Polish–Soviet War

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This article is about the conflict of 1919–21. For other Russo–Polish conflicts, see Polish–Russian War.
Polish–Soviet War
Part of the Russian Civil War
Polish-soviet war montage.jpg
Top left: Polish Renault FT tanks of the Polish 1st Tank Regiment during the Battle of Dyneburg, January 1920.

Below left: Polish and Ukrainian troops in Kiev, Kiev Offensive (1920) Khreshchatyk, 7 May 1920.
Top right: Polish Schwarzlose M.07/12 MG nest during the Battle of Radzymin,August 1920.
Middle: Polish defences with a machine gun position near Miłosna, in the village of Janki, battle of Warsaw, August 1920.
Bottom left: Russian prisoners on the road between Radzymin and Warsaw after the attack of the Red Army on Warsaw.

Bottom right: Polish defensive fighting positions on Belarus, Battle of Niemen, September 1920.
Date 1919–1921
Location Central and Eastern Europe

Decisive Soviet victory

  • Polish forces prevent Soviet occupation of Poland[N 1]
  • Soviet forces take control of Ukraine
  • Peace of Riga
 Russian SFSR
 Ukrainian SSR

Republic of Poland

Ukrainian People's Republic
Commanders and leaders
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Leon Trotsky
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Mikhail Tukhachevsky (Western Front)
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Joseph Stalin (Lviv/Lwów front)
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Alexander Ilyich Yegorov (Southwestern Front)
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Semyon Budyonny (1st Cavalry Army)
Flag of Poland.svg Józef Piłsudski
Flag of Poland.svg Tadeusz Rozwadowski
Flag of Poland.svg Edward Rydz-Śmigły
Flag of Poland.svg Władysław Sikorski
Flag of Ukrainian People's Republic (non-official, 1917).svg Symon Petlyura
From ~50,000 in early 1919[1] to almost 800,000 in summer 1920[2] From ~50,000 in early 1919[3] to ~738,000 in August 1920[4]
Casualties and losses

Estimated 60,000 killed[5]
80,000 – 157,000 taken prisoner [6][7]

(including rear-area personnel)
About 47,000 killed[8][9]
113,518 wounded[9]
51,351 taken prisoner[9]
Names of Polish Armed Forces mortal casualties
in period 1918 – 1920
totaling 47,055

The Polish–Soviet War (February 1919 – March 1921) was an armed conflict that pitted Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine against the Second Polish Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic over the control of an area equivalent to today's Ukraine and parts of modern-day Belarus. Ultimately the Soviets, following on from their Westward Offensive of 1918–19, hoped to fully occupy Poland, and at some point in the war this appeared possible.

Although united under communist leadership, Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine were theoretically two separate independent entities since the Soviet republics did not unite into the Soviet Union until 1922.



Names and dates[edit]

The war is known by several names. “Polish–Soviet War” may be the most common, but is potentially confusing as “Soviet” refers to the Soviet Russia, not the Soviet Union, which did not officially exist until 31 December 1922. Alternative names include “Russo–Polish War [or Polish–Russian War] of 1919–1921”[N 2] (to distinguish it from earlier Polish–Russian wars) and “Polish–Bolshevik War”.[10] This second term (or just “Bolshevik War” (Polish: Wojna bolszewicka)) is most common in Polish sources. In some Polish sources it is also referred as the "War of 1920" (Polish: Wojna 1920 roku).[N 3]


While the events of 1919 can be described as a border conflict, and only in early 1920 did both sides realize they were engaged in all-out war, the conflicts that took place in 1920 were an inevitable escalation of fighting that began in earnest a year earlier.[11] In the end, the events of 1920 were a logical, though unforeseen, consequence of the 1919 prelude.[11]


Partitions of Poland 1795. The colored territories show the extent of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, just before the first partition. Blue (north-west) were taken by Kingdom of Prussia, green (south) by Austria, and cyan (east) by the Russian Empire.

