<>First Escape:
Dealing with the Totalitarian Legacy in
the Early Postwar Emigration

John-Paul Himka

In periodizing the history of Ukrainians in the Western diaspora after the Second World War, it is useful to make two large divisions. The first, which I call the Postwar Emigration, lasts from the mid-1940s through the 1970s. It is a period in which the leading political and cultural actors were ЋmigrЋs from Ukraine, the chief activity institution building, and the political context the Cold War. The second began in the 1980s, and I call it the period of the Diaspora. It was at this time that the diaspora began to refer to itself as such,[1] perhaps partly because now the ЋmigrЋs from Ukraine began to depart from the scene and the leadership of the community passed to men and women who were already born in the West. Other characteristics of the second period are the decline of Ukrainian community institutions, concern with collective memory issues such as the famine of 1932-33 and the behavior of Ukrainians during World War II, and the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state. This paper is concerned with the earliest subdivision of the first period, i.e., the late 1940s, when most of the postwar emigration consisted of displaced persons (DPs) in Europe, especially Germany.

The problem under investigation is how did this postwar emigration imagine the transition from totalitarianism. The ЋmigrЋs had just experienced both Soviet and Nazi rule, both in their most virulent stages. They themselves had been deeply influenced by the totalitarian impulses of the age. Now Nazi Germany had been defeated, and they had been delivered from the hands of the Soviets. They now claimed to condemn both totalitarianisms. How did they imagine that they would evolve into a post-totalitarian community, living in exile within democratic states? How did they understand the future deliverance of their homeland from Soviet totalitarianism? As far as I know, this study is the first to ask and attempt to answer these questions, and I hope that this compensates for the rather fragmentary and exploratory research on which it is based.

The study focuses on the largest players in the early postwar emigration: the nationalists from Western Ukraine and the revolutionary democrats from Central and Eastern Ukraine. According to a report written by Robert F. Kelley for the United States Army, there were about 3.5 million Ukrainians in Western Europe at the end of World War II. The majority were Central and Eastern Ukrainians who had ended up in Germany either as POWs or Ostarbeiter. But most of these were repatriated, often forcibly, to the Soviet Union, and many of those who managed to remain in the West maintained a low profile or passed as Galician Ukrainians. By 1950, Kelley estimated, Galicians made up 55 percent of the Ukrainian emigrants. The largest political group among them was the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists headed by Stepan Bandera (OUN-B). Perhaps 75-80 percent of the displaced persons from Galicia sympathized with the OUN-B. The party itself claimed 6500-7000 members in the US zone of occupation and 3500-4000 in the British. Their rivals said these claims were exaggerated and conceded only 1500 members in all of Germany, and Kelley accepted their estimate. There were also an estimated 150 active members in the rival Melnyk organization (OUN-M). The Lebed group, which split off from the Bandera group in 1948, was "the smallest of the three."[2] The political scientist Vasyl Markus much later arrived at the following estimates. There were about 8-10,000 political activists in the DP camps and another 15,000 sympathizers, financial contributors, and readers of the party press, together accounting for about 12-15 percent of the total ЋmigrЋ population. At the end of 1948 OUN-B had 5000 members in Western Europe, including 1500 members of its youth division, OUN-M had 1200-1500 members, also including its youth division, and the Lebed group had about 100 members.[3] Another indicator of the relative size of the Bandera and Lebed group is that when they split, at the Mittenwald conference in August 1948, Lebed's group constituted about 20 of the nearly 150 delegates.[4] The largest party of Ukrainians who had come from Central and Eastern Ukraine, i.e., from the Ukrainian SSR in its pre-1939 borders, was the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (URDP) led by Ivan Bahriany. Kelley estimated that it had 100-120 active members, thus slightly smaller than the Melnyk nationalist group;[5] Markus estimated that it was about the same size as the Melnyk group, i.e., with 1200-1500 members.[6]


Formal Rejection of Totalitarianisms

Nazi Germany had been ignominiously defeated and its great crimes against humanity exposed to the public. The Soviet Union had emerged victorious, but all the Ukrainians who chose not to return there, but to remain in Western Europe, were vehemently anti-Soviet. The Cold War was beginning, and the concept of totalitarianism, which identified common features in Nazism and Communism, was becoming popular. This was the context in which the postwar Ukrainian emigration began to redefine its politics. It downplayed as much as possible the cooperation between the Ukrainian nationalist parties and the Germans and emphasized instead how Ukrainian nationalists fought both the Germans and the Soviets and how the Ukrainian nation suffered enormously at the hands of both.

