The British Monarchy

It seemed an appropriate time to write a little piece about the British monarchy, an institution which truly sets Britain apart from our neighbours and represents a great source of pride.

Through recent years there has been some criticism of the monarchy as representing an outdated or unnecessary element to our society, yet much of this criticism is unfounded or does not account for the many benefits that the Royal Family bring to the nation.

Cold hard cash is usually a central line of argument, with people saying that the Royals are maintained at high cost to the taxpayer for little return. Yet the monarch’s income is calculated via the Sovereign Grant from profits made by the Royal household and holdings; the proportion of this granted to the Royal Family is 15%. This essentially translates to the Queen paying 85% income tax on the palaces within which she is permitted to reside.

The Royal Family’s income is also used to pay for both the staff and upkeep of the many fine buildings to which they are linked, buildings which are of great utility to the nation both as sources of revenue and for state functions. The estimated amount paid by the Royals for upkeep of palaces and payment of staff was £35.8million, roughly 65% of their income [after the equivalent 85% tax].

This is not to suggest that the Royals are poorly off, but it must be remembered that they live in their palaces through parliamentary permission and their homes are very frequently used to host state occasions. Indeed, it has proven time and again that Royal occasions are a very useful diplomatic tool in aiding British interests the world over.

These state occasions are far from the only services rendered to the country by the Royal Family. The Queen alone had 341 engagements in 2015 varying from state visits abroad to school visits, which is an impressive total for a now nonagenarian. The family combined are in a constant state of activity when supporting charities, representing the country, or simply supporting the communities they serve.

As the head of state, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second represents both the United Kingdom, its territories, and the Commonwealth overseas. Whilst she wields no official power, it is worth remembering that the monarch is the symbol many people hold when considering Britain. Rather than an elected official, the representative of this nation is an individual who has spent a lifetime training, learning, and executing the responsibilities of office. One need only compare her with so divisive a figure as Donald Trump to realise the advantages of being represented by one who is not only prepared for the realities of diplomacy, but has been trained to carry out her duties with dignity.

The responsibilities of the office are oft forgotten when considering the advantages – the palaces, the staff, and the inherited influence, yet it must be remembered that all those in the Royal Family – not just the monarch – have spent their whole lives learning that with such influence comes a responsibility. The Royals do not own their palaces, they wield no political power, and they live their whole lives in the public eye as a consequence of their birth. There are many wealthier people in the nation than the Royal Family; The Queen did not reach even the top 300 wealthiest Britons in the 2015 Times listing whilst in comparison Paul Pogba was paid more to change football teams than the Royal Family were granted by the Government in a year. Indeed, there are plenty of stupendously wealthy people in the world who contribute very little indeed, whilst their are few families the world over who can point to the lifetimes of charitable and social work carried out by the British Royal Family.

Times do change, and we must change with them, yet this is not a maxim for obliterating the past. The monarchy is a tangible link to that past, whose maintenance costs each of us less than £1 a year. So much of our history, our traditions, our institutions, indeed what makes us up as a nation is intrinsically linked through the monarchy, they stand as a living cultural foundation which continues to serve every citizen of Britain and the Commonwealth. Other nations may have cast aside their history or removed their monarchs but Britain has not, and is stronger for it; with both a long-standing and respected head of state and a governmental system that has evolved around the monarchical model for centuries we enjoy a stability, security, and cultural unity that is rarely seen in the world.

In the form of the Royal Family, British and Commonwealth citizens have a living link to their past – a shared representative of their culture, values, and presence in the world. Their are few states that can enjoy such a unifying and proud symbol, and it is one we should cherish.



On autonomous systems

Today I read this article: in which the research chief of the US Navy proffered a gentle rebuke to the Royal Navy for their headlong pursuit of increased autonomy.

With Royal Navy manpower at extraordinarily low levels in the current climate it is unsurprising that autonomous systems are being forwarded as a necessity. As tools to complete missions of a 3-D brief (i.e. Dull, Dirty, and Dangerous) they are indeed a great asset, but caution must be observed when introducing machines with a capacity for independent decision making in a combat environment.

The prevailing thought is that greater autonomy of systems will provide an edge to the fighting force, but little thought is being given to the profound implications of taking human beings out of the decision making loop. The US caution in the above piece was, after all, more for matters of combat security rather than the deeper dangers attached to combat robotics, and thus whilst pertinent has somewhat missed the point.

As combat technology advances, the time for decision making in combat is growing ever shorter, and machines are already adopting greater responsibility for threat identification and prosecution than humans. The shooting down of Iran Flight 655 was an example of how a machine making strategic decisions (it identified the plane as hostile) could lead to confusion and accidental killing (the crew trusted the systems more than their own judgement and, under a time constraint, opened fire rather than take the time to verify.)

By placing more responsibility in the hands of machines, potentially fatal decisions will be taken outside of human consideration. It is all well and good to argue that the eventual trigger should always be pulled by a person, but when that person’s time frame for consideration is reduced to fractions of seconds, what is the point?

For many years in the West, the prevailing thought has been that combat technology must advance, and military forces must keep up with that pace of change. In once sense this is unarguably true – failure to develop measures to counter new weapons will result in avoidable deaths. But how little time is taken to consider what avenues should be explored, and what dangers could lurk within the Pandora’s Box of progress? Increased reliance on computers at the expect of human actors could well carry many profound implications that could lead to needless deaths.

The dangers of machines being able to make life-or-death decisions have been explored ad nauseam through both academic and fictional works, but what of the more mundane thoughts? The recent issues with Type 45 destroyers have highlighted a particularly simple problem – ships can lose power. If an advanced warship loses power, many of its most important combat systems go offline. If such a vessel were entirely dependent on autonomous systems for defence, attack, and monitoring, its crew would be completely vulnerable in the case of loss of power. Were an enemy able to weaponise a means of producing a power loss, it would be a critical advantage against even the most advanced weapons.

In the headlong rush for the most advanced technology, reliability can often be forgotten. Every great disaster in cyberspace (such as the NHS ransomware attack) gains immediate attention, and is followed by statements that such things could never happen to military systems, but such certainty is misplaced. War is a field in which the unexpected always (indeed, must) happen and should not be fought based on the assumption that one’s defences are impregnable. Ultimately, autonomous systems will find their place in the defence of the nation, but they should always be seen as an auxiliary tool. If the armed forces are to remain credible and capable of facing every eventuality, they must be able to operate entirely independently of their robotic assistants.

The Gathering Storm

I have recently finished reading Winston Churchill’s The Gathering Storm, and the resonance his writings sustain in the modern world is striking. Writing as he does of the years between the World Wars, a resounding theme is that of disarmament and the perils such a policy can bring upon a nation. In the following peace, I will be highlighting sections of Churchill’s historical narrative from Hitler’s accession to power and will attempt to show how the dangers highlighted in these writings are just as applicable to the modern world as they were in describing the cataclysm that he saw approaching.

[a.n. The following piece does contain multiple references to political parties which still exist in one form or another in Britain today. I would have preferred to remove them but their prevalence is too extensive to do so without making the narrative difficult to follow. The disastrous events which transpired were a result of a unilateral failure to appreciate military and diplomatic facts, for which all political parties in the nation at the time must be held accountable, and the lessons to be learned here are applicable across the political spectrum.]

The section I have selected to open covers the British governmental policy soon after German rearmament became overtly obvious to all in Europe, and how the hard-earned advantages possessed by the victorious powers of the Great War were squandered. This especially serves to highlight how a well-intentioned desire for peace could actually exacerbate future conflict, when pursued without consideration of the character of other nations or the realities of inter-state relations.

