Attack was ultimately a defeat for Japan

Guest Columnist By Guest Columnist The Oregonian
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on December 07, 2011 at 4:20 AM

By Ted Mahar 

Even seven decades after the history-wrenching Pearl Harbor attack, it is likely that most Americans still do not appreciate that the ambush was a disaster for the perpetrators and did incalculable good for the victims.

In fact, American planners were trying to maneuver Japan into beginning the inevitable war by firing the first shots. In U.S. Navy war games for decades the presumed foe was Japan. War was expected in spring 1942.

Japan's attack was meant to prevent the war. Japan wanted to stun America into frustrated despair and a willingness to accept a truce giving Japan freedom to operate undisturbed in its Asian sphere and renewed access to Dutch East Indies oil. Treaties mandated that Japan buy Dutch oil from the United States at prices higher than Japan would have paid on its own. After Japan took over Indochina, America froze Japanese assets and cut off Japan's oil supply on July 26, 1941.

It was a virtual declaration of war because it forced Japan to either surrender its goals without a fight or go to war. In fact, Japan began active war planning in November 1940, stirred by America's transfer of the Pacific fleet from California to Pearl Harbor in April and the passage of the Two-Ocean Naval Expansion Act in May. The 209 ships it called for included 18 aircraft carriers.

The tactical goals of the Dec. 7 attack were to destroy Army Air Forces planes on the ground at Hickam Field adjacent to Pearl Harbor and at Wheeler Field near Schofield Barracks in central Oahu, and to sink the aircraft carriers and battleships in Pearl Harbor.

Paradoxically, the attack succeeded in all but one aspect but was a colossal failure because of terrible luck and terrible planning. The bad luck was that no U.S. carriers were near the harbor; their absence alone was a major failure.

But Japanese pilots failed to destroy some two dozen oil storage tanks at Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field. Given that Japan went to war for oil, it is astounding that the tanks holding a two-year oil supply were not the primary target. Loss of the tanks would have reduced the U.S. fleet to virtual scrap metal.

Also amazing is that the attack left the Navy's repair facilities, a main reason for any naval base, unscathed. Most ships sunk in the attack were raised from the mud and repaired. The carrier Yorktown, heavily damaged in the May 6 Battle of the Coral Sea, was repaired at Pearl Harbor in time to join the June 4-6 Battle of Midway. The Yorktown played a vital role in sinking four of the six carriers that attacked Pearl Harbor and putting Japan on the defensive just six months after the raid.

Finally, the submarine base was untouched. U.S. subs began deploying the day after the attack.

Even the sunken battleships helped America respond. Many naval leaders considered battleships the fleet's principal weapon and carriers as unproven experimental weapons. Japan eliminated debate, forcing the U.S. Navy to depend on what were its most important ships.

In fact, Japan probably should have done exactly what it had been expected to do for decades: Invade the Philippines. The U.S. fleet would have had to sail to the Philippines battle, terribly vulnerable to air, surface and submarine assaults in midocean, where vessels could not be raised and repaired.

And, of course, Japan's most spectacular failure was that instead of slugging America into confused inaction and submission, the attack stirred America into a fury and dedication that nothing else could have.

Strong isolationist beliefs had long run deep in America, making it politically impossible for America to fire the first shot. With malice aforethought, Japan fired up the outrage that would fuel America's crusade for vengeance through a long, punishing war.

Ted Mahar is a Portland freelance writer. Reach him at