10.6092/issn.2531-6133/7663
At a time when there are not even negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians in order to resolve their longstanding dispute, this article seeks to explain the origins of the conflict by examining Britain’s conduct in Palestine from 1917-1948, first as an occupier, then as the responsible mandatory, under international law. Although at first sight dealing with a purely historical issue, a discussion of British conduct in Palestine is relevant at a time when the realization of a viable two-State-solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is becoming ever more urgent and concurrently less likely. This article analyses the developments in Palestine as of 1917 and the legality, in international law, of (mainly) British actions. It will be argued that British attempts at implementing the Balfour Declaration -which, as will be shown, had no standing in international law- while being occupiers of enemy territory were contrary to the Hague Regulations as acknowledged by leading British officials at the time. It will then be explained that the Palestine Mandate, as confirmed by the League of Nations’ Council, contravened Article 22 (4) of the League of Nations Covenant, and that British efforts to implement it as of 1920 -and thus four years before the peace treaty with Turkey came into force- were similarly inconsistent with the Hague Regulations. Far from believing in the legality of their actions, leading British officials and politicians were, as will be documented, well aware of their conduct’s “legal imperfections”. It will be concluded that British conduct in Palestine could rarely, if at all, claim to be accordance with the new international legal order the UK had helped to create following WWI. Repeatedly ignoring international law did not benefit the British: their rule in Palestine was to end in humiliating defeat in 1948. Almost seventy years later the world is still trying to resolve a conflict the British set in motion in 1917 with the issuance of the Balfour Declaration.
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Patrick Terry
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Britain in Palestine (1917-1948) - Occupation, the Palestine Mandate, and International Law
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Patrick Terry
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Britain in Palestine (1917-1948) - Occupation, the Palestine Mandate, and International Law
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ARTICLES & ESSAYS                                                         https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.2531-6133/7663




Britain in Palestine (1917-1948) - Occupation, the Palestine Mandate,
and International Law

                                           PATRICK C. R. TERRY †

TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Introduction; 2. The Balfour Declaration; 2.1. The Letter; 2.2.
Background; 2.3. Controversies Surrounding the Balfour Declaration; 2.3.1. The “Too
Much Promised” Land; 2.3.1.1. Sykes-Picot-Agreement (1916); 2.3.1.2. Mcmahon-
Hussein Correspondence (1915/1916); 2.3.2. International Legal Status of the Balfour
Declaration; 2.3.3. Interpretation of The Text; 3. British Occupation of Palestine (1917-
1923); 4. The Palestine Mandate; 4.1. The Mandates System; 4.1.1. Self-Determination
and President Wilson; 4.1.2. Covenant of The League of Nations; 4.1.2.1. Article 22;
4.1.2.2. Sovereignty; 4.1.2.3. Assessment; 4.1.3. President Wilson’s Concept of Self-
Determination and The Covenant; 4.2. The Palestine Mandate in Detail; 4.2.1. First
Decisions; 4.2.2. Turkey; 4.2.3. The Mandate’s Provisions; 4.2.4. The Mandate’s
Legality; 4.2.4.1. Self-Determination; 4.2.4.2. Article 22 (4) Covenant of The League of
Nations; 4.2.4.3. Other Violations of International Law; 5. Conclusion.


ABSTRACT: At a time when there are not even negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinians in order to resolve their longstanding dispute, this article seeks to explain
the origins of the conflict by examining Britain’s conduct in Palestine from 1917-1948,
first as an occupier, then as the responsible mandatory, under international law.
Although at first sight dealing with a purely historical issue, a discussion of British
conduct in Palestine is relevant at a time when the realization of a viable two-State-
solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is becoming ever more
urgent and concurrently less likely. This article analyses the developments in Palestine
as of 1917 and the legality, in international law, of (mainly) British actions. It will be
argued that British attempts at implementing the Balfour Declaration -which, as will
be shown, had no standing in international law- while being occupiers of enemy
territory were contrary to the Hague Regulations as acknowledged by leading British
officials at the time. It will then be explained that the Palestine Mandate, as confirmed
by the League of Nations’ Council, contravened Article 22 (4) of the League of Nations
Covenant, and that British efforts to implement it as of 1920 -and thus four years
before the peace treaty with Turkey came into force- were similarly inconsistent with
the Hague Regulations. Far from believing in the legality of their actions, leading
British officials and politicians were, as will be documented, well aware of their
conduct’s “legal imperfections”. It will be concluded that British conduct in Palestine
could rarely, if at all, claim to be accordance with the new international legal order the
UK had helped to create following WWI. Repeatedly ignoring international law did not
benefit the British: their rule in Palestine was to end in humiliating defeat in 1948.
Almost seventy years later the world is still trying to resolve a conflict the British set in
motion in 1917 with the issuance of the Balfour Declaration.


KEYWORDS: Palestine (1917-1948); United Kingdom; Public International Law


                                            UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW

                                                    ISSN 2531-6133

                                                     [VOL.2:2 2017]

           This article is released under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License


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           The contradiction between the letters of the Covenant and the policies of the Allies is even more flagrant in the
                                                                                         case of ‘independent’ Palestine. . .
           What I have never been able to understand is how it can be harmonized with the declaration, the Covenant, or
                                                                        the instructions to the Commission of Enquiry. . . 1




          1. INTRODUCTION

The conflict in Palestine is one of the most enduring in the world. To many, it
remains a mystery why the parties cannot reach a just and sensible agreement
based on international law. Some claim this is due to the conflict parties’
“legal fundamentalism” and accuse mainly the Palestinian Arabs of constantly
reverting to legal arguments, thereby making compromise impossible. 2 This
article, however, will show that the Palestinian Arab position is more
understandable when Palestine’s history under British rule is considered.

          Although it is true that a just solution for the future cannot be found by
dwelling on the past, it seems obvious that if wrongs committed are not at
least acknowledged during negotiations the party subjected to them -in this
case, the Palestinian Arabs- will continue to perceive any solution as unjust.
Furthermore, ignoring past illegal actions does nothing more than highlight
the weakness of the contrary legal arguments, and can only increase distrust
on the part of those to whose disadvantage such a course of action is.

          Beginning with the Balfour Declaration in 1917, and ending with the
recognition of the State of Israel in 1948, virtually all the steps undertaken by
Britain were contrary to the international legal order it had helped create.
Palestinian Arabs suffered the consequences of British actions, which
culminated in the creation of a new state. The statements accompanying these
actions, however, stressed their legality or, more commonly, ignored legal
issues.

          The story of Palestine and international law begins in the First World
War. Palestine, still under Ottoman rule at that time, became the “too much


†
  Patrick C. R. Terry is a Professor of Law at the University of Public Administration in Kehl
(Germany). A similar version of this article was published previously in the Ukrainian Yearbook of
International Law 2009 (year of publication: 2014). All URLs were last accessed on 6th May 2017.
1
  British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour in a Memorandum (dated 11st August 1919) to Earl
Curzon; extracts reprinted in Doreen Ingrams, Palestine Papers 1917-1922, Seeds of Conflict, London:
John Murray Publishers Ltd. (1972), 73 (PRO. FO. 371/4183).
2
  See JOHN STRAWSON, PARTITIONING PALESTINE, LEGAL FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI
CONFLICT (2010).



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promised land”.3 Britain and France had agreed it would be under an
international regime in the event of victory, while the British might have
promised the Arabs that Palestine or parts of Palestine would be included in an
independent Arab state. Moreover, the British government “viewed with
favour” the establishment of a “Jewish national home” there.

         Britain, having become reliant on the Suez Canal as a vital transport
link, mainly wanted to create a reliable European outpost near the Canal by
establishing such a “homeland” and hoped that by gaining Jewish favour the
outcome of the First World War could be influenced in a positive way. The
United Kingdom did not achieve these objectives. Far from creating a stable
outpost near the Suez Canal, Britain, burdened by having made too many
contradictory promises, would scramble to remain in control of Palestine. After
thirty years of futile attempts at restoring order, Britain, in 1947, at last
acknowledged its defeat.

         This sorry story began in 1917. Following Palestine’s occupation Britain
went on to assure itself of the Palestine Mandate, based on the newly
developed mandates system. Irreconcilable promises and safeguards in the
Mandate soon meant that Britain was having ever more difficulties in adhering
to its provisions. The attempt at remaining within the terms laid down after
the First World War finally was abandoned in the late 1930s, when it proved
too arduous for Britain to keep unrest at bay.

         This article will demonstrate that none of the major British actions in
Palestine was consistent with international law. After briefly explaining and
interpreting the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and showing that it had no
standing in international law, the British regime of occupation in Palestine will
be examined. First attempts at implementing the Balfour Declaration as of
1920 will be shown to have been contrary to the 1907 Hague Regulations to
which Britain was a party.

         Following an analysis of the mandates system conceived by the
victorious First World War Allies, which will illustrate why that system fell
short of U.S. President Wilson’s much heralded principle of self-determination,

3
  A. E. Prince, The Palestine Impasse, 1 INT’L J. 122, 125 (1946); Robert Gale Woolbert, Pan Arabism and
the Palestine Problem, 16 FOREIGN AFF. 309, 311 (1938).



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the Palestine Mandate will be examined in some detail. It will be argued that
the terms of that mandate could not be reconciled with Article 22 (4) of the
Covenant of the League of Nations (hereinafter the Covenant).

           By 1947, the British had realized they would not be able to fulfil their
obligations. Various earlier U-turns based on contradictory commission reports
had foreshadowed this result. In the end, violating international law had
become the norm. Nevertheless, this course of action had not benefitted
Britain, instead culminating in a humiliating defeat.

