Intimidating the World: The United States Atomic Army, 1956-1960

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Title: Intimidating the World: The United States Atomic Army, 1956-1960
Author: Jussel, Paul C.
Description: The atomic bomb created a new military dynamic for the world in 1945. The bomb, if used properly, could replace the artillery fires and air-delivered bombs used to defeat the concentrated force of an enemy. The weapon provided the U.S. with an unparalleled advantage over the rest of the world, until the Soviet Union developed its own bomb by 1949 and symmetry in warfare returned. Soon, theories of warfare changed to reflect the belief that the best way to avoid the effects of the bomb was through dispersion of forces. Eventually, the American Army reorganized its divisions from the traditional three-unit organization to a new five-unit organization, dubbed pentomic by its Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor. While atomic weapons certainly had an effect on Taylor’s reasoning to adopt the pentomic organization, the idea was not new in 1956; the Army hierarchy had been wrestling with restructuring since the end of World War II. Though the Korean War derailed the Army’s plans for the early fifties, it returned to the forefront under the Eisenhower Administration. The driving force behind reorganization in 1952 was not only the reoriented and reduced defense budget, but also the Army’s inroads to the atomic club, formerly the domain of only the Air Force and the Navy. But investigation into formerly classified government records indicates the effectiveness was dependent upon the adoption of three essential elements: mobility, firepower, and communications. Mobility complemented dispersion and allowed concentration at the desired place. Firepower, especially tactical atomic weapons but not limited to them, amplified the ability of dispersed units to defeat or destroy an enemy. To coordinate all of these efforts, a new level of communications was essential to tie all of the units together. The evidence indicates that the pentomic organization was neither based on the Eisenhower administration policy of massive retaliation nor solely dependant on the atomic weapons for its effectiveness. Rather, the organization evolved over time through a gradual process of experimentation and continuous dialogue among senior Army leaders. More was required than experimentation and dialogue. General Taylor ordered the pentomic reorganization, but failed to support fiscally the necessary developmental requirements. Scientific progress did not match expectations; equipment was not sufficiently advanced to base an organization on the expectation of its arrival. As a final failure, the majority of the Army only found fault with the new organization and had little confidence in it. Within four years of its implementation, the pentomic organization was discredited. The Army returned to its traditional three-unit division organization with much relief.
Permanent Link: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1085083063
Date: 2004

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