John Diefenbaker

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The Right Honourable
John Diefenbaker
John G. Diefenbaker.jpg
13th Prime Minister of Canada
In office
June 21, 1957 – April 22, 1963
Monarch Elizabeth II
Governor General Vincent Massey
Georges Vanier
Preceded by Louis St. Laurent
Succeeded by Lester Pearson
Personal details
Born John George Diefenbaker
(1895-09-18)September 18, 1895
Neustadt, Ontario
Ottawa, Ontario
Resting place Outside the Diefenbaker Canada Centre, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
Political party Progressive Conservative
Children none[a]
Alma mater University of Saskatchewan
Profession Lawyer
Religion Canadian Baptist
Signature A scrawled "J Diefenbaker"
Military service
Nickname(s) "Dief", "The Chief"
Allegiance Canada
Service/branch Canadian Army
Years of service 1916–1917
Rank Cdn-Army-Lt(OF-1A)-2014.svg Lieutenant
Unit 196th Battalion
Battles/wars First World War




Even though factionalism within the party was muted by Diefenbaker's electoral success, it surged again as the Progressive Conservatives lost support, falling from office in 1963, and his opponents were able to force a leadership convention in 1967. Diefenbaker stood for re-election as party leader at the last moment, but only attracted minimal support and withdrew. He remained an MP until his death in 1979, two months after Joe Clark became the first Tory Prime Minister since Diefenbaker.

Early life[edit]




Diefenbaker as a law student, c.1919

After graduating from high school in Saskatoon, in 1912, Diefenbaker entered the University of Saskatchewan.[6] He received his Bachelor of Arts degree in 1915, and his Master of Arts the following year.[7]


After leaving the military in 1917,[8] Diefenbaker returned to Saskatchewan where he resumed his work as an articling student in law. He received his law degree in 1919,[10] the first student to secure three degrees from the University of Saskatchewan.[11] On June 30, 1919, he was called to the bar, and the following day, opened a small practice in the village of Wakaw, Saskatchewan.[10]

Barrister and candidate (1919–1940)[edit]

Wakaw days (1919–1924)[edit]

Recreation of Diefenbaker's first office, Wakaw, Saskatchewan


Diefenbaker won the local people over through his success; in his first year in practice, he tried 62 jury trials, winning approximately half of his cases. He rarely called defence witnesses, thereby avoiding the possibility of rebuttal witnesses for the Crown, and securing the last word for himself.[13] In late 1920, he was elected to the village council to serve a three-year term.[14]



Aspiring politician (1924–1929)[edit]




Handout for the Diefenbaker campaign 1926


Perennial candidate (1929–1940)[edit]

Diefenbaker as King's Counsel, 1929

Diefenbaker stood for the Legislative Assembly in the 1929 provincial election. He was defeated,[23] but Saskatchewan Conservatives formed their first government, with help from smaller parties. As the defeated Conservative candidate for Prince Albert City, he was given charge of political patronage there, and was created a King's Counsel.[24] Three weeks after his electoral defeat, he married Saskatoon teacher Edna Brower.[25]

Diefenbaker chose not to stand for the House of Commons in the 1930 federal election, citing health reasons. The Conservatives gained a majority in the election, and party leader R.B. Bennett became Prime Minister.[24] Diefenbaker continued a high-profile legal practice, and in 1933, ran for mayor of Prince Albert. He was defeated by 48 votes in an election in which over 2,000 ballots were cast.[e]




Diefenbaker quietly sought the Conservative nomination for the federal riding of Lake Centre, but was unwilling to risk a divisive intra-party squabble. In what Diefenbaker biographer Smith states "appears to have been an elaborate and prearranged charade", Diefenbaker attended the nominating convention as keynote speaker, but withdrew when his name was proposed, stating a local man should be selected. The winner among the six remaining candidates, riding president W.B. Kelly, declined the nomination, urging the delegates to select Diefenbaker, which they promptly did.[30] Mackenzie King called a general election for March 25, 1940.[31] The incumbent in Lake Centre was the Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons, Liberal John Frederick Johnston. Diefenbaker campaigned aggressively in Lake Centre, holding 63 rallies and seeking to appeal to members of all parties. On election day, he defeated Johnston by 280 votes on what was otherwise a disastrous day for the Conservatives, who won only 39 seats out of the 245 in the House of Commons—their lowest total since Confederation.[31]

Parliamentary rise (1940–1957)[edit]

Mackenzie King years (1940–1948)[edit]


Diefenbaker was appointed to the House Committee on the Defence of Canada Regulations, an all-party committee which examined the wartime rules which allowed arrest and detention without trial. On June 13, 1940, Diefenbaker made his maiden speech as an MP, supporting the regulations, and emphatically stating that most Canadians of German descent were loyal.[34] When the Mackenzie King government sought to force Canadians of Japanese descent from the Pacific Coast, Diefenbaker fought against the government's actions. However, his efforts were unsuccessful, and the forced relocation and internment of many Japanese-Canadians proceeded.[35]

According to Diefenbaker biographer Smith, the Conservative MP quietly admired Mackenzie King for his political skills.[36] However, Diefenbaker proved a gadfly and an annoyance to Mackenzie King. Angered by the words of Diefenbaker and fellow Conservative MP Howard Green in seeking to censure the government, the Prime Minister referred to Conservative MPs as "a mob".[36] When Diefenbaker accompanied two other Conservative leaders to a briefing by Mackenzie King on the war, the Prime Minister exploded at Diefenbaker (a constituent of his), "What business do you have to be here? You strike me to the heart every time you speak."[36]