         It should be noted that this article will not deal extensively with historic
Arab and Jewish claims and counter-claims on Palestine, which frequently go
back thousands of years,4 as these can -at best- be described as providing a
“dubious prescriptive right” in international law,5 or, more accurately, as not
providing any legal entitlement at all.6 Furthermore, this article does not deal


4
  For a more detailed look at these claims, see: Carsten Wieland, “Thousands of Years of Nation-
Building? Ancient Arguments for Sovereignty in Bosnia and Israel/Palestine” in NATION BUILDING BETWEEN
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, BADEN-BADEN: NOMOS VERLAGSGESELLSCHAFT
81, 86-97 (Henriette Riegler ed., 2005); see also John A. Collins, Self-Determination in International
Law: The Palestinians, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 137, 155 (1980); (he briefly describes Jewish claims
going back to 1800 B.C. (Abraham) and Arab claims relating to the Canaanites, dating back to
about 3000 B.C.); Prince, supra note 3, at 122-123; ELI MURLAKOV, DAS RECHT DER VÖLKER AUF
SELBSTBESTIMMUNG IM ISRAELISCH-ARABISCHEN KONFLIKT 35-38 (1983).
5
  Felix Frankfurter, The Palestine Situation Restated, 9 FOREIGN AFF. 409, 411 (1931) (it should be
noted that Frankfurter was President of the American Zionist Organization).
6
  The King-Crane Commission, sent to the Middle East by the United States in 1919 in order to
determine what local feeling was, pointed out: “For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist
representatives, that they have a "right" to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand
years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.”; see Recommendations of the King-Crane-
Commission, para. 5 (Aug. 28, 1919),
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/crane.html; similarly, the I.C.J. in a case
concerning title to islands off the coast of Jersey, declared, referring to a judgment from 1202
France was relying on: “To revive its legal force to-day by attributing legal effects to it after an
interval of more than seven centuries seems to lead far beyond any reasonable application of legal
principles”; later on in the judgement the court added: “What is of decisive importance, in the
opinion of the Court, is not indirect presumptions deduced from events in the Middle Ages, but the
evidence which relates directly to the possession of the Ecrehos and Minquiers groups”; see also
The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v. United Kingdom), Judgment, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 57
(November 17); Lord Curzon (at the time British Foreign Secretary), responding to a draft of the
Palestine Mandate, in a minute of 6th August1920: “I do not myself recognise that the connection
of the Jews with Palestine, which terminated 1200 years ago, gives them any claim whatsoever. On
this principle we have a stronger claim to parts of France.”; reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at
98 (PRO. FO. 371/5245); VICTOR KATTAN, FROM COEXISTENCE TO CONQUEST: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1891-1949, at 50-52 (2009); J.B. McGeachy, Is it Peace in
Palestine?, 3 INT’L J. 239, 241 (1948); Collins, supra note 4, at 156; JEREMY SALT, THE UNMAKING OF THE
MIDDLE EAST: A HISTORY OF WESTERN DISORDER IN ARAB LANDS 124 (2009); Phillip J. Gendell & Paul G.
Stark, Israel: Conqueror, Liberator, or Occupier Within the Context of International Law, 7 SW. U.L. REV.
206, 216 (1975); they seem to disagree. Without offering any explanation, they assume that there
was a legal right of self-determination prior to the Second World War; they claim that this “most
important concept” was “the right of the Jewish People to self-determination within the confines
of the historical land of Israel”; Murlakov, supra note 4, at 50; he argues that the historical



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with the legality of the creation of the State of Israel against the backdrop of
the situation in Palestine in mid-1948.7




         2. THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

   2.1. THE LETTER

The so-called Balfour Declaration is actually a letter by the British Foreign
Secretary addressed to a prominent supporter and benefactor of the Zionist
movement, Lord Rothschild, dated November 2nd, 1917.

         Its contents are as follows:

          Dear Lord Rothschild,

          I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty’s
          Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish
          Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by,
          the Cabinet:

          His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in
          Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their
          best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being
          clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice
          the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in



connection of the Jews to Palestine justifies the realization of their right of self-determination
there. This frequently repeated argument is to b+e rejected. Authors who put forward this
argument invariably justify the treatment of the Palestinian Arabs on the grounds that there was
no legal right of self-determination at that time (a notion supported here). It then, however,
seems contradictory to base Jewish claims to Palestine on such a right. Furthermore, accepting the
“historical connection” argument in international law would self-evidently lead to chaos, as many
borders worldwide would have to be redrawn. It also seems obvious that religious notions should
not determine international law, as there are five “world religions”, apart from many others, that
would have to be respected. Furthermore, the fact the Zionist movement even contemplated
alternatives, such as Argentina or Uganda, undermines the argument. These arguments also
militate against accepting Sol M. Linowitz’s argument in Sol Myron Linowitz, Analysis of a
Tinderbox: The Legal Basis for the State of Israel, 43 AM. B. ASS’N J. 522, 524 (1957) who -based on
ancient history- argues that the Jews were “deprived” of their “sovereignty by force” and had
“never renounced it”.
7
  See JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 62 (1987); he makes a similar point when
he states: “The meaning of the Balfour Declaration, the validity of the Partition Plan approved in
Resolution 181 (II), and the moral basis of the State of Israel are still a cause for debate. However,
this debate does not affect Israel’s position as a State in the international community...”; see also
JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 120-21
(2010).



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           Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
           other country.

           I would be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the
           knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

           Yours, Arthur James Balfour8




    2.2. BACKGROUND

Many developments during the First World War came together to facilitate the
adoption of this pro-Zionist statement by the British government. Its approval
of Zionist aspirations was mainly due to two rather different considerations:
the religious beliefs of many of the decisive politicians, 9 and, more
importantly, strategic concerns in the context of the First World War and its
aftermath.10

         Many of the most influential supporters of Zionism were ardent
Protestants.11 Balfour and the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, were “brought up
on the Bible” and -similar to Christian fundamentalists in the United States
nowadays- believed the return of the Jews to Palestine was inevitable.12 These
strongly held beliefs led them to be natural supporters of Zionist aspirations. 13




8
   “The Balfour Declaration”,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents
/1682961.stm>.
9
   Frankfurter, supra note 5, at 413 (he mentions “the sway that the Old Testament and thereby
Palestine exercised over British imagination” as one of the motives for British policies in
Palestine); see also ANTHONY PARSONS, FROM COLD WAR TO HOT PEACE: UN INTERVENTIONS 1947-1995, at
3 (1995); Salt, supra note 6, at 123; DAVID FROMKIN, A PEACE TO END ALL PEACE: THE FALL OF THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 267-68, 274, 283, 298 (2000);
Ingrams, supra note 1, at 5; Kattan, supra note 6, at 70; Strawson, supra note 2, at 28; Avi Shlaim,
Israel and Palestine, London: Verso (2009), 11; JOHN KEAY, SOWING THE WIND: THE MISMANAGEMENT OF
THE MIDDLE EAST 1900-1960, at 79, 82 (2004).
10
    See Herbert Louis Samuel, Alternatives to Partition, 16 FOREIGN AFF. 143 (1937); Chaim Weizmann,
Palestine’s Role in the Solution of the Jewish Problem, 20 FOREIGN AFF. 324, 336 (1941); ALAIN GRESH, DE
QUOI LA PALESTINE EST-ELLE LE NOM?” 63 (2010).
11
    See Ilan Pappe, Clusters of history: US involvement in the Palestine Question, 48 RACE & CLASS 1, 3-8
(2007); (he describes the pro-Zionist influence of leading Protestants in America as early as the
late nineteenth century, based on ideas derived from Scottish and Irish Protestants).
12
    See KENNETH YOUNG, ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR 387-88 (1963); Fromkin, supra note 9, at 267-268,
274, 283, 298; Ingrams, supra note 1, at 5; Gresh, supra note 10, at 66-67 (he refers to the South
African Smuts’ religious beliefs; General Smuts was a member of the Imperial War Cabinet and
instrumental in developing the whole concept of the mandates system); MARGARET MACMILLAN,
PEACEMAKERS: SIX MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 425-26 (2002).
13
    Young, supra note 12, at 387-388; Fromkin, supra note 9, at 267-268, 274, 283, 298.




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Nevertheless, for most of the project’s supporters, political reasons were
decisive. Some had the suspicion that Jews had enormous influence within the
Ottoman Empire, especially among the Young Turk movement. 14 Many also
thought that Jewish Russians might be decisive in keeping Russia in the war in
support of the allies before and after the Tsar had been overthrown: 15

           It is clear that at that stage His Majesty’s Government were mainly
           concerned with the question of how Russia . . . . was to be kept in the
           ranks of the Allies . . . . The idea was that such a declaration [of
           sympathy for Jewish national aspirations] might counteract Jewish
           pacifist propaganda in Russia.16

Moreover, some believed that Jewish Americans might persuade the US
Government to enter the war, and that this subsequently might persuade some
of the wealthy among them to support the Allied cause financially: 17 “It was
supposed that American opinion might be favourably influenced if His
Majesty’s Government gave an assurance that the return of the Jews to
Palestine had become a purpose of British policy.” 18


14
   Fromkin, supra note 9, at 92; Kattan, supra note 6, at 70-71; see also JONATHAN SCHNEER, THE
BALFOUR DECLARATION: THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 153-154 (2010).
15
   Fromkin, supra note 9, at 286-288, 296; Quigley, supra note 7, at 13; Kattan, supra note 6, at 70-
71, 75-76; Schneer, supra note 14, at 153-154, 214; Shlaim, supra note 9, at 9; see also FRANK OWEN,
TEMPESTUOUS JOURNEY: LLOYD GEORGE, HIS LIFE AND TIMES 427 (1954); Macmillan, supra note 12, at
427.
16
   William Ormsby-Gore, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a 1922
Memorandum (on the origins of the Balfour Declaration) for Winston Churchill, then Secretary of
State for the Colonies; extracts reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 7-8 (PRO. CAB. 24/158). In a
Memorandum by Ronald Graham, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Lord
Hardinge, this view is expressed as follows: “We ought therefore to secure all the political
advantage we can out of our connection with Zionism and there is no doubt that this advantage
will be considerable, especially in Russia . . . . ”; reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 8 (PRO. FO.
371/3058). Fears remained even after the war: during a meeting of the Eastern Committee on
December 5th, 1918, the Director of Military Intelligence, General Macdonogh, declared that he
had heard that “if the Jewish people did not get what they wanted in Palestine we should have the
whole of Jewry turning Bolsheviks and supporting Bolshevism in all the other countries as they
have done in Russia . . . .”; reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 50 (PRO. CAB. 27/24).
17
   See William Ormsby-Gore, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a 1922
Memorandum (on the origins of the Balfour Declaration) to Winston Churchill, then Secretary of
State for the Colonies, supra note 16; Fromkin, supra note 9, at 286-288, 296; Quigley, supra note 7,
at 14; see also Günther Weiß, Die Entstehung des Staates Israel Teil 1, 13 ZAöRV 146, 146-172 (1950);
JEAN ALLAIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CLOSER TO POWER THAN JUSTICE 76 (2004);
Parsons, supra note 9, at 3; Kattan, supra note 6, at 70-71, 75-76; Schneer, supra note 14, at 154-
155; Shlaim, supra note 9, at 9; Owen, supra note 15, at 426, 427; Macmillan, supra note 12, at 427.
18
   William Ormsby-Gore, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a 1922
Memorandum (on the origins of the Balfour Declaration) for Winston Churchill, then Secretary of
State for the Colonies; supra note 16. In a meeting of the War Cabinet on 3rd September 1917,
during a debate on whether to proceed with the Declaration, the Acting Foreign Secretary, Lord
Cecil, declared that “there was a very strong and enthusiastic organization, more particularly in
the United States, who were zealous in this matter, and his belief was that it would be of most



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During a debate in the House of Commons, Winston Churchill partly confirmed
this analysis of British motives:

           They [the pledges] were made because it was considered they would
           be of value to us in our struggle to win the War. It was considered
           that the support which the Jews could give us all over the world, and
           particularly in the United States, and also in Russia, would be a
           definite palpable advantage.19

These assumptions were based on unfounded illusions and rumours; 20
however, they were decisive in persuading a majority of the British cabinet to
support the issuance of the Balfour Declaration.

