10.6092/issn.2531-6133/10654
In recent times, private industry has made great advancements in the commercialization of outer space. Such advancement represents a monumental shift from a period in which outer space activities were the business of national governments. However, the traditional interpretation of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty still assigns responsibility for private space activities to States despite private industry’s increased ability to conduct outer space activities without government involvement or assistance. Ultimately, the blanket application of State responsibility associated with the traditional interpretation of Article VI may be unworkable or inequitable as private industry becomes a dominant force in outer space. Therefore, this Article evaluates the shortcomings of the traditional interpretation of Article VI and proposes a solution based on the customary law of State responsibility in order to ensure that both private and public actors in outer space are unhampered by an overly broad interpretation of Article VI.
application/pdf
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10654
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en
Christian Joseph Robison
University of Bologna Law Review
Private Industry
Changing Responsibility for a Changing Environment: Revaluating the Traditional Interpretation of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty in Light of Private Industry
Text.Serial.Journal
https://bolognalawreview.unibo.it/
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Articles & Essays
2020-03-16
2020-03-16
2020-03-16
2020-07-22
1-27
UBLR
Christian Joseph Robison
2020/03/16
10.6092/issn.2531-6133/10654
1
United States Air Force
2531-6133
1
Private Industry
en
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Changing Responsibility for a Changing Environment: Revaluating the Traditional Interpretation of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty in Light of Private Industry
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5
 llVOLUME 5                                           llISSUE 1                           ARTICLES & ESSAYS



                                  UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW
                                 h ps://doi.org/10.6092/issn.2531-6133/10654
                                                       A

         Changing Responsibility for a Changing Environment:
  Revalua ng the Tradi onal Interpreta on of Ar cle VI of the
                Outer Space Treaty in Light of Private Industry
                                          CHRISTIAN JOSEPH ROBISON †

                                                      ABSTRACT
 In recent times, private industry has made great advancements in the commercialization of outer
 space. Such advancement represents a monumental shift from a period in which outer space
 activities were the business of national governments. However, the traditional interpretation of
 Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty still assigns responsibility for private space activities to
 States despite private industry’s increased ability to conduct outer space activities without
 government involvement or assistance. Ultimately, the blanket application of State responsibility
 associated with the traditional interpretation of Article VI may be unworkable or inequitable as
 private industry becomes a dominant force in outer space. Therefore, this Article evaluates the
 shortcomings of the traditional interpretation of Article VI and proposes a solution based on the
 customary law of State responsibility in order to ensure that both private and public actors in
 outer space are unhampered by an overly broad interpretation of Article VI.


                                                     KEYWORDS
                       Liability; State Responsibility; Outer Space; Attribution; Private Industry

                                                TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .          .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .    2
 1. State Responsibility and Article VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .          .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .    5
          1.1 State Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .         .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .    5
          1.2. History and Formation of Article VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .           .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .    7
          1.3. Structure and Traditional Interpretation of Article VI . . . . . .            .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .    9
 2. Difficulties of Applying the Traditional Interpretation of Article VI . . . .            .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   12
          2.1. Plain Ambiguity – National Activities and The Appropriate State               .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   12
             2.1.1. National Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   12
             2.1.2. The Appropriate State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .          .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   16
          2.2. Further Complication - Private Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . .             .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   17
 3. Path Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .         .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   19
          3.1. A Viable Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .         .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   20
          3.2. Control and the Outer Space Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .            .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   23
          3.3. Implementing Control – Domestic Legislation . . . . . . . . . .               .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   25
 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .          .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   26

† Christian J. Robison is an attorney for the United States Air Force. Mr. Robison specializes in government

 contracts and procurement and resolves legal matters revolving around the development and
 commercialization of outer space technology. Mr. Robison holds both a J.D. and LL.M. from the University of
 Mississippi (U.S.).



                                                           1
                   CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT


      INTRODUCTION

Since the inception of the Outer Space Treaty, mankind’s means of exploring and
utilizing the resources of outer space has rapidly evolved. Not only are more countries
able to develop robust space programs, but also more private entities are able to develop
their own spacecraft and launch vehicles without government assistance. Pioneering
companies such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Boeing have made significant monetary
gains by winning lucrative contracts to further the interests of the United States
government.1 However, these same entities have contracted with other non-space faring
companies to carry out private interests in outer space,2 and have continued to develop
technology that will hopefully allow for affordable space travel for the average citizen3
and the extraction of valuable resources from asteroids and other celestial bodies.4
          Despite great advances in the private commercialization of outer space, many
space activities have been, and still are, propelled by the work of large government
agencies such as NASA and Roscosmos.5 Of course, this can be interpreted as the result of
the historical formation of the Outer Space Treaty. When the Treaty was originally
drafted, the exploration and use of outer space were almost exclusively occupied by the
governments of the United States and the former Soviet Union.6 Consequently, many of
the basic premises found within the Treaty itself are centered upon a series of

1
  In 2016, Both SpaceX and United Launch Alliance (a joint venture between Boeing and Lockheed
  Martin) have provided launches for key missions for the United States government and the International
  Space Station. See, OSIRIS-REx Asteroid Sample Return Mission at the Launch Pad, NASA (Sep. 8,
  2016), http://www.nasa.gov/image-feature/osiris-rex-asteroid-sample-return-mission-at-the-launch-pad
  (detailing mission in which United Launch Alliance launched spacecraft that will intercept an asteroid
  and transport samples back to Earth); Completed Missions, SpaceX, http://www.spacex.com/missions (listing
  SpaceX launches including those that have transported resupply payloads to the International Space
  Station).
2
  For prime example, SpaceX was to launch a satellite for Facebook that would have provided internet
  access to a large portion of sub-Saharan Africa. Though the rocket and payload were destroyed during
  a static engine test, such a mission demonstrates a commercial space company’s financial ability to
  transact with large private entities rather than depending upon government contracts. See Brian
  Fung, That SpaceX Explosion Blew Up One of Facebook’s Most Ambitious Projects, WASH. POST (Sept. 1,
  2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/09/01/that-spacex-explosion-blew-
  up-one-of-facebooks-most-ambitious-projects/.
3
  Both SpaceX and Boeing have revealed plans to transport private citizens to Mars.                           See
  Nicky Woolf, SpaceX founder Elon Musk plans to get humans to Mars in six years, THE GUARDIAN
  (Sept.         28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/27/elon-musk-spacex-
  mars-colony. Julie Johnsson, Boeing CEO Vows to Beat Musk to Mars, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2016),
  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-04/boeing-ceo-vows-to-beat-musk-to-mars-as-
  new-space-race-beckons.
4
  See, Asteroids, PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com/asteroids/#asteroids-intro
  (detailing Planetary Resources goals of extracting resources from asteroids).
5
  See Launch Services Program – Earth’s Bridge to Space, NASA (2012), https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/LS
  P_Brochure_508.pdf (describing NASA’s directorate that is in charge of launching expendable launch
  vehicles that satisfy both commercial and governmental interests).
6
  See infra note 34 and accompanying text.


