Over the last two decades, discoveries made in the field of cognitive neuroscience have begun to permeate the humanities and social sciences. In the context of this intersection, Neurofilmology is a research program that arises at the encounter between two models of viewer: the viewer-as-mind (deriving from a cognitive/analytical approach) and the viewer-as-body (typical of the phenomenological/continental approach). Accordingly, Neurofilmology focuses on the viewer-asorganism, by investigating with both empirical and speculative epistemological tools the subject of audiovisual experience, postulated as embodied, embedded, enacted, extended, emerging, affective, and relational. This introduction is divided into three parts. Firstly, it compares the classic filmological approach of the 1940s-50s with contemporary audiovisual media studies devoted to the analysis of viewer experience. Secondly, it outlines an epistemological and conceptual framework for the research: in this sense, it illustrates the theoretical model of the viewer-as-organism, and sketches a general outline of audiovisual experience that allows researchers to rearrange different kinds of research within a unitary framework. Thirdly, it briefly summarizes the contributions to the special issue.
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Neurofilmology: An Introduction
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14
Neurofilmology: An Introduction
Adriano D’Aloia and Ruggero Eugeni,
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore




Abstract

   Over the last two decades, discoveries made in the field of cognitive neuroscience
   have begun to permeate the humanities and social sciences. In the context of this
   intersection, Neurofilmology is a research program that arises at the encounter
   between two models of viewer: the viewer-as-mind (deriving from a cognitive/
   analytical approach) and the viewer-as-body (typical of the phenomenological/
   continental approach). Accordingly, Neurofilmology focuses on the viewer-as-
   organism, by investigating with both empirical and speculative epistemological
   tools the subject of audiovisual experience, postulated as embodied, embedded,
   enacted, extended, emerging, affective, and relational. This introduction is di-
   vided into three parts. Firstly, it compares the classic filmological approach of the
   1940s-50s with contemporary audiovisual media studies devoted to the analysis
   of viewer experience. Secondly, it outlines an epistemological and conceptual
   framework for the research: in this sense, it illustrates the theoretical model of
   the viewer-as-organism, and sketches a general outline of audiovisual experience
   that allows researchers to rearrange different kinds of research within a unitary
   framework. Thirdly, it briefly summarizes the contributions to the special issue.


   This special issue of Cinéma & Cie focuses on major conceptual and epis-
temological arguments arising from the dialogue between audiovisual studies
and neurosciences developed over the last twenty years. In fact, the contribu-
tors share the conviction that such a dialogue can be fruitful if and only if it is
conducted within a common and consistent framework, including both episte-
mological and conceptual aspects. Such a framework should allow each of the
research programs to contribute to a shared understanding of that particular
and complex phenomenon that is the film and audiovisual media viewing ex-
perience. Therefore, this introduction will both illustrate the main difficulties
involved in the dialogue between audiovisual studies and neurosciences, and
propose a methodological and conceptual framework for underpinning and
girding interdisciplinary research projects.

                                          Cinéma & Cie, vol. XIV, no. 22/23, Spring/Fall 2014
                              Adriano D’Aloia and Ruggero Eugeni


    In doing so, we assume a twofold orientation. On the one hand, our proposal
looks to the contemporary research fields crossing film theory and experimen-
tal sciences – such as “psychocinematics,” “neurocinematics,” “neurocognitive
film and media theory,” or “film neuroaesthetics.” The framework we propose
is integrative, rather than alternative; more exactly, we intend to overcome some
oppositions between different conceptions of audiovisual experience, under-
lying and undermining the dialogue between audiovisual theory and experi-
mental sciences. On the other hand, our proposal looks to the past and more
particularly to Filmology, the research program that during the 1950s and the
1960s intersected for the first time theoretical and empirical approaches within
a systematic investigation of film viewing experience. Although largely forgot-
ten by current psychocinematic studies, Filmology nevertheless constitutes a
key anticipation of current issues and debates – as well as of contemporary
limits and problems of interdisciplinary collaborations. We will label our epis-
temological and theoretical framework Neurofilmology.
    The first part of this introduction is dedicated to an analysis of both the clas-
sic filmological approach and the contemporary landscape of interdisciplinary
studies on audiovisual experience. The second part illustrates our proposal both
in epistemological and in conceptual terms, and outlines a theoretical model of
audiovisual experience. The third part briefly presents the individual contribu-
tions to this special issue.


The (problematic) heritage of classic Filmology

     Cette diversité des thèmes traités dans notre Revue marquera utilement, non pas le li-
     mites, mais l’étendue du champ des études filmologiques et rendra sensible la nécessité,
     pour ces études, de méthodes d’investigation très diverses, et par suite d’équipes de tra-
     vailleurs multiples et variées, et la mise en jeu d’outillages complexes et spécialisés. No-
     tre discipline exigera, pour que soit réalisé son programme, que nous ne saurions encore
     définir et limiter, la convergence de ces méthodes et l’harmonisation de ces curiosités.1

   Reading Mario Roques’ Introduction to the Revue Internationale de Filmologie
issue no. 16 (January-March 1954), entirely devoted to Études expérimentales
de l’activité nerveuse pendant la projection du film, one can say that, even after
exactly sixty years, things have changed little. The dark fascination of the brain
and the nerves still tempt audiovisual studies, constantly in search of empirical
evidence to solve the ineffable mystery of film viewing. The yellowed pages of
that issue, equipped with figures of the mu rhythm (i.e. a type of brain wave that
can be measured via electroencephalography) of the experiments reported, are a

*
  The authors would like to thank Warren Buckland for his helpful advice and comments on
various arguments in this Introduction.
1
  Revue Internationale de Filmologie, no. 16, “Études expérimentales de l’activité nerveuse pendant
la projection du film,” January-March 1954.

