Tuesday, June 29, 2010

The Limits of Science

My view is that there are no theoretical limits on what science can discover. To put it another way, there are no inherently undiscoverable facts. This is naturalism as I understand it.

I think this is an a priori truth. It doesn't make sense to say that there are things that exist but which science cannot study. I know it seems like a perfectly reasonable thing to say; but when analyzed, it doesn't stands to reason. What it would mean is that there are facts which cannot be described by any process of describing facts. It would mean there were inherently indescribable facts. But facts are describable by definition. So it's a contradiction in terms. You can believe in the indescribable--you can believe in the supernatural--but not rationally. That's why people call it "faith."

Wittgenstein wrote, "A nothing would do just as well as a something about which nothing could be said." The relevance is thus: When discussing what is possible, there is no difference between postulating the indescribable and postulating nothing at all. So there is no sense in supposing that the indescribable is even possible. It's just a meaningless assertion. It can have emotive power, for sure; it can inspire faith. But it cannot be the subject of rational belief.

Sunday, June 27, 2010

Naturalism Defined














Thursday, June 24, 2010

Morality, Personal and Social

I have been discussing dignity in personal terms, as what defines a person as such, and so with reference to self-awareness, self-worth, and self-respect. Yet, morality has an intrinsically social dimension. This might seem to create a tension in our understanding, though I don't think that should be the case.

Rationality and personhood are normative concepts--they require communities. Dignity therefore cannot be defined from the inside, such that each person's dignity were a wholly subjective matter. Rather, personhood is defined through social interaction, through rational processes of negotiating differences. There could be no concept of person without the process of rational negotiation. So, when we have dignity--when we respect and value ourselves--we are understanding and defining ourselves through others. When we condemn or praise others with our own moral judgments, we are saying something about what it means to be a person. We are setting a standard for ourselves and all others.

Thus, we might say that to foster dignity is to promote, negotiate, and follow principles which guide rational negotiation.

I should add that I am using the term "negotiation" very widely, to cover all types of inter-personal influence, including formal and informal conflict and dispute resolution and both physical and psychological manipulation.

Wednesday, June 23, 2010

More on Kant, Dignity, and Morality

Ronald A. Lindsay was kind enough to reply to my comment about the purpose of morality. (I claimed that the primary function of morality was to foster the dignity of persons--i.e., rational, self-aware agents.) He asked for some clarification of what I meant by "dignity," and also made some comments which reminded me that his primary concern is with establishing a methodology for resolving moral dilemmas. Here is the substance of my reply:

I agree that it might be hard for people to accept my answer without a little discussion of what “dignity” means. I like the way Kant approaches it. He contrasts dignity with prices. Prices are relative values, and they are fixed to objects because those objects are means to ends. The value of an object is relative to the ends it serves. For Kant, dignity is the quality of being beyond comparative value. It is the quality of being an end in oneself. Persons are distinct from objects because they have dignity—they are ends in themselves—and this is what defines their moral dimension.

I don’t suppose most people think about dignity in these terms. We are more likely to think of dignity in terms of self-worth, or self-respect. But these needn’t be treated as mutually exclusive alternatives to Kant’s view. Rather, Kant may have been suggesting an explanation for what it means to value and respect oneself.

It’s common to say that everyone has a price, that we can all be bought. Isn’t this another way of saying that moral principles only go so far? Though isn’t it impossible to buy a person completely, so that they can no longer think of themselves as an end? No, I don’t think you can buy a person’s sense of self—though with violence you can destroy it.

One lacks moral principles to the extent that one can be bought. But this is not to say that one’s moral principles are necessarily good. It is only to recognize them as moral principles, for better or for worse.

I think the point to take to heart here is that understanding what morality is for—what makes morality what it is—does not help us resolve moral dilemmas. It does not tell us which moral principles are good or bad. It doesn’t tell us what we should do with morality. It only tells us how to recognize a moral principle as such.

As for constructing a methodology for resolving moral dilemmas . . . I’m not so optimistic that this can be done. Rules of thumb can be loosely established, if we’re talking about a third-party methodology. E.g., Find the most basic common ground. Identify the motivating emotional and circumstantial factors. Establish the relevant scientific and historical facts. Look for possible areas of compromise. Avoid harm. Minimize losses. Etc. But I’m not sure how well moral disagreements lend themselves to third-party moderation. And without that, I don’t see how a methodology could be possible at all.