The Conservatives elected a floor leader, and in 1941 approached former Prime Minister Meighen, who had been appointed as a senator by Bennett, about becoming party leader again. Meighen agreed, and resigned his Senate seat, but lost a by-election for an Ontario seat in the House of Commons.[37] He remained as leader for several months, although he could not enter the chamber of the House of Commons. Meighen sought to move the Tories to the left, in order to undercut the Liberals and to take support away from the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF, the predecessor of the New Democratic Party (NDP)). To that end, he sought to draft the Liberal-Progressive premier of Manitoba, John Bracken, to lead the Conservatives. Diefenbaker objected to what he saw as an attempt to rig the party's choice of new leader[38] and stood for the leadership himself.[39] Bracken was elected on the second ballot; Diefenbaker finished a distant third in both polls. At Bracken's request, the convention changed the party's name to "Progressive Conservative Party of Canada".[40] Bracken chose not to seek entry to the House through a by-election, and when the Conservatives elected a new floor leader, Diefenbaker was defeated by one vote.[41]



Leadership contender (1948–1956)[edit]

For more details on one of Diefenbaker's major legal cases during this time, see Canoe River train crash.
Diefenbaker makes his point in the House of Commons, 1948.




The governing Liberals repeatedly attempted to deprive Diefenbaker of his parliamentary seat. In 1948, Lake Centre was redistricted to remove areas which strongly supported Diefenbaker. In spite of that, he was returned in the 1949 election, the only PC member from Saskatchewan. In 1952, a redistricting committee dominated by Liberals abolished Lake Centre entirely, dividing its voters among three other ridings.[46] Diefenbaker stated in his memoirs that he had considered retiring from the House; with Drew only a year older than he was, the Westerner saw little prospect of advancement, and had received tempting offers from Ontario law firms. However, the gerrymandering so angered him that he decided to fight for a seat.[49] Diefenbaker's party had taken Prince Albert only once, in 1911, but he decided to stand in that riding for the 1953 election, and was successful.[46] He would hold that seat for the rest of his life.[50] Even though Diefenbaker campaigned nationally for party candidates, the Progressive Conservatives gained little, rising to 51 seats as St. Laurent led the Liberals to a fifth successive majority.[51] In addition to trying to secure his departure from Parliament, the government opened a home for unwed Indian mothers next door to Diefenbaker's home in Prince Albert.[46]



With the Tories' second consecutive disastrous defeat under Drew in 1953, speculation arose in the press that the leader might be pressured to step aside. Drew was determined to remain, however, and Diefenbaker was careful to avoid any action that might be seen as disloyal. However, Diefenbaker was never a member of the "Five O'clock Club" of Drew intimates who met the leader in his office for a drink and gossip each day.[54] By 1955, there was a widespread feeling among Tories that Drew was not capable of leading the party to a victory. At the same time, the Liberals were in flux as the aging St. Laurent tired of politics.[55] Drew was able to damage the government in a weeks-long battle over the Trans-Canada Pipeline in 1956—the so-called Pipeline Debate—in which the government, in a hurry to obtain financing for the pipeline, imposed closure before the debate even began. The Tories and the CCF combined to obstruct business in the House for weeks before the Liberals were finally able to pass the measure. Diefenbaker played a relatively minor role in the Pipeline Debate, speaking only once.[56]

Leader of the Opposition; 1957 election[edit]

By 1956, the Social Credit Party was becoming a potential rival to the Tories as Canada's main right-wing party.[57] Canadian journalist and author Bruce Hutchison discussed the state of the Tories in 1956:


In August 1956, Drew fell ill and many within the party urged him to step aside, feeling that the Progressive Conservatives needed vigorous leadership with an election likely within a year. He resigned in late September, and Diefenbaker immediately announced his candidacy for the leadership.[59] A number of Progressive Conservative leaders, principally from the Ontario wing of the party, started a "Stop Diefenbaker" movement, and wooed University of Toronto president Sidney Smith as a possible candidate. When Smith declined,[60] they could find no one of comparable stature to stand against Diefenbaker. At the convention in Ottawa in December, Diefenbaker won on the first ballot, and the dissidents reconciled themselves to his victory. After all, they reasoned, Diefenbaker was now 61 and unlikely to lead the party for more than one general election, an election they believed would be won by the Liberals regardless of who led the Tories.[59]

In January 1957, Diefenbaker took his place as Leader of the Official Opposition. In February, St. Laurent informed him that Parliament would be dissolved in April for an election on June 10. The Liberals submitted a budget in March; Diefenbaker attacked it for overly high taxes, failure to assist pensioners, and a lack of aid for the poorer provinces.[61] Parliament was dissolved on April 12.[62] St. Laurent was so confident of victory that he did not even bother to make recommendations to the Governor General to fill the 16 vacancies in the Senate.[63][64]

Diefenbaker ran on a platform which concentrated on changes in domestic policies. He pledged to work with the provinces to reform the Senate. He proposed a vigorous new agricultural policy, seeking to stabilize income for farmers. He sought to reduce dependence on trade with the United States, and to seek closer ties with the United Kingdom.[65] St. Laurent called the Tory platform "a mere cream-puff of a thing—with more air than substance".[66] Diefenbaker and the PC party used television adroitly, whereas St. Laurent stated that he was more interested in seeing people than in talking to cameras.[67] Though the Liberals outspent the Progressive Conservatives three to one, according to Newman, their campaign had little imagination, and was based on telling voters that their only real option was to re-elect St. Laurent.[64]