The OUN-M spoke of "millions of victims who perished at the criminal hands of the red and black totalisms [мільйонів жертв, що впали від злочинних рук чорного і червоного тоталізмів]."[7] The OUN-M felt that the totaliarian systems had emerged as a response to the genuine failings of the democratic system, but "the totalitarian reaction in all its varieties has demonstrated its frightening antihuman character and so has revealed itself in the role of a false antithesis of the socio-political crisis of our life today [тоталітарна реакція у всіх своїх різновидностях показала свою застршаючу антилюдянність і, тим самим, розкрила себе в ролі фалшивої антитези соціяльно-політичної кризи нинішнього життя]."[8]

The URDP made even more consistent use of anti-totalitarian rhetoric. Ivan Bahriany spoke of fascism and Communism as "twins [близнюки]," "the two last totalitarian antidemocratic systems [двох останніх тоталітарних антидемократичних систем]." Ukrainians had fought both, "putting an equal sign between the two systems because of their actions [поставивши між цими двома системами знак рівності по їх ділах]." "The repudiation of the one totalitarian system, built on the principle of class hatred and violence, is in the same measure a repudiation of the related system built on the principle of violence and race hatred [Заперечення однієї тоталітарної системи, збудованої на принципі класової зненависті і насильства, є в однаковій мірі запереченням і спорідненої системи, збудованої на принципі насильства і зненависті расової]."[9] He defined the political course [політичний курс] of his party as based on two theses: opposition to Communism and to reaction, the latter identified with "the recidivists of creeping fascism [рецидиви повзучого фашизму]" (he meant the Galician nationalists).[10] This reflected the views prevalent in the homeland: "A characteristic feature of the entire population of Ukraine is a colossal, repressed, but implacable hatred to the Bolshevik totalitarian regime, on the one hand, and to fascism in all its manifestation, even the memory of it, on the other [Характерною рисою всього населення України є колосальна, затаєна, але непримиренна ненависть до більшовицького тоталітарного режиму, з одного боку, й до фашизму у всіх його проявах, навіть у самій пам"яті -- з другого]."[11] He was deeply convinced that "our people in the Fatherland, having experienced totalitarian enslavement in all its modern variants [наш народ на Батьківщині, переживши тоталітарне поневолення у всіх його модерних варіантах]" had developed a "healthy immunity and resistance [здорового імунітету й відпорності]" to it.[12]


Holding the Line

The party that was, at least at this time, the least ready to denounce totalitarianism was the group of nationalists led by Bandera. Experienced conspirators, they seized control of the most important positions in the displaced-persons camps. They used these to raise funds and to consolidate their position as the dominant political force among the Ukrainians in Western Europe. They were reluctant to share power. Their top leadership had spent from 1941 until 1944 in German concentration camps and prisons and remained to some extent frozen in the authoritarian doctrines of the early stages of the war.

It was because of their dominance that the OUN-M made a point of denouncing one-party rule,[13] since that one party would obviously have been the OUN-B.

At the 1948 conference at which the Lebed group was excluded from the OUN-B, the loyal followers of Bandera declared that the correct principles of the Organization remained "unity, monolithicity, and revolutionary discipline [єдинства, монолітности і революційної дисциплінованости]" and not the "discussion-club democracy [клюбово-дискусійною демократичністю]" advocated by the dissidents.[14] The OUN-B also remained true to the principles of revolutionary centralism -- once a decision had been made by the competent authorities, it had to be followed by all members of the Organization without question.[15]

Kelley's report to the US Army, which seems to have relied heavily on information from Mykola Lebed, described the confrontation at the Mittenwald congress as follows:

During the Congress Bandera and Stetsko attacked Lebid and Hrynioch as opportunists who had secured leadership of UHVR [Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council] for personal reasons and were seeking to split OUNR [OUN-B] and UHVR. Stetsko said that the aim of the OUNR was to create a free independent state by forming a united strong party led by one man. Hrynioch declared that the UHVR was not created by Bandera and Stetsko but by the people in the homeland. These people rejected one-man government and one-party system as well as party terrorism and any type of political monopoly. The fighting people of the homeland were not prepared to accept Bandera as a dictator.[16]

In a letter to an old friend, Orest Lisynets'kyi in Brazil, Lebed had this to say about the Bandera group's efforts to be the single dominant force in the Ukrainian emigration: "People don't want to realize that tomorrow they are going to have to pay plenty for this, just like we had to pay in 1941 and subsequent years for an unhealthy politics and conception [Люде не хочуть усвідомити собі, що завтра прийдеться за це дорого платити, як платили ми в 1941 р. і дальших роках за нездорову політику і концепцію]."[17] (The unhealthy politics and conception refer to OUN's early orientation on Hitler's Germany.)

Myroslav Yurkevych has summarized Bandera's position: "For Bandera and his associates in the OUN-B, democracy meant competition among various political currents and the victory of one, representing the majority of the population. The OUN was conceived as a vanguard party which interpreted and executed the popular will. This was democracy on the totalitarian model, though Bandera would never have called it that."[18]


Problematic Democracy

Although the OUN-M explicitly rejected totalitarianism, it did not want to replace it with democracy. A member of the OUN-M leadership, Yurii Blokhyn (pseud. Boiko), explained how Ukrainian nationalism differed from totalitarianism: 

Totalitarianism, with all the characteristics that are presently included in the concept, is essentially foreign to Ukrainian nationalism. Nationalism does not know the police regimentation of creativity, it seeks its power in reliance on the people, not in violence, and it is inclined always to guarantee the right of expression of thought opposed to its own tendencies, and it is ready to apply dictatorial methods only against the activity of alien national forces and blind anarchy.[19]

[Тоталітаризм з усією специфікою, яка вкладається в це поняття тепер, є посутньо чужий українському націоналізмові. Націоналізм не знає поліційної регляментації творчости, своєї сили шукає в оперті на народ, а не в насильстві і схильний назавжди забезпечити право вислову опозиційної думки до своїх потягнень та лише проти дії чужонаціональних сил і сліпої анархії готов застосувати методи диктатури.]

But nationalism was not democratic either. It had, Blokhyn said, broken decisively with "the demoliberal understanding of the concept of the nation[демоліберальним розумінням поняття нації]."[20]

The theses of the OUN-M's ideological conference, held in June-July 1948, spoke clearly against democracy. They blamed democratic tolerance for allowing Communism and other totalitarianisms to undermine societies.[21] They explicitly rejected Rousseau and the concept of natural rights.[22] They rejected totalitarianism, but wanted no "sick partyism [хоробливе партійництво]" to have influence on Ukrainian politics.[23] Instead of democracy, they put forward the notion of a "nation-authoritative state [народовладна держава]," which incorporated and modified some democratic principles. For example, there would be equality before the law, but limited by the interests of the Ukrainian nation, and freedom of expression could exist "in culturally and socially appropriate limits [в культурно і соціяльно доцільних межах]."[24]

The leading theoretician of democracy in the Lebed group was Lev Rebet. He supported pluralism, but his understanding of democracy emphasized the mobilization of the demos, of the people [народ], rather than democratic institutions and the rule of law.[25]

Ivan Bahriany was a vocal proponent of democracy. He saw the victory of democracy as part of a dialectical movement, an "implacable [невблаганний]" historical process.[26] But this victory required a new revolution, and Bahrianyi named his program and his movement "revolutionary democracy." He too had nothing to say about developing institutions and the rule of law. His concept of democracy was oriented on "the multimillion masses of... peasants and workers [багатомільйонних мас...селянства і робітництва]" who, he said, constitute 99 percent of Ukraine's population. "Their desires and their aspirations will determine the political character of tomorrow's Ukraine [Їхні прагнення і їхні стремління визначатимуть устроєвий характер завтрашньої України]."