While [rearmament was] taking place in Germany, the MacDonald-Baldwin Government felt bound to enforce for some time the severe reductions and restrictions which the financial crisis had imposed upon our already modest armaments, and steadfastly closed their eyes and ears to the disquieting symptoms in Europe. In vehement efforts to procure a disarmament of the victors equal to that which had been enforced upon the vanquished by the Treaty of Versailles, Mr. MacDonald and his Conservative and Liberal colleagues pressed a series of proposals forward in the League of Nations and through every other channel that was open. The French […] clung tenaciously to the French Army as the centre and prop of the life of France and of all her alliances. This attitude earned them rebukes both in Britain and in the United States. The opinions of the press and the public were in no way founded upon reality; but the adverse tide was strong.

When in May, 1932, the virtues of disarmament were extolled in the House of Commons by all parties, the Foreign Secretary opened a new line in the classification of weapons which should be allowed or discouraged.” [p.71]

In this speech the Foreign Secretary outlined a ways in which weapons might be classified as offensive or defensive, a distinction which Mr Churchill believed to be somewhat ludicrous given the capacity of any weapon to be used in battle. In his opposing speech, Churchill concluded with his fears as to the current military situation in Europe created by the British obsession with disarmament:

I should very much regret to see any approximation in military strength between Germany and France. Those who speak of that as though it were right, or even a question of fair dealing, altogether underrate the gravity of the European situation. I would say to those who would like to see Germany and France on an equal footing in armaments: “Do you wish for war?” For my part, I warnestly hope that no such approximation will take place during my lifetime or that of my children. […] I am sure that the thesis that [Germany] should be placed in an equal military position with France is one which, if it ever emerged in fact, would bring us within practical distance of almost measureless calamity.

The British air estimates of March, 1933, revealed a total lack of comprehension alike by the Government and the Opposition, Labour and Liberal, of what was going on. I had to say (March 14, 1933)

I regretted to hear the Under-Secretary say that we were only the fifth air power, and that the ten-year programme was suspended for another year. I was sorry to hear him boast that the Air Ministry had not laid down a single new unit this year. All these ideas are being increasingly stultified by the march of events, and we should be well advised to concentrate upon our air defences with greater vigour.” [p.72-3]

In these passages it is apparent that the government had become so compelled by their desire for peace in the continent that they were unwilling to face up to the fact that other nations might not share their admirable convictions. The coming war, whilst by no means inevitable, could well have been curtailed by firmness and determination on the part of the victorious allies. Even if the British government had continued to refuse in an expansion of attacking arms, their pride in neglecting to even modernise the defensive capacities of the British Isles is startling. The foundation of deterrence is determination; were the British government of these years militarily determined to preserve the hard-earned peace it could well have been upheld. But attempts to assure peace through a pacifist example were dangerously counter-productive.

Churchill continues to detail how events unfolded before the eyes of the wider world:

All this while the United States remained intensely preoccupied with its own vehement internal affairs and economic problems. Europe and far-off Japan watched with steady gaze the rise of German warlike power. Disquietude was increasingly expressed in Scandinavian countries and the states of the “Little Entente” in the Balkan countries. Deep anxiety ruled in France, where a large amount of knowledge of Hitler’s activities and of German preparations had come to hand. There was, I was told, a catalogue of breaches of the Treaties of immense and formidable gravity; but when I asked my French friends why this matter was not raised in the League of Nations, and Germany invited, or even ultimately summoned, to explain her action and state precisely what she was doing, I was answered that the British government would deprecate such an alarming step. Thus, while Mr MacDonald, with Mr. Baldwin’s full authority, preached disarmament to the French, and practiced it upon the British, the German might grew by leaps and bounds, and the time for overt action approached.

In justice to the Conservative Party it must be mentioned that at each of the conferences of the National Union of Conservative Associations from 1932 onwards, resolutions proposed by such worthies as Lord Lloyd and Sir Henry Croft in favour of an immediate strengthening of our armaments to meet the growing danger from abroad were carried almost unanimously. But the parliamentary control by the Government Whips in the House of Commons was at this time so effective, and the three parties in the Government, as well as the Labour opposition, so sunk in lethargy and blindness, that the warnings of the followers in the country were as ineffective as were the signs of the times and the evidence of the Secret Service. This was one of those awful periods which recur in our history, when the noble British nations seems to fall from its high estate, loses all trace of sense or purpose, and appears to cower from the menace of foreign peril, frothing pious platitudes while foemen forge their arms.

In this dark time the basest sentiments received acceptance or passed unchallenged by the respectable leaders of the political parties. In 1933 the students of the Oxford Union, under the inspiration of a Mr. Joad, passed their ever-shameful resolution, “That this House refuses to fight for King and Country.” it was easy to laugh off such an episode in England, but in Germany, in Russia, in Italy, in Japan, the idea of a decadent, degenerate Britain took deep root and swayed many calculations.” [p. 84-5]

The notion of international prestige has fallen out of favour in much modern analysis of current affairs, yet this passage aptly demonstrates the impact the perception nations hold of one another can have upon their decision making process. By demonstrating an unwillingness to take action, the British made themselves appear weak and easy to circumvent, provoking their enemies to take bolder action at just the time the government were making efforts to further undermine any British ability to retaliate. The failure of multi-national bodies to support international agreements likewise devalued the institutions and further incited the more aggressive states into taking greater action. The habit of expecting peace to continue, and failing to appreciate that threats may arise at any time has recurred since Churchill’s time, most recently in the 1990s; in which the British military cashed in a ‘peace dividend’ with the fall of the Soviet Union and saw the nation’s defensive abilities heavily curtailed once again. What is more alarming in Churchill’s example of this trend is the accompanying pressure that Britain placed upon France to equally weaken herself; if a nation such as Britain is to withdraw from an active role in world affairs this is destabilising enough, but that she was to attempt to drag a powerful ally down with her demonstrates a terrifying blinker over the course of world affairs. The danger this was to place the world in is now apparent, and should serve as a warning to any that would attempt to promote peace through damaging the capacity of one’s allies to act in self defence.

The utter collapse of British assertiveness in international affairs was to have its first overt consequences in Asia, as Churchill describes:

In September, 1931, on a pretext of local disorders, the Japanese occupied Mukden and the zone of the Manchurian railway. In January, 1932, they demanded the dissolution of all Chinese associations of an anti-Japanese character. The Chinese government refused, and on January28, the Japanese landed to the north of the International Concession at Shanghai. The Chinese resisted with spirit, and, although without airplanes or anti-tank guns or any of the modern weapons, maintained their resistance for more than a month. […] Early in 1932, the Japanese created the puppet state of Manchukuo. A year later, the Chinese province of Jehol was annexed to it, and in March, 1933, Japanese troops penetrating deeply into defenceless regions, had reached the Great Wall of China. This aggressive action corresponds to the growth of Japanese power on the Far East and her new naval position on the oceans.

From the first shot the outrage committed upon China aroused the strongest hostility in the United States. But the policy of isolation cut both ways. Had the United States been a member of the League of Nations, she could undoubtedly have led the Assembly into collective action against Japan, of which the United States would have been the principal mandatory. The British Government on their part showed no desire to act with the United States alone; nor did they wish to be drawn into antagonism with Japan further than their obligations under the League of Nations charter required. There was a rueful feeling in some British circles at the loss of the Japanese Alliance and the consequential weakening of the British position with all its long-established interests in the Far East.[the alliance had been broken at American insistence in 1921, despite the consistent support and respect Japan had showed to the British. Churchill argues that this did much to provoke Japanese imperialism, as they viewed the breaking of the alliance as a spurning of Japan by the West] His Majesty’s Government could hardly be blamed if, in their grave financial and growing European embarrassments, they did not seek a prominent role at the side of the United States in the Far East without any hope of corresponding American support in Europe.

