10.54103/ai/19726
The title of this project, “An-icon,” refers to “images that deny themselves.” Virtual reality may be viewed as a typical, though not exclusive, case able to illustrate this kind of image: we know we have crossed the threshold of an environment that consists of images (ontologically), but we experience it (phenomenologically) as if it were a real environment. Something similar can be said about immersivity, but reversing the perspective: we are (ontologically) immersed in reality (virtual or non-virtual), but (phenomenologically) we know and say we are, and for this very reason we reject the idea that we are simply immersed in an environment. This applies first and foremost to our experience in general, regardless of the status of the experiences we gain through virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR) or mixed reality (MR).And yet, within this very general condition, human beings have over time created environments and works that carve out zones of “special immersivity,” so to speak, dedicated to immersion. What are we looking for in VR immersivity? Are new immersive technologies merely refinements of older techniques, or can they affect our relationship with ourselves, reality, and others in novel ways? What are artistic practices called on to do when faced with such new technological practices?
application/pdf
2785-7433
19726
I
en
Stefano Velotti
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
AN-ICON. Studies in Environmental Images [ISSN 2785-7433]
Uncontrollability
Immersivity as An-immersivity
Text.Serial.Journal
https://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/anicon
2
Thematic Section
2023-12-28
2023-01-19
2023-12-28
2024-02-07
AN-ICON
Stefano Velotti
2023/12/28
10.54103/ai/19726
Sapienza University of Rome
2785-7433
I
Uncontrollability
en
Zerubavel, E., Hidden in Plain Sight: The Social Structure of Irrelevance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
Immersivity as An-immersivity
https://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/anicon/article/download/19726/20026
2
Immersivity
as An-immersivity
by Stefano Velotti
         Ordinary and immersive experience
                     Virtual reality and art
                     Experience economy
                     Control
                     Uncontrollability




                       Issue №1                Year 2023
                       → Immersions and Dives: From
                       the Environment to Virtual Reality
                       Edited by Roberto P. Malaspina,
                       Elisabetta Modena, and Sofia Pirandello
Immersivity as
An-immersivity
STEFANO VELOTTI, Sapienza. Università di Roma – https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9421-0257
https://doi.org/10.54103/ai/19726


Abstract                        The title of this project, “An-icon,” refers to “im-
                 ages that deny themselves.” Virtual reality may be viewed
                 as a typical, though not exclusive, case able to illustrate this
                 kind of image: we know we have crossed the threshold of an
                 environment that consists of images (ontologically), but we
                 experience it (phenomenologically) as if it were a real environ-
                 ment. Something similar can be said about immersivity, but
                 reversing the perspective: we are (ontologically) immersed
                 in reality (virtual or non-virtual), but (phenomenologically) we
                 know and say we are, and for this very reason we reject the
                 idea that we are simply immersed in an environment.
                                This applies first and foremost to our experience
                 in general, regardless of the status of the experiences we
                 gain through virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR) or
                 mixed reality (MR).
                                 And yet, within this very general condition, human
                 beings have over time created environments and works that
                 carve out zones of “special immersivity,” so to speak, dedicated
                 to immersion. What are we looking for in VR immersivity? Are
                 new immersive technologies merely refinements of older tech-
                 niques, or can they affect our relationship with ourselves, reality,
                 and others in novel ways? What are artistic practices called on
                 to do when faced with such new technological practices?

Keywords         Ordinary and immersive experience Virtual reality and art
                 Experience economy                       Control               Uncontrollability
To quote this essay: S. Velotti, “Immersivity as An-immersivity,” AN-ICON. Studies in Environmental
Images [ISSN 2785-7433] 2, no. 1 (2023): 139-157, https://doi.org/10.54103/ai/19726.

STEFANO VELOTTI                                   139                                         AN-ICON
                                 An-Immersivity

                             The title of this project, “An-icon,” refers to “im-
               ages that deny themselves.” Virtual reality may be viewed
               as a typical, though not exclusive, case able to illustrate this
               kind of image: we know we have crossed the threshold of
               an environment that consists of images (ontologically), but
               we experience it (phenomenologically) as if it were a real
               environment. Something similar can be said about immer-
               sivity, but reversing the perspective: we are (ontologically)
               immersed in reality (virtual or non-virtual), but (phenomeno-
               logically) we know and say we are, and for this very reason
               we reject the idea that we are simply immersed in an envi-
               ronment. If we were, we would have no way of becoming
               aware of this. In fact, to speak of immersivity, we must find
               our balance on an unstable boundary, which allows us to
               recognize the encompassing and intrascendible character
               of immersive experience while at the same time belying
               its closure, piercing it from within. To speak of immersivity
               therefore implies recognizing that one is in a condition of
              “an-immersivity,” where the hyphen separating and joining
               the privative prefix “an” to “immersivity” is the sign of a
               paradox. It could also be said that the hyphen evokes the
               figure of an unstable threshold, referring to the co-presence
               of inside and outside.1 This applies first and foremost to
               our experience in general, regardless of the status of the
               experiences we gain through virtual reality (VR), augmented
               reality (AR) or mixed reality (MR).