                                                       2
2020]                            UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW                                    [Vol: 5:1


compromises based upon the conflicting political ideologies of the two nations.7 While
the democratic and entrepreneurial United States foresaw the eventual private
commercialization of outer space, the Soviet Union desired space activities to be under
the control of national governments.8 The resulting compromise from these competing
ideologies can be seen in Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty which requires States to
“bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the
[M]oon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities . . . .”9
          In short, the traditional interpretation of Article VI attributed the activities of
private actors in outer space to the State itself, thus obliging States to ensure that its
space activities did not violate the Outer Space Treaty or rules of international law; if a
private actor breaches these international obligations, then potential liability for such a
breach is imputed to the State. Such an interpretation is ratified by the registration
requirements contained in the component outer space treaties,10 the long history of
government activity in outer space, the regulation of outer space through domestic
legislation and national space agencies, and the continued use of private space
companies for governmental interests.
          But, as stated previously, private entities have been able to make leaps and
bounds in the arena of space exploration and have already begun to pursue endeavors
without government involvement. Such a trend has also coincided with the rise of
transnational corporations that are not necessarily tied to one national jurisdiction, but
are rather subject to multiple arenas of jurisdiction. These continuing trends, with a
potential to soon be the norm in commercial space efforts, begs the question: under
what circumstances are States responsible for the potentially unlawful activities of
private actors in outer space under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty?
          As private commercial endeavors in outer space continue to rapidly develop, it
may become inefficient and inequitable to broadly assign State responsibility for private
activities centered upon the basic schemas of State jurisdiction as enforced by the outer
space agreements.11 Indeed, not only have certain space companies been able to garner

7
   See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
8
   See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
 9
   Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
   the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VI, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (emphasis added) [hereinafter
   Outer Space Treaty].
10
   That is, the Liability and Registration Conventions. See Convention on the International Liability for Damage
   Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]; Convention on
   Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration
   Convention].
11
   See infra notes 59-98 and accompanying text.


                                                       3
                      CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT


enough monetary resources to pursue completely private projects, but have also
expanded across international borders becoming much like the traditional transnational
corporation.12 This evolution essentially blurs the lines of what constitutes a “national
activity” or the “appropriate State” for the purposes of State responsibility, and thus
calls for a more detailed analysis based upon the international law surrounding conduct
attributable to the State.
             To that end, the responsibility for private conduct is evaluated on a narrower
scale when compared to the basic structure of Article VI and the outer space regime. In
general, responsibility for private conduct, regardless of whether that private entity is
tied to the State by some means of national jurisdiction, may only be attributable to the
State if that conduct is somehow linked to the State’s national government. In short,
wrongful private actions not associated with carrying out governmental authority or
functions cannot automatically impute liability to the State without further analysis.
Ultimately, considering the shift of space activities from national governments to
private enterprise, as well as the inherent difficulties of assigning the appropriate state
for the purposes of responsibility under the Outer Space Treaty, Article VI should not be
interpreted in an overly broad manner that prevents a more detailed analysis that is
based upon the foundations of State attribution.
             Such a bold proposition may seem like a call to abrogate or amend Article VI of
the Outer Space Treaty and question the obligations of authorization and supervision
contained therein, but such a criticism is not the case; a focus on international norms of
State responsibility for breaches of obligations that span beyond the traditional notions
of national jurisdiction does not require treaty amendments. Rather, an interpretation of
Article VI that gives credence to international law surrounding State responsibility is not
only consistent with the Treaty itself, but may allow private commercial efforts in outer
space to flourish as national governments are not automatically burdened with potential
liability based upon the basic principles of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, an interpretation
that focuses on State attribution rather than national jurisdiction must be propelled via
international law making mechanisms, specifically domestic legislation.
             Therefore, Part I of this Article will recount the main legal principles behind
State responsibility, and in turn, describe how these principles are relevant to the
current interpretation and application of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty – an
interpretation that automatically attributes responsibility for any private space activity
to the State. Part II will discuss the problems posed by this current interpretation and
application of Article VI, especially in light of the evolving private nature of the space
12
     See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.


                                                    4
2020]                              UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW                                         [Vol: 5:1


industry. Consequently, Part III will focus on how more detailed and narrow State
attribution analysis that is specifically based on an evaluation of government control can
provide a better framework in assessing responsibility.                                This Part will discuss
international law-making mechanisms, particularly the use of domestic legislation, that
may push States to accept an interpretation of Article VI that narrows State
responsibility for activities in outer space.




       1. STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND ARTICLE VI

The Outer Space Treaty is considered the foundational document of the space law
regime. Its content establishes the key tenants of space law such as the prohibitions
against sovereignty13 and nuclear weapons in outer space.14 The Treaty also establishes
the basic structure of State responsibility via Article VI. In order to assess the application
of Article VI, we first must understand the legal principles behind State responsibility.
After such analysis, we may explore the history and formation of Article VI and how its
structure interacts with the basic foundations of customary international law.



     1.1 STATE RESPONSIBILITY

“Responsibility” in the legal sense “applies in particular to a person’s answerability for
compliance with his or her legal duties, and for any breaches thereof.”                          15   Thus, as many
could presume, a State is legally responsible, and thus liable, for conduct in breach of its
international obligations, regardless of what source of international law those
obligations derive.16            Consequently, it should be noted that “responsibility” and
“liability” are different concepts, but are yet intertwined by the potential results of
wrongful conduct. That is, States have a responsibility, or a duty, to comply with
obligations under international law; a breach of that duty is of course considered to be
wrongful conduct.17 But generally, liability becomes relevant only when a breach of that
duty results in damage. 18
13
   See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at art. II.
14
   See id. at art. IV.
15
   Bin Cheng, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty Revisited: “International Responsibility,” “National Activities,” and
   “The Appropriate State,” 26 J. Space Law 7, 9 (1998) (citation omitted).
16
   See ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 378 (2d ed. 2010).
17
   See Cheng, supra note 15, at 9.
18
   See Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgement, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13) (“reparation
   must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation


                                                           5
                     CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT


The law that further expounds upon this basic premise of State responsibility is
encapsulated by the International Law Commission’s articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.19 The articles, and the large amount of legal
commentary that accompanies each provision, are generally accepted as a codification of
customary international law.20
           To that end, Articles 1, 2, and 3 provide that an internationally wrongful act of a
State entails its international responsibility, but the particular action of the State is
wrongful only when (a) the conduct is attributable to that State under international law
and (b) the conduct constitutes a breach of international obligation of that State.21 As
the central focus of this Article is that of State responsibility for private activities in
outer space, much of our attention will be focused on how exactly the conduct of private
actors may be attributed to the State.
           Now of course, a private entity like a human individual or a corporation may be
held solely responsible for wrongful actions under international law.22 But, there are
several avenues in which a State can be held responsible for such wrongful actions.23
First and most obviously, an entity’s wrongful actions can be attributable to the State if
that entity is considered to be an “organ” of the government, that is a direct arm of the
government itself, or an agent of the government (i.e. “an entity acting under the
direction, instigation or control” of a State organ).24 This also includes individuals or
entities that are empowered by a State’s internal law to exercise elements of
governmental authority.25 Second, the conduct of a private entity may be attributable to


   which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.”). The exact definitions
   of responsibility and liability can differ with language or treaty construction. This particular nuance is
   central to tenants of responsibility and liability in the Outer Space Treaty as the Treaty is recorded in English,
   Russian, Spanish, French, and Mandarin. In French for example, there is only one word for “responsibility”
   and “liability.” Cheng, see supra note 15, at 10.
19
   G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter
   State Responsibility].
20
   See e.g., Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hung.v Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 ICJ Rep. 7, ¶ 39 (Sept. 25)
   (demonstrating how the International Court of Justice allowed the Article’s provision on necessity control
   a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia).
21
   State Responsibility, supra note 19, at art. 2(b).
22
   See e.g., Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (The district courts [of the United States] shall verify
   original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
   or a treaty of the United States) (alteration to original).
23
   See infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
24
   See AUST, supra note 16, at 379 (citing State Responsibility, supra note 19, at art. 4(1)(The conduct of any
   State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises
   legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the
   State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State)).
25
   See State Responsibility, supra note 19, at art. 5 (The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ
   of the State under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the
   governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person
   or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance).


