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"Conflict zone" redirects here. For the 2001 video game, see Conflict Zone.
The War by Tadeusz Cyprian (1949), a photograph in the collection of the National Museum in Warsaw showing ruins of Warsaw's Napoleon Square in the aftermath of World War II.

War is a state of armed conflict between societies. It is generally characterized by extreme collective aggression, destruction, and usually high mortality. The set of techniques and actions used to conduct war is known as warfare. An absence of war is usually called "peace". Total war is warfare that is not restricted to purely legitimate military targets, and can result in massive civilian or other non-combatant casualties.

While some scholars see war as a universal and ancestral aspect of human nature,[1] others argue that it is only a result of specific socio-cultural or ecological circumstances.[2]

In 2013 war resulted in 31,000 deaths down from 72,000 deaths in 1990.[3] The deadliest war in history, in terms of the cumulative number of deaths since its start, is the Second World War, with 60–85 million deaths, followed by the Mongol conquests[4] which was greater than 41 million.[5] Proportionally speaking, the most destructive war in modern history is the War of the Triple Alliance, which took the lives of over 60% of Paraguay's population, according to Steven Pinker. In 2003, Richard Smalley identified war as the sixth (of ten) biggest problem facing humanity for the next fifty years.[6] War usually results in significant deterioration of infrastructure and the ecosystem, a decrease in social spending, famine, large-scale emigration from the war zone, and often the mistreatment of prisoners of war or civilians.[7][8][9] Another byproduct of some wars is the prevalence of propaganda by some or all parties in the conflict,[10] and increased revenues by weapons manufacturers.[11]


Mural of War (1896), by Gari Melchers

The English word war derives from the late Old English (circa.1050) words wyrre and werre; the Old French werre; the Frankish werra; and the Proto-Germanic werso. The denotation of war derives from the Old Saxon werran, Old High German werran, and the German verwirren: “to confuse”, “to perplex”, and “to bring into confusion”.[12] Another posited derivation is from the Ancient Greek barbaros, the Old Persian varhara, and the Sanskrit varvar and barbara. In German, the equivalent is Krieg; the Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian term for "war" is guerra, derived from the Germanic werra (“fight”, “tumult”).[13] Etymologic legend has it that the Romanic peoples adopted a foreign, Germanic word for "war", to avoid using the Latin bellum, because, when sounded, it tended to merge with the sound of the word bello ("beautiful").[citation needed]



Main article: Types of war



Modern military science considers several factors before a national defence policy is created to allow a war to commence: the environment in the area(s) of combat operations, the posture that national forces will adopt on the commencement of a war, and the type of warfare that troops will be engaged in.

  • Biological warfare, also known as germ warfare, is the use of biological toxins or infectious agents such as bacteria, viruses, and fungi with the intent to kill or incapacitate humans, animals or plants.
  • Chemical warfare involves the intentional use of chemicals in combat. Poison gas as a chemical weapon was principally used during World War I, and resulted in an estimated 1.3 million casualties, including 100,000–260,000 civilians. Tens of thousands or more civilians and military personnel died from chemical weapon effects such as scarring of the lungs, skin damage, and cerebral damage in the years after the Great War ended.[14] Various treaties have sought to ban its further use. Non-lethal chemical weapons, such as tear gas and pepper spray, are widely used, sometimes with deadly effect.
  • Globalizing war refers to a form of war which extends beyond the national or regional boundaries of the immediate combatants to have implications for the whole planet.[2] An obvious example of this form of war is World War II, but others such as the Vietnam War also qualify. Globalizing war thus includes world war- with that category tending to be restricted by convention to the two main examples. Transnational war, a cognate concept, refers to wars fought locally, but with implications or hostilities across the boundaries of nation-states[15]
  • Total war is warfare by any means possible, disregarding the laws of war, placing no limits on legitimate military targets, using weapons and tactics that result in significant civilian casualties, or demanding a war effort that requires significant sacrifices by the friendly civilian population.