...This is democracy in the authentic meaning of the word, authentic rule by the people. This is social orderliness. This is political liberty and safety from violence and terror. In a word, this is that order "without serf and master," which the great Shevchenko already predicted....[27]

[...це демократія в справжньому розумінні цього слова, справжнє народоправство. Це соціальна упорядкованість. Це політична свобода і забезпеченість від насильства і терору. Словом, це отой лад "без хлопа і пана", про який віщував ще великий Шевченко....]

This was, of course, a very populist vision of democracy, and one that could easily be criticized as ultimately compatible with a form of totalitarianism.


Mimicry of Democracy

In 1947 Ivan Bahriany complained that the Bandera nationalists were engaging in "political mimicry, masking themselves under democracy, but not changing their reactionary essence [політичної мімікрії, маскуючись під демократію, але не змінивши своєї реакційної суті]."[28] A year earlier he had noted that the nationalist camp was trying to repudiate its heritage of xenophobia, antisemitism, voluntarism, leaderism [вождизм], and antidemocratism, but "not by overcoming these things, but by assuring us that they had not existed [не переборюючи їх, а запевняючи, що їх і не було]."[29] Similar statements were made also by Rebet.[30]

Perhaps the most successful practitioner of political mimicry and rewriting history to suit the new democractic mood was Lebed. Lebed had been working with American intelligence since at least 1947,[31] and the democratic rhetoric of his group seemed to have more to do with the politics of their patrons than with any deep-seated change of convictions.[32] Lebed's group published document collections that doctored historical texts to eliminate pro-German and antisemitic statements.[33] Lebed left his papers to the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Many documents in that collection have been retyped, with no originals preserved, and the years 1941-42 seem hardly to exist, since these were the years of OUN's closest involvement with the Germans.


Xenophobia and Antisemitism

Although their language certainly became more temperate in the postwar years, Bahriany still charged the nationalists with retaining their xenophobia and antisemitism. He contrasted the West Ukrainian nationalists with the population of Central and Eastern Ukraine: "...A characteristic trait of the population of Ukraine...is the absence of national hatred to the degree that some Ukrainian apostles of hatred and xenophobia would like [...характерна риса населення України...-- це відсутність національного ненанисництва такої міри, як того хотіли б деякі українські апостоли ненанисництва й ксенофобія]."

What was really remarkable about the URDP's stand on antisemitism was the attention it paid to reeducating its sympathizers about Jews. In 1946-47 the party newspaper Ukrains'ki visti reported favorably on Jews' desire to establish their own state in Palestine and identified the Arabs as Soviet clients;[34] it painted the USSR as antisemitic[35] and Jewish activists as anti-Communist.[36] This philosemitic stance was obviously intended as an antidote to the Nazi and collaborationist propaganda to which Ukrainians had been exposed during the war.



A characteristic feature of the emigration's political thinking in the early postwar period was reticence to discuss the failings of one's own camp. Bahriany frequently criticized the nationalists for their fascist outlook and methods, but he and his Eastern Ukrainian sympathizers were also criticized as having been infected by Bolshevism, materialism, and denationalization.[37] Perhaps these mutual accusations inhibited frank discussion of internal issues.

Only rarely did self-critical passages appear in the writings of this period. Very early on, and in a piece directed to the outside world, Bahriany mentioned in passing "the type of person" [тип людини] that was formed in Soviet Ukraine: "a frightened person, suspicious, close-mouthed, and inclined to fatalism [людини заляканої, підозрідої, мовчазної і фатально настроєної]."[38] In his articles written in the rest of the 1940s he never returned to this theme. Instead, he consistently reproduced an upbeat image of Soviet Ukrainian peasants and workers, immune to totalitarianism, who would transform Ukraine through a democratic revolution. The social psychology projected in these texts does not differ much from the one inherited from Soviet propaganda.

A rare example of nationalist self criticism comes from the pen of Yurii Boiko-Blokhyn: "Ukrainian nationalism in its youthful impulse, in the exuberance of its powers, sometimes put forward imperialist slogans that did not benefit it [Український націоналізм у молодому пориві, в буянні сил, інколи виставляв імперіялістичні кличі, що не приносили йому користи]." Characteristically, this passage is immediately preceded by a vision of Ukraine as "a territorially large state, which includes in full all ethnographically Ukrainian lands and secures for itself important military-strategic bases" [великопростірна держава, що повністю включає в себе етнографічно українські терени і забезпечує за собою важливі воєнно-стратегічні бази].[39]



Although the transitology of the 1990s and 2000s has placed a major emphasis on economic issues, generally linking free politics with a free market, Ukrainian political thinkers of the late 1940s did not devote much attention to this sphere.

