Egyptian–Hittite peace treaty

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Egyptian–Hittite peace treaty
Istanbul - Museo archeol. - Trattato di Qadesh fra ittiti ed egizi (1269 a.C.) - Foto G. Dall'Orto 28-5-2006.jpg
Ägyptisch-Hethitischer Friedensvertrag Karnaktempel.jpg
Created c.1259 BC
Discovered 1828 (Egyptian) and 1906 (Hittite)

The Egyptian–Hittite peace treaty which was concluded between Egyptian Pharaoh Ramesses II and Hittite King Hattusili III. According to most Egyptologists it was concluded in or around 1259 BC,[1][2] marking the official end of negotiations and Ramesses II's acceptance from Hittite diplomats of a silver tablet on which the terms were inscribed. The location where the treaty was signed is uncertain.

Its purpose was to establish and maintain peaceful relations between the parties. It was the first known diplomatic agreement from the Near East,[3][4][5] and it is the oldest written treaty to survive to-date (though not the oldest known treaty).[6]

Sometimes called the Treaty of Kadesh, after the Battle of Kadesh fought some sixteen years earlier, the treaty itself did not bring about a peace; in fact "an atmosphere of enmity between Hatti and Egypt lasted many years," until the eventual treaty of alliance was signed.[7]

In Egypt it was inscribed on the walls of temples in hieroglyphics, while in the Hittite capital of Hattusa (in present day Turkey) it was preserved on baked clay tablets. Archaeological excavations at the Hittite royal palace uncovered it among the palace's sizable archives.

The Egyptian version of the peace treaty was engraved on the walls of Pharaoh Ramesses II's mortuary temple in Thebes. Translation of the text revealed that this engraving was originally translated from the silver tablet given to Ramesses II, but had since been lost to contemporary historians. The scribes who engraved the Egyptian version of the treaty included descriptions of the figures and seals that were on the tablet that the Hittites delivered.[8] Two of the tablets are today displayed at the Museum of the Ancient Orient, part of the Istanbul Archaeology Museums. The third is on display in the Berlin State Museums in Germany.[9] A copy of this treaty is prominently displayed on a wall in the United Nations Headquarters in New York City.



Pre-Ramesses II relationship with the Hittites[edit]

Hittite-Egyptian relations officially began once the Hatti took over Mitanni's role as the ruling power in central Syria and from there tensions would continue to be high until the conclusion of the treaty nearly one hundred years later.[12] During the invasion and eventual defeat of Mitanni, the Hittite armies poured into Syria and began to exert their rule over the Egyptian vassals of Kadesh and Amurru. The loss of these lands in northern Syria would never be forgotten by the Egyptian pharaohs and their later actions demonstrated that they never would fully concede this loss at the hands of the Hittite empire.[13] Egypt's attempts to regain the territory lost during the rule of Akhenaten continued to be futile until under the leadership of Seti I, father to Ramesses II, did significant gains start to be made. In his own Kadesh-Amurru campaign against the Hittite armies Seti I vanquished his foes at a battle near Kadesh, these gains proved short-lived since Kadesh was eventually given up by Seti in a later treaty.[14] This short gain by the Egyptians was the "opening salvo" of a conflict between the two nations which would drag on over the next two decades.[15]

Battle of Kadesh[edit]

The accounts of this battle mainly are derived from Egyptian literary accounts known as the Bulletin (also known as the Record) and the Poem as well as pictorial reliefs on the Ramesseum.[16] Unfortunately for scholars and individuals interested in the Battle of Kadesh the details that these sources provide are heavily biased interpretation of the events. Since Ramesses II had complete control over the building projects these resources were used for propagandistic purposes by the pharaoh who used them to brag about his victory at Kadesh.[17] Despite this uncertainty it is known that Ramesses marched through Syria with four divisions of troops in the hopes of destroying the Hittite presence there and restoring Egypt to the "preeminent position it had enjoyed under Tuthmosis III".[18] The Hittite king, Muwatallis, gathered together an army of his allies to prevent the invasion of his territory. At the site of Kadesh Ramesses foolishly outdistanced the remainder of his forces and after hearing unreliable intelligence regarding the Hittite position from a pair of captured prisoners the pharaoh pitched camp across from the town.[19] The Hittite armies, hidden behind the town, launched a surprise attack against the Amun division and quickly sent the division scattering. Although Ramesses tried to rally his troops against the onslaught of the Hittite chariots it wasn't until the arrival of relief forces from Amurru that the Hittite attack was thrown back.[20] Although the Egyptians were able to survive a terrible predicament in Kadesh it was not the splendid victory that Ramesses sought to portray but rather a stalemate in which both sides sustained heavily losses.[21] After an unsuccessful attempt to gain further ground the following day, Ramesses headed back south to Egypt bragging about his individual achievements during Kadesh. Even though Ramesses technically won the battle, he ultimately lost the war when Muwatallis and his army retook Amurru and extended the buffer zone with Egypt further southward.[22]

