Humanism and the Beginning of Change in the Social Paradigm: From Servetus to Thomas Jefferson

Marian Hillar. Center for Philosophy and Socinian Studies, Member of the Michael Servetus Institute

Michael Servetus occupies a unique place in the annals of European history. He was a lonely scholar and a bold mind who brought together what was best in the cultural renewal of the Renaissance and in the attempt at the moral renewal programmed by those later described as Radical Reformers. He discovered through the study of the Bible, which was made possible by the Reformation trends, that its truth contrasted with official Christian practice and official doctrinal formulations. He saw that Christianity was corrupt morally and ideologically, and, inspired by the rising spirit of the reform, he envisioned a plan to restore Christianity to its original simplicity and integrity as suggested by the Erasmus.

Undoubtedly the title of his major work Restoration of Christianity is reminiscent of the proposal by Erasmus (1466-1536) which was based on three major premises as explained by Hans R. Guggisberg : Erasmus postulated 1. studying the original texts of the Gospels, the first apostolic writings, and the first Christian theologians still operating in the Greco-Roman social paradigm as the source of religious assertions; 2. that sophisticated theological speculations should be abandoned; 3. that this was necessary in order to reduce the religious beliefs to a small number of fundamental and essential doctrines.

While Erasmus satisfied his interests with philological studies and made no effort at reforming the old system of thought, Servetus, in the realm of intellectual inquiry, demanded a radical reevaluation of the entire ideological religious system of assertions and dogmas imposed on Western Europe since the fourth century. Servetus's theological inquiry initiated the study of scriptural tradition in an attempt to uncover the real religious doctrines contained in it. In the process he developed a new more humane religion and a new understanding of divinity and divine matters closer to the realities of the human condition. This was one of his two major legacies as categorized by Prof. Alcalá. The other legacy concerns the function of society at the moral level. Servetus realized the full potential of human nature, capabilities, and rationality. Thus he demanded freedom of intellectual inquiry, thought, conscience, and expression that was denied to millions on doctrinal theological grounds. By his sacrifice Servetus set into motion a process of change in the entire social paradigm and recovery of the right to freedom of conscience.

Establishment of an ecclesiastical paradigm.

Servetus’s role as the central figure in history who initiated the process of recovering the social humanistic paradigm becomes obvious if we put it in a historical perspective. Greco-Roman pre-Christian society enjoyed toleration, freedom of religion, of conscience, and of thought. The ancient western world did not have a concept of "heresy" or "heretic." Greco-Roman society tolerated all religions and did not impose restrictions on free thought. Acts of intolerance were rare, and if they occurred, they were never justified by deviations from one doctrine or another. This was due to the lack of a state religion and state sanctioned theological doctrine though the people and the centers of power were highly religious.

All this was dramatically changed with the advent of state supported Christianity. Ever since the fourth century Christianity became an institution of organized clergy and was fused with the political power in the Roman Empire and later in the rest of Western Europe. Christianity triumphed only because it evolved into a rigid, totalitarian theocracy.

The Emperors Valentinian II and Theodosius I established on February 28, 380, the Christian religion of the Roman pontiff as obligatory in the Empire declaring those who would not embrace it “demented and insane,” and therefore, “shall be smitten first by divine vengeance and second by the retribution of Our own initiative, which We shall assume in accordance with the divine judgment” (Codex. Theodosius 16.1.2). This decree may be considered an official declaration of the first forced adherence to a state religion and the official initiation of persecutions for the convictions of conscience.

In a short span of time Christian emperors accomplished the elimination of free thought and the imposition of a totalitarian theocratic system so that they could congratulate themselves in 423 on a job well done:

The regulations of constitutions formerly promulgated shall suppress any pagans who survive, although We now believe that there are none [left] (Cod. Theod. 16.10.22).

Constantine the Great who issued an edict against them already on September 1, 326, persecuted “heretics” and schismatics from the beginning. The fundamental principle on which the persecution was based was deviation from the official state religion. Heresy was considered "a public crime, since whatever is committed against divine religion amounts to the detriment of all" (Cod. Theod. 16.5.38-39). The definition of a "heretic" left no doubt that a theocratic society could not tolerate any free thought:

Those persons who may be discovered to deviate, even in a minor point of doctrine, from the tenets and path of the Catholic religion are included under the designation of heretics and must be subject to the sanctions which have been issued against them (Arcadius and Honorius, September 3, 395; Cod. Theod. 16.5.28).

