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December 2015


The One and the Many: The Ontology of Science in Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, CURTIS L. HANCOCK

If contemporary philosophers of science could transcend the skepticism that seems to have become obligatory in modern epistemologies, they could restore a comprehensive vision of science that would be a boon to science and scientific education. Science is not mere knowledge. Science is knowledge of something that is necessary and universal because its causes are understood. This was Aristotle’s conception of science (epistēmē), a conception which includes knowledge of substances and the first ontological principles of things. St. Thomas Aquinas refined this understanding of science in a way that, perhaps surprisingly, has escaped the notice of many Thomists, especially the way St. Thomas understands physical substance to be a generic universal grounding necessary relations for some of its accidents. The recovery of Aristotle’s and St. Thomas’s conception of science would in no way threaten contemporary empirical science. Instead, it would explain how empirical science complements the ontology of science. 

The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing, DANIEL D. DE HAAN

This essay expounds Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of being and examine the function it plays in his Metaphysics of the Healing (aš–Šifā’, al–Ilāhiyyāt). In the first part addresses the question: What is Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of being? The essay begins by situating Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of being within the epistemological framework of his account of metaphysics as an Aristotelian science. It then explicates Avicenna’s own presentation of analogy within his account of names of univocity, analogy, resemblance, and equivocity, and elucidates his division of absolute and relational analogies. The second part probes the question: Is Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of being consistent with his account of the subject of metaphysics as being qua being? This part shows why Avicenna rejects that being is univocal and presents two ways for interpreting consistently his doctrine of the analogical character of being qua being.

The Necessity and Limits of Kant’s Transcendental Logic, with Reference to Nietzsche and Hegel, MAX GOTTSCHLICH

Engaging with Kant’s transcendental logic seems to be a question of mere scholarly historical interest today. It is most commonly regarded a mixture between logic and psychology or epistemology, and by that, not a serious form of logic. Transcendental logic seems to be of no systematic impact on the concept of logic. This paper aims to disclose a different account on the endeavour of Kant’s transcendental logic in particular and of the Critique of Pure Reason in general. Kant’s fundamental question is in a revolutionary way aiming to ground the character of necessity of knowledge, which means to justify the claim that thinking in accordance with the forms and principles of formal logic does not lead to sheer tautologies or an unsolved contradiction, but to knowledge that is objectively valid. The first part of the essay demonstrates the necessity and the significance of this new fundamental question of the CPR with respect to its genesis out of pre-Kantian metaphysics. The second part opens up a perspective that lies beyond Kant’s standpoint with reference to Nietzsche and eventually to Hegel. It answers the question: What knowledge do we achieve about being or actuality by means of formal logic? The paper argues that Kant shows that formal logic is the logic of all technical-practical conduct but also, at least indirectly, the limitation of the technical-practical knowledge and its legitimate sphere of application.

Does “I Know” Tolerate Metaphysical Emphasis? R. G. Collingwood’s Affirmative Answer to Wittgenstein’s Rhetorical Question, GUIDO VANHEESWIJCK

A number of articles have highlighted the resemblances between Collingwood’s and Wittgenstein’s positions in the domains of philosophy of language, anthropology, and logic. The introduction of this essay recalls some aspects of these resem­blan­ces. However, the main difference between the two philosophers con­sists in their attitudes toward metap­hysics. Whereas Wittgenstein’s thesis in On Certainty is that “I know” does not tolerate metaphysical emphasis, Collingwood claims in An Essay on Metaphysics that it is the specific task of metaphysics to articulate our basic presuppositions in their historical transformations. That difference has been noted, but never really examined. Moreover, the majority of Collingwood scholars see no reason why his historical study of basic presuppositions should usurp the name of metaphysics and, therefore, reject the term as an unfortunately chosen one. The main purpose of this essay is to explain why Collingwood’s term “metaphysics” is not so idiosyncratic as it is supposed to be and in what sense his metaphysics differs from Wittgenstein’s approach.   

Speculari Aude: The Platonic Path of Metaphysics in Dieter Henrich, ANDY GERMAN

What form can metaphysics still take in a philosophical modernity that has been decisively shaped by the impact of Kant’s critical project? This question has exercised Dieter Henrich, one of Kant’s greatest living interpreters. This paper focuses on Henrich’s intricate argument that metaphysical thinking, albeit of a new kind, remains indispensable especially in an age for which self-consciousness is a first principle. Henrich seeks a form of thought that can justify and preserve what he views as modernity’s greatest achievement, its conception of the free, self-determining subject. Yet his description of this metaphysics for a new era reveals its surprisingly Platonic affinities. The paper focuses on those affinities, both in order critically to assess Henrich’s own work on subjectivity, but also because they reveal a fundamental and philosophically significant continuity that underlies all forms of comprehensive thinking, even in forms as divergent as those of Plato and Kant.