10.54103/ai/17655
Vilém Flusser uses the concept of illusion in a non-systematic way, resulting in two ostensible contradictions. First of all, he often uses the term illusion, while criticizing the metaphysic assumptions that it implies; secondly, he seems to both dispraise and value the illusionary nature of technical images. This article aims at clarifying Flusser’s thoughts on illusion in the belief that they are not as conflicting as they might seem at first.
In fact, when Flusser deplores the risk of deception associated with technical images, he refers to the illusion of transparency. He does not oppose the concept of illusion to a supposed objective truth, on the contrary, he opposes the illusion of the objective nature of images to the awareness of their constructed and mediated character.
However, a rational demystification of illusions is not a viable option, since, according to Flusser, they are the result of a voluntary self-deception: we suppress our critical thinking because we cannot bear its complexity, we want images to “release us from the necessity for conceptual, explanatory thought.” This is why Flusser thinks that aware illusion – in other words: fiction – can help us overcome our “inertia of happiness” and develop a critical imagination.
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Self-deception
The polysemy of Vilém Flusser’s concept of illusion
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Self-deception
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Zielinski, S., Weibel, P., Irrgang, D., eds., Flusseriana: An Intellectual Toolbox (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2015).
The polysemy of Vilém Flusser’s concept of illusion
https://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/anicon/article/download/17655/17772
1
            The polysemy
            of Vilém Flusser’s
concept of illusi  o
by Francesco Restuccia
              Flusser
                      n
                         Illusion
                         Fiction
                         Fontcuberta
                         Idolatry
                         Self-deception




                             Issue №2 Year 2022
                             → Just an illusion? Between simulation,
                             emulation, and hyper-realism
                             Edited by Pietro Conte
                             and Lambert Wiesing
The polysemy of
Vilém Flusser’s concept
of il usion
FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA, Sapienza - Università di Roma – https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8900-642X
https://doi.org/10.54103/ai/17655



Abstract                       Vilém Flusser uses the concept of illusion in
                 a non-systematic way, resulting in two ostensible contra-
                 dictions. First of all, he often uses the term illusion, while
                 criticizing the metaphysic assumptions that it implies; sec-
                 ondly, he seems to both dispraise and value the illusionary
                 nature of technical images. This article aims at clarifying
                 Flusser’s thoughts on illusion in the belief that they are not
                 as conflicting as they might seem at first.
                               In fact, when Flusser deplores the risk of de-
                 ception associated with technical images, he refers to the
                 illusion of transparency. He does not oppose the concept
                 of illusion to a supposed objective truth, on the contrary,
                 he opposes the illusion of the objective nature of images to
                 the awareness of their constructed and mediated character.
                               However, a rational demystification of illu-
                 sions is not a viable option, since, according to Flusser,
                 they are the result of a voluntary self-deception: we
                 suppress our critical thinking because we cannot bear
                 its complexity, we want images to “release us from the
                 necessity for conceptual, explanatory thought.” This is
                 why Flusser thinks that aware illusion – in other words:
                 fiction – can help us overcome our “inertia of happiness”
                 and develop a critical imagination.

Keywords         Flusser               Illusion              Fiction               Fontcuberta
                 Idolatry              Self-deception
To quote this essay: F. Restuccia, “The polysemy of Vilém Flusser’s concept of illusion,” AN-ICON.
Studies in Environmental Images [ISSN 2785-7433] 2 (2022): 52-66, https://doi.org/10.54103/ai/17655