                                 “Special immersivity”

                           Before even considering the complexities and
               opportunities of virtual immersivity, it should be noted that

      1 In this I am comforted by the title of A. Pinotti’s fine book, Alla soglia dell’immagine: Da
      Narciso alla realtà virtuale (Turin: Einaudi, 2021).

STEFANO VELOTTI                                  140                                            AN-ICON
               immersivity presents itself first and foremost as a feature
               of our being in the world: we are always already immersed
               in experience, in a given situation part of an indeterminate
               totality. Where else could we be? And yet, within this very
               general condition, human beings have over time created
               environments and works that carve out zones of “special
               immersivity,” so to speak, dedicated to immersion, with
               different modalities, complexities, techniques, functions,
               and meanings, many of which – the earliest – tend to be
               beyond our understanding and perhaps always will.
                             Is it possible that the insistent recourse to
              “(special) immersivity” arises especially at times of deep
               crisis, when the very foundations of a civilization are felt
               to be uncertain, invested with a high rate of contingency?2
               To simplify: since forms of life do not allow us to feel at
               home in this world, which seems to have become foreign,
               indecipherable and threatening, one is drawn to limited and
               controlled spaces in which to immerse oneself, to feel more
               alive and safe, at least for a while. I think this perspective is
               plausible, though it is partial and, indeed, a simplification.
               What else are we looking for in VR immersivity? Are new
               immersive technologies merely refinements of older tech-
               niques, or can they affect our relationship with ourselves,
               reality, and others in novel ways? What are artistic practices



      2 O. Grau, From Illusion to Immersion (2001), trans. G. Custance (Cambridge MA: MIT Press,
      2003) offers a historical survey of artworks aimed at providing immersive experiences. In
      recent decades, however, interest in Paleolithic and “cave art” has been rekindled outside the
      circle of specialists as well, both as such – see, e.g., G. Rigal, Le temps sacré des cavernes
      (Paris: Corti, 2016) – and in relation to contemporary art, to this regard see again Pinotti, Alla
      soglia dell’immagine (especially the section on “Avatāra” in ch. V). Cfr. also M. Stavrinaki,
      Saisis par la préhistoire: Enquête sur l’art et le temps des modernes (Paris: Les presses du réel,
      2019) and in particular the pages devoted to Frederick Kiessler’s Endless House and Giuseppe
      Pinot Gallizio’s Caverna dell’antimateria. Both of these works, created in the late 1950s, reflect
      the anguish connected to the atomic bomb, at that time perceived as a looming threat, later
      forgotten but always resurgent. The short-circuit between contemporary art and the Paleolithic
      seems to be related to the perception of a profound change in a civilization, if not its end, and
      thus to a need to revisit its origins, as if one had to start over. In this regard, in addition to a
      number of works of visual art that explicitly harken back to the Paleolithic, see also Richard
      Powers’ symptomatic novel Plowing the Dark (2000), which I have analyzed in S. Velotti, “Art in
      the time of Pandemic: Three Terms,” Paradigmi 39, no. 1 (2021): 127-140.

STEFANO VELOTTI                                  141                                           AN-ICON
              called on to do when faced with such new technological
              practices?
                           Nowadays the adjective “immersive” is used
              obsessively in the presentation of theme parks and other
              sensational “adventures” or “experiences” that promise
              to take us “inside” paintings and frescoes or into physi-
              cally inaccessible places. The word invariably appears in
              the press releases of museums, exhibitions, performances,
              installations, but also in advertisements for apartments for
              sale or wine and food itineraries.3 One way to understand
              the meaning of the word is “proof of the opposite:” what,
              for example, would a “non-immersive” visit to an apartment
              look like? Hard to answer, unless we specify restrictive
              conditions for what is meant by immersivity. Used loosely,
              however, “immersive” risks being meaningless since its
              negation does not seem to change anything. And yet it is
              precisely for this reason that it is an enigmatic adjective,
              hovering like an obscure object of desire in our social imag-
              ination.
                           Are we therefore to conclude that the attribution
              of immersivity is in vain since it neither adds nor detracts
              from the characterization of experience? I don’t think so.
              However, we must first clarify in what sense each of our ex-
              periences is both immersive and non-immersive, or, indeed,
             “an-immersive.” On this basis it will be easier to ask what
              peculiar traits are offered by the different uses of “special
              immersivity,” by this form of reality that is VR, particularly
              in relation to art, which, if it is anything, is a way of under-
              standing how we place ourselves in the world.