Behaviour and conduct

The behaviour of troops in warfare varies considerably, both individually and as units or armies. In some circumstances, troops may engage in genocide, war rape and ethnic cleansing. Commonly, however, the conduct of troops may be limited to posturing and sham attacks, leading to highly rule-bound and often largely symbolic combat in which casualties are much reduced from that which would be expected if soldiers were genuinely violent towards the enemy.[17] Situations of deliberate dampening of hostilities occurred in World War I by some accounts, e.g., a volley of gunfire being exchanged after a misplaced mortar hit the British line, after which a German soldier shouted an apology to British forces, effectively stopping a hostile exchange of gunfire.[18] Other examples of non-aggression, also from World War I, are detailed in Good-Bye to All That. These include spontaneous ceasefires to rebuild defences and retrieve casualties, alongside behaviour such as refusing to shoot at enemy during ablutions and the taking of great risks (described as 1 in 20) to retrieve enemy wounded from the battlefield. The most notable spontaneous ceasefire of World War I was the Christmas truce.

The psychological separation between combatants, and the destructive power of modern weaponry, may act to override this effect and facilitate participation by combatants in the mass slaughter of combatants or civilians. The unusual circumstances of warfare can incite apparently normal individuals to commit atrocities.[19] Sociologists and historians often view dehumanization as central to war.


Main article: Military history

The earliest evidence of war belongs to the Mesolithic cemetery Site 117, which has been determined to be approximately 14,000 years old. About forty-five percent of the skeletons there displayed signs of violent death.[20] Since the rise of the state some 5,000 years ago,[21] military activity has occurred over much of the globe. The advent of gunpowder and the acceleration of technological advances led to modern warfare. According to Conway W. Henderson, "One source claims that 14,500 wars have taken place between 3500 BC and the late 20th century, costing 3.5 billion lives, leaving only 300 years of peace (Beer 1981: 20)."[22]

In War Before Civilization, Lawrence H. Keeley, a professor at the University of Illinois, says that approximately 90–95% of known societies throughout history engaged in at least occasional warfare,[23] and many fought constantly.[24]

Japanese samurai attacking a Mongol ship, 13th century
F-15E deploys flares during a flight over Afghanistan, 12 November 2008

Keeley describes several styles of primitive combat such as small raids, large raids, and massacres. All of these forms of warfare were used by primitive societies, a finding supported by other researchers.[25] Keeley explains that early war raids were not well organized, as the participants did not have any formal training. Scarcity of resources meant that defensive works were not a cost effective way to protect the society against enemy raids.[26]


It is problematic, however, to make generalizations of prehistoric violence, frequency and manifestation of warfare varies greatly in the ethnographic and archaeological record.


In Western Europe, since the late 18th century, more than 150 conflicts and about 600 battles have taken place.[29] During the 20th century, war resulted in a dramatic intensification of the pace of social changes, and was a crucial catalyst for the emergence of the Left as a force to be reckoned with.[30]






Throughout history

Main article: Wars

Nine largest by death toll



Date War
60.7–84.6 1939–1945 World War II (see World War II casualties) [35][36]
60 13th century Mongol Conquests (see Mongol invasions and Tatar invasions)[37][38][39]
40 1850–1864 Taiping Rebellion (see Dungan revolt)[40]
39 1914–1918 World War I (see World War I casualties)[41]
25 1616–1662 Qing dynasty conquest of Ming dynasty[34]
20 1937–1945 Second Sino-Japanese War[43]
20 1370–1405 Conquests of Tamerlane[44][45]
16 1862–1877 Dungan revolt
5–9 1917–1922 Russian Civil War and Foreign Intervention[46]


Nations customarily measure the 'costs of war' in dollars, lost production, or the soldiers killed or wounded. Rarely do military establishments attempt to measure the costs of war in terms of individual human suffering. Psychiatric breakdown remains one of the most costly items of war when expressed in human terms.

— No More Heroes, Richard Gabriel[29]
Disability-adjusted life year for war per 100,000 inhabitants in 2004[47]
  no data
  less than 100
  more than 8800
The Apotheosis of War (1871) by Vasily Vereshchagin

On military personnel



— No More Heroes, Richard Gabriel[29]



— 14–18: Understanding the Great War, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Annette Becker[29]




During Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, more French military personnel died of typhus than were killed by the Russians.[50] Of the 450,000 soldiers who crossed the Neman on 25 June 1812, less than 40,000 returned. More military personnel were killed from 1500–1914 by typhus than from military action.[51] In addition, if it were not for modern medical advances there would be thousands more dead from disease and infection. For instance, during the Seven Years' War, the Royal Navy reported that it conscripted 184,899 sailors, of whom 133,708 died of disease or were 'missing'.[52]

