Cutting Risks Of Nuclear War

August 05, 1985|By Joan Beck.

Even if the Geneva arms talks succeed, even if President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev reach a promising agreement, would you stop worrying about nuclear war?

Of course not. The world already has so many nuclear bombs and so many volatile political situations that nonproliferation treaties and strategic arms limitations agreements won`t do much to lessen the terrible possibility of nuclear conflict and devastation.

But the United States can take many concrete, practical steps that will substantially reduce the possibility of nuclear war without jeopardizing its primary goal of protecting U.S. values and institutions.

A list of 51 such actions has been proposed by three scholars from Harvard`s John F. Kennedy School of Government, who describe themselves not as hawks or doves, but owls. The owls explain their recommendations in a new book (``Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War`` edited by Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye Jr.) that should be required reading on the 40th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Nuclear war could occur in several possible ways, say the owls. These include surprise attack (rated the most unlikely), a first strike based on the presumption that war is imminent and unavoidable, escalation from conventional war, accident or third-party action that pulls in the major powers. Among the strategies they propose the U.S. use to reduce such risks are these:

Maintain a credible nuclear deterrent so Soviet leaders can see no advantage in the balance of nuclear forces. Modernize the strategic triad. Don`t adopt a no-first-use policy or pursue a comprehensive freeze that is difficult to define and verify. Don`t consider MAD (mutural assured destruction) to be a strategy or goal.

Obtain a credible conventional deterrent. Develop and deploy conventional weapons systems to avoid use of battlefield nuclear weapons. Strengthen NATO. Don`t provoke the Soviet Union or threaten vital Soviet interests.

Shape nuclear forces to minimize incentives for a pre-emptive strike and to allow time for diplomacy to work during a crisis. Develop better protection for the nation`s command, control and communication structures. Get a survivable, small ICBM. Don`t adopt a launch-on-warning policy or seek a disarming first-strike capability or consider using a nuclear ``shot across the bow`` to show resolve in response to conventional Soviet aggression; all increase the dangers of pre-emptive strike.

Reduce the possibility and impact of accident. Cut reliance on short-range nuclear weapons such as nuclear artillery shells. Improve safety devices and warning systems. Don`t use nuclear alerts to send political signals.

Make plans to stop a war if it begins. Develop survivable U.S-Soviet communications. Keep civilian control over nuclear weapons. Don`t plan to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict.

See that new political decision-makers and other leaders are well prepared to handle nuclear crises. Discuss crisis prevention and management with the Soviets. Keep hotlines working between all nuclear powers. Avoid direct combat between American and Soviet forces. Don`t try to make rapid changes in Eastern Europe.

Vigorously work for nonproliferation. Reinforce guarantees of security for smaller countries wherever credible. Be prepared to act against terrorist groups who obtain nuclear weapons.

Try to limit misperceptions. Meet regularly with Soviet leaders. Encourage nongovernmental contacts with the Soviets. Don`t exaggerate military imbalances to generate support for military budgets. Don`t cut off communications as a sanction in a time of crisis.

Pursue arms control negotiations. Preserve existing agreements. Work for new accords that improve crisis stability with the Soviets. But don`t oversell arms control, abuse bargaining chips or restrict arms control to formal agreements.

Reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence over the long term, even though it seems to have worked for 40 years and may do so for for decades more. Do intensify the search for alternatives.

The owls offer their agenda as a ``starting point for a new consensus on a strategy to reduce the risks of nuclear war`` and a way to move debate off the old hawk-dove axis. There could be no more fitting way to mark the 40th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.