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                              52                                        AN-ICON
                            Leafing through the pages of Herbarium (1982-
              1985) by Joan Fontcuberta one is immediately seduced by
              the beauty of these black and white analog photographs
              of exotic plants, whose geometric details remind one of
              Karl Blossfeldt’s work. The whole series is presented as
              scientific documentation, including the botanical nomencla-
              ture of these newly discovered species. Only at a second
              glance one might notice that something is wrong: some
              details in the image, the strange pseudo-Latin names. What
              appeared to be plants are actually small assemblages of
              pieces of plastic, fragments and parts of animals found by
              the artist in the industrial outskirts of Barcelona. We have
              been victims of an illusion. These images, both hyper-re-
              alistic and extremely unlikely, aim to deceive us and at the
              same time to reveal the deception. Without any digital ma-
              nipulation, Fontcuberta’s work on the one hand invites us
              to reflect upon the supposed immediate and documentary
              character of photography, on the other hand it allows us to
              experience unprecedented and surprising configurations.
                            Fontcuberta had an important intellectual col-
              laboration with a philosopher and media theorist who ded-
              icated many of his writings to discussing the illusionary
              character of technical images: Vilém Flusser.1 Although
              the term “illusion” appears only rarely in his writings and
              in a non-systematic way, Flusser was definitely fascinated
              by the ambiguity of this concept, which, as it emerges in
              Herbarium, can be conceived both as a form of deception,
              with dangerous and deplorable effects, and as a precious
              artistic and epistemic tool.2 Often Flusser refers to illusive
              phenomena in a pejorative way; sometimes he tends to re-
              ject the metaphysical assumption – implied by the concept
              of illusion – that an objective truth can be found beyond

      1 Flusser also wrote the introduction to the German edition of Herbarium: V. Flusser,
     “Einführung ‘Herbarium’ von Joan Fontcuberta,” in Standpunkte: Texte zur Fotografie
      (Göttingen: European Photography, 1998): 113-116.
      2 As Carrillo Canán wrote, “Flusser has no explicit theory on deception but as with many
      critical thinkers, his theory is to a great extent a theory of deception.” A.J.L. Carrillo Canán,
     “Deception and the ‘magic’ of ‘technical images’ according to Flusser,” Flusser Studies, no. 4
      (2008): 1-12, 1. Significantly, neither “illusion,” “deception,” nor “fiction” was chosen as one
      of the 235 entries that make up the glossary of Flusseriana. S. Zielinski, P. Weibel, D. Irrgang,
      eds., Flusseriana: An Intellectual Toolbox (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2015).

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                              53                                            AN-ICON
              appearance; on other occasions he seems convinced that
              the art of illusion is the best tool for the creative training of
              our imagination. Therefore, it could be useful to try to put
              an order, as far as this is possible, to Flusser’s thoughts
              on illusion, in the belief that they are not as conflicting as
              they might initially seem. First we will analyze the contexts
              where he deplores the risk of deception associated with
              any mediation, and with new media and technical images
              in particular; then we will consider his critiques of the con-
              cepts of illusion and especially of disillusion, focusing on
              his theory of a voluntary self-deception; finally we will see
              how Flusser approves of illusion when it is understood as
              a form of fiction.

                               Illusion as deception

                            The German word that Flusser uses the most
              when referring to the negative sense of illusion is “Täu-
              schung,” which could be translated as “deception.” The
              verb “täuschen” literally means to exchange, to swap: by
              exchanging two different things, one mistakes one for an-
              other one. Being deceived is, first of all, taking something
              for something else, or conferring to one thing the value that
              we should only confer to something else. What are the two
              things that, according to Flusser, might dangerously be
              confused? The model and its copy, the signified and the
              signifier, the thing and the image. Deception is “a reversal
              [Umkehrung] of the vectors of significance,”3 or a “reversal
              of the function of the image:”4 images should represent the
              world and help us “to orientate” ourselves within it, but we
              end up forgetting about the world and living in function of
              the images we have created.5 Images “are supposed to be



      3 V. Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography (1983), trans. A. Mathews (London:
      Reaktion Books, 2000): 37, 68.
      4 Ibid.: 10.
      5 On the concept of reversal as the key to understanding Flusser’s conception of technical
      images see D. Irrgang, Vom Umkehren der Bedeutungsvektoren: Prototypen des Technischen
      Bildes bei Vilém Flusser (Cologne: Verlag der Buchhandlung Walther König, 2017).