In the sixth century Emperor Justinian incorporated explicitly the Catholic creed, including the doctrine of the Trinity, into Roman state law. Chapter 1 of Book I, entitled De Trinitate et Fide catholica, confirms establishing the Catholic faith as the official state religion and forbids any critical thought under penalty of being burned at the stake. Justinian defines faith in the Trinity in terms of the Nicaean creed ("trinitatem consubstantialem"), and ordains that any deviation from it should be punished as well as any so-called heretical views. It is interesting too, that the law promulgated in 413 declares the death penalty for the crime of rebaptism.

Thus in the fourth century a switch took place in the social paradigm, if we may borrow the concept from the history of science, from the humanistic principles of ancient morality to the new ecclesiastical one. The social paradigm can be defined as an entire constellation of beliefs, values, and worldview which is shared by the community and has a normative character. Initially it was imposed forcefully by the emperor and formulated by the clergy; later it became a tradition established by a system of laws (state and ecclesiastical), theological doctrines (e.g., the doctrines of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas), and its preservation was scrupulously supervised by the ecclesiastical authority, institutions (e.g., infant baptism, canon law), and courts (e.g., Inquisition).

The Reformation arose in the sixteenth century aiming at correcting financial abuses of the ecclesiastical institution and a competition for political power by local centers. It brought also new trends: the assertion of individual, personal experience as a basis for religion, and an emphasis on biblical studies. It also underscored the need for tolerance, at least in the initial phase, for its own survival. Unfortunately, as soon as the “reformed” churches gained independence they, too, quickly became as intolerant as the old Roman church and ossified into the old dogmatic tradition. There were a few leaders of liberal religious thought who opposed the moral corruption and power of the popes and the clergy, though any real investigation of the accepted dogmatic assertions was persecuted by both Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches. Protestants accepted the theological arguments of the Catholic Church for the persecution of those who differed in their views based on the Hebrew laws expressed in the book of Deuteronomy. The so-called heretics, apostates, and non-believers were considered sinners of the highest degree and their punishment was justified by a wide range of arguments ranging from the political necessity of maintaining the unity of the church and state to the vindication of God’s honor.

The implementation in practice of the persecution of the so-called heretics depended on the actual political situation in a given country or state. The general rule was “cuius regio eius religio” which replaced the Catholic Church monopoly. The persecution continued until the rulers liberated themselves from the domination of the clergy and realized that they had to separate the matters of religion from the practical task of running a country or state. They realized that religious pluralism was not only not dangerous to the state but, on the contrary, brought significant advantages. This change in politics coincided on the pragmatic level with a change in the type of argumentation for tolerance and religious freedom from the biblico-theological to the economically and politically oriented secular ones. This was achieved with the help of writings produced by members of a Unitarian-type church known in Western Europe as the Socinians, who prepared the intellectual environment with their philosophical argumentation.

The only reformers who defended religious freedom were the members of the Radical Reformation movement who argued for tolerance mostly on the political level of religious minorities. Anabaptists rejected infant baptism, the oath, a paid ministry, legal suits, military service, and a union of church and state. They were regarded as menace to society – ecclesiastical and political – and were banished on penalty of death. They were convinced that a worldly authority does not have power over the religion of its subjects and if they are to be brought to consensus this should be done only with spiritual means. Such a view was postulated by a baptist scholar, Balthasar Hübmaier (1480-1528). He wrote the treatise, Concerning Heretics and Those Who Burn Them (1524), defending the complete freedom of religion. He argued that the Gospel precludes coercion and claimed that the state has no jurisdiction in religious matters. He extended liberty even to law abiding atheists, "It is well and good that the secular authority puts to death the criminals who do physical harm to the defenseless, Romans 13. But no one may injure the atheist who wishes nothing for himself other than to forsake the gospel." Another prominent representative of the Radical Reformation was Sebastian Franck (1499-1542), a German independent preacher and spiritualist who, for the first time, expressed the idea that only God knows who the heretic is, and who granted everybody universal tolerance, even to the unbelievers.