                                                          6
2020]                              UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW                                         [Vol: 5:1


a State if it was acting on the State’s instruction, control, or direction.26                                  “Most
commonly, cases of this kind will arise where State organs supplement their own action
by recruiting or instigating private persons or groups who act as ‘auxiliaries’ while
remaining outside the official structure of the State.”                     27   Finally, if the conduct is not
attributable to the State under the aforementioned avenues, a State may still be held
responsible for the actions of a private entity if the State unequivocally acknowledges
and adopts the conduct as its own.28 This can be done by strongly endorsing and
perpetuating particular private actions after such actions have occurred,29 or, more
basically, by assuming direct responsibility for certain actions via international
agreements.30
           Such avenues of State attribution can be collectively categorized as “direct” State
responsibility as the private actions would be considered acts of the State itself. Some have
held that direct responsibility is distinguishable from “indirect” responsibility in which a
State always has a duty to ensure that all actions within its jurisdictional control do not
violate the rights of other States.31 “However, since the international wrong consists in
reality in governmental officers failing to fulfil the State’s international duty of protection
and not in the initial acts of the individuals . . . so-called indirect responsibility . . .
resolves itself into a case of direct State responsibility.”32 In other words, because a State
always has a duty to not violate the rights of other States, a breach of an international
obligation is a direct violation of its duty under international law.



     1.2. HISTORY AND FORMATION OF ARTICLE VI

As mentioned previously, the Outer Space Treaty was drafted during the height of the Cold
War in which the United States and the former Soviet Union were heavily engaged in space

26
   See id. at art. 9 (The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under
   international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the
   direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct).
27
   Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 2, at 47 (2001), U.N.
   Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).
28
   See State Responsibility, supra note 19, at art. 11 (Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the
   preceding articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law if and to the
   extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own).
29
   For example, in the Tehran Hostages case, the International Court of Justice held that the infamous student-led
   siege of the US Embassy in Iran was attributable to Iran because the government endorsed and perpetuated
   the actions of the students. See U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980
   I.C.J. Rep. 3 (May 24).
30
   Responsibility qualified via international agreement is especially pertinent in discussing the interpretation
   of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. See infra notes 52 and accompanying text.
31
    See Cheng, supra note 15, at 12 n. 10.
32
   Id. at 12.


                                                           7
                     CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT


activity.33 As many know, these two nations were diametrically opposed when it came to
matters of governance, and as a result, many sections of the Treaty were “drafted in such
a way that allows [the Treaty] to bend to political ideology.”34 Article VI is no exception.
The Article as it stands today states:
             States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for
             national activities in outer space, including the [M]oon and other celestial
             bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or
             by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are
             carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.
             The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the
             Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing
             supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are
             carried on in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, by
             an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty
             shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States
             Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.35

In sum, the assignment of State responsibility for both governmental and private space
activities is a direct result of conflicting political views. That is, the United States, a
democratic nation with a mixed economy, supported involvement of private entities in
outer space activities.36 However, this proposal was opposed by the Soviet Union, an
authoritarian communist regime, which wanted only States to undertake space
activities.37 As seen above, Article VI “was drafted to allow private activity in outer space
on the condition that the appropriate State exercises authorization and continuing




33
   See Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and Challenges in the Era of Globalization, 37 SUFFOLK
   U.L. REV. 1041 (2004).
34
   P.J. Blount & Christian J. Robison, One Small Step: The Impact of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness
   Act of 2015 on the Exploitation of Resources in Outer Space, 19 N.C. J. L. & Tech. (2016) (discussing the impact of
   the American-Soviet dynamic on the formation of Article II) (alteration to the original).
35
   Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at art. VI.
36
   See      Rand       Simberg,        Property     Rights     in    Outer      Space,     THE      NEW       ATLANTIS,
   http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publicatio
   ns/property-rights-in-space (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
37
   See Paul Stephen Dempsey, National Laws Governing Commercial Space Activities: Legislation, Regulation, &
   Enforcement, 36 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 1, 6 (2016) (citing Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep.
   of the Legal Subcomm. on the Work of Its First Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.2, at 4 (1962); Comm. on
   the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on the Work of Its Seventeenth Session, U.N.
   Doc. A/5181, annex 3, at 8 (1962).


                                                           8
2020]                           UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW                                   [Vol: 5:1


supervision over its non-governmental entities.38 [Therefore,] [t]he State [was] made
responsible for its national activities, even those by private parties.”39
          Despite this straightforward compromise of State responsibility, the changing
nature of the space industry itself has left Article VI fraught with ambiguity. In other
words, it may have been relatively simple to assign responsibility for space activities to
States as such activities were predominated by direct State activity, but as the private
space industry has developed, key phrases such as “national activities” and “the
appropriate state” places into question as to exactly which State is responsible for what
specific endeavors in outer space.40 Nonetheless, many have held onto a traditional
interpretation and application of Article VI that may be overly broad despite the
immense progress of the private commercial actors in outer space.



     1.3. STRUCTURE AND TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE VI

All things considered, the traditional interpretation of Article VI holds that States must
take responsibility for all activities in outer space.                   Specifically, by establishing
responsibility, States party to the Outer Space Treaty take upon the duties of (a) assuring
that State activities in outer space comply with the Treaty;41 (b) assuring that
non-governmental activities in outer space with a State’s jurisdictional control comply
with the Treaty;42 and (c) to subject those non-governmental space activities to
authorization and continuing supervision.43 Many States have chosen to fulfill these
duties through extensive licensing and compliance regulations.44
          With that said, there is no controversy in regards to States imposing various laws
and regulations to ensure that both governmental and non-governmental actors comply
with their international obligations – the State is of course in the business of lawmaking.
Consequently, the only possible controversy surrounding Article VI is what type of private
space activities are States responsible for in the case of a breach of an obligation found in
the Outer Space Treaty or elsewhere in international law.
38
   The U.S.S.R. agreed it would be possible to consider the question of not excluding from the declaration the
   possibility of activity in outer space by private companies, on the condition that such activity would be
   subject to the control of the appropriate State, and the State would bear international responsibility for
   it. Id. (citing Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on the Work of Its
   Twenty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.22, at 23 (1963).
39
   Dempsey, supra note 37, at 6 (citation omitted).
40
   See infra §. II-A-B.
41
   See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at art. VI.
42
   Id.; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
43
   See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at art. VI.
44
   “At least 26 States - about 14% of the members of the United Nations - regulate space activities.” Dempsey,
   supra note 37, at 15-16.


                                                      9
                    CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT


The plain text of Article VI would relay that only non-governmental “national activities”
would be imputed to the “appropriate State.”                       Though there is no exact working
definition of “national activities” or the “appropriate State,”45 the great compromise
between the world’s two leading space faring nations has led many noted scholars and
publicists to conclude that all “non-governmental national space activities are
assimilated to governmental space activities.”46 Essentially, a “[State is responsible for a
thing that is done by such non-governmental entities and] is deemed to be an act
imputable to the State as if it were its own act, for which it bears directly responsibility.
Thus a breach of any provision of the Space Treaty by such a non-governmental entity
involves immediately the State’s direct responsibility, as if it were a breach by the State
itself.”47
             This particular interpretation of Article VI, an interpretation that could be
supported by the plain text of the provision and the intent of the drafters,48 divorces the
Outer Space Treaty from the more analytical avenues of State responsibility as outlined
above.49 Indeed, the same authors who have held fast to the lex specialis50 nature of the
outer space regime in interpreting Article VI have provided certain interpretations of
key terms that are consistent with the notion that States have directly assumed
responsibility for the potential breaches of its private actors.51

45
   See id. at 7 n. 22.
46
   Cheng, supra note 15, at 14.
47
   Id.; see also P.J. Blount, Renovating Space: The Future of International Space Law, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
   515, 530-31 (2011). (“By creating an affirmative obligation to authorize and supervise non-governmental
   actors in space in addition to making states responsible for the activities of these entities, Article VI makes
   it a high risk activity for a state to allow commercial actors to operate in the space environment. In the
   past legislation has been written so as to help states effectively fulfill Article VI obligations. Traditionally
   this has been through licensing regimes for nongovernmental actors.”); see also MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF
   OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 122 (Sijthoff 1972) (“States bear international
   responsibility for any activity in outer space, irrespective of whether it is carried out by governmental
   agencies or non-governmental entities. This is intended to ensure that any outer space activity, no matter
   by whom conducted, shall be carried on in accordance with the relevant rules of international law, and to
   bring the consequences of such activity within its ambit. The acceptance of this principle removes all doubts
   concerning imputability . . . States are under obligation to take appropriate steps in order to ensure that
   natural or juridical persons engaged in outer space activity conduct it in accordance with international law.
   States have taken upon themselves the explicit obligation that such activity will require their ‘authorization
   and continuing supervision’”).
48
   See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (outlining method
   of general and supplemental treaty interpretation).
49
   See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
50
   Lex specialis is a Latin phrase which means ‘law governing a specific subject matter’ (emphasis added).
   Lex Specialis Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, http://definitions.uslegal.com/l/lex-specialis/. Of course,
   international space law is a prime example of a lex specialis regime. Article 55 of the Articles on State
   Responsibility make it clear that an international agreement such as the Outer Space Treaty can qualify
   or preclude the application of the methods of assigning responsibility to the State. State Responsibility,
   supra note 19, at art. 55. But as we will discuss later, the Outer Space Treaty in itself does not preclude the
   use of international custom in order to interpret the remaining ambiguities of the Treaty.
51
   See infra notes 59-98 and accompanying text.