10
                                Neurofilmology: An Introduction


sort of archaeological evidence – the fossil witness of a past age in which meth-
odology, prior to even phenomena, was a field of experimentation.
   The Filmology manifesto was experimental in itself, due to the intrinsic interdis-
ciplinarity that characterized the filmological research project as a whole. Accord-
ing to Gilbert Cohen-Séat’s Essai sur les principes d’une philosophie du cinéma,2 a
serious and systematic study of cinema and a comprehensive analysis of the “cin-
ematic fact” and “filmic fact” were essential to found an autonomous and specific
discipline, accountable for the complexity of the film “enterprise” as both a social
and a psychological object. The co-operation of sociologists, aesthetologists, phi-
losophers, experimental and developmental psychologists, and physiologists was
the very revolutionary specificity of the new discipline, established on the inte-
grated contribution of different perspectives and methodologies.
   However, as several commentators recognize today, this project lacked an ad-
equate methodological and conceptual framework that would have been able to
unify and coordinate the different scholars’ efforts and accordingly to shift from
a pluri-disciplinary to a real inter-disciplinary setting. As a consequence, the posi-
tivist premises of Filmology pushed it towards a predominance of experimental
sciences (as opposed to philosophical and culturalist disciplines) and of a be-
havioural approach (as opposed to phenomenological and even psychoanalytical
ones).3 Issue no. 16 of the Revue de Filmologie, introduced above, is a perfect
example of this overall trend.
   Indeed, that issue consists of the report of three experiments conducted by
three different teams (only Gilbert Cohen-Séat is accredited in the all three),4 as
the outcome of the work of one of the four domaines d’études promoted at the
Institut de Filmologie (founded by Cohen-Séat at Sorbonne University in 1947).5

2
  Gilbert Cohen-Séat, Essai sur les principes d’une philosophie du cinéma. Tome I. “Introduction
générale. Notions fondamentales et vocabulaire de filmologie,” PUF, Paris 1946.
3
  See particularly Martin Lefebvre, “L’aventure filmologique: documents et jalons d’une histoire
institutionnelle,” in Cinémas: revue d’études cinématographiques / Cinémas: Journal of Film Studies,
vol. 19, no. 2-3, “La filmologie, de nouveau,” sous la direction de François Albera et Martin Lefe-
bvre, 2009, pp. 59-100; and Laurent Jullier, “‘L’esprit, et peut-être meme le cerveau…’ La question
psychologique dans la Revue internationale de filmologie, 1947-1962,” Ivi, pp. 143-167. See also
Zbigniew Gawrak, “La filmologie: bilan de la naissance jusqu’au 1958,” in Ikon, no. 65-66, 1968,
pp. 111-118; Christian Metz, Langage et Cinéma, Larousse, Paris 1971 (Language and Cinema,
Mouton, The Hague-Paris 1974, pp. 9-21); Edward Lowry, The Filmology Movement and Film
Study in France, University of Michigan Research Press, Ann Arbor 1985, particularly pp. 157-170;
Francesco Casetti, Theories of Cinema, 1945-1995, The University of Texas Press, Austin 1999, pp.
94-106; David Rodowick, Elegy for theory, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA)-London
2014, pp. 112-130.
4
  Gilbert Cohen-Séat, Henry Gastaut, Jacque Bert, “Modification de l’E.E.G. pendant la projec-
tion cinématographique,” in Revue Internationale de Filmologie, no. 16, cit., pp. 7-26; Gilbert
Cohen-Séat, Jacques Faure, “Retentissement du ‘fait filmique’ sur les rythmes bioélectriques du
cerveau,” in Ivi, pp. 27-50; Georges Heuyer, Gilbert Cohen-Séat, Serge Lebovici, Monique Rebeil-
lard, M.lle Daveau, “Note sur l’électroencéphalographie pendant la projection cinématographique
chez des adolescents inadaptés,” in Ivi, pp. 51-64.
5
  The four domains were: études psychologiques, directed by Henri Wallon; études techniques,
directed by Gilbert Cohen-Séat, filmologie générale et philosophie directed by Raymond Bayer,

                                                                                                 11
                              Adriano D’Aloia and Ruggero Eugeni


The aim of these innovative – for that age, at least – studies was to demonstrate
and measure viewers’ psychophysiological response to “experimental” films –
made specifically for these studies – or short sound films, by means of electroen-
cephalograms (EEG). Differently from the investigation of “latent consequences
of the cinematographic projection,”6 the EEG

     permet au moins de déceler, par la manifestation objective des variations du potentiel
     de l’électricité somatique, l’existence de certaines réactions. Elle peut donc offrir une
     méthode concrète pour comparer certains états au cours de la projection filmique.7

   Rather than anything that they might reveal, what was so innovative about
these experiments was the existence of the responses, and that they could be
measured objectively by means of a relatively new instrument. The main discov-
ery of the use of EEG was the fact that desynchronization of mu waves occurs
not only during active movements of the subject, but also while the subject ob-
serves actions executed by someone else, even when this someone else is not a
real person, but a film character.
   This “concrete method,” however, is subject to the same scepticism that em-
pirical methodology raises today when applied to humanities. Roques himself,
in fact, notes two critical aspects. First, the uncertainty of the EEG techniques
forces researchers to “hide behind” descriptions and anatomical-neurological
hypothesis that make interpretation “insufficiently clear.”8 Second, the fact that
these studies seem not to refer directly to filmological aspects or to have applica-
tions to filmological dynamics. The main problem – Roques comments – is the
difficulty of introducing in the laboratory a set of stimulus equivalent to that
normally specific to real life. These experiments were recreated in a context that
nor fully correspond to the “cinematographic situation,” i.e. the spatial and psy-
chological conditions that make the film experience powerfully “empathetic.”
   The words “real” and “empathy” are not used by chance or in their general
sense; rather, they implicitly refer to two key essays published in the Revue by
Albert Michotte in previous years. In Le caractère de ‘réalité’ des projections
cinématographiques9 the Belgian experimental psychologist explained that the
strong impression of reality provided by the film depends on movement, i.e. a
factor that gives “life,” a body, to the onscreen objects and that is perceived as
real in itself. In La participation émotionnelle du spectateur à l’action représentée


and études comparatives directed by Mario Roques.
6
  Mario Roques, “Introduction,” in Revue Internationale de Filmologie, no. 16, “Études expéri-
mentales de l’activité nerveuse pendant la projection du film,” cit., p. 3.
7
  Ivi, p. 4.
8
  Ivi, p. 5.
9
  Albert Michotte, “Le caractère de ‘réalité’ des projections cinématographiques,” in Revue Inter-
nationale de Filmologie, no. 3-4, 1948, pp. 249-261 (The character of “reality” of cinematographic
projections, in Georges Thinès, Alan Costall, George Butterworth [eds.], Michotte’s Experimental
Phenomenology of Perception, Hillsdale [NJ], Erlbaum 1991, pp. 197-209).