China, however, was a member of the League, and although she had not paid her subscription to that body, she appealed to it for what was no more than justice. On September 30, 1931, the League called on Japan to remove her troops from Manchuria. In December, a Commission was appointed to conduct an inquiry on the spot. The League of Nations entrusted the chairmanship of the Commission to the Earl of Lytton […] The Report, which was unanimous, was a remarkable document, and forms the basis of any serious study of the conflict between China and Japan. The whole background of the Manchurian affair was carefully presented. The conclusions drawn were plain: Manchukuo was the artificial creation of the Japanese General Staff, and the wishes of the population had played no part in the formation of this puppet state. Lord Lytton and his colleagues in their Report not only analysed the situation, but put forward concrete proposals for an international solution. These were for the declaration of an autonomous Manchuria. It would still remain part of China, under the aegis of the League, and there would be a comprehensive treaty between China and Japoan regulating their interests in Manchuria. The fact that the League could not follow up these proposals in no way detracts from the value of the Lytton Report. […] In February, 1933, the League of Nations declared that the state of Manchukuo could not be recognised. Although no sanctions were imposed upon Japan, nor any other action taken, Japan, on March 27, 1933, withdrew from the League of Nations. Germany and Japan had been on opposite sides in the war; they now looked towards each other in a different mood. The moral authority of the League was shown to be devoid of any physical support at a time when its activity and strength were most needed.” [p. 87-8]

The neglect paid to the Far East in these years has done much to cloud future friendly relations; China was left to a cruel fate by a Western world too absorbed in petty politics and a lofty idealism. The consequences of this neglect may still be felt today, China’s fall to communism was in no small part influenced by her abandonment in this era and the League of Nations proven to be a body and voice without a hand. Churchill concludes his analysis of this sorry affair in words that need little further explanation:

We must regard as deeply blameworthy before history the conduct, not only of the British National and mainly Conservative Government, but of the Labour-Socialist and Liberal Parties, both in and out of office, during this fatal period. Delight in smooth-sounding platitudes, refusal to face unpleasant facts, desire for popularity and electoral success irrespective of the vital interests of the State, genuine love of peace and pathetic belief that love can be its sole foundation, obvious lack of intellectual vigour in both leaders of the Coalition Government, marked ignorance of Europe and aversion of its problems in Mr. Baldwin, the strong and violent pacifism which at this time dominated the Labour-Socialist party, the utter devotion of the Liberals to sentiment apart from reality, the failure and worse than failure of Mr. Lloyd George, the erstwhile great wartime leader, to address himself to the continuity of his work, the whole supported by overwhelming majorities in both Houses of Parliament: all these constituted a picture of British fatuity and fecklessness which, though devoid of guile, was not devoid of guilt, and, though free of wickedness or evil design, played a definite part in the unleashing upon the world of horrors and miseries which, even so far as they have unfolded, are already beyond comparison in human experience.” [p. 89]

We would do well to take heed. ****

The terrible consequences of an unwillingness to support brave actions with words had been brutally laid bare in this moment; Britain in this era was desperate for peace to be preserved, but was utterly hampered by an erroneous belief that peace could only continue if no nation was willing to take military action, even in the face of the use of force. The lack of political backbone and unwillingness to face the uncomfortable reality in which the nation found herself was a blessing to the more aggressive nations of the world, and one which has recurred with regrettable consequences on numerous occasions in numerous locations since. The need for determination in deterrence should be made only too clear by the example of China; with her military credibility undermined through both the avowed policy of her government and public demonstrations by her people, Britain was in no place to make demands of a nation interested more in action than negotiation, and was made shamefully culpable in the atrocities to come.

Churchill continues:

By the autumn of 1933, it was plain that neither by precept nor still less by example would the British effort for disarmament succeed. The pacifism of the Labour and Liberal Parties was not affected even by the grave event of the German withdrawal from the League of Nations. Both continued in the name of peace to urge British disarmament, and anyone who differed was called “warmonger” and “scaremonger.” It appeared that their feeling was endorsed by the people, who, of course, did not understand what was unfolding. At a by-election which occurred in East Fulham in October 25, a wave of pacifist emotion increased the Socialist vote by nearly nine thousand, and the Conservative vote fell by over ten thousand. The successful candidate, Mr Wilmot, said after the poll that “British people demand… that the British Government shall give a lead to the whole world by initiating immediately a policy of general disarmament.” And Mr. Lansbury, then leader of the Labour Party, said that all nations must “disarm to the level of Germany as a preliminary to total disarmament.” This election left a deep impression upon Mr. Baldwin, and he referred to it in a remarkable speech three years later. In November came the Reichstag election, at which no candidates except those endorsed by Hitler were tolerated, and the Nazis obtained ninety-five percent of the votes polled.

It would be wrong in judging the policy of the British Government not to remember the passionate desire for peace which animated the uninformed, misinformed majority of the British people, and seemed to threaten with political extinction any party or politician who dared to take any other line. This, of course, is no excuse for political leaders who fall short of their duty. It is much better for parties or politicians to be turned out of office than to imperil the life of the nation.” [p.111-2]

This turn of events reveals how public sentiment can cloud political leadership even in the face of genuine fact; such was the public will for disarmament that their elected representatives were willing to ignore their responsibility to assure the safety of their constituents and encourage the general policy of undermining British defence. The condemnation of those who would advocate against the group ideal is a regrettably prevalent theme in all nations, but a particularly dangerous one to emerge when the majority view is led by a misguided idealism detached from the realities of the time.

The European situation continued to worsen, as the British Government refused to permit the spending necessary to allow the British air forces to even maintain parity with the rapidly expanding Luftwaffe (an expansion expressly prohibited by the Versailles Treaty) and instead encouraged greater disarmament in the states surrounding the now overtly militaristic Germany. In a speech delivered to Parliament, Churchill had recourse to state :

The Opposition are very free-spoken, as most of us are in this country, on the conduct of the German Nazi Government. No one has been more severe in criticism than the Labour Party or that section of the Liberal Party which I see opposite. And their great newspapers, now united in the common cause, have been the most forward in the severity of their strictures. But these criticisms are fiercely resented by the powerful men who have Germany in their hands. So that we are to disarm our friends, we are to have no allies, we are to affront powerful nations, and we are to neglect our own defences entirely. This is a miserable and perilous situation. Indeed, the position to which they seek to reduce us by the course which they have pursued […] is one of terrible jeopardy” [p.117]

It is easy to criticise from afar, but far harder to actually take a stand against that to which you are opposed. It is evident that the lessons of the Manchurian Crisis had still to be digested in this period, despite the obvious display of Western impotence shown to the world by their failure to affect any action against Japanese devastation of northern China. Likewise, as Churchill warned, these criticisms were further alienating Britain and undermining her diplomatic abilities in concert with the calamitous weakening of her armed forces. Condemnation of foreign action in Parliament without the requisite strength to take action serves no other purpose than currying domestic favour; the slighted party will have less inclination to enter into diplomatic discussion in the future, whilst hurling insults will do nothing to actually address the perceived ill.