The Case of Servetus

The pivotal event in the history of Europe which brought to the fore the absurdity and moral turpitude of the whole ecclesiastical paradigm was the case of our lonely scholar. It does not mean that there were no voices even before the Reformation arguing for religious tolerance. For the early humanists the model of argumentation was the Erasmian hope for a religious consensus based on the reduction of theological assertions to an essential minimum.

Servetus’s role, however, is unique because of the depth of his humanism and historical circumstances of his martyrdom.

Servetus was sought by the Catholic Inquisition ever since the publication of his De Trinitatis erroribus in 1531, but he was able to evade capture by disguising his identity under the assumed name of Michaelis Villanovanus, and refraining from publicly expressing his ideas. Calvin, however, upon learning about the book Christianismi restitutio, which Servetus undertook to publish secretly in 1553, designed an intricate scheme to condemn Servetus and denounce him to the Catholic Inquisition in Vienne. Servetus managed to escape from prison, but was tried and condemned in absentia on June 17, 1553. The list of charges was as follows: "the crime of scandalous heresy, dogmatization; elaboration of new doctrines, publication of heretical books; sedition; schism and disturbance of unity and tranquility by public rebellion; disobedience against the decree concerning heresies; breaking out and escaping from the royal prison."

Calvin himself, being a "heretic" by Catholic standards, strongly supported capital punishment for those who deviated from imposed doctrines -- his own doctrines in the region under his control. He later defended the punishment of Servetus in his Defensio orthodoxae fidei (Geneva 1554) where he attacked freedom of conscience and justified the right to condemn to death the so-called heretic based on his own doctrine of persecution “by the mandate of God.”

Calvin's doctrine is representative not only of his own views; he was a spokesman for the entire Catholic and Protestant Christianity as well. His arguments to justify this conclusion were derived from the Old Testament and ran against the spirit and letter of the New Testament.

When Servetus showed up in Geneva in August of 1553, Calvin seized the moment to realize his promise of February 13, 1546, not to let him leave Geneva. The arrest was made at the explicit demand of Calvin who admitted it in several documents. The whole trial in Geneva and its procedure were orchestrated by Calvin who, as leader of the church, was considered superior to everyone except God (which is attested by his biographer Théodore de Bèze). Moreover, Calvin was motivated by his own Christian thinking. The supporters of Calvin take this fact as an excuse for his action. They say Calvin was doing only what the whole of Christianity approved: "Unanimously, all the churches of Switzerland replied: 'Servetus ought to be condemned to death.'" The law under which Servetus was condemned was the Codex of Justinian that prescribed the death penalty for the denial of the Trinity and the repetition of baptism. The sentence was carried out immediately on October 27, 1553.

Humanism of Servetus

Servetus placed great value on human natural spontaneity, reason, and capability to do good works, and through this he emphasized human dignity and autonomy in moral decisions. Catholics could not agree with him because he eliminated the role of the church and the papacy for justification and salvation, and Protestants disagreed with his concept of faith and accepting the works of love. Though he states that faith is first a precondition of secondary grace, he confirms that love is the greatest and supports this statement with several arguments. "Faith then, to conclude, if considered in its pure and essential property, does not contain such perfection as love ... Love is superior to everything ... durable, sublime, more resembling God, and closer to the perfection of the future age." Even faith now from the act of mental assent to the credible propositions became an act of will, and is "a creative act of the soul." Luther, Calvin, and other reformers denied man any spontaneity and moral impulse.

Human nature cannot be depraved, condemned, utterly corrupt, and helpless, claimed Servetus in opposition to the reformers and Catholics. There is no inherent necessity for sin in man, no state of sin and depravity. Though Servetus justified this state by constant communication with God through God's innate Spirit and inner light, he believed that we have knowledge of good and evil, and that we act with a free will. Sin thus becomes qualified, conditioned by historical, cultural and personal factors. And from this Servetus was able to deduce a universal and humanistic moral principle:

Natural righteousness is to give everyone what is his: that is, to help everybody in need and harm nobody; to do what conscience and natural reason dictate so that whatever you want others to do to you, do to others. In such righteousness ... nations are justified and saved, including the Jews.

