Operation Passage to Freedom
Get Operation Passage to Freedom essential facts below. View Videos or join the Operation Passage to Freedom discussion. Add Operation Passage to Freedom to your PopFlock.com topic list for future reference or share this resource on social media.
Operation Passage to Freedom



The migration boosted the Catholic power base of Diem; whereas the majority of Vietnam's Catholics previously lived in the north, they were now in the south. The campaign was intended to strengthen the population of the south in preparation for the reunification elections. Fearing a communist victory, Diem cancelled the elections. Believing the northern Catholics to be a bastion of solid anti-communist support, Diem proceeded to treat his new constituents as a special interest group. In the long run, the northern Catholics never fully integrated into southern society and Diem's favoritism toward them caused tension that culminated in the Buddhist crisis of 1963, which ended with the downfall and assassination of the South Vietnamese leader.


At the end of World War II, the Viet Minh had proclaimed independence under the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in September 1945. This occurred after the withdrawal of Imperial Japan, which had seized control of the French colony during World War II. The military struggle started in November 1946 when France attempted to reassert control over Indochina with an attack on the northern port city of Haiphong.[8] The DRV was recognised by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). On the other hand, the western powers recognised the French-backed State of Vietnam, nominally led by Emperor B?o i, but with a French-trained Vietnamese National Army (VNA) which was loyal to the French Union forces. In May 1954, after eight years of fighting, the French were surrounded and defeated in a mountainous northern fortress at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.[9] France's withdrawal from Indochina was finalised in the Geneva Accords of July 1954, after two months of negotiations between Ho's DRV, France, the PRC and the Soviet Union. Under the terms of the agreement, Vietnam was temporarily divided at the 17th parallel north pending elections in 1956 to choose a national government that would administer a reunified country. The communist Viet Minh were left in control of North Vietnam, while the State of Vietnam controlled the south. French Union forces would gradually withdraw from Vietnam as the situation stabilised.[10] Both Vietnamese sides were unsatisfied with the outcome at Geneva; Ngo Dinh Diem, Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam, denounced France's agreement and ordered his delegation not to sign. He stated "We cannot recognise the seizure by Soviet China . . . of over half of our national territory" and that "We can neither concur in the brutal enslavement of millions of compatriots".[11] North Vietnamese Prime Minister Ph?m V?n ng expressed bitterness after his Soviet and Chinese backers threatened to cut support if he did not agree to the peace terms; Dong had wanted to press home the Viet Minh's military advantage so they could lay claim to more territory at the negotiating table.[11]










Accordingly, Task Force 90 (CTF-90) was inaugurated under the command of Rear Admiral Lorenzo Sabin. US servicemen renovated and transformed cargo vessels and tank carriers to house the thousands of Vietnamese who would be evacuated in them. The repairs were frequently done en route to Haiphong from their bases at Subic Bay in the Philippines.[12] Sabin had no prior involvement in humanitarian matters, and he and his staff prepared Operation Order 2-54--the 114-page policy framework for the operation--in the space of a week during their sea voyage from Japan to Vietnam.[21]

The first US vessel to participate in the mass evacuation was the Menard, which left Haiphong on August 17. It carried 1,924 refugees for a 1,600 kilometre, three-day journey to the southern capital.[22] By this time, there were already 132,000 people registered at the waiting areas, although very few had any identification.[19] As a result, there would be more work to be done in identifying their needs once they arrived in the south.[19] The Montrose followed on the next day, with 2,100 passengers. Both were originally built as attack transport vessels. In August, the US policy was liberalised so that Vietnamese and French military personnel could also be evacuated at the discretion of CTF-90 and the Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group (CHMAAG).[22] To cope with the rising volume of southbound sea transport, CHMAAG established a refugee debarkation site at V?ng Tàu, a coastal port at the entrance of the Saigon River. This site relieved congestion in the Saigon refugee camps and decreased the traffic bottlenecks along the river. A setback occurred when a typhoon struck the Haiphong area, destroying almost half of the refugee staging area. Despite the problems, by September 3, the US Navy had evacuated 47,000 northerners after only two weeks of operations.[23] The high rate of evacuation caused the South Vietnamese government to order that only one shipment of at most 2,500 passengers was to arrive in Saigon or V?ng Tàu per day, until September 25. The population pressure in the south was eased as incoming numbers fell due to Viet Minh propaganda campaigns and forcible detention, combined with the rice harvesting season, which had prompted some to delay their departure.[24] Some were even waiting to finish all their business deals before moving in the Lunar New Year. On October 10, the Viet Minh were given full control of Hanoi, closing off one point of evacuation for those who wanted out.[25] Some also decided to stay behind and see how the Viet Minh would treat the inhabitants of Hanoi before making a decision on whether to leave their ancestral lands.[25] On October 20, the French authorities that were still in control of the ports decided to waive docking fees on US vessels engaged in the evacuation.[24] Because of the high demand, the naval vessels had to travel quickly; one ship completed one round trip in a record of only six days.[26] The record for the most passengers taken in one journey was set by the USS General Black, which sailed on October 29 with 5,224 Vietnamese aboard.[27] In November, the evacuation was further hampered by another typhoon, while the entire crew of one American vessel were struck down by a scabies outbreak.[28] In December, because of Viet Minh obstruction, which prevented people from rural and regional areas from travelling to Hanoi and Haiphong to emigrate, the French Navy sent ships to hover just off the coast near the regional town of Vinh to evacuate refugees.[29]