These previous an subsequent segments show how short term political gain can greatly impact the long term capacity of a nation to take action; the political parties of the era were entirely possessed by a desire to reflect the peaceful hopes of their constituents, even in the face of facts pointing to impending danger. Their near-sighted hopes of clinging to office were to have dire consequences, however, as their unwillingness to tell people uncomfortable truths led to a campaign of virtue signalling that was to cripple the British defence infrastructure as she became led by a Parliament that was singularly incapable of comprehending the danger which stalked closer with each passing day. It would be well to remember in the modern world the fact that these individuals were unwilling to entertain; that peace has never in the course of human history proven to be lasting.

During a debate upon air parity, Churchill writes:

..when on July 20, 1934, the Government brought forward some belated and inadequate proposals for strengthening the Royal Air Force by forty-one squadrons or about 820 machines only to be completed in five years, the Labour Party, supported by the Liberals, moved a vote of censure upon them in the House of Commons. The motion regretted that

His Majesty’s Government should enter upon a policy of rearmament neither necessitated by any new commitment nor calculated to add to the security of the nation, but certain to jeopardise the prospects of international disarmament and to encourage a revival of dangerous and wasteful competition in preparation for war

In support of this complete refusal by the Opposition to take any measures to strengthen our air power, Mr. Attlee, speaking in their name, said: “we deny the need for increased air armaments .. we deny the proposition that an increased British air force will make for the peace of the world, and we reject altogether the claim to parity.” The Liberal Party supported this censure motion, although they would have preferred their own, which ran as follows:

That this House views with grave concern the tendency among the nations of the world to resume the competitive race of armaments which has always proved a precursor of war; it will not approve any expansion of our own armaments unless it is clear that the Disarmament Conference has failed and unless a definite case is established; and these conditions not being present as regards the proposed additional expenditure of £20,000,000 upon air armaments, the House declines its assent.

In his speech the Liberal leader, Sir Herbert Samuel, said: “what is the case in regard to Germany? Nothing we have so far seen or heard would suggest that our present air force is not adequate to meet any peril at the present time from this quarter.”

When we remember that this was the language used after careful deliberation by the responsible heads of parties, the danger of our country becomes apparent. This was the formative time when by extreme exertions we could have preserved the air strength on which our independence of action was founded. If Great Britain and France had each maintained quantitative parity with Germany, they would together have been double as strong, and Hitler’s career of violence might have been nipped in the bud without the loss of a single life. Thereafter it was too late.”


It was soon made clear that the assurances received by Parliament that the Germans were not within reach of air parity in the near future were utterly false, and Stanley Baldwin was forced to bring to the house the fact that the German air force was not only of equal size to the British, but was growing with each passing day, he was forced to confess this to the House and made the remarkable confession:

responsibility is not that of any single minister; it is the responsibility of the Government as a whole, and we are all responsible, we are all to blame”

Yet whilst this statement was laudable, the response was not.

The Labour and Liberal Oppositions, having nine months earlier moved or supported a vote of censure even upon the modest steps the Government had taken were ineffectual and undecided. They were looking forward to an election against “Tory Armaments.” […] and they did not attempt to adapt their speeches to this outstanding episode. Mr. Attlee said:

As a party we do not stand for unilateral disarmament… We stand for collective security through the League of Nations. We reject the use of force as an instrument of policy. We stand for the reduction of armaments and pooled security… We have stated that this country must be prepared to make its contribution to collective security. Our policy is not one of seeking security through rearmament, but through disarmament. Our aim is the reduction of armaments, and then the complete abolition of all national armaments and the creation of an international police force under the League.

What was to happen if this spacious policy could not be immediately achieved or till it was achieved, he did not say. He complained that the White Paper on Defence justified increases in the Navy {a.n. A Royal Navy already crippled by arbitrary restrictions on tonnage of warships that most nations except Britain were already ignoring} by references to the United States, and increases in our air forces by references to the air forces of Russia, Japan, and the United States. “All that was old-fashioned talk and right outside the collective system.” He recognised that the fact of German rearmament had become dominating, but “The measure of the counterweight to any particular armed forces is not the forces of this country or of France, but the combined force of all loyal Powers in the League of Nations. An aggressor must be made to realise that if he challenges the world, he will be met by the co-ordinated forces of the world, not by a number of disjointed national forces.” The only way was to concentrate all air power in the hands of the League, which must be united an become a reality. Meanwhile, he and his party voted against the measure proposed.

For the Liberals, Sir Archibald Sinclair asked the Government to summon

a fresh economic conference, and to bring Germany not only within the political comity of nations, but also into active co-operation with ourselves in all the works of civilisation and in raising the standard of life of both peoples … Let the Government table detailed and definite proposals for the abolition of military air forces and the control of civil aviation. If the proposals are resisted, let the responsibility be cleared and properly fixed.

Nevertheless [he said], while disarmament ought vigorously to be pursued as a chief objective of the government, a situation in which a great country not a member of the League of Nations possesses the most powerful army and perhaps the most powerful air force in Western Europe … cannot be allowed to endure […] The Liberal Party would feel bound to support measures of national defence when clear proof was afforded of their necessity … I cannot therefore agree that to increase our national armaments is necessarily inconsistent with our obligations under the collective peace system.

[…] Nothing in the speeches of the Opposition leaders was in the slightest degree related to the emergency in which they admitted we stood, or to the far graver facts which we now know lay behind it.” [p.123-5]

This has been taken slightly out of sequence, but serves to demonstrate the consequences of the outlook detailed by the previous sections. Such was the desire for peace in parliament, that they willingly constrained the capacity of the nation to not only make war but to even defend itself. Whilst the hopes for collective security are understandable given the freshness of the Great War in the national memory, the multiple failures of the League of Nations and the lack of support and interest given it by major nations such as the United States should have been a clear indication that Britain should have made ready to protect herself even as she pursued her peaceful designs through diplomatic means. The view that providing adequate forces for defence could be construed as a precursor to war should prove a clear falsehood; a strong defence provides a far stronger deterrent to war than stern diplomatic words without substance, and the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands and Belgium should eloquently describe the form of peace that can be assured against aggressive neighbours through disarming oneself. The terrible consequences of this misguided pacifism were to reverberate through the years ahead, as a failure to maintain military capabilities in the here and now will take years, if not decades, to rectify – it is far easier to maintain a capability than rebuild it. The immediate consequence of the British and French governments failing to adequately support their air forces were felt in the Battle of France, when Hitler’s invading armies swept the neglected allied forces before them; despite having similar sized armies and a superiority in tanks and guns, the German air forces were totally dominant; deploying over five and a half thousand planes compared to fewer than three thousand British and French. 2,233 allied aircraft were lost in the campaign, compared to 1,236 German.


The issue of German air parity with Britain, in grotesque violation of the Versailles Treaty, was discussed at the Stresa Conference in 1935, between Britain, France, and Italy, wherein Churchill reports:

There was general agreement that open violation of solemn treaties, for the making of which millions of men had died, could not be borne. But the British representatives made it clear at the outset that they would not consider the possibility of sanctions in the event of treaty violations. This naturally confined the Conference to the region of words. A resolution was passed unanimously to the effect that “unilateral” – by which they meant one sided – breaches of treaties could not be accepted, and the Executive Council of the League of Nations was invited to pronounce upon the situation disclosed […] The final declaration [a.n. By Mussolini] was as follows:

The three powers, the object of whose policy is the collective maintenance of peace within the framework of the League of Nations, find themselves in complete agreement in opposing, by all practicable means, any unilateral repudiation of treaties which may endanger the peace of Europe, and will act in close and cordial collaboration for this purpose.