12
                                Neurofilmology: An Introduction


à l’écran. Essai d’une théorie10 Michotte completed his theory of participation
by perception, suggesting an intimate and mutually dependent relation between
motor and emotional responses of the viewer to the motor and emotional activ-
ity of the film character.
   Whereas Michotte’s background was in Gestalt theory and causalism, the
behaviouristic character of Cohen-Séat’s EEG experiments is undeniable. The
behavioural foundation of these studies was to justify, theoretically, the filmo-
logical thesis that the cinema affects and modifies the modes of perception and
judgement; and, strategically, to stress the “conditioning” potential of the film:
“Le film peut également être considéré comme un agent conditionnant, capable
de modifier les réponses aux événements à venir.”11
   In conclusion, Filmology established a dialogue between empirical sciences
and humanities in order to both conceptualize and analyze the film viewing ex-
perience; however, the inadequacy of its epistemological foundation condemned
Filmology to a theoretical and practical impasse. In our opinion, it is necessary
today to recover the filmological challenge, while avoiding filmological errors.
Accordingly, the contemporary dialogue between hard sciences and humani-
ties should develop within a shared and consistent epistemological framework.
Therefore, the construction of such a framework will be the first aim of a con-
temporary “neurofilmogical” enterprise.


The (problematic) landscape of contemporary neurological-oriented audiovisual studies

   Although the filmological tradition has remained largely unknown until recent
times, a “new” dialogue between audiovisual theory and neurological sciences
has nevertheless been progressively arising over the last twenty years. We cannot
here reconstruct in detail the events that led to such a “neurological turn” in film


10
   Albert Michotte, “La participation émotionnelle du spectateur à l’action représentée à l’écran.
Essai d’une théorie,” in Revue Internationale de Filmologie, no. 13, 1953, pp. 87-96 (The Emotional
Involvement of the Spectator in the Action Represented in a Film: Toward a Theory, in Georges
Thinès, Alan Costall, George Butterworth [eds.], Michotte’s Experimental Phenomenology of Per-
ception, cit., pp. 209-217).
11
   Gilbert Cohen-Séat, Gilbert Lelord, “Étude expérimentale des procédés cinématographiques
comme agents de conditionnement,” in Revue international de filmologie, no. 34, 1960, p. 11.
As Massimo Locatelli notes, “It is striking […] the fact that the results of EEG-research could
coherently answer different needs exactly at the same time. It responded to a widespread fear
of modernity, which could be thus technologically mastered; the pedagogical apprehension for a
changing, mediatized juvenile lifeworld; and the scientific anxiety to classify and sort out bodily
experience, including the old, fascinating and mysterious experience of dreaming” (Filmological
Fallacies. EEG-Research and the Sleeping Beauty, in Alberto Beltrame, Giuseppe Fidotta, Andrea
Mariani [eds.], At the Borders of (Film) History. Temporality, Archaeology, Theories, Forum, Udine
forthcoming). It is not by chance, therefore, that, as Lefebvre reconstructs, in the 1950s-60s this
was a notable aspect in the field of theory of mass communication and that attracted the attention
of state governments (Martin Lefebvre, “L’aventure filmologique,” cit., p. 75).

                                                                                                13
                             Adriano D’Aloia and Ruggero Eugeni


and media studies; rather we will limit ourselves to outlining the two different
theoretical perspectives that have been primarily responsible for such a trend.
   The first perspective focuses on the spectator’s experience as mental activ-
ity. Departing from linguistics, semiotics, psychoanalysis (the so-called “Grand-
Theory”), American psychologists and philosophers proposed to adopt a post-
computational cognitivist perspective to describe the ways film is mentally
understood by the spectator. In the 1990s, this focus on a disembodied, mental
experience of film has been consolidated, although the specific focus has shifted
from narration to those of emotions and visual perception, the latter under the
ecological perspective.12
   A second, alternative model of spectatorship has been developed by authors
who refer the description of aesthetic experience to phenomenological philoso-
phy, with particular reference to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of embodied
perception.13 To Bordwell’s lapidary statement, “the spectator thinks” through
a mind, phenomenologists would reply that “the spectator feels” through a
body intended as the site of perceptual synaesthetic fluxes of both affections
and thoughts. In this direction, the “Deleuzian turn” in film studies, focusing
on the “logic of sensations” implied in the spectator experience, produced rich
theoretical insights.14


12
   References in this field are too many to be mentioned in detail. We limit to signal a number of
both “classic” and recent readers: David Bordwell, Noël Carroll (eds.), Post-Theory: Reconstruct-
ing Film Studies, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1996; Carl Plantinga, Gregory M. Smith
(eds.), Passionate Views: Thinking about Film and Emotion, Johns Hopkins University Press, Bal-
timore 1997; Richard Allen, Murray Smith (eds.), Film Theory and Philosophy, Clarendon Press,
Oxford 1997; Thomas E. Wartenberg, Angela Curran (eds.), The Philosophy of Film. Introductory
Text and Readings, Blackwell - Wiley, Malden (MA) 2005; Noël Carroll, Jinhee Choi (eds.), Philoso-
phy of Film and Motion Pictures. An Anthology, Blackwell, Malden (MA) 2006; Joseph Anderson,
Barbara Anderson (eds.), Narration and Spectatorship in Moving Images: Perception, Imagination,
Emotion, Cambridge Scholar Press, Newcastle 2007; Paisley Livingston, Carl Plantinga (eds.), The
Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film, Routledge, London-New York 2009; Amy Coplan,
Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophycal and Psychological Perspectives, Oxford University
Press, Oxford - New York 2011; Ted Nannicelli, Paul Taberham (eds.), Cognitive Media Theory,
Routledge, New York - London 2014; Michael J. Grabowski (ed.), Neuroscience and Media. New
Understandings and Representations, Routledge, London-New York 2015.
13
   The main reference is Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of the Film
Experience, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1992. See also the work of – among others –
Laura Marks and Steven Shaviro.
14
   See Gilles Deleuze, L’image-mouvement. Cinéma 1, Minuit, Paris 1983 (Cinema 1. The Move-
ment-Image, The Athlone Press, London 1986); Id., L’image-temps. Cinéma 2, Minuit, Paris 1985
(Cinema 2. The Time-Image, The Athlone Press, London 1989); Id., The Brain is the Screen, in G.
Flaxman (ed), The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema, University of Min-
nesota Press, Minneapolis 2000, pp. 365-373 and the works of – among others – Raymond Bel-
lour, David N. Rodowick, Brian Massumi. See also Robert Pepperell, Michael Punt (eds.), Screen
consciousness. Cinema, Mind and World, Rodopi, New York 2006; Jérôme Game (ed.), Images des
corps/corps des images au cinéma, ENS Éditions, Paris 2010. On the epistemological problems
implied by an integration of Deleuzian approach within the phenomenological framework, see
Elena del Rio, Cinema, in Hans Rainer Sepp, Lester Embree (eds.), Handbook of Phenomenological
Aesthetics, Springer, Dordrech-Heidelberg-London-New York 2010, pp. 111-118.

