Yalta Conference

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The Yalta Conference, sometimes called the Crimea Conference and codenamed the Argonaut Conference, held from February 4 to 11, 1945, was the World War II meeting of the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, represented by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Premier Joseph Stalin, respectively, for the purpose of discussing Europe's post-war reorganization. The conference convened in the Livadia Palace near Yalta in Crimea.


Yalta was the second of three wartime conferences among the Big Three. It had been preceded by the Tehran Conference in 1943, and was followed by the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, which was attended by Stalin, Churchill (who was replaced halfway through by the newly elected British Prime Minister Clement Attlee) and Harry S. Truman, Roosevelt's successor.

The Conference[edit]

All three leaders were attempting to establish an agenda for governing post-war Europe. They wanted to keep peace between post-world war countries. On the Eastern Front, the front line at the end of December 1943 remained in the Soviet Union but, by August 1944, Soviet forces were inside Poland and parts of Romania as part of their drive west.[1] By the time of the Conference, Red Army Marshal Georgy Zhukov's forces were 65 km (40 mi) from Berlin. Stalin's position at the conference was one which he felt was so strong that he could dictate terms. According to U.S. delegation member and future Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, "[i]t was not a question of what we would let the Russians do, but what we could get the Russians to do."[2] Moreover, Roosevelt hoped for a commitment from Stalin to participate in the United Nations.

Stalin, insisting that his doctors opposed any long trips, rejected Roosevelt's suggestion to meet at the Mediterranean.[3] He offered instead to meet at the Black Sea resort of Yalta, in the Crimea. Stalin's fear of flying also played a contributing factor in this decision.[4] Each leader had an agenda for the Yalta Conference: Roosevelt wanted Soviet support in the U.S. Pacific War against Japan, specifically invading Japan, as well as Soviet participation in the UN; Churchill pressed for free elections and democratic governments in Eastern and Central Europe (specifically Poland); and Stalin demanded a Soviet sphere of political influence in Eastern and Central Europe, an essential aspect of the USSR's national security strategy.


Roosevelt wanted the USSR to enter the Pacific War with the Allies. One Soviet precondition for a declaration of war against Japan was an American official recognition of Mongolian independence from China (Mongolian People's Republic had already been the Soviet satellite state in World War One and World War Two), and a recognition of Soviet interests in the Manchurian railways and Port Arthur (but not asking the Chinese to lease), as well as deprivation of Japanese soil (such as Sakhalin and Kuril Islands) to return to Russian custody since the Treaty of Portsmouth; these were agreed without Chinese representation, consultation or consent, with the American desire to end war early by reducing American casualties. Stalin agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific War three months after the defeat of Germany. Stalin pledged to Roosevelt to keep the nationality of the Korean Peninsula intact as Soviet Union entered the war against Japan.

A Big Three meeting room


At the time, the Red Army had occupied Poland completely and held much of Eastern Europe with a military power three times greater than Allied forces in the West. The Declaration of Liberated Europe did little to dispel the sphere of influence agreements that had been incorporated into armistice agreements.


Also, the Big Three agreed that all original governments would be restored to the invaded countries (with the exception of France, whose government was regarded as collaborationist; Romania and Bulgaria, where the Soviets had already liquidated most of the governments;[clarification needed] and Poland whose government-in-exile was also excluded by Stalin) and that all civilians would be repatriated.

Key points[edit]

The key points of the meeting are as follows:

  • Germany would undergo demilitarization and denazification.
  • The Polish eastern border would follow the Curzon Line, and Poland would receive territorial compensation in the west from Germany.
  • Roosevelt obtained a commitment by Stalin to participate in the UN.
  • Stalin requested that all of the 16 Soviet Socialist Republics would be granted UN membership. This was taken into consideration, but 14 republics were denied; Roosevelt agreed to membership for Ukraine and Byelorussia while reserving the right, which was never exercised, to seek two more votes for the United States.[8]

Democratic elections[edit]







Poland and the Eastern Bloc[edit]

Poland's old and new borders, 1945

Because of Stalin's strong promises and admission of guilt over Poland, Churchill believed that he would keep his word regarding Poland, remarking "Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong. But I don't think I am wrong about Stalin."[13]


These Polish troops were instrumental to the Allied defeat of the Germans in North Africa[citation needed] and Italy,[citation needed] and hoped to return to their homes in Kresy in an independent and democratic Poland at the end of the War. But at Yalta, Roosevelt and Churchill largely acceded to Stalin's demands to annex[14] the territory which in the Nazi-Soviet Pact he and Hitler had agreed to the Soviet Union controlling, including Kresy, and to carry out Polish population transfers (1944–1946). Consequently, they in effect agreed that tens of thousands of veteran Polish troops under British command should lose their Kresy homes to the Soviet Union. In reaction, thirty officers and men from the II Corps (Poland) committed suicide.[15]