According to COMIGAL,[30] the South Vietnamese government agency responsible for the migration, French aircraft made 4,280 trips, carrying a total of 213,635 refugees. A total of 555,037 passengers were recorded on 505 sea trips. The French Navy accounted for the vast majority of the naval evacuees, with 388 voyages, while the US Navy made 109. British, Taiwanese and Polish ships made two, two and four journeys respectively. The official figures reported that a total of 768,672 people had migrated under military supervision. Of this number around 190,000 were French and Saigon soldiers and returned prisoners; some 43,000 were military dependents, "15,000-25,000 Nung tribesmen who were military auxiliaries, between 25,000 and 40,000 French citizens, and about 45,000 Chinese residents."[2] It also included several thousand people who had worked for the French and Vietnamese administrations in the North. The official figures recorded that more than 109,000 people journeyed into the south by their own means, some arriving outside the 300-day period. These people typically crossed the river that divided the zones on makeshift rafts, sailed on improvised watercraft into a southern port, or trekked through Laos. As of 1957, the South Vietnamese government claimed a total of 928,152 refugees, of whom 98.3% were ethnic Vietnamese. The 1957 report said that 85% were engaged in farming or fishing for their livelihood and 85% were Catholics, while the remainder were Buddhists or Protestants.[31] However, an October 1955 government report claimed that 76.3% were Catholics, 23.5% were Buddhists and 0.2% Protestants.[32] In 1959, however, the head of COMIGAL, Bui Van Luong, admitted that the actual number of refugees could have been as low as 600,000. The official data excluded approximately 120,000 anti-communist military personnel and claimed that only 4,358 people moved north, though no historians consider this number credible. The northward migration was attributed to itinerant workers from rubber plantations who returned north for family reasons.[31]



The largest numbers of Catholic refugees came from the two northern dioceses with the highest percentage of Catholics in Vietnam.[33] These were Phát Diêm and Bùi Chu, mainly located in modern-day Ninh Bình and Nam nh Provinces respectively. The bishops of the dioceses had been strident opponents of the communists, and both had organised Catholic paramilitary groups that fought against the Viet Minh, which had long identified Catholics with colonial collaborationism.[33] When the communists had gained the upper hand in the north, many Catholics had already begun making preparations to move to the south, where the communists were less influential, and large movements began immediately when news of the partition came through.[33] After the defeat of French Union forces at Dien Bien Phu, French officers had evacuated their troops from Bui Chu and Phat Diem to reinforce the area between Hanoi and Haiphong which they still controlled, making it very easy for the communists to progress through the Catholic strongholds.[33] The French withdrawal was not announced and was supposed to be secret, but the local church leadership found out quickly and the local Catholic community had already begun to move to the ports before end of talks in Geneva. By the time the accords were signed, 45,000 Catholic refugees were already waiting in Hanoi, Haiphong or H?i Dng.[33] According to the records of the Catholic Church, over 70% of Catholics in Bui Chu and Phat Diem left, compared to around 50% in most other areas. The Catholic records claim that only a third of Hanoi Catholics left, and that around 80% of all clergy left.[32] In all areas, a higher proportion of priests left than laypeople, which has been attributed to the communists inflicting heavier punishments on more prominent opposition figures, such as clerics.[34] The departure rate was also lower in areas further removed from the coastal areas and departure ports;[35] in H?ng Hóa, only 11.8% of Catholics were recorded by their diocese as have migrated.[32] It has been speculated that the low rate of Hanoi residents choosing to depart may have been because the city was relatively untouched by the decade of fighting,[35] and that the varying and high rate of departures among rural Catholics was due to the influence of the local clergy;[36] priests in northern Vietnam were noted to be more theocratic and involved in civic decision-making.[37] They used a variety of ways to persuade their disciples to migrate; some explained their belief that circumstances would be difficult for people who did not immigrate, some simply gave dogmatic reasons such as "God is not here any more",[37] while others gave no reason at all and made declarations such as "We are leaving tomorrow" in the expectation that their followers would obey without question.[37] Surveys on the immigrants suggested they were largely content to follow the recommendation of the local priest.[37] In some areas, the bishop in charge of the diocese told Catholics to stay, but laypeople were more likely to leave or stay depending on the stance of the local priest with whom they had regular contact; in many cases, such as in Hanoi, a majority of priests ignored their bishop and left anyway.[38]