14
                               Neurofilmology: An Introduction


   The cognitivist and the phenomenological perspective set up a dialogue with
neurosciences in relatively different ways and without a strict reciprocal confron-
tation; as a consequence, we find today different and not-immediately compat-
ible models of film spectatorship.
   Within cognitivist studies of film, the development of neuroscientific-based
models for the study of spectatorship is part of the project of “psychocinematics”15
as a natural evolution of the centrality attributed to attention, simulation, empa-
thy/sympathy, intentionality and emotions by cognitivist film scholars. Psycho-
cinematic studies show that processing of film is firmly rooted in psychologi-
cal and biological characteristics of our species, and favours empirical research.
However, as Charles Forceville notes in his review of Arthur P. Shimamura’s
book, included in this issue, “the volume convincingly shows how cognitivist
approaches and psychocinematics are natural allies, and demonstrates fine op-
portunities for collaboration between film scholars, psychologists and brain re-
searchers,” yet it “has actually less to say (pace Shimamura) on the aesthetics of
film viewing than on how film is understood.”16
   Phenomenological studies meanwhile argue that the fundamental (and con-
troversial) insight behind neuroscientific findings is that the complex processes
of the human mind find in the brain’s architecture and functioning their neural
correlates. This correlation is based on a functional link between observation of
goal-directed actions or emotions and sensorimotor activation of the observer.17
In particular, the philosophical and psychological implications of the function
of so-called “visuomotor neurons” have caused a breakthrough in the under-
standing of the mind-body relation and of phenomena such as human conscious-
ness, empathy, intersubjectivity, affect, and aesthetic response to works of art.
Unity of action and perception is allowed by an embodied simulation, a basic
functional mechanism by means of which our brain-body system models its in-
teractions with the world.18 This proposal falls fully within the paradigm of em-
bodied cognition, according to which cognition depends upon those experiences
“that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities [that] are
themselves embedded in more encompassing biological, psychological and cul-
tural context.”19 In turn, this paradigm is based on both a phenomenological ac-


15
   Arthur P. Shimamura (ed.), Psychocinematics: Exploring Cognition at the Movies, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, New York-Oxford 2013.
16
   See infra in the book reviews section.
17
   Giacomo Rizzolatti, Corrado Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions and
Emotions, Oxford University Press, Cambridge (MA) 2008; Marco Iacoboni, Mirroring people:
The Science of Empathy and How We Connect with Others, Picador, New York 2009.
18
   See Vittorio Gallese, Alvin I. Goldman, “Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory,” in Trends
in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 2, no. 12, 1998, pp. 493-501; Vittorio Gallese, “Embodied Simulation:
From Neurons to Phenomenal Experience,” in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, no.
4, 2005, pp. 23-48; Id., “Mirror Neurons, Embodied Simulation, and the Neural Basis of Social
Identification,” in Psychoanalytic Dialogues, no. 19, 2009, pp. 519-536.
19
   Francisco J. Varela, Eleanor Thompson, Evan Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and
Human Experience, MIT Press, Boston 1991. See also George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Philosophy in

                                                                                              15
                              Adriano D’Aloia and Ruggero Eugeni


count of the body and human experience and on the ecological approach to visual
perception. Phenomenological film theory still seems to harbour some resistance
to neurophenomenology,20 although the search for a post-dualistic neurological
foundation of the film experience could allow it to overcome continental philoso-
phy’s rejection of natural science. The study of the neural substratum of the film
experience arises as a terrain of encounter and dialogue between cognitive and
phenomenological film studies.21
   A first outcome of the dialogue between audiovisual theory and neurosciences
is thus the forced cohabitation of different models of film viewer. A second out-
come is a forced “naturalization” of the film viewing situation as the result of the
anti-culturalist trend unifying cognitivist and phenomenological perspectives, as
well as of theoretical premises implied by empirical research methods. Indeed,
some neuroscientists not only consider cinema as a metaphor for the human
mind,22 but also carry out neuroimaging tests on audiences, aiming to outline
a “neurocinematics.”23 For instance, in his pioneering study Uri Hasson et al.
acknowledge that neuroimaging methods may serve as “an objective scientific
measurement for assessing the effect of distinctive styles of filmmaking upon the
brain, and therefore substantiate theoretical claims made in relation to them,”24
despite the fact that they cannot provide an aesthetic judgment on the cinematic
style from a “naturalistic” point of view. More broadly, neurocinematic approach
promises a naturalistic account of a series of phenomena (from film style to film
genre system) previously explained by culturalist tools.
   In conclusion, in the wake of its dialogue with neurosciences, the contem-
porary landscape of audiovisual studies appears today to be split by a twofold
antinomy: on the one hand, we find an opposition between viewer-as-mind and



the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought, Basic Books, New York 1999.
20
   See Francisco J. Varela, “Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Prob-
lem,” in Journal of Consciousness Studies, no. 3, 1996, pp. 330-349.
21
   See for example Vittorio Gallese, Michele Guerra, “Embodying Movies,” in Cinema: Journal of
Philosophy and the Moving Image, no. 3, 2012; Adriano D’Aloia, Cinematic Empathies. Spectator
involvement in the film experience, in Matthew Reason, Dee Reynolds (eds.), Kinesthetic Empathy
in Creative and Cultural Practices, Intellect, Bristol 2012, pp. 91-108; Id., “The Intangible Ground:
A Neurophenomenology of the Film Experience,” in Necsus, no. 2, 2012, pp. 219-239; Id., La
vertigine e il volo. L’esperienza filmica fra estetica e neuroscienze cognitive, Fondazione Ente dello
Spettacolo, Roma 2013; Maarten Coëgnarts, Peter Kravanja (eds.), Embodied Cognition and Cin-
ema, Leuven University Press, Leuven 2015.
22
   Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, G.P. Putnam/
Avon Books, New York 1994; Id., The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making
of Consciousness, Harcourt Brace, New York-San Diego 1999.
23
   ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
   Uri Hasson, Orit Furman, Dav Clark, Yadin Dudai, Lila Davachi, “Enhanced Intersubject Cor-
relations During Movie Viewing Correlate with Successful Episodic Encoding,” in Neuron, vol. 57,
no. 3, 2008, pp. 452-462. See also Uri Hasson, Ohad Landesman, Barbara Knappmeyer, Ignacio
Vallines, Nava Rubin, David J. Heeger, “Neurocinematics: The Neuroscience of Film,” in Projec-
tions. The Journal for Movies and Mind, no. 1, 2008, pp. 1-26.
24
   Uri Hasson et al., “Neurocinematics: The Neuroscience of Film,” cit., p. 1.