Ramesses' subsequent campaigns into Syria[edit]

Despite suffering the later losses during his year five invasion of Syria Ramesses II launched another campaign in his eighth year of rule which proved largely successful. Instead of launching an attack against the heavily fortified position of Kadesh or going through Amurru, Ramesses conquered the city of Dapur in the hope of using the city as a bridgehead for future campaigns.[23] After the successful capture Dapur the army returned to Egypt and consequently the recently acquired territory reverted to Hittite control. In year ten of his rule Ramesses II launched another attack on the Hittite holdings in central Syria and yet again all areas of conquest eventually returned to Hittite hands. It is this campaign that led the pharaoh to recognize the impossible task of holding Syria in such a fashion and therefore from year 11 to 17 his northern campaigns ceased to be.[24] This period is notable in the relationship between the Hittites and the Egyptians because despite the hostilities between the two nations and military conquests in Syria, Kadesh had been the last direct, official military confrontation fought among the Hittites and Egyptians. In some regards, as historians have noted, this period can be considered 'cold war' between Hatti and Egypt.[25]


The Egyptian version of the peace treaty was preserved on a wall in the Temple of Amun at Karnak, with other copies in temples at Luxor and Abydos. Jean-François Champollion copied a portion of the accord in 1828 and published his findings in 1844.[4] The Egyptian account described a great battle against the "Great King of Khatti" – a then-unknown figure, later confirmed by other archaeological evidence to be the Hittite monarch Muwatalli II.

In 1906-1908, the German archaeologist Hugo Winckler excavated the site of the Hittite capital, Hattusa (now Boğazkale in Turkey) in conjunction with Theodore Makridi, the second director of the Istanbul Archaeological Museum. The joint Turkish-German team found the remains of the royal archives where they discovered 10,000 clay tablets documenting many of the Hittites' diplomatic activities.[26] The haul included three tablets on which the text of the treaty was inscribed in the Akkadian language, a lingua franca of the time. Winckler immediately grasped the significance of the discovery:








A second clause promotes alliance by making reassurances of aid, most likely military support, if either party is attacked by a third party or by internal forces of rebellion or insurgency.[30] The other stipulations coincide with Hattušiliš' aims (consult Hittite aims section) in that the Hittite ruler placed great emphasis on establishing legitimacy for his rule: each country swore to the other to extradite political fugitives back to their home country and within the Hittite version of the treaty Ramesses II agreed to provide support to Hattušiliš' successors in order to hold the Hittite throne against dissenters.[30][31] After the conclusion of the provision detailing the extradition of emigrants to their land of origin, the two rulers call upon the respective gods of Hatti and Egypt to bear witness to their agreement. The inclusion of the gods is a common feature in major pieces of international law since only a direct appeal to the gods could provide the proper means to guarantee adherence to the treaty.[32] Their noted ability to bestow curses and blessings to people is employed as a serious penalty that would be imposed in case of a violation.

Analysis-theories about the treaty[edit]