With most of the refugees being Catholic, the voluntary agencies most prominent in helping the US and French governments with humanitarian relief efforts were Catholic. The National Catholic Welfare Conference and Catholic Relief Services contributed over US$35 million ($327 million as of 2019) and sent hundreds of aid workers to South Vietnam. US clerics such as Joseph Harnett spent more than a year supervising the establishment of humanitarian and religious projects in Saigon. These included the establishment and maintenance of orphanages, hospitals, schools and churches. Harnett's volunteers fed rice and warm milk to 100,000 refugees on a daily basis. Tens of thousands of blankets donated by the American Catholic organisations served as beds, makeshift roofs against monsoonal downpours and as temporary walls in mass housing facilities.[42] The United Nations Children's Fund contributed technical assistance and helped to distribute merchandise, foodstuffs and various other gifts.[41]

Propaganda campaign

The US ran a propaganda campaign through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to enhance the size of the southward exodus. The program was directed by Colonel Edward Lansdale, who masqueraded as the assistant US air attaché in Saigon while leading a covert group that specialised in psychological warfare. Lansdale had advised Diem that it was imperative to maximise the population in the south in preparation for the national reunification elections. When Diem noted the limited ability of the south to absorb refugees, Lansdale assured him that the US would bear the burden. Diem thus authorised Lansdale to launch the propaganda campaign. According to the historian Seth Jacobs, the campaign "ranked with the most audacious enterprises in the history of covert action".[43] Lansdale recollected that "U.S. officials wanted to make sure that as many persons as possible, particularly the strongly anti-communist Catholics, relocated in the South".[44] While many Diem supporters claimed that the mass exodus was proof of the popularity of Diem and the people's hatred of communism, the CIA operative Chester Cooper said "the vast movement of Catholics to South Vietnam was not spontaneous".[45] However, while Lansdale is often credited by historians--usually those critical of his influence--with the large exodus of refugees due to superstition, he rejected the notion that his campaign had much effect on popular sentiment, saying in later years: "People don't just pull up their roots and transplant themselves because of slogans. They honestly feared what might happen to them, and their emotion was strong enough to overcome their attachment to their land, their homes, and their ancestral graves. So the initiative was very much theirs--and we mainly made the transportation possible."[46] Some northerners who stayed behind and were interviewed half a century later said that they had not come across any pro-migration propaganda and said that their decisions were based on discussions with fellow locals.[39] They said that concerns over the possible effects of communist rule were discussed among themselves independent of outside information.[39]


Lansdale's men forged documents allegedly issued by the Vietminh that promised to seize all private property. He claimed that "The day following distribution of these leatlets, refugee registration tripled".[44] The Central Evacuation Committee in Haiphong, an American-funded group, issued pamphlets claiming that in South Vietnam, "the cost of living is three times less",[44] and that there would be welfare payments and free ricelands, the latter two of which were false.[44] It said that "By remaining in the North you will experience famine and will damn your souls. Set out now, brothers and sisters!"[44]