The war's main area of contention lies in present-day Ukraine and Belarus and formed, until the middle of the 14th century, part of the medieval state of Kievan Rus'. After a period of internecine wars and the Mongolian invasion of 1240, these lands became objects of expansion for Poland and Lithuania. In the first half of the 14th century, Kiev and land between the Dnieper, Pripyat, and Daugava (Westeren Dvina) rivers became part of Lithuania, and in 1352 Poland and Lithuania divided the kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia between themselves. In 1569, according to the Union of Lublin between Poland and Lithuania, some of the Ukrainian lands passed to the Polish crown. Between 1772 and 1795, much of the Eastern Slavic territories became part of Russia in the course of the Partitions of Poland. After the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, much of the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw (Poland) transferred into Russian control.[12]

In the aftermath of World War I, the map of Central and Eastern Europe changed drastically.[13] Germany's defeat rendered its plans for the creation of Eastern European puppet states, including one in Poland (Mitteleuropa) obsolete,[14] and the Russian Empire collapsed, resulting in the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Russian Civil War.[15] Many small nations of the region saw a chance for real independence and seized the opportunity to gain it;[13] Russia viewed these territories as rebellious provinces, vital for its security,[16] but did not have the resources to react swiftly.[15] While the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 had not made a definitive ruling in regard to Poland's eastern border, it issued a provisional boundary in December 1919 called the Curzon line as an attempt to define the territories that had an "indisputably Polish ethnic majority"; the participants did not feel competent to make a certain judgment on the competing claims.[17]

With the success of the Greater Poland Uprising (1918–19), Poland had re-established its statehood for the first time since the 1795 partition. Formed as the Second Polish Republic, it proceeded to carve out its borders from the territories of its former partitioners. Many of these territories had long been the object of conflict between Russia and Poland.

Reestablishment of the Polish state, March 1919

Poland was not alone in its new-found opportunities and troubles. With the collapse of Russian and German occupying authorities, virtually all of the newly independent neighbors began fighting over borders: Romania fought with Hungary over Transylvania, Yugoslavia with Italy over Rijeka, Poland with Czechoslovakia over Cieszyn Silesia, with Germany over Poznań and with Ukrainians over Eastern Galicia. Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, Estonians and Latvians fought against each other and against the Russians, who were just as divided.[18] Spreading Communist influences resulted in Communist revolutions in Munich, in Berlin, in Budapest and in Prešov in Slovakia. Winston Churchill commented: "The war of giants has ended, the wars of the pygmies began."[19] All of these engagements–with the sole exception of the Polish–Soviet war–would prove short-lived.

The Polish–Soviet war likely happened more by accident than design, as it seems unlikely that anyone in Soviet Russia or in the new Second Republic of Poland would have deliberately planned a major foreign war.[11][20] Poland, its territory a major battle ground of the First World War, was unstable politically; it had just won the difficult conflict with the West Ukrainian National Republic and was already engaged in new conflicts with Germany (the Silesian Uprisings) and with Czechoslovakia. Revolutionary Russia, meanwhile, was focused on thwarting counter-revolution and the intervention by the Allied powers. While the first clashes between Polish and Soviet forces occurred in February 1919, it would be almost a year before both sides realized that they had become engaged in a full war.[11]

Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin

As early as late 1919 the leader of Russia's new Bolshevik government, Vladimir Lenin, inspired by the Red Army's civil-war victories over White Russian anti-communist forces and their Western allies, began to see the future of the revolution with greater optimism. The Bolsheviks proclaimed the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and agitated for a worldwide Communist community. They had an avowed intent to link the revolution in Russia with an expected revolution in Germany and to assist other Communist movements in Western Europe; Poland was the geographical bridge that the Red Army would have to cross to provide direct physical support.[16][21][22][23] Lenin aimed to regain control of the territories ceded by Russia in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, to infiltrate the borderlands, to set up Soviet governments there as well as in Poland, and to reach Germany where he expected a Socialist revolution to break out.[16] He believed that Soviet Russia could not survive without the support of a socialist Germany.[16] By the end of summer 1919 the Soviets managed to take over most of Ukraine, driving the Ukrainian Directorate from Kiev. In early 1919, they also set up a Lithuanian-Belorussian Republic (Litbel). This government was very unpopular due to terror and the collection of food and goods for the army.[16]

Officially, however, the Soviet Government denied charges of trying to invade Europe.[24]

As the war progressed, particularly around the time the Polish Kiev Offensive of 1920 had been repelled, the Soviet leaders, including Lenin, increasingly saw the war as the real opportunity to spread the revolution westwards.[16][22][25] Historian Richard Pipes noted that before the Kiev Offensive, the Soviets had prepared for their own strike against Poland.[22]

