The Persistent Economic Slump

In 2010, two years after the Financial meltdown of 2008, the Great Recession continued to reverberate throughout the world. One by one, many European Union countries faced possible bankruptcy. There were indications that a currency war might have begun, with the U.S. and China the key combatants. Americans learned that the price of keeping the international financial system afloat was $3.3 trillion in loans and other forms of credit from the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) to such firms as General Electric and Toyota and a passel of foreign banks.

The U.S. Sputters from Recession.

For all of its international dimensions, the Great Recession wore a “Made in America” label. A huge run-up in U.S. housing prices in the early 2000s, abetted by mortgage lenders and investment banks willing to take big risks to make big profits, set the stage for the monumental collapse in the real-estate sector that began in 2007 and then spread with speed and intensity to the financial sector. Lenders, afraid that even their most reliable borrowers could not pay them back, hunkered down. That in turn threatened the lending that enables business to conduct business, not only in the U.S. but also in other free-market countries in the global economy.

For many Americans it came as a surprise to learn that their economy was not officially in recession in 2010. In September the National Bureau of Economic Research (a group of private economists who act as the arbiters of such matters) determined that the U.S. economy, which had plunged into reverse in December 2007, had reached a trough and officially emerged from recession in June 2009. Even if the economy did not fall into a much-feared double-dip slump, the 18 months already on the books made the so-called Great Recession the longest such period of decline since the end of World War II.

In its impact on American workers, this recession was also one of the deepest. Although the unemployment rate never came close to its peak of 25% in the Great Depression of the 1930s, the rate hit double digits in October 2009 for only the second time in the postwar period and reached at least a temporary peak in November 2010 of 9.8%. Of the 15.1 million job-seeking unemployed, some 6.3 million had been out of work for at least six months, easily eclipsing the previous postwar high. Another 1.3 million Americans were considered “discouraged” because they had ceased looking for employment. Many, particularly at the older end of the workforce spectrum, had no hope of ever working again. The U.S. Congress had repeatedly extended unemployment compensation to out-of-work Americans and in late 2010 agreed to extend it yet again as part of a larger tax bill.

A terrible year for labour, however, turned out to be a good one for capital. Companies that had scored large savings by cutting their workforces during the recession maintained those savings and converted them into productivity gains—2.5% in the third quarter, year on year—by simply leaving their payrolls lean and mean instead of hiring. American corporate profits reached a record high of nearly $1.7 trillion on an annual basis in the July–September quarter of 2010. Stock markets, which had plunged by more than half during the worst of the financial crisis, in March 2009 began an overall rise that had recovered more than three-quarters of their losses by the end of 2010.

The Global Impact.

Just how global was the global financial crisis? The answer became clearer in 2010, and it emerged that the term was something of a misnomer. Generally, the crisis stung most sharply in developed economies that were most intimately linked to the global economy. More precisely, the recession’s bite was most acute in countries whose financial systems and trade patterns depended on ties with the U.S. Thus, during the period 2008–09, most members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) suffered recessions of varying degrees of severity. Hardest hit were countries that had adopted banking policies most closely echoing those of the U.S.

Europe provided multiple case studies. In tiny Iceland a financial bubble proportionately much larger than the one in the U.S. developed and burst; the fallout impoverished much of the country and brought down the government. Latvia saw its economic output fall by one-quarter as Germany and other major trading partners, in recession themselves, reduced Latvian imports. Greece and Ireland, on the brink of bankruptcy, accepted massive bailouts from the EU, although they were plagued less by the financial crisis than by their own government deficits and their use of the euro. (See Sidebar.)

Most of Asia, except Japan, escaped the brunt of the financial crisis. Japan was bruised because its financial system was linked to that of the world’s other richest countries. Its economy shrank in 2008 and 2009—by an annualized 12.1% in the fourth quarter of 2008 alone. The economies of Malaysia and Thailand rebounded smartly in 2010 from minor contractions in 2009. Asia’s other major economies, notably China and India, kept growing as if nothing was amiss in the Western world. China’s growth was slowed almost imperceptibly by the recessions in the U.S. and other major export markets; growth in the range of 10–15% before the financial crisis fell back to 9–10% annually for the period 2008–10. India slid back to 6.7% growth in 2008–09 before rebounding to a more familiar 7.4% in 2009–10, according to IMF estimates. Indonesia, which had registered growth above 6% in 2007 and 2008, prospered in the shadow of the two Asian giants and showed a gritty resilience during the financial crisis. The Paris-based OECD reported that in 2009 Indonesia’s economic growth slipped to 4.6%, but the OECD estimated that growth would rebound to 6% in 2010 and 2011, especially if, as promised, the government canceled fuel subsidies that disproportionately benefited the rich and distorted energy consumption.