Thus, all nations and peoples are taught from nature. Israelites were capable of righteousness through the Law and all other people through an inner natural light. Servetus granted all men dignity and recognized equal endowment in their ability to recognize good and evil.

Servetus was the first Christian thinker in modern times who proclaimed in clear terms the right of every individual to follow his own conscience and express his own convictions. He was the first to express an idea that it was a crime to persecute and kill for ideas. His argument was rational based on a humanistic principle of morality:

Neither with those nor with others I am in agreement in everything, because all seem to me partly right and partly in error. Moreover, everyone sees the error of the other, but nobody sees his own …. It would be easy to distinguish all this if in the church all people would be allowed to speak by contending in a prophetic spirit.

Servetus clearly stated that persecution and killing for ideas is contrary to the teaching of the apostles and the original church doctrine. In a letter already in 1531, to Iohannes Oecolampadius (Johan Hausschein), leader of the Reformation in Basel, Servetus stated:

If you find me in error in one point you should not on that account condemn me in all, for according to this there is no mortal who would not be burned a thousand times …. The greatest of the apostles were sometimes in error. Even though you see Luther erring egregiously on some points you do not condemn him in the rest …. Such is human frailty that we condemn the spirits of others as impostors and impious and except our own, for no one recognizes his own errors … I beg you, for God’s sake, spare my name and fame … You say that I want all to be robbers and that I will not suffer any to be punished and killed. I call almighty God to witness that this is not my opinion and I detest it, but if ever I said anything it is that I consider it a serious matter to kill men because they are in error on some question of scriptural interpretation, when we know that the very elect may be led astray.

This assertion of Servetus was later fully elaborated by Sebastian Castellio in his famous defense of Servetus and condemnation of Calvin, Contra libellum Calvini (1554):

To kill a man is not to defend a doctrine, but to kill a man. When the Genevans killed Servetus they did not defend a doctrine, they killed a man. The defense of a doctrine is not the matter to be resolved by the judges, it is an issue only to be solved by teachers. What has the sword to do with the matter of teaching?

In a letter to judges in Geneva dated August 22, 1553, Servetus defended the right to freedom of conscience and expression. He accused the court of instituting "a new invention unknown to the apostles, to their disciples, and the ancient church of initiating criminal procedure for the doctrines of the Scripture or for the theological themes derived from it." Even the Arians in the time of Constantine the Great were not handed over to civilian tribunals in accordance with the ancient doctrine, but the church alone decided such questions and the only possible punishment for "heresy" was banishment. Such a punishment was always used against heretics in the primitive church. On the basis of these precedents he demanded to be set free from the criminal accusations.

Servetus’s struggle for freedom of conscience was a part of his program for the restoration of Christianity and one of the “heresies” for which he was condemned. Servetus attempted to discuss the issue with Calvin in one of his letters to Calvin sent with Christianismi restitutio. He approaches a problematic subject in his time and rhetorically asks himself whether it is permissible for the Christian to fulfill the duties of a magistrate or to be a king, or to kill. And Servetus answers to himself that: “While there is the world, regardless whether we want it or not, we have to preserve the worldly order, especially the one which is safeguarded by the administration of justice.” And he admits the death penalty for some especially malicious crimes, but categorically rejects such a penalty for schism or heresy:

In other crimes … we have to expect corrections by using other types of punishments and not by killing. Among those we prefer exile … as well as excommunication by the church which was used initially when there still were preserved traces of the apostolic tradition and with which schisms and heresies were punished.

Setting in movement a process of change in the social paradigm

Just like in science where the accumulation of new data and scientific facts makes it necessary to reevaluate the old paradigm and establish a new one, so personal sacrifice of a pious scholar became a turning point inducing thinking people to rethink the morality of the prevailing church ideology and mental framework of how religion and society treated the issue of intellectual inquiry and its repression.

