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Union army officers study Chinese general and strategist Sun Tzu's "The Art of War" in 1863.

There was once a Chinese philosopher of war named Sun Tsu. He wrote a book called The Art of War more than 2,500 years ago. It was a good book. Indeed, it has survived to this day. One of the most popular quotes from this book have worked their way into our Western consciousness.


Today a lot of people buy into this theoretical statement. This leads to a degree of admiration for generals in our own history who manage significant victories at the operational level without ever really having to go toe-to-toe with the enemy in a slugfest. Historians are particularly susceptible to becoming enamored with figures of history who pull this off.

Thus, among professional historians, one of Napoleon's greatest victories was not his smashing at Austerlitz in 1805, but instead his magnificent marching, deception, and misdirection of the Austrian general "The Unfortunate Mack" during his campaign of 1805 that culminated at a place called Ulm, in Bavaria. Essentially in that campaign Napoleon so completely bamboozled and out-maneuvered his opponent that the campaign, and indeed that particular war (of the multiple "Napoleonic Wars") was essentially over through a mass surrender by the opponent without there ever being a major pitched battle.

This is all well and good, and it has worked its way into modern American military thinking and doctrine, couched as "Maneuver Warfare." But see, the problem is that this is not always the right thing. And Chattanooga I (as I will call this) is an example of why.

In early August, about two weeks ago in 1863, our boy Rosecrans set out from Tullahoma. His operational-level (that is to say his "campaign") objective was to capture the city of Chattanooga, Tennessee. We saw, two weeks ago, how he outmaneuvered "The Unfortunate Bragg," in the campaign that took Central Tennessee away from the rebels. Now this is the sequel.

Once again Rosecrans splits his force and advances, in multiple columns, across a front which spread more than 50 miles across. That started about two weeks ago, around about the 5th of August 1863. But this time, at the end, he faced a river crossing before he could reach his objective. So once again, deception was foremost in his mind. He needed to make Bragg think that he was crossing the river at one place, then cross with most of his forces somewhere far away. Makes sense, right? An opposed river crossing absolutely sucks. The American Army learned that at Fredericksburg last December. It is just not something you want to do.

So Rosecrans splits his forces and sends them on a broad spread. At the same time he called upon another American army to come down from the Northeast. This much smaller army was commanded by a somewhat disgraced general named Burnsides (yes, we get the term "Sideburns" from him). He coincidentally had been the commander out East responsible for the screwed-up American defeat at Fredericksburg I just mentioned. But together their forces would be even stronger.

If you have ever been a wrestler or a boxer, then you will understand what I am about to describe. I will use wrestling as my example, because that is where my own background rests.

When I was a young'un learning to wrestle, my coach taught us the simplest of moves. You slide down and forward, from a crouch onto one knee, and snatch the other guy's leg behind the knee. This can give you control of his body, as you lift one leg from the ground. The problem being, of course, that he sees you coming and so, obviously, moves his damned leg backwards, out of your reach.

How to prevent that? Well, it is the silliest -- and simplest -- thing in the world (at that level of wrestling, by which I mean 12 year-olds). The instant before you dive for his leg, you flash your fist towards his face, at the last instant, six inches away, expanding the fist into an open splayed hand. You do not touch him. He will absolutely blink. And that is your gap. You plunge and take his leg while he is blinking, and in that lightening second, you make your single-leg takedown.

Now I should note that this only works between the ages of 12 and 14. Past that point most wrestlers are too experienced to fall for this, since it is a trick that all of us learn as pre-teens. But the salient point is that the generals of that day were like 13 year-old boys. They had only been generals, let alone in command of divisions and corps, for months, or a year. They were susceptible to the "hand flash."

And that is what Rosecrans pulled on Bragg. The hand-flash. It was not subtle or sophisticated, and the duration was limited.

Rosecrans sent some of his force to the northeast, along the river. This was not a large force, but they were supposed to act "flashy." And they did. They made a lot of noise, lit a lot of fires, and in general looked like they were the majority of the army. In the meantime, he sent two-thirds (or perhaps as much as three-fourths, depending on your accounting) to the south and slightly to the west. That was where the real crossings occurred. American troops crossed the river south of Chattanooga, with the intent of trapping Bragg and his forces against the river, with the Americans coming from the South and East.

Now this again is one of those things that we historians quibble about in our little, insignificant, internal squabbles. What happened next is that Bragg, faced with all of this, did the sensible thing. He hauled ass. He abandoned the city and repositioned South and East. Rosecrans had his second Sun Tsu "victory without fighting." Another major city was in American hands once again, and barely a life was shed. (This occurs, by the way, around about next Monday or Tuesday. Before our next update.)

But here is the problem. Bragg's rebel army still exists.

Rosecrans has outmaneuvered Bragg, but that rebel army still exists. They can still fight. And they will in a little while.

And so we come back to the quotes at the beginning. Sun Tsu is all well and good in the China of 2,500 years ago when the "Warring States" were smaller and maneuver could potentially result in the end of a conflict. But Sun Tsu was writing at a time when the scale of conflict occurring in North America of 1863 was not imaginable. The numbers of forces he was writing about, if we take them at face value, might matter. But a conflict across an entire continent, and if you include naval operations across the globe, really was not something the Chinese philosopher of war imagined. Sometimes, historians should remember to tell strategists, Sun Tsu can go and get stuffed.

To win a war you must defeat a people. In 2003, we never did fight at pitched battle that fought most of the Iraqi Army, and made them "feel" defeated for a while. We won tactical fights. We are really good at that. But at the operational level, we mistook taking Baghdad as the objective. Our political leaders at the time, trained as pilots, believed that hitting the right targets meant winning. They had no concept of the human dimension or war as we on the ground experience the situation.

In the meanwhile, the men of the Iraqi army faded away. Then those who remained were ultimately dismissed under a dude named Bremer, who does not understand history or war. Their construct had fallen, but what our leaders (not just political) did not understand about a war on the ground is that war it is about emotions. Emotionally, there had been no defeat, because the ground forces were not defeated.

And then, sadly for all of us, the fighting continued.

You can agree or disagree with me in the comments, or write to me at R_Bateman_LTC@hotmail.com.

These are my opinions, not those of the DoD, the Army, or anyone else but me.

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