      3 A real estate agency in Rome advertises its luxurious apartments in the Parioli district with
      the following words, “Enjoy an immersive experience! Come visit your new home.” The real
      estate company is called Pitagora because it is located near Piazza Pitagora, not because it is
      referencing the Greek philosopher; however, the agency’s slogan is “Pitagora – the philosophy
      of living.” Which, supposedly, explains its “unique and iconic character.” As for food and
      wine itineraries, one can visit, for example, “The Temple of Brunello” in Montalcino (Tuscany),
      which actually offers “a station with VR viewers called InVolo” that “allows visitors to immerse
      themselves in the villas, castles, vineyards and hamlets that dot the municipality’s vast and
      diversified area,” https://www.orodimontalcino.it/tempio-del-brunello/, accessed December 24,
      2022.

STEFANO VELOTTI                                 142                                           AN-ICON
                                 Fish and amphibians

                              At first glance, one would be tempted to say
              that we human animals are like fish immersed in water – to
              quote a famous apologue by David Foster Wallace about
              the difficulty of grasping the medium in which we are im-
              mersed: an old fish asks two young fish, “Morning, boys.
              How’s the water?” and they in turn ask themselves, “What
              the hell is water?”4 The element in which we are immersed
              is in this sense a medium that cannot be iconized or repre-
              sented. In one respect, it is undeniable that we are always
              already situated, immersed in a concrete environment that
              resists iconic reduction. On the other hand, one must ask
              whether asserting this undeniable condition of immersion
              does not imply a partial denial of it.
                             The simplest critiques of a representational
              model of the mind often target a naive idea of representa-
              tion, one that can be imagined as a frame or filter interposed
              between us and things, constituted by the spatio-temporal
              forms of intuition or by a priori categories, universal or cul-
              turally determined conceptual schemes. Access to reality
             “in itself” is therefore denied to us, because according to this
              account reality is always filtered through (inter)subjective
              lenses. On the complementary plane of our actions and
              productions we have mental representations enclosed in
              our head that we then try to externalize, technically, artis-
              tically or in other ways.
                              Various versions of enactivism oppose this view
              of the representational mind, rightly insisting that percep-
              tion is an active way of exploring the material and social
              environment in which we are immersed, of experiencing
              affordances and building skills, not a way of corresponding


      4 D. Foster Wallace, This is Water, 2005. Commencement speech to the graduating class at
      Kenyon College, https://fs.blog/david-foster-wallace-this-is-water/, accessed December 28, 2022.

STEFANO VELOTTI                                 143                                          AN-ICON
              more or less correctly to an already organized world.5 Not
              least because, in order to see whether our representations
             “correspond” to the world, we would need to be able to
              have unfiltered access to reality. On another front, anti-rep-
              resentationalism is also endorsed by those who replace
              representations with immanent flows and forces, or who
              propose that we think of ourselves as “things among things,”
              according to a “flat ontology” devoid of anthropocentric hi-
              erarchies, where all entities are equally agents and patients,
              from stones to plants, from artifacts to animals.
                            Yet, both the idea of a representational filter
              and the various versions of absolute immersivity run into
              the same problem: if we think these ideas and formulate
              them linguistically, as in fact we do, then they are self-con-
              tradictory. If they are true, then they are false.6 For if we
              experienced the world through a filter, we would have to
              see the world, ourselves and the filter with a view from
              nowhere. And if on the other hand it were true, as in some
              ways it is true, that we are always immersed in a translucent
              medium like fish in water, we could not communicate this.
              We would just be immersed. The fact is that we discover
              ourselves immersed and emerged at the same time, more
              amphibian than fish. We realize that we see and do not see
              a frame, that we remain on this side of a threshold knowing
              that we cannot cross it and therefore crossing it.7 Toward
              where? Toward an infinitely expandable context, the inde-
              terminable totality of every possible experience in which

      5 Cfr. J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, E. A. Di Paolo, Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive
      Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010). For a recent survey of enactivism in relation to
      cultural contexts see C. Durt, T. Fuchs, C. Tewes, eds., Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture
      (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2017).
      6 Here I broadly trace the exposition of the paradoxes of experience articulated by E. Garroni,
      Estetica: Uno sguardo-attraverso (Milan: Garzanti, 1992).
      7 Christian Stiegler acknowledges the liminality of the “liquid spaces” in which we are
      immersed, but then seems to unilaterally emphasize the disappearance of all frames: “Liquid
      spaces are moments of uncertainty, instability, and fluidity in mediated experiences. They
      emerge as thresholds between the physical and the mediated. These spaces create the
      feeling of immersion even beyond the mediation by eliminating critical distance and dissolving
      the frames of media.” C. Stiegler, The 360° Gaze: Immersions in Media, Society, and Culture
      (London: MIT Press, 2021): 61.