The final Gallup poll before the election showed the Liberals ahead, 48% to 34%.[69] Just before the election, Maclean's magazine printed its regular weekly issue, to go on sale the morning after the vote, editorializing that democracy in Canada was still strong despite a sixth consecutive Liberal victory.[70] On election night, the Progressive Conservative advance started early, with the gain of two seats in reliably Liberal Newfoundland.[71] The party picked up nine seats in Nova Scotia, five in Quebec, 28 in Ontario, and at least one seat in every other province. The Progressive Conservatives took 112 seats to the Liberals' 105: a plurality, but not a majority.[f] While the Liberals finished some 200,000 votes ahead of the Tories nationally, that margin was mostly wasted in overwhelming victories in safe Quebec seats. St. Laurent could have legally stayed in office until Diefenbaker could defeat him on the floor of the Commons.[72] However, with the minor parties pledging to cooperate with a Tory government, St. Laurent chose not to do so, making Diefenbaker Prime Minister-designate of Canada.[73]

Prime Minister (1957–1963)[edit]

Domestic events and policies[edit]

Minority government[edit]



With the Conservatives leading in the polls, Diefenbaker wanted a new election, hopeful that his party would gain a majority of seats. It was then Canadian constitutional practice that the Governor General could refuse a dissolution early in a parliament's term, unless the government had been defeated in the House, or was winning divisions by only a handful of votes. Diefenbaker sought a pretext for a new election.[78]

Such an excuse presented itself when former Minister of External Affairs Lester Pearson attended his first parliamentary session as Leader of the Opposition on January 20, 1958, four days after becoming the Liberal leader. In his first speech as leader, Pearson (recently returned from Oslo where he had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize), moved an amendment to supply (a technical device whereby oppositions attempt to secure the government's resignation), and called, not for an election, but for the Progressive Conservatives to resign, allowing the Liberals to form a government. Pearson stated that the condition of the economy required "a Government pledged to implement Liberal policies".[79] Government MPs laughed at Pearson, as did members of the press who were present. Pearson later recorded in his memoirs that he knew that his "first attack on the government had been a failure, indeed a fiasco".[79] Diefenbaker spoke for two hours and three minutes, and devastated his Liberal opposition. He mocked Pearson, contrasting the party leader's address at the Liberal leadership convention with his speech to the House:

On Thursday there was shrieking defiance, on the following Monday there is shrinking indecision ... The only reason that this motion is worded as it is is that my honourable friends opposite quake when they think of what will happen if an election comes ... It is the resignation from responsibility of a great party.[80]



According to the Minister of Finance, Donald Fleming, "Pearson looked at first merry, then serious, then uncomfortable, then disturbed, and finally sick."[80] Pearson recorded in his memoirs that the Prime Minister "tore me to shreds".[79] Liberal frontbencher Paul Martin (whose son Paul Martin, Jr. would later become Prime Minister), called Diefenbaker's response "one of the greatest devastating speeches" and "Diefenbaker's great hour".[82] On February 1, Diefenbaker asked the Governor General, Vincent Massey, to dissolve Parliament, alleging that though St. Laurent had promised cooperation, Pearson had made it clear he would not follow his predecessor's lead. Massey agreed to the dissolution, and Diefenbaker set an election date of March 31, 1958.[83][84]

1958 election[edit]

The 1958 election campaign saw a huge outpouring of public support for the Progressive Conservatives. At the opening campaign rally in Winnipeg on February 12 voters filled the hall until the doors had to be closed for safety reasons. They were promptly broken down by the crowd outside.[85] At the rally, Diefenbaker called for "[a] new vision. A new hope. A new soul for Canada."[86] He pledged to open the Canadian North, to seek out its resources and make it a place for settlements.[85] The conclusion to his speech expounded on what became known as "The Vision",



Pearson and his Liberals faltered badly in the campaign. The Liberal Party leader tried to make an issue of the fact that Diefenbaker had called a winter election, generally disfavoured in Canada due to travel difficulties. Pearson's objection cut little ice with voters, and served only to remind the electorate that the Liberals, at their convention, had called for an election.[91] Pearson mocked Diefenbaker's northern plans as "igloo-to-igloo" communications, and was assailed by the Prime Minister for being condescending.[92] The Liberal leader spoke to small, quiet crowds, which quickly left the halls when he was done.[91] By election day, Pearson had no illusions that he might win the election, and hoped only to salvage 100 seats. The Liberals would be limited to less than half of that.[91]


Mandate (1958–1962)[edit]


As a trial lawyer, and in opposition, Diefenbaker had long been concerned with civil liberties. On July 1, 1960, Dominion Day, he introduced the Canadian Bill of Rights in Parliament, and the bill rapidly passed and was proclaimed on August 10, fulfilling a lifetime goal of Diefenbaker's.[95] The document purported to guarantee fundamental freedoms, with special attention to the rights of the accused. However, as a mere piece of federal legislation, it could be amended by any other law, and the question of civil liberties was to a large extent a provincial matter, outside of federal jurisdiction. One lawyer remarked that the document provided rights for all Canadians, "so long as they don't live in any of the provinces".[96] Diefenbaker had appointed the first First Nations member of the Senate, James Gladstone in January 1958,[97] and in 1960, his government extended voting rights to all native people.[8]



