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Philosophical aspects of the abortion debate: Wikis




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The central arguments in the abortion debate are deontological or rights-based. The view that all or almost all abortion should be illegal generally rests on the claims: (1) that the existence and moral right to life of human beings (human organisms) begins at or near conception-fertilisation; (2) that induced abortion is the deliberate and unjust killing of the embryo in violation of its right to life; and (3) that the law should prohibit unjust violations of the right to life. The view that abortion should in most or all circumstances be legal generally rests on the claims: (1) that women have a right to control what happens in and to their own bodies; (2) that abortion is a just exercise of this right; and (3) that the law should not criminalise just exercises of the right to control one’s own body. Both sides of the debate would grant premise (3) of the central pro-life argument and premises (1) and (3) of the central pro-choice argument.

Although both sides are likely to see the rights-based considerations as paramount, some popular arguments appeal to consequentialist or utilitarian considerations. For example, pro-life advocacy groups (see the list below) sometimes draw attention to the abortion-breast cancer hypothesis, post-abortion syndrome, and other alleged medical and psychological risks of abortion. On the other side, some pro-choice groups (see the list below) claim that criminalizing abortion will lead to the deaths of many women through ‘back-alley abortions’; that unwanted children have a negative social impact (or conversely that abortion lowers the crime rate); or that reproductive rights are necessary to achieve the full and equal participation of women in society and the workforce. Consequentialist arguments on both sides tend to be vigorously disputed, though are not widely discussed in the philosophical literature.

Philosophical argumentation on the moral issue


Another family of arguments (see the section on Thomson, below) relates to bodily rights—the question of whether the woman’s bodily rights justify abortion even if the embryo has a right to life. A negative answer would support claim (2) in the central pro-life argument, while an affirmative answer would support claim (2) in the central pro-choice argument.

Arguments based on criteria for personhood


  1. It is wrong to kill innocent human beings.
  2. The embryo is an innocent human being.
  3. Hence it is wrong to kill the embryo.

Warren, however, thinks that 'human being' is used in different senses in (1) and (2). In (1), 'human being' is used in a moral sense to mean a 'person', a 'full-fledged member of the moral community'. In (2), 'human being' means 'biological human'. That the embryo is a biologically human organism or animal is uncontroversial, Warren holds. But it does not follow that the embryo is a person, and it is persons that have rights, such as the right to life.[2]

To help make a distinction between 'person' and 'biological human', Warren notes that we should respect the lives of highly intelligent aliens, even if they are not biological humans. She thinks there is a cluster of properties that characterize persons:[3]



Other writers apply similar criteria, concluding that the embryo lacks a right to life because it lacks self-consciousness,[5] or rationality and self-consciousness,[6] or 'certain higher psychological capacities' including 'autonomy'.[7] These writers disagree on precisely which features confer a right to life,[8] but agree those features must be certain developed psychological features which the embryo lacks.

Arguments of this sort face two main objections. The comatose patient objection claims that as patients in a reversible coma do not satisfy Warren's (or other) criteria—they are not conscious, do not communicate, and so on—therefore they would lack a right to life on her view.[9] One response is that 'although the reversibly comatose lack any conscious mental states, they do retain all their unconscious [or dispositional] mental states, since the appropriate neurological configurations are preserved in the brain.'[10] This may allow them to satisfy some of Warren’s criteria.


Nonetheless, Warren grants that her argument entails that infanticide would be morally acceptable under some circumstances, such as those of a desert island. Philosopher Peter Singer similarly concludes that infanticide, particularly of severely disabled infants, is justifiable under certain conditions.[12] And Jeff McMahan grants that under very limited circumstances it may be permissible to kill one infant to save the lives of several others.[13] Opponents may see these concessions as a reductio ad absurdum of these writers' views; while supporters may see them merely as examples of unpleasant acts being justified in unusual cases.

The natural capacities view


Grounding the right to life in essential natural capacities rather than accidental developed capacities is said to have several advantages.[15] As developed capacities are on a continuum, admitting of greater and lesser degrees—some, for example, are more rational and self-conscious than others—therefore: (1) the 'developed capacities’ view must arbitrarily select some particular degree of development as the cut-off point for the right to life—whereas the 'natural capacities' view is non-arbitrary; (2) those whose capacities are more developed would have more of a right to life on the 'developed capacities' view—whereas the 'natural capacities' view entails we all have an equal right to life; and (3) the continuum of developed capacities makes the exact point at which personhood ensues vague, and human beings around that point, say between one and two years of age, will have a shadowy or indeterminate moral status—whereas there is no such indeterminacy on the 'natural capacities' view.[16]

Some defenders of Warren-style arguments grant that these problems have not yet been fully solved,[17] but reply that the 'natural capacities' view fares no better. It is argued, for example, that as human beings vary significantly in their natural cognitive capacities (some are naturally more intelligent than others), and as one can imagine a series or spectrum of species with gradually diminishing natural capacities (for example, a series from humans down to amoebae with only the slightest differences in natural capacities between each successive species), therefore the problems of arbitrariness and inequality will apply equally to the 'natural capacities' view.[18] In other words, there is a continuum not only of developed but of natural capacities, and so the 'natural capacities' view will inevitably face these problems as well.