STEFANO VELOTTI                                144                                          AN-ICON
                we are already included, on whose horizon this determinate
                experience stands, which is such precisely insofar as it is
               “cut out” from that indeterminate and uncontrollable horizon
                of possibility.
                             What McLuhan says about medial awareness
               – summarized in the famous “rearview-mirror” metaphor
                recalled by Pinotti – is therefore not entirely true:

As long as s/he is immersed in a medium, the human being is as
little aware of it as the fish of the water in which he swims. Only
the moment that medium is overtaken by a later medium can it be
retrospectively focused on and grasped precisely as the medium
in which the experience had been organized: “we are always one
step behind in our view of the world.”8
                              We do not need the appearance of another me-
                dium to know that we are not like fish in water: the possibil-
                ity of saying that we are is enough for us to prove ourselves
                wrong. Some philosophers, such as Thomas Nagel, have
                claimed that this condition of ours expresses “the absurd”
                of the human condition, which should be accepted with
                a little irony and without taking ourselves too seriously. In
                fact, unlike other animals that lack self-awareness and lan-
                guage, we cannot simply remain immersed and absorbed
                in our occupations, nor can we, however, install ourselves
                in a permanent emersion, in a transcendent dimension, be-
                cause even the mind of the mystic is still playing one of the
                possible games situated in the concreteness of experience,
                not an out-of-this-world “super game.” Because of this we
                are forced to accept this irreconcilable oscillation between
                immersion and emergence, adherence and detachment,




       8 A. Pinotti, Alla soglia dell’immagine: 17 [my translation].

STEFANO VELOTTI                                   145                  AN-ICON
               involvement in the ordinary tasks of life and the distance of
               a gaze that relativizes the latter or nullifies their importance.9
                             But is this really the case? What if, on the other
               hand, it were sometimes possible to make such indetermi-
               nate totality transit – analogically, symbolically – in concrete,
               determinate experience? What if things, practices, concrete
               experiences were given that exemplified the indeterminable
               and uncontrollable dimension against which they stand out?
               What if this were not only a source of disquiet (due to the
               feeling of being in touch with the uncontrollable), but also
               a sensible pleasure, deriving from the fact that our vitality,
               the feeling of being alive, is increased by the simultaneous
               co-presence of immersion and emergence? Perhaps this
               is one of the ways of approaching some particularly sensi-
               ble experiences, for example, those in which we recognize
               something as art: a set of practices, events or “things” that
               allow us to “see” (feel, experience, understand) the complex
               texture of our forms of life, our being in the world between
               immersion and emersion.
                             Before trying to articulate these still vague
               statements, and precisely in relation to what we have called
               forms of “special immersivity,”10 it is necessary to go back
               to their homology with the an-immersivity of ordinary ex-
               perience, also from the point of view of its limitations.




      9 T. Nagel, “The Absurd,” in Mortal Questions (London: Canto, 1979): 11-23.
      10 It should be made clear from the outset that what I have called “special immersivity” is
      obtained with diverse and heterogeneous forms that can be sorted into categories. For an
      excellent survey of immersive forms of storytelling, see E. Modena, Nelle storie: Arte, cinema
      e media immersivi (Rome: Carocci, 2022). Ultimately, however, as far as artistic practices are
      concerned, it is the singularity of the work that must be taken into account.

STEFANO VELOTTI                                146                                          AN-ICON
                                Limits of immersivity

                            Let us see the extent to which the experience of
              virtual immersivity, in its “special” meaning, can be equated
              with that of ordinary immersivity.
                            The three characteristics of immersive VR, sum-
              marized by Pinotti, are (1) the saturation of the 360° gaze
              (“unframedeness”); (2) the feeling of presence, of “being
              there,” which can be further articulated as telepresence,
              selfpresence and social presence (“presentness”);11 (3) the
              experience of immediacy, due paradoxically to the great
              complexity of technological mediations that produce VR,
              making the medium as transparent as possible (“immedi-
              ateness”).12
                            It is easy to see that we could characterize our
              experience of the ordinary world using the same properties:
              nothing I see is potentially limited by a frame, I have the
              perception of “being here,” of presence, and my experience
              seems immediate, that is, unmediated by a medium that
              interferes with reality. But, one might say, if by hypothesis
              VR fulfills these promises to the point of pushing itself to
              (illusory) indistinguishability from reality, then – from a phe-
              nomenological, though not an ontological, point of view –
              we would be thrown back into the reality we already know,
              and – except for the advantageous uses of it, related to
              various forms of telepresence and simulation – the experi-
              ence we derive from it would be nothing new. Conversely,
              one can highlight the limits of these claims and emphasize
              the aspects that prevent illusion. Both perspectives, how-
              ever, are simplistic. VR is not equivalent to ordinary reality,
              nor are the limitations of VR absent in ordinary reality:



      11 E. Pett, Experiencing Cinema: Participatory Film Cultures, Immersive Media and the
      Experience Economy (New York-London: Bloomsbury, 2021).
      12 A. Pinotti, “Prologo,” in Alla soglia dell’immagine: xi-xviii.