Diefenbaker's disinclination to make concessions to Quebec, along with the disintegration of the Union Nationale, the failure of the Tories to build an effective structure in Quebec, and Diefenbaker not appointing many Quebecers to his Cabinet, all led to an erosion of Progressive Conservative support in Quebec.[99] Diefenbaker did recommend the appointment of the first French-Canadian governor general, Georges Vanier.[8]



By the time Diefenbaker called an election for June 18, 1962, the party had been damaged by loss of support in Quebec and in urban areas[104] as voters grew disillusioned with Diefenbaker and the Tories. The PC campaign was hurt when the Bank of Canada was forced to devalue the Canadian dollar to 92½ US cents; it had previously hovered in the range from 95 cents to par with the United States dollar. Privately printed satirical "Diefenbucks" swept the country.[105] On election day, the Progressive Conservatives lost 92 seats, but were still able to form a minority government. The New Democratic Party (the successor to the CCF) and Social Credit held the balance of power in the new Parliament.[104]

Foreign policy[edit]

Britain and the Commonwealth[edit]


Diefenbaker attended a meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London shortly after taking office in 1957. He generated headlines by proposing that 15% of Canadian spending on US imports instead be spent on imports from the United Kingdom.[106] Britain responded with an offer of a free trade agreement, which was rejected by the Canadians.[107] As the Harold Macmillan government in the UK sought to enter the Common Market, Diefenbaker feared that Canadian exports to the UK would be threatened. He also believed that the mother country should place the Commonwealth first, and sought to discourage Britain's entry. The British were annoyed at Canadian interference. Britain's initial attempt to enter the Common Market was vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle.[108]

Through 1959, the Diefenbaker government had a policy of not criticizing South Africa and its apartheid government.[109] In this stance, Diefenbaker had the support of the Liberals but not that of CCF leader Hazen Argue.[110] In 1960, however, the South Africans sought to maintain membership in the Commonwealth even if South African white voters chose to make the country a republic in a referendum scheduled for later that year. South Africa asked the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference to allow it to remain in the Commonwealth regardless of the result of the referendum. Diefenbaker privately expressed his distaste for apartheid to South African External Affairs Minister Eric Louw and urged him to give the black and coloured people of South Africa at least the minimal representation they had originally had. Louw, attending the conference as Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd recovered from an assassination attempt, refused.[111] The conference resolved that an advance decision would be interfering in South Africa's internal affairs.[112]


Policy towards the United States[edit]

"Ike" and "John": the Eisenhower years[edit]

American officials were uncomfortable with Diefenbaker's initial election, believing they had heard undertones of anti-Americanism in the campaign. After years of the Liberals, one US State Department official noted, "We'll be dealing with an unknown quantity."[115] Diefenbaker's 1958 landslide was viewed with disappointment by the US officials, who knew and liked Pearson from his years in diplomacy and who felt the Liberal Party leader would be more likely to institute pro-American policies.[116] However, US President Dwight Eisenhower took pains to foster good relations with Diefenbaker. The two men found much in common, from Western farm backgrounds to a love of fishing, and Diefenbaker had an admiration for war leaders such as Eisenhower and Churchill.[117] Diefenbaker wrote in his memoirs, "I might add that President Eisenhower and I were from our first meeting on an "Ike–John" basis, and that we were as close as the nearest telephone."[118] The Eisenhower–Diefenbaker relationship was sufficiently strong that the touchy Canadian Prime Minister was prepared to overlook slights. When Eisenhower addressed Parliament in October 1958, he downplayed trade concerns that Diefenbaker had publicly expressed. Diefenbaker said nothing and took Eisenhower fishing.[119]

Diefenbaker had approved plans to join the United States in what became known as NORAD, an integrated air defence system, in mid-1957.[120] Despite Liberal misgivings that Diefenbaker had committed Canada to the system before consulting either the Cabinet or Parliament, Pearson and his followers voted with the government to approve NORAD in June 1958.[121]

In 1959, the Diefenbaker government cancelled the development and manufacture of the Avro CF-105 Arrow. The Arrow was a supersonic jet interceptor built by Avro Canada in Malton, Ontario, to defend Canada in the event of a Soviet attack. The interceptor had been under development since 1953, and had suffered from many cost overruns and complications.[122] In 1955, the RCAF stated it would only need nine squadrons of Arrows, down from 20, as originally proposed.[122] According to C.D. Howe, the former minister responsible for postwar reconstruction, the St. Laurent government had serious misgivings about continuing the Arrow program, and planned to discuss its termination after the 1957 election.[123] In the run-up to the 1958 election, with three Tory-held seats at risk in the Malton area, the Diefenbaker government authorized further funding.[124] Even though the first test flights of the Arrow were successful, the US government was unwilling to commit to a purchase of aircraft from Canada.[125] In September 1958, Diefenbaker warned[126] that the Arrow would come under complete review in six months.[127] The company began seeking out other projects including a US-funded "saucer" program that became the VZ-9 Avrocar, and also mounted a public relations offensive urging that the Arrow go into full production.[128] On February 20, 1959, the Cabinet decided to cancel the Avro Arrow, following an earlier decision to permit the United States to build two Bomarc missile bases in Canada. The company immediately dismissed its 14,000 employees, blaming Diefenbaker for the firings, though it rehired 2,500 employees to fulfil existing obligations.[g]