Lansdale's campaign focused on northern Catholics, who were known for their strongly anti-communist tendencies. His staff printed tens of thousands of pamphlets with slogans such as "Christ has gone south" and "the Virgin Mary has departed from the North",[49] alleging anti-Catholic persecution under Ho Chi Minh. Posters depicting communists closing a cathedral and forcing the congregation to pray in front of Ho, adorned with a caption "make your choice", were pasted around Hanoi and Haiphong.[49] Diem himself went to Hanoi several times in 1954 while the French were still garrisoned there to encourage Catholics to move, portraying himself as a savior of Catholics.[50] The campaign resonated with northern Catholic priests, who told their disciples that Ho would end freedom of worship, that sacraments would no longer be given and that anyone who stayed behind would endanger their souls.[49] A survey of refugees some five decades later confirmed that they felt their interests would be best served under a Catholic leader and that Diem had substantial personal appeal due to his religion.[50] Some have argued that the Catholics would have left regardless of Lansdale's activities, as they had first-hand experiences of their priests and co-religionists being captured and executed for resisting the communist revolution.[51]

Regardless of the impact of the propaganda campaigns, the Catholic immigrants helped to strengthen Diem's support base. Before the partition, most of Vietnam's Catholic population lived in the north. After the borders were sealed, the majority were now under Diem's rule. The Catholics implicitly trusted Diem due to their common faith and were a source of loyal political support. One of Diem's main objections to the Geneva Accords--which the State of Vietnam refused to sign--was that it deprived him of the Catholic regions of North Vietnam,[42] and he had unsuccessfully called for Bui Chu and Phat Diem to be omitted from the communist zone.[52] With entire Catholic provinces moving south en masse, in 1956 the Diocese of Saigon had more Catholics than Paris and Rome. Of Vietnam's 1.45 million Catholics, over a million lived in the south, 55% of whom were northern refugees.[42] Prior to this, only 520,000 Catholics lived in the Dioceses of Saigon and Hu? combined.[53] Lansdale employed the refugee movements as a cover for paramilitary activities from his Saigon Military Mission.[54]


The Viet Minh engaged in counter-propaganda campaigns in an attempt to deter the exodus from the north.[55] They moved through the neighbourhoods of Hanoi and Haiphong on a daily basis, passing out their pamphlets.[56] Evacuees reported being ridiculed by the Viet Minh, who claimed that they would be sadistically tortured before being killed by the French and American authorities in Haiphong. The communists depicted the personnel of Task Force 90 as cannibals who would eat their babies, predicting disaster in the jungles, beaches and mountains of South Vietnam.[55] They further said that the Americans would throw them overboard to drown in the ocean.[56] The Viet Minh boasted to the emigrants that it was a high and futile risk, asserting that the 1956 reunification elections would result in a decisive communist victory.[55] The communist efforts were helped by the fact that many French or State of Vietnam offices in the north evacuated their personnel and sold or otherwise left behind their printing facilities, many of which fell into Viet Minh hands.[56]

Communist prevention of emigration

Along with counter-propaganda, the Viet Minh also sought to detain or otherwise prevent would-be refugees from leaving. As the American and French military personnel were only present in the major cities and at air bases and on the waterfront, the communists tried to stop people from trying to leave through a military presence in the ruralside to interdict the flow of would-be refugees.[27] The communists were most effective in Ngh? An and Thanh Hóa Provinces, which they had long controlled;[35] only 20% of Catholics in Thanh Hóa migrated.[32] In parts of the Red River Delta, ferry services and other water traffic were shut down so that refugees would not be able to travel to Haiphong.[57] In some cases there were reports of thousands-strong groups of refugees being forced back by similar numbers of armed communist cadres.[57] As a result, many refugees headed directly for the nearest coastal point to wait for passing vessels.[58] In one sweep of the coast near the Catholic stronghold of Phát Diêm, the French Navy picked up 42,000 stranded refugees in two days.[28] The VNA also swept the area in late 1954 for two days, picking up several thousand refugees, but increasing communist attacks forced them to stop.[59] In some rural coastal areas where it was common for refugees to converge before boarding vessels to connect to the long-distance naval vessels taking them south, the Viet Minh installed mortars on the beaches to deter prospective immigrants.[60]


Media and public relations





Social integration


Diem appointed Bui Van Luong--a family friend and devout Catholic--as the head of COMIGAL, the government resettlement agency. COMIGAL worked in cooperation with the United States Operations Mission, the non-military wing of the American presence and the Military Assistance Advisory Group.[70] Although COMIGAL was purely dedicated to refugee issues, there was a constant turnover of public servants through their staff, and the benefits of continuity did not materialize.[26] After only a few months in the job, Luong was replaced by Pham Van Huyen on December 7, 1954.[26] COMIGAL were supplemented by American Catholic aid agencies and an advisory group from Michigan State University, where Diem had stayed while in self-imposed exile in the early 1950s.[70] There were three phases in the resettlement program.[71] With more than 4,000 new arrivals per day, the northerners were housed in Saigon and V?ng Tàu in 42 makeshift reception centers.[71] These consisted of existing schools, vacated French barracks, churches and tent cities on the grounds of Tan Son Nhut Air Base and Phú Th? Racecourse.[71] These could not be used indefinitely as the grounds needed to be used for their preexisting purpose, and furthermore, such ad hoc areas were vulnerable to outbreaks of fire and disease.[71]