STEFANO VELOTTI                               147                                        AN-ICON
      ■-     It is true that in VR the frame has disappeared, but in a
      sense it persists: I am wearing a headset and in the future I will
      perhaps wear a headband, or be fitted with an implant connected
      to my neurons. On the other hand, even here, now, in non-virtual
      reality, I am partially framed by the actions that brought me to a
      given place and situation (I am aware that I occupy a limited or
     “framed” portion of reality), by attention variously focused on the
      scenario in front of me or the task I set myself, but also by the
     “frames” studied by Erving Goffman and those we do not pay
      attention to because they are “hidden in plain sight.”13
      ■-     Presence, being here, cannot be doubted. I am not else-
      where, or at least no more than I am elsewhere when I am im-
      mersed in a virtual environment.
      ■-     Finally, the apparent immediacy produced by innumerable
      technological mediations also characterizes my real experience:
      we know all too well that what is felt as natural,spontaneous, ob-
      vious is intertwined with acquired habits and artificial construc-
      tions and prosthetic extensions: the normative, the perceptual,
      proxemics, social mediations, and all the ways of acting of a
      certain form of life.

                            So, those characteristics that serve to phenom-
               enologically distinguish the experience of a non-immersive
               image from an “an-iconic” immersive experience are not
               sufficient to distinguish the experience of immersive VR
               from that of ordinary reality. However, from here we cannot
               conclude that between “ordinary” immersivity and what we
               have called “special immersivity” there is no difference, not
               only on the ontological level, but also on the phenomeno-
               logical one.
                            There are countless features of VR that distin-
               guish it from ordinary reality. The most obvious, related first
               and foremost to the dimension of space, is the possibility of
      13 E. Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (1974) (Boston:
      Northeastern University Press, 1986); E. Zerubavel, Hidden in Plain Sight: The Social Structure
      of Irrelevance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

STEFANO VELOTTI                                148                                          AN-ICON
              becoming immersed in scenarios that cannot be found in
              ordinary reality or that would be impossible to experience
              because of scale or distance: entering an animal’s blood-
              stream or its brain, acting at a distance, traveling through
              a body. Also, there is the cognitive conflict between pro-
              prioception in the real world and that in the virtual world –
              walking on water or plunging into an abyss while remaining
              firmly on the ground but feeling a sense of vertigo and fear
              (or, vice versa, I am immersed in the “magic circle” of VR
              and have an accident in the ordinary world).
                           I do not intend to try to list all the differences
              and perhaps imagine how some of them will be eliminat-
              ed or reduced by technological progress, integrating our
              other senses,14 nor do I intend to address all the possible
              ways of using VR, which is likely to become even more
              useful and indispensable in the future than it already is now
              for many of our practices, medical, architectural, forensic,
              social, professional, educational, recreational, and so on.
              Rather, here I intend to focus on what immersive VR can
              tell us about the human experience in general, drawing on
              the experience we sometimes have in our relationship with
              what we call artistic works or practices.

                              “Experience economy”

                           In the 1990s the idea gained ground – with
              anticipations already in the previous decades – that the
              economy most suited to our times – at least in the wealth-
              iest societies – is not so much based on the production of
              goods, or even on services, but on experience. In those
              years, expressions such as “Erlebnisgesellschaft,” “Erleb-
              nismarkt,” and “Dream Society” began to circulate, until
              James Gilmore and Joseph Pine II became the proudest

      14 Cfr. R. DeSalle, Our Senses: An Immersive Experience (New Haven-London: Yale University
      Press, 2018).

STEFANO VELOTTI                              149                                       AN-ICON
              proponents of the “Experience Economy” with a book that
              would have a certain fortune, followed by other volumes
              on related issues.15 The key to their thinking is stated in the
              preface to the 2011 updated edition of their The Experience
              Economy:

So let us here be most clear: goods and services are no longer
enough to foster economic growth, create new jobs, and maintain
economic prosperity. To realize revenue growth and increased em-
ployment, the staging of experiences must be pursued as a distinct
form of economic output. Indeed, in a world saturated with largely
undifferentiated goods and services the greatest opportunity for
value creation resides in staging experiences.16
                           The market for goods is saturated, and produc-
              ers must offer products that promise to stage experiences.
              For this reason the watchwords are “mass customize,” i.e.
              transform every service into a unique (mass) experience;
             “work is theater,” i.e. “stage experiences” and train sellers
              in specific performance practices; and finally, ensure that
              the experience offered generates in the consumer (“pro-
              sumer” or “experiencer”) an actual change, which must be
              properly paid for: “these transformations should themselves
              command a fee in the form of explicitly charging for the
              demonstrated outcomes that result from the underlying
              experiences. [...] We especially challenge enterprises in
              three industries: those that focus on making people healthy,
              wealthy, and wise.”17
                           It would be all too easy to reiterate once again
              how the neoliberal creed attempts to infiltrate every aspect

      15 G. Schulze, Die Erlebnisgesellschaft: Kultursoziologie der Gegenwart (Frankfurt am Main-
      New York: Campus-Verlag, 1993); R. Jensen, “Dream Society,” The Futurist 30, no. 3 (1996):
      9-13; J. Gilmore and B.J. Pine II, The Experience Economy (1999) (Boston: Harvard Business
      School Press, 2011); J. Gilmore and B.J. Pine II, Authenticity. What Consumers Really Want
      (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2007).
      16 J. Gilmore and B.J. Pine II, “Preview to the Updated Edition: Beyond Goods and Services,”
      in The Experience Economy: ix-xxii, ix [emphasis mine].
      17 Ibid.