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                           54                                        AN-ICON
               maps but they turn into screens: Instead of representing
               [vorstellen] the world, they obscure [verstellen] it.”6
                              Flusser is not concerned by the deceptions
               that occur when we take an image of A for an image of B.
               As long as we truly know that something is an image, we
               also know that it is a human construction, that it needs to
               be interpreted and that this interpretation might be wrong.
               The real problem arises when images conceal their own
               nature.
                              Flusser’s main models for his (implicit) theory
               of deception are Plato’s concept of eidolon and the Jewish
               and early Christian conception of idolatry.7 In his interpre-
               tation, both Plato’s eidola and religious idols are images
               that should mediate and represent something else (ideas
               for Plato, God in the Jewish and Christian tradition), but
               instead of presenting themselves as such, they end up
               being taken for what they should refer to. Flusser rethinks
               the concept of idolatry in a secular way, conceiving it as
               that particular form of deception which occurs when we
               do not recognize the symbolic and cultural nature of an
               image. In Towards a Philosophy of Photography idolatry is
               defined as “the inability to read off ideas from the elements
               of the image, despite the ability to read these elements
               themselves; hence: worship of images.”8 It is important to
               notice that idolatry is not only a perceptual deception, but
               has effects on human behavior: Flusser writes, metaphor-
               ically, that images are “worshiped” when they “have a hold
               over people as objects.”9
                             Sometimes, in order to identify this particular
               form of deception Flusser uses, instead of “idolatry,” the
               term “hallucination.”

      6 V. Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography: 10.
      7 Ibid.: 11; V. Flusser, “The codified world” (1978), in Writings, trans. E. Eisel (Minneapolis-
      London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002): 35-41, 39. See also F. Restuccia, “Flusser
      against idolatry,” Flusser Studies, no. 26 (2018): 1-15 and F. Restuccia, Il contrattacco delle
      immagini. Tecnica, media e idolatria a partire da Vilém Flusser (Milan: Meltemi, 2021).
      8 V. Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography: 83. A similar “semiotic” definition of
      idolatry was proposed by Augustine: “Now, he is in bondage to a sign who uses, or pays
      homage to, any significant object without knowing what it signifies,” S. Augustine, On
      Christian Doctrine, trans. D.W. Robertson jr. (London: Pearson, 1958): III, IX, 13.
      9 V. Flusser, “Design: obstacle for/to the removal of obstacles” (1993), in The Shape of
      Things. A Philosophy of Design (London: Reaktion Books, 1999): 58-61, 60.

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                              55                                            AN-ICON
Imagination can dialectically reverse and become hallucination.
Images resulting from this reversed imagination stop working as
mediation and become opaque surfaces hiding the world. The se-
mantic vectors invert and point towards their producer instead of
pointing towards the world.10
                            It is important to notice that this sort of reversal
              can happen with any kind of mediation and not only with
              images. When we stop using texts and conceptual thinking
              to help us understand the world, and we start using the
              world in order to understand our texts, or forcing data to
              fit into our conceptual grid, then we are victims of another
              form of deception. In this case Flusser talks about texto-
              latry, as opposed to idolatry, or paranoia, as opposed to
              hallucination.11
                            This dangerous reversal of imagination hap-
              pens when we do not recognize a medium, especially a
              visual one, as such. Therefore, the most illusionary images
              are those that appear transparent, concealing their status
              of images and presenting themselves as objective reality.
              According to Flusser, technical images – all images pro-
              duced by apparatuses, starting with photography – are the
              most deceiving, in this sense, because their mechanical
              production seems to grant an automatic and almost natural
              process that avoids any human and cultural interference.12
             “But this ‘objectivity’ of the photograph is deceptive [täus-
              chend],”13 because technology is a human product and is
              also culturally biased. The program that apparatuses use
              to code images was written by human beings and is an
              externalization of the visual schemata that they would use
              if they were drawing an image themselves. When we see

      10 V. Flusser, “Iconoclastia,” Cavalo azul, no. 8 (1979): 78-84, 79, my translation; see also V.
      Flusser Towards a Philosophy of Photography: 10.
      11 The choice of the last couple of words is due to their etymology: “hallucination,” which
      might be related to the Latin word lux (light), refers to visual thinking, whereas “paranoia,”
      which comes from the Greek word nous (intellect), refers to conceptual thinking. See V. Flusser,
     “Iconoclastia:” 79, and V. Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography: 10.
      12 H. Fox Talbot, The Pencil of Nature (London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans,
      1844) was one of the first to assert such a natural character of photography. See K. Walton,
     “Transparent pictures: on the nature of photographic realism,” Critical Inquiry, no. 11 (1984):
      246-277, https://www.doi.org/10.1086/448287.
      13 V. Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography: 51.

