The Washington Times
October 29, 1997

Nuclear weapons and the CTBT

BYLINE: Federico Peña

On Sept. 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the culmination of a 40-year, bipartisan quest to end nuclear testing. The treaty is now before the Senate for approval, and this week the first hearings have begun. The Test Ban Treaty should be approved because it is an important tool to combat nuclear proliferation and will strengthen regional and global security. It serves the national security interests of the United States.

The hearings will focus on two fundamental questions: Can we maintain our nuclear arsenal without nuclear explosive testing and can we effectively monitor whether other countries are conducting tests? The answer is yes to both.

In 1992, a bipartisan majority in the Congress led by Sens. Mark Hatfield, Oregon Republican, James Exon, Nebraska Democrat, and George Mitchell, Maine Democrat, legislated a ban on U.S. nuclear testing to begin in 1996. In 1993, Mr. Clinton directed the Energy Department to develop the Stockpile Stewardship program -- a way of maintaining our nuclear weapons without nuclear testing.

The Stockpile Stewardship program gives us the information necessary to determine whether our nuclear weapons are safe, secure and reliable, now and in the future. We are using data from past nuclear tests, high-speed supercomputers, non-nuclear subcritical experiments and high-tech simulation experiments to check for and correct problems in the nuclear stockpile -- problems that in the past would have been resolved by nuclear testing. We are also constructing new facilities, such as the National Ignition Facility which will have the world's largest laser, to give us the additional laboratory capabilities and the data we will need to maintain our nuclear weapons in the future.

Some charge that stockpile stewardship is too costly, that it will be used to develop new and more destructive nuclear weapons, or that it can not work and that the United States needs to conduct nuclear tests. Let me address these concerns.

First, Stockpile Stewardship costs -- about $4.5 billion in 1999 -- are about 2 cents out of every dollar this nation spends on defense -- a small price to pay to ensure our nuclear deterrent is safe and reliable. This represents a significant reduction from Cold War expenditures when the United States averaged more than $6 billion per year to develop, build, test and maintain our nuclear arsenal.

Second, Stockpile Stewardship will not support the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. Without nuclear testing, the nuclear weapons states will not be able to develop, with confidence, advanced new nuclear weapons types.

Third, Stockpile Stewardship is already working today to maintain our nuclear deterrent, and it is on course to do so in the future. The president has directed a new annual certification procedure for each weapons type in the stockpile, to identify any safety or reliability problems that could undermine our deterrent.

In this review, the defense secretary and I must certify to the president, in writing, that our nuclear arsenal is safe and reliable. We do so with the full input and advice from the Energy Department's nuclear weapons laboratory directors, the Nuclear Weapons Council and the U.S. Strategic Command, after they thoroughly examine each weapons type. We have completed one annual review and certification that our weapons are safe and reliable, and we will soon complete the second certification.

We have a high degree of confidence in Stockpile Stewardship. But if I were informed by these advisers that there is a problem with the stockpile that we could not correct without returning to underground nuclear testing, I would so advise the president.

President Clinton has made clear that Stockpile Stewardship will require sustained bipartisan support from the administration and the Congress for the next decade and beyond. We're committed to working with Congress to ensure that support, both for the Stockpile Stewardship budget and for the president's six Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty safeguards. These safeguards are important - they strengthen our commitment to Stockpile Stewardship and specify the conditions under which the United States would be prepared to withdraw from the Treaty in the event nuclear testing were required.

Critics of the CTBT also argue the United States can not effectively verify a ban on nuclear testing, and that potential adversaries will be able to test undetected while we forgo testing. But our intelligence capabilities, the Treaty's verification provisions and our diplomatic efforts provide the tools we need to effectively verify compliance.

Moreover, Mr. Clinton has directed a number of enhancements in our monitoring capabilities and included them in the six Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty safeguards. Congress has not yet provided full funding for these vital enhancements -- which are needed with or without a CTBT -- and we are committed to working with Congress to ensure adequate funding.

The vision for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty began with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. The zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed by President Clinton can finally make this vision a reality.

We have the means to end nuclear testing and to maintain the safety, security and reliability of our nation's nuclear weapons. We look forward to working with the Senate as it begins its review of this landmark treaty.


Federico Peña is U.S. secretary of energy.