         Other strategic concerns seem more rational. Realizing the Suez Canal’s
potential for trade, and recognizing Palestine as a vital link in the route
between the British possessions in Africa and India via the British-dominated
Egypt, some politicians believed that it might be useful to have a “European
people” -and the prospective Jewish settlers were, of course, mostly
European- settle in Palestine post-victory. Generally, Arabs were seen as less
trustworthy.21 Ronald Storrs, Military Governor in Palestine as of 1917,
described this policy as creating “a little loyal Ulster in the heart of a
fundamentally hostile Arabia.”22 Furthermore, Palestine was viewed as an ideal
buffer between any other foreign presence in the Middle East and Egypt with
its canal:23


substantial assistance to the Allies to have the earnestness and the enthusiasm of these people
enlisted on our side.”; extracts reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 10 (PRO. FO. 23/4); also
quoted in Quigley, supra note 7, at 14.
19
   Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies, during a debate in the House of Commons
on 4th July 1922; Hansard, Commons Sitting, ser 5 vol 156, Colonial Office, cc221-343, c329; (July
4, 1922).
20
   Shlaim, supra note 9, at 10-11; Kattan, supra note 6, at 75; Schneer, supra note 14, at 152-153,
343, 366.
21
   Allain, supra note 17, at 77; Parsons, supra note 9, at 3; Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the Middle
East Situation, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 12 (1968); Salt, supra note 6, at 123; KONRAD W. WATRIN,
MACHTWECHSEL IM NAHMEN OSTEN: GROSSBRITANNIENS NIEDERGANG UND DER AUFSTIEG DER VEREINIGTEN
STAATEN 1941-1947, at 58-59, 66 (1989); Fromkin, supra note 9, at 281, 295; Kattan, supra note 6,
at 64, 70-71; Gresh, supra note 10, at 48-49, 57, 62-63; JAMES BARR, A LINE IN THE SAND: BRITAIN,
FRANCE AND THE STRUGGLE THAT SHAPED THE MIDDLE EAST 56 (2011); see, e.g., ANTONY ANGHIE,
IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141-44 (2005) (more generally on
the European economic interests behind the establishment of the mandates system).
22
   Ronald Storrs, quoted in Keay, supra note 9, at 195; Weizmann is alleged to have described a
future Jewish Palestine as an “Asiatic Belgium” (Macmillan, supra note 12, at 427).
23
   Shlaim, supra note 9, at 9; Ingrams, supra note 1, at 36; Kattan, supra note 6, at 30, 38-39; Keay,
supra note 9, at 81, 195, 244; Gresh, supra note 10, at 57, 62-63; Gresh views the Declaration partly
as a British attempt to extricate itself from its obligations towards France arising from the Sykes-



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           Palestine adjoins the Sinai Peninsula, the Suez Canal, and Akaba,
           and a British railway from Akka-Haifa to Iraq would traverse
           Palestine in its first section. It is therefore a British desideratum
           that   if   the   effective   government      of   Palestine      demands          the
           intervention of a single outside power in its administration, that
           Power should be either Great Britain or the United States . . . .24

The consequences for the Muslim and Christian Arabs -who formed the vast
majority of the population-25 of creating a Jewish national home in Palestine,
did not figure prominently among British politicians’ concerns. 26 As the Prime
Minister, Lloyd George, later put it: “We could not get in touch with the
Palestinian Arabs as they were fighting against us.”27

         Their “religious and civil rights” were protected in the Declaration, but
not much more thought was given to local reaction. Since at the time Arab
states did not exist in the area ruled by the Ottomans, some politicians might
have convinced themselves that the putative independent Arab state(s) would
be getting so much territory that the Arabs ultimately would be indifferent to
the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine.28



Picot-Agreement of 1916; a point also made by Wright, supra note 21, at 12; Barr, supra note 21, at
56; Macmillan, supra note 12, at 427.
24
   Arnold Toynbee (Political Intelligence Department at the Foreign Office) in a memorandum of
October 1918; extracts reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 40-41 (PRO. FO. 371/4368); similar
sentiments were expressed by the Minister without Portfolio, Chamberlain, during a meeting of
the War Cabinet on 15th August 1918: “With regard to Mesopotamia, Palestine and East Africa, the
question resolved itself into one of the security of the British Empire and of its allies.”; reprinted
in Ingrams, ibid, 38-40 (PRO. FO. 800/221). During a meeting on 10th September 1919, General
Shea pointed out that “from the point of the air he thought it essential to have Palestine. The
necessity of this was to break up an air attack on the Suez Canal.”; Minutes reprinted in Ingrams,
ibid, 75-78 (PRO. CAB. 21/153).
25
   On 6th December 1918, Sir Gilbert Clayton, Chief Political Officer Egyptian Expeditionary Forces,
estimated the population in Palestine to be as follows: “Moslems 512,000; Christians 61,000; Jews
66,000”; reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 43-44; Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Self-
Determination and the Palestinians, 65 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 31, 35 (1971) (90%); Ilan Dunsky, Israel, the
Arabs, and International Law: Whose Palestine Is It, Anyway?, 2 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 163, 168 (1993)
(85%); Prince, supra note 3, at 125 (90%).
26
   In a record of a meeting between the British Foreign Secretary Balfour and the leader of the
British Zionists, Chaim Weizman, on 4th December 1918, it is stated that “Mr Balfour agreed that
the Arab problem need not be regarded as a serious hindrance in the way of the development of a
Jewish National Home.”; reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 46 (PRO. FO. 371/3385); Fromkin,
supra note 9, at 297.
27
   Lloyd George; quoted in Fromkin, supra note 9, at 297; the Military Governor in Palestine as of
1917, Ronald Storrs, later remarked: “The Declaration . . . took no account of the feelings or desires
of the actual inhabitants of Palestine.” [in:Sir Ronald Storrs, Orientations 352 (1943)].
28
   See SAMI HADAWI, PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND LOSSES IN 1948, at 6-9 (1988); he demonstrates how
ridiculous such an assumption was, when he details resistance to Zionist landowners developing
as early as the late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, even after the Second World War, this
argument was still being put forward: Abba Solomon Eban, Israel: The Emergence of a Democracy, 29



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Some, among them many Zionists, also believed that the local “backward”
population could only benefit from the colonisation by a “civilized”, mainly
European people.29 It was argued repeatedly that the Arabs of Palestine would
probably become the wealthiest Arabs in the area, thanks to future Zionist
efforts.30 Colonel Meinertzhagen, British Chief Political Officer in Syria and
Palestine, probably summarized these feelings best in a report of 31st March
1920 to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon:

          It is not doubted that Zionism will and must succeed to the benefit
          of Palestine and all its inhabitants. Should the Arab, as is inevitable,
          fail to compete with a superior civilisation, and from his nature it is
          probable he will not compete, is it fair that Palestine with its
          undeveloped resources, should be refused progress because its
          inhabitants are incapable of it? The Arabs will be compelled under
          Zionism to enjoy increased prosperity and security . . . .31




   2.3. CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

Nearly everything regarding the Declaration -issued against this backdrop- is
highly controversial. Its status in international law, and the fact that Great
Britain entered into other agreements, which did or may have applied to

FOREIGN AFF. 424, 434 (1951), argues that Arab states should accept Israel as Israel only occupied
“one hundredth” of the area in which Arabs had gained independence; accord JULIUS STONE, ISRAEL
AND PALESTINE: ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS (1981); he provides the same statistics (at 16), and
concludes that any Arab right to self-determination had therefore been fulfilled (at 17-18). Some
within in the British establishment may also have deluded themselves that, no matter what they
did, the local population would prefer British rule to a return of the Ottomans. That is implied by
what Sir Valentine Chirol, one-time Times journalist and British diplomat, wrote in 1922. In
“Islam and Britain” [Sir Ignatius Valentine Chirol, Islam and Britain, 1 FOREIGN AFF. 48 (1923).] he
acknowledges Arab disappointment at unfulfilled Allied promises (at 57-58), and specifically
mentions Palestine, but goes on to state: “Hatred of the Turk as a ruler is stronger than the
tendency to sympathize with him as a brother in the Faith.”; some within the British
Establishment also accused the Arabs of “ingratitude”. The British having liberated them from the
Turks, the Arabs would surely “not begrudge that small notch [Palestine].”; Macmillan attributes
this statement to Foreign Secretary Balfour (supra note 12, at 432).
29
   Frankfurter, supra note 5, at 409-413, 415 (Frankfurter states that “no wise friend of Arab
aspirations would seek to charge the Arab with responsibility for composing the delicate religious
and racial problems in Palestine”); see also DAVID BEN-GURION, ISRAEL: YEARS OF CHALLENGE 14-15
(1964); Shlaim, supra note 9, at 11; Macmillan, supra note 12, at 431.
30
   Frankfurter, supra note 5, at 418; Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies and
on a visit to Palestine in March 1921, remarked that he believed Jewish immigration into Palestine
“will be good for the world, good for the Jews and good for the British. But we also think it will be
good for the Arabs who dwell in Palestine . . . .”; reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 118-119
(PRO. CO. 733/2); Strawson, supra note 2, at 31-32.
31
   Colonel Meinertzhagen, Chief Political Officer in Syria and Palestine, to Lord Curzon, British
Foreign Secretary, in a report of 31st March 1920 on the situation in Palestine; reprinted in
Ingrams, supra note 1, at 82-83 (PRO. FO. 371/5034).



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Palestine, has led some to view the Declaration as invalid. Due to its ambiguous
terms, attempts at interpreting the Declaration’s actual meaning have caused
even more controversies.




     2.3.1. THE “TOO MUCH PROMISED” LAND

           The Palestine position is this.32 If we deal with our commitments,
           there is first the general pledge to Hussein in October 1915, under
           which Palestine was included in the areas as to which Great Britain
           pledged itself that they should be Arab and independent in the
           future . . . . Great Britain and France -Italy subsequently agreeing-
           committed     themselves     to   an   international     administration            of
           Palestine in consultation with Russia, who was an ally at the time . .
           . . A new feature was brought into the case in 1917, when Mr.
           Balfour, with the authority of the War Cabinet, issued the famous
           declaration to the Zionists that Palestine should be the national
           home of the Jewish people . . . .33




     2.3.1.1. SYKES-PICOT-AGREEMENT (1916)

In late 1915, the British and the French began negotiations on the fate of the
Middle East in the aftermath of the First World War. Regarding Palestine, the
British representative, Sykes, and the French negotiator Picot, achieved a
compromise: two ports and a stretch of land, enabling the construction of a
railway line to Mesopotamia, should become British-administered territory,
while the rest of the territory was to be under an international regime.34 In
early 1916, both governments approved the Sykes-Picot-Agreement, but kept it
secret. The Russians, in April 1916, also agreed to the outlines of the
agreement.35



32
   Prince, supra note 3, at 125; Woolbert, supra note 3, at 311 (quote in the paragraph’s title).
33
   Lord Curzon, Lord President of the Council, member of the Inner War Cabinet and future British
Foreign Secretary, at a meeting of the “Eastern Committee” (previously the Middle Eastern
Committee) on 5 December 1918; Minutes of the meeting reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 48
(PRO. CAB. 27/24).
34
   Quigley, supra note 7, at 12-13; Kattan, supra note 6, at 40-41; Schneer, supra note 14, at 75-86;
Barr, supra note 21, at 31.
35
   Quigley, supra note 7, at 13; Schneer, supra note 14, at 80; Barr, supra note 21, at 60.