The Italian Dictator in his speech had stressed the words “peace of Europe”, and paused after “Europe” in a noticeable manner. This emphasis on Europe at once struck the attention of the British Foreign Office representatives. They pricked up their ears and well understood that, while Mussolini would work with France and Britain to prevent Germany from re-arming, he reserved for himself any excursion in Africa against Abyssinia on which he might later resolve. Should this issue be raised or not? Discussions were held that night among the Foreign Office officials. Everyone was so anxious for Mussolini’s support in dealing with Germany that it was felt undesirable at that moment to warn him off Abyssinia, which would obviously have very much annoyed him. Therefore, the question was not raised; it passed by default, and Mussolini felt, and in a sense had reason to feel, that the Allies had acquiesced in his statement and would give him a free hand against Abyssinia. The French remained mute on the point, and the Conference separated.

In due course, on April 15/17, the Council of the League of Nations examined the alleged breach of the Treaty of Versailles committed by Germany in decreeing universal compulsory military service. The following Powers were represented on the Council: The Argentine Republic, Australia, Great Britain, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the U.S.S.R. All the Powers voted for the principle that treaties should not be broken by “unilateral” action, and referred the issue to the Plenary Assembly of the League. […] In all, nineteen countries formally protested. But how vain was all their voting without the readiness of any single Power or any group of Powers to contemplate the use of force, even in the last resort!” [133-4]

Due to the weakness imposed upon Britain by Parliament’s refusal to allow the military to be properly equipped, the nation’s only means of response to the worsening international situation was the above shameful facade. Aggressive actions were met only by words which were impossible to support, especially with an attitude of pacifism so prevalent that any use of force was seen as anathema, even to prevent an outright war. Mussolini had clearly appreciated the weakness of the League, and used his position as a stronger nation to strong-arm the democracies into silence over his planned endeavours in Africa.

When these endeavours were undertaken, the shock and outrage that they engendered finally managed to shake the mood of unquestioning pacifism that had racked the United Kingdom and yet, as Churchill reveals, even the public outpouring of disgust at the Italian attack on Abyssinia, encouraged as it was by the frailty of the League of Nations, was insufficient to promote action.

Bloodshed in Abysinnia, hatred of Fascism, the invocation of Sanctions by the League, produced a convulsion within the British Labour Party. Trade-unionists, among whom Mr. Ernest Bevin was outstanding, were by no means pacifist by temperament. A strong desire to fight the Italian Dictator, to enforce sanctions of a decisive character, and to use the British Fleet, if need be, surged through the sturdy wage-earners. Rough and harsh words were spoken at excited meetings. […] Many members of the parliamentary Labour Party shared the trade-unionist mood. In a far wider sphere, all the leaders of the League of Nations found themselves bound to the cause of the League. […] Here were principles for which lifelong humanitarians were ready to die, and if to die, also to kill.

[…] But this national awakening was not in accord with Mr. Baldwin’s outlook or intentions.[…] The Prime Minister had declared that sanctions meant war; secondly, he was resolved there must be no war; and thirdly, he decided upon sanctions. It was evidently impossible to reconcile these three conditions. Under the guidance of Britain and the pressures of Laval, the League of Nations Committee, charged with devising sanctions, kept clear of any that would provoke war. A large number of commodities, some of which were war materials, were prohibited from entering Italy, and an imposing schedule was drawn up. But oil, without which the campaign in Abyssinia could not have been maintained, continued to enter freely, because it was understood that to stop it meant war. [a.n. Ian Kershaw, in To Hell and Back, notes that whilst oil imports were still free to enter Italy, foie gras imports were stopped. A clear indication of the feeble power of the League to influence world events.] Here the attitude of the United States, not a member of the League of Nations and the world’s main oil supplier, though benevolent, was uncertain. Moreover, to stop it to Italy involved also stopping it to Germany. The export of Aluminium into Italy was strictly forbidden; but aluminium was almost the only metal that Italy produced in quantities beyond her own needs. […] Thus, the measures passed with so great a parade were not real sanctions to paralyse the aggressor,, but merely such half-hearted sanctions as the aggressor would tolerate, because in fact, though onerous, they stimulated the Italian war spirit. The League of Nations, therefore, proceeded to the rescue of Abyssinia on the basis that nothing must be done to hamper the invading armies. These facts were not known to the British public at the time of the election. They earnestly supported the policy of bringing the sanctions, and believed this was a sure way of bringing the Italian assault upon Abyssinia to an end.

Still less did His Majesty’s Government contemplate the use of the Fleet. […] The British Fleet which was lying at Alexandria had by now been reinforced. It could by a gesture have turned back Italian transports from the Suez Canal, and would as a consequence have had to offer battle to the Italian Navy. We were told it was not capable of meeting such an antagonist. […] It transpired, however, that the Admiral commanding resented the suggestion attributed to him that he was not strong enough to fight a fleet action. It would seem that before taking their first decision to oppose Italian aggression, His Majesty’s Government should carefully have examined ways and means and also made up their minds.

There is no doubt on our present knowledge that a bold decision would have cut the Italian communications with Ethiopia, and that we should have been successful in any naval battle which might have followed. I was never in favour of isolated action by Great Britain, but having gone so far it was a grievous deed to recoil. Moreover, Mussolini would never have dared to come to grips with a resolute British Government. Nearly the whole of the world was against him, and he would have had to risk his regime upon a single-handed war with Britain, in which a fleet action in the Mediterranean would be the early and decisive test. How could Italy have fought this war? Apart from a limited advantage in modern light cruisers, her navy was a but a fourth the size of the British. Her numerous conscript army, which was vaunted in millions, could not come into action. Her air power was in quantity and quality far below even our modest establishments. She would instantly have been blockaded. The Italian armies in Abyssinia would have famished for supplies and ammunition. Germany could as yet give no effective help. If ever there was an opportunity of striking a decisive blow in a generous cause with the minimum of risk, it was here and now, The fact that the nerve of the British Government was not equal to the occasion can be excused only by their sincere love of peace. Actually it played a part in leading to an infinitely more terrible war. Mussolini’s bluff succeeded, and an important spectator drew far-reaching conclusions from the fact. Hitler had long resolved on war for German aggrandisement. He now formed a view of Great Britain’s degeneracy which was only to be changed too late for peace and too late for him. In Japan, also, there were pensive spectators. [p.174-7]

The feeble sanctions brought against Fascist Italy when she also chose to take advantage of the paralysing indecision of the League of Nations likewise shows how a failure to back up rhetoric with credible military force allows more daring states to assert their will. Mussolini’s gamble could have been quashed by Britain alone, yet she did nothing and allowed the extraordinarily brutal Italian campaign continue. By failing to prevent this action of one League member upon another, Britain and France shattered all international respect for the League. The failure of NATO to protect Crimea shows a modern example of how a protracted period of military neglect and lack of public support for military action can allow such events to still occur. Churchill’s chilling conclusion to this episode should resonate uncomfortably to the modern reader; a love of peace can very readily blinker short-sighted political thought, and encourage conditions in which far greater bloodshed than might otherwise occur can be invoked.

Once Abyssinia was conquered, the impact of Italian operations became clear:

The collapse of Abyssinian resistance and the annexation of the whole country by Italy produced unhelpful effects in German public opinions. Even those elements which did not approve of Mussolini’s policy or action admired the swift, efficient, and ruthless manner in which, as it seemed, the campaign had been conducted. The general view was that Great Britain had emerged thoroughly weakened. She had earned the undying hatred of Italy; she had wrecked the Stresa Front once and for all; and her loss of prestige in the world contrasted agreeably with the growing strength and repute of the new Germany. “I am impressed,” wrote one of our representatives in Bavaria, “by the note of contempt in references to Great Britain in many quarters … it is to be feared that Germany’s attitude in the negotiations for a settlement in Western Europe and for a more general settlement of European and extra-European questions will be found to have stiffened.”