The refugees needed buildings such as schools, hospitals, warehouses, places of worship were built for them. As part of the second phase, temporary villages were built and by mid-1955, most of the one million refugees were living in rows of temporary housing settlements, mostly near highways leading out of Saigon, in provinces adjacent to the capital. The largest concentration of housing in this second stage was located to the north of the capital.[70][71] Only a minority could be sent to the fertile Mekong Delta, as the area was already overcrowded. It was also restive due to the presence of militant religious sects, so the most of the military evacuees were sent there.[72]

Overcrowding was a serious problem in many of the ad hoc secondary camps set up in the Saigon region, and led to public health issues.[72] The Biên Hòa region on the northeastern outskirts of Saigon was scheduled to have a capacity of 100,000 refugees,[72] but this was soon exceeded.[73] In the Ho Nai camp near Bien Hoa, which was supposed to hold only 10,000 refugees, more than 41,000 were present by the end of 1954.[74] The area surrounding Th? D?u M?t north of the southern capital had initially been allocated a quota of 20,000 even though there was no rice paddies in the area.[72] The area near Tây Ninh was to accommodate 30,000 people, although the locals thought that 100,000 could fit in.[72] Some large Catholic settlements such as Th? c, Bình Th?nh and Gò V?p on the outskirts of Saigon have now been subsumed by urban sprawl and are now districts of the city.[75] Because of the excessive number of inhabitants, the infrastructure at many camps could not cope and the promises made to the refugees were not kept.[74] American military doctors travelled around the south in groups of three, and because of the paucity of health professionals, saw around 150-450 patients per day. They were also hampered by customs law, which only allowed charities to bring medicine into the country without taxation. This forced them to turn to charitable organisations as a conduit, creating another layer of bureaucracy.[76] This was exacerbated by the fact that some corrupt Vietnamese officials pocketed the medical aid.[77]



The next objective was to integrate the refugees into South Vietnamese society. At the time, there was a lack of arable land in secure areas. In early 1955, the Viet Minh still controlled much of the Mekong Delta, while other parts were controlled by the private armies of the Cao ?ài and Hòa H?o religious sects. The Bình Xuyên organised crime gang controlled the streets of Saigon, having purchased the operating license for the national police from Emperor B?o i. The new arrivals could not be safely sent to the countryside until the Viet Minh had moved north and Diem had dispersed the sects and gangs. The urban areas were secured when the VNA defeated the Bình Xuyên in the Battle for Saigon in late April and early May. Lansdale managed to bribe many of the Hòa H?o and Cao ?ài military commanders to integrate into Diem's VNA, but some commanders fought on. It was not until early 1956 that the last Hoa Hao commander, Ba C?t, was captured in an Army of the Republic of Vietnam campaign by General Dng V?n Minh. This allowed COMIGAL to send expeditions to survey the rural land for settlement.[70]


COMIGAL dispatched inspection teams throughout South Vietnam to identify areas that were suitable for accommodating the new arrivals according to their professional skills. This required a search for arable land for farmers, favourable coastal areas for fishing and areas near large population centres for industrially oriented arrivals. Having identified the relevant areas, COMIGAL would set up plans for settlement subprojects, sending proposals to the USOM or the French Technical and Economic Cooperation Bureau to gain approval and funding. The bureaucracy was relatively low, with most applications taking less than a fortnight for finalising paperwork and receiving approval. Each subproject was given a nine-month deadline for completion.[82]

When suitable areas were found, groups of refugees usually numbering between one and three thousand were trucked to the site and began creating the new settlement. This involved digging wells, building roads and bridges, clearing forests, bushes and swamps and constructing fishing vessels. Village elections were held to select members for committees that would liaise with COMIGAL on behalf of the new settlement.[82]


Difficulties and criticism




The indigenous population in the central highlands complained bitterly about the settlement of ethnic Vietnamese Catholics in their regions. As a result of their discontent with the southern government, communist propagandists in the highlands found it easier to win them over.[97]