STEFANO VELOTTI                               150                                        AN-ICON
                of human life, putting a price tag on it. Instead, I have men-
                tioned these marketing strategies to make some distinc-
                tions concerning the notion of experience. It is interesting
                to see how Gilmore and Pine respond to the obvious ob-
                jection that an experience purchased from a catalog is a
                fake experience. Their line of defense comes in the central
                chapter of their next book, Authenticity, in which they draw
                on some philosophical references to arrive at the following
                conclusion:

there is no such thing as an inauthentic experience because ex-
periences happen inside us. Therefore, we remain free to judge
our experiences with any economic offering as authentic or not.
Businesses that offer them therefore can, whether intentionally or
by happenstance, gain the perception of authenticity. [...] Business-
es can render their inauthentic offerings as authentic. Doing so
requires embracing this essential paradox: all human enterprise is
ontologically fake - that is, in its very being it is inauthentic - and
yet, output from that enterprise can be phenomenologically real -
that is, it is perceived as authentic by the individuals who buy it.18

                             The distinction between an ontological and a
                phenomenological point of view returns here in a particu-
                larly insidious way. For on the one hand, it is true that there
                is no class of “fake” immersive experiences ontologically
                distinct from a class of “authentic” immersive experiences.
                And the experience one has cannot be anything other than
                the experience of a subject, and in this sense it is obvious-
                ly subjective (which, however, does not necessarily mean
                that it is only “inside us”). Kant himself, who entrusted to
                the principle of the judgment of taste even the possibility
                of making sense of experience in general and building a

       18 J. Gilmore, B. J. Pine II, “The Authenticity Paradox,” in Authenticity: 89-90, 89 [emphasis
       mine].

STEFANO VELOTTI                                  151                                          AN-ICON
                system of nature, reiterated that I can judge anything aes-
                thetically, material or immaterial, and that my judgment
                depends on what “I make of this representation in my-
                self.”19 As is well known, however, Kant ascribed to such
                judgment a claim to “subjective universality” and “exem-
                plary necessity,” springing from a “free play” of imagination
                and understanding. In the perspective of the “experience
                economy,” what we witness is a caricature of these claims:
                the freedom-spontaneity of the free play of the faculties
                becomes the consumer’s “freedom of choice,” a psycho-
                logical choice expressed as a preference (however moti-
                vated or induced, as long as it has the desired effect). The
                impossibility of establishing ontologically distinct classes
                for what is “beautiful-sensible” and what is not is reduced to
                what the consumer “buys or doesn’t buy” (in both senses of
                the word). Since nothing escapes human intervention and
                thus technique and money, the Las Vegas hotel “The Vene-
                tian” and the city of Venice possess the same ontological
                status, that of both being “fakes.” The authenticity of an
                experience cannot therefore depend on “what” we experi-
                ence (everything is equally ontologically “fake”), but only on
                something that “happens inside us,” and can therefore be
               “phenomenologically real.” The singularity of experience is
                completely annulled, and every object, practice, situation
                is identical to any other, as long as it produces the same
                effect: a novel or a pill, a bump on the head or a movie,
                a concert or a wedding.20 There is no longer any trace of

       19 “It is readily seen that to say that it is beautiful and to prove that I have taste what matters
       is what I make of this representation in myself, not how I depend on the existence of the
       object.” I. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews
       (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 5; 205.
       20 Cfr. Wittgenstein’s objection to the idea of aesthetic experience conceived as an effect:
      “There is a tendency to talk about the ‘effect of a work of art’– feelings, images, etc. Then
       it is natural to ask: ‘Why do you hear this minuet?,’ and there is a tendency to answer: ‘To
       get this, and that effect.’ And doesn’t the minuet itself matter? – hearing this: would another
       have done as well? You could play a minuet once, and get a lot out of it, and play the same
       minuet another time and get nothing out of it. But it doesn’t follow that what you get out of it
       is then independent of the minuet.” L. Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics,
       Psychology, and Religious Belief (Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967):
       29.

STEFANO VELOTTI                                  152                                            AN-ICON
               recourse to an elaboration by the subject, to the exercise
               of a “reflective faculty of judgment” (as distinct from the
               objectifying exercise of “determining judgment”), to show
               the impossibility of constructing classes of “beautiful” or
               meaningful things or experiences. Instead, once again, it
               is the “invisible hand” of the market that knows best how
               to allocate the “resource” of authenticity.

