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Physicalism is the metaphysical position (associated particularly with Quine) that everything is physical; that is, that there are no kinds of things other than physical things. Likewise, physicalism about the mental is a position in philosophy of mind which holds that the mind is a physical thing in some sense. This position is also called "materialism", but the term "physicalism" is preferable because it does not have any misleading ethical connotations, and because it carries an emphasis on the physical, meaning whatever is described ultimately by physics -- not just matter but energy and whatever else physical theories might talk about. Some proposed examples might be space, time, physical forces, structure, physical processes,information, state, et al.

The term physicalism was coined by Otto Neurath, in a series of early 20th century essays on the subject, in which he wrote


Because it claims that only physical things exist, physicalism is a form of monism. The opposite of physicalism is subjective idealism, as exemplified by the metaphysics proposed by George Berkeley, which holds that there is no physical reality at all. In this view, all that exists is mental or spiritual: it is thus also monistic. It is also in opposition to neutral monism, a philosophy advocated by Baruch Spinoza that states that only one substance exists, but that this substance is neither physical or mental.

The rest of this article discusses physicalism about the mental: this is merely a specific application of physicalism as described above. Physicalism about the mental contrasts with mind-body dualism, which claims that the physical and the mental are two different sorts of things and thus that the mind is non-physical, and exists in a different metaphysical category and realm.


Supervenience Edit

Levels of existence



Supervenience is the relationship between a higher level and lower level where the higher level is dependent on the lower level. This means that one level supervenes on another if and only if a change in the lower level causes a change in the higher level (e.g. a set of properties A supervenes upon a set of properties B when there cannot be an A difference without a B difference). In physicalism, superveniences establishes a relationship between the mental and the physical, so that any change in the mental is caused by a change in the physical. Just as a shadow is dependent upon the position of the object causing it, so is the mental dependent upon the physical. Physicalism thusly implies (through modal realism) that:


The corresponding conclusion about the mental would be as follows:



Arguments against supervenienceEdit


Epiphenomenal ectoplasm Edit


The lone ammonium molecule problem Edit


Modal status problem Edit

The modal status problem is only problematic if one thinks of physicalism as a contingent truth (i.e. not necessary), because it is described in terms of modal notions (i.e. through modal realism). The problem is presented when one takes the statement "Minimal physical truths entail all truths", from this one takes the statement "S (a statement that describes all minimal physical truths) entails S* (a statement that describes the world)". This statement is a necessary truth, and therefore supervenience physicalism could not be contingent. The solution to this is to accept the above statement not as the equivalent of physicalism, but as an entailment of it.

Problem of necessary beings Edit


Token and TypeEdit

Physicalism is divided into two branches, depending upon its support of supervenience: Token and Type. Both are ontologically reductionist, as they reduce mental states and processes into physical states and processes. This should not be misinterpreted as meaning that mental events are reduced into neurological states and process, as this is true only of type physicalism. (See Reductive physicalism).

Token physicalismEdit


Still, token physicalism presents at least two problems. It requires that for social, moral, and psychological particulars there must be a physical particular identical with them. Consider the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court exists, but according to token physicalism, there is a physical object that is identical to the Supreme Court. However, this physical particular does not necessarily exist in any conventional use of the word 'physical'. Supervenience escapes this problem as the social, moral, and psychological particulars are said to supervene on the physical particulars that compose them. Another problem is that token physicalism does not capture minimal physicalism, meaning that it does not capture the core commitment of physicalism, i.e. that everything is physical. Simply because every particular has a physical property does not rule out the possibility that some particulars have non-supervenient mental properties. This shows that token physicalism supports property dualism and therefore does not entail minimal physicalism. However, if one accepts both supervenience physicalism and token physicalism, then minimal physicalism is met as supervenience physicalism is not compatible with property dualism. [1]

Type physicalismEdit

Main article: Type physicalism



If type physicalism is true then mental state M1 would be identical to brain state B1. This seems quite unlikely, as it would imply that the mental state of pain, for example, would perfectly correlate to a specific brain state in all organisms at all times. Many avoid this problem by saying that mental states can not be reduced to a specific brain state as they are multiply realizable. That is, the same mental state can be produced from many different physical states. Token physicalism states that for every particular or occurrence, there is a physical particular with which it is identical. Therefore, while the mental state of pain or happiness is not type-identical to any specific brain state, it is still physical.






A priori and A posterioriEdit

Physicalism is then further divided depending on whether it can be known a priori or a posteriori: If physicalism is true, S is the statement that describes the entire physical nature of the world collectively, and S* is the statement that describes the entire nature of the world. S entails S*.

A priori physicalism is that, which assumes that the above can be known without observation (i.e. independently from experience). Originally it was assumed that physicalism was a priori, until Kripke published Naming and Necessity in 1980, which proposed the idea that there are truths that are both necessary and a posteriori.

