New START Data Shows Russia Reducing, US Increasing Nuclear Forces


By Hans M. Kristensen





Slooow Implementation

The increase in counted deployed forces does not mean that the United States has begun to build up is nuclear forces; it’s an anomaly. But it helps illustrate how slow the U.S. implementation of the treaty has been so far.

Two and a half years into the New START Treaty, the United States has still not begun reducing its operational nuclear forces. Instead, it has worked on reducing so-called phantom weapons that have been retired from the nuclear mission but are still counted under the treaty.

For reasons that are unclear (but probably have to do with opposition in Congress), the administration has chosen to reduce its operational nuclear forces later rather than sooner. Not until 2015-2016 is the navy scheduled to reduce the number of missiles on its submarines. The air force still hasn’t been told where and when to reduce the ICBM force or which of its B-52 bombers will be denuclearized.

Moreover, even though the navy has already decided to reduce the missile tubes on its submarine force by more than 30 percent from 280 in 2016 to 192 on its next-generation ballistic missile submarine, it plans to continue to operate the larger force into the 2030s even though it is in excess of targeting and employment guidance.

Destabilizing Disparity

But even when the reductions finally get underway, the New START Treaty data illustrates an enduring problem: the growing disparity between U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. The United States now is counted with 336 deployed nuclear launchers more than Russia.

Russia is already 227 deployed missiles and bombers below the 700 limit established by the treaty for 2018, and might well drop by another 40 by then to about 430 deployed strategic launchers. The United States plans to keep the full 700 launchers.

Put in another way: unless the United States significantly reduces its ICBM force beyond the 400 or so planned under the New START Treaty, and unless Russia significantly increases deployment of new missiles beyond what it is currently doing, the United States could end up having nearly as many launchers in the ICBM-leg of its Triad as Russia will have in its entire Triad.

Strange Bedfellows

For most people this might not matter much and even sound a little Cold War’ish. But for military planners who have to entertain potential worst-case threat scenarios, the growing missile-warhead disparity between the two countries is of increasing concern.

For the rest of us, it should be of concern too, because the disparity can complicate arms reductions and be used to justify retaining excessively large expensive nuclear force structures.

For the Russian military-industrial complex, the disparity is good for business. It helps them argue for budgets and missiles to keep up with the United States. But since Russia is retiring its old Soviet-era missiles and can’t build enough new missiles to keep some degree of parity with the United States, it instead maximizes the number of warheads it deploys on each new missile.

As a result, the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces has begun a program to deploy modified SS-27 ICBMs with multiple warheads (the modified SS-27 is known in Russia as RS-24 or Yars) with six missile divisions over the next decade and a half (more about that in a later blog). And a new “heavy” ICBM with up to ten warheads per missile is said to be under development.

So in a truly bizarre twist, U.S. lawmakers and others opposing additional nuclear reductions by the Obama administration could end up help providing the excuse for the very Russia nuclear modernization they warn against.

Granted, the Putin government may not be the easiest to deal with these days. But that only makes it more important to continue with initiatives that can take some of the wind out of the Russian military’s modernization plans. Slow implementation of the New START Treaty and retention of a large nuclear force structure certainly won’t help.

See also blog on previous New START data.


3 thoughts on “New START Data Shows Russia Reducing, US Increasing Nuclear Forces


    -I imagine it has more to do with the cost associated with removing the missiles and finding places to store them and then the additional cost of converting the launcher to remove it from treaty accountability. You can’t just stick a trident missile on a trailer in a parking lot you need a magazine to store it in.

    1. Keith

      Completely agree. New START reductions have all to do with implementing the treaty itself and nothing to do with Congressional “interference”.

      Remember, the Treaty is a process. There are defined timelines in the Treaty that have to be implemented in order. For example, the B-52Gs in storage at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base have to be destroyed and satellite verified. Any additional B-52H bombers in “environmentally-sealed condition” at Davis-Monthan have to be non-nuclear verified by inspection. The B-1B bombers have, yet once again, to be inspected and certified to be non-nuclear platforms. Only 44 of the total inventory of 76 declared operational B-52H bombers are to be certified (coded) to carry nuclear weapons and they will need inspection and verification and also the inspectors must determine the unique features needed to distinguish a conventional bomber from a nuclear one. The four Ohio-class SSGNs have to be inspected and certified non-nuclear. The five converted ICBM launcher silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, now used as missile defense interceptor launchers, have to be inspected and certified that the converted launchers are no longer able to launch ICBMs and the inspectors must determine the unique features needed to distinguish converted silo launchers from unconverted ones. Today, the United States has 450 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs but there at least 50+ additional silos, old MMIII and Peacekeepers silos, at Warren Air Force Base that will need destroying to comply with the Treaty. (The Treaty counts silos (launchers) not missiles)

      All this work needs to be done before a single “counted warhead” is reduced from the American arsenal.

      Then the Trident fleet can be inspected to certify by Treaty that only 20 launch tubes are operational. The eliminated SLBM launchers have to have their missile launch tube hatches, their associated superstructure fairings, and, if applicable, the gas generators removed. Then, the ICBM fleet is scheduled to drop from 450 operational silos to 420 with the remaining 30 destroyed and verified by satellite and inspection.

      For the United States, there is a lot of work involved in reaching New START compliance by February 2018. All Russia has to do is build missiles.

      Frank Shuler


  2. Good grief. It’s a process. New START is entirely on track for February 2018; we think so, the Russians think so. Even Mr. Karpov, the Deputy Director of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament in the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated back on September 26, 2013 that Russia had no interest in farther nuclear reductions until New START was implemented. Are the 700/800 launchers and 1550 warhead numbers too high, yes. Are we reducing our inventory of nuclear weapons to get to these numbers, yes. Is Russia building up their inventory of nuclear weapons to get to these numbers, yes. If the United States implemented the New START numbers tomorrow, would Russia cease building to match? Of course not.

    Frank Shuler


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