It is estimated that between 1985 and 1994, 378,000 people per year died due to war.[53]

On civilians


Most estimates of World War II casualties indicate that around 60 million people died, 40 million of which were civilians.[56] Deaths in the Soviet Union were around 27 million.[57] Since a high proportion of those killed were young men who had not yet fathered any children, population growth in the postwar Soviet Union was much lower than it otherwise would have been.[58]

On the economy


Typically speaking, war becomes very intertwined with the economy and many wars are partially or entirely based on economic reasons. Some economists believe war can stimulate a country's economy (high government spending for World War II is often credited with bringing the USA out of the Great Depression by most Keynesian economists) but in many cases, such as the wars of Louis XIV, the Franco-Prussian War, and World War I, warfare serves only to damage the economy of the countries involved. For example, Russia's involvement in World War I took such a toll on the Russian economy that it almost collapsed and greatly contributed to the start of the Russian Revolution of 1917.

World War II

One of the starkest illustrations of the effect of war upon economies is the Second World War. The Great Depression of the 1930s ended as nations increased their production of war materials to serve the war effort.[59] The financial cost of World War II is estimated at about a trillion U.S. dollars worldwide, making it the most costly war in capital as well as lives.[60][61]


On the arts



It is not uncommon that during Wars, cultural institutions, such as libraries, are seen as “targets in themselves; their elimination was a way to denigrate and demoralize the enemy population.” It is important to know about and understand the impact such destruction can have on a society because “in an era in which competing ideologies fuel internal and international conflict, the destruction of libraries and other items of cultural significance is neither random nor irrelevant. Preserving the world’s repositories of knowledge is crucial to ensuring that the darkest moments of history do not endlessly repeat themselves.”[66]






Tangible/intangible aims:

  • Intangible war aims - like the accumulation of credibility or reputation[69] - may have more tangible expression ("conquest restores prestige, annexation increases power").[70]

Explicit/implicit aims:

  • Explicit war aims may involve published policy decisions.
  • Implicit war aims[71] can take the form of minutes of discussion, memoranda and instructions.[72]

Positive/negative aims:

  • "Positive war aims" cover tangible outcomes.
  • "Negative war aims" forestall or prevent undesired outcomes.[73]

War aims can change in the course of conflict and may eventually morph into "peace conditions"[74] - the minimal conditions under which a state may cease to wage a particular war.

Factors in completion

American and Filipino troops surrender to the Japanese at Bataan.

The political and economic circumstances in the peace that follows war usually depend on the facts on the ground. Where evenly-matched adversaries decide that the conflict has resulted in a stalemate, they may cease hostilities to avoid further loss of life and property. They may decide to restore the antebellum territorial boundaries, redraw boundaries at the line of military control, or negotiate to keep or exchange captured territory. Negotiations between parties involved at the end of a war often result in a treaty, such as the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, which officially ended the First World War of 1914-1918.

A warring party that surrenders or capitulates may have little negotiating power, with the victorious side either imposing a settlement or dictating most of the terms of any treaty. A common result involves conquered territory coming under the dominion of the victorious military power. An unconditional surrender can take place in the face of overwhelming military force as an attempt to prevent further harm to life and property. For example, the Empire of Japan unconditionally surrendered to the Allies in 1945 after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (see Surrender of Japan) and the preceding massive strategic bombardment of Japan and the overrunning of Manchukuo. A settlement or surrender may also be obtained through deception or bluffing.


Some wars or aggressive actions end when a power has achieved its the military objective. Others do not, especially in cases where the state structures do not exist, or have collapsed prior to the victory of the conqueror. In such cases, disorganised guerilla warfare may continue for a considerable period. In cases of complete surrender, conquered territories may come under the permanent dominion of the victorious side. A raid for the purpose of looting may be completed with the successful capture of goods. In other cases an aggressor may decide to end hostilities to avoid continued losses and cease hostilities without obtaining the original objective, such as happened in the Iran–Iraq War of 1980-1988.