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When the British government started contemplating its expression of support
for Zionist intentions in Palestine, it was indeed the Sykes-Picot-Agreement,
and possible adverse French reaction to any such venture, that worried officials
most.36 However, Zionist supporters managed to enlist French support. On 4th
June 1917, Cambon, a leading official in the French Foreign Ministry, gave a
Zionist representative a written confirmation that France felt “sympathy” for
the     Zionist   endeavours       in   Palestine. 37   Subsequently,          the      Sykes-Picot-
Agreement no longer was seen as an obstacle to British support of Zionism.38



      2.3.1.2. MCMAHON-HUSSEIN CORRESPONDENCE (1915/1916)

As mentioned earlier, the British government never took the possibility of Arab
opposition to the Declaration seriously. Nevertheless, the correspondence of
1915/1916 between the British High Commissioner in Egypt, McMahon, and the
Sharif Hussein of Mecca -who was viewed as one of the main leaders of Arab
resistance against Ottoman rule- was to trouble the British government for
many decades, as it dealt with post-war Arab independence.39

          Indeed, it has been argued frequently that the Balfour Declaration is
invalid because the British had already promised the Arabs that Palestine
would be part of an independent Arab state’s territory. In exchange for Arab
support     against     the    Ottomans,      the    British    had     promised            the      Arabs
independence. Up to this day it is, however, highly controversial whether the
territory promised to Hussein included Palestine or not. 40

          Based mainly on a letter by McMahon of 24th October 1915, 41 many
argue that Palestine was included in the territory to be under Arab rule. 42


36
   Fromkin, supra note 9, at 291, 297; Schneer, supra note 14, at 159-160, 218-219, 232-236.
37
   Fromkin, supra note 9, at 292-293; Quigley, supra note 7, at 18; he mentions a secret agreement
between British Prime Minister Lloyd George and the French in December 1918, whereby Palestine
should be British.
38
   Young, supra note 12, at 391-392; he also mentions Foreign Office efforts to convince the French;
Schneer, supra note 14, at 86.
39
   Report of a Committee set up to consider certain correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon
and The Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 16, Cmd. 5974, (March 16, 1939),
http://www.gwpda.org/1916/mcmahon_sharif.html as evidenced by the Committee set up to
investigate the correspondence in the late 1930s); Strawson, supra note 2, at 55-56.
40
   Schneer, supra note 14, at 64, 74.
41
   For a translated version of the letter, see
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/hussmac1.html>. It is the two statements:
“The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the



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Among others, a British Foreign Secretary and various civil servants in the
Foreign Office supported that view. 43 Furthermore, in June 1922, a large
majority in the House of Lords passed a motion, which declared the Palestine
Mandate “inacceptable” because, among other things, “it directly violates the
pledges made by His Majesty’s Government to the people of Palestine in the
Declaration of October, 1915”.44 This provides a strong indication that many in
the House of Lords also believed Palestine to have been included in the
territory promised to Hussein.

         Officially, the British government always maintained that Palestine was
not part of the territory promised to the Arabs, but had instead been explicitly
excluded.45 McMahon himself,46 who is usually given credit for having


districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be
excluded from the limits demanded” and “Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is
prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the
limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca” which have led to the controversy. It has remained in
dispute whether Palestine was excluded from the area in which Arabs were to be independent or
not.
42
    See, e.g., Hillary Harry St. John Bridger Philby, The Arabs and the Future of Palestine, 16 FOREIGN
AFF. 156, 157 (1937), (he claims that only Aden was excluded from Arab independence in the
correspondence); Prince, supra note 3, at 125; implicitly Woolbert, supra note 3, at 311
(“contradictory promises during the World War”); Günther Weiß, Die Entwicklung der Palästina-
Frage seit dem Peel-Bericht, 9 ZAöRV 382, 416-17 (he offers a linguistic interpretation based on
Turkish and Arab terms for “district”, and concludes that the Arabs were justified in assuming
Palestine was included); and supra note 17, at 148; DAVID HIRST, THE GUN AND THE OLIVE BRANCH 160
(2nd ed. 1984); Allain, supra note 17, at 78; Hadawi, supra note 28, at 11-14; Watrin, supra note 21,
at 60; Strawson, supra note 2, at 3-4; Kattan, supra note 6, at 45-46, 98-111.
43
   Lord Curzon, Lord President of the Council, member of the Inner War Cabinet and future British
Foreign Secretary, at a meeting of the “Eastern Committee” (previously the Middle Eastern
Committee) on 5th December 1918; he declared that Palestine was “included in the areas as to
which Great Britain pledged itself . . . . in a general pledge to Hussein in October 1915 . . . . that
they should be Arab and independent in future”; Minutes of the meeting reprinted in Ingrams,
supra note 1, at 48 (PRO. CAB. 27/24); J. RUSSELL GAINSBOROUGH, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A
POLITICO-LEGAL ANALYSIS 5 (1986) he refers to a note on a map (Foreign Office Minute of 1918, also
mentioned by Kattan, supra note 6, at 40), PRO. FO. 371/4352, which states: “Palestine was
implicitly included in King Hussein’s original demands and was not explicitly excluded in Sir H.
McMahon’s letter of 24.10.1915. We are therefore, presumably, pledged to King Hussein by this
letter that Palestine shall be ‘Arab’ and ‘independent’”; a further memorandum, prepared by the
Political Intelligence Department at the Foreign Office in preparation for the negotiations at
Versailles states: “With regard to Palestine, H.M.G. are committed by Sir Henry McMahon’s letter
to the Sherif on October 24th, 1915, to its inclusion in the boundaries of Arab independence”; see:
Light on Britain’s Palestine Promise, THE TIMES, Apr. 17, 1964, at 15; also quoted in Kattan, supra note
6, at 38 (FO. 608/92); Quigley, supra note 7, at 11-12; Frankfurter, supra note 5, at 414-415; though
a leading Zionist, he only mentions the controversy without expressing an opinion; he only claims
it is in the Arabs’ own best interest not to rule Palestine.
44
   Hansard, Palestine Mandate, H.L. Deb. vol 50 cc994-1033, c994; (June 21, 1922).
45
   Ben-Gurion, supra note 29, at 11; Quigley, supra note 7, at 12.
46
    McMahon (in 1937); quoted in “Report of a Committee set up to consider certain correspondence
between Sir Henry McMahon and The Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 16”, 16th March 1939, Cmd. 5974,
para. 13 e, supra note 39: “I feel it is my duty to state, and I do so, definitely and emphatically, that
it was not intended by me in giving the pledge to King Hussein to include Palestine in the area in
which Arab independence was promised”.



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expressed himself as vaguely as possible in his correspondence with Hussein,
supported this view.47 In later times, nevertheless, the British government
somewhat modified its position regarding the promises made.

        In the Arab-U.K. Committee Report of 1939, the U.K. representatives
declared:

          16. Both the Arab and the United Kingdom representatives have tried
          (as they hope with success) to understand the point of view of the
          other party, but they have been unable to reach agreement upon an
          interpretation of the Correspondence, and they feel obliged to report
          to the conference accordingly.

          17. The United Kingdom representatives have, however, informed
          the Arab representatives that the Arab contentions, as explained to
          the committee, regarding the interpretation of the Correspondence,
          and especially their contentions relating to the meaning of the
          phrase “Portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of
          Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo”, have greater force than has
          appeared hitherto.

          18. Furthermore, the United Kingdom representatives have informed
          the Arab representatives that they agree that Palestine was included
          in the area claimed by the Sharif of Mecca in his letter of the l4th
          July, 1915, and that unless Palestine was excluded from that area
          later in the Correspondence it must be regarded as having been
          included in the area in which Great Britain was to recognise and
          support the independence of the Arabs. They maintain that on a
          proper construction [sic] of the Correspondence Palestine was in fact
          excluded. But they agree that the language in which its exclusion
          was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable as it was
          thought to be at the time. 48

Faced with this controversy, the British opted for a compromise regarding
Palestine, which resulted in its later partition and the creation of Trans-
Jordan. In his White Paper of 1922, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill
already outlined the partition in the following terms:


47
  Barr, supra note 21, at 22-29.
48
  “Report of a Committee set up to consider certain correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon
and The Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 16”, 16 March 1939, Cmd. 5974, paras. 16-18 (supra note 39).



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          With reference to the Constitution which it is now intended to
          establish in Palestine, the draft of which has already been published,
          it is desirable to make certain points clear. In the first place, it is not
          the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that
          during the war His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that
          an independent national government should be at once established
          in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated the
          24th October, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's
          High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sherif of Mecca, now King
          Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as
          conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and
          support the independence of the Arabs within the territories
          proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation
          made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among
          other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the
          District of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by
          His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the
          independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the
          Jordan was thus excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge.                49



The precise meaning of the McMahon-Hussein-correspondence has remained
controversial.50 The feeling of betrayal on the Arab side, caused by the differing
interpretations of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, certainly seems
justified, when it is considered that, privately, many British officials agreed
with the Arab interpretation.51

        Nevertheless, this discussion is, as far as international law is concerned,
largely irrelevant. As will be explained shortly, the fact that Palestine later was
categorized as an “A”-Mandate, and as such was subject to Article 22 (4) of the
Covenant and the Palestine Mandate (hereinafter the Mandate), makes this
controversy obsolete.52



49
   Winston Churchill, “The British White Paper”, (June 3, 1922).
50
   Schneer, supra note 14, at 64-74; Tom Segev, Mohammed und Herr Cohen, SPIEGEL GESCHICHTE 82,
83 (2011).
51
   Chirol, supra note 28, at 57; he states: “The dream of a great Arab state which the Allies
encouraged by their lavish promises during the war has vanished into thin air with the separate
mandates which Britain and France agreed to confer upon themselves”.
52
   According to Article 20 (2) of the Covenant, the obligations under the Covenant took precedence
over prior obligations that were contrary to its provisions. Member states were to extricate
themselves from such obligations. Furthermore, there are doubts as to Britain’s right to dispose of



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   2.3.2. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

This leads on to the Balfour Declaration’s status in international law. Some
have argued that it represented a binding agreement between the Allies and the
Zionists. In exchange for Zionist support during the First World War, the Allies
had agreed to provide the Jewish people with a national home. 53 The latter
contention is based on American government approval of the Declaration’s text
prior to the British government’s issuance, while the French and Italian
governments expressed their support in February and May 1918, respectively. 54