Bilateral antipathy: the Kennedy administration[edit]

The Kennedy administration began its dealings with Canada badly, with Kennedy mispronouncing Diefenbaker's[h] name in a press conference announcing the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in February 1961. A furious Diefenbaker brought up in Cabinet whether to send a note of protest at the gaffe to Washington; his colleagues were inclined to let the matter pass.[131] When the two met in Washington on February 20, Diefenbaker was impressed by Kennedy, and invited him to visit Ottawa. President Kennedy, however, told his aides that he never wanted "to see the boring son of a bitch again".[132] The Ottawa visit also began badly: at the welcome at the airport, Kennedy again mispronounced Diefenbaker's name and stated that after hearing the Prime Minister's (notoriously bad) French, he was uncertain if he should venture into the language (Kennedy's French was equally bad).[133] After meeting with Diefenbaker, Kennedy accidentally left behind a briefing note suggesting he "push" Diefenbaker on several issues, including the decision to accept nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, which bitterly divided the Cabinet. Diefenbaker was also annoyed by Kennedy's speech to Parliament, in which he urged Canada to join the OAS (which Diefenbaker had already rejected),[134] and by the President spending most of his time talking to Leader of the Opposition Pearson at the formal dinner.[135][136] Both Kennedy and his wife Jackie were bored by Diefenbaker's Churchill anecdotes at lunch, stories that Jackie Kennedy later described as "painful".[137]


By 1962, the American government was becoming increasingly concerned at the lack of a commitment from Canada to take nuclear weapons. The interceptors and Bomarc missiles with which Canada was being supplied as a NORAD member were either of no use or of greatly diminished utility without nuclear devices.[139] Canadian and American military officers launched a quiet campaign to make this known to the press, and to advocate for Canadian agreement to acquire the warheads.[140] Diefenbaker was also upset when Pearson was invited to the White House for a dinner for Nobel Prize winners in April, and met with the President privately for 40 minutes.[141] When the Prime Minister met with retiring American Ambassador Livingston Merchant, he angrily disclosed the paper Kennedy had left behind, and hinted that he might make use of it in the upcoming election campaign.[142] Merchant's report caused consternation in Washington, and the ambassador was sent back to see Diefenbaker again. This time, he found Diefenbaker calm, and the Prime Minister pledged not to use the memo, and to give Merchant advance word if he changed his mind.[143] Canada appointed a new ambassador to Washington, Charles Ritchie, who on arrival received a cool reception from Kennedy and found that the squabble was affecting progress on a number of issues.[144]

Though Kennedy was careful to avoid overt favouritism during the 1962 Canadian election campaign, he did allow his pollster, Lou Harris, to work clandestinely for the Liberals.[145] Several times during the campaign, Diefenbaker stated that the Kennedy administration desired his defeat because he refused to "bow down to Washington".[146] After Diefenbaker was returned with a minority, Washington continued to press for acceptance of nuclear arms, but Diefenbaker, faced with a split between Defence Minister Douglas Harkness and External Affairs Minister Howard Green on the question, continued to stall, hoping that time and events would invite consensus.[147]

When the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted in October 1962, Kennedy chose not to consult with Diefenbaker before making decisions on what actions to take. The US President sent former Ambassador Merchant to Ottawa to inform the Prime Minister as to the content of the speech that Kennedy was to make on television. Diefenbaker was upset at both the lack of consultation and the fact that he was given less than two hours advance word.[148] He was angered again when the US government released a statement stating that it had Canada's full support.[149] In a statement to the Commons, Diefenbaker proposed sending representatives of neutral nations to Cuba to verify the American allegations, which Washington took to mean that he was questioning Kennedy's word.[150] When American forces went to a heightened alert, DEFCON 3, Diefenbaker was slow to order Canadian forces to match it. Harkness and the Chiefs of Staff had Canadian forces clandestinely go to that alert status anyway,[151] and Diefenbaker eventually authorized it.[152] The crisis ended without war, and polls found that Kennedy's actions were widely supported by Canadians. Diefenbaker was severely criticized in the media.[153]


 Button, "Keep the Chief"
Button urging Diefenbaker's re-election


With the Cabinet still divided between adherents of Green and Harkness, Diefenbaker made a speech in the Commons on January 25 that Fleming (by then Minister of Justice) termed "a model of obfuscation".[156] Harkness was initially convinced that Diefenbaker was saying that he would support nuclear warheads in Canada. After talking to the press, he realized that his view of the speech was not universally shared, and he asked Diefenbaker for clarification. Diefenbaker, however, continued to try to avoid taking a firm position.[156] On January 30, the US State Department issued a press release suggesting that Diefenbaker had made misstatements in his Commons speech. For the first time ever, Canada recalled its ambassador to Washington as a diplomatic protest.[157] Though all parties condemned the State Department action, the three parties outside the government demanded that Diefenbaker take a stand on the nuclear weapon issue.[158]


Two members of the government resigned the day after the government lost the vote.[161] As the campaign opened, the Tories trailed in the polls by 15 points. To Pearson and his Liberals, the only question was how large a majority they would win.[162] Peter Stursberg, who wrote two books about the Diefenbaker years, stated of that campaign:


Though the White House maintained public neutrality, privately Kennedy made it clear he desired a Liberal victory.[164] Kennedy lent Lou Harris, his pollster to work for the Liberals again.[165] On election day, April 8, 1963, the Liberals claimed 129 seats to the Tories' 95, five seats short of an absolute majority. Diefenbaker held to power for several days, until six Quebec Social Credit MPs signed a statement that Pearson should form the government. These votes would be enough to give Pearson support of a majority of the House of Commons, and Diefenbaker resigned. The six MPs repudiated the statement within days. Nonetheless, Pearson formed a government with the support of the NDP.[166]

Later years (1963–1979)[edit]

Return to opposition[edit]

Diefenbaker continued to lead the Progressive Conservatives, again as Leader of the Opposition. In November 1963, upon hearing of Kennedy's assassination, the Tory leader addressed the Commons, stating, "A beacon of freedom has gone. Whatever the disagreement, to me he stood as the embodiment of freedom, not only in his own country, but throughout the world."[167] In the 1964 Great Canadian Flag Debate, Diefenbaker led the unsuccessful opposition to the Maple Leaf flag, which the Liberals pushed for after the rejection of Pearson's preferred design showing three maple leaves. Diefenbaker preferred the existing Canadian Red Ensign or another design showing symbols of the nation's heritage.[168] He dismissed the adopted design, with a single red maple leaf and two red bars, as "a flag that Peruvians might salute".[169] At the request of Quebec Tory Léon Balcer, who feared devastating PC losses in the province at the next election, Pearson imposed closure, and the bill passed with the majority singing "O Canada" as Diefenbaker led the dissenters in "God Save the Queen".[169]


There were calls for Diefenbaker's retirement, especially from the Bay Street wing of the party as early as 1964. Diefenbaker initially beat back attempts to remove him without trouble.[172] When Pearson called an election in 1965 in the expectation of receiving a majority, Diefenbaker ran an aggressive campaign. The Liberals fell two seats short of a majority, and the Tories improved their position slightly at the expense of the smaller parties.[173] After the election, some Tories, led by party president Dalton Camp, began a quiet campaign to oust Diefenbaker.[8]

Camp was able to force a leadership review, which was held at the Tories' 1966 convention amidst allegations of vote rigging, violence, and seating arrangements designed to ensure that when Diefenbaker addressed the delegates, television viewers would see unmoved delegates in the first ten rows. Other Camp supporters tried to shout Diefenbaker down. Camp was successful in forcing a leadership convention for 1967.[174] Diefenbaker initially made no announcement as to whether he would stand, but angered by a resolution at the party's policy conference which spoke of "deux nations" or "two founding peoples" (as opposed to Diefenbaker's "One Canada"), decided to seek to retain his leadership.[8] Although Diefenbaker entered at the last minute to stand as a candidate for the leadership, he finished fifth on each of the first three ballots, and withdrew from the contest, which was won by Nova Scotia Premier Robert Stanfield.[175]

Diefenbaker addressed the delegates before Stanfield spoke,


Final years and death[edit]


Although Stanfield worked to try to unify the party, Diefenbaker and his loyalists proved difficult to reconcile. The division in the party broke out in well-publicised dissensions, as when Diefenbaker called on Progressive Conservative MPs to break with Stanfield's position on a bilingualism bill, and nearly half the caucus voted against their leader or abstained.[178] In addition to his parliamentary activities, Diefenbaker travelled extensively and began work on his memoirs, which were published in three volumes between 1975 and 1977. Pearson died of cancer in 1972, and Diefenbaker was asked if he had kind words for his old rival. Diefenbaker shook his head and said only, "He shouldn't have won the Nobel Prize."[179]


In the 1976 New Year Honours, Diefenbaker was created a Companion of Honour, an accolade bestowed as the personal gift of the Sovereign.[181] After a long illness, Olive Diefenbaker died on December 22, a loss which plunged Diefenbaker into despair.[182]

Joe Clark succeeded Stanfield as party leader in 1976, but as Clark had supported the leadership review, Diefenbaker held a grudge against him.[183] Diefenbaker had supported Claude Wagner for leader, but when Clark won, stated that Clark would make "a remarkable leader of this party".[184] However, Diefenbaker repeatedly criticized his party leader, to such an extent that Stanfield publicly asked Diefenbaker "to stop sticking a knife into Mr. Clark"—a request Diefenbaker did not agree to.[185] According to columnist Charles Lynch, Diefenbaker regarded Clark as an upstart and a pipsqueak.[186]

The Diefenbaker grave, close by the Diefenbaker Centre




Leo Mol's statue of John Diefenbaker on Parliament Hill, Ottawa

Several of Diefenbaker's policies did not survive the 16 years of Liberal rule which followed his fall. By the end of 1963, the first of the Bomarc warheads entered Canada, where they remained until the last were finally phased out during John Turner's brief government in 1984.[191] Diefenbaker's decision to have Canada remain outside the OAS was not reversed by Pearson, and it was not until 1989, under the Tory government of Brian Mulroney, that Canada joined.[192]

But many of what are now considered to be defining features of modern Canada can be traced back to Diefenbaker. Diefenbaker's Bill of Rights, although ineffective in its own right, laid the foundation for the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which came into force after his death.[8] Few people in Canada today think it at all remarkable that there are women or members of ethnic minorities in the federal cabinet or in the Senate; it was Diefenbaker who made such things normal. It was under Diefenbaker that Canada finally achieved universal adult suffrage, with the granting of the vote to Native Canadians in 1960. The removal of explicit racial discrimination from the criteria for admission to Canada under the Immigration Act of 1961 was a major factor in the creation of today's multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Canada. Tory factionalism and a distinct anti-Diefenbaker slant in the depictions of Diefenbaker's leadership (starting with Peter Newman's Renegade in Power of 1963) long conspired to write Diefenbaker off as a minor figure in Canadian history, an aberration even. But a serious study of what he achieved will reveal a lasting and positive imprint on Canada.