16
                                Neurofilmology: An Introduction


viewer-as-body models; on the other one, a contrast between a naturalistic-ori-
ented versus a culturalist-oriented vision of the film viewing situation is evident.


An epistemological toolbox

   From this section, we start the second part of the introduction, devoted to the
proposal of a neurofilmological perspective. As we said, Neurofilmology aims to
establish a unified and consistent framework for both theoretical and empirical
current research programs on the film viewer experience. To achieve this objective,
and on the basis of previous considerations and statements, we need to take four
steps. First, we have to highlight a set of epistemological principles, with the aim of
promoting and governing the exchange of theories and models between theoreti-
cal and empirical disciplines; second, we have to tackle and try to overcome the op-
position between a mental versus an embodied model of viewer; third, we have to
cope with and try to bridge the gap between a natural versus a socio-cultural model
of the viewing situation; finally, we can sketch a model of audiovisual experience as
a conceptual framework for both actual and possible research projects.
   As we have seen, the dialogue between the “three cultures”25 – i.e. natural
sciences, social sciences and humanities – is a key problem for both classical fil-
mology and contemporary film theory.26 Our position in this regard is that of an
epistemological pluralism, that is, a not necessarily ontological anti-reductionism.
The same states-of-things (i.e. the film viewing situation) can be described, and
the same phenomena (i.e. viewer’s perceptual, cognitive, emotional, etc. process-
es) can be understood and explained by different research programs at different
levels (i.e. neurological, psychological, phenomenological, etc.) without neces-
sarily implying a determining relationship between these levels. Such coexistence
of different research programs should be governed by three principles.
   The first principle is a common operational mechanism of different research
programs. Indeed, the methods of theoretical disciplines and those of the em-
pirical sciences are closer than it seems at first glance. On the one hand, experi-


25
   Jerome Kagan, The Three Cultures. Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, and the Humanities in the
21st Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (MA)-New York 2009. In this Introduction
we will leave aside the problem of a dialogue with social sciences, which was nevertheless a central
issue of classic Filmology.
26
   See for instance the discussion on the “naturalization” and “scientism” of film theory in David N.
Rodowick, Philosophy’s Artful Conversation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) - London
2015; for a survey see Ted Nannicelli, Paul Taberham (eds.), Cognitive Media Theory, cit. Two
updated accounts of the problem of reductionism are Jennifer Lackey, Testimonial Knowledge, in
Sven Bernecker, Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, London -
New York, 2011, pp. 316-325; and Sven Walter, Marcus Eronen, Reduction, Multiple Realizability
and Levels of Reality, in Steven French, Juha Saatsi (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to the
Philosophy of Science, Bloomsbury, London-New Delhi 2014, pp. 138-156. In the aesthetic field,
see Joseph Margolis, The Cultural Space of the Arts and the Infelicities of Reductionism, Columbia
University Press, New York 2010.

                                                                                                  17
                             Adriano D’Aloia and Ruggero Eugeni


mental procedures of the hard sciences proceed from backgrounds composed of
theories, models, taken-for-granted assumptions (which in turn depend on ex-
perimental protocols, technical constraints, and sometimes utilitarian interests);
these backgrounds are highly responsible for final results, while in turn these
findings can confirm, deny or modify the original theoretical background. On
the other hand, theoretical reflection is also based on experimental processes:
the researchers test their hypotheses on their own experience, and therefore uses
themselves as objects of experimentation, through a chiastic oscillation from first
to third person and back.
   The second principle is that of declarativeness: every scientific approach to the
cinema viewer should set and state their premises, i.e. their models, methods,
the technologies being used, the level of state-of-things that will be analysed, the
time and space scale of the phenomena approached and accordingly the time
and space windows investigated.27
   The third principle is that of shared hermeneutics: each of the different re-
search programs should be willing to redefine its own theoretical background on
the basis of pertinent findings reported by other programs. In this respect, we
can find three possibilities:
   1) The theoretical backgrounds, the models and the results of a research pro-
gram are incommensurable, and therefore neither compatible nor incompatible
with those of another program. This possibility typically occurs when research
programs investigate different time (or space) windows. For example, the findings
of neurological research relating to perceptual narrower time windows and sub-
conscious mechanisms can neither be confirmed nor denied by a phenomenologi-
cal approach, which works on a conscious (or bearable to consciousness) level.
   2) Theories, models and results from different research programs are com-
mensurable, yet compatible. For example, the findings of neurological research
on connections between visual perception and motor and pre-motor neurons
activation, match with ecological and enactive theories of visual perception (see
above). In these cases, evidence from one research program intersect with evi-
dence from other programs, in a sort of “triangulation” that both corroborates
the findings and illuminates not immediately obvious aspects of each level.28
   3) The third possibility, which is the most interesting for the advancement of


27
   We think on the one hand to a “rational reconstruction” of research programs, on the model
of Warren Buckland, Film Theory. Rational Reconstructions, Routledge, London-New York 2014;
and on the other hand to a consideration of the programs as forms of “science in action” (see
Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge [MA] 1987) within a well-defined social, cultural and political world,
on the model proposed for neurosciences by Suparna Choudhury, Jan Slaby (eds.), Critical Neuro-
science. A Handbook of the Social and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden
(MA)-Oxford-Chichester 2012.
28
   Murray Smith, Triangulating Aesthetic Experience, in Arthur P. Shimamura, Stephen E. Pal-
mer (eds.), Aesthetic Science. Connecting Minds, Brains, and Experience, Oxford University Press,
Oxford-New York 2012, pp. 80-106.