Previous and contemporary Egyptologists have argued over the correct labeling of the treaty: some have interpreted it as a treaty of peace while others have seen it as a treaty alliance between two hostile states. James Breasted in 1906 was one of the first people to collect the historical documents of Ancient Egypt in an anthology and understood the treaty to be "not only a treaty of alliance, but also a treaty of peace, and the war [Ramesses' Syrian campaigns] evidently continued until the negotiations for the treaty began".[33] For Breasted the intermediate periods of conflict were directly resolved by the signing of the treaty and therefore required the treaty to be one of both alliance and peace. However later Egyptologists and other scholars began, even within twenty years of Breasted's publishing, to question whether or not the treaty between Ramesses II and Hattušiliš III to be one of peace at all. Alan Gardiner and his partner S. Langdon examined previous interpretations and determined that their predecessors had misinterpreted the line "to beg peace" in the text. This oversight in the language caused Egyptologists to incorrectly see the treaty terminating a war instead of seeking a beneficial alliance between Hatti and Egypt.[34] Trevor Bryce further argues that within the Late Bronze Age treaties were established "for reasons of expediency and self-interest…their concern was much more with establishing strategic alliances than with peace for its own sake".[35] The consensus that is starting to emerge is that although the treaty mentions establishing "brotherhood and peace forever" it is not about peace but rather about forming a mutually beneficial alliance between the two powers.

Another matter that has caused scholars to speculate is which of the two countries pursued negotiations first. As previously mentioned Ramesses II had lost portions of his Syrian territory when he retreated back to Egypt at the conclusion of the Battle of Kadesh. In this sense Hattušiliš would have had the upper hand in the negotiations considering Ramesses' desires to emulate the militaristic successes of Tuthmosis III. Up until the 1920s, Egyptologists had mistaken the insecurity of Egypt's Syrian holdings to mean that Ramesses had come to Hattušiliš begging for a solution to the Syria problem. Donald Magnetti brings up the point that the pharaoh's duty to bring mortal activity in line with the divine order through the maintenance of maat would have been reason enough for Ramesses II to pursue peace.[36] However this interpretation is incorrect since the questions about Hattušiliš' legitimacy as monarch would demand recognition by his fellow royals in the Near East. The weak position abroad and at home that defined Hattušiliš' reign suggests that it was the Hatti leader who sued for peace.[37] In fact Trevor Bryce interprets the opening lines of the treaty "Ramesses, Beloved of Amon, Great King, King of Egypt, hero, concluded on a tablet of silver with Hattušiliš, Great King, King of Hatti, his brother" to enforce that the incentives of the Hatti ruler had far greater implications which compelled him to sue for peace.[38]


Egyptian aims[edit]

Considering his relatively stronger position over Hattušiliš, what would Ramesses hope to achieve by accepting an alliance with his hated Hittite enemies? After fifteen years of futile attempts at regaining his lost territory in Syria, scholars argue that Ramesses now realized that his opportunities to match the military achievements of Tuthmosis III were unrealizable. In that light, it became increasingly important for Ramesses to obtain an international victory through diplomacy to bolster his deeds as pharaoh.[39] The attempts at regaining the lands that the Hittites had taken had ultimately failed to break the hold that the Hittites had over the region. Instead Ramesses would take his losses so long as the Hittites would recognize the current division of Syria, give Egypt access to ports in the Hittite territory to boost commerce, and grant trading access as far north as Ugarit.[40] Therefore the advancement Egypt's financial and security interests controlled Ramesses' willingness to pursue friendlier relations with the Hittites. Maintaining the status quo in the region became a priority for Ramesses considering the emergence of the Assyrian military power. Assyria as a military force was not to be reckoned with and thereby made it desirable to ensure that Assyria would not have a presence in Syria. If the Assyrians were allowed to enter Syria they would be an arm's length away from Egypt herself and pose a threat to Egypt proper.[41] By accepting the Hittite overture of alliance the newly made allies would help safeguard their mutual holdings in Syria against this upstart power.[42]

Besides the added incentive of no longer stressing the finances with expensive wars with Hatti and increasing the security of Egypt's claims in Syria, signing the treaty with Hatti also provided Ramesses the opportunity to brag about his "defeat" of the Hittites. Since Hattušiliš had been the one to approach Ramesses, the pharaoh in his depictions at the Ramesseum represents the settlement as one that the Hittite had asked for in a position of submission.[43] Considering the official language of the treaties at the time was completely independent of one another Ramesses was able to present the terms of the treaty from his perspective. This free control over the depictions of his role by the language of the treaty gave the pharaoh opportunity to present a greatly idealized point of view.[44] His ability to assert a sense of supremacy as ruler of Egypt and his attempts to portray this strategic alliance as a victory over the Hittites demonstrate why Ramesses' would be so willing to choose such a mutually beneficial peace. The conclusion of open hostilities between the two regional powers was a personal triumph for the aging pharaoh and as his monument at Abu Simbel shows the pharaoh made his subjects well aware of the fact that he, Ramesses, was the conqueror of the Hittites.[45]