[…] His Majesty’s Government had imprudently advanced to champion a great world cause. They had led fifty nations forward with much brave language. Confronted with brute facts Mr. Baldwin had recoiled. Their policy had for a long time been designed to give satisfaction to powerful elements of opinion at home rather than seek the realities of the European situation. By estranging Italy they had upset the whole balance of Europe and gained nothing for Abyssinia. They had led the League of Nations into an utter fiasco, most damaging if not fatally injurious to its effective life as an institution. [p . 186-7]

The impact of the international appearance of weakness caused by a failure to oppose aggression is here made clear; it was the failure to protect Manchuria and Abyssinia that were to show Hitler that his designs could well be put in to practice without fear of serious opposition. Had France and Britain taken an assertive line with Italy and maintained their capacity to intervene, especially under the aegis of the League, German expansion could have been curtailed before it began. Even as Hitler began his conquests, multiple opportunities still presented themselves to prevent a Second World War, yet the vacillation of the democracies continued. No matter how well-intentioned, it was this failure to consider the use of arms that was to sow the seeds of a conflict that was to claim over 50 million lives.


Having made their bed of the policies of appeasement, the Western Allies continued to lie in it. Over the next four years the League watched, paralysed, as Germany massively expanded her borders at the expense of her neighbours and constructed armed forces of a technical and numerical superiority far in advance of the democracies. As her military expanded, her position of increasing strength allowed Hitler’s Germany to overawe and consume her smaller neighbours and overtly prepare for war. Each act of domination was met by feeble complaints from the impotent League, and mute acceptance by the democracies who had by now set a standard that any overt opposition would be seen as a declaration of war. When a red line was finally drawn by Britain and France, it was far too late to hope that Hitler would be cowed, and from a position in which the genuine guarantee of the use of force could no longer serve as an active deterrent. As Churchill summarises:

In this sad tale of wrong judgements formed by well-meaning and capable people we now reach our climax. That we should all have come to this pass makes those responsible, however honourable their motives, blameworthy before history. Look back and see what we had successively accepted or thrown away: a Germany disarmed by solemn treaty; a Germany re-armed in violation of a solemn treaty; air superiority or even air parity cast away; the Rhineland forcibly occupied and the Siegfried line built or building; the Berlin-Rome Axis established; Austria devoured and digested by the Reich; Czechoslovakia deserted and ruined by the Munich Pact; its fortress line in German hands; its mighty arsenal of Skoda henceforward making munitions for German armies; President Roosevelt’s efforts to stabilise or bring to a head the European situation by the intervention of the United States waved aside with one hand [a.n. In January of 1938 Roosevelt had offered to intervene directly to calm matters, but Chamberlain had bluntly rebuffed him before signing the Munich Pact], and Soviet Russia’s willingness to join the Western Powers and go all lengths to save Czechoslovakia ignored on the other [a.n. The Soviets had likewise been rebuffed by a British government seemingly incapable of understanding that Germany was planing war and that allies would be needed. This decision directly drove the Soviets into signing the infamous non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany]; the services of thirty-five Czech divisions against the still unripened German Army cast away, when Great Britain could herself only supply two to strengthen the front in France – all gone with the wind.

And now, when every one of these aids and advantages has been squandered and thrown away, Great Britain advances, leading France by the hand, to guarantee the integrity of Poland. […] There was sense in fighting for Czechoslovakia in 1938 when the German Army could scarcely put half a dozen trained divisions on the Western Front, when the French with nearly sixty or seventy divisions could most certainly have rolled forward across the Rhine or into the Ruhr. But this had been judged unreasonable, rash, below the level of modern intellectual thought and morality. Yet now at last the two Western Democracies declared themselves ready to stake their lives upon the territorial integrity of Poland. History, which we are told is mainly the record of the crimes, follies, and miseries of mankind, may be scoured and ransacked to find a parallel to this sudden and complete reversal of five or six years’ policy of easy-going placatory appeasement, and its transformation almost overnight into a readiness to accept an obviously imminent war on far worse conditions and on the greatest scale.” [346-7]

This catalogue of failures should serve to highlight how short-sighted idealism reaps its rewards in inter-state relations; when war was preventable, it was seen as uncouth to even contemplate, by the time it became unavoidable, it was too late to prepare.

The greatest folly of British policy in this period was the callous insistence that France follow her lead in disarming, and supporting a resurgent German military. The prevalent assumption was that by allowing Germany to reassert herself, there would be less resentment. The logic of Versailles (that a weak Germany could not present a threat) was forgotten in the hope that a strong Germany would not want to present a threat. The British government happily destroyed their arms and encouraged France to do the same, whilst making no effort to ensure that Germany followed suit. By so doing, Britain not only removed the bulwark of the French army from the path of German militarism, but even removed the means of preventing the process of German rearmament as there was no force to impose it. As the main powers of the League of Nations, Britain and France together were the driving force behind the world order envisioned in the creation of the League, yet their unwillingness to take any action in support of these ideals saw both the ideas and the League fatally weakened as the rise of the dictators across Europe presented an alternative future of strength. Attempting to encourage disarmament through example left Britain and France friendless and weak, trailing behind the assertive policies of the Italian and German states.

The most profound example of how this danger should be remembered in the modern world is in the realms of nuclear weapons: If a nation is desirous of leading others to disarm, they would be unwise to throw away their own weapons first. As in Churchill’s example of aircraft production, a defence capacity central to national defence should not be allowed to wither, as if neglected, it will take time to rebuild. A nuclear arsenal in particular is incredibly difficult to assemble, and indeed to be seen to be doing so would be seen as a direct threat to foreign powers and could provoke a first strike. By attempting to lead by example, a nation that discards its weapons will only achieve a greater instability; the allies of that nation would find themselves less secure and would cling more closely to their weapons, whilst their opponents would feel more confident and willing to assert themselves as they would face less incentive to disarm. This is without the dangers that would be faced by the disarming nation; as Britain and France discovered in 1940, weakening oneself only provides encouragement to more aggressive neighbours. In the modern world, only one nation has ever disposed of her nuclear weapons in the hopes that such power would not be needed to deter attack; Ukraine. Nuclear weapons, above all other weapons, preserve peace between great powers through the continued threat of use and their reckless disposal without a mutual agreement will do no more than threaten the security of the nation.

It is the greatest mistake to mix up disarmament with peace. When you have peace you will have disarmament.” [p.102]

The lesson of the sorry tale told by Churchill of the almost entirely preventable escalation of tensions that were to spawn the cataclysm of the Second World War may essentially be boiled down to the lesson that “all the is necessary for evil to prevail is for good men to do nothing.” The hopes for peace in Europe were sincere, but clouded by the naive belief that arms themselves were to blame for conflict, rather than warlike desires. This mistaken belief, clung to in the face of mounting danger and supported by electorates bereft of facts, was in no small part to blame for the catastrophe that was to soon engulf mankind. The possession of adequate armaments, and the determination to use them, could well have curtailed the ambitions of the fascist leaders whilst they were still nascent and spared Europe and the world the atrocities that were to ensue. We would do well today to remember that aggressive nations cannot always be deterred by words, nor national security ensured through hope and good intentions.

Naval gazing

“The British Army should be a projectile to be fired by the British Navy” – Edward Grey

Writing as he did at the peak of British influence, Viscount Grey’s statement may seem a little peculiar when viewed through the modern lense of power projection theory – the British Army, deployed as it has been in various campaigns both conventional and counter-insurgency sine the end of the Second World War, has long held the limelight as the paramount tool of serving Britain’s interests, but this is not necessarily a permanent state of being.