The idea of punishing "heretics" was so pervasive in the society that it did not occur even to most thinking Protestants that the whole concept of repression of thought was evil and against the spirit, and the letter, of the Gospels. No Protestant religious leader was against the punishment of heretics in general. Even Sebastian Castellio, recognized champion of rational tolerance and a precursor of the French Revolution and the Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme, could not avoid these contradictions. Only later did he develop, through the experience of the fraternal religious war in France, the concept of mutual toleration and freedom of conscience. Though he still recognized the scripture as the source of valid statements, the concept of “liberum arbitrium” became the foundation of human rationality and natural moral principle. The trap of contradictions and theocratic mentality were so pervading that even in the eighteenth century Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote in 1762 in his Contrat social, that in the future ideal state, one who did not believe in the religious truths decreed by the legislator should be banished from the state or even, one who, after having recognized them, would cease to believe should be punished by death.

A month after the publication of Calvin's Defensio there appeared in Basel an anonymous, eloquent pamphlet against intolerance entitled De haereticis, an sint persequendi... A few weeks later there appeared a French translation of this treatise entitled Tracté des hérétiques, a savoir, si on les doit persecuter, etc. This treatise was later translated into German and Dutch (1620, 1663), and English (1935). The book contained extracts promoting toleration taken from the writings of some twenty five Christian writers, ancient and modern, including Luther and Calvin himself and was authored by Castellio, perhaps with some collaboration from Laelius Socinus and Celio Secondo Curione. Castellio wrote also a rebuttal to Calvin’s Defensio, in the already mentioned Contra libellum Calvini.

The movement for tolerance grew out of the influence of Castellio and his associates in Basel. Servetus's martyrdom gave a stimulus to the rise of religious toleration as a general policy, as a moral principle. But the process was very slow and lasted for several centuries before the switch in paradigm could take place.

The figure of Servetus stands out at the beginning of the movement. In the later phase Castellio deserves more ample recognition than he received. He continued to point out that most important is the principle of absolute tolerance of differing views. This position was an outgrowth of an entirely new concept of religion initiated by Servetus as centered not in dogma but in life and character. It is the very essence of this kind of religion to regard freedom and reason not as incidental but as fundamental conditions of a thoroughly wholesome existence of religion.

Servetus’s legacy was first spread by the Italian humanists and reformers Francesco Stancaro, Giorgio Biandrata, Gianpaolo Alciati, Valentino Gentile, Bernardino Ochino, and Lelio and Fausto Sozzini in Poland and Transylvania, and led to the development of the Antitrinitarian or Unitarian movement represented by the Unitarians of Transylvania and the Socinians of Poland. In Poland they were known as the Minor Church or Polish Brethren. After their expulsion from Poland they developed into the Unitarian movement in England and America. Socinians were the first who demanded and fully understood the moral imperative of the complete separation of church and state. Such ideas were developed by Faustus Socinus (1539-1604), John Crell (1590-1633), Christopher Ostorodt (d. ca 1611), Andrew Wojdowski (1565-1622), John Sachs (1641-1671), and particularly by Samuel Przypkowski (1592-1670) and Jonasz Szlichtyng (1592-1661). They published numerous treatises in Poland and in Holland and defended their rights against the machinations of Jesuits who eventually succeeded in the destruction of the Reformation in Poland.

Przypkowski, for example, argued in six points in a pamphlet entitled Brotherly Declaration (1646), the importance of guaranteeing freedom of conscience: 1. It is a fundamental right on which is based the integrity and freedom of the republic; 2. It is a foundation of the unity of the republic composed of many ethnic and religious groups; 3. It is a foundation of the social equality of citizens; 4. it is a foundation of all civil liberties; 5. It is a guardian against religious and ecclesiastical jurisdiction; 6. It is the highest law. Przypkowski, still in another treatise, On the Law of the Christian Magistrate and Private Person in War and Peace (1650), and Szlichtyng in Apology for the Truth (1654), developed a complete modern and secular doctrine of the separation of church and state.

