Australia must go all the way with Asia

Teaching Mandarin is only a part of getting more comfortable about Asia. Class at Canberra Grammar Northside Junior School.
Teaching Mandarin is only a part of getting more comfortable about Asia. Class at Canberra Grammar Northside Junior School. Photo: Karleen Minney
by Michael Wesley

How does a country locate itself in the world? What qualities does it use to judge its place? Most countries rely on five coordinates to situate themselves in the world: lineages, contributions, ideals, loyalties and affinities.

Lineages trace the history of how a society came to be as it is: the ways its interaction with others shapes its ethnic make-up, its ideals and institutions, its outlook on the world. Each society cares deeply about its distinctive contributions to human progress, in art and culture, in science and technology, in cuisine and architecture, and wants these to be acknowledged by others. The ideals a country stands for are an important marker of its place in the world: its vision of the human condition, its willingness to oppose what it sees as wrong, its commitment to promoting its ideals beyond its borders. The loyalties of a society draw it back time and again to partner with certain other societies, to support them and not others, and to expect succour from them in times of need. Finally, the affinities of society locate it in a community outside of itself: usually a broader geographic-cultural grouping tied together by broad similarities in circumstance, wealth, historical experience and cosmology.

These coordinates locate Australia precisely in the North Atlantic Ocean. Modern Australia finds its lineages in Britain and Europe, with some borrowings from the US. Its contributions to human progress have been made and acknowledged in Europe and North America. Its ideals draw it more powerfully to the institutions designed by Americans and Europeans: the UN, the IMF, the WTO. And its loyalties and affinities have seen it take the field, time after time, alongside American and other NATO forces.

But Australia has been less than completely comfortable with these coordinates for a very long time. Locating Australia in relation to Asia has been a talisman of vision and innovation for Australian governments of all stripes. In 1938 John Crawford, who was to become one of the great mandarins of Australia’s postwar nation building, called for Australia to initiate a Pacific regional community, which would include Australia and most of the countries of South-East Asia.

Teaching Mandarin is only one way for the country to become more enmeshed in Asia. Misha Landman studies for her ...
Teaching Mandarin is only one way for the country to become more enmeshed in Asia. Misha Landman studies for her Mandarin year 12 exam, November, 2007. Photo: Angela Wylie

forging a new path in asia

Governments since have been unable to resist trying to forge a new path in Asia. Along the way they coined a range of lofty phrases to capture what they tried to do: from Menzies’s “near north", to Whitlam’s references to “the neighbours", Hawke’s “enmeshment", Beazley’s “security in, not from Asia", and Keating’s “engagement". Even the Howard government, which came to office decrying Keating’s “Asia only" foreign policy, left office most proud of its diplomatic achievement in Asia.

But for all of the consistency of its aspirations, Australia is always left with the bleak feeling that its position in Asia is less than it should be. This is why Asia is the most consistent point of opposition critique of government foreign policy, and why every government at some stage conceives of a grand Asia vision. The question of why is an important element of our national psychology.

Two diagnoses come to mind. The first is the discomfort of the outsider, the one who seems never to quite belong. For Europeans and Americans, Australia is too small and too far away to be naturally, effortlessly one of them. For Asia and the South Pacific, Australia’s sense of its lineages, contributions, ideals, loyalties and affinities will always set it apart. The conclusion is so inevitable it occurs anew to every government: Australia will never be big enough or close enough to the Atlantic to be an insider there, but perhaps there’s some way it can fit in more naturally in Asia?

Goods from China arrive in Sydney in November, 2007, ahead of Christmas sales.
Goods from China arrive in Sydney in November, 2007, ahead of Christmas sales. Photo Robert Pearce

The second diagnosis is a tic of Australia’s gambler’s soul. For a country in which outlook on life has been shaped by a progression of lucky breaks, Asia looms as an opportunity too good to miss. This is manifest in the latest Australian government Asia vision: Julia Gillard ’s Australia in the Asian Century white paper. In its preface it proclaims: “The Asian Century is Australia’s opportunity"; “the tyranny of distance is being replaced by the prospects of proximity"; and “Australia is located in the right place at the right time." But shot through these statements, just as in every past government’s Asia vision, is a deep nervousness about Australia missing the opportunity, failing to make the most of this hand it’s been dealt, being outplayed by countries further afield.

Australia’s two opportunities in asia

Asia presents two opportunities to Australia. The first is a chance to gain stature in the eyes of its affinity and loyalty groups: America and Europe. Australian governments have long been accorded respect in Washington and London because proximity to Asia was presumed to give Australia great Asia expertise.