18
                                Neurofilmology: An Introduction


research capable of causing the “scientific revolutions,”29 is that theories, models
and findings of a given research program appear commensurable but not compat-
ible with those of another one. As a consequence, the research community has
to make a choice, whose policy is to prefer the theoretical framework that has a
greater explanatory and predictive power, and that is at the same time as simple
as possible. This theoretical framework could be either one of those in play, or a
third one able to recover the results of both previous theories. We are going to
find an example of this situation in the next section.


A model of filmic viewer

   As we mentioned in the first part of this introduction, the encounter between
film theory and empirical sciences implies convergence of research programs
whose models are often commensurable but not always compatible; as a result,
we detect the occurrence of conflicts that could undermine the project of a uni-
fied framework, and that should be consequently overcome by applying the epis-
temological principles introduced above.
   A first point of conflict is the model of viewer assumed and implemented by re-
search programs. On the one hand we find viewer-as-mind models whose centre
of gravity is represented by cognitive processes, related both to perceptive and
emotional ones (the latter enhanced by the models of “hot cognition”). On the
other hand we find viewer-as-body models, whose centre of gravity is constituted
by sensitive, affective and motor processes. Moreover, viewer-as-mind models
tend to highlight top-down mental mechanisms, while viewer-as-body ones ac-
centuate the role of bottom-up processes.
   In our view Neurofilmology should solve this opposition by assuming the
model of the viewer-as-body, yet radicalising it in a new model that we call the
viewer-as-organism.30 The key difference compared to both the previous mod-
els is that viewer-as-organism are not already given before and independently
from the film experience as a well defined entity, but constitute themselves in
the course of this very experience, in complex, dynamical and provisional forms.
   Indeed, the viewer-as-organism handles simultaneously many processes of dif-
ferent nature (sensory, perceptual, cognitive, emotional, motor, active, mnemon-
ic), within different time windows; they are constantly striving to coordinate the


29
   Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 4th ed., with an Introductory Essay by Ian
Hacking, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London 2012.
30
   We could say that the 4EA model of subject, intended as “embodied, embedded, enacted,
extended, and affective” (John Protevi, Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic,
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2009, p. 4) should be replaced by a 5EAR model,
envisioning the subject as embodied, embedded, enacted, extended, emerging, affective and re-
lational. For a survey of the debate on these issues we refer to Shaun Gallagher, Dan Zahavi, The
Phenomenological Mind. An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, Routledge,
London-New York 2008.

                                                                                                19
                              Adriano D’Aloia and Ruggero Eugeni


first and synchronize the latter. To achieve these goals, they produce progressive
synthetic configurations, following a spiral-shaped dynamic: both perceptual in-
put and already owned resources are used to constitute new configurations that
in turn become resources potentially available for new processing.31 We can call
“interpretation” this ongoing and unfolding dynamic. Configurations gradually
produced are homeodynamic, since they tend to stable forms of self-organization
yet constantly open to redefinition; some of them are related to the very subjects,
which are therefore not given a priori but emerging from this process.
   The assumption of the viewer-as-organism model allows Neurofilmology to
overcome the opposition between the viewer-as-mind and viewer-as-body mod-
els. Indeed, the different processes in which the viewer is involved within differ-
ent time windows (whether they are sensitive, perceptual, cognitive, emotional,
motor-active, and so on) are to be considered on the same plane, while the focus
shifts from the singular processes to the logic and patterns of their interactions
within the interpretative dynamic. As a consequence, the alternative flows of
top-down and bottom-up processes are reconfigured as a network of recipro-
cal determinations between current and memory resources within the “on line”
dynamic of interpretation.


A model of filmic situation

   The second opposition threatening the filmological project concerns models
of the film viewing situation; in this case, we find a competition between a socio-
cultural and a naturalistic definition of such situation. There are two accounts of
this opposition, a radical and a moderate one.
   The radical version addresses the ontological foundation of the film viewing
situation. Indeed, the culturalist position states that the set of capacities, dis-
positions and preferences of the film viewer result from cultural transmission
and social learning: consequently, the filmic situation is essentially socio-cultural.
Conversely, the naturalist position argues that perceptual, cognitive and affective
capabilities as well as dispositions and preferences necessary for film viewing,
emerged under natural selection in the Pleistocene era: therefore, they are part
of film viewer’s biological heritage, and as such they are completely innate and
universal; consequently, the vision of the film is an essentially natural situation.
   The naturalistic account can be understood as a reaction to the strong domain
of culturalism represented by the Grand-Theory during the seventies.32 How-

31
   The term “configuration” does not refer to a “representation” of states-of-things, and it rather
implies a reciprocal relationship between affection and expression: the viewers experience directly
a certain state-of-things, express it to their selves, and through this expression they change and
reconfigure in turn their very experience.
32
   A reconstruction of these reasons is Joseph Anderson, Barbara Anderson, Introduction, in Id.
(eds.), Narration and Spectatorship in Moving Images: Perception, Imagination, Emotion, Cam-
bridge Scholar Press, Newcastle 2007, pp. 1-14.

20
                              Neurofilmology: An Introduction


ever, naturalistic scholars do nothing but recover and reverse the culturalist argu-
ment, without exceeding an abstract opposition between nature and culture. On
the contrary, it seems clear today that the genetic makeup and, consequently, the
physical and mental conformation of individuals, are not absolute constraints;
rather, they must be conceived of as fields of possibilities well defined but open
to multiple forms of adaptation, exaptation, learning, invention and reinvention,
on the basis of the encounter of the organism with the world and the possible
technological manipulations of the latter. In this respect, cinema is an excellent
example: a technological device for delivering moving images and sounds be-
comes a dispositive that, starting from the physical and psychological capacities
of the subjects involved, allows them to experiment with the limits and possibili-
ties of those dispositions, within specific cultural and historical conditions.
   In a different way, the moderate version of the opposition between naturalism
and culturalism focuses on the degree of continuity or discontinuity between filmic
situation and those of ordinary life: in this case, the culturalist position accentu-
ates the discontinuity, while the naturalist one tends to read the filmic situation
as an “extension by other means” of ordinary life experience.
   On the basis of our previous argument, we cannot help taking on this point
a position that tends toward the culturalist. On the one hand, we must admit
that ordinary life dispositions and capabilities (such as the sensory and percep-
tual grasping of objects and spaces, the recognition of events and their narrative
organization, the understanding and sharing of mental and emotional states of
other subjects, and so on) are re-enacted during the film experience. On the oth-
er hand, however, there is no doubt that this is done within a technological and
cultural dispositive and through the use of stylistic and narrative forms linked to
specific historical periods; that this very dispositive was and is subject to transfor-
mations and “relocations” (visions of film on television sets, PCs, tablets, mobile
phones, and even film viewing situations within neurological laboratories);33 and
finally that the filmic experience is not simply guided, contrived and constrained
by the audiovisual materials provided by the dispositive, but it is far more radi-
cally designed on the basis of whole project.
   We can therefore speak of a (relative) discontinuity of filmic experience from
ordinary life experience; this statement is relevant for two epistemological rea-
sons. First, this issue entails the raison d’être of film studies as specific research
program: indeed, if we assume that the filmic situation represents an entirely nat-
ural kind of experience, without any pertinent gap from ordinary life, then film
studies would be reabsorbed in a general examination (whether neurological,
psychological, phenomenological, and so on) of the human experience.34 Sec-
ond, if we assume that filmic experience is not just contrived, but more radically
designed by the movie materials, we should integrate neurofilmological studies