These problems aside, some critics reject the 'natural capacities' view on the basis that it takes mere species membership or genetic potential as a basis for respect (in essence a charge of speciesism),[19] or because it entails that anencephalic infants and the irreversibly comatose have a full right to life.[20] Moreover, as with Marquis’s argument (see below), some theories of personal identity would support the view that the embryo will never itself develop complex mental qualities (rather, it will simply give rise to a distinct substance or entity that will have these qualities), in which case the 'natural capacities' argument would fail.

The deprivation argument

A seminal essay by Don Marquis argues that abortion is wrong because it deprives the embryo of a valuable future.[21] Marquis begins by arguing that what makes it wrong to kill a normal adult human being is the fact that the killing inflicts a terrible harm on the victim. The harm consists in the fact that ‘when I die, I am deprived of all of the value of my future’:[22] I am deprived of all the valuable ‘experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments’ that I would otherwise have had.[23] Thus, if a being has a highly valuable future ahead of it—a ‘future like ours’—then killing that being would be seriously harmful and hence seriously wrong.[24] But then, as a standard embryo does have a highly valuable future, killing it is seriously wrong.[25] And so ‘the overwhelming majority of deliberate abortions are seriously immoral’—‘in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human being’.[26]



As this response makes clear, Marquis's argument requires that what will later have valuable experiences and activities is the same entity, the same biological organism, as the embryo.[28] The identity objection rejects this assumption. On certain theories of personal identity (generally motivated by thought experiments involving brain or cerebrum transplants), each of us is not a biological organism but rather an embodied mind or a person (in John Locke’s sense) that comes into existence when the brain gives rise to certain developed psychological capacities.[29] If either of these views is correct, Marquis’s argument will fail; for the embryo (even the early fetus, lacking the relevant psychological capacities) would not itself have a future of value, but would merely have the potential to give rise to a different entity, an embodied mind or a person, that would have a future of value. The success of Marquis’s argument thus depends on one’s favored account of personal identity.

The interests objection claims that what makes murder wrong is not just the deprivation of a valuable future, but the deprivation of a future that one has an interest in. The embryo has no conscious interest in its future, and so (the objection concludes) to kill it is not wrong. The defender of Marquis-style arguments may, however, give the counterexample of the suicidal teenager who takes no interest in his or her future, but killing whom is nonetheless wrong and murder.[30] If the opponent responds that one can have an interest in one's future without taking an interest in it, then the defender of the Marquis-style argument can claim that this applies to the embryo.[31] Similarly, if an opponent claims that what is crucial is having a valuable future which one would, under ideal conditions, desire to preserve (whether or not one does in fact desire to preserve it),[32] then the defender may ask why the embryo would not, under ideal conditions, desire to preserve its future.

The equality objection claims that Marquis’s argument leads to unacceptable inequalities.[33] If, as Marquis claims, killing is wrong because it deprives the victim of a valuable future, then, since some futures appear to contain much more value than others—a 9 year old has a much longer future than a 90 year old, a middle class person’s future has much less gratuitous pain and suffering than someone in extreme poverty—some killings would turn out to be much more wrong than others. But as this is strongly counterintuitive (most people believe all killings are equally wrong, other things being equal), Marquis’s argument must be mistaken. Some writers have concluded that the wrongness of killing arises not from the harm it causes the victim (since this varies greatly among killings), but from the killing’s violation of the intrinsic worth or personhood of the victim.[34] However, such accounts may themselves face problems of equality,[35] and so the equality objection may not be decisive against Marquis's argument.


The bodily rights argument

In her well-known article A Defense of Abortion, Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that abortion is in some circumstances permissible even if the embryo has a right to life. Her central argument involves a thought experiment. Imagine, Thomson says, that you wake up in bed next to a famous violinist. He is unconscious with a fatal kidney ailment; and because only you happen to have the right blood type to help, the Society of Music Lovers has kidnapped you and plugged your circulatory system into his so that your kidneys can filter poisons from his blood as well as your own. If he is disconnected from you now, he will die; but in nine months he will recover and can be safely disconnected. Thomson takes it that you may permissibly unplug yourself from the violinist even though this will kill him. The right to life, Thomson says, does not entail the right to use another person's body, and so in disconnecting the violinist you do not violate his right to life but merely deprive him of something—the use of your body—to which he has no right. Similarly, even if the embryo has a right to life, it does not have a right to use the pregnant woman's body; and so aborting the embryo is permissible in at least some circumstances. However, Thomson notes that the woman's right to abortion does not include the right to directly insist upon the death of the child, should the fetus happen to be viable, that is, capable of surviving outside the womb.[37]