Polish leader Józef Piłsudski

Before the start of the Polish–Soviet War, Polish politics were strongly influenced by Chief of State (naczelnik państwa) Józef Piłsudski.[26] Piłsudski wanted to break up the Russian Empire[27] and create a Polish-led[28][29][30][31][32] "Międzymorze Federation" of independent[32] states: Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, and other Central and East European countries emerging out of crumbling empires after the First World War.[33] He hoped that this new union would become a counterweight to any potential imperialist intentions on the part of Russia or Germany. Piłsudski argued "There can be no independent Poland without an independent Ukraine", but he may have been more interested in Ukraine being split from Russia than in Ukrainians' welfare.[34][35] He did not hesitate to use military force to expand the Polish borders to Galicia and Volhynia, crushing a Ukrainian attempt at self-determination in the disputed territories east of the Southern Bug River, which contained a significant Polish minority,[16] who made up the majority of the population in cities like Lwów, in contrast to the Ukrainian majority in the countryside. Speaking of Poland's future frontiers, Piłsudski said: "All that we can gain in the west depends on the Entente—on the extent to which it may wish to squeeze Germany," while in the east, "There are doors that open and close, and it depends on who forces them open and how far."[36] In the chaos to the east the Polish forces set out to expand there as much as feasible. On the other hand, Poland had no intention of joining the Western intervention in the Russian Civil War[16] or of conquering Russia itself.[37]

Piłsudski also said:


Before the Polish–Soviet war, Jan Kowalewski, a polyglot and amateur cryptologist, managed to break the codes and ciphers of the army of the West Ukrainian People's Republic and of General Anton Denikin's White Russian forces during his service in the Polish–Ukrainian War. As a result, in July 1919 he was transferred to Warsaw, where he became chief of the Polish General Staff's radio-intelligence department. By early September he had gathered a group of mathematicians from Warsaw University and Lwów University (most notably, founders of the Polish School of MathematicsStanisław Leśniewski, Stefan Mazurkiewicz and Wacław Sierpiński), who were also able to break Russian ciphers. Decoded information presented to Piłsudski showed that Soviet peace proposals with Poland in 1919 were false and that in reality the Soviets had prepared for a new offensive against Poland and had concentrated military forces in Barysaw near the Polish border. Pilsudski decided to ignore Soviet proposals, sign an alliance with Symon Petliura and prepare the Kiev Offensive. During the war, decryption of Red Army radio messages made it possible to use small Polish military forces efficiently against the Russians and to win many individual battles, most importantly the 1920 Battle of Warsaw.[39][40][41]



First Polish–Soviet conflicts[edit]

The first serious armed conflict of the war took place around 14 February[11][20] – 16 February, near the towns of Manevychi and Biaroza in Belarus.[10][16] By late February the Soviet westward advance had come to a halt. Both Polish and Soviet forces had also been engaging the Ukrainian forces, and active fighting was going on in the territories of the Baltic countries (cf. Estonian War of Independence, Latvian War of Independence, Lithuanian Wars of Independence).

Polish propaganda poster showing Polish cavalry and a gorilla-like Bolshevik soldier with a starred cap. The text reads: "Smash the Bolshevik"
Central and Eastern Europe in December 1919

In early March 1919, Polish units started an offensive, crossing the Neman River, taking Pinsk, and reaching the outskirts of Lida. Both the Soviet and Polish advances began around the same time in April (Polish forces started a major offensive on 16 April[10]), resulting in increasing numbers of troops arriving in the area. That month the Red Army had captured Grodno, but was soon pushed out by a Polish counter-offensive. Unable to accomplish its objectives and facing strengthening offensives from the White forces, the Red Army withdrew from its positions and reorganized. Soon the Polish–Soviet War would begin in earnest. Polish forces continued a steady eastern advance.[10] They took Lida on 17 April[10] and Nowogródek on 18 April, and recaptured Vilnius on 19 April, driving the Litbel government from their proclaimed capital.[16] On 8 August, Polish forces took Minsk[10] and on the 28th of that month they deployed tanks for the first time. After heavy fighting, the town of Babruysk near the Berezina River was captured.[10] By 2 October, Polish forces reached the Daugava river and secured the region from Desna to Daugavpils (Dyneburg).[10]