33
  Francesco Casetti, The Lumière Galaxy, Columbia University Press, New York 2015.
34
   A similar argument has been advanced (in a more specific context) by Malcolm Turvey, Evolu-
tionary Film Theory, in Ted Nannicelli, Paul Taberham, Cognitive Media Theory, cit., ch. 3.

                                                                                           21
                              Adriano D’Aloia and Ruggero Eugeni


with a discipline that would be able to rebuild the projects of experience on the
basis of a close analysis of filmic materials: we are thinking to a neo-semiotics, no
longer tied to topics such as signs, language, text or discourse, but rather radi-
cally reconfigured as an analysis of the filmic experience design.35


A model of filmic experience

   Previous considerations on the models of film viewer and situation converge
within a model of filmic experience. We intend to suggest that such a model,
though simplified, should constitute a conceptual framework for Neurofilmol-
ogy: therefore, it should allow us both to frame current trends of research, and
to highlight new areas of interest currently uncovered (or scarcely covered) by
research activities.
   The construction of our model is based on two basic assumptions. First, the
experience in general is based on three levels of configurations: the sensory scan-
ning and qualification of inputs, the narrative scanning and sorting of perceived
events, the relational scanning of and tuning with other subjects. In fact, we can
notice a logical progression between the three levels; in particular the transition
from the first to the second level introduces a distinction between the subject and
a field of entities (i.e. objects and subjects composing a world). Second, the filmic
experience entails not only one field of entities (as ordinary experience) but three
distinct fields of objects and subjects: the world directly perceived (i.e. the “or-
dinary world”), the field of sensory materials provided by the dispositive (i.e.
the “discourse”), and the world perceived indirectly (i.e. the “diegetic world,”
whether fictional or factual). On this basis, the model of film experience will be
articulated in seven joints, each of which corresponds to a relatively autonomous,
whether actual or possible, research area.36
   The (multi)sensory scanning and the qualitative notation of the sensorial input:
the viewers “feel” a series of sensations without a clear distinction neither be-
tween the inner and the outer world, nor between the different sensory modal-
ity. We can retrieve here the research findings regarding the “multi” and “inter-
sensorial” aspects of film experience (including proprioceptive and interoceptive
modality: see for instance Maarten Coëgnarts and Peter Kravanja’s essay in this
issue), as well as philosophical suggestions from the Deleuzian “logic of sensa-
tions” and its neurological and psychological counterparts.
   The narrative sorting of the diegetic world: on the basis of the recognition


35
   Ruggero Eugeni, Semiotica dei media. Le forme dell’esperienza, Carocci, Roma 2010. The pres-
ence of a design of the experience does not entail the assumption of its automatic and deterministic
effectiveness within filmic situations: on this sensitive problem see both Temenuga Trifonova’s and
Maria Poulaki’s contributions to this issue.
36
   Given the impossibility of a full account of different research areas, we refer to the readers sig-
naled in the first part of this Introduction.

22
                           Neurofilmology: An Introduction


of different fields of objects and subject, the viewers notice and follow what’s
happening in the indirect world by gaining a living experience of it. While
the viewer’s perception is already a well developed object of film studies, new
models of online narrative experience based on the concepts of “event recogni-
tion” and “nowness” are still emerging (see for instance Pia Tikka and Mauri
Kaipainen’s essay in this issue).
   The narrative sorting of the discourse: viewers give sense to the presence of
sensory materials provided by cinematic devices by articulating them in (a) a flow
of ongoing discursive production, (b) a plot unfolding and re-working the story
line and (c) a format with a material extension into the space and time. This is
a relatively new and poorly covered field of research, but recent studies on the
perception of filmic stylistic figures are producing very interesting findings (as
Vittorio Gallese and Michele Guerra show in their essay for this issue).
   The narrative sorting of the ordinary/surrounding world: viewers check and de-
tect the existing relationships between their own situated activity and the dieget-
ic world: these relationships can be of continuity (in the case of factual media ex-
perience) or discontinuity (in the case of fictional media experience), with many
intermediate solutions (like for instance the different forms of “diegetisation of
the dispositive”). In this field we can find new studies on spatial perception and
on the managing of spatial situatedness by the viewer (for instance in the case of
videogames and the viewer’s immersiveness implied), as well as a focus on the
“ecological” role of dispositive within the media experience.
   The relational tuning with the subjects of the diegetic world: viewers notice the
presence within the diegetic world of other subjects (i.e. entities developing and
manifesting a living experience comparable to the viewers one), and the possi-
bility of understanding them and in case sharing experiences with them. This is
one of the most covered fields of neurofilmological studies, with a great extent
of studies about “sympathy,” “empathy” and other “relational emotions;” more
recently a number of scholars outlined the strict relation between cognitive and
emotional/embodied processes in this regard (see Patricia Pisters’s and Enrico
Carocci’s essays in this issue).
   The relational tuning with the subjects of discourse: viewers feel the presence
of an ongoing activity of audiovisual “writing,” recognize the style of “speaking”
subjects, and establish a relation of trust and confidence (or distrust and lack of
confidence) with them. This is a less considered research area, partially covered
by the studies mentioned at the point E. We can however retrieve on this point
the “neuroaesthetical” approaches to cinema (see for instance Temenuga Tri-
fonova’s essay in this issue).
   The relational tuning with the subjects of the ordinary/surrounding world: the
viewers feel the presence of other subjects around him, or in any case located
within the same ordinary world; film experience becomes the living experience
of the spring of social bonds (Georg Simmel’s “sociability”). We find occasional
reference to this potential area of interests – which is in any case implied by the
research on intersubjective correlations/synchronization of audience members’