Bahriany treated economic issues more frequently than did the representatives of other camps. After some initial hesitation, Bahriany decided that his party would not advocate socialism.[40] Nonetheless, he consistently opposed the restoration of capitalism.[41] After the democratic revolution, the people of Ukraine could establish the socio-economic order they wanted, but his party would argue "against the restoration of the landlord-capitalist order [проти реставрації поміщицько-капіталістичного ладу]."[42] There should be no return of an exploitative order, and collective and state farms should be dissolved.[43]

The Melnyk nationalists, who retained corporatist ideals, were also anticapitalist. One of the problems of democracy was that the kind of liberty it championed "imposed the yoke of capitalism on the workers and constituted an evil irony to the very idea of liberty [така свобода накинула ярмо капітализму на робітництво і була злою іронією до самої ідеї свободи]."[44]



This survey demonstrates how difficult it was for the first post-totalitarian generation of Ukrainians to move beyond the worldviews in which they had been immersed in the 1930s and early 1940s. They were still not well integrated into a different set of circumstances. Indeed, they were for most of the late 1940s still in refugee camps in devastated, as yet unreconstructed Germany. Their experience of non-totalitarian alternatives was minimal.

They were in a disoriented position, not quite defeated, but certainly not victors. They were cut off from their homeland, although they were not ready to admit it. They took courage from what they heard about a nationalist insurgency in Western Ukraine and hoped for a revolution. The OUN looked forward to a national revolution, which they believed would solve all Ukraine's problems. The Bahrianyi group looked forward to a democractic revolution, in which they also invested unrealistically large hopes.

They were for the most part men about 40 years of age. Andrii Melnyk was the oldest at 58 in 1948. Boiko-Blokhyn, Bandera, and Lebed were all 39. Bahriany was 42. All of them, except for Boiko-Blokhyn, had spent years in prison.

If this study has demonstrated the shortcomings of how these individuals and the movements they headed dealt with their totalitarian legacies, it is not intended to diminish their stature. It is rather intended as a lesson in how hard it is to rebuild thoughts and attitudes, let alone social structures.

[1] Vic Satzewich, The Ukrainian Diaspora (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 8.

[2] Robert F. Kelley, "Survey of Russian Emigration," 92-93, 106-07, 111, 116, in Lebed archives, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, box 1, file 12. This document was declassified on 30 October 1992.

[3] Vasyl Markus, "Political Parties in the DP Camps," in Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus, eds., The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), 118-19.

[4] Oleksandr Panchenko, Lev Rebet: Natsiia i derzhava, demokratiia i pravo (Hadiach: Vydavnytstvo "Hadiach," 2003), 127. Kelley speaks of 160 party members attending the Mittenwald  congress and of 17 oppositionists of the Lebed group. Kelley, "Survey of Russian Emigration," 98.

[5] Kelley, "Survey of Russian Emigration," 111.

[6] Markus, "Political Parties in the DP Camps," 118.

[7] Rezoliutsii III-ho Velykoho Zboru Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv (N.p., 1947).

[8] Tezy ideolohichnoi konferentsii Orhanizatsii ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv (cherven'-lypen' 1948) (N.p.: Nakladom OUN, 1948), 22.

[9] Ivan Bahrianyi, "Komunizm, fashyzm i revoliutsiina demokratiia [1947]," in Ivan Bahrianyi, Publitsystyka. Dopovidi, statti, pamflety, refleksii, ese, ed. Oleksii Konoval (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo "Smoloskyp," Fundatsiia im. Ivana Bahrianoho, 1996), 75.

[10] Ivan Bahrianyi, "Tak trymaty!! [1947]," in Bahrianyi, Publitsystyka, 82.