Diefenbaker reinvigorated a moribund party system in Canada. Clark and Mulroney, two men who, as students, worked on and were inspired by his 1957 triumph, became the only other Progressive Conservatives to lead the party to election triumphs.[i][181] Diefenbaker's biographer, Denis Smith, wrote of him, "In politics he had little more than two years of success in the midst of failure and frustration, but he retained a core of deeply committed loyalists to the end of his life and beyond. The federal Conservative Party that he had revived remained dominant in the prairie provinces for 25 years after he left the leadership."[8] The Harper government, believing that Tory prime ministers have been given short shrift in the naming of Canadian places and institutions, has named the former Ottawa City Hall, now a federal office building, the John G. Diefenbaker Building. It has also given Diefenbaker's name to a human rights award and an icebreaking vessel. Prime Minister Harper has often invoked Diefenbaker's northern vision in his speeches.[193]

Conservative Senator Marjory LeBreton worked in Diefenbaker's office during his second time as Opposition Leader, and has said of him, "He brought a lot of firsts to Canada, but a lot of it has been air-brushed from history by those who followed."[194] Historian Michael Bliss, who published a survey of the Canadian Prime Ministers, wrote of Diefenbaker:


See also[edit]


Explanatory notes

  5. ^ Smith 1995, p. 75. Thirty years later, the winning candidate, H.J. Fraser, challenged Diefenbaker for his parliamentary seat, and was defeated by a 5-to-1 margin. Newman 1963, p. 21.