                                                                                 23
                              Adriano D’Aloia and Ruggero Eugeni


neural activity (see for example Maria Poulaki’s essay in this issue) – but we still
lack strong investments.37


An overview of this special issue

   This special issue aims to evaluate, from a multidisciplinary and critical per-
spective, both the relevance of the neurological approach for the psychology
and the aesthetics of the film experience and, more generally, the epistemologi-
cal consequences of this approach in the humanities, assuming that the borders
between these models are permeable and that a convergence would be desirable
and of advantage for audiovisual studies.
   A first group of contributions critically discuss neurocinematics. In her essay,
Temenuga Trifonova argues that, although rooted in neuroscience (i.e. a quantita-
tive assessment of the impact of different art and film styles on viewers’ brains)
rather than in ideological, linguistic and psychoanalytic models (i.e. subject-posi-
tioning “Grand-theories”), neurocinematics is an extension of apparatus theory
for its positioning the subject in function of the architecture of their brains. Ac-
cordingly, even what the subject unconsciously experiences of a film is part of the
interpretation process of visual stimuli. In this sense, neuroaesthetics bridge the
“hermeneutic gap” between (low) perception and (high) interpretation of stimuli.
   Although she adopts a different (cognitivist) theoretical framework, Maria
Poulaki also gives salience to notions of control and attention, i.e. the “effec-
tiveness” of the film in predicting and driving the mental activity of the viewer.
Adopting a complex-system theory, the author discusses the ISC (inter-subject
correlation) experimental method – that helps to assess the similarities/differ-
ences in brain activity across viewers, looking at common patterns of response
time courses in different brain regions. Nevertheless, in the end Poulaki de-
parts from cognitivist hypotheses of a unique interpretation of film meaning and
claims that the notion of control indicates that also the stimulus can be multiple,
not only the interpretation.
   A second group of essays share the attempt to conciliate of the opposition be-
tween cognition/emotion, or mind/body. Patricia Pisters offers an application of
her own notion of “neuro-image” to television series Dexter and convincingly de-
scribes Neurofilmology as a terrain of fertile encounter between apparent distant
perspectives such as analytical philosophy/cognitivist film theory and continen-
tal philosophy/phenomenology of the film experience. As Pisters writes, “Since
important branches of contemporary neuroscience emphasize the significant role



37
  Obviously the seven areas, still relatively autonomous, are nonetheless mutually interrelated and
determined: for example there is a close link between the understanding of characters mental sta-
tes (E) and the modulation of situations and events (B); or between some set of recurring sensory
patterns (A) and the recognition of an “author” (F).

24
                               Neurofilmology: An Introduction


of embodiment in any kind of processes of the brain,” it is time to overcome the
classic division between mind/cognition versus body/phenomenological.
   On the same line of thought, Enrico Carocci argues that the tensions between
the quantitative and qualitative approaches corresponds to the clash between the
third-person – empirical – perspective and the first-person – phenomenological –
perspective. In order to overcome this bias, the author relies on Jaak Panksepp’s
notion of selfhood and focuses on affective neuroscience as a valuable framework
for empirical investigations of the qualities of cinematic emotional experience,
for its providing important theoretical insights and empirical evidences for the
study of the subjective (or first-person) dimension of emotional experience from
a naturalistic point of view.
   The relevance of an embodied approach to the mental experience of audiovisual
media inspired also Maarten Coëgnarts and Peter Kravanja’s essay. Departing from
a cognitivist “disembodied” perspective, and relating recent neuroscientific evi-
dence from cognitive linguistics, the authors claim that the sensory-motor system
plays a constitutive role in the cinematic characterization of abstract concepts, as
well as in language. Two of Stanley Kubrick’s films serve as case studies for under-
lying conceptual and metaphorical design which is inherently embodied.
   The project of a new multidisciplinary approach to the film experience would
remain unproductive if not concretely applied to film aesthetics and viewer par-
ticipation. More than metaphorically conceivable as an experimental laboratory
setting, the film experience offers a space for testing narrative and formal solu-
tions that provide, control and regulate sensory-motor activation and emotional
involvement. A third group of contributions in this special issue reports empiri-
cal experiments and discuss their relevance for new approach to film style, narra-
tion, and spectatorship. In their essay – based on Husserl’s concepts of retention
and protention and on Francisco Varela’s neurophenomenological exploration
of time consciousness – Pia Tikka and Mauri Kaipainen argue that film nar-
ratives are intrinsically time-dependent designs. Their contribution proposes a
model of “nowness” relating this to the neural epiphenomena of narrative expe-
rience, in connection with other researches conducted by the group aivoAALTO
at University Finland on enactive cinema, a model that assumes changes in the
psychophysiological reactions of participants (enactors) to represent implicit and
unconscious reactions of the mind and determine the changes made to the nar-
rative presentation in real-time.38
   The empirical studies reported in Vittorio Gallese and Michele Guerra’s essay
describe an innovative experiment that uses a combined behavioural and high
density EEG experiment to determine whether various types of camera move-
ments, more or less simulating an observer’s own movement toward the observed


38
  Pia Tikka, Aleksander Väljamäe, Aline W. de Borst, Roberto Pugliese, Niklas Ravaja, Mauri Kai-
painen, Tapio Takala, “Enactive Cinema Paves Way for Understanding Complex Real-Time Social
Interaction in Neuroimaging Experiments,” in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, vol. 6, Art. 298
(2012), pp. 1-6.

                                                                                             25
                         Adriano D’Aloia and Ruggero Eugeni


acting agent, might modulate observers’ mirror mechanism. Their findings pro-
vide evidence that the steadicam determines stronger viewers’ brain activation in
respect to other camera movements (e.g., dolly or zoom-in). This contribution
provides empirical ground to the notion of the capacity of the camera to simulate
the virtual presence of the viewers inside the movie.
   We would also like to invite readers to consult the Projects & Abstracts section,
in which PhD projects in the field of Neurofilmology are presented.




26