Polish success continued until early 1920.[10] Sporadic battles erupted between Polish forces and the Red Army, but the latter was preoccupied with the White counter-revolutionary forces and was steadily retreating on the entire western frontline, from Latvia in the north to Ukraine in the south. In early summer 1919, the White movement had gained the initiative, and its forces under the command of Anton Denikin were marching on Moscow. Piłsudski was aware that the Soviets were not friends of independent Poland, and considered war with Soviet Russia inevitable.[42] He viewed their westward advance as a major issue, but also thought that he could get a better deal for Poland from the Bolsheviks than their Russian civil war contenders,[43] as the White Russians – representatives of the old Russian Empire, partitioner of Poland – were willing to accept only limited independence of Poland, likely in the borders similar to that of Congress Poland, and clearly objected to Ukrainian independence, crucial for Piłsudski's Międzymorze,[44] while the Bolsheviks did proclaim the partitions null and void.[45] Piłsudski thus speculated that Poland would be better off with the Bolsheviks, alienated from the Western powers, than with the restored Russian Empire.[43][46] By his refusal to join the attack on Lenin's struggling government, ignoring the strong pressure from the Entente, Piłsudski had possibly saved the Bolshevik government in summer–fall 1919,[47] although a full-scale attack by the Poles in support of Denikin was not possible.[48] He later wrote that in case of a White victory, in the east Poland could only gain the "ethnic border" at best (the Curzon line).[49] At the same time, Lenin offered Poles the territories of Minsk, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, in what was described as mini "Brest"; Polish military leader Kazimierz Sosnkowski wrote that the territorial proposals of the Bolsheviks were much better than what the Poles had wanted to achieve.[49]

Diplomatic front, part 1[edit]

In 1919, several unsuccessful attempts at peace negotiations were made by various Polish and Russian factions.[10] In the meantime, Polish–Lithuanian relations worsened as Polish politicians found it hard to accept the Lithuanians' demands for certain territories, especially the city of Vilnius which had a Polish ethnic majority but was regarded by Lithuanians as their historical capital.[50] Polish negotiators made better progress with the Latvian Provisional Government, and in late 1919 and early 1920 Polish and Latvian forces were conducting joint operations including the Battle of Daugavpils, against Soviet Russia.[51]


Polish Gen. Listowski (left) and Ukrainian leader Symon Petlura, allied with Poland

For Piłsudski, this alliance gave his campaign for the Międzymorze federation the legitimacy of joint international effort, secured part of the Polish eastward border, and laid a foundation for a Polish-dominated Ukrainian state between Russia and Poland.[53] For Petlura, this was the final chance to preserve the statehood and, at least, the theoretical independence of the Ukrainian heartlands, even while accepting the loss of West Ukrainian lands to Poland.[49] Yet both of them were opposed at home. Piłsudski faced stiff opposition from Dmowski's National Democrats who opposed Ukrainian independence. Petlura, in turn, was criticized by many Ukrainian politicians for entering a pact with the Poles and giving up on Western Ukraine.[25][49][54][55]

The alliance with Petlura did result in 15,000 pro-Polish allied Ukrainian troops at the beginning of the campaign,[56] increasing to 35,000 through recruitment and desertion from the Soviet side during the war.[56] This would, in the end, provide insufficient support for the alliance's aspirations.


Opposing forces[edit]


Red Army[edit]

By early 1920, the Red Army had been very successful against the White armies.[32] They defeated Denikin and signed peace treaties with Latvia and Estonia. The Polish front became their most important war theater and a plurality of Soviet resources and forces were diverted to it. In January 1920, the Red Army began concentrating a 700,000-strong force near the Berezina River and on Belarus.[20]

By the time Poles launched their Kiev offensive, the Red Southwestern Front had about 82,847 soldiers including 28,568 front-line troops. The Poles had some numerical superiority, estimated from 12,000 to 52,000 personnel.[57] By the time of the Soviet counter-offensive in mid-1920 the situation had been reversed: the Soviets numbered about 790,000 – at least 50,000 more than the Poles; Tukhachevsky estimated that he had 160,000 "combat ready" soldiers; Piłsudski estimated his enemy's forces at 200,000–220,000.[58]


Norman Davies shows the growth of Red Army forces on the Polish front in early 1920:[60]

1 January 1920 – 4 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry brigade
1 February 1920 – 5 infantry divisions, 5 cavalry brigades
1 March 1920 – 8 infantry divisions, 4 cavalry brigades
1 April 1920 – 14 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry brigades
15 April 1920 – 16 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry brigades
25 April 1920 – 20 infantry divisions, 5 cavalry brigades


Polish forces[edit]


Logistics and plans[edit]


The Soviet High Command planned a new offensive in late April/May. Since March 1919, Polish intelligence was aware that the Soviets had prepared for a new offensive and the Polish High Command decided to launch their own offensive before their opponents.[16][20] The plan for Operation Kiev was to beat the Red Army on Poland's southern flank and install a Polish-friendly Petlura government in Ukraine.[16]

Kiev Offensive[edit]

Main article: Kiev Offensive (1920)
Polish Kiev Offensive at its height. June 1920
Polish Breguet 14 operating from Kiev airfield

Until April, the Polish forces had been slowly but steadily advancing eastward. The new Latvian government requested and obtained Polish help in capturing Daugavpils. The city fell after heavy fighting at the Battle of Daugavpils in January and was handed over to the Latvians.[51] By March, Polish forces had driven a wedge between Soviet forces to the north (Belorussia) and south (Ukraine).