Britain, as an island nation, has long enjoyed the advantage of not needing to maintain a strong army. Unlike her continental neighbours, Britain effectively had no hostile neighbours with whom she shared a land border for several centuries, and even now is only bordered by one neutral country. Lacking any immediate threats, much funding could be diverted to naval power projection and commercial development; an asset which played no small part in securing Britain’s domination of the global scene until the early Twentieth Century.

It would be wise to remember our history when considering our future; the Army is an extremely useful tool in the national arsenal, its troops are of an extraordinarily high standard and it enjoys capabilities shared only by the very top echelon of world fighting forces. In recent years the Army has conducted its campaigns to a very high standard, and provides vital training expertise to bolster the quality of allied forces. For all these advantages, however, successive rounds of cuts since 1991 have seen the Army reduced to a size (oft quoted in the media) roughly comparable to the pre-Napoleonic era.

In modern fighting forces, number of bodies is not the sole measure of quality; indeed, the British Army of 1914 was the smallest in Europe and yet man-for-man perhaps the most powerful. The well-trained British volunteers reaped a fearsome toll on the German invaders of the West, but ultimately required a huge influx of manpower before it could stand on its own two feet. The losses suffered by the British and Imperial armies throughout the Great War were a consequence of being deployed to fight a conflict that they were ultimately not intended to fight; as Grey appreciated, Britain’s power rested upon her ability to control the seas, and it was natural that any military strategy should be an extension of this control.

The key to effective utilisation of sea power against a potential adversary is a strong amphibious capability, which even in the modern world Britain still possesses (although a replacement to HMS Ocean is of paramount importance in retaining this); the means to rapidly transfer troops and equipment ashore allows for a decisive blow to swiftly be struck against a foe, and whilst 40% of the world’s population live within 100KM of the coastline a strong amphibious capacity grants a nation a disproportionate edge. Currently, British amphibious capacity largely lies with the Royal Marines; an elite force ostensibly listed as a part of the Royal Navy. This small force is a vital link in our defence capabilities, yet recently suffered a further down-sizing in manpower.

With the small size of forces available, it would be wise to continue to consider how best to employ them in order to maximise impact. The British Army is currently moving towards a ‘strike brigade’ concept, in which it intends to rapidly deploy a brigade size force into the field at short notice, in order to effect a rapid response to a crisis. This concept is, however, currently largely dependent on air power. This detachment between land and sea, however, estranges the two at a time when inter-service cooperation is of vital importance to ensuring national security.

With a Royal Navy capable of deploying and sustaining a strike force on land, it makes sense to encourage a greater degree of inter-operability with the Army; a modest expansion in transport and amphibious assault craft could see the strike brigade integrated with the Navy and able to be deployed at very short order to a variety of potential conflict zones. There would naturally be some reticence in the Army to see their principal attack force brought into operational integration with the Navy, but such a move would have the potential to both reduce inter-service rivalry and improve efficiency.

The size of the Army precludes it assuming the primary role of national power projection, but if a combined-arms approach were embraced its power and flexibility would be fundamentally increased in either combat or humanitarian operations especially as it would be deployed in concert with the force most responsible for our continued prosperity.

That the Royal Navy still, despite the turmoil of the past century, retains its role as the linchpin of national security should be beyond doubt; as a nation dependent upon global trade for survival a powerful fleet is a necessity, whilst protection and support for our overseas possessions and manifold allies can only be afforded via a powerful sea presence. Recent investment in the new aircraft carriers heralds something of a resurgence in support for the Royal Navy, but a greater expansion, supported by a doctrinal appreciation of a truly naval outlook, would pay dividends on Britain’s future capacity to remain a major player on the world stage. With a strong fleet, and a larger ground force ready to be deployed via such a fleet, rapid deployment of force across the world would allow Britain to (in words so beloved in recent years) punch well above her weight internationally and enjoy the manifold returns in prestige and relations that would accompany such presence.

Excepting a fundamental doctrinal change, such a development being unlikely in the immediate future given the upheaval within the Army caused by the adoption of the Strike Brigade concept and the general rediscovery of capabilities lost in 2010, a change in outlook alone could well be sufficient to achieve a development in operations.

A revival of the maritime outlook of the nation, including an appreciation that our interests are best served at sea, could well encourage such a shift. The Army can naturally operate in areas beyond the ready reach of naval forces, and must be ready to do so if the need should arise, but when planning for the future we would be wise to remember the costs of lengthy ground operations and consider how a naval outlook might better serve Britain once more. 


Another article on this matter, highlighting the importance of amphibious capability:

Fatal Limitations

In the past decade or so there has been much debate in the public sphere of the impact of downsizing the British armed forces and how short-term savings can have perilous long-term consequences for such institutions. Such thinking is obviously not new, and there have been times in the past where such considerations have likewise raised their heads. I have recently been reading Winston S. Churchill’s ‘The Gathering Storm’, early in which he discusses the impact of downsizing the German military under the terms of the Versailles peace accords. I will quote him at length below, as I feel his observations most aptly describe the damage a large-scale enforced reduction can have upon a military institution’s ability to rapidly reform and face new threats.

“It is a prodigious task to make an army embodying the whole manhood of a mighty nation. The victorious Allies had at Mr. Lloyd George’s suggestion limited the German army to a hundred thousand men, and conscription was forbidden. This force, therefore, became the nucleus and the crucible out of which an army of millions of men was if possible to be reformed. The hundred thousand men were a hundred thousand leaders. Once the decision to expand was taken, the privates could become sergeants, the sergeants officers. None the less, Mr. Lloyd George’s plan for preventing the re-creation of the German army was not ill-conceived. No foreign inspection could in times of peace control the quality of the hundred thousand men allowed to Germany. But the issue did not turn on this. Three or four millions of trained soldiers were needed merely to hold the German frontiers. To make a nation-wide army which could compare with, still more surpass, the French Army required not only the preparation of the leaders and the revival of the old regiments and formations, but the national compulsory service of each annual quota of men reaching the military age … Without universal national service the bones of the skeleton could never be clothed with flesh and sinew.”

Churchill is here alluding to the need for institutional depth as well as quality; for a military to be an effective force it needs large pools of manpower to draw upon as such trained soldiers are of far more utility even than the most advanced technology. A military can be equipped rapidly, especially in the modern age, but without experienced soldiers such technology is useless – the various failures of the Iraqi army in containing the rise of ISIS present a pertinent example of this; despite commanding a hugely powerful force of American weapons and vehicles many of their soldiers simply fled after first contact with the enemy.
In Churchill’s example, the German army could only retain a small pool of experienced soldiers. These men could form the nucleus of a new military expansion but such an expansion was hampered by their inability to allow large-scale basic training of conscripts. As he goes on to explain, the inability to build up a large reserve denied the Germans the backbone their army would need to fight in any form of war.

“There was, therefore, no possibility of Germany creating an army which could face the French Army until conscription had been applied for several years. Here was a line which could not be transgressed without an obvious, flagrant breach of the Treaty of Versailles. Every kind of concealed, ingenious, elaborate preparation could be made beforehand, but the moment must come where the Rubicon would have to be crossed and the conquerors defied. Mr Lloyd George’s principle was thus sound. Had it been enforced with authority and prudence, there could have been no new forging of the German war machine. The class called up for each year, however well schooled beforehand, would also have to remain for at least two years in the regimental or other units, and it was only after this period of training that the reserves, without which no modern army is possible, could be gradually formed and accumulated. France, though her manhood had been depleted in a horrible degree by the previous war, had nevertheless maintained a regular uninterrupted routine of training annual quotas and of passing the trained soldiers into a reserve which comprised the whole fighting man-power of the nation. For fifteen years Germany was not allowed to build up a similar reserve. In all these years the German Army might nourish and cherish its military spirit and tradition, but it could not possibly even dream of entering the lists against the long-established, unbroken development of the armed, trained, organised man-power which flowed and gathered naturally from the French military system.”