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2020]                           UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW                                    [Vol: 5:1


For example, and as we will extensively discuss later in this Article, Bin Cheng, Frans G.
von Der Dunk, and several others have retained that national activities are tied to the core
means through which a State may assert jurisdiction.52 In short, national activities and the
appropriate state may be linked to (1) the registration requirements of the Registration
Convention, (2) the liability associated with launch activities as evinced by the Liability
Convention, or (3) the state or nationality of the entities involved.53 Regardless of how
a particular non-governmental space activity is associated with a certain State, it is clear
that the assertion of absolute State responsibility for activities in outer space is tied to the
main agreements of the outer space regime.
          All things considered, the lex specialis nature of United Nations outer space
agreements has allowed authors to assert narrow definitions of key treaty provisions
based upon plain language and drafter intent. Therefore, the traditional interpretation
of Article VI is not invalid. In fact, this interpretation has indeed been functional for
activities in outer space as a great majority of such activities have had clear ties to
national governments or have been identified by a distinct nationality.54 Moreover, the
requirements of the Registration Convention and schemas of liability contained within
the Liability Convention are relatively straightforward, though of course subject to
further interpretation.
          Nonetheless, and as alluded to numerous times over, the nature of activities in
outer space has dramatically changed in recent years, and will only continue to evolve.
Though a direct assumption of State responsibility for space activities may have once
been “revolutionary,”55 it may soon be time for us to recognize the innovative nature of
the Outer Space Treaty56 and look to the more analytical legal foundations of State
responsibility in order to better interpret and apply Article VI.




52
   See id.
53
   See id.
54
   See e.g., U.S. Private Space Companies Plan Surge in Launches This Year, REUTERS (Feb.            23, 2016),
   http://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-launches-idUSKCN0VC2G7.
55
   See Cheng, supra note 15, at 15.
56
   See supra note 34 Blount & Robison (“[I]nnovation can be said to be a specific value that is embedded in
   international space law . Indeed, the Outer Space Treaty itself is an example of legal innovation”).


                                                      11
                       CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT


         2. DIFFICULTIES OF APPLYING THE TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATION
         OF ARTICLE VI

Again, the traditional interpretation of Article VI is not necessarily incorrect. However,
as more countries and individuals are able to conduct space activities unhampered by
the ideological battle of the Cold War, a battle that directly influenced the formation of
the Outer Space Treaty, the application of Article VI may become inefficient. Indeed, as
will be discussed here, this interpretation of Article VI has only led to more questions
especially when more countries have participated in outer space activities. Difficulties
associated with more actors in outer space are only exacerbated with the monumental
shift of space activities from the hands of government to the hands of private space
companies that are quickly spanning across the globe. Therefore, with this section, we
will examine the current difficulties of applying the traditional interpretation of Article
VI, and subsequently, the potential difficulties of applying the traditional interpretation
to private actors.



       2.1. PLAIN AMBIGUITY – NATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND THE APPROPRIATE
       STATE

The same authors that directly assign State responsibility to all space activities
surprisingly concede that there are ambiguities within the text of Article VI that may
make their broad interpretation of the provision difficult to apply. These ambiguities
center mainly around two key phrases: “national activities” and “the appropriate
state.”57 Though necessarily does not exist any patent ambiguity within these terms, the
shifting nature of the space industry and the increased ability of multiple nations to
conduct space activities does in fact create difficulties in its application. For simplicity,
we will discuss each phrase in turn by exploring their application within the context of
the traditional Article VI interpretation, and subsequently, demonstrate how such
traditional applications is difficult, and will continue to be difficult to apply within the
environment of a progresive space industry.



       2.1.1. NATIONAL ACTIVITIES

As explicitly stated above, the meaning behind “national activities” is relatively
straightforward within the context of the traditional interpretation of Article VI
57
     See supra note 9 Outer Space Treaty, at art. VI.


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2020]                              UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW                                         [Vol: 5:1


considering that all space activities are to be imputed to the State.58 Nonetheless, there
are multiple proposed avenues in which a certain space endeavor may be considered a
“national activity” for the purposes of State responsibility, thus giving way to more
uncertainty surrounding the meaning of Article VI. The first method of assigning State
responsibility falls directly within the confines of the lex specialis space law regime as
reflected by the requirements of the Registration and Liability Conventions.59
Specifically, under Article II of the Registration Convention, “[w]hen a space object is
launched into Earth orbit or beyond, the launching State shall register the space object
by means of an entry in an appropriate registry which it shall maintain. Each launching
State shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the establishment of
such a registry.”60 According to Article I of the same agreement, a “launching state” is a
State which launches a space object, a State that procures a launch, a State from whose
territory a space object is launched, or a State from whose facility a space object is
launched.61 Such a definition is reinforced by Article I of the Liability Convention, and as
we have briefly mentioned, the interplay of responsibility and liability contained within
international space law is crucial to our central question.62
           This method of identifying the “national” space activities via registration is of
course tied to quasi-territorial jurisdiction.63 But the plain text of these provisions pose
a particular problem in light of the broad application of State responsibility in outer
space. Specifically, a component provision of the Registration Convention requires that
“[w]here there are two or more launching States in respect of any such space object, they
shall jointly determine which one of them shall register the object in accordance with
paragraph 1 of this article . . . .”64 Thus, it is possible for States and private entities alike
to “forum shop” among bankrupt or less-regulated States for the malicious convenience
of evading responsibility.65 Though the drafters of the Registration Convention did not
intend this possibility, simple registration cannot be the only criterion in determining
“national activities” for the purposes of Article VI.66
           The second method of identifying national activities concerns itself with the
nationality of individuals involved. Indeed, this interpretation could be supported by
58
   See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
59
   See Frans G. von der Dunk, The Origins of Authorisation: Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and International Space
   Law, Space and Telecommunications Law Program Faculty Publications, Paper 69, at 7 (2011), available at
   http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelaw/69.
60
   Registration Convention, supra note 10, at art. II.
61
   Id. at art. I.
62
   See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
63
   See AUST, supra note 16, at 43.
64
   Registration Convention, supra note 10, at art. II(2).
65
   See Cheng, supra note 15, at 22.
66
   Id.