Hittite aims[edit]




After reaching the desired alliance with the Hatti, Ramesses was now able to turn his energies to domestic building projects, such as the completion of his great rock Abu Simbel temples.[52] The warming of the relationship between Ramesses and the Hittite king enabled the pharaoh to gather the necessary resources, which no longer were spent on the war effort but rather, for the extensive construction projects. In year 34 of Ramesses II's reign there is evidence that to continue the relationship between the two empires, the pharaoh married a Hittite princess in an effort to establish stronger, familial bonds with Hatti.[53] Evidence of the dynastic marriage as well as the lack of textual evidence of a deterioration of the friendly relationship demonstrates that peaceful dealings between Hatti and Egypt continued for the remainder of Ramesses' reign.[54] By furthering their bonds of friendship through marriage the Hittites and Egyptians ensured that a mutually beneficial peace would exist between them until the fall of Hatti to Assyria nearly a century later.[55]


  1. ^ Bryce, Trevor. The Kingdom of the Hittites. Oxford University Press, USA, 1999 page 256
  2. ^ Klengel, Horst, "From War to Eternal Peace: Ramesses II and Khattushili III," Canadian Society for Mesopotamian Studies 37 (September 2002), page 52
  3. ^ Barker, Craig J. International Law and International Relations. Continuum International Publishing Group, 2000, ISBN 0-8264-5028-8, p. 2.
  4. ^ a b c Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und vorderasiatische Archäologie. Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1999, p. 149.
  5. ^ "Peace Treaty between Ramses II and Hattusili III". 
  6. ^ Fitzgerald, Stephanie. Ramses II: Egyptian Pharaoh, Warrior, and Builder, p. 64. Compass Point Books, 2008. ISBN 978-0-7565-3836-1
  7. ^ Klengel, 51.
  9. ^ "Kadesh Treaty". Museum of the Ancient Orient, Istanbul
  10. ^ a b c d Bederman, David J. International law in antiquity, pp. 147-150. Cambridge University Press, 2001. ISBN 978-0-521-79197-7
  11. ^ Burney, p. 233
  13. ^ Murnane "The Road to Kadesh" 24
  15. ^ Murnane "Battle of Kadesh" 105
  18. ^ Bryce The Kingdom of the Hittites 256
  19. ^ Kitchen 54
  20. ^ Murnane "Battle of Kadesh"
  21. ^ Murnane, "The Road to Kadesh", 426.
  22. ^ Kitchen 63
  23. ^ Kitchen 68
  24. ^ Kitchen 70
  25. ^ Klengel 51
  26. ^ "Boğazköy: Excavations" in Historical dictionary of the Hittites, pp. 46-47. Burney, Charles Allen. Scarecrow Press, 2004. ISBN 978-0-8108-4936-5
  28. ^ Klengel 49
  29. ^ Breasted 169
  30. ^ a b Bryce Kingdom of the Hittites 307
  33. ^ Breasted 166
  35. ^ Bryce "The 'Eternal Treaty' from the Hittite perspective" 1
  36. ^ Magnetti 823
  37. ^ Gardiner, Alan H., Langdon S 201
  38. ^ Bryce "The 'Eternal Treaty' from the Hittite perspective" 8
  39. ^ Bryce The Kingdom of the Hittites 306
  40. ^ Kitchen 75
  41. ^ Rowton, M.B., "The Background of the Treaty between Ramesses II and Hattušiliš III," Journal of Cuneiform Studies 13:1 (1959) page 11
  42. ^ Bryce The Kingdom of the Hittites 304
  43. ^ Bryce "The 'Eternal Treaty' from the Hittite perspective" 3
  44. ^ Bryce The Kingdom of the Hittites 307
  45. ^ Breasted 174
  46. ^ Bryce "The 'Eternal Treaty' from the Hittite Perspective" 6
  47. ^ Kitchen 74
  48. ^ Bryce "The 'Eternal Treaty' from the Hittite Perspective" 7
  49. ^ Bryce The Kingdom of the Hittite 281
  50. ^ Klengel 54
  52. ^ Kitchen 81
  53. ^ Cline, Eric H. "Hittites"
  54. ^ Klengel 55
  55. ^ Breasted 175