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                             56                                          AN-ICON
               a drawing or any other traditional image, though, we are
               aware that what we are looking at is someone’s interpre-
               tation of the world, and not the world itself; but when we
               see a photograph, or a video, we assume that what we
               are looking at is a direct emanation of reality. “This lack of
               criticism of technical images is potentially dangerous […]
               for the reason that the ‘objectivity’ of technical images is
               an illusion [Täuschung].”14 The elements of a photograph
               appear to be “symptoms” of the world, instead of “symbols”
               that need to be “decoded.”15 The only way to avoid idolatry,
               hallucination and deception is to recognize the symbols
               contained in an image and decode them, discovering the
              “programmed concepts” they represent, “so as to identify
               the true significance of the photograph.”16
                            Based on what has been discussed so far,
               Flusser seems to maintain a sort of platonic dualism: im-
               ages are just symbols and should not be confused with
               the real world. However, Flusser refuses this approach as
              “‘metaphysical’ […] in the worst sense of the word.”17 The
               reason why he deplores the illusion of transparency of tech-
               nical images is because, according to him, no such thing
               as an immediate reality can be found, not even beyond
               images. Even “the amorphous stew of phenomena (‘the
               material world’) is an illusion [Täuschung],”18 since it is only
               accessible through our nervous system and is therefore
               also a construction. In an interview with Florian Rötzer he
               declared:

The concept of simulation disturbs me. When something is simulated,
that is, when it looks like something else, there must be something
being simulated. In the term simulation or simulacrum lies a deep
metaphysical belief that something can be simulated. I do not share


       14 Ibid.: 15.
       15 Ibid.; V. Flusser, “Für eine Theorie der Techno-Imagination, 1980 in Standpunkte: Texte zur
       Fotografie: 8-16, 8.
       16 V. Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography: 44.
       17 Ibid.: 62.
       18 V. Flusser, “Form and material,” in Shape of Things: A Philosophy of Design: 22-29, 22.

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                             57                                          AN-ICON
this belief [...]. In my opinion in the word simulation hides what is left
of a belief in the absolute.19
                              Flusser is not afraid that the real world could
                be replaced with a simulation: on the one hand because
                our technologies do not allow us to build virtual worlds as
                defined as the experience of the world built by our nervous
                system, on the other hand because if this ever happened,
                then it would not make sense to distinguish these experi-
                ences as belonging to different levels of reality.20 Moreover
                our lifeworld and our simulations are already intertwined,
                since the experiences we have in the former affect those
                we have in the latter and vice versa. The real illusion is the
                possibility of accessing a pure, immediate reality.
                              If all is construction, then why is Flusser con-
                cerned? Because if we assumed that images – and gener-
                ally our whole experience of the world – are immediate and
                pure, then we would accept them acritically. We would start
                unconsciously absorbing interpretations of reality without
                questioning them, and our imagination would slowly be-
                come lethargic.
                              We should then try to avoid surrendering to the
                illusion of transparency, train our imagination and learn to
                decode the images we are surrounded by. But how can
                we do this? Is a rationalistic debunking the only way out
                of deception?

                                 Illusion as self-deception

                             In the essay Filmerzeugung und Filmverbrauch
                Flusser rethinks the movie theater as a modern version of21
                Plato’s cave. People sit in a dark space looking at images

       19 V. Flusser, Zwiegespräche (Göttingen: European Photography, 1996): 230-231, my
       translation. See J. Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (1981), trans. S. Glaser (Ann Arbor:
       University of Michigan Press, 1995). Flusser considered Baudrillard a friend and often quotes
       him in his final years, although mostly polemically.
       20 V. Flusser, “Vom Virtuellen,” in F. Rötzer, P. Weibel, eds., Cyberspace. Zum medialen
       Gesamtkunstwerk (München: Boer, 2002): 65-71; V. Flusser, Kommunikologie weiter denken
       (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2008): 75-77.
       21 V. Flusser, “Filmerzeugung und Filmverbrauch,” in Lob der Oberflächigkeit. Für eine
       Phänomenologie der Medien (Bensheim-Düsseldorf: Bollman Verlag, 1993): 153-166.