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                  CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT


Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty which refers to “activity or experiment planned by it
or its nationals in outer space,”67 or by the simple international principles that allow
States to have jurisdiction over its nationals abroad.68 This notion is even reflected in
national space laws of the United Kingdom which claims jurisdiction over British
nationals, whether they be individuals or corporations.69 But much like the first method
of identifying national activities, this method also has its shortcomings. The main pitfall
of this interpretation is that it excludes the possibility of assigning responsibility by
territory whether that be by a certain national being in another State’s physical territory
or on a space vehicle bearing another State’s flag or registration.70 Not only does this
method possibly exclude those that should be responsible for space activities, but it also
may unduly assign responsibility to multiple actors, thus possibly causing much
confusion in the case of liability.
         The third and final method of determining what constitutes a national activity
falls under the coined concept of “jurisdiction” – a legal theory derived from interplay of
“overriding” jurisdictions.71       Jurisdiction in itself is defined as “the internationally
recognized competence of a State concretely to set up machinery to . . . physically to
exercise the functions of a State.”72 This competence is derived solely from the elements
of territorial, quasi-territorial, or personal jurisdiction.73            However, each form of
jurisdiction is weighted against the other, with pure territorial jurisdiction being
superior to both quasi-territorial jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction based on
nationality.74 For example, a national of State A travelling on a ship flying the flag of
State B commits an internationally wrongful act in a port belonging to State C. In this
scenario, State C would have the sole ability to arrest and prosecute the national for the
internationally wrongful act. If the ship was traversing international waters while A
engaged in illegal conduct, State B would have the power to act considering that the
ship’s quasi-territorial jurisdiction is superior to that of the personal jurisdiction of State
A. Applying the basic premise of jurisdiction to the interpretation of national activities
under Article VI is a deceivingly effective method of determining State responsibility in
outer space. By allowing certain forms of jurisdiction having priority over the other, the
“responsible” State can be readily identified. Nonetheless, proponents of applying the

67
   Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at art. IX (emphasis added).
68
   See Aust, supra note 16, at 43-44.
69
   Outer Space Act, c. 38 §§ 1-2 (1986).
70
   See supra note 64 and accompanying text (briefly describing quasi-territorial jurisdiction).
71
   See GBENGA ODUNTAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION IN THE AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE: LEGAL CRITERIA   FOR
   SPATIAL DELIMITATION 92 (2012).
72
   Cheng, supra note 15, at 24.
73
   See ODUNTAN, supra note 71, at 92.
74
   See id.


                                                  14
2020]                             UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW                                         [Vol: 5:1


premise of jurisdiction to State responsibility in outer space concede that “[e]ffective
jurisdiction is when and where a State’s jurisdiction is not overridden by that of any other
State, and may actually be exercised.”75
           The need to come to effective jurisdiction when applying the theory of
jurisdiction creates several shortcomings in the realm of outer space. First, because
territorial and not extraterritorial jurisdiction is the supreme form of jurisdiction, there
may be an undue emphasis on the “State from whose territory”76 a space object is
launched when identifying a national activity.77 Though this scenario can be limited, or
possibly cured, by other means of identifying a launching State under the Liability
Convention,78 it would be inequitable to assign liability for a potential disaster to the
State from whose territory a space object is launched when the fault of disaster may lie
with another State’s spacecraft which the launching State sent into orbit (i.e.
quasi-territorial jurisdiction) or with another State’s national (i.e. personal jurisdiction).
This inequitable assignment may be assuaged when a space object reaches outer space,79
but then again, the system of jurisdiction may unduly assign liability based upon the
quasi-territorial jurisdiction derived from a certain spacecraft’s nationality when fault
may be actually lie with a foreign national operating the spacecraft. As one can see from
these scenarios, the theory of jurisdiction becomes extremely difficult to apply when
multiple States are involved in one single space activity.
           All in all, the main methods of determining whether a space activity is the
“national activity” of one particular State fail to account for the fact that multiple States
are often involved in an outer space mission. These methods may have been workable
during a time in which many space activities were unilateral affairs under the direction
of national governments, but such methods applied to the current nature of the space
industry runs the risk of inequitable assignments of liability.                          The insistence upon
assigning State responsibility to fit the initial interpretation that a State is always
responsible for activities in outer space is only furthered when trying to interpret the
term, “the appropriate state.”



75
   Cheng, supra note 15, at 24 (emphasis added).
76
   Liability Convention, supra note 10, at art. I(c)(ii).
77
   Indeed, “bias” in favor of territorial jurisdiction has, in the past, been instrumental in shaping international
   law. “However, increasing trends have challenged the effectiveness of territorial jurisdiction, thus making
   a system of jurisdiction increasingly unworkable in the modern world. For more information on this trend,
   especially in relation to its effect on transnational corporations”, see generally Larry Cata Backer, Private
   Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board and the
   Global Governance Order, 18 IND. J. INT’L L. 751 (2011).
78
   See Liability Convention, supra note 10, at art. I(c)(i).
79
   Id. at art. III.


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                    CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT


     2.1.2. THE APPROPRIATE STATE

Unlike “national activities,” the ambiguous “appropriate State” has not been analyzed to
a great extent in relevant academic literature. However, questions surrounding this term
create similar difficulty in the application of Article VI. The most visible question is
contained within the Treaty text itself, as the “appropriate State” is singular.80 This may
suggest that there could only be one appropriate State for responsibility, especially since
Article II of the Registration Convention allows for a choice of registration when two or
more countries launch a space object.81 However, one can easily determine that such an
interpretation would be unjustified as this would once again induce forum shopping and
more importantly, unduly qualify State responsibility when multiple countries are
involved in a single space mission.
           Therefore, another approach within the strict confines of the traditional
interpretation of Article VI has been to separate registration requirements from
jurisdictional requirements. That is, a space object could be registered in one country,
but there could be separate agreements or other means of assigning State
responsibility.82 However, this particular method would wrongfully remove registration
as a means of quasi-territorial jurisdiction by divorcing registration requirements from
“jurisdiction and control” under Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty.83 Ultimately, any
singular notion of the appropriate State or a method that would allow for selective
responsibility would be a dubious application of Article VI.
           Considering these practical failures of shortsighted interpretations of “the
appropriate State,” it has been proposed that one should reference the Declaration of
Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space - the precursor to the Outer Space Treaty.84 Contained within the Principles
appears the phrase “the State concerned” in regards to State responsibility.85 In fact, it is
possible that this term could replace the “appropriate State” considering that, as we
have extensively discussed, more than one State can be involved in space activities. But


80
   See von der Dunk, supra note 59, at 8.
81
   See also Registration Convention, supra note 10, at art. II.
82
   See Cheng, supra note 15, at 27; von der Dunk, supra note 59, at 12-13.
83
   See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at art. VIII. (“A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object
   launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any
   personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body”).
84
   See von der Dunk, supra note 59, at 3. (citing G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal Principles Governing
   the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Dec. 13, 1963) [hereinafter Resolution
   1962]).
85
   See Resolution 1962, supra note 84, § 5 (“The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space shall
   require authorization and continuing supervision by the State concerned”).


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2020]                             UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW                                         [Vol: 5:1


alas, there could be just as many interpretations for the “State concerned” as there are
for the “appropriate State” or “national activities.”



     2.2. FURTHER COMPLICATION - PRIVATE INDUSTRY

As we can see, it becomes extremely difficult to apply the provisions of Article VI when it
comes to multiple actors. These difficulties are only increased when we factor in private
actors. Though the traditional interpretation of Article VI would hold that such a factor
is irrelevant, its increased presence in the space faring world calls us to reevaluate the
broad application of State responsibility in outer space. The beginnings of certain
multinational projects such as the Sea Launch Company best illustrates how the
difficulties of designating a “national activity” and determining the “appropriate State”
are only exacerbated with the presence of multiple private actors.
The Sea Launch Company is a multinational spacecraft launch service that uses a mobile
maritime launch platform for equatorial launches of commercial payloads on a Russian
launch vehicle.86           The Company itself was founded as limited duration company
incorporated in the Cayman Islands, a British Crown colony.87 The initial activities of the
Company were supported by four different corporations, all from different countries: (1)
RSC Energia of the Russian Federation; (2) the Boeing Company of the United States; (3)
Kvaerner A.S. of Norway; and (4) NPO Yuzhnoye of Ukraine.88
           The initial organization of the Sea Launch project clearly demonstrates
inconsistencies in the blanket application of Article VI. That is, all methods of
determining “national activities” and the “appropriate State” as outlined above would
impute the actions of the Company to the United States, Russia, Norway, Ukraine, the
country or company which may purchase the Company’s services, and possibly, the