Churchill defended his actions at Yalta in a three-day Parliament army debate starting on February 27, which ended in a vote of confidence. During the debate many MPs openly criticised Churchill and passionately voiced loyalty to Britain's Polish allies and expressed deep reservations about Yalta.[15] Moreover, 25 of these MPs risked their careers to draft an amendment protesting against Britain's tacit acceptance of Poland's domination by the Soviet Union. These members included: Arthur Greenwood; Sir Archibald Southby, 1st Baronet; Sir Alec Douglas-Home; James Heathcote-Drummond-Willoughby, 3rd Earl of Ancaster and Victor Raikes.[15] After the failure of the amendment, Henry Strauss, 1st Baron Conesford, the Member of Parliament for Norwich, resigned his seat in protest at the British treatment of Poland.[15]


On March 1, Roosevelt assured Congress that "I come from the Crimea with a firm belief that we have made a start on the road to a world of peace."[16] However, the Western Powers soon realized that Stalin would not honour his promise of free elections for Poland. After receiving considerable criticism in London following Yalta regarding the atrocities committed in Poland by Soviet troops, Churchill wrote Roosevelt a desperate letter referencing the wholesale deportations and liquidations of opposition Poles by the Soviets.[16] On March 11, Roosevelt responded to Churchill, writing, "I most certainly agree that we must stand firm on a correct interpretation of the Crimean decision. You are quite correct in assuming that neither the Government nor the people of this country will support participation in a fraud or a mere whitewash of the Lublin government and the solution must be as we envisaged it in Yalta." [17]

By March 21, Roosevelt's Ambassador to the USSR Averell Harriman cabled Roosevelt that "we must come clearly to realize that the Soviet program is the establishment of totalitarianism, ending personal liberty and democracy as we know it."[18] Two days later, Roosevelt began to admit that his view of Stalin had been excessively optimistic and that "Averell is right."[18]

Four days later, on March 27, the Soviet Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) arrested 16 Polish opposition political leaders that had been invited to participate in provisional government negotiations.[18] The arrests were part of a trick employed by the NKVD, which flew the leaders to Moscow for a later show trial followed by sentencing to a gulag.[18][19] Churchill thereafter argued to Roosevelt that it was "as plain as a pike staff" that Moscow's tactics were to drag out the period for holding free elections "while the Lublin Committee consolidate their power."[18] The Polish elections, held on January 16, 1947, resulted in Poland's official transformation to a communist state by 1949.

Following Yalta, in Russia, when Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov expressed worry that the Yalta Agreement's wording might impede Stalin's plans, Stalin responded "Never mind. We'll do it our own way later."[13] While the Soviet Union had already annexed several occupied countries as (or into) Soviet Socialist Republics,[20][21][22] other countries in eastern Europe that it occupied were converted into Soviet-controlled satellite states, such as the People's Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Hungary,[23] the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,[24] the People's Republic of Romania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the People's Republic of Albania,[25] and later East Germany from the Soviet zone of German occupation.[26] Eventually the United States and the United Kingdom made concessions in recognizing the then Communist-dominated regions, sacrificing the substance of the Yalta Declaration, while it remained in form.[27]

Aborted enforcement plans[edit]

Further information: Operation Unthinkable


Potsdam and the atomic bomb[edit]

Further information: Potsdam Conference and Potsdam Agreement

The Potsdam Conference was held from July to August 1945, which included the participation of Clement Attlee (who had replaced Churchill as Prime Minister)[30][31] and President Harry S Truman (representing the United States after Roosevelt's death).[32] At Potsdam, the Soviets denied claims that they were interfering in the affairs of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.[27] The conference resulted in (1) the Potsdam Declaration regarding the surrender of Japan,[33] and (2) the Potsdam Agreement regarding the Soviet annexation of former Polish territory east of the Curzon Line, and, provisions, to be addressed in an eventual Final Treaty ending World War II, for the annexation of parts of Germany east of the Oder-Neisse line into Poland, and northern East Prussia into the Soviet Union.


Cultural significance[edit]


See also[edit]


  2. ^ Black et al. 2000, p. 61
  4. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012). The Second World War. New York: Little, Brown and Company. p. 709. ISBN 9780316023740. 
  5. ^ a b Berthon & Potts 2007, p. 285
  7. ^ Osmańczyk, Edmund. Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements: T to Z. p. 2773. ISBN 0-415-93924-0. 
  16. ^ a b Berthon & Potts 2007, pp. 290–94
  19. ^ Wettig 2008, pp. 47–8
  21. ^ Roberts 2006, p. 43
  22. ^ Wettig 2008, pp. 20–1
  24. ^ Grenville 2005, pp. 370–71
  25. ^ Cook 2001, p. 17
  26. ^ Wettig 2008, pp. 96–100
  27. ^ a b Black et al. 2000, p. 63
  28. ^ "Operation Unthinkable". Northeastern University. Archived from the original on 2010-11-16. Retrieved 2015-09-25. defined as no more than square deal for Poland 
  30. ^ Roberts 2006, pp. 274–5
  32. ^ Truman 1973, p. 208



Further reading[edit]

External links[edit]