         However, there can be no doubt that the Declaration did not have any
status in international law.55 The Allies may have generally approved the text of
the Declaration. Nevertheless, as the text evidences, it is only “His Majesty’s
Government”         making      any     pledges     -whatever        their     content          may        be.
Furthermore, the British were making pledges regarding a territory they had
not even occupied at the time.56 Palestine was still Ottoman-ruled, and the
outcome of the First World War was still uncertain.57

         Moreover, states do not enter into public international law obligations
in what was formally a letter to an individual, even if that person was
prominent within the Zionist movement. 58 Furthermore, the Zionists at that


territory it had not even yet occupied, and as to Hussein’s right to represent the Arabs. In that
sense, the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence suffers from similar defects as the Declaration
(which will be explained shortly).
53
    Murlakov, supra note 4, at 59-61; W. T. Mallison Jr., The Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims to
Constitute The Jewish People Nationality Entity and to Confer Membership in it: Appraisal in
Public International Law, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983, 1002-1005 (1963) (although he limits the
obligation to Great Britain).
54
   See Palestine Royal Commission Report, July 1937, Cmd. 5479, 22, Chapter II, para. 14;
https://palestinianmandate.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/cm-5479.pdf; Leonard Stein, The Jews in
Palestine, 4 FOREIGN AFF. 415, 420 (1926); Strawson, supra note 2, at 45; Owen, supra note 15, at
428; Keay, supra note 9, at 79.
55
   Dunsky, supra note 25, at 167; Frankfurter, supra note 5, at 414 (“The Mandate explicitly recited
the Balfour Declaration . . . . Thus was the Balfour Declaration made part of the law of nations”);
Allain, supra note 17, at 73, 78; Shabtai Rosenne, Directions for a Middle East Settlement - Some
Underlying Legal Problems, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 44, 48 (1968) (“legal status . . . . may be open to
discussion”); Gendell, Stark, supra note 6, at 217; they seem to disagree.
56
   See Muhammad H. El-Farra, The Role of the United Nations vis-à-vis the Palestine Question, 33 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 68, 68 (1968); Mallison, supra note 53, at 1002; Linowitz, supra note 6, at 522;
Kattan, supra note 6, at 44; Strawson, supra note 2, at 35; Shlaim, supra note 9, at 4, 8.
57
   See DAWOUD EL-ALAMI & DAN COHN-SHERBOK, THE PALESTINE-ISRAELI CONFLICT 144 (3rd ed. 2008);
Kattan, supra note 6, 44.
58
    Strawson, supra note 2, at 35; Kattan, supra note 6, at 58-59. Even if the Declaration were
construed to be an agreement between the British and the Zionists, it would not be governed by
public international law. Its status would be similar to that of a concession granted by a state to a
private company. The Zionist organization -certainly at that time- had no status in public
international law. Regarding concessions, also see Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v.



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time were not anything approaching a majority among the Jews worldwide.
Therefore, their right to represent the Jewish world population in general must
be disputed.59

         The only conclusion can therefore be that the Balfour Declaration is
“not a legal document, and has no standing in international law.” 60




   2.3.3. INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT

Due to its vagueness, the interpretation of the Balfour Declaration has always
been extremely controversial. Although the Declaration itself never had any
“Standing in international law”, it, nevertheless, was later included in the
Mandate for Palestine, which was approved by the League of Nations. This
makes it necessary to examine more closely what was actually meant by the
phrases “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” and “it being clearly
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”.61

         Some have claimed that the wording of the Declaration can only mean
that Palestine in its entirety (including what is nowadays Jordan) was to
become the Jewish National Home, resulting in the creation of a “Jewish
Commonwealth”.62 The so-called “Safeguard Clause”, dealing with the non-


Iran), Judgement, 1952 I.C.J. Rep. 93, 111-113 (July 22). The I.C.J. declined its jurisdiction also on
the basis that the Concession granted to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. by Iran did not create any rights
as far as the United Kingdom was concerned.
59
   Mallison, supra note 53, at 1004 (also quoting Weizmann, who acknowledged that fact); see also
Anis F. Kassim, The Palestine Liberation Organization’s Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis under
International Law, 9 Dᴇɴᴠ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. & Pᴏʟ’ʏ 1, 13-14 (1980); he rightly points out that the first time
the Zionist Organization was internationally recognized as a public body was in the Mandate
which established the Jewish Agency.
60
   Dunsky, supra note 25, at 167; Mallison, supra note 53, at 1030; Mallison disagrees. He argues
that the Declaration has become part of customary international law. This position can hardly be
reconciled with his own interpretation of the Declaration (he concludes that it contained only a
“political promise clause”).
61
   “The Balfour Declaration”, supra note 8.
62
   HOWARD GRIEF, Legal Rights and Title of Sovereignty of the Jewish People to the Land of Israel and
Palestine under International Law, NATIV ONLINE (2004), http://www.acpr.org.il/English-Nativ/02-
issue/grief-2.htm; 1-12, 1, 2; Dunsky, supra note 25, at 170; Dunsky makes a related argument; he
claims that the mandates system meant that the international community had made “an explicit
decision” that the Jews “were to achieve self-determination” in the part of Palestine that was not
Trans-Jordan. This seems contradictory, given Dunsky’s argument in the previous sentence,
according to which the concept of self-determination at that time was “purely political ...and not
binding”.



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Jewish communities, is argued to obviously envisage their future minority
status within a new Jewish entity.63

        The then Prime Minister, Lloyd George, supported this interpretation -
in general terms. Before the “Peel Commission” in 1937, he declared, when
giving evidence:

          The idea was, and this was the interpretation put upon it at the
          time, that a Jewish State was not to be set up immediately by the
          Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the
          inhabitants. On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the
          time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if
          the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them
          by the idea of a national home and had become a definite majority of
          the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish
          Commonwealth.      64



On the other hand, in his White Paper of 1922, Winston Churchill, the Colonial
Secretary, had declared:

          Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the
          purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have
          been used such as that Palestine is to become "As Jewish as England
          is English." His Majesty’s Government regard any such expectation
          as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any
          time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation,
          the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population,
          language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the
          fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate
          that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National
          Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine.65

Later, when the troubles in Palestine were threatening to overwhelm Britain,
the British government sought to distance itself even further from the view
that the Balfour Declaration had created any definite obligations:




63
   Linowitz, supra note 6, at 523.
64
   Lloyd George, quoted in Palestine Royal Commission Report, July 1937, Cmd. 5479, 24, Chapter II,
para. 20; supra note 54; Shlaim, supra note 9, at 14.
65
   Winston Churchill, “The British White Paper”, supra note 49.




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           The Balfour Declaration, in itself a compromise document, was not
           expressed in definitive political terms. It was a gesture, the
           expression of a hope then existing that the Jews and Arabs would
           compose their differences and eventually coalesce into a single
           commonwealth united in Palestinian citizenship. That evolution had
           not taken place . . . .66

A literal understanding of the Declaration would seem to imply that Winston
Churchill’s interpretation -as described in his White Paper of 1922- is correct.67
Neither is a “Jewish state” mentioned in the Declaration, nor is Palestine
described as “the” Jewish National Home.                    68
                                                                 As both Shlaim and Strawson
point out, at that time the term “national home” -in contrast to the word
“state”- had no defined political or legal meaning whatsoever.69 When, on the
other hand, assessing Lloyd George’s contrary interpretation it is necessary to
bear his strong pro-Zionist bias in mind.

         Certainly, Lord Curzon, also a member of the Cabinet at the time it
passed the Declaration, and by now Foreign Secretary, took a different view
from that of the Prime Minister. When presented with a draft of the Mandate,
which included the phrase “Will secure the establishment of a Jewish National
Home      and     a    self-governing        Commonwealth”,             Curzon          responded             by
commenting: “’Development of a self-governing Commonwealth’. Surely most
dangerous. It is a euphemism for a Jewish State, the very thing they accepted
and that we disallow.70




66
   William Ormsby-Gore, Secretary of State for the Colonies, before the Permanent Mandates
Commission in 1937; Thirty-Second (Extraordinary) Session, Devoted to Palestine, Held at Geneva
from         July       30th-August          18th,        1937,          twenty-second         meeting;
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/FD05535118AEF0DE052565ED0065DDF7.
67
   Kattan, supra note 6, at 5; without offering any explanation, Dunsky, however, views this
interpretation as “unlikely” (supra note 25, at 173).
68
   Collins, supra note 4, at 157; Kattan, supra note 6, at 59-63; Strawson, supra note 2, at 36;
Shlaim, supra note 9, at 14, 23.
69
    Shlaim, supra note 9, at 14 (“never clearly defined and . . . . no precedent in international law”);
Strawson, supra note 2, at 36 (“it [the term ‘national home’] was unknown in international law”
and “in political discourse”); Kattan, supra note 6,at 61-62; he agrees, and goes on to argue that
the Zionist drafters of the first version of the Declaration deliberately avoided the term “state”,
because they realized that any such commitment would be rejected by the British government.
70
   Comment by Lord Curzon on a draft of the Mandate, March 1920; reprinted in Ingrams, supra
note 1, at 94 (PRO. FO. 371/5199); Eric Forbes Adam (Diplomatic Service) responded to this
comment on 18th March 1920, by stating that “the use of the phrase did not, to our mind, imply
any acceptance in the mandate of the Jewish idea that the Palestinian state set up by the mandate
would ever become a Jewish state”; reprinted in Ingrams, ibid, 94-95 (PRO. FO. 371/5199).



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In the ensuing discussion, Curzon went on to point out that the creation of a
Jewish State, if included in the Mandate, was “Contrary to every principle upon
which we have hitherto stood, I at any rate cannot accept it.” 71

         Further illumination is provided when the draft “Declarations” not
adopted by the British government before the Balfour Declaration was issued
are examined. The British cabinet actually had already rejected four previous
drafts before approving the Balfour Declaration on 31st October 1917. 72 The first
draft (July 1917), prepared by Zionists, was comparatively straightforward. It
provided that the British government “accepts the principle that Palestine
should be reconstituted as the National Home of the Jewish people”. 73 No
safeguard clause was included. The second draft (August 1917), authored by
Balfour, was more or less identical to the Zionist draft. Milner’s third draft
(August 1917) already included a much weaker statement which declared that
the British government “accepts the principle that every opportunity should be
afforded for the establishment of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine”.
However, a safeguard clause still was not included.

         By the time the fourth draft (the so-called “Milner-Amery Draft”) was
presented on 4th October 1917, the original, Zionist proposal had been
“watered down” considerably.74 In it, the British government only “viewed
with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
race”. For the first time a safeguard clause protecting the “non-Jewish
communities’” rights was included. 75 With two minor amendments this fourth
draft was to become the Balfour Declaration.