Moral, social, and political doctrines of the Socinians eventually led to the development of the Enlightenment. Their ideas were perfected, extended and popularized by writings of philosophers John Locke (1632-1704), Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), Voltaire (1694-1778), and David Hume (1711-1776). The arguments used by John Locke in his famous four Letters on Toleration, published in Holland between 1683 and 1689, coincide with those used by the Polish philosophers. Locke possessed in his library a complete set of Socinian works and certainly read them. He presented a detailed analysis of toleration and church-state relations from a political point of view, obviously suitable for the circumstances in England. A severe weakness of Locke’s statements in which he contradicted himself, as well of some statements of the Polish Brethren, was the exclusion of atheists from religious liberty. Pierre Bayle made numerous references to the Socinians and introduced one more element for the change of the social paradigm: namely, he was the first in the Christian world who argued for the separation of ethics and morality from religion. He also defended atheism on a rational basis.

The ideas of John Locke were transplanted directly to the American continent by James Madison (1751-1836) and Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), who implemented them for the first time in American legislation. They were philosopher-statesmen who shared a strong conviction of absolute freedom of conscience and distrusted any kind of established ecclesiastical institution. Their conviction was that the established churches create only “ignorance and corruption” and introduce the “diabolic principle of persecution.” The exercise of religion should be completely separated from government. Toleration was not enough; only absolute freedom could be acceptable. For them democracy was the best guarantee of religious freedom. It was an institution that erected a “wall of separation” between church and state, and protected the liberties of minority groups against the imposition of majority views. Both were broadly educated and Jefferson had a keen interest in studying religions, especially Servetus and the Socinians.

In the religious realm I will signal a few consequences and results of the seminal thoughts of Servetus. Today biblical scholars confirm the discovery of Servetus and his universal understanding of the divinity which breaks with tribal or ecclesiastical particularism.

Philosophers and religious scholars develop further Servetain understanding of the divinity which manifests itself and evolves in a historical process in the new concepts of process theology. However, others reject the ontological concept of divinity but recognize the importance of human values and make them the center of a new “religion,” a religion of the “highest values” as the one propounded by a Polish philosopher of religion, Stanislaw Cieniawa.

All these intellectual ideas and movements can flourish only in the environment of unhindered and free exercise of inquiry.

From a historical perspective, Servetus died in order that freedom of conscience could become a civil right of the individual in modern society.


1. Hans R. Guggisberg, “Wandel der Argumente für religiose Toleranz und Glabensfreiheit in 16. and 17. Jahrhundert.” In Michael Erbe, ed., Querdenken Dissens und Toleranz im Wandel der Geschichte. Festschrift zum 65 Geburstag von Hans R. Guggisberg, (Manheim: Palatin, 1996). P. 139.

2.. Ángel Alcalá, “Los dos grandes legados de Servet: el radicalismo como método intelectual y el derecho a la libertad de conciencia.” En Turia, Revista Cultural, No 63-64, (2003), pp. 221-242.

3. Marian Hillar, The Case of Michael Servetus (1511-1553) - The Turning Point in the Struggle for Freedom of Conscience (Lewiston, N.Y; Lampeter, U.K.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997), pp. 13-180. The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmondian Constitutions. (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1952).

4. Corpus Iuris Civilis. Editio stereotypa sexta. Volumen secundum. "Codex Iustinianus." Recognovit Paulus Krueger. (Berolini: Apud Weidmannos, 1895).

5. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 175.

6 . M. Hillar, The Case of Michael Servetus, op. cit., chapters 4, 5, pp. 137-180.

7. Roland Bainton, Here I Stand. A Life of Martin Luther, (New York, Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1940s).

8. Alan Eyre, The Protesters, (Birmingham: The Christadelphian, 1975, 1985). Alan Eyre, Brethren in Christ. A Stirring Record of Faithful Believers of the Truth During the 16th and 17th Centuries, (Torrens Park, Australia: Christadelphian Scripture StudyService, 1982).

9. H. R. Guggisberg, op. cit., p. 140. William R. Estep, ed., Anabaptist Beginnings, 1523-1533: A Sourcebook, (Nieuwkoop: B. de Graaf, 1976). Balthasar Hubmaier, Balthasar Hubmaier Theologian of Anabaptism, translated and edited by H. Wayne Pipkin and John H. Yoder, (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1989).