On 24 April, Poland began its main offensive, Operation Kiev. Its stated goal was the creation of an independent Ukraine[16] that would become part of Piłsudski's project of a "Międzymorze" Federation. Poland's forces were assisted by 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers under Symon Petlura, representing the Ukrainian People's Republic.[56]

On 26 April, in his "Call to the People of Ukraine", Piłsudski told his audience that "the Polish army would only stay as long as necessary until a legal Ukrainian government took control over its own territory".[64] Despite this, many Ukrainians were just as anti-Polish as anti-Bolshevik,[25] and resented the Polish advance.[16]



On 24 May 1920, the Polish forces in the south were engaged for the first time by Semyon Budyonny's famous 1st Cavalry Army (Konarmia). Repeated attacks by Budyonny's Cossack cavalry broke the Polish–Ukrainian front on 5 June.[10] The Soviets then deployed mobile cavalry units to disrupt the Polish rearguard, targeting communications and logistics. By 10 June, Polish armies were in retreat along the entire front. On 13 June, the Polish army, along with the Petlura's Ukrainian troops, abandoned Kiev to the Red Army.

String of Soviet victories[edit]

Polish fighters of the 7th Kościuszko Squadron
Soviet offensive successes. Early August 1920

On 30 May 1920 General Aleksei Brusilov, the last Czarist Commander-in-Chief, published in Pravda an appeal entitled “To All Former Officers, Wherever They Might Be”, encouraging them to forgive past grievances and to join the Red Army.[65] Brusilov considered it as a patriotic duty of all Russian officers to join hands with the Bolshevik government, that in his opinion was defending Russia against foreign invaders. Lenin also spotted the use of Russian patriotism. Thus, the Central Committee appealed to the "respected citizens of Russia“ to defend the Soviet republic against a Polish usurpation. The historians recalled the Polish invasions of the early 17th century.[66]









Diplomatic front, part 2[edit]


Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership's confidence soared.[71] In a telegram, Lenin exclaimed: "We must direct all our attention to preparing and strengthening the Western Front. A new slogan must be announced: 'Prepare for war against Poland'."[72] Soviet communist theorist Nikolay Bukharin, writer for the newspaper Pravda, wished for the resources to carry the campaign beyond Warsaw "right up to London and Paris".[73] General Tukhachevsky's order of the day, 2 July 1920 read: "To the West! Over the corpse of White Poland lies the road to worldwide conflagration. March on Vilno, Minsk, Warsaw!"[68] and "onward to Berlin over the corpse of Poland!"[16] The increasing hope of certain victory, however, gave rise to political intrigues between Soviet commanders.[74]

By order of the Soviet Communist Party, a Polish puppet government,[75] the Provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee (Polish: Tymczasowy Komitet Rewolucyjny Polski, TKRP), had been formed on 28 July in Białystok to organize administration of the Polish territories captured by the Red Army.[16] The TKRP had very little support from the ethnic Polish population and recruited its supporters mostly from the ranks of minorities, primarily Jews.[25] At the height of the Polish–Soviet conflict, Jews had been subject to anti-semitic violence by Polish forces, who considered Jews a potential threat, and who often accused Jews as being the masterminds of Russian Bolshevism;[76][77] during the Battle of Warsaw, the Polish government interned all Jewish volunteers and sent Jewish volunteer officers to an internment camp.[78][79]



In early July 1920, Prime Minister Władysław Grabski travelled to the Spa Conference in Belgium to request assistance.[80] The Allied representatives were largely unsympathetic.[80] Grabski signed an agreement containing several terms: that Polish forces withdraw to the Curzon Line, which the Allies had published in December 1919, delineating Poland's ethnographic frontier; that it participate in a subsequent peace conference; and that the questions of sovereignty over Vilnius, Eastern Galicia, Cieszyn Silesia, and Danzig be remanded to the Allies.[80] Ambiguous promises of Allied support were made in exchange.[80]

Polish antisemitic propaganda poster, "Jewish Paws Again? Never!"