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                              58                                          AN-ICON
              projected on the wall in front of them, ignoring the world
              outside the “cave.” What does Flusser’s interpretation of
              the myth teach us? That people want to stay in the cave,
              they are not chained, they do not desire to be freed. Their
              illusion is voluntary.
                            According to Flusser commercial cinema still
              has some degree of idolatry: people contemplate those
              images acritically, as pure entertainment, without question-
              ing the message that is being passed. Therefore they are
             “programmed” by the technical images to think and act in a
              certain way: the same people who leave the movie theater,
              writes Flusser, will form a line to enter the supermarket.
              They are victims of a double illusion: on the one hand they
              see the lights projected on the screen as a world taking
              shape in front of their eyes, on the other hand they end
              up believing that the people, the feelings, the values they
              perceived somehow exist and have a life of their own, that
              they are not the creation of a team of artists and technicians.
              However, neither of the two forms of illusion is a complete
              deception. Any film spectator knows how a film is made:
              they know the impression of movement is produced by the
              rapid sequence of the frames, they know the events por-
              trayed have been written, designed and reproduced, but
              they choose to believe in them. “Moviegoers are believers
              not in good faith, but in bad faith [böse Glaubens]: they
              know better, but don’t want to know. This is not magic, but
              something new.”22
                            In Towards a Philosophy of Photography, writ-
              ten around three years later, Flusser further develops his
              conception of a voluntary illusion, or belief in bad faith.
              Even though people nowadays act as if they were under
              the magic spell of technical images – they see a commer-
              cial and buy the product, they watch a video and change
              their political opinion – yet they do not believe in those
              images in the same way as people belonging to traditional
              magic cultures believed in their images. While the latter did
              not develop their critical consciousness (their conceptual

      22   Ibid.: 163, my translation.

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                      59                          AN-ICON
                thinking), which can only be trained through literacy,23 the
                former do have it, but end up suppressing it.

Both Native Americans and functionaries believe in the reality of
images, but functionaries do this out of bad faith. After all, they
have learned to write at school and consequently should know
better. Functionaries have a historical consciousness and critical
awareness but they suppress these. They know that the war in
Lebanon is not a clash between good and evil but that specific
causes have specific consequences there. They know that the
toothbrush is not a sacred object but a product of Western history.
But they have to suppress their superior knowledge of this.24
                              The main sources for Flusser’s conception of
                a belief in bad faith might be Johan Huizinga and Marcel
                Mauss.25 However, these authors developed the idea of
                a voluntary belief, or a partially aware illusion, in order to
                describe traditional magical thinking and not only the con-
                temporary experience of technical images.26 By trying to
                prove that any magic ritual has a playful dimension, just as
                any game has a ritual dimension, Huizinga affirms that no
                illusion is ever a complete deception: it is always combined
                with some degree of simulation.

As far as I know, ethnologists and anthropologists concur in the
opinion that the mental attitude in which the great religious feasts
of savages are celebrated and witnessed is not one of complete
illusion. There is an underlying consciousness of things “not be-
ing real.” [...] A certain element of “makebelieve” is operative in all


       23 V. Flusser, “Line and surface” (1973), in Writings: 21-34; V. Flusser, Die Schrift. Hat
       Schreiben Zukunft? (Göttingen: Immatrix, 1987).
       24 V. Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography: 63.
       25 V. Flusser, Post-History (1983), trans. R. Maltez Novaes (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2013): 99-
       106; V. Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography: 27; Kommunikologie weiter denken: 245.
       26 The notion of “voluntary illusion” [illusion volontaire] can already be found in Paul Souriau,
       L’imagination de l’artiste (Paris: Librairie Hachette et cie, 1901), while the concept of aware
       illusion [bewußte Selbsttäuschung] was first developed by Konrad Lange, Die Bewußte
       Selbsttäuschung als Kern des künstlerischen Genusses (Leipzig: Verlag von Veit & Comp.,
       1895).