86
   See About Sea Launch, SEA LAUNCH, http://www.sea-launch.com/about/11398.
87
   See Armel Kerrest, Launching Spacecraft from the Sea and the Outer Space Treaty: The Sea Launch Project, 1997 INT’L
   INST. SPACE LAW PROC. 264, 265.
88
   Id. In the beginning stages of the venture, the companies listed above came together to form a
   partnership that varied in shares and responsibilities. Kvaerner provided the launch platform and
   the Assembly and Command Ship (20%); RSC Energia supplied the third stage of the launch vehicle
   (and some parts of the first and second stages) and conducted launches (25%); NPO Yuzhnoye supplied
   the first and second stages of the launch vehicle (15%); and Boeing led the team, furnished the
   home port, some parts of the launcher and payload accommodation, and commercialized the launches
   via licensing in the United States (40%). Id. Unfortunately, the Sea Launch Company has not
   conducted a launch since 2014 due to reorganization of the company’s corporate structure. See Sea
   Launch Platform Stripped of Foreign Equipment, Ready to Leave US for Russia, SPACE DAILY (Oct. 9, 2019),
   http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Sea_Launch_platform_stripped_of_foreign_equipment_ready_to_lea
   ve_US_for_Russia_999.html. More specifically, it appears that involvement from the United States will
   discontinue, while the Russian Federation assumes leadership. See id. Nonetheless, the Sea Launch Company
   still exists and stands as poignant example of multinational involvement in singular space activities.


                                                         17
                    CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT


United Kingdom.89 This application does not take into account the variety of activities
each company performs, the amount of ownership each company may have in the
venture, or the relationship each country may have with a national government. Rather,
the methods outlined above would simply look to basic notions of territorial,
quasi-territorial, or personal jurisdiction, especially in regards to identifying the
launching State.90
           Ultimately, this lack of consideration for the level of involvement leads to
potential consequences that further complicate the Article VI schema of State
responsibility. For example, without considering the level of involvement in a space
activity, liability resulting from a breach of an international obligation may not be fairly
apportioned by joint and several liability requirements of Liability Convention Article
IV.91 Of course, such an occurrence could be controlled by the finding of fault,92 but even
this analysis could unfairly force the burden of responsibility onto one State and allow
another State to suffer little consequence. For instance, Planetary Resources, an entity
recently acquired by ConsenSys, Inc., is a pioneering American company planning to
exploit natural resources from asteroids.93 The government of Luxembourg invested a
large sum of money in the Planetary Resources venture.94 Though the government of
Luxembourg benefits from the activities of the company, it is the burden of the United
States to license, monitor, and shoulder the potential mistakes of Planetary according to
the traditional means of assigning State responsibility in outer space.95
89
   See Kerrest, supra note 87, at 267-68.
90
   See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
91
   See Liability Convention, supra note 10, at art. IV.
92
   See id. arts. I, II.
93
   See Company, PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com/company/#timeline. (Planetary
   Resources should not be confused with Deep Space Industries. Deep Space Industries is a Luxembourgish
   company that places some of its operations in the United States.) See Deep Space Industries Congratulates
   Luxembourg on Their Bold Legislative Action to Facilitate the Space Resources Industry, NEWSWIRE (Nov.
   16, 2016), https://www.newswire.com/news/deep-space-industries-congratulates-luxembourg-on-their-
   bold-legislative-action. As noted above, Planetary Resources was recently acquired by ConsenSys, Inc.
   (a.k.a. ConsenSys Space) in late 2018. See ConsenSys Acquires Planetary Resources, Planetary Resources (Oct.
   31, 2018). Since the acquisition, it does not appear the ConsenSys has eradicated the original mission of
   Planetary Resources or divested itself of investment provided by the government of Luxembourg. See also
   Alan Boyle, Why in the Universe is a Blockchain Company Buying the Assets of a Formerly High-Flying Asteroid
   Miner?,GEEKWIRE (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.geekwire.com/2018/consensys-blockchain-studio-acquires-
   planetary-resources-asteroid-mining-venture/. (Though Planetary Resources has undergone significant
   corporate restructuring like the Sea Launch Project, the entity, and its associated capitalization, still remains
   as an excellent example of how the traditional interpretation of Article VI is challenged by the advent of
   outer space privatization. Please note that the name “Planetary Resources” is utilized throughout this article
   in place of “ConsenSys” for the sake of clarity).
94
   See David Z. Morris, Luxembourg to Invest $227 Million in Asteroid Mining, FORTUNE (June 5, 2016),
   http://fortune.com/2016/06/05/luxembourg-asteroid-mining/.
95
   See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text. (This particular fact may of course change with new
   domestic space legislation recently passed in Luxembourg. That is, Luxembourg could choose to shoulder
   responsibility for Planetary Resources activities depending on how exactly Luxembourg chooses to assert
   its jurisdiction). See also, DEEP SPACE INDUSTRIES, supra note 93.


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2020]                              UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW                                  [Vol: 5:1


But aside from difficulties associated with determining the correct State for
responsibility, the main dilemma surrounding the application of Article VI is the refusal
to depart from the antiquated notion that States themselves are the sole actors in outer
space. As repeated throughout this article, space is becoming an arena for private actors
that are fueled by commercial profitability or quite simply, a spirit for adventure.96
Soon, transnational corporate activity in outer space may become just as common as
transnational corporate activity on Earth. And like the actions of those transnational
companies on Earth, the actions of those same entities in outer space should not
automatically be imputed to the State. Therefore, reevaluation of the application of
Article 6 is necessary not only to assuage the difficulties associated with multiple actors,
but to also ensure the creation of a regime that allows private ingenuity to take on the
future of outer space exploration.




         3. PATH FORWARD

Simply put, the broad application of Article VI will become increasingly difficult to apply
as multiple private actors become a dominant force in the commercialization and
exploration of outer space. Consequently, there must be a solution that eases the burden
of assigning State responsibility when several entities are involved in a single space
operation, and more importantly, ensures that States are not unfairly called upon to
rectify the international wrongs of purely private actors. This solution lies with careful
and concentrated State attribution analysis as outlined by customary international law
rather than selecting the aforementioned methods that are confined by the broad
interpretation of Article VI. Therefore, in discussing this solution, we will first examine
how such analysis is effective in determining State responsibility in outer space. We will
then examine whether such analysis is consistent with the Outer Space Treaty, and
subsequently, how States may support a more narrow interpretation of Article VI via of
domestic legislation.97




96
     See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
97
     Though indicated above, this article does not propose a new international legal regime for the governance
     of private outer space activities. Rather, this article simply provides a more modern and equitable method
     in assessing State responsibility and liability that still preserves the current Outer Space Treaty regime.


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                    CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT


     3.1. A VIABLE SOLUTION

 We have extensively discussed the numerous consequences that come with attempting
 to apply the traditional interpretation of Article VI in a modern and continually evolving
 space industry. But a viable solution to this dilemma is ironically a traditional one rooted in
 customary international law. In fact, each method of equating private actions with actions
 of the State under customary international law can prove effective in fairly assigning State
 responsibility.
 To that end, it would be relatively simple to assign State responsibility for space missions
 conducted by space agencies of national governments as such entities are clearly organs
 of the State.98 In fact, as briefly mentioned before, the traditional interpretation of
 Article VI was quite viable and in little need of scrutinized interpretation during the
 early days of space exploration that was dominated by the United States and the former
 Soviet Union. Furthermore, the viability of the traditional interpretation of Article VI is
 also confirmed under the customary international law of State responsibility when a
 government contractor assists in furthering the interests of national governments in
 outer space.99 In continuing this business custom, private government contractors like
 SpaceX or Boeing are under the direction of the national government that procures their
 services, and thus their actions are attributed to the contracting State party.100 But as
 briefly mentioned, private space faring entities are gaining profit from other sources
 aside from still-lucrative government contracts.101          This is where the traditional
 interpretation of Article VI fails to consider the varying corporate structures of a
 transnational space-faring company.
           Fortunately,      an application of the customary law surrounding State
 responsibility can allow us to consider corporate structure and government involvement
 when determining whether a private company’s activities in outer space are justifiably
 attributable to the State. That is, by looking to Article 8 under the Articles on State
 Responsibility, we can look to whether the activity of a private entity in outer space is in
 fact a national space activity of the State via government control.102 As we will discuss,
 this particular method of assigning State responsibility is broad enough to hold several
 States responsible for private activity, yet narrow enough to ensure that responsibility
 for such private activity is not unjustly imputed to national governments.