Some hostilities, such as insurgency or civil war, may persist for long periods of time with only a low level of military activity. In some cases there is no negotiation of any official treaty, but fighting may trail off and eventually stop after the political demands of the belligerent groups have been reconciled, a political settlement has been negotiated, the combatants are gradually killed or decide the conflict is futile, or the belligerents cease active military engagement but still threaten each other. The Chinese Civil War of 1946-1950 offers a good example: active hostilities essentially ceased by 1950, but in the second half of the 20th century the People's Republic of China pursued attempts to isolate the Republic of China (commonly known as Taiwan) diplomatically, and still sporadically threatens the island of Taiwan with invasion. For this reason, some[which?] historians consider the war not ended but continuing.

Ongoing conflicts

There are currently dozens of ongoing armed conflicts around the world, the deadliest of which is the Syrian Civil War.

Limiting and stopping

Main article: Anti-war movement



The Mexican Drug War, with estimated casualties of 40,000 since December 2006, has been recently facing a fundamental opposition.[77] In 2011, the movement for peace and justice has started a popular middle-class movement against the war. It has won the recognition of President Calderon, who started the war, but has not ended it.[78]


Theories for motivation


There is no scholarly agreement on which are the most common motivations for war.[79] Motivations may be different for those ordering the war than for those undertaking the war. For example, in the Third Punic War, Rome's leaders may have wished to make war with Carthage for the purpose of eliminating a resurgent rival, while the individual soldiers may have been motivated by a wish to make money. Since many people are involved, a war may acquire a life of its own from the confluence of many different motivations. An interpretation of the ancient Jewish commentary (BeReshit Rabbah) on the fight between Cain and Abel in Genesis 4 (Parashot BeReshit XXII:7) states that there are three universal reasons for wars: (A) Economics, (B) Power, and (C) Religion.[80] As the strategic and tactical aspects of warfare are always changing, theories and doctrines relating to warfare are often reformulated before, during, and after every major war. Carl von Clausewitz said, 'Every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.'[81] The one constant factor is war’s employment of organized violence and the resultant destruction of property and/or lives that necessarily follows.

Psychoanalytic psychology






— Hermann Göring at the Nuremberg trials, April 18, 1946[87]



Several theories concern the evolutionary origins of warfare. There are two main schools: One sees organized warfare as emerging only in or after the Mesolithic as a result of complex social organization and greater population density and competition over resources; the other school sees human warfare as a more ancient practice that derives from common animal tendencies, such as territoriality and sexual competition.[88]

The latter school argues that since warlike behavior patterns are found in many primate species such as chimpanzees,[89] as well as in many ant species,[90] group conflict may be a general feature of animal social behavior. Some proponents of the idea argue that war, while innate, has been intensified greatly by developments of technology and social organization such as weaponry and states.[91]

In The Blank Slate, psychologist and linguist Steven Pinker claims that war-related behaviors may have been naturally selected in the ancestral environment due to the benefits of winning wars, e.g. gaining territory and women. He also argues that in order to have credible deterrence against other groups (as well as on an individual level), it was important to have a reputation for retaliation, causing humans to develop instincts for revenge as well as for protecting a group's (or an individual's) reputation ("honor"). In The Better Angels of Our Nature Pinker argues that the development of the state and the police have dramatically reduced the level of warfare and violence in comparison to the ancestral environment. Whenever the state is not present, he says, such as in poor areas of a city, humans again organize in groups for protection and aggression and concepts such as violent revenge and protecting honor again become extremely important.


Ashley Montagu strongly denied universalistic instinctual arguments, arguing that social factors and childhood socialization are important in determining the nature and presence of warfare. Thus, he argues, warfare is not a universal human occurrence and appears to have been a historical invention, associated with certain types of human societies.[93] Montagu's argument is supported by ethnographic research conducted in societies where the concept of aggression seems to be entirely absent, e.g. the Chewong and Semai of the Malay peninsula.[94] Bobbi S. Low has observed correlation between warfare and education, noting that societies where warfare is commonplace encourage their children to be more aggressive.[95]





Woodrow Wilson, September 11, 1919, St. Louis.[98]



Belligerents of the Second Congo War, with all sides taking advantage of the anarchy to plunder the Congo's natural resources.





Dwight Eisenhower, Farewell Address, January 17, 1961.