Kant on Morality and Dignity

Yesterday I came up with the notion that the primary function of morality is to foster dignity. I noted a relation between my idea and Kant's view of rational agents as ends in themselves, but I wasn't aware just how similar my view is to Kant's. Today, while doing a little reading about dignity, I found this passage from his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (edited and translated by Mary Gregor, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 42-43):


Now, morality is the condition under which a rational being can be an end in itself, since only through this is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends.

Kant concludes that morality, and that which practices morality, alone has dignity on the grounds that morality is "the condition under which a rational being can be an end in itself." However, in the view which I expressed yesterday, morality requires that persons be treated as ends in themselves because morality is the practice of fostering dignity. Our views look the same, but our reasoning is in opposite directions.

Update: After a little reflection, I wonder if Kant's reasoning really is so different from my own. Kant's view may have been that only ends in themselves can have dignity, because only ends in themselves can be valued in themselves, and not according to some price. Thus, when he says morality is the kingdom of ends, he is saying that morality is the province of dignity. I'm not sure if this is quite the same as saying that morality is the practice of fostering dignity, but it seems awfully close. Still, I'm not sure how much I like defining "dignity" as being beyond price. Maybe there's nothing wrong with that definition, but it leaves a lot unsaid.

Second update (Dec. 20): I've taken out a couple paragraphs of wrong-headed Kantian interpretation.

Tuesday, June 22, 2010

The Purpose of Morality

Ronald A. Lindsay, of the Center for Inquiry, asks, What is the purpose of morality?

Here's my answer:

In my understanding, the primary function of morality is to foster the dignity of persons, which I would define as self-aware, rational agents. The principles underlying any such process or practice would, by definition, be moral principles. Any principles which do not foster the dignity of persons could not be considered moral.

I didn't have this answer a few days ago, when I first read Lindsay's post. I had some vague idea that, from an evolutionary perspective, morality probably helps people function together. But that is too general to be of value. It doesn't get at what is unique to morality. Also, I was never persuaded by the idea that morality is functionally limited to any species, or any definable biological group. After all, we can have moral dilemmas about sentient robots. This is not to say that morality has no basis in evolutionary biology. It surely does, but those roots do not limit the scope of its functionality to any set of biological organisms.

I like the answer I came up with. I'm not sure what made me think of it, though Kant was an influence. I've always liked his idea that morality requires that we treat rational agents as ends in themselves, though I was never sure it had a firm theoretical foundation. It occurred to me that, if morality is just about fostering the dignity of rational agents, then Kant's idea logically follows.

Monday, June 21, 2010

Morality and Emotions

Richard Brown, a CUNY Assistant Professor of Philosophy and author of the blog Philosophy Sucks!, recently shared some of his thoughts on the relationship between morality and emotions. I found it very stimulating and offered several observations and objections in the comments section. We'll see if any minds are changed.

I'm posting the (cosmetically modified) content of my comments below. They're out of context here, of course, but I think my points are understandable:

  1. I appreciate the response, Richard.





    My reason for taking issue with your notion of “correct emotions” is similar. Unlike actions, emotions cannot be correct or incorrect. Only those behaviors which are intended can be either correct or incorrect. For example, a sunset cannot be correct or incorrect, unless we are talking about some action which intended that sunset or which accidentally caused the sunset by intending to do something else.


    In terms of evolutionary biology, my fear of the garden hose was adaptive. It’s adaptive to be afraid when you see something that might be a snake. You might suggest that an error arises when fear persists even after we recognize that it’s a garden hose, and not a snake. But how could this be an error?


  2. Another objection to your view occurs to me.




  3. One more argument which might be worth considering . . .


Monday, June 7, 2010

What is Philosophy?

Brian Leiter has invited his readers to answer this question in 75 words or less. The original challenge was to do it in 50 words or less, but I guess Leiter thought that wasn't fair. In any case, I've just submitted the following 49-word answer to his blog:

Philosophy is thinking about thinking. It explores the varieties and limits of thought and thinking things. It is therefore concerned with understanding the nature of knowledge, belief, intuition, propositions, judgments, facts, inferences, arguments, reasons, and justifications. To this end, it develops views of meaning, truth, validity, morality, possibility, and plausibility.

Edited on June 7, 2010, to add a 50th word: "meaning."