On 11 July 1920, the government of Great Britain sent a telegram to the Soviets, signed by Curzon, which has been described as a de facto ultimatum.[81] It requested that the Soviets halt their offensive at the Curzon line and accept it as a temporary border with Poland, until a permanent border could be established in negotiations.[16] In case of Soviet refusal, the British threatened to assist Poland with all the means available, which, in reality, were limited by the internal political situation in the United Kingdom.[82] On 17 July, the Bolsheviks refused[16] and made a counter-offer to negotiate a peace treaty directly with Poland. The British responded by threatening to cut off the ongoing trade negotiations if the Soviets conducted further offensives against Poland. These threats were ignored.

On 6 August 1920, the British Labour Party published a pamphlet stating that British workers would never take part in the war as Poland's allies, and labour unions blocked supplies to the British expeditionary force assisting Russian Whites in Arkhangelsk. French Socialists, in their newspaper L'Humanité, declared: "Not a man, not a sou, not a shell for reactionary and capitalist Poland. Long live the Russian Revolution! Long live the Workmen's International!"[68] Poland also suffered setbacks due to sabotage and delays in deliveries of war supplies, when workers in Czechoslovakia and Germany refused to transit such materials to Poland.[16] On 6 August the Polish government issued an "Appeal to the World", disputing charges of imperialism, stressing Poland's determination for self-determination and the dangers of Bolshevik "invasion of Europe".[83]

Poland's neighbor Lithuania had been engaged in serious disputes with Poland over the city of Vilnius and the borderlands surrounding Sejny and Suwałki. A 1919 Polish attempt to take control over the entire nation by a coup had additionally disrupted their relationship.[84] The Soviet and Lithuanian governments signed the Soviet-Lithuanian Treaty of 1920 on 12 July; this treaty recognized Vilnius as part of Lithuania. The treaty contained a secret clause allowing Soviet forces unrestricted movement within Soviet-recognized Lithuanian territory during any Soviet war with Poland; this clause would lead to questions regarding the issue of Lithuanian neutrality in the ongoing Polish–Soviet War.[85][86] The Lithuanians also provided the Soviets with logistical support.[86] Despite Lithuanian support, the Soviets did not transfer Vilnius to the Lithuanians till just before the city was recaptured by the Polish forces (in late August), instead up till that time the Soviets encouraged their own, pro-communist Lithuanian government, Litbel, and were planning a pro-communist coup in Lithuania.[87][88] The simmering conflict between Poland and Lithuania culminated in the Polish–Lithuanian War in August 1920.



Battle of Warsaw[edit]



Joseph Stalin, then chief political commissar of the Southwest Front, was engaged at Lwów, about 200 miles from Warsaw.[94] The absence of his forces at the battle has been the subject of dispute.[94] A perception arose that his absence was due to his desire to achieve 'military glory' at Lwów.[68][94][95] Telegrams concerning the transfer of forces were exchanged.[96] Leon Trotsky interpreted Stalin's actions as insubordination; Richard Pipes asserts that Stalin '...almost certainly acted on Lenin's orders' in not moving the forces to Warsaw.[96] That the commander-in-chief Sergey Kamenev allowed such insubordination, issued conflicting and confusing orders and did not act with the decisiveness of a commander in chief contributed greatly to the problems and defeat the Red forces suffered at this critical junction of the war.

Polish soldiers displaying captured Soviet standards after the Battle of Warsaw
Austin-Putilovets «Poznańczyk» near Bobruysk, Polish–Soviet War 1920




Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army's advance toward Lwów was halted, first at the battle of Brody (29 July – 2 August),[10] and then on 17 August at the Battle of Zadwórze,[10] where a small Polish force sacrificed itself to prevent Soviet cavalry from seizing Lwów and stopping vital Polish reinforcements from moving toward Warsaw. Moving through weakly defended areas, Budyonny's cavalry reached the city of Zamość on 29 August and attempted to take it in the Battle of Zamość;[10] however, he soon faced an increasing number of Polish units diverted from the successful Warsaw counteroffensive. On 31 August, Budyonny's cavalry finally broke off its siege of Lwów and attempted to come to the aid of Soviet forces retreating from Warsaw. The Soviet forces were intercepted and defeated by Polish cavalry at the Battle of Komarów near Zamość, one of the largest cavalry battles since 1813 (Brandy Station in 1863, during the American Civil War, was larger) and one of the last cavalry battles in history. Although Budyonny's army managed to avoid encirclement, it suffered heavy losses and its morale plummeted.[10] The remains of Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army retreated towards Volodymyr-Volynskyi on 6 September[10] and were defeated shortly thereafter at the Battle of Hrubieszów.