If the Asian giants suggested that geographic proximity to the U.S. was not necessary for economic success, the experience of some U.S. neighbours made such proximity seem downright harmful. Economic output in 2009 fell by about 2% in Canada and 6% in Mexico, according to the IMF. Both suffered a decline in exports to their huge North American neighbour as it battled recession. Meanwhile, in South America output gained a bit in Argentina and fell slightly in Brazil.

To deal with the financial crisis, countries with emerging economies demanded—and got—a larger role on the world stage. For 35 years the Group of Seven (G7) had provided the leaders of the seven largest industrial democracies—the U.S., Canada, Japan, and the four largest European economies (Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K.)—with a cozy opportunity to discuss economic concerns. In the wake of the Great Recession, however, the G7 was largely supplanted by the Group of 20 (G20), which comprised the G7 members plus the EU and 12 emerging economies: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey.

The G20 members that were not in the G7 could make a strong case that they represented the economic powers of the future. In 2009, with the financial crisis still going strong, all seven of the G7 countries had shrinking economies. Of the dozen G20 countries not in the G7, the economies of half grew despite the crisis. The IMF estimated that in 2010 every G20 newcomer would outpace every G7 member except Germany and Canada, which were expected to grow slightly faster than Australia and South Africa.

When the G20 leaders met Toronto in June and again in Seoul in November 2010 to discuss the global economy, U.S. Pres. Barack Obama was rebuffed on his three chief proposals. In Toronto the president asked his colleagues to follow the U.S. lead and put in place further government spending programs to stimulate their economies. Other G20 leaders, notably German Chancellor Angela Merkel, rejected such a step as potentially inflationary. Germany was also among the countries that dismissed Obama’s later calls to reduce their trade surpluses. Obama’s other target was China, which for years had been accused of artificially holding down the value of its currency, the renminbi (yuan). A weak renminbi had the effect of making Chinese goods cheaper on world markets. Chinese officials gave conciliatory speeches in Seoul about letting the renminbi find its own level, but in practice little changed.

The Severity of the Downturn.

It was clear that the Great Recession would never be confused with a garden-variety downturn in the business cycle. How did the world economy come to such a sorry pass? Fingers everywhere pointed to the U.S.—or, more precisely, mortgage lenders in the U.S. and Wall Street investment bankers.

Investment houses had discovered that great profits could flow from the practice of buying hundreds or even thousands of mortgages and bundling them into securities that would provide a steady stream of income from individual mortgage payments. So great was the lure of mortgage-backed securities—and the demand for more mortgages to bundle—that lenders offered “subprime” mortgages to some home buyers who could not be expected to meet their monthly payments. Exotic mortgages designed to hide their real costs proliferated. As more families were enticed into the real-estate market, the price of housing soared.

Finally, inevitably, the real-estate bubble burst. Many mortgage holders—particularly those who held subprime mortgages—failed to make their payments. The value of thousands and thousands of properties plunged to less than the occupants owed on the mortgage. Some homeowners, among them even ones who could afford to make their mortgage payments, simply walked away from their homes.

RealtyTrac, an online marketplace for foreclosure properties, reported 1.7 million foreclosure filings in the first half of 2010, an 8% increase over the same period a year earlier. One in 78 homes in the U.S. had been the object of some kind of foreclosure action during January–June 2010. Banks and other mortgage holders made matters worse by foreclosing on properties without completing the proper procedures, often wrongly designating properties for foreclosure. Fire sales of foreclosed homes and short sales of homes that had barely escaped foreclosure as owners sold their property for less than the outstanding mortgage continued to depress the real-estate market. In 20 major cities, average home prices roughly doubled between 2000 and 2007 and then gave back half their gains in two years before stabilizing at their 2003 level.

Mortgage lenders who had made the bulk of the subprime mortgages found themselves stuck with mounds of worthless contracts. The buyers of mortgage-backed securities, including the federally chartered Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, did likewise many times over. American International Group (AIG), the giant insurance company that had insured mortgage-backed securities against loss, could not make good on its policies. Car sales plunged as buyers could not get loans. Investment houses that had pioneered mortgage-backed securities and held many of them suddenly went from positive to negative net worth.