Youth bulge



While Malthusian theories focus on a disparity between a growing population and available natural resources, youth bulge theory focuses on a disparity between non-inheriting, 'excess' young males and available social positions within the existing social system of division of labour. Young males who cannot find acceptable positions within the existing system of division of labour and thus become "socially superflous" are, according to youth bulge theory, prone to become violent in one form or another. This implies that in a situation where a youth bulge is given, a major economic depression with massively increasing unemployment will likely lead to outbreaks of violence (as, for example, evidenced in Europe during the great depression, when fascist organizations mobilized a lot of male youth to march the streets).





Palestinian militant with an M16 rifle, 2009




  1. Demographically superfluous,


Mexican soldiers detain cartel suspects in Michoacán, 2007
  1. Emigration ("non-violent colonization")
  2. Violent crime
  3. Rebellion or putsch
  4. Civil war and/or revolution

Religions and ideologies are seen as secondary factors that are being used to legitimate violence, but will not lead to violence by themselves if no youth bulge is present. Consequently, youth bulge theorists see both past "Christianist" European colonialism and imperialism and today's "Islamist" civil unrest and terrorism as results of high birth rates producing youth bulges[113] – with the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip now being seen as another example of youth-bulge-driven violence.

Among prominent historical events that have been linked to the existence of youth bulges is the role played by the historically large youth cohorts in the rebellion and revolution waves of early modern Europe, including the French Revolution of 1789,[114] and the importance of economic depression hitting the largest German youth cohorts ever in explaining the rise of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s.[115] The 1994 Rwandan Genocide has also been analyzed as following a massive youth bulge.[116]

While the implications of population growth have been known since the completion of the National Security Study Memorandum 200 in 1974,[117] neither the U.S. nor the WHO have implemented the recommended measures to control population growth to avert the terrorist threat. Prominent demographer Stephen D. Mumford attributes this to the influence of the Catholic Church.[118]

Youth Bulge theory has been subjected to statistical analysis by the World Bank,[119] Population Action International,[120] and the Berlin Institute for Population and Development.[121] Detailed demographic data for most countries is available at the international database of the United States Census Bureau.[122] Statistic data about historical development of demographic and economic parameters over the last 200 years for each country can be visualized at Gapminder.[123]

Youth bulge theories have been criticized as leading to racial, gender and age "discrimination".[124]


U.S. soldiers directing artillery on enemy trucks in A Shau Valley, April 1968.







Within the rationalist tradition, some theorists have suggested individuals engaged in war suffer a normal level of cognitive bias,[128] but are still "as rational as you and me".[129] According to philosopher Iain King, "Most instigators of conflict overrate their chances of success, while most participants underrate their chances of injury...."[130] King asserts that "Most catastrophic military decisions are rooted in GroupThink" which is faulty, but still rational.[131]



The rationalist theory focused around bargaining is currently under debate in the field. The Iraq War proved to be an anomaly that undercuts the validity of applying rationalist theory to some wars.[132]

Political science


The following subsections consider causes of war from system, societal, and individual levels of analysis. This kind of division was first proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State, and War (1959) and has been often used by political scientists since then.[133]:143

System-level theories



  1. Balance of power theory: States have the goal of preventing a single state from becoming a hegemon. Wars result if the would-be hegemon doesn't back down from trying to acquire power. According to this view, an international system with more equal distribution of power is more stable, and "movements toward unipolarity are destabilizing."[133]:147 However, evidence has shown that power polarity is not actually a major factor in the occurrence of wars.[133]:147–148
  2. Power transition theory: Hegemons take control and impose stabilizing conditions on the world order, but they eventually decline, and wars occur when a declining hegemon either is challenged by another rising power or aims to preemptively suppress the new rising power.[133]:148 On this view, unlike for balance-of-power theory, wars become more probable when power is more equally distributed. This "power preponderance" hypothesis has empirical support.[133]:148

While these two theories appear to contradict each other, they could both be correct depending on the system. For instance, balance-of-power theory might better describe Europe's history, while power-transition theory might better describe the world overall.[133]:148