  1. ^ a b Frankum, Ronald (2007). Operation Passage to Freedom: The United States Navy in Vietnam, 1954-55. Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech University Press. ISBN 978-0-89672-608-6.
  3. ^ a b c Lindholm, pp. 55-57.
  4. ^ Lindholm, p. 49; Prados
  6. ^ a b Tran, Thi Lien (November 2005). "The Catholic Question in North Vietnam". Cold War History. London: Routledge. 5 (4): 427-49. doi:10.1080/14682740500284747.
  7. ^ Jacobs (2006), p. 45
  8. ^ Jacobs (2006), p. 23.
  9. ^ Karnow, pp. 210-214.
  10. ^ Karnow, p. 218.
  11. ^ a b Jacobs (2006), pp. 41-42.
  12. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Jacobs (2006), pp. 43-44.
  13. ^ Hansen, p. 178.
  14. ^ Jacobs (2004), p. 130.
  15. ^ a b c Frankum, p. 38.
  16. ^ Frankum, p. 39.
  17. ^ a b Frankum, p. 109.
  18. ^ Frankum, p. 114.
  19. ^ a b c Frankum, p. 110.
  20. ^ Frankum, pp. 38-39.
  21. ^ a b Frankum, p. 40.
  22. ^ a b Lindholm, p. 63.
  23. ^ Lindholm, p. 64.
  24. ^ a b Lindholm, pp. 65-67.
  25. ^ a b Frankum, p. 158.
  27. ^ a b Frankum, p. 159.
  28. ^ a b Frankum, p. 172.
  29. ^ Frankum, pp. 188-189.
  31. ^ a b Lindholm, pp. 48-50.
  34. ^ Hansen, p. 189.
  36. ^ Hansen, p. 182.
  38. ^ Hansen, pp. 188-189.
  40. ^ Hansen, p. 188.
  41. ^ a b c Lindholm, p. 50.
  45. ^ Jacobs (2004), p. 132.
  46. ^ Hansen, pp. 182-183.
  51. ^ Hansen, p. 184.
  52. ^ Hansen, p. 203.
  53. ^ Hansen, p. 177.
  55. ^ a b c Lindholm, p. 78.
  56. ^ a b c Frankum, p. 112.
  57. ^ a b Frankum, p. 160.
  58. ^ Frankum, p. 162.
  59. ^ Hansen, pp. 204-205.
  60. ^ a b Frankum, p. 190.
  61. ^ Frankum, p. 167.
  62. ^ Frankum, pp. 167-168.
  63. ^ Frankum, p. 168.
  69. ^ Jacobs (2004), pp. 191-192.
  73. ^ Frankum, pp. 180-195.
  75. ^ Hansen, p. 202.
  76. ^ Frankum, pp. 171-172.
  77. ^ a b Frankum, p. 183.
  78. ^ a b Frankum, p. 150.
  79. ^ Hansen, p. 194.
  80. ^ a b Frankum, p. 185.
  81. ^ a b c Hansen, p. 195.
  82. ^ a b Lindholm, p. 51.
  83. ^ a b c Lindholm, pp. 52-53.
  84. ^ a b Hansen, p. 196.
  85. ^ Jacobs (2006), p. 55.
  87. ^ Frankum, p. 191.
  88. ^ Frankum, p. 151.
  89. ^ Hansen, p. 197.
  90. ^ Hansen, p. 199.
  92. ^ Hansen, pp. 177-178.
  93. ^ Hansen, p. 201.
  94. ^ Hansen, p. 175.
  95. ^ Jacobs (2006), p. 143.
  96. ^ Jones, p. 429.
  97. ^ Lindholm, p. 94.


  • Hansen, Peter (2009). "B?c Di C?: Catholic Refugees from the North of Vietnam, and Their Role in the Southern Republic, 1954-1959". Journal of Vietnamese Studies. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 4 (3): 173-211. doi:10.1525/vs.2009.4.3.173.
  • Jacobs, Seth (2004). America's Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950-1957. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. ISBN 0-8223-3440-2.
  • Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950-1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-4447-8.
  • Tran, Thi Lien (November 2005). "The Catholic Question in North Vietnam: From Polish Sources, 1954-56". Cold War History. London: Routledge. 5 (4): 427-449. doi:10.1080/14682740500284747.

External links




Music Scenes