         It is therefore understandable that the Zionist leader Dr Weizmann
described the Milner-Amery draft, more or less identical to the Declaration, as
a “painful recession”;76 a comment which cannot be easily reconciled with the


71
   Response by Lord Curzon to minutes prepared by Eric Forbes Adam, 19 March 1920; reprinted in
Ingrams, supra note 1, at 95 (PRO. FO. 371/5199).
72
   For the text of all four drafts, see: Lᴇᴏɴᴀʀᴅ Sᴛᴇɪɴ, Tʜᴇ BᴀʟFᴏᴜʀ Dᴇᴄʟᴀʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, 664 (ACLS Humanities E-
Book 2008) (1961); for evidence of the discussions within the British Cabinet, also see: Ingrams,
supra note 1, at 7-18; Kattan, supra note 6, at 59-63; Strawson, supra note 2, at 29-30; Schneer,
supra note 14, at 334-336, 339-341.
73
   Ingrams, supra note 1, at 9.
74
   Mallison, supra note 53, at 1014; Kattan, supra note 6, at 62-63.
75
   Ingrams, supra note 1, at 12-13 (PRO. CAB. 23/4).
76
   Dr Chaim Weizmann, as quoted by Mallison, supra note 53, at 1013; and Kattan, supra note 6, at
61; Fromkin, supra note 9, at 297; Fromkin describes the final version as a “much diluted” version



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arguments put forward by those who claim that the Balfour Declaration had
clearly promised the Zionists the creation of a Jewish state. The British
government only “favoured” the establishment of “a” national home for the
Jews. Any “reconstitution” of such a home that might have implied
acknowledgement of ancient Jewish rights was not mentioned, and, finally, the
safeguard clause in favour of the “non-Jewish communities” was included.77

         Considering this evolution of the Balfour Declaration, it becomes clear
that the British cabinet in its totality -no matter what Lloyd George’s and
Balfour’s intentions had been- was at pains to avoid any precise legal
obligations, and certainly did not want to guarantee the future establishment
of a Jewish State or Commonwealth in Palestine. 78 Obviously, the British
government would not have wished to antagonize the local inhabitants
unnecessarily at a time when the planning for a British invasion of Palestine
was in its last stages.79

         Schneer adds another                twist. According to him, leading British
politicians were actually willing to drop the pledges in the Balfour Declaration
towards the end of the First World War. In an effort to persuade Turkey to
desert the Central Powers, negotiations with individual Turkish politicians
ensued in early 1918, during which Lloyd George seemed willing to grant
Turkey at least nominal sovereignty over Palestine.80 That is why Schneer has


and claims Weizmann was unhappy with the result.
77
   Strawson, supra note 2, at 36.
78
   Allain, supra note 17, at 79; Owen, supra note 15, at 427, 428; he (a “George Lloyd” Liberal M.P.
in 1929, and biographer of Lloyd George) points out that “rifts” developed in the War Cabinet as
far as the Declaration was concerned which were to continue for a long time afterwards. One of
the consequences being that the Declaration did not answer the question what British policy
actually was; see Norman Bentwich, The Mandate for Palestine, 10 BRIT. Y.B INT’L L. 137, 139 (1929),
he states: “A national home connotes a territory in which a people, without receiving the rights of
political sovereignty, has, nevertheless a recognized legal position . . . .”; this statement by
Bentwich is quoted by Frankfurter (President of the American Zionist Organization), and described
as the comment of a “leading authority” (supra note 5, at 417); Omar M. Dajani, Stalled Between
Seasons: The International Legal Status of Palestine During the Interim Period, 26 Dᴇɴᴠ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. & Pᴏʟ’ʏ
27, 36-37 (1997); Mallison, supra note 53, at 1018; Mallison describes the Declaration as “having a
very restricted political meaning”; Grief, supra note 62, at 2; Grief disagrees. Without providing
any evidence, he argues that the British Cabinet had meant a “state” when it used the term
“Jewish National Home”- a state that encompassed all of Palestine. However, there are only few
who share Grief’s extreme interpretation. Rather, the fact that the Holy Sites were situated in
what was then Palestine makes it highly unlikely that the British Cabinet would have agreed to a
Jewish state being created that was identical to Palestine (This assertion does, however, not
necessarily preclude the argument -opposed here- that some kind of Jewish state was envisaged
in Palestine, see above).
79
   Mallison, supra note 53, at 1014; Kattan, supra note 6, at 255.
80
   Schneer, supra note 14, at 347-361.




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concluded that Palestine, in fact, was promised “four times”. 81 Nothing came
of these negotiations, but the episode certainly does demonstrate that leading
British politicians were not inhibited by any commitments undertaken in the
Balfour Declaration.

         The conclusion must therefore be that the Balfour Declaration did not
include the promise of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. 82 Its content
was more in line with the original Foreign Office sentiment, which was the
establishment,        in   Palestine,      of    “a    sanctuary       for     Jewish         victims          of
persecution”.83 This view was shared within the U.S. State Department. In a
memorandum of 22 September 1947, Loy Henderson wrote to the Secretary of
State:

           We are under no obligation towards the Jews to set up a Jewish State.
           The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate provide not for a Jewish
           State but for a Jewish national home. Neither the United States nor
           the British Government has ever interpreted the term “Jewish
           national home” to be a Jewish national state.84

Nevertheless, and undoubtedly, a promise to allow Jewish immigration into
Palestine in the case of British occupation was made.

         How the British government wanted to reconcile the creation of a
Jewish national home with its desire not to prejudice the existing “non-Jewish
communities’” rights remains open to question. All the indications are that the
possible consequences were not analysed in detail, and that the Balfour
Declaration was a politicians’ compromise: as vague as possible in order to
please as many as possible, if only superficially. Accordingly, Kermit Roosevelt,
a Middle East expert who worked for the C.I.A., described the Declaration’s
content as being “of the poetical obscurity of the Delphic Oracle” due to its
many “deliberate ambiguities”.85 Certainly, detailed concepts of how to proceed

81
   Schneer, supra note 14, at 368.
82
   This is further evidenced by Frankfurter’s (President of the American Zionist Organization)
comment in 1930 (supra note 5, at 415): “But authoritative Jewish demand is not for a Jewish state;
it does not ask to govern others.”; Macmillan, supra note 12, at 427-428; she points out that the
British government “insisted repeatedly” that a national home “did not mean a state”.
83
   Mallison, supra note 53, at 1012.
84
   The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State,
September 22nd, 1947; U.S. Department of State, F.R.U.S., 1947, The Near East and Africa, 1947,
1153-1158, 1157.
85
   Kermit Roosevelt, quoted in Keay, supra note 9, at 80.




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in Palestine after the war are nowhere to be found which, in turn, by 1939, had
led to eleven British commissions having been sent to Palestine in order to
figure out how to reconcile the conflicting aims of the Balfour Declaration. 86 In
the end, Britain could only acknowledge its failure to do so. Lord Cecil was to
be proved right in his prediction, made during a discussion on who should
administer Palestine, that “whoever goes there will have a poor time.” 87




         3. BRITISH OCCUPATION OF PALESTINE (1917-1923)

By Christmas 1917, the British had occupied Jerusalem. General Sir Edmund
Allenby placed the area under military administration. Military rule in the
“Occupied Enemy Territory” lasted until 30th June 1920.88 Regarding Jewish
immigration into Palestine, a ban was in place, which the Ottoman rulers had
imposed.89 However, Hebrew immediately became one of Palestine’s official
languages, which caused an influx of Jewish inhabitants into the local civil
service.90 In Britain, meanwhile, the “Zionist Commission” was set up with the
task of advising the British administration in Palestine.91 It soon became an
“Administration within an Administration.” 92




86
   Kattan, supra note 6, at 44; Shlaim, supra note 9, at 17-19.
87
   Lord Robert Cecil, Assistant Secretary of State, at a meeting of the “Eastern Committee”
(previously the Middle Eastern Committee) on 5th December 1918; Minutes of the meeting
reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 48-50, 50 (PRO. CAB. 27/24).
88
   See Norman Bentwich, Mandated Territories: Palestine and Mesopotamia (Iraq), 2 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.
48, 50 (1921); see also Norman Bentwich, The Legal Administration of Palestine Under the British
Military Occupation, 1 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 139-148 (1920).
89
   A law from 1882 prohibited all foreign Jews from visiting Palestine, except as pilgrims. The sale
of land to foreign Jewish settlers was prohibited in 1883, and, in 1892, the Department of Land
Registration prohibited the sale of any land to any Jews. The laws stayed in force until the end of
the Ottoman Empire. However, they were not very successfully enforced. For more details, see:
Mim Kermal Öke, The Ottoman Empire, Zionism, And The Question of Palestine (1880-1908), 14 Iɴᴛ. J.
Mɪᴅᴅʟᴇ E. Sᴛᴜᴅ. 329-341 (1982).
89
   Storrs, supra note 27, at 302, 354.
90
   Storrs, supra note 27, at 302, 354.
91
   “Plans Zionist Commission, England will aid Repatriation of Jews and Restoration”; The New
York Times, (Feb. 13, 1918)
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf?_r=1&res=9807EED7103FE433A25750C1A9649C9
46996D6CF&oref=slogin.
92
   Letter by General Bols, Chief Administrator in Palestine, to the Foreign Office (1920); reprinted
in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 85-86 (PRO. FO. 371/5119).



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A Civil Administration took over subsequent to a Resolution passed at the San
Remo Conference93 on 25th April 1920,94 which stated that Britain should be the
mandatory power for Palestine. While the Resolution included the provisions of
the Balfour Declaration, it also noted that the terms of the mandate had to be
approved by the Council of the League of Nations. This approval was received
on 24th July 1922, and the Mandate for Palestine came into effect on 29th
September 1923. Nevertheless, based on the San Remo Resolution, the Ottoman
ban on Jewish immigration was lifted by the Civil Administration under High
Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel.