Tukhachevsky managed to reorganize the eastward-retreating forces and in September established a new defensive line running from the Polish–Lithuanian border to the north to the area of Polesie, with the central point in the city of Grodno in Belarus. The Polish Army broke this line in the Battle of the Niemen River. Polish forces crossed the Niemen River and outflanked the Bolshevik forces, which were forced to retreat again.[10] Polish forces continued to advance east on all fronts,[10] repeating their successes from the previous year. After the early October Battle of the Szczara River, the Polish Army had reached the TernopilDubnoMinskDrisa line.








After the peace negotiations Poland did not maintain all the territories it had controlled at the end of hostilities. Due to their losses in and after the Battle of Warsaw, the Soviets offered the Polish peace delegation substantial territorial concessions in the contested borderland areas, closely resembling the border between the Russian Empire and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth before the first partition of 1772.[102] Polish resources were exhausted, however, and Polish public opinion was opposed to a prolongation of the war.[16] The Polish government was also pressured by the League of Nations, and the negotiations were controlled by Dmowski's National Democrats. Piłsudski might have controlled the military, but parliament (Sejm) was controlled by Dmowski: Piłsudski's support lay in the territories in the East, which were controlled by the Bolsheviks at the time of the elections,[103] while the National Democrats' electoral support lay in central and western Poland.[103] The peace negotiations were of a political nature. National Democrats, like Stanisław Grabski,[102] who earlier had resigned his post to protest the Polish–Ukrainian alliance[55] and now wielded much influence over the Polish negotiators, cared little for Piłsudski's vision of reviving Międzymorze, the multicultural Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. This post-war situation proved a death blow to the Międzymorze project.[16] More than one million Poles, living mostly in the disputed territories, remained in the SU, systematically persecuted by Soviet authorities because of political, economical and religious reasons (see the Polish operation of the NKVD).

The National Democrats in charge of the state[34] also had few concerns about the fate of their Ukrainian ally, Petliura, and cared little that their political opponent, Piłsudski, felt honor-bound by his treaty obligations;[104] his opponents did not hesitate to scrap the treaty. The National Democrats wanted only the territory that they viewed as 'ethnically or historically Polish' or possible to polonize.[105] Despite the Red Army's crushing defeat at Warsaw and the willingness of Soviet chief negotiator Adolf Joffe to concede almost all disputed territory,[102] the National Democrats' ideology allowed the Soviets to regain certain territories.[102] The Peace of Riga was signed on 18 March 1921,[10] splitting the disputed territories in Belarus and Ukraine between Poland and Russia.[106][107] The treaty, which Piłsudski called an "act of cowardice",[104] and for which he apologized to the Ukrainians,[16] actually violated the terms of Poland's military alliance with the Directorate of Ukraine, which had explicitly prohibited a separate peace.[53] Ukrainian allies of Poland found themselves interned by the Polish authorities.[106] The internment worsened relations between Poland and its Ukrainian minority: those who supported Petliura were angered by the betrayal of their Polish ally, anger that grew stronger because of the assimilationist policies of nationalist inter-war Poland towards its minorities. To a large degree, this inspired the growing tensions and eventual violence against Poles in the 1930s and 1940s.[108]

The war and its aftermath also resulted in other controversies, such as the situation of prisoners of war of both sides,[9][109] treatment of the civilian population[110][111][112] and behavior of some commanders like Stanisław Bułak-Bałachowicz[113] or Vadim Yakovlev.[114] The Polish military successes in the autumn of 1920 allowed Poland to capture the Vilnius region, where a Polish-dominated Governance Committee of Central Lithuania (Komisja Rządząca Litwy Środkowej) was formed. A plebiscite was conducted, and the Vilnius Sejm voted on 20 February 1922, for incorporation into Poland. This worsened Polish–Lithuanian relations for decades to come.[15] However the loss of Vilnius might have safeguarded the very existence of the Lithuanian state in the interwar period. Despite an alliance with Soviets (Soviet-Lithuanian Treaty of 1920) and the war with Poland, Lithuania was very close to being invaded by the Soviets in summer 1920 and forcibly converted into a socialist republic. It was only the Polish victory against the Soviets in the Polish–Soviet War (and the fact that the Poles did not object to some form of Lithuanian independence) that derailed the Soviet plans and gave Lithuania an experience of interwar independence.[115] Another controversy concerned the pogroms of Jews, which caused the United States to send a commission led by Henry Morgenthau, Sr. to investigate the matter.[116]



In 1943, during the course of World War II, the subject of Poland's eastern borders was re-opened, and they were discussed at the Tehran Conference. Winston Churchill argued in favor of the 1920 Curzon Line rather than the Treaty of Riga's borders, and an agreement among the Allies to that effect was reached at the Yalta Conference in 1945.[118] The Western Allies, despite having alliance treaties with Poland and despite Polish contribution, also left Poland within the Soviet sphere of influence. This became known in Poland as the Western Betrayal.