A posteriori physicalism is that, which holds physicalism as a necessary truth that is known a posteriori (i.e. known through empirical observation). There are two main interpretations of a posteriori physicalism which exist today. One is that, a posteriori truth can be reached a priori by contingent a posteriori truths. The other holds that there are a posteriori truths that are taken from non-contingent (i.e. necessary) truths. A problem arises when the former is combined with the above statement (S entails S*). This problem is that according to the former there is a contingent truth that entails the above statement S#, so that S and S# then S*[2]. However, if S describes the nature of the physical word collectively, it seems that S# is already included in S. Therefore, the truth is not a posteriori after all, but merely the same statement knowable a priori. The a posteriori physicalist must then turn to the alternative interpretation that there are non-contingent a posteriori truths. However, this view remains very controversial within analytic philosophy and it remains an unsettled question.

Reductive physicalismEdit


Before Donald Davidson introduced the concept of supervenience to physicalism, reductionism was widely held by many physicalists. However, it is now questioned whether non-reductive physicalism is coherent or if physicalism entails reductionism. One proposed solution to this is to analyze in other terms. One states “Reductionism is true if and only if for every mental predicate F, there is a physical predicate G so that ‘x is F if and only if x is G’. The problem with this is that it has remained unsupported by physicalist since before 1959, when J.J.C. Smart proposed a topic neutral {i.e. it describes terms of neither the physical nor mental); this means that the above statement can be rejected, being considered one of the greatest innovations in philosophy of mind.

However, as this was applied to philosophy of science by Ernest Nagel, as a bridge law, it provided a problem. He concluded “Reductionism is true if and only if for each mental predicate F there is a neurological predicate G such that a sentence of the form ‘x is F if and only if x is G’”. The problem is that one psychological process may be caused by many neurological processes, and possible non-neurological processes causing it to be false.

A third idea is present; it states “Reductionism is true if and only if for each mental predicate F there is non-mental predicate G such that a sentence of the form 'if x is F then x is G' is a priori”. This kind follows the identity theory, and therefore is tied to supervenience, and is reliant on a priori truth.

Non-reductive physicalism Edit

Non-reductive physicalism is the idea that while mental states are physical they are not reducible to physical properties. Donald Davidson proposed anomalous monism as a non-reductive physicalism. Supervenience physicalism (also proposed by Donald Davidson) is a non-reductive physicalism, as mental events supervene (i.e. physical properties are identical to mental properties) on physical events rather than mental events reducing to physical events. For example if we accept supervenience physicalism, if you were to be electrocuted, the pain you would feel would supervene on the firing of your c-fibres. If we accept, reductive physicalism, the pain would be those c-fibres firing.

Jaegwon KimEdit





Main article: Materialism

In philosophy, materialism is that form of physicalism which holds that the only thing that can truly be said to exist is matter; that fundamentally, all things are composed of material and all phenomena are the result of material interactions. Science uses a working assumption, sometimes known as methodological naturalism, that observable events in nature are explained only by natural causes without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural. As a theory, materialism belongs to the class of monist ontology. As such, it is different from ontological theories based on dualism or pluralism. In terms of singular explanations of the phenomenal reality, materialism stands in sharp contrast to idealism. Alternate definition: materialism postulates that matter is ontologically primary to existence of the idealistic phenomena, and that the latter cannot exist separately from the former. This definition does not deny existence of such idealistic (i.e., non-material) phenomena as space, time, mind, or even information outside of human consciousness. Thus, it is not nominalistic or strictly monistic, but it does say that these phenomena cannot exist separately from the matter that "creates" them. Materialistic brain leads to the existence of idealistic mind, which disappears with destruction of the brain; materialistic doughnut leads to the existence of idealistic doughnut hole, and the latter exists independently of the human mind. The ideal phenomena mentioned refer to the "phenomena [that] are result of material interactions" and the "material interactions" and relationships themselves, mentioned but not defined in the first definition. They do not refer to the supernatural phenomena.

Arguments for physicalismEdit

Exclusion principleEdit


Argument from methodological naturalismEdit


Arguments against physicalismEdit

Knowledge argumentEdit

Though there have been many objections to physicalism throughout its history, many of these arguments concern themselves with the apparent contradiction of the existence of qualia in an entirely physical world. The most popular argument of this kind is the so-called knowledge argument as formulated by Frank Jackson. The argument asks us to consider Mary, a young girl who has been covered in black and white paint, along with the room in which she lives for her entire life. However, she is allowed access to a large amount of books, containing all physical knowledge within them. During her time in the room, she eventually comes to know all of the physical facts about the world, including all of the physical facts about color. Now, to the physicalist, it would seem that this would entail Mary knowing everything about the world. However, once she is let out of her room and into the world, it becomes apparent that Mary does not know everything about the world, such as the feeling or experience of seeing color. If Mary did not have such knowledge, how can it be said that everything supervenes upon the physical?


Argument from philosophical zombiesEdit

The zombie argument is a thought experiment that attempts to show that it is conceivable, and therefore possible, that an organism that is physically identical to a conscious being may itself, lack consciousness or qualia. Though few think zombies are nomologically possible, that is, possible in our world, some philosophers do argue that they are metaphysically possible. This poses a problem for the physicalist as the metaphysical possibility of zombies would entail that mental states do not supervene upon physical states, a claim that the physicalist is committed to. It is then the burden of the physicalist to show that zombies are not conceivable, or if they are conceivable, that they are not metaphysically possible.




See also Edit

Notes Edit


References Edit

External linksEdit


es:Fisicalismo fr:Physicalisme ru:Физикализм


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