The second opportunity is economic. By luck of geography and geology, Australia has been ideally placed to fuel and provision the rise of Asia’s economies. That’s why Australia’s definition of what constitutes “Asia" has tended to follow the money. For as long as the Asian tigers were islands or peninsulas in the western Pacific, Australia’s Asia excluded the entire continent not on the Pacific coastline. Now India is booming, the western boundary of Australia’s Asia has lurched thousands of kilometres westwards.

It also explains why Australian governments always rely on the logic of economics to make the case for their grand Asia visions. This resonates with the pragmatic, no-nonsense style of public discourse here, but it also reflects the most vital sinews connecting Australia to Asia. The remarkable growth of Australia’s trading relationships with Asia reflects complementarities to warm the heart of the 18th century economist David Ricardo.

formula for future prosperity

Australia in the Asian Century finds in the history of Australia’s economic complementarities with Asia the formula for future prosperity and success. It gives a great deal of credit to past liberalising economic reforms for helping foster Australia’s close economic links to Asia, and it looks beyond the mining boom to forecast new horizons for Australian business in feeding Asia and meeting the service needs of its middle classes.

But the language of economics is too sterile to foster any sense of loyalty or belonging beyond the calculations of mutual advantage. What is remarkable about Australia in the Asian Century is that it’s not really about Asia at all. The only aspects of Asia it considers are those that relate to self-enrichment opportunities for Australia. This includes its brief excursion into security issues, confined to various intramural disputes that could interrupt money-making potential. Indeed, the white paper takes increments to our per capita wealth as its main measure of success.

A market-based relationship is entirely transactional. The only mutual concern between vendor and customer relates to the transaction: whether the vendor’s goods are worth the price; and whether the customer has enough money to pay. A transactional relationship builds no belonging, loyalty or community.

The transactional nature of Australia’s economic relationships with Asia can be read from data on our economic relationships. These show that while over two-thirds of our trade is with Asia, only a small fraction of our investment goes there; the vast bulk of Australian investment goes to America and Europe. And the majority of international investment in Australia is from America and Europe.

Investment is a different relationship from trade. It involves an ongoing bond of trust and mutual gain, the placing of a bet on another’s performance and character. Investment creates an ongoing relationship of mutual concern, a genuine interest in the health and wellbeing of another.

Herein lies the cause of Australia’s perpetual agonising about its place in Asia. It has become rich trading with Asian countries but has never invested in them, in a financial, strategic, political, cultural or emotional sense. The repeated consideration of how we can do better in Asia sends a message that Asia is somehow optional, a set of relationships to be dialled up or down depending on what’s in it for us. What is manifestly lacking is any sense that Australia is deeply tied into and vitally interested in the fates of the countries to its north. The rapidity with which Australia overlooks the importance of Japan and Korea in favour of China shows the depth of our commitment to regional relationships.

Successive Asia visions send a message to Asia that speaks volumes about our insecurity and our lack of any real investment in the region. No other country in “our" region has published or even contemplated a document akin to Australia in the Asian Century. The title, like the exercise, signals clearly: Australia is not part of the Asian Century, but we sure would like to profit from it.

australia’s involvement with asia is not optional

The fact is Australia is part of the Asian Century. Our involvement is not optional. The rise of Asia is also an Australian story – from our minerals and energy fuelling the industrialisation of Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China, to the changing preferences of Asia’s rich for Australian meat, dairy and wine; the education of Asia’s new generations in Australian schools and universities; and the acquisition of Australian residency and property by Asia’s rich as a hedge against things falling apart.

Australia’s future will be deeply tied to Asia’s, not to that of the US and Europe, and in a more profound sense than the consequences for our per capita wealth. Strategically, Australia must realise it is the anchor of the Indo-Pacific peninsula, a chain of islands dividing the Pacific and Indian Oceans, which will become the centre of global strategic competition this century. If Asia descends into competition and war, there is no way we can sit on the sidelines. Australia must realise that its most important security interest lies in the stability, integrity and independence of the countries that form the Indo-Pacific peninsula.

The hole at the heart of Australia’s sense of where it sits in relation to its geographic region lies in the lack of a narrative in our society that tells the story of how countries in Asia have shaped modern Australia, and how Australia has shaped modern Asia. This is not a difficult story to tell. Our lineages are not solely Atlantic, nor are our contributions or our ideals. As we start to tell a different, more geographically located story of where we are located, our affinities and loyalties will start to evolve also. Because without such an investment now, Australia will be ill placed to capture the benefits and deal with the dangers of the rise of Asia.

The Australian Financial Review