[11] Ivan Bahrianyi, "Do pytan' stratehii i taktyky nashoi vyzvol'noi borot'by (Dopovid' na III z"izdi URDP [1949]," in Bahrianyi, Publitsystyka, 130.

[12] Ivan Bahrianyi, "Memento mori [1951]," in Bahrianyi, Publitsystyka, 233.

[13] "Attempts to monopolize Ukrainian life by one party in today's conditions are unnatural and doomed in advance to fail. They only anarchize Ukrainian society [Намагання монополізації українського життя однією партією в нинішніх обставинах протиприродні і заздалегідь засуджені на невдачу. Вони лише анархізують українське суспільство]." Rezoliutsii, 7.

[14] OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borot'by 1929-1955, Biblioteka ukrains'koho pidpil'nyka, 1 (N.p., 1955),222. This collection was published by the Lebed group.

[15] Ibid., 224.

[16] Kelley, "Survey of Russian Emigration," 99.

[17] The letter is dated 30 November 1949. Lebed archives, box 1, file 13.

[18] Myroslav Yurkevich, "Ukrainian Nationalists and DP Politics, 1945-50," in Isajiw et al., eds., The Refugee Experience, 134.

[19] Iurii Blokhyn [Boiko], "Ideolohiia ukrains'koho natsionalizmu," in Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv 1929-1954 (Na chuzhyni [sic]: Persha Ukrains'ka Drukarnia u Frantsii, 1955), 88.

[20] Ibid., 82.

[21] Tezy, 22.

[22] Ibid., 21.

[23] Ibid., 32.

[24] Ibid., 31.

[25] Panchenko, Lev Rebet, 131-34.

[26] Bahrianyi, "Mizh 'trupom' i 'pryvydom' [1946]," in Bahrianyi, Publitsystyka, 67.

[27] Bahrianyi, "Tak trymaty!!" 84.

[28] Ibid., 82.

[29] Bahrianyi, "Natsional'na ideia i 'natsionalizm' [1946]," in Bahrianyi, Publitsystyka, 63.

[30] Panchenko, Lev Rebet, 134.

[31] Jeffrey Burds, The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948, The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies, 1505 (Pittsburgh: The Center for Russian and East European Studies, a program of the University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 2001), 16-17.

[32] On the difficulty nationalists had shedding their totalitarian heritage, see Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi, "Natsionalizm i totalitaryzm (Vidpovid' M. Prokopovi)," Journal of Ukrainian Studies 7, no. 2 (Fall 1982), 80-86..

[33] For example: Zlochyny komunistychnoi Moskvy v Ukraini v liti 1941 roku (New York: Proloh, 1960). I have carefully compared all the texts in this volume that were taken from the wartime newspaper Krakivs'ki visti with the originals in the newspaper. The originals were vehemently antisemitic, but the offending passages have all been eliminated or modified in the document collection.

[34] Ukrains'ki visti, 1946, no. 4 (11): 6, no. 7 (14): 6, no. 10 (17): 6, no. 16 (23): 1, no. 20 (27): 2, no. 35 (45): 2, no. 45 (55): 2, 1947, 6 (64): 1, no. 7 (65): 1, no. 8 (66): 1, no. 16 (74): 3, no. 19 (77): 1.

[35] Ukrains'ki visti, 1947, no. 13 (71): 3, no. 14 (72): 3.

[36] Ukrains'ki visti, 1947, no. 10 (68): 6.

[37] Bahrianyi, "Velykyi ispyt" [1950], in Bahrianyi, Publitsystyka, 206.

[38] Bahrianyi, "Chomu ia ne khochu vertatysia do SRSR?" [1946], 27.

[39] Blokhyn, "Ideolohiia ukrains'koho natsionalizmu," 84.

[40] Bahrianyi, "Dopovid' na II z"izdi URDP. Komunizm, fashyzm, kapitalyzm, sotsializm i my [1948]," 87-97.

[41] Bahrianyi, "Na novyi shliakh [1946]," in Bahrianyi, Publitsystyka, 16. Bahrianyi, "Tak trymaty!!" 83.

[42] Bahrianyi, "Dopovid' na II z"izdi URDP," 95-96.

[43] Bahrianyi, "Tak trymaty!!" 85.

[44] Tezy, 20.