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                              60                                           AN-ICON
primitive religions. Whether one is sorcerer or sorcerized one is al-
ways knower and dupe at once. But one chooses to be the dupe.27
                             In a similar way, a few years before, Mauss
               wrote that any magical performance reveals the collective
               will to believe in it, both on the part of the spectators and
               the magician:

We are in no doubt that magical facts need constant encourage-
ment and that even the sincerest delusions of the magician have
always been self-imposed to some degree.28
                            Yet, one should be able to distinguish between
               this sort of sincere self-delusion that we can find in the ex-
               perience of traditional magic, from the “belief in bad faith”
               that Flusser identifies in the experience of technical images.
               On the one hand the “underlying consciousness of things
              ‘not being real’” is still a blurry intuition, on the other hand
               the critical consciousness reached by educated people
               is fully developed and can only coexist with illusion if it is
               partially suppressed.
                             Why do we systematically suppress our critical
               and conceptual thinking and choose to be deluded? Flusser
               thinks that this human behavior is not only a result of our
               tendency to conform. The reason why we need to partially
               suppress our critical consciousness in order to function
               within society is that, at this level of complexity, conceptual
               thinking is no longer efficient. The point is not that people
               do not understand rational explanations; it is that they do
               not want to hear them. Commenting on how, during the
              1982 Lebanon War, people formed their opinions based
               on videos and photos, rather than on theoretical analyses,
               Flusser writes:



       27 J. Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture (1938), trans. R.F.C.
       Hull (London-Boston-Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949): 22-23.
       28 M. Mauss, General Theory of Magic (1902), trans. R. Brain (London-New York: Routledge,
       2001): 118.

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                           61                                       AN-ICON
We are by now sick and tired of explanations and prefer to stick
to the photograph that releases us from the necessity for con-
ceptual, explanatory thought and absolves us from the bother of
going into the causes and consequences of the war in Lebanon:
In the image we see with our own eyes what the war looks like.
The text simply consists of instructions as to how we are to see.29
                           We suppress our conceptual thinking because
               of the cognitive comfort provided by technical apparatus-
               es that calculate and build images for us. Flusser calls the
               state of numbness generated by this comfort the inertia of
               happiness: “It is this inertia of happiness that stands in the
               way of a changeover.”30
                           This theory forces us to reconsider the rational-
               istic approach that one could at first read into Flusser’s cri-
               tique of deception. If our illusion is somehow self-imposed
               and the suppression of our critical consciousness is a re-
               action to the heaviness, the complexity and the abstract-
               ness of conceptual thinking, which expresses the need to
               expand the visual, sensory and emotional dimension of
               existence, we cannot simply debunk our self-delusion by
               rational means. The only way to overcome the negative
               aspects of deception is within the image world, therefore
               through a creative use of illusion.

                                Illusion as fiction

                             When the term “illusion” is used by Flusser with
               a positive connotation it has the meaning of construction
               or fiction. In the posthumous book The Surprising Phe-
               nomenon of Human Communication, where he defines the
               structure of communication as the infrastructure of human
               reality, Flusser writes that the act of communicating produc-
               es the illusion of immortality. We know, due to the suffering
               of our bodies, that it is an illusion: “Despite our individual
               and collective memories, we remain mortals. Nevertheless,

       29 V. Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography: 62.
       30 V. Flusser, Kommunikologie weiter denken: 210. “Es ist diese Trägheit des Glücks, die
       einer Umschaltung entgegensteht.”

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                            62                                         AN-ICON
              this illusion is, still, our own reality, our ontological dignity.”31
              In this case illusion is a different name for sense-making,
              the attribution of meaning, which according to Flusser is
              what makes us humans.
                             When illusion is conceived in this constructive
              way, Flusser replaces the term “täuschen” (deceive) with
              the term “vortäuschen,” which could be translated as “sim-
              ulate,” “feign.”32 In Shape of Things he defines the verb “to
              design” as “to concoct something, to simulate [vortäus-
              chen], to draft, to sketch, to fashion, to have designs on
              something.”33 A simulation – this constructive form of illu-
              sion – is not about producing a copy [Abbild], it is about
              shaping a model [Vorbild].34
                             In “Filmerzeugung und Filmverbrauch” Flusser
              affirms that not only does the sequence of frames produce
              the illusion of movement, but the very frames are illusions,
              as they recreate the impression of three dimensional spaces
              through the two-dimensional disposition of colors. In this
              context “illusion” is not meant in a negative sense: Flusser
              is fascinated by the capacity of technical images to evoke
              meaningful and visual experiences from non-meaningful
              and often non-visual elements, such as the bits of infor-
              mation for digital photography.35 Technical images have
              an illusionistic effect in that they evoke an impression by
              means of calculation.
                             The point-projection perspective designed by
              renaissance painters, the trompe-l’œil designed by baroque
              architects, the tricks designed by stage magicians produce
              emotional effects using rational techniques. Experimental
              photographers and programmers work in the same way, but