Critics of this argument generally agree that unplugging the violinist is permissible, but claim there are morally relevant disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion. The most common objection is that the violinist scenario, involving a kidnapping, is analogous only to abortion after rape. In most cases of abortion, it is said, the pregnant woman was not raped but had intercourse voluntarily, and thus has either tacitly consented to allowing the embryo to use her body (the tacit consent objection[38]), or else has a duty to sustain the embryo because the woman herself caused it to stand in need of her body (the responsibility objection[39]). Other common objections turn on the claim that the embryo is the pregnant woman's child whereas the violinist is a stranger (the stranger versus offspring objection[40]); that abortion kills the embryo whereas unplugging the violinist merely lets him die (the killing versus letting die objection[41]); or, similarly, that abortion intentionally causes the embryo's death whereas unplugging the violinist merely causes death as a foreseen but unintended side-effect (the intending versus foreseeing objection;[42] cf the doctrine of double effect).

Defenders of Thomson's argument—most notably David Boonin[43]—reply that the alleged disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion do not hold, either because the factors that critics appeal to are not genuinely morally relevant, or because those factors are morally relevant but do not apply to abortion in the way that critics have claimed. Critics have in turn responded to Boonin's arguments.[44] Thomson's argument thus remains highly controversial; but arguably it does at least show that the moral impermissibility of abortion does not obviously and necessarily follow from the claim that the embryo has a right to life.

See also


  1. ^ Warren 1973
  2. ^ Warren 1973: 457. The same point is made in Tooley 1972: 40-43; Singer 2000: 126-28 and 155-156; Pojman 1994: 280; and elsewhere. Note that 'person' can also be used in two senses. In John Locke’s sense (often employed in discussions of personal identity), 'person' is a descriptive term that tells us about a being's psychological properties. In Warren's sense, 'person' is a moral or evaluative term that tells us about a being's moral properties. Warren and others hold, however, that being a person in the moral sense actually requires being a person in the psychological sense.
  4. ^ Warren 1973: 458-459
  5. ^ Michael Tooley argues that the bearer of a right to life must conceive of itself 'as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states' (Tooley 1972: 44), or must at some time possess 'the concept of a continuing self or mental substance' (Tooley 1984: 218)
  7. ^ McMahan 2002: 260
  11. ^ Warren 1982
  12. ^ Singer 2000: 186-193
  13. ^ McMahan 2002: 359-360
  14. ^ Grisez 1970: 277-287; Lee 1996 and 2004; Lee and George 2005: 16-20; Schwarz 1990: 91-93; Beckwith 1993: 108-10; Reichlin 1997: 22-23; and many others. Note that on Marquis’s view (see below), by contrast, one could fail to have a right to life—for example by becoming irreversibly comatose, since one’s future would then lack valuable experiences and activities.
  16. ^ This third point is discussed in McMahan 2002: 261-265
  17. ^ McMahan 2002: 261-265; Stretton 2004: 281-282
  19. ^ McMahan 2002: 209-217; Stretton 2004: 275-276
  22. ^ Marquis 1989: 190
  23. ^ Marquis 1989: 189
  25. ^ Marquis 1989: 192
  26. ^ Marquis 1989: 183. Although Marquis views the killing of an embryo or normal human adult as seriously wrong, he avoids any reference to 'rights' or the 'right to life', and so is apparently not committed to deontological ethics.
  27. ^ Stone 1987: 816-817; cf Marquis 1989: 201-202
  29. ^ Supporters of the embodied mind view include Tooley 1984: 218-219 (using the term ‘subject of consciousness’); McMahan 2002: ch 1; and Hasker 1999: ch 7. Supporters of the personhood view include Warren 1978: 18; McInerney 1990 (though there is some ambiguity); Doepke 1996: ch 9; and Baker 2000.
  30. ^ Marquis 1989: 198
  31. ^ Cf Stone 1994: 282 n 4
  32. ^ Boonin 2003: 70-85
  34. ^ For example, McMahan 2002: 240-265
  35. ^ McMahan 2002: 247-248
  36. ^ McInerney 1990; McMahan 2002: 271; Stretton 2004: 171-179
  38. ^ eg Warren 1973; Steinbock 1992
  39. ^ eg Beckwith 1993; McMahan 2002
  40. ^ eg Schwarz 1990; Beckwith 1993; McMahan 2002
  41. ^ eg Schwarz 1990; Beckwith 1993; McMahan 2002
  42. ^ eg Finnis 1973; Schwarz 1990; Lee 1996; Lee and George 2005
  43. ^ Boonin 2003: ch 4
  44. ^ eg, Beckwith 2006


  • Himma, Kenneth Einar. “Thomson’s Violinist and Conjoined Twins,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, vol. 8, no. 4 (Fall 1999)

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