  1. ^ a b Smith 1995, p. 1.
  2. ^ Diefenbaker 1975, pp. 17–18.
  3. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 5–6.
  4. ^ Newman 1963, p. 15.
  5. ^ a b Newman 1963, p. 16.
  6. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 15–16.
  7. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 19–20.
  8. ^ a b c d e f g h Smith 2000.
  9. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 20–30.
  10. ^ a b Smith 1995, pp. 31–33.
  11. ^ Diefenbaker 1975, p. 79.
  12. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 34–35.
  13. ^ Newman 1963, p. 18.
  14. ^ Smith 1995, p. 38.
  15. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 38–39.
  16. ^ Smith 1995, p. 41.
  17. ^ Diefenbaker 1975, p. 64.
  18. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 41–42.
  19. ^ Smith 1995, p. 43.
  20. ^ Newman 1963, pp. 19–20.
  21. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 44–46.
  22. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 47–50.
  23. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 56–57.
  24. ^ a b Smith 1995, pp. 70–71.
  25. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 58–60.
  26. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 76–77.
  27. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 81–83.
  28. ^ Newman 1963, pp. 22–23.
  29. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 98–99.
  30. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 102–103.
  31. ^ a b Newman 1963, pp. 23–24.
  32. ^ Smith 1995, p. 109.
  33. ^ Smith 1995, p. 116.
  34. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 114–115.
  35. ^ Diefenbaker 1975, pp. 223–224.
  36. ^ a b c Smith 1995, pp. 120–122.
  37. ^ Smith 1995, p. 125.
  38. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 128–129.
  39. ^ Smith 1995, p. 130.
  40. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 131–134.
  41. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 135–136.
  42. ^ Smith 1995, p. 155.
  43. ^ a b Bliss 2004, pp. 194–195.
  44. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 166–167.
  45. ^ Newman 1963, p. 28.
  46. ^ a b c d Newman 1963, pp. 29–30.
  47. ^ Diefenbaker 1975, pp. 268–269.
  48. ^ Newman 1963, p. 5.
  49. ^ Diefenbaker 1975, pp. 271–272.
  50. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 573–574.
  51. ^ Smith 1995, p. 195.
  52. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 185–189.
  53. ^ Bliss 2004, p. 202.
  54. ^ Smith 1995, p. 199.
  55. ^ Smith 1995, p. 200.
  56. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 201–203.
  57. ^ Meisel 1962, pp. 17–18.
  58. ^ Meisel 1962, p. 16.
  59. ^ a b Bliss 2004, p. 188.
  60. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 203–204.
  61. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 217–218.
  62. ^ Smith 1995, p. 224.
  63. ^ English 1992, p. 185.
  64. ^ a b Newman 1963, p. 53.
  65. ^ Newman 1963, p. 52.
  66. ^ Meisel 1962, p. 158.
  67. ^ Newman 1963, p. 54.
  68. ^ Meisel 1962, p. 286.
  69. ^ Smith 1995, p. 235.
  70. ^ Newman 1963, pp. 57–58.
  71. ^ Newman 1963, p. 56.
  72. ^ Newman 1963, p. 58.
  73. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 238–240.
  74. ^ Smith 1995, p. 244.
  75. ^ Daniell 1957.
  76. ^ Newman 1963, pp. 61–63.
  77. ^ Newman 1963, pp. 63–65.
  78. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 272–273.
  79. ^ a b c English 1992, p. 200.
  80. ^ a b Smith 1995, p. 276.
  81. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 287–288.
  82. ^ Stursberg 1975, p. 88.
  83. ^ Stursberg 1975, p. 89.
  84. ^ Smith 1995, p. 278.
  85. ^ a b Smith 1995, p. 279.
  86. ^ Nash 1990, p. 49.
  87. ^ Smith 1995, p. 280.
  88. ^ Stursberg 1975, p. 98.
  89. ^ Stursberg 1975, p. 94.
  90. ^ Stursberg 1975, p. 95.
  91. ^ a b c English 1992, pp. 201–202.
  92. ^ English 1992, p. 203.
  93. ^ Smith 1995, p. 282.
  94. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 287–289.
  95. ^ Smith 1995, p. 335.
  96. ^ Bliss 2004, pp. 195–196.
  97. ^ Newman 1963, p. 101.
  98. ^ Van Dusen 1968, p. 79.
  99. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 284, 367, 414.
  100. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 393–394.
  101. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 397–399.
  102. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 400–406.
  103. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 412–413.
  104. ^ a b Smith 1995, p. 442.
  105. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 437–439.
  106. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 251–53.
  107. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 255–56.
  108. ^ Newman 1963, pp. 272–274.
  109. ^ Gabriel 1987, p. 53.
  110. ^ Gabriel 1987, pp. 56–57.
  111. ^ Gabriel 1987, pp. 58–63.
  112. ^ Diefenbaker 1976, pp. 211–212.
  113. ^ Gabriel 1987, p. 66.
  114. ^ Newman 1963, p. 258.
  115. ^ Nash 1990, p. 46.
  116. ^ Nash 1990, p. 50.
  117. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 54–55.
  118. ^ Diefenbaker 1976, p. 157.
  119. ^ a b Nash 1990, pp. 56–57.
  120. ^ Smith 1995, p. 292.
  121. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 295–296.
  122. ^ a b Smith 1995, pp. 307–308.
  123. ^ Stewart 1991, pp. 254–255.
  124. ^ Smith 1995, p. 309.
  125. ^ Smith 1995, p. 310.
  126. ^ Smith 1995, p. 316.
  127. ^ Stewart 1991, pp. 244–245.
  128. ^ Smith 1995, p. 317.
  129. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 59–61.
  130. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 61–62.
  131. ^ Smith 1995, p. 380.
  132. ^ Smith 1995, p. 382.
  133. ^ Nash 1990, p. 107.
  134. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 385–388.
  135. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 126–128.
  136. ^ Montreal Gazette 1979-08-17, Obituary.
  137. ^ Druzin 2011.
  138. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 139–141.
  139. ^ Nash 1990, p. 144.
  140. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 144–146.
  141. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 156–158.
  142. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 433–435.
  143. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 435–436.
  144. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 162–164.
  145. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 166–167.
  146. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 167–168.
  147. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 176–177.
  148. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 180–184.
  149. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 189–190.
  150. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 188–189.
  151. ^ Nash 1990, p. 194.
  152. ^ Nash 1990, p. 200.
  153. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 203–204.
  154. ^ Nash 1990, pp. 223–225.
  155. ^ Smith 1995, p. 469.
  156. ^ a b Smith 1995, pp. 471–472.
  157. ^ Nash 1990, p. 245.
  158. ^ Smith 1995, p. 475.
  159. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 478–479.
  160. ^ Smith 1995, p. 485.
  161. ^ Stursberg 1976, p. 80.
  162. ^ Nash 1990, p. 273.
  163. ^ Stursberg 1976, p. 89.
  164. ^ Smith 1995, p. 504.
  165. ^ Stursberg 1976, p. 94.
  166. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 509–510.
  167. ^ Nash 1990, p. 314.
  168. ^ Diefenbaker 1977, p. 223.
  169. ^ a b Smith 1995, pp. 522–524.
  170. ^ Diefenbaker 1977, p. 272.
  171. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 539–541.
  172. ^ Van Dusen 1968, pp. 61–62.
  173. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 534–536.
  174. ^ Stursberg 1976, pp. 171–176.
  175. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 558–559.
  176. ^ Smith 1995, p. 559.
  177. ^ a b Smith 1995, pp. 559–563.
  178. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 563–564.
  179. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 565–567.
  180. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 567–568.
  181. ^ a b Smith 1995, p. 568.
  182. ^ Smith 1995, pp. 570–571.
  183. ^ a b Smith 1995, pp. 571–574.
  184. ^ Stursberg 1976, pp. 200–201.
  185. ^ The Canadian Press 1977-09-23.
  186. ^ Lynch 1977.
  187. ^ a b c Smith 1995, pp. 575–577.
  188. ^ Archbold 2002, p. 147.
  189. ^ CBC Digital Archives, Farewell Dief.
  190. ^ Parks Canada, Historic Sites.
  191. ^ Nash 1990, p. 310.
  192. ^ Nash 1990, p. 114.
  193. ^ Cheadle 2011.
  194. ^ Cobb 2011.
  195. ^ Bliss 2004, p. 186.


  • Nash, Knowlton (1990), Kennedy & Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border, McClelland and Stewart, ISBN 0-7710-6705-4 
  • Smith, Denis (2000), "John George Diefenbaker", Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online XX, University of Toronto and the Université Laval 

Online sources

Further reading[edit]

  • Hilliker, John. "The Politicians and the 'Pearsonalities': The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canadian External Relations," in Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings ed. J. L. Granatstein (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993), pp 152–167.

External links[edit]