      31 V. Flusser, The Surprising Phenomenon of Human Communication (1975), trans. R. Maltez
      Novaes, D. Naves (Metaflux, 2016): 154.
      32 V. Flusser, “Gärten,” in Dinge und Undinge. Phänomenologische Skizzen (München-Wien:
      Carl Hanser, 1993): 46-52, 51.
      33 V. Flusser, “About the word design,” in Shape of Things: A Philosophy of Design: 17.
      34 V. Flusser, “Abbild – Vorbild oder: was heißt darstellen?,” in Lob der Oberflächlichkeit
      (Düsseldorf: Bollmann, 1993): 293-317.
      35 Even in the case of analog photography, according to Flusser, the image could be
      reduced to computable elements, such as the exposure time, the focal aperture, and the ISO
      setting.

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                           63                                        AN-ICON
               with more efficient tools: they can program an apparatus
               that will translate an alphanumeric input into a visual output.
                               According to Flusser, this allows for the first
               time for an experimental approach to image making and
               therefore an element of control over the visual world: a
               synthesis between conceptual-critical thinking and visu-
               al-emotional thinking. The word “experimental” is used in a
               literal sense: technical images can be used for experiments.
               One can insert a certain input, see what the outcome is,
               and consequently change the input in order to achieve a
               different result.
                               If one writes the equation of a Mandelbrot frac-
               tal in a computer in order to visualize it on the screen, one
               may be surprised by the outcome and therefore learn from
               it. The complexity of that geometrical figure where the to-
               tality is infinitely repeated in the parts could not be perfectly
               foreseen.

One sits in front of a keyboard, taking one dot element after another
out of the memory, to fit it into an image on the screen, to compute it.
This step-by-step process of extraction can be automated so that
it can proceed very quickly. The images appear on the screen one
after another in breathtaking speed. One can follow this sequence
of images, just as if the imagination had become self-sufficient;
or as if it had traveled from inside (let’s say from the cranium) to
outside (into the computer); or as if one could observe one’s own
dreams from the outside. In fact, some of the appearing images
can be surprising: they are unexpected images.36
                           The idea of an experimental character of tech-
               nical images could be better understood by taking into
               consideration Flusser’s notion of science fiction, where
               he further develops the relationship between conceptual
               and emotional thinking. With this expression Flusser not
               only refers to the literary genre, to which, moreover, he
       36 V. Flusser, “A new imagination,” in Writings: 110-116, 114. For a closer analysis of
       this essay and for a discussion about the idea of surprising images and the externalization
       of imagination, see L. Wiesing, Artificial Presence (2005), trans. N.F. Schott (Stanford:
       Stanford University Press, 2010): 98-101. See also V. Flusser, “Ein neuer Platonismus?,”
       kulturRRevolution, no. 19 (1988): 6.

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                              64                                          AN-ICON
               contributed with many charming short stories,37 but also
               reflects about the deep inner connection between science
               as fiction and fiction as science: something that has been
               called a “speculative fiction.”38 Any scientific knowledge is
               based on the development of models and simulations that
               are, strictly speaking, illusions. When fiction is enhanced
               with the experimental exactness provided by technical im-
               ages, it becomes a powerful tool to create surprising mod-
               els that will allow us to think of what we are not yet able
               to conceive.
                             This is, according to Flusser, the greatest po-
               tentiality of virtual simulations: they allow us to experience
              – emotionally, visually, haptically – what until now we were
               only able to calculate; and at the same time they allow us to
               calculate and control experiences that until now we could
               only vaguely imagine. Flusser believes that virtual environ-
               ments, and in general all technical images, should not be
               used to reproduce what already exists for recreational pur-
               poses,39 but should “bring to virtuality” alternative worlds.
              Thanks to simulated environments, for example, we could
               be able to experience a world where all living creatures
               are sulfur-based instead of carbon-based – a world that,