98
    See supra notes 5, 24 and accompanying text.
99
    See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
100
    Id.
101
    See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
102
    See supra note 26.


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 2020]                            UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW                                       [Vol: 5:1


 As we may recall, Article 8 treats the actions of a private entity as actions of the State if it
 is found that a national government exercised a certain amount of “control” over the
 private action.103 According to the Article Commentary, control can be exercised in a
 variety of ways such as allowing a private activity to be under the direction of a national
 government or allowing a certain business to become a State-owned entity.104 Therefore,
 determining whether a national government exhibited the requisite amount of control
 needed for the actions of a private organization to be imputed to the State is, quite
 simply, fact-intensive.105 As evidenced through several cases presented before several
 international tribunals, no particular method of attributing private conduct to the State
 is allowed to be absolutely dispositive in determining whether a national government
 asserted the requisite degree of control.106 In fact, some international tribunals have
 gone as far as to separate individual actions of a private entity in order to fairly
 determine the extent of government control and liability.107 Presumably, one might
 argue that not allowing any one factor to be dispositive in determining State
 responsibility is inefficient, and in the realm of space, no more useful than the variety of
 methods of assigning responsibility in accordance with the traditional interpretation of
 Article VI. However, the focus on government control allows us to assert a method of
 attributing conduct to the State that is neither overly broad nor narrow. Basically,
 though an emphasis on control allows one to focus on the facts of each individual case,
 an evaluation of such facts still rests upon the more concrete methods of attributing
 private conduct to the State that acts as the foundational rationale for control. For
 instance, in evaluating individual facts, we may look to how a particular corporation’s
103
    Id.
104
    See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 27, at art. 8.
105
    Id. (“[C]onduct [may be] nevertheless attributable to the State because there exists a specific factual
    relationship between the person or entity engaging in the conduct and the State”).
106
    See, e.g., Hyatt Int’l Corporation v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 72 (1985). In this particular case, Hyatt
    International Corporation litigated breach of contract claims against Iran claiming that the contracting
    entity in Iran, The Foundation for the Oppressed, was a State-controlled. The tribunal explored a number
    of details to determine that the Foundation was indeed directly controlled by the Iranian government.
    The tribunal discussed various factors such as how the Foundation was established and the identity of its
    corporate officers and leaders.
107
    For example, in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case,
                 the [International Court of Justice] rejected the broader claim of Nicaragua that all
                 the conduct of the [American-backed] contras was attributable to the United States
                 by reason of its control over them. It concluded that: ‘[D]espite the heavy subsidies
                 and other support provided to them by the United States, there is no clear evidence
                 of the United States having actually exercised such a degree of control in all fields as
                 to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf.’ Thus while the United States
                 was held responsible for its own support for the contras, only in certain individual
                 instances were the acts of the contras themselves held attributable to it, based upon
                 actual participation of and directions given by [the United States].
    See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 27, at art. 8(4).
    (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, Judgement,
    1986 I.C.J. Rep 14, ¶ 51 (June 27) (alterations to the original) (emphasis added).


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                     CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT


 structure is established in order to determine whether partial State ownership makes
 that particular corporation an organ of the State pursuant to Article 4.108 Similarly, we
 can determine requisite government control by evaluating whether the activity of a
 private entity is exercising the authority of a national government pursuant to Article
 5.109
            This particular analysis can be especially useful, and should be applied in some
 capacity, in evaluating State responsibility for private activity in outer space. Let us
 return to our discussion of Luxembourg’s direct investment in the American asteroid
 mining company, Planetary Resources.110 According to the traditional interpretation of
 Article VI, we can see that the United States’ responsibility for Planetary Resource’s
 activities is exclusive, absent a different launching territory, because on the surface
 Luxembourg may not claim to have jurisdiction over the company by qualifying its
 amount of government ownership.111 However, if we apply control analysis, we can
 abrogate the United States’ responsibility for what is an objectively purely private
 commercial endeavor, while also ensuring that Luxembourg does not completely escape
 responsibility while reaping the benefits of Planetary Resources’ activities. To that end, a
 certain number of factual scenarios in regards to the relationship between the company,
 the United States, and Luxembourg can be evaluated under the general guise of control.
            For example, we can evaluate the basic corporate structure of Planetary
 Resources and determine whether the government of Luxembourg has significant
 control over the direction of the company.112 On a similar note, we can also look to
 whether Planetary’s services were directly procured or contracted for by either the
 Luxembourgish or American governments for a particular mission. But, in weighing

108
    See supra note 24.
109
    See supra note 25. Admittedly, looking to Article 5 alone would do little to cure the shortcomings of the
    traditional interpretation of Outer Space Treaty Article VI as the dispositive element of authority asks us to
    consider whether the activity of the private entity could be considered “governmental”. See also Report of
    the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 27, at art.5.
                 In order to determine whether an act is governmental, the Commentary proposes to
                 rely on the particular society, its history and traditions. According to an alternative
                 approach, the assessment should be based upon a comparative standard and it should
                 be determined from an objective point of view whether the act is normally regarded
                 as governmental in a contemporary setting.
    Michael Feit, Responsibility of the State under International Law for the Breach of Contract Committed by a State-
    Owned Entity, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 142, 147-48 (2010) (citations omitted). Therefore, considering these
    two approaches to identify a governmental activity, it might be difficult to determine whether a certain
    space activity is indeed governmental given the recent trend of the increased privatization of space. But
    nonetheless, this difficulty in determining whether a space activity is a government function is beneficial
    as this would deter one from focusing on one dispositive factor to determine requisite government control
    for the purposes of assigning State responsibility.
110
    See generally supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
111
    See supra notes 97 and accompanying text.
112
    See supra note 108.


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 2020]                           UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW                                    [Vol: 5:1


 these considerations, it is important to ensure that the analysis remains a fact intensive
 one focused on overall control and does not cling to one particular method of State
 attribution as dispositive of the ultimate determination of State responsibility.113
 Otherwise, our careful and meticulous analysis of State responsibility in outer space
 would be no different from the traditional interpretation of Article VI that directly
 assigns responsibility on the basic notions of jurisdiction.
           Again, one might argue that looking to a myriad of non-dispositive factors
 associated with government control supported by the customary international law
 surrounding State responsibility has little to no advantage over the traditional
 interpretation of Article VI considering that the traditional interpretation of Article VI
 provides multiple avenues of assigning State responsibility. But as stated, those who
 continue to advocate for such an interpretation limit factors of responsibility strictly to
 territorial, quasi-territorial, or national jurisdiction while ignoring the unique situations
 that are posed by transnational space-faring entities such as Planetary Resources, and
 the fact that space activities are no longer a “special function” of national governments.
 All in all, the notion that all space activities are attributable to the State may be
 satisfactory from an academic point of view, but an attribution scheme based on a clear
 set of non-dispositive factors “may prove to be [more] helpful in the future to deal with
 the growing number of private space activities in many different circumstances.”114



      3.2. CONTROL AND THE OUTER SPACE TREATY

 Though we may have discussed a viable solution in correctly assigning State responsibility
 for outer space activities, we must discuss how such a solution may become integrated into
 the international space law regime. Therefore, we must first determine whether State
 attribution analysis that is consistent with customary international law is also consistent
 with the Outer Space Treaty.
           From our extensive discussion of the traditional interpretation of Article VI, we
 know that the proponents of this interpretation cling to the intent of the drafters and
 hinge the application of Article VI upon key terms of “national activities” and “the
 appropriate State.”115 Many factors demonstrate that the traditional interpretation of
 Article VI is correct, but we must also remind ourselves that the lex specialis nature of the
113
    See AUST, supra note 16, at 380 (“The degree to which the State may be involved in an entity, such as owning
    or funding it, is not decisive”).
114
    Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, The Term “Appropriate State” in International Space Law, 37th PROC. COLLOQUIUM L.
    OUTER SPACE 77, 79 (1994). Dr. Bockstiegel essentially supports a “functionalist view” in determining the
    “appropriate State”.
115
    See supra §. II-A-B.