Liberals in international relations cite other factors as relevant to conflicts, such as trade. If two countries have a profitable trading relationship, it's assumed that war would hurt both of them economically, making it less attractive. Realists respond that military force may sometimes be at least as effective as trade at achieving economic benefits, especially historically if not as much today.[133]:149 Also, trade can create dependence that allows for coercion, which can escalate conflict.[133]:150 Empirical data on the relationship of trade to peace are mixed, and moreover, some evidence suggests that countries at war don't necessarily trade less with each other.[133]:150

Societal-level theories

  • Diversionary theory, also known as the "scapegoat hypothesis", suggests that politicians may use war to distract or rally together domestic popular support.[133]:152 This idea is supported by literature showing that outgroup hostility enhances ingroup bonding, and a significant domestic "rally effect" has been demonstrated when conflicts begin.[133]:152–153 However, studies looking for increased use of force as a function of need for internal political support are more mixed.[133]:152–153 US war-time presidential popularity surveys taken during the presidencies of several recent US leaders have supported diversionary theory.[134]
  • Democratic peace theory suggests that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other.

Individual-level theories

These theories suggest that differences in people's personalities, decision-making, emotions, belief systems, and biases are important in determining whether conflicts get out of hand.[133]:157 For instance, it has been proposed that conflict is modulated by bounded rationality and various cognitive biases,[133]:157 such as prospect theory.[135]

Other relevant factors can include ethic, moral, and religious differences, including declarations of independence by certain groups.



The seeming contradiction between warfare and morality has led to serious moral questions, which have been the subject of debate for thousands of years.[136] The debate in the West, generally speaking, has two main viewpoints: Pacifists, who believe that war is inherently immoral and therefore is never justified regardless of circumstances, and those who believe that war is sometimes necessary and can be moral.




The Just War standard is as old as Western Civilization itself, and still has significant impact on thinking about the morality of wars and violence today.[143] Just War Theory was foundational in the creation of the United Nations and in International Law's regulations on legitimate war.[136]



Fascism, and the ideals it encompasses, such as Pragmatism, racism, and social Darwinism, hold that violence is good.[144][145] Pragmatism holds that war and violence can be good if it serves the ends of the people, without regard for universal morality. Racism holds that violence is good so that a master race can be established, or to purge an inferior race from the earth, or both. Social Darwinism thinks that violence is sometimes necessary to weed the unfit from society so that civilization can flourish. These are broad archetypes for the general position that the ends justify the means. Social Darwinism as elaborated by the late U.S. sociologist and social evolutionist, William Sumner, states competition, conflict, inequality, and hierarchy is natural and good as it allows able-bodied and intelligent individuals and societies to lead and prosper. Lewis Coser, U.S. conflict theorist and sociologist, argued that conflict provides a function and a process whereby a succession of new equilibriums are created. Thus, the struggle of opposing forces, rather than being disruptive, may indeed be a means of balancing and maintaining a social structure or society.[146]

See also

General reference
War-related lists





  • Geoffrey Blainey. The Causes of War (1973)
  • Smedley D. Butler. War is a Racket (1935)
  • Fry, Douglas. 2004. “Conclusion: Learning from Peaceful Societies.” In Keeping the Peace, Graham Kemp, editor. New York: Routledge.
  • Fry, Douglas. 2009. Beyond War. Oxford University Press.
  • Howell, Signe, and Roy Willis. 1990. Societies at Peace: Anthropological Perspectives. London: Routledge.
  • Kemp, Graham, and Douglas Fry. 2004. Keeping the Peace. New York: Routledge.
  • McIntosh, Jane. 2002. A Peaceful Realm: The Rise and Fall of the Indus Civilization. Oxford, UK: Westview Press.
  • Montagu, Ashley. 1978. Learning Nonaggression. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Otterbein, Keith, 2004, How War Began. College Station TX: Texas A&M University Press.
  • Pearson, Richard. 2004. “New Perspectives on Jomon Society.” Bulletin of the International Jomon Culture Conference, Vol. 1.
  • Sponsel, Leslie, and Thomas Gregor. 1994. Anthropology of Peace and Nonviolence. Lynne Rienner Publishing.