The U.S. government, terrified that the economic engine would freeze up, rescued major players by lending them money or buying their stock, thus partially nationalizing some companies. Among the largest of those that accepted government bailouts were Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG, General Motors, Chrysler, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, and Goldman Sachs. Investment house Lehman Brothers, a pioneer in mortgage-backed securities, was allowed to fail in 2008 as the government sought to show that irresponsible behaviour was not always rewarded by federal aid. That lesson may have been learned, but so was another: that lending was risky. Consequently, the credit markets locked up.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury carried out the congressionally mandated Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which made $700 billion available for support for financial institutions saddled with worthless mortgage-backed securities. The Fed, acting on its own authority, played a much larger role, manufacturing a great variety of novel ways to lend money to teetering businesses whether domestic or foreign, financial or nonfinancial. Thus, TARP enabled controversial government moves to make General Motors a $6.7 billion loan and buy 60.8% of its stock. GM later regained control of the company and repaid the loan (although with a different pot of TARP money). The Treasury estimated that TARP’s ledgers would ultimately show a $29 billion loss, a fraction of the funds put at risk. The Fed meanwhile quietly channeled $3.3 trillion in credit to a host of other businesses, including such American companies as motorcycle manufacturer Harley-Davidson and telecommunications firm Verizon, as well as European- and Asian-owned banks. The Fed did not lose money on any of its lending programs, and it made a profit on some.

Jump-Starting the Economy.

The Great Recession could hardly have come at a worse time. Traditionally, a government has two weapons—fiscal policy and monetary policy—to combat recessions. Both involve getting more money into people’s hands so that they have more to spend. On the fiscal side, the government can use its budget to cut taxes or increase spending. On the monetary side, it can use its unique power to print money. Both were already going flat out in the U.S., however, when the financial crisis plunged the economy into recession.

On the fiscal side, 2009 and 2010 produced the two biggest annual deficits relative to the size of the economy since the end of World War II: almost 10% of total GDP. In dollar terms 2009 was the record holder, at $1.4 trillion, with 2010 in second place. By the end of 2010, the government was spending nearly $10 billion a day, including nearly $4 billion that it had to borrow, and increasingly members of the public were saying that enough was enough. Making the budget outlook still more bleak, the aging baby-boom generation, which was just beginning to reach full retirement age, figured to put enormous pressure on the government’s two biggest entitlement programs, Social Security and Medicare.

On the monetary side the outlook was just as unfriendly. The Fed, which controls short-term interest rates directly by dictating the Federal Funds Rate (the interest rate that banks may charge each other for overnight loans), slashed the rate from 4.25% in early 2008 to 0.0–0.25% at year’s end—just about as low as it could go. This did nothing, however, for longer-term rates. In 2008 and 2009 the Fed bought $1.7 trillion in longer-term Treasury securities, which had the effect of taking the securities out of circulation and injecting cash. When that failed to bring longer-term interest rates down sufficiently to boost economic activity, the Fed announced another $600 billion infusion in November 2010. This evoked predictable criticism from China, which complained that the U.S. was trying to bring down the value of the dollar to boost its exports. Other major American trading partners, including Brazil and Germany, joined the chorus. The German finance minister suggested that the U.S. was engaging in currency manipulation and exhorted the U.S. to shore up its industrial base instead.

At home, inflation hawks also warned that the Fed’s easy-money, low-interest-rate policy would ultimately trigger another round of uncontrolled price increases. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, one of the country’s preeminent Great Depression scholars, promised that the Fed was on the lookout daily for signs of inflation.

The Fed, by virtue of its independence even from the president, could continue to try to manipulate interest rates and the money supply in the face of congressional opposition. The deficit was another story. Given the astronomical deficits of 2009 and 2010, voices in favour of using more deficit spending to stimulate the economy were scarce, and the Republican gains in Congress in the 2010 midterm elections all but removed that option from the table. (See Sidebar.)

A taste of how difficult it would be to reduce the deficit was offered by a commission appointed by Obama to recommend steps to do just that. The commission’s cochairs—former Republican senator Alan K. Simpson and Erskine Bowles, former chief of staff to Democratic Pres. Bill Clinton—produced a proposal that included raising the Social Security retirement age and eliminating or reducing a host of popular tax breaks, such as the mortgage-interest deduction. When it became clear that the commission could not muster at least 14 of its 18 members to vote in favour of the proposal—the number required to force the measure to the Senate and House floors—the commission simply adjourned without a vote.

The Persistent Economic Slump
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