          The decision to introduce an immigration law,95 and to simplify land
transfer96 in Palestine “in anticipation of the definite granting of the Mandate”
was not simply “imperfect in its legal foundation” -as the Legal Secretary of
the Government of Palestine (later Attorney-General) Bentwich admitted in
1922.97 Rather, it contravened Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, 98 which
requires the occupier of “the territory of the hostile state” to respect “unless
absolutely prevented the laws in force of the country”. These Ottoman laws
included a ban on Jewish immigration and on transfers of land to foreign
Jews.99    In   1920,     the    Chief     Administrator        in    Palestine,         General          Bols,
acknowledged the legal difficulties:

           This Administration has loyally carried out the wishes of His
           Majesty’s Government, and has exceeded in doing so the strict




93
   The San Remo Conference was a meeting of the Allied Supreme Council (Britain, France, Italy, and
Japan). The United States insisted on not being referred to as an “ally”, but instead preferred the
term “Associated Power”. It should be noted that the United States never declared war on the
Ottoman Empire, so that it was also not represented in San Remo.
94
    For the text of the San Remo Resolution, see http://ecf.org.il/media_items/299.
95
   Immigration Ordinance (1920).
96
   See Land Transfer Ordinance (1920), Mahlul Land Ordinance (1920) and Mawet Land Ordinance (1921).
97
   Bentwich, supra note 88, at 50, 52; Berriedale Keith, Mandates, 4 J. Cᴏᴍᴘ. LᴇɢɪS. & Iɴᴛ’ʟ L., 71, 72-
73 (1922); he describes the legal situation in the “A”- Mandates in 1922 as “anomalous” due to
the lack of a peace treaty with Turkey: despite Britain’s “lack of title”, the British were
“exercising large powers of government”, irrespective of the fact that British and French rights on
Turkish territory only “rest on the fact of occupation and conquest”; Elihu Lauterpacht, The
Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law- Survey and Comment, IV,
State Territory, 6 Iɴᴛ’ʟ COMP. L. Q. 513, 514 (1957); Malcolm M. Lewis, Mandated Territories, Their
International Status, 39 L.Q. REV 458, 460 (1923) (“somewhat anomalous”).
98
   Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Convention), Oct. 18, 1907; 36 Stat. 2277.
99
     For details, see note 89; Öke, supra note 88.




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           adherence to the laws governing the conduct of Military Occupant of
           Enemy Territory, but this has not satisfied the Zionists . . . .100

In his subsequent recollections of his time in Palestine, the Military Governor
in 1917, Roland Storrs,101 was even more forthright as to the “admitted
departure from the Laws and Usages of War”: 102 “The Military Administration
notably contravened the Status quo, in the matter of Zionism . . . . For these
deliberate and vital infractions of military practice O.E.T.A. [Occupied Enemy
Territory Administration] was criticized both within and without Palestine.” 103

         Furthermore, Turkey, successor to the Ottoman Empire, never ratified
the original peace treaty, the Treaty of Sèvres of 10th August 1920. The final
peace treaty, the Treaty of Lausanne, was concluded only on 24th July 1923.
Therefore, Palestine, at the time of the enactment of the new immigration and
land transfer laws, was still “territory of the hostile state”. The British
government subsequently acknowledged that only ratification of the Treaty of
Lausanne in August 1924 “regularized the international status of Palestine as a
territory detached from Turkey and administered under a Mandate entrusted to
His Majesty's Government.”104

         That there was no “absolute” necessity to act 105 in fulfilment of the
Balfour Declaration before the League of Nations had approved the envisaged
Mandate and it had come into effect is self-evident. British measures to enable
the implementation of the Balfour Declaration, undertaken before the
ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, were therefore inconsistent with
international law.106




100
    Letter by General Bols, Chief Administrator in Palestine, to the Foreign Office (1920); reprinted
in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 85-86 (PRO. FO. 371/5119).
101
    Ronald Storrs was Military Governor of Jerusalem between 1917 and 1920, and then Civil
Governor between 1920 and 1926.
102
    Storrs, supra note 27, at 354.
103
    Storrs, supra note 27, at 301; Storrs goes on to point out that the British Administration in
Palestine was supposed to act as a “Military Government and not as Civil Reorganizers”, and
would consequently have been obliged to “administer the territory as if it had been Egypt.”
104
    Report of His Britannic Majesty’s Government on the Administration under Mandate of Palestine and
Transjordan for the year 1924, Section I (Dec. 31, 1924); for full text also see:
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/A87D21F4E57F2D0F052565E8004BACE0.
105
     Hague Convention, supra note 98, art. 43.
106
    Allain, supra note 17, at 80-81; Macmillan, supra note 12, at 435; referring to the difficulties in
concluding a peace treaty with “Ottoman Turkey”, she continues: “The British simply carried on
as though Palestine was officially theirs.”



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          4. THE PALESTINE MANDATE

      4.1. THE MANDATES SYSTEM

The introduction of the mandates system in the aftermath of the First World
War was a legal novelty,107 usually attributed to the South African General
Smuts, member of the Imperial War Cabinet.108 Although similar to a
protectorate in some respects, the mandate had unique implications as far as
the mandatory power was concerned, as specific obligations towards the
League of Nations were imposed.109

          From the outset, the mandates system was very controversial. Many,
especially in the United States, viewed the system as nothing more than a
“cloak for annexation” by the European powers. 110 Besides isolationism, this
was one of the main reasons the United States refused to take on the Palestine
Mandate -as suggested by some-, and turned down the mandate for Armenia.111




      4.1.1. SELF-DETERMINATION AND PRESIDENT WILSON

In 1916, Wilson had outlined his vision of national self-determination, when he
declared in an address to the League to Enforce Peace “that every people has a
right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live.” He emphasized
his beliefs when he added that “no peace can last or ought to last which does
not accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the

107
    Grief, supra note 62, at 1; Henry Goudy, On Mandatory Government in the Law of Nations, 1 J. COMP.
LEGIS. & INT’L L., no. 3, 1919 at 175; Keith, supra note 97, at 72; Donald S. Leeper, International Law:
Trusteeship Compared with Mandate, 49 Mɪᴄʜ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1199-1210, 1199 (1951); Lewis, supra note 97, at
458; Mark Carter Mills, The Mandatory System, 17 Am. J. Int’L. L. 50, 50-62.
108
    Based on his “Practical Suggestion” of December 1918; Anghie, supra note 21, at 119-120;
Quigley, supra note 7, at 20-22; Strawson, supra note 2, at 37-39; Owen, supra note 15, at 549.
109
    See Percy E. Corbett, What is the League of Nations?, 5 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 119, 130 (1924); Lewis,
supra note 97, at 459, 474.
110
    Mills, supra note 107, at 54; he claims that the U.S. Secretary of State Lansing shared that view;
Watrin, supra note 21, at 61; Keith, supra note 97, at 74; Keith claims that many mandatory powers’
governments assumed that the “C”-Mandates allowed “virtual annexation”, and agrees with that
assessment (at 76); 75 (American attitude); Bassiouni, supra note 25, at 34; he describes the
mandate system in Palestine as a “colonial regime”; Corbett, supra note 109, 133; Corbett cites M.
Rolin (later to be a judge at the Permanent Court of International Justice, 1931-1936) as stating that
the mandates system was a disguise for annexation; Goudy, supra note 107, at 175; Philby, supra
note 42, at 158; Philby argues that the “system of Mandates” differed “only in theory from
annexation”; Stefan Tolin, The Palestinian People and Their Political, Military and Legal Status in the
World Community, 5 N. CAROLINA. CENT. L. J. 326, 328 (1973-1974) (“colonial device”); Hadawi, supra
note 28, at 19 (“a form of colonization”).
111
     Mills, supra note 107, at 57.




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consent of the governed”, and that “no right anywhere exists to hand peoples
about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property.” 112

         In his address to a Joint Session of Congress in January 1918, President
Wilson then announced his famous “Fourteen Points”, which he deemed to be
the “only possible program” for the “world’s peace”. 113 In six of the fourteen
points, Wilson dealt with aspects of self-determination. In particular,
regarding “colonial claims”, he maintained that “the interests of the
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the
government”.114 As far as the non-Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire were
concerned, they were to enjoy “an absolutely unmolested opportunity of
autonomous development”.115 Wilson described the principle underlying his
“Fourteen Points” as “the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities,
and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another,
whether they be strong or weak”.116

         Despite this attitude towards colonized peoples seeming innovative, it is
notable that self-determination, as envisaged in the “Fourteen Points”,
appears to be a more limited concept than in previous statements made by
President Wilson. The seemingly hierarchical distinction made between
“assuring sovereignty” -with regard to Belgium or Turkey-, “assuring
autonomous development”, as outlined in the case of non-Turkish parts of the
Ottoman Empire, and the mode for settling “colonial claims” by giving “equal
weight” to “the interests of the populations concerned” as far as other areas
are concerned, is conspicuous.117

         Soviet attitudes to self-determination should be mentioned briefly. 118
Lenin’s Decree on Peace of 26th October 1917, was much more far-reaching than

112
     President Wilson, “Civil War and Imperialism”, Encyclopedia of the New American Nation;
http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Self-Determination-Civil-war-and-
imperialism.html.
113
      “President Wilson’s Fourteen Points”, World War I Document Archive, 1-5;
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Fourteen_Points; Quigley, supra note 7,
at 16-17; Kattan, supra note 6, at 48-49; Gresh, supra note 10, at 64.
114
    Point V.
115
    Point XII.
116
    “President Wilson’s Fourteen Points”, World War I Document Archive, 4; supra note 113.
117
    Points VII and XII (Belgium and Turkey); supra note 115 (non-Turkish parts of the Ottoman
Empire); supra note 114 (colonial claims); L.C. Green, Self-Determination and Settlement of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, 65 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 40, 41-42 (1971); Quigley, supra note 7, at 17.
118
    For more details, see: Quigley, supra note 7, at 15-16; Kattan, supra note 6, at 118-119; Anghie,




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Wilson’s concept of self-determination.119 Although at that time Soviet
influence on international law’s development was minimal, it seems likely that
worries about the Bolshevist programme’s attractiveness helped persuade
European powers to be more receptive to Wilson’s more limited version of
self-determination.120




   4.1.2. COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

With President Wilson, the only true supporter of the principle among the First
World War victors, toning down his rhetoric on self-determination, it was
inevitable that –given the complete lack of enthusiasm for the concept on the
part of the victorious European powers- it would be watered down further and
only applied selectively, once the peace agreement would be negotiated.121
Indeed, the result was that the concept of self-determination would be applied
only in Europe. Conveniently, in Europe, the principle of self-determination
had the decisive advantage of seemingly justifying the dismemberment of the
Central Powers that had lost the war.122

         Non-European areas, formerly dominated by the Central Powers, on the
other hand, were deemed to require “tutelage” of varying degrees on the part
of the “advanced nations” which were, of course, generally synonymous with
the victors.123 Regarding allied or other colonial possessions, no adjustments
regarding self-rule were deemed necessary.124




supra note 21, at 139.
119
    Decree on Peace; delivered at the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies, 26th October 1917, and published by Izvestiya, (Oct. 27, 1917)
http://www.historyguide.org/europe/decree.html.
120
    Kattan, supra note 6, at 118-119; Anghie, supra note 21, at 139.
121
    Collins, supra note 4, at 140; he warns against “blithely accepting” Wilson’s and the Allied
statements on self-determination; Huntington Gilchrist, V. Colonial Questions at the San Francisco
Conference, 39 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 982, 989 (1945); he points out that even in 1945 “certain imperial
powers maintained that many colonial peoples preferred dependence”; Anghie, supra note 21, at
119-120, 139-140.
122
    Green, supra note 117, at 41; Gresh, supra note 10, at 36, 48-49.
123
    League of Nations Covenant art. 22 (2).
124
    Green, supra note 117, at 42; he points out that the United States made it plain that it “would
never concede to the local inhabitants the right of deciding upon the proposed transfer” when the
Danish West Indies became American. The Danish West Indies were sold to the United States by
way of a treaty in 1916 (Convention between the United States and Denmark, Cession of the Danish
West Indies, August 4, 1916, U.S.T. 629). The islands are now referred to as the U.S. Virgin Islands.



