. Third is the unauthorised use of tactical nuclear weapon in some form by a radicalised section of armed forces.

Pakistan authorities should take preventive action rather than sitting comfortably on the premise that codes (PALs) and 20,000 personnel are sufficient to secure their nuclear assets. This demands identifying and weeding out suspicious elements both from the armed forces and the scientific community. If Pak authorities do not take appropriate action, they would keep on worrying about the exercises of US to take control of the Pak nuclear stores. In the present circumstances, US authorities have limited options.

DISCLAIMER : Views expressed above are the author's own.
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