Lieutenant Józef Kowalski, of Poland, was the last known living veteran from this war. He was awarded the Order of Polonia Restituta on his 110th birthday by the president of Poland.[120] He died on 7 December 2013 at the age of 113.

Historical assessment[edit]

Despite the final retreat of Russian forces and annihilation of their three field armies, historians do not universally agree on the question of victory.[N 1] The Poles claimed a successful defense of their state, while the Soviets claimed a repulse of the Polish eastward invasion of Ukraine and Belarus, which they viewed as a part of the foreign intervention in the Russian Civil War. The British military historian and general J.F.C. Fuller ranks the battle of Warsaw in 1920, and the Polish victory in the war, as one of the most decisive victories in history since it prevented Soviet influence from spreading to the borders of Germany, Hungary and Romania at a critical stage in these countries.

List of battles[edit]


See also[edit]


    2) Szczepański 1995 Wojna 1920 roku na Mazowszu i Podlasiu


  1. ^ Davies 2003, p. 39
  2. ^ a b Davies 2003, p. 142
  3. ^ Davies 2003, p. 41
  7. ^ Matveev 2006
  10. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y (Polish) Wojna polsko-bolszewicka. Entry at Internetowa encyklopedia PWN. Retrieved 27 October 2006.
  11. ^ a b c d e f Davies 2003, p. 22
  13. ^ a b Fraser & Dunn 1996, p. 2
  14. ^ Jukes, Simkins & Hickey 2002, pp. 84,85
  15. ^ a b c Goldstein 1992, p. 51
  18. ^ Davies 2003, p. 21
  21. ^ Davies 2003, p. 29
  34. ^ a b Zerkalo Nedeli, "A Belated Idealist." (Mirror Weekly), 22–28 May 2004. Archived 29 June 2011 at the Wayback Machine
  41. ^ Grzegorz Nowik (2004). Zanim złamano Enigmę: Polski radiowywiad podczas wojny z bolszewicką Rosją 1918–1920 (Before Enigma was Broken: Polish radio-intelligence during the war against Bolshevik Russia 1918–1920). Warsaw, RYTM Oficyna Wydawnicza. ISBN 978-83-7399-099-9. 
  42. ^ Urbanowski, op.cit., page 90 (second tome)
  45. ^ Urbanowski, op.cit., Pages 291
  46. ^ Urbanowski, op.cit., page 45 (second tome)
  49. ^ a b c d (Russian)(Ukrainian) Oleksa Pidlutskyi, Postati XX stolittia, (Figures of the 20th century), Kiev, 2004, ISBN 978-966-8290-01-5, LCCN 2004-440333. Chapter "Józef Piłsudski: The Chief who Created Himself a State" reprinted in Zerkalo Nedeli (the Mirror Weekly), Kiev, 3–9 February 2001. Archived 3 February 2010 at the Wayback Machine Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "ZerkDestiny" defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  54. ^ Prof. Ruslan Pyrig, "Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Bolsheviks: the price of political compromise", Zerkalo Nedeli, 30 September – 6 October 2006. Archived 19 December 2009 at the Wayback Machine
  62. ^ Davies 2003, p. 83
  63. ^ a b Davies 2003, p. 85
  66. ^ Polen 1919–1921 von Alexander Riediger S. 24
  68. ^ a b c d e f g h i Battle Of Warsaw 1920 by Witold Lawrynowicz; A detailed write-up, with bibliography. Polish Militaria Collectors Association. Retrieved 5 November 2006.
  83. ^ The Annual Register. Abebooks. 1921. 
  88. ^ Senn, Alfred Erich (September 1962). "The Formation of the Lithuanian Foreign Office, 1918–1921". Slavic Review 3 (21): 500–507. doi:10.2307/3000451. 
  89. ^ (Polish) Janusz Szczepański, Kontrowersje Wokol Bitwy Warszawskiej 1920 Roku (Controversies surrounding the Battle of Warsaw in 1920). Mówią Wieki, online version.
  106. ^ a b Snyder, op cit, Google Print, p. 140
  108. ^ Snyder, op cit, Google Books, p.144

Further reading[edit]





External links[edit]