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      4.1.2.1. ARTICLE 22

These considerations are reflected in the Covenant of the League of Nations,
signed at the Paris Peace Conference on 28th June 1919. Its Article 22 contains
the mandates system’s “constitution”. “On behalf of the League” the
mandatory powers were to “exercise” their “tutelage” of “peoples not yet able
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world”.125
Based on the different “stages” of “development” the peoples concerned had
reached, three categories of mandates were established. 126

           The “A-Mandates”, as outlined in Article 22 (4) of the Covenant, were
applicable to “certain communities” formerly under Ottoman rule. Their
“existence as independent nations” was “provisionally” recognized. They were
to receive only “advice and assistance” until they could “stand alone”. The “B-
Mandates”, outlined in Article 22 (5) of the Covenant, were to apply especially
to “peoples of Central Africa”. They envisaged “administration” by the
mandatory power. Finally, the “C-Mandates”, outlined in Article 22 (6) of the
Covenant, were applicable to South-West-Africa and “certain South Pacific
Islands”. These areas were to be “administered under the laws” of the
mandatory powers as “integral part” of their “territory”.

           Article 22 of the Covenant further required the mandatory powers to file
annual reports on the mandated territories, established the Permanent Mandates
Commission, and set out the Council of the League’s responsibility for drafting
the mandate’s precise terms in cases when the League of Nations had not yet
agreed on them.127




      4.1.2.2. SOVEREIGNTY

One of the most hotly debated issues surrounding the mandates system, which
has remained controversial, is where sovereignty over the mandated territories
was to reside.128 The Covenant does not provide an explicit answer, 129 which has


125
    League of Nations Covenant art. 22 (1) and (2).
126
    Id. article 22 (3).
127
    Id. article 22 (7)-(9).
128
    Mills, supra note 107, at 54; Mills points out that, during the peace negotiations, U.S. Secretary
of State Lansing repeatedly (and unsuccessfully) tried to bring to President Wilson’s attention the



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led to a proliferation of theories on the topic, 130 further complicated by the
different categories of mandate.

         There were those who concluded that the old-fashioned concept of
sovereignty was ill suited to the legal novelty of the mandates system. They
maintained that the question was unanswerable or that sovereignty was “in
abeyance”.131 Others argued that sovereignty lay with the mandatory power as
evidenced, for example, by that power’s control of the mandated territories’
foreign relations.132 Others, again, argued that the League of Nations retained
sovereignty and the mandatory was simply acting on its behalf, as evidenced
by the League’s supervisory role.133 Another school of thought adhered to the




fact that it was not clear where sovereignty would reside as far as the mandated territories were
concerned; Lauterpacht, supra note 97, at 514; Leeper, supra note 107, at 1204; Arnold D. McNair,
Mandates, 3 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 149, 158-159 (1928); T.J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
80-82 (7th ed. 1923); WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 162-163 (8th ed.
1924); Quigley, supra note 7, at 66-75; Kattan, supra note 6, at 56-58; Anghie, supra note 21, at
125-127, 133, 147-156.
129
      The fact that the issue of where sovereignty resided was not regulated explicitly in the
Covenant should, perhaps, not be surprising. Many contemporary scholars and international
lawyers would not have been unduly perturbed by this. As Craven has explained, as early as in the
nineteenth century any definition of the term “state” necessitated the explanation of a vast array
of different arrangements: “sovereign” and “semi-sovereign” states, vassals, unions,
protectorates, etc.. By the middle of the century, a minimum of eleven different categories of
states was recognized. This situation became even more complicated at the turn of the century, as
treaties with non-European states and tribes seemed to require further differentiation based on a
gradation of sovereignty. While non-European states could not be denied sovereignty completely,
without rendering the treaties European states had concluded with them invalid, it was
inconceivable to attribute to those states the kind of sovereignty European states enjoyed. Only
when such non-European states had “demonstrated their ‘civilized’ credentials” was the “badge
of imperfect membership” in the international community of sovereign states removed. As Craven
has therefore concluded, the mandates system thus merely gave this belief “institutional form”,
based as it was on the “tutelage” of the peoples in the mandates by the “advanced nations” until
they “were able to stand by themselves”see (Matthew Craven, Statehood, Self-Determination, and
Recognition, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 203, 210-214 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3rd ed. 2010).
130
     See Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 Isr. L.
Rev. 279, 282 (1968); Lawrence, supra note 128, at 80-82 (he believed there should be a case-by-
case evaluation of where sovereignty resides based on the texts of the Mandate); Hall, supra note
128, at 162-163 (he believed sovereignty over the mandates to be divided between the mandatory
power and the League of Nations); Quigley, supra note 7, at 66-75; Anghie, supra note 21, at 147-
156.
131
    Blum, ibid, 282; Leeper, supra note 107, at 1208 (“best solution”); International Status of South-
West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. Rep.128 (July 11) (separate Opinion by Sir Arnold McNair,
J.).
132
     See Lord Balfour, Statement, 18th Session of the Council, 1922, 3 League of Nations O.J. (1922)
547.
133
     Bentwich, supra note 88, at 48; he seems to be inclined to agree with this view, when he states
that the “League of Nations becomes the general guardian of three infant nations” who “delegates
the care of the minor to a Power who is termed the Mandatory”. In later articles, he seems more
doubtful, especially regarding Palestine. He repeatedly points out that the “Mandatory exercises
full power of legislation and administration”; Norman Bentwich, Nationality in Mandated Territories
Detached from Turkey, 7 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 97, 100 (1926).



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notion that sovereignty rested in the inhabitants of the mandated territories,
albeit temporarily exercised by others.134

           Many others argued that assuming shared sovereignty (in various
combinations) was the correct solution, and some argued that the answer to
the question where sovereignty rested was dependent on the category of
mandate concerned.135 The International Court of Justice (hereinafter I.C.J.), when
later dealing with mandated territories, avoided taking an unequivocal stand
on the issue.136




      4.1.2.3. ASSESSMENT

Assuming sovereignty of the mandatory powers is incompatible with the
Covenant of the League of Nations.137 Although there is no doubt that the

134
    ICJ, Legal Consequence for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J.
Rep. 16, 69 (June 21) (separate opinion by Vice-President Ammoun, J.); Judge Ammoun refers to
Stoyanovsky‘s view “of virtual sovereignty residing in a people deprived of its exercise by
domination or tutelage” as the “more accurate view”; Anghie, supra note 21, at 179-180; Corbett,
supra note 109, at 129-130 (Corbett, however, limits this to “A” mandates).
135
    McNair, supra note 128, at 159-160; he, writing in 1927/1928, argues that sovereignty was
divided between the League and the mandatory, the distribution dependent on the category of
mandate. Later, when he was a Judge at the I.C.J., he seems to have changed his mind (I.C.J.,
International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. Rep.128 (July 11) (separate
Opinion by Sir Arnold McNair, J.); Corbett, supra note 109, at 129, 134 (“A”-Mandates: sovereignty
inhabitants, some powers divided between Mandatory and League; “B” and “C” Mandates:
sovereignty divided between Mandatory and League; Palestine as a special case); Charles Henry
Alexander, Israel in Fieri, 4 INT’L L. Q. 423, 423-426 (1951); Alexander offers another explanation,
which, however, fails to convince. He argues that sovereignty with regard to the mandated
territories lay with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. He bases that on Article 118 of the
Treaty of Versailles. This theory is fraught with difficulties. The Allied Powers never claimed
sovereignty regarding the mandated territories. Moreover, referring to the problem of the
dissolution of the Supreme Council, which made the administration of any shared sovereignty
impossible, he claims that this made no difference to the legal situation. Lastly, in order to justify
his post-World War II conclusions, he implies that the “powerful nations” -and therefore
presumably the states that shared sovereignty- changed with the times. This view seems
extremely far-fetched; Leeper, supra note 107, at 1204-1205; he points out that only the United
States ever claimed that sovereignty “resided in the Allied and Associated Powers”- a view that
was so overwhelmingly rejected at the time that the United States dropped this position.
136
     See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion,
1971 I.C.J. Rep.16, 28-30 (June 21)- the I.C.J. explicitly rejected the notion that sovereignty resided
in the mandatory powers. An implicit rejection by the I.C.J. of the idea that the League of Nations
retained sovereignty over the mandated territories can be seen in the court’s statement, after
having rejected the notion that the League of Nations’ function amounted to that of a
“mandatory”: “It [the League of Nations] had only assumed an international function of
supervision and control.” (in: International Status of South-West Africa, supra note 135, at 132)
The I.C.J., however, avoided a conclusive statement on where it believed sovereignty actually did
reside.
137
    See I.C.J., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, supra note 136 (the I.C.J.



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mandatory powers exercised many sovereign functions for the mandated
territory, especially in the case of the “C”-Mandates, it is widely assumed that
the mandatory power did not have a unilateral right of annexation or territorial
adjustment.138      Furthermore,        some      argue     that    the     League          of     Nations,
theoretically at least, was empowered to withdraw the Mandate in cases of
persistent violations of the Mandate’s terms on the part of the mandatory
power.139 This cannot easily be reconciled with assuming the mandatory
power’s sovereignty.

         Further indications that sovereignty over mandated territories did not
rest in the mandatory are: a) the obligation of the mandatory powers to
provide annual reports to the League of Nation; b) the role of the Permanent
Mandates Commission in supervising the mandatory power; c) the compulsory
role of the Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter P.C.I.J.); d) the
League of Nations’ Council’s -at least theoretical- role in drafting the mandates;
e) and the fact that even inhabitants of the “C”-Mandates did not become
nationals/subjects of the mandatory power. 140 Regarding “A”-Mandates -
whose “existence as independent nations” was “provisionally recognized” and
where the mandatory’s role was reduced to “advice and assistance”- the
notion that sovereignty resided in the mandatory becomes untenable. 141




rejected that notion even in the case of “C”-mandates); Lauterpacht, supra note 97, at 514; Lewis,
supra note 97, at 469, 470; McNair, supra note 128, at 151; Quincy Wright, Sovereignty of the
Mandates, 17 AM. J. INT’L L. 691, 695-696 (1923); Kattan, supra note 6, at 134-135.
138
    Corbett, supra note 109, at 134-135; Goudy, supra note 107, at 180; Quigley, supra note 7, at 66-
68.
139
    See I.C.J., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, supra note 136, at 47-50;
Goudy, supra note 107, at 180; Wright, supra note 137, at 702-703; Kattan, supra note 6, at 144-145;
Corbett, supra note 109, at 135; he disagrees, and argues there was no right of “revocation” on the
part of the League