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                      CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT


 outer space law regime does not completely exclude further consideration of the plain
 meaning of terms, and more importantly, the consideration of customary international
 law.116
            In regards to basic treaty interpretation, we can see that the plain meaning of
 “national activities” in particular gives way to our proposed use of attribution analysis
 rooted in control. In the literal sense, “national” is an adjective used to describe an
 entity or function that is “of, relating to, or maintained by a nation as an organized
 whole or independent political unit:”117 . Such a definition is indeed consistent with State
 attribution analysis that focuses on whether a particular private activity is a
 governmental activity, as “national” can refer to actions carried out by the government.
 This notion is strongly reinforced by international custom not only through the Articles
 on State Responsibility, but through extensive use of this analysis in regards to private
 corporations which could operate in a number of countries.
            To that end, contrary to the premise of the main outer space agreements, the
 Articles on State Responsibility fundamentally proscribes against using the jurisdiction
 of a State as the sole means of attributing private conduct to that State. It is this
 proscription that has led to a more detailed analysis of State attribution that has been
 used to evaluate the conduct of corporations associated with the State. In fact, decisions
 from international tribunals such as the International Centre for Settlement of
 Investment Disputes (ICSID), have used a basic test of “structure, control, or authority”
 to determine whether private conduct carried out by a private corporation is conduct
 attributable to the State.118
            Though the Outer Space Treaty does allow for the use of international custom to
 further interpret its application, custom surrounding outer space activities may still
 regard such activities as governmental, and thus always attributable to a particular State,
 regardless of the changing nature of the private space industry in which government
 involvement or control may be variable.119 Therefore, it is necessary that we consult

116
    See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at art. III (“States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities
    in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with
    international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international
    peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding”) (emphasis added).
117
    National, Dictionary, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/national?s=t (last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
118
    See, e.g., Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award on Jurisdiction, 5 ICSID Rep. 396
    (2000). In this case, the ICSID evaluated these factors in order to determine whether the actions of a State-
    owned entity were directly attributable to Spain in order to determine where the ICSID itself had jurisdiction
    over the investor dispute. Though this basic structure of “structure, ownership or control” would seem to
    lessen our emphasis on “control,” we must remind ourselves that structure and authority are basic rationales
    that provide deeper analysis under the general guise of control. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying
    text.
119
    See supra note 111.


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 2020]                              UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW                                         [Vol: 5:1


 other particular mechanisms of international law making in order to qualify the
 traditional notion that space activities are always attributable to one particular
 jurisdictionally appropriate State.



      3.3. IMPLEMENTING CONTROL – DOMESTIC LEGISLATION

 The current nature of the space industry characterized by the rapid privatization of space
 may still not be enough to demonstrate that space activities should not be considered
 exclusive functions of the State. Thus, because we are dependent upon the principles of
 control to determine whether the conduct of a private space company may be considered
 the action of the State, we must find another international law-making mechanism that
 may give credence to our innovative interpretation of Article VI.
            One such method that has gained ground in recent times as being instrumental
 in the development of international space law is that of incremental law making in
 which States “engage in the process of fulfilling their treaty obligations” via domestic
 legislation.120 Essentially, “[t]his means that international law grows incrementally as
 States act and react within legal lacunae.”121 This particular method of interpretation is
 particularly well-suited towards our proposed interpretation of Article VI as many States
 have implemented licensing and liability legislation in order to ensure that their private
 actors comply with international obligations imposed by the Outer Space Treaty.
            Now, the institution of regulatory legislation for outer space activities is not an
 issue. States always have a duty to ensure that entities within its jurisdiction do not violate
 the rights of other States.122 Rather, the main issue is that such legislation may be quite
 broad in order to conform the traditional interpretation of Article VI. In fact, the domestic
 space law of the both the United States and the United Kingdom assumes responsibility
 for any space activities in which it may assert its respective jurisdiction.123
            But of course, calling for a sudden narrowing of domestic space legislation may
 cause controversy as such an action, if implemented too quickly, would amount to a
 State unfairly limiting its responsibility in case of breach of an international obligation
 by a private actor. Thus, because we have demonstrated concern mainly about the
 consequences of State attribution in case of a breach, we can focus upon the gradual


120
    See Blount & Robison, supra note 34.
121
    Id. For a more detailed description of the incremental lawmaking process, see W. Michael Reisman,
    International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International Law, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1984).
122
    See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
123
    See 51 U.S.C. § 50101 (2012); Outer Space Act, c. 38 §§ 1-2 (1986).


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                    CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT


 narrowing of State legislation that focuses strictly on liability rather than legislation that
 deals with general licensing or registration procedures.
           For example, both American and French law require that launching entities
 carry a certain amount of liability insurance when launching in their respective
 territories.124 If the resulting damage exceeds the value of the required amount of
 liability, then the State government is required to pay the remaining value of damage in
 accordance with the outer space agreements’ schema of responsibility.125 In order to
 “push” the international community in viewing space activities as something other than
 a special government function, it could be possible for these States to vary amounts of
 liability coverage in order to not involve the State at all in case of damage. One might
 argue that such a method is inequitable or may reintroduce fears of forum shopping, but
 such a method only shifts responsibility for fault to a private party rather than
 automatically imputing fault to the State itself. Moreover, such shifting of reparation
 does not leave the violated party without relief – a party could seek relief in a domestic
 court of a State that has jurisdiction over a private space company or through
 international arbitration pursuant to a contract.126
           All in all, no matter how exactly a State reforms its interpretation of Article VI,
 States must adopt a narrow interpretation of State responsibility for outer space activity
 in order to allow the foundational custom surrounding state responsibility to take hold.
 Put another way, States and other subjects of international law must begin to narrow the
 application of State responsibility for outer space activities in order to yield a more
 practical, equitable, and innovative, interpretation of Article VI.




       CONCLUSION

 Despite the great advancements of private industry in outer space, we are still far from
 private space activity being a commonplace phenomenon. In retrospect, it has only been
 in this last century that private industry has become a formidable player in the realm of
 outer space. As conceded early on, many space projects are still under the direction of
 national governments who were, and still remain, the leaders of developments in outer

124
    See 51 U.S.C. § 50914 (2012); Law 2008-518 of June 3, 2008 on Space Operations, Official Gazette of France,
    available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000020719167&amp;dateTexte.
125
    See Armel Kerrest, Remarks on the Responsibility and Liability for Damages Caused by Private Activity in Outer
    Space, 40th PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 134, 137 (1997) (discussing the legal parameters of conducting
    launches from French Guyana).
126
    See id. at 136.


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2020]                     UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW                         [Vol: 5:1


space. Despite this fact, we do know that private space faring companies are indeed the
future of outer space exploration. Therefore, it is not too early to begin discussing a time
in which missions in outer space are not the special projects of national governments, but
rather a natural product of private endeavors.
        Consequently, we must begin to look towards a simple, yet thoughtful, legal
regime that accounts for the future. As demonstrated, a focus on government control in
accordance with the international customary law of State responsibility is a broad yet
sufficiently narrow analysis that is better suited towards assigning State responsibility
for outer space activities. The traditional interpretation of Article VI may serve well to
resolve past and present legal dilemmas, but the evolving nature of the space industry
presents new dilemmas that are unaccounted for in the application of the traditional
interpretation of Article VI. But ultimately, a focus on State responsibility can be
revolutionary insomuch that it not only accounts for the challenges of the future, but
also preserves the foundations of the Outer Space Treaty.




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