                                The perspective of control

                             On a photography information site, I find a re-
              view of Richard Avedon’s recent exhibition, Relationships
              (Palazzo Reale, Milan, September 22, 2022-January 29,
              2023). The reviewer informs us right away that it is “an en-
              joyable immersive experience in the artist’s photographic
              universe.”21 What is of interest here, however, is not the
              indiscriminate use of the adjective, but one of the most
              famous quotes attributed to Avedon, which stands out in
              one of the rooms: “I think all art is about control – the en-
              counter between control and the uncontrollable.” Referred
              to photography, or to a certain way of doing photography,
              the statement easily lends itself to multiple interpretations.22
              I believe, however, that Avedon was right: every art form is
              characterized by this encounter and, indeed, it could be
              argued that every experience worthy of the name is.
                            This “encounter,” however, takes place less and
              less often in everyday life: control and self-control, exacer-
              bated also by digital technologies (surveillance, quantified
              self, digital self, etc.) seem to run more and more in parallel
              with an increasing loss of control (sense of powerlessness,

      21 E. Dal Verme, “Richard Avedon: Relationships,” Fotografia.it (September 22, 2022),
      https://www.fotografia.it/articoli/opinioni/richard-avedon-relationships/, accessed January 5,
      2023 [emphasis mine].
      22 Cfr., e.g., R. Kelsey, Photography and the Art of Chance (Cambridge MA-London: Harvard
      University Press, 2015) and some observations in S. Velotti, The Present of Photography
      and the Dialectics of Control, in M. Delogu, A. Dandini de Sylva, eds., Fotografia: Il presente
      (Macerata: Quodlibet, 2015): 21-29.

STEFANO VELOTTI                                153                                          AN-ICON
               acting out, addictions, panic attacks, conspiracy theories
               etc.), without the two dimensions ever converging. Although
               often untied in our impoverished everyday life, the knot that
               ties control to uncontrollability is very complex and can-
               not be reduced to the “society of control” preconized by
               Deleuze.23 The problem is complex, but here, in conclusion,
               I would like to put forward only a few questions about con-
               trol in relation to “special immersivity,” or, more specifically,
               immersive art practices. On the one hand, the most mun-
               dane experiences of “special” immersivity are meant to be
               forms of sensational entertainment (Caravaggio experience
               and the like), or reassuring bubbles where all contact with
               what is uncontrollable and indeterminate is preemptively
               sterilized. On the other, they promise they will allow us to
              “get lost” in immersion. (Of course, there may also be a more
               subtle pleasure in “letting go,” relying on someone else’s
               control, as artist Janet Cardiff argues when speaking of her
               extraordinary AR “walks”24). However, this is an unresolved
               problem for the “experience economy,” which on the one
               hand wants the prosumer/experiencer to feel that he or she
               is in control of his or her own choices (with reference to the
               alternatives offered) to ensure their authenticity, and on the
               other hand knows that the provider must remain in control
               of this offer, if only to justify the fee the prosumer/experi-
               encer has to pay for it. There is nothing wrong with buying
               an “organized immersive adventure”– which may be fun,
               exciting, unusual – but the doubt remains: either it is not an
               adventure, or it is not organized. Even in valuable academic
               contributions, the question of control appears repeatedly,




      23 Cfr. S. Velotti, Dialettica del controllo: Limiti della sorveglianza e pratiche artistiche (Roma:
      Castelvecchi, 2017); H. Rosa, The Uncontrollability of the World (2018), trans. J.C. Wagner
      (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020).
      24 C. Christov-Bakargiev, Janet Cardiff: A Survey of Works Including Collaborations with
      George Bures Miller (New York: P.S.1 Contemporary Art Center, 2003): 35.

STEFANO VELOTTI                                   154                                            AN-ICON
              yet without being thematized – it remains opaque, ambig-
              uous, if not contradictory.25
                            What if, instead, the “special” immersivity of VR
              were employed to reveal, by exemplifying it, the paradoxical
              an-immersivity of ordinary experience, usually overlooked
              or misunderstood? What if certain uses of “special” im-
              mersivity were able to bring out from within not the illusory
              simulation of ordinary reality “as it is,” perhaps displaced
              into fantastic scenarios, nor sensational and amazing expe-
              riences, but the most ordinary experience, making it visible
              and understandable as an “encounter” of controllability and
              uncontrollability? Then we would not only have a bubble, a
              vacation from ordinary space, an interruption in the web of
              a life lived obtusely, but also the concrete exemplification
              of the antinomian forces that render us alive: on the one
              hand, the need and satisfaction of exercising some control
              over ourselves, the world, and others – of being agents
              endowed with “efficacy,” not powerless and systematically
              frustrated agents. On the other, the equally essential need
              not to remain entrenched in such control, which can only
              become animated in the “encounter” with what is and re-
              mains uncontrollable: the indeterminate totality of experi-
              ence, the unpredictability of our multiple relationships, the
              infinitely rich grain of reality.
                            Possible examples of such successful “en-
              counters” abound in contemporary art practices. Here I
              would like to cite just one, which I think is particularly signif-
              icant because of its apparent incongruity and which would



