


[what is involved in being part of something else]

27 ideas
Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato]
The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle]
Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts [Leibniz]
Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill]
Class membership is not transitive, unlike being part of a part of the whole [Lesniewski, by George/Van Evra]
In the military, persons are parts of parts of large units, but not parts of those large units [Rescher]
I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen]
We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins]
Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien]
Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo]
A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil]
A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil]
Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks]
We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons]
Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins]
For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki]
The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki]
The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]