Indochina at war,

Photographs under surveillance [1945-1954]

16 10 2010 … 16 01 2011

The exhibition « L’Indochine en guerre, des images sous contrôle [1945-1954] (Indochina at war, Photographs under surveillance [1945-1954]) » is a continuation of the approach the musée Nicéphore Niépce has taken toward war photography over the past number of years.

War and photography have been inextricably linked since the First World War The 1914-1918 war was a time of spectacular development in magazine photography (Le Miroir, L’Illustration ,…), as it was for aerial photography (1915). The conflicts that followed (the Spanish Civil War, the China-Japan war, the Second World War) saw the emergence of photo-journalism and the consolidation of army in-house photography departments.
From 1964 onwards, the American invasion of South Vietnam brought war photography to another level. However, contrary to what is commonly thought, press photographers encountered difficult situations, huge constraints and endless pressure when trying to do their job. They experienced a very short window of opportunity in which to do their job freely. Modern warfare, since Kuwait and up until today’s Iraqi and Afghan conflicts, is waged in the media and the public are used to this. Recent conflicts give the impression that war photography and coverage has only recently come under the control of the military. An analysis of French photographic production during the war in Indochina [1945-1954] proves this is far from the case.
Using publications, the French army’s photographic archives, private, and institutional sources, this exhibition will attempt to depict the conditions under which images of the conflict were produced and spread: to serve the official story, set up and controlled by the French authorities.

The exhibition will also provide unusual and confidential visions of the conflict with the work of Willy Rizzo and Werner Bischof both of whom worked for Paris-Match in Indochina, as well as the work of Raoul Coutard and Pierre Ferrari, who were members of the military and who propose another perspective from inside.

The military administration runs and controls the production and spread of all photographic images. The mythical figure of Robert Capa who died in Indochina was replaced by the ambiguous and despised image of « embedded » photographers who rely on the army to give them their itinerary and their timetable. The working conditions of photo-journalists have deteriorated beyond repair. But what appears to be a recent situation has in fact been the case since the fifties. In fact, during the war in Indochina, the French military administration implemented an official editorial policy that covered all modern images, both photography and film.
At the end of the Second World War, France was completely preoccupied with reconstruction and supplies. The Indochina conflict was far away and without any real direct consequences for the majority of the French people, in other words they lacked interest. The Far East Expeditionary Corps had been given the mission to restore French sovereignty which had been severely hit and to « pacify » an essential element of « l’Union Française ». What began as a « simple police operation » to tackle a bandit problem rapidly turned into an international conflict. Politicians and the military were quickly obliged to implement a global strategy and that included controlling « information » to use the term of the time.

Mao Tse Tung’s « Red China » (1949) now had a border with France. General de Lattre de Tassigny was appointed High-Commissioner in 1950 to turn around what had become a difficult situation and the minute he got to Hanoi he set up a communication plan that brought together the civil and military information services. This fusion was to produce the SPI (Service Presse Information). This department was run by Jean-Pierre Dannaud and Captain Michel Frois with the remit to supply the national and foreign press with information and images of the conflict. The SPI was more than a simple organ for the spread of illustrative documentation or propaganda; it was to become a real tactical weapon in the service of the Haut Commissariat. Its main role was to put a positive spin on the activities of the Expeditionary Corps and the civilising actions of French institutions in Indochina faced with communist « disinformation » and the prevailing scepticism at home.
General de Lattre de Tassigny was only too aware of the importance of image so he made information control a primary weapon against the enemy. The main objective was to « sell the war », to heighten public awareness in order to obtain more financing, notably from the U.S.
« Le Roi Jean » (King John) as he was known, was popular and the French army followed his lead. Photographers, film makers, whether they were embedded or accredited were now covering all operations while civilian press correspondents had to make do with briefings from the press camp. « Information » now more open but more controlled and neutralised as a result.

What did all of this produce? A fake output removed from the reality of combat and the complex and contradictory political situation. The SPI directed and depicted (unconsciously?) a war that was not colonial but fratricidal, a war where the French soldier was the only thing left between France and communism. This simple hero was merely continuing on the educational and progressive mission of France in the Far East. Run by a squeaky-clean hierarchy, the French army, with American support and the mosaic of Indochinese peoples couldn’t possibly lose to the Vietminh, a subversive organisation supported by the Chinese and the USSR.

This produced smooth, aesthetic images, where the hardship of combat, distress, suffering and death were missing. The candid shot became the rule. In a conflict that led to the death of thousands of men, the French press never once presented a dead Frenchman. This romantic and unanimous vision was called into question by the American magazine Life (n°5, August 3rd 1953), in an article by one of its best-known reporters David Douglas Duncan. This does not mean that the military photographs taken by Jean Péraud, Raymond Varoqui, Fernand Jentile, Paul Corcuff, Daniel Camus, etc, are of no interest, quite the opposite in fact. However, answering to the military authority to which they were obliged to surrender their negatives, using unsuitable equipment (Rolleiflex 6x6), with no control over the choice and final destination of the images, these photographers were not in a position to highlight original stories. These war photographers, often volunteers with little technical know-how from modest origins, found the conflict full of opportunities that would lead some on to illustrious careers (Pierre Schoendoerffer, Raoul Coutard …)

The exhibition proposes a simultaneous vision of the official photographs (SPI / ECPAD) and less well-known but just as interesting images for the perspective they give of the military. The latter category includes work by Willy Rizzo, Werner Bischof, Raoul Coutard and Pierre Ferrari.
 Paris-Match got tired of the photography being supplied by the army and was looking for something different. The magazine sent its photographer Willy Rizzo to « depict » the war. Werner Bischof purposely turned his back on the conflict and concentrated on the beauty of the people, the women and children. Photographers working within the army provide other visions. Both Pierre Ferrari and Raoul Coutard managed to depict, each in their own way, the realities of combat and of the country in their official capacity. In particular, Pierre Ferrari managed to capture brutal and effective scenes of close combat at the events at Banh Hine Siu, in Laos (January 1954). Raoul Coutard, head of photography for the magazine, Indochine, Sud-Est Asiatique , was one of the few to depict the minorities in colour during his forays on to the high plateaus.