External links

  5. Mongol Conquests
  7. Tanton, John (2002). The Social Contract. p. 42. 
  8. Moore, John (1992). The pursuit of happiness. p. 304. 
  9. Baxter, Richard (2013). Humanizing the Laws of War. p. 344. 
  10. Dying and Death: Inter-disciplinary Perspectives - Page 153, Asa Kasher - 2007
  11. Chew, Emry (2012). Arming the Periphery. p. 49. 
  12. "war". Online Etymology Dictionary. 2010. Retrieved 24 April 2011. 
  13. Diccionario de la Lengua Española, 21a edición (1992) p. 1071
  16. Peters, Ralph. New Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy, 2005. p. 30
  17. 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 Lt. Col. Dave Grossman (1996). On Killing – The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War & Society. Little, Brown & Co.,. 
  18. Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
  19. Waller, James. Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing. 
  20. Keeley, Lawrence H: War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage. Page 37.
  21. Diamond, Jared, Guns, Germs and Steel
  26. Keeley, Lawrence H: War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage. Page 55.
  29. 29.0 29.1 29.2 29.3 World War One – A New Kind of War | Part II, From 14 – 18 Understanding the Great War, by Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Annette Becker
  31. "Albert Einstein: Man of Imagination". 1947. Retrieved 2010-02-03. [dead link] Nuclear Age Peace Foundation paper
  33. Hewitt, Joseph, J. Wilkenfield and T. Gurr Peace and Conflict 2008, Paradigm Publishers, 2007
  38. "Mongol Conquests". Users.erols.com. Retrieved 2011-01-24. 
  40. "Taiping Rebellion – Britannica Concise". Britannica. Retrieved 2011-01-24. 
  44. "Timur Lenk (1369–1405)". Users.erols.com. Retrieved 2011-01-24. 
  45. Matthew White's website (a compilation of scholarly death toll estimates)
  46. "Russian Civil War". Spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk. Retrieved 2011-01-24. 
  49. Kitchen, Martin (2000), The Treaty of Versailles and its Consequences, New York: Longman
  50. The Historical Impact of Epidemic Typhus. Joseph M. Conlon.
  51. War and Pestilence. TIME.
  53. Obermeyer Z, Murray CJ, Gakidou E (June 2008). "Fifty years of violent war deaths from Vietnam to Bosnia: analysis of data from the world health survey programme". BMJ. 336 (7659): 1482–6. PMC 2440905Freely accessible. PMID 18566045. doi:10.1136/bmj.a137. 
  55. History of Europe – Demographics. Encyclopædia Britannica.
  56. "World War II Fatalities". Retrieved 2007-04-20. 
  60. Mayer, E. (2000). "World War II course lecture notes". Emayzine.com. Victorville, California: Victor Valley College. Archived from the original on 1 March 2009. Retrieved 4 July 2014. 
  63. The New York Times, 9 February 1946, Volume 95, Number 32158.
  64. Karol Jan Borowiecki, 2012. Are composers different? Historical evidence on conflict-induced migration (1816–1997). European Review of Economic History, vol.16(3), pp.270–91. <https://ideas.repec.org/p/tcd/tcduee/tep0811.html>.
  65. Karol Jan Borowiecki and John O'Hagan, 2013. Impact of War on Individual Life-cycle Creativity: Tentative Evidence in Relation to Composers. Journal of Cultural Economics, vol.37, pp.347–58. <https://ideas.repec.org/p/tcd/tcduee/tep1711.html>.
  67. Sullivan, Patricia (2012). Who Wins?: Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict. Oxford University Press, USA. p. 17. ISBN 9780199878338. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199878338.003.0003. Retrieved 2015-08-25. A state with greater military capacity than its adversary is more likely to prevail in wars with 'total' war aims—the overthrow of a foreign government or annexation of territory—than in wars with more limited objectives. 
  68. Fried, Marvin Benjamin (2014). Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans During World War I. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 4. ISBN 9781137359018. Retrieved 2015-08-24. War aims are the desired territorial, economic, military or other benefits expected following successful conclusion of a war. 
  69. Welch distinguishes: "tangible goods such as arms, wealth, and - provided they are strategically or economically valuable - territory and resources" from "intangible goods such as credibility and reputation" - Welch, David A. (1995). Justice and the Genesis of War. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge University Press. p. 17. ISBN 9780521558686. Retrieved 2015-08-24. 
  76. "Stop the War Coalition: Timeline of Events 2001–2011". Archived from the original on 1 January 1970. [dead link]
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