{"push_id":869566293,"size":2,"distinct_size":2,"ref":"refs/heads/android-3.18","head":"a9ac1262ce80c287562e604f3bb24f232fcb686e","before":"24dc742abc1fa4f953b42750ec08e3ec4586de42","commits":[{"sha":"0549ddb90f1553553dcb1b348e2884076e7cba3e","author":{"email":"eec72676ad9a62f2727dfed6d270d98c0d02adec@linux.intel.com","name":"Kirill A. Shutemov"},"message":"UPSTREAM: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace\n\n(cherry pick from commit ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce)\n\nAs pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,\n/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do\nattacks.\n\nThis disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.\n\n[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html\n\n[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now\n  this is the simple model.   - Linus ]\n\nSigned-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>\nAcked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>\nAcked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>\nCc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>\nCc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>\nCc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>\nCc: stable@vger.kernel.org\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>\nBug: 25739721\nChange-Id: I0b0cf101125b10a3316ef54959e24d7ca1d3a3c6","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/android/kernel_common/commits/0549ddb90f1553553dcb1b348e2884076e7cba3e"},{"sha":"a9ac1262ce80c287562e604f3bb24f232fcb686e","author":{"email":"33837adfb53316eae44aad04041e1240088d76fd@linaro.org","name":"John Stultz"},"message":"ANDROID: exec_domains: Disable request_module() call for personalities\n\nWith Android M, Android environments use a separate execution\ndomain for 32bit processes.\nSee:\nhttps://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/122131/\n\nThis results in systems that use kernel modules to see selinux\naudit noise like:\n  type=1400 audit(28.989:15): avc: denied { module_request } for\n  pid=1622 comm=\"app_process32\" kmod=\"personality-8\"\n  scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tclass=system\n\nWhile using kernel modules is unadvised, some systems do require\nthem.\n\nThus to avoid developers adding sepolicy exceptions to allow for\nrequest_module calls, this patch disables the logic which tries\nto call request_module for the 32bit personality (ie:\npersonality-8), which doesn't actually exist.\n\nChange-Id: I6885347e69d5778e69ad5312f56f389be7bb4883\nSigned-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/android/kernel_common/commits/a9ac1262ce80c287562e604f3bb24f232fcb686e"}]}