Such observations have clear echoes in the modern debate and serve to highlight that no matter the strength of the frontline fighting force, its robustness is sorely limited without a large pool of reserves.  Equally, without a regular flow of new recruits a force can lose its essential vitality and capacity to expand; the cap placed on the German military by its denial of both reserves and conscription ensured that it was a rump force; highly skilled but incapable of protracted operations as each battle casualty it might have suffered could not be replaced – there were no replacements available.
In our modern world, limitations such as this are often referred to as hollowing out – the German people of the 1920s could still see the shadows of their great military past in the cap badges and regimental colours, but these were little more than a facade – without the men to wear the badges these institutions had little tactical use. The reduction in the number of soldiers is always accompanied by an equal reduction in skills available; certain capabilities will be lost as generals have to prioritise where to place the scant numbers of men available to them; post-Treaty Germany lost its entire air force (admittedly by Allied design) and many other specialised units and had to prioritise simply having enough soldiers to keep its borders guarded.
By interrupting the cycle of training and tradition, whole centuries of accumulated wisdom can be lost; as one regiment dies out or is amalgamated its operational methods die with it, and such losses are almost impossible to replace. In our modern world it is wise to remember that it is not so simple to rebuild a military tradition as to simply thrust weapons into young men’s hands and call them soldiers.

Churchill goes on to describe the impact of the Treaty of Versailles on the German Army’s officer corps, which was mandated to reduced from thirty-four thousand men to a mere four thousand. It’s effective survival was largely a result of the work of General von Seeckt, who ensured that whilst the treaty was followed openly there were large numbers of trained officers retained working in concert within various hollow governmental departments.

“Rabenau [Seeckt’s biographer] makes an illuminating comment:

Without Seeckt there would today [in 1940] be no General Staff in the German sense, for which generations are required and which cannot be achieved in a day, however gifted or industrious officers may be. Continuity of conception is imperative to safeguard leadership in the nervous trials of reality. Knowledge or capacity in individuals is not enough. In war the organically developed capacity of a majority is necessary, and for this decades are needed. … In a small hundred-thousand army, if the generals were not also to be small, it was imperative to create a great theoretical framework. To this end large-scale practical exercises or war games were introduced … not so much to train the General Staff, but rather to create a class of higher commanders.

These would be capable of thinking in full-scale military terms.
Seeckt insisted that false doctrines, springing from personal experience of the Great War, should be avoided. All the lessons of that war were thoroughly and systematically studied. New principles of training and instructional courses of all kinds were introduced. All the existing manuals were rewritten, not for the hundred-thousand army, but for the armed might of the German Reich.”

The stunning successes of the German Army in the early years of the Second World War are testimony to the efficacy of Seeckt’s methods; he recognised that the core of a successful fighting force is the ability of its officers and men to act decisively in combat through a readiness for any eventuality. Despite the crippling downsizing imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, Seeckt ensured that a capable institution could be rapidly rebuilt, even accounting for the necessarily lower quality of fighting men that would be available as a result of the lack of a trained reserve.
If a military is to resist being hollowed out, it must ensure that the men left available to it are of the highest quality, particularly those in leadership positions. Vital skills must be not only preserved, but nurtured and grown in new recruits.
The lessons of the post-Great War German Army should thus be seen twofold; firstly, for military to be effective it must be able to take a punch as well as deliver one – it is not enough to possess a strong frontline force, it must be bolstered by trained reserves in order to be credible. Secondly; a force must retain its traditions and experience, particularly at higher levels, in order to remain effective. Skilled commanders, operating within an environment that encourages excellence, are the cornerstone of an effective fighting force and preserving such traditions is a vital step to retaining the ability of an armed force to fight.



Armed Forces Day 2017

Today is the day in which the citizens of the United Kingdom are free to express their gratitude for all that our armed services provide for our nation.

The primary goal of the forces is of course defence; from patrolling our shipping lanes and isolated territories, to interdicting threats overseas, to their preparation to defend our very homes to the end the armed forces are there to keep British citizens and our allies safe. 
Beyond the realms of direct action the services also forward our nations interests indirectly; the army in particular conducts many training missions with our allies, showing commitment and reassurance to friendly states the world over. The deployment of ships or aircraft also show a powerful symbol of willingness to act; by their mere presence can our services deter military conlict.

As a tool of the state, the armed services can also provide aid to the most needy; the Royal Navy have conducted many disaster relief efforts, whilst military doctors provide much needed expertise to countries stricken by famine or disease. Even at home we can see the services in action; in flooding relief to the recent deployment of Operation Temperer in which the army assisted the police in the face of terrorism.

Within the institutions that provide these vital works may be seen skills and traditions that have been passed on through centuries of service personnel, and it should be a point of pride that our protectors also represent some of the older pillars of our society.

By their dedication and willingness to serve do the military help our society and our friends, they are deserving of respect, support, and praise and I am glad to see how widely this day has been marked.

Money well spent?

In august 2016 the French football player Paul Pogba was transferred to Manchester United for over £89 million, a sum so high that even FIFA have been forced to investigate. The spiralling salaries in football have long been a subject of some rebuke, but seeing this particular figure seems to have really brought the subject home for a lot of people.

Football has become a big business, and in such high demand markets money often becomes of little object. Given the vested advertising and commercial interests costs will naturally escalate, but with how much money is also extracted from fans through high ticket prices and merchandise costs, a sour taste is likely present in many mouths.

In recent years the Chinese market has also expanded, seeing comparatively mediocre players being snapped up for eye-watering sums; with Carlos Tevez being signed on to a contract in which he is paid £1 per second (£615,000 per week). Such a surge in offered rates can only push up player fees more.

This piece is not intended to denigrate footballers, there is naturally a high level of training and personal discipline required to play the sport at a high level, but more to bring attention to the immense business behind the sport. I suspect there are few within the audience who now believe that the wages offered are truly comparable with the demands of playing the game. The wages offered are now more comparable to the prices paid by big manufacturers for advanced machinery or rare resources than a fair representation of pay deserved for a job that carries little personal risk.

When I saw the price of the Pogba transfer, my first instinct was to check the MoD website, and calculate a comparison between the bounty offered to him just to move to his new position, and the wage that a naval rating could expect. By my initial calculation, on the base salary of a fully trained junior rating, the sum offered to Pogba for his transfer could provide a year’s wage for 4944 sailors.

Such a gulf in pay is quite shocking, and I elected to look a little further into military applications for this sum of money. Regrettably, I could not find the costs of training a new recruit; I was hoping to calculate how many badly-needed sailors could be brought into the Navy for the cost of signing one Premier League footballer but at this stage such an appraisal seems not to be.

Regardless of the exact number, it is evident that the huge sums spent on footballers are in a totally different league to the money available for recruitment into Her Majesty’s Armed Forces. As a private commercial enterprise, premiership football is run by private interests who can afford to sustain such expenditure, but seeing how costs have run away is shocking when compared to the badly-stretched military forces who are struggling to finance the materiel they need to defend our nation. I am aware of a campaign some years back that suggested that the salaries should be switched; this is a ridiculous notion, and not one I feel the Treasury would be happy to support, but it’s tagline is still catchy: “incomparable risks, incomparable salaries”.