10. Sebastian Franck, Chronica, [Zeitbuch und Geschichtsbibell von anbegyn bis in dis gegenwertig 1536 jar verlegt. Reprograf. Nachdr. d. Orig.-Ausg. Ulm 1536]. Reprinted, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchges., 1969. Originally published in 1531 in Strassburg.

11. For example the writings of Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499); Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494); or Nicholas of Cusa (1400-1464); Joseph Lecler, Histoire de la Tolérance au siècle de la Réforme ; (Paris: Aubier, 1955), 2 Vols.

12. Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia. (1870; reprint New York, London: Johnson Reprint Corporation, and Frankfurt a. M.: Minerva G.m.b.H:, 1964) Vol. VIII. p. 752.

13. Defensio orthodoxae fidei in Calvini, Opera, op. cit., Vol. VIII, pp. 480-481.

14. Ibid. pp. 478-479.

15. Ibid. pp. 462, 479.

16. Doumergue, Émile, Jean Calvin. Les hommes et les choses de son temps. (Lausanne, Paris: 1899-1927; Slatkine Reprints: Genève, 1969), Vol. VI, p. 351.

17. Christianismi restitutio, 350-354.

18. Ibid. 631.

19. Ibid. 331.

20. Ibid. 623-624, 635, 733.

21. De Iusticia, a tractate added to Servetus’s Dialogorum de Trinitate libri duo, F7a-7b, 1531). Reprinted by G.m.b.H., Frankfurt a. Mein, 1965.

22. Letter to Aecolampadius in Calvini, Opera, op. cit., Vol. IX, 861-862.

23. Sébastien Castellion, Contra libellum Calvini, Vaticanus 77 (Amsterdam, 1612).

24. Letter to the judges in Geneva of August 22, 1553. In Calvini, Opera, op. cit., Vol. VIII. 762-763.

25. Miguel Servet, Treinta cartas a Calvino, traducción de Ángel Alcalá, (Madrid: Editorial Castalia, 1981), carta XXVII, pp. 186-187.

26. Thomas S. Kuhn, op. cit., p. 175.

27. Rousseau, Jean Jacques, Oeuvres immortelles du contrat social. Du Contrat social ou principes du droit politique. (Genève: Consant Bourquin, Éditeur, 1947). p.370.

28. Sébastien Castellion, Traité des hérétiques, a savoir, si on les doit persecuter, et comment on se doit conduire avec eux, selon l’avis, opinion, et sentence de plusieurs auteurs, tant anciens, que modernes. (1554; Édition nouvelle publiée par A. Olivet, préface par E. Choisy; Genève: A. Julien, Libraire-Éditeur, 1913).

29. Bainton, Roland H., Concerning heretics; whether they are to be persecuted and how they are to be treated; a collection of the opinions of learned men, both ancient and modern; an anonymous work attributed to Sebastian Castellio now first done into English, together with excerpts from other works of Sebastian Castellio and David Joris on religious liberty by Roland H. Bainton. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935).

30. Hillar, M.,”From the Polish Socinians to the American Constitution,” A Journal from the Radical Reformation. A Testimony to Biblical Unitarianism, 1994, no. 3, pp. 44-51.

31. Marian Hillar with Claire S. Allen, Michael Servetus: Intellectual Giant, Humanist, and Martyr (Lanham, New York, Oxford: University Press of America, 2002), p. 257. Hillar, “From the Polish Socinians,” op. cit.

32. Edmund J. Fortman, The Triune God (New York: Baker Book House, 1972). Anthony F. Buzzard and Charles F. Hunting, The Doctrine of the Trinity. Christianity’s Self-Inflicted Wound (San Francisco, London, Bethesda: International Scholars Publications, 1999). Karl-Josef Kuschel, Born Before All Time.

33. M. Hillar, “Process Theology and Process Thought in the Writings of Michael Servetus,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Sixteenth Century Studies Conference, October 24-27, 2002, San Antonio, TX.

34. Stanislaw Cieniawa, “The Plurality of Confessions and one Religion,” in Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism, (Houston, Humanists of Houston, 2003), pp. 13-20.