      25 See for example C. Stiegler, The 360° Gaze: “If all the frames, stages, and technologies
      dissolve now, we are about to confuse different concepts of realities […] They emphasize
      the dissolution of boundaries and control”; but, at the same time, he writes that in the use
      of avatars “Nonhuman characters can activate the same emotional alignment and level of
      acceptance as human characters. Elena Kokkinara and Rachel McDonnell confirm that even
      though photorealistic imagery supports acceptance and engagement, authenticity depends
      much more ‘on the levels of perceived ownership and sense of control (agency) we feel
      towards this virtual character.’” Stiegler, The 360° Gaze: 92 [emphasis mine].

STEFANO VELOTTI                                155                                         AN-ICON
               deserve a much deeper analysis:26 about 50 years ago, an
              Australian theology professor, John M. Hull, noticed that
               he was going blind, and decided to tape-record a diary of
               this dramatic progression. In 1990, these recordings be-
               came an extraordinary book, Touching the Rock. An Ex-
               perience of Blindness. In the preface, Oliver Sacks wrote,
               quite rightly, that if Wittgenstein had gone blind, he would
               probably have written a similar book. A short film, a feature
              film and finally (in 2016) a virtual reality application, Notes
               on Blindness: Into Darkness, are based on this book.27 It
               is “an experience” that takes place at the intersection of
               multiple authorships: Hull, the creators of the work in VR,
               and, it must be added, a partial interactivity on the part of
               the “experiencer.” The latter wears a binaural audio device
              – the same sound reproduction technique used by Cardiff
               for her assisted “walks” – coupled with a 360-degree VR
               headset. Beginning with Hull’s experience of blindness, the
               making, as well as the enjoyment of the experience, are
               the work of the “non-blind.” It is not about disavowing
               the tragedy of losing one’s sight, nor is it about telling a
               story of “redemption.” Rather, what happens is that the
               blindness of the person wearing the VR headset – and
               the related loss of control over the outside world – is not
               replaced by images aiming to immerse the person in a
               realistic, broadly illusionistic environment, but rather “into
               Darkness,” one of the most obvious manifestations of the
               loss of control over the environment. What we find in this
              VR, however, is not total darkness, but the disjointed and
               fragmented world described by Hull’s words. The apparent
               obviousness of ordinary visual perception is suspended.

      26 See C. Roussel, “If Blindness Creates a New World,” CJDS 8, no. 6 (2019): 108-130,
      which documents and analyzes the genesis and structure of Notes on Blindness VR in the
      most comprehensive way. E. Modena, building on Roussel’s analysis, devotes some of the
      finest pages to it in her book Nelle storie: 84-87. See also the presentation of the project by A.
      Colinart, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=im3CpA14jEQ, accessed January 8, 2023.
      27 Cfr. e.g., A. Noë, Learning to Look: Dispatches from the Art World (New York: Oxford
      University Press, 2021).

STEFANO VELOTTI                                 156                                            AN-ICON
              It involves participating in the reconstitution of the unity
              of experience almost “from scratch,” which depends on
              acoustic signals that “bounce” back to us from objects if
              given certain environmental conditions: wind or rain make
              the world perceptible. Perceiving requires our activity, which
              is partially controllable, and a “collaboration” of the world
              that is usually beyond our control, i.e. weather events (in
              the app, the experiencer can control the triggering of such
              uncontrollable conditions). The idea that seeing is not ob-
              vious, that we need to learn how to do it actively, and that
              art is a way of “learning to look,” I think is right, as long
              as “looking” is translated into a more global “perceiving”
              extended to the whole body. What we see in the virtual
              scenario are not really images, in the sense of figures, but
              sketches, elusive and ghostly graphic patterns (like Kantian
              image-schemes)28 correlated to sound. A silent world would
              be dark. This reduction of figurativeness is much closer
              to a staging of our ordinary perception than any mimetic
              or fantastic imagery. Like blindness for the non-blind, our
              perceptual life in its entanglement with the world cannot
              be properly depicted visually. However, the suspension
              of ordinary sight opens up an understanding of a usually
              occluded perceptual experience, revealing, I believe, the
              paradoxical an-immersive interweaving of controllability
              and uncontrollability that constitutes us and toward which
              we are becoming increasingly blind.




      28 E. Garroni, Immagine, linguaggio, figura (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2005).
STEFANO VELOTTI                               157                               AN-ICON
AN-ICON has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme. Grant agreement No. 834033 AN-ICON.
The project is hosted by the Department of Philosophy “Piero Martinetti” – Department of Excellence at the State University of Milan.



                                                                                           1 / I                                                                              AN-ICON