      37 Most of Flusser’s philosophical science fiction short stories can be found in the
      following publications: V. Flusser, Ficções Filosóficas (São Paulo: Edusp, 1998); V. Flusser,
      Angenommen: Eine Szenenfolge (Göttingen: European Photography, 2000); V. Flusser, L. Bec,
      Vampyroteuthis Infernalis: A treatise with a Report by the Institut Scientifique de Recherche
      Paranaturaliste (1987), trans. V.A. Pakis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).
      See also Flusser’s essays on fiction: V. Flusser, “Da ficção,” O diário (August 26, 1966); V.
      Flusser, “Science fiction” (1988), trans. W. Hanff, Flusser Studies, no. 20 (2015): 1-3, where
      Flusser writes about a fantasia essata (exacting fantasy), which he attributes to Leonardo da
      Vinci.
      38 J. Torres, “Homo Fictor: em busca de uma ficção filosófica,” Santa Barbara Portuguese
      Studies 2, no. 4 (2020): 1-12, 7. Much has been published on Flusser’s theory of fiction, and
      science fiction in particular. See G. Salvi Philipson, “Flusser para além do ensaio: de outros
      modos possíveis de habitar a intersecção entre ficção e filosofia,” Flusser Studies, no. 25
      (2018): 1-17; the sixth chapter of A. Finger, R. Guldin, G. Bernardo Krause, Vilém Flusser. An
      Introduction (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2011): 109-129; P. Bozzi, “Rhapsody in
      blue: Vilém Flusser und der vampyroteuthis infernalis,” Flusser Studies, no. 1 (2005): 1-20; G.
      Bernardo Krause, “On philosophical fiction,” in R. Guldin, ed., Das Spiel mit der Übersetzung.
      Figuren der Mehrsprachigkeit im Werk Vilém Flussers (Tübingen-Basel: Francke, 2004): 119-
      128.
      39 Flusser is extremely skeptical about the documentary function of technical images, not
      only because of their illusionary character (technical images can be easily manipulated), but
      because he questions the neutrality of any sort of documentation. Any document presents
      a point of view, with a system of ethical and political implications, as it were objective. See F.
      Restuccia, “La realtà sta nella fotografia. Autenticazioni delle immagini della guerra del Libano,”
      Carte semiotiche, no. 4 (2016): 160-170.

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                              65                                           AN-ICON
               without any technical help, we can anticipate, but not fully
               conceive.40
                           Rethinking illusion as an aware and voluntary
               simulation allows Flusser to avoid the rationalistic approach
               to debunking. He realizes that visual interfaces (and even
               more, haptic and immersive ones) allow for experiencers
               to overcome their inertia of happiness and take part in the
               model making process. However, this is only possible if
               technical images and virtual environments are open to a
               strong interactive participation.41 This way, by turning the
               coding process into a playful interaction, it will be possible
               to bridge the gap between critical and visual thinking, be-
               tween the elite of programmers and the mass of consumers.




      40 V. Flusser, “Vom Virtuellen:” 70-71; V. Flusser, Kommunikologie weiter denken: 78.
      Recently Andrea Pinotti identified this approach as part of a post-human trend in VR (try to
      experience the world beyond the limits of the human body and mind, for example by flying as
      an eagle) as opposed to a humanitarian trend (VR as an empathy machine meant to move the
      experiencer about social issues). The main limit of the post-human approach is that it will only
      allow perceiving a non-human world as a human being would perceive it. A. Pinotti, Alla soglia
      dell’immagine (Torino: Einaudi, 2021): 201; see also A. Pinotti, “What is it like to be a hawk?
      Inter-specific empathy in the age of immersive virtual environments,” in Y. Hadjinicolaou, ed.,
      Visual Engagements. Image Practices and Falconry (Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter, 2020): 30-47.
      The best example of this post-human approach in Flusser is definitely his Vampyrotheutis
      infernalis.
      41 On the (post-)political implications of Flusser’s theory of participation, see M. Menon,
      Vilém Flusser e la “Rivoluzione dell’Informazione”: Comunicazione, Etica, Politica (Pisa: Edizioni
      ETS, 2022): 172-178.

FRANCESCO RESTUCCIA                              66                                           AN-ICON
AN-ICON has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme. Grant agreement No. 834033 AN-ICON.
The project is hosted by the Department of Philosophy “Piero Martinetti” – Department of Excellence at the State University of Milan.



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