

What might have saved these veterans?








The plurality obstacle



Yet there are two problems with majority-rule elections.

One problem is that not all elections, especially in multi-candidate situations, have majority winners. Many countries then utilize a second-stage runoff among the top two finishers in order to establish a majority preference. This can add to the cost of the election process and to the organizational difficulties of election management; people might lose interest and tire of the political game.

The second problem is far more significant, as it concerns ethical rather than mere administrative complications. There is a difference between a candidate who wins with 51 percent of the vote (as Barack Obama did in Florida in 2008) and a candidate who wins with 92 percent of the vote (as Obama did in Washington, D.C.). We believe that every vote should matter. In the latter case, many votes did not. The 8 percent of District of Columbia voters who chose John McCain just as easily might have stayed home. Equally, a large number of Obama voters in the district need not have turned out. The outcome would have been exactly the same whether they voted or not. In a majority-rule system, the only time there is a strong incentive for individuals to show up at the polls is when the result is quite uncertain and likely to be very close. In all other cases, one's vote though counted fails to affect any discernable outcome.

The author proposes a mixed electoral system for the Electoral College, whereby majority winners receive a clear benefit yet every vote matters and the states retain their critical position yet there is also a national vote aggregation, in which there is opportunity for voters to express their preference among multiple candidates yet increased legitimacy to the election winner. The proposed system builds upon our existing practices, but adds a dimension that is logical, equitable and feasible.

A larger Electoral College

First, increase the size of the Electoral College from 538 to 601 votes. The odd number is important in order to eliminate the possibility of ties. Without change, 538 votes will be allocated initially to the states based on the number of their senators and representatives, plus three for the District of Columbia. States will select electors by majority rule. A candidate receiving a majority in any state will get all of the electors from that state. Yet there will be states without a majority winner. In addition, there are the 63 electoral votes added by our plan to the Electoral College. These electors will be selected nationally, based on the proportional allocation of “unused votes” from the states.

The definition of “unused votes” is common in cross-national election analysis. In those states where there is no majority winner, all of the votes are unused and will be available for the national aggregation. In the states with a majority winner, all the votes for the losing candidates are unused, plus all of the votes for the majority winner above the 50 percent-plus-one criterion. In the 2008 U.S. presidential election, for example, only four states did not have a clear majority winner. In 2004, three such states did not. In 2000, however, there were 10 states without a majority winner (encompassing 98 electoral votes – nearly 20 percent of the total), including the key battleground states of Ohio and Florida.

There will also be a 3 percent national vote threshold – candidates must receive at least 3 percent of the total vote to be eligible for the national electoral vote allocation. As the Founders believed, it is sensible to discourage narrowly regional candidates and those who enter the race with the intention of being spoilers.

Politically, this system establishes a strong incentive for candidates to seek a majority win in each state, for it gives them title to all of the state's electoral votes. Equally, however, it pushes candidates not to ignore those states where they are expected to lose or where they are so far ahead that the outcome is never in doubt. A vote is not forgotten if a candidate loses a state, nor is it forgotten if a candidate wins a state overwhelmingly. Given the national aggregation of “unused” votes, every single ballot is relevant, as it can contribute to the proportional allocation of supplemental electoral votes.

The object of this reform is not to alter the Electoral College outcome, but to insert a more rational and defensible logic into the translation of popular ballots into electoral votes. For the 2008 election, for example, Obama won a majority in 27 states (338 electoral votes) and McCain in 20 states (160 electoral votes). After adding to this the simulated proportional electoral vote allocation from “unused” votes, Obama still achieves a decisive victory (with 62.7 percent of the 601 electoral votes compared with 67.8 percent in actuality). Similarly, for the 2004 election, George W. Bush won a majority in 29 states (274 electoral votes) and John Kerry in 19 states (242 electoral votes). Adding the simulated proportional allocation from “unused” votes again results in a clear Bush victory (with 52.7 percent of the 601 electoral votes compared with 53.2 percent in actuality).

A more interesting case is the 2000 election, which was essentially a tie. The simulated outcome awards to George W. Bush 301 electoral votes and Al Gore 300. In actuality, Bush won the electoral count by four but Gore won a narrow plurality of the popular vote. By contrast, our simulation leads to a different interpretation. Gore gains a slightly greater share of the electoral vote allocated from majority wins in the states. Yet his majority wins tended to be narrow ones and his losses were large. Thus, Bush secures a slightly greater allocation from the national aggregation of “unused” votes, sufficient to garner a one-vote Electoral College victory.

To examine where our proposed system might change the result, the author also simulated outcomes for the four post-World War II presidential elections where a third-party candidate received enough votes to surpass the 3 percent allocation threshold. In 1996, for example, Ross Perot in actuality gained 8.4 percent of the popular vote but no electoral votes; in our simulated outcome, he does receive some electoral votes from the national allocation but Bill Clinton nevertheless wins easily over Bob Dole. Similarly, in 1980, John Anderson gained 6.6 percent of the popular vote but no electoral votes; in simulation, Ronald Reagan still defeats Jimmy Carter by a huge electoral margin. Reagan in 1980 actually received a majority of the popular vote despite Anderson's third-party challenge, but Clinton in 1996 failed to receive a popular majority. Our majority-plus-allocation alternative for the Electoral College thus has the beneficial implication of confirming the legitimacy of the Clinton win.

The Perot factor

Even more noteworthy is the 1992 election where Perot gained 18.9 percent of the popular vote. Although he won no electoral votes, Perot's effect was so great that only two states (with 9 electoral votes) had majority outcomes. Winning many states by mere plurality, Clinton in actuality obtained 68.8 percent of the electoral vote with only 43 percent of the popular vote, which hints of democratic illegitimacy. In our simulation for 1992, nearly all the electoral votes are assigned by national allocation from the enormous number of “unused” votes. Quite logically, there would be no majority winner in the Electoral College. Clinton leads with 43.8 percent of the electoral total, Bush receives 37.4 percent, and Perot 18.8 percent.

A parallel situation occurs for 1968, when George Wallace received 13.5 percent of the popular vote and 46 electoral votes. In this election, 28 states were decided by plurality leader, which underlay Richard Nixon's electoral victory despite only 43.4 percent of the popular vote, minimally ahead of the 42.7 percent for Hubert Humphrey. In simulation, awarding electoral votes in majority-win states supplemented by a national allocation based on unused votes, Nixon remains slightly ahead but no candidate receives an Electoral College majority.

Given the priority placed on majority rule for democratic elections, it seems that the best alternative where there is no Electoral College winner is to call a runoff election between the top two finishers. Although the complications are real, it is a preferable arrangement compared with relying on the House of Representatives (as the Constitution currently stipulates), allowing the plurality leader to become president, or declaring by means of mathematical formula an electoral vote winner where none naturally occurs.

Logic for a broken system

This proposal is for moderate Electoral College reform, introducing democratic logic to strengthen the foundations for what, in effect, is a 200-year-old ad hoc political compromise.

In its present structure, the method of electing the U.S. president is broken. Equally, one must recognize, it is highly improbable that the states will abandon their current status and accept a national popular vote as full replacement for the existing state-centered arrangement.

Our conclusion, however, is that there is no need for such wholesale replacement. The U.S. presidency is a national office yet the votes cast for president come from within the various states. The two perspectives can successfully be combined, in a fashion that adds greater rationality and produces greater legitimacy for the American political system. All we need to do is establish the dominance of majority rule and insure a process in which every vote truly matters.

King is a professor and chair of the Political Science Department at San Diego State University. He is the author of four books, including “Money, Time and Politics.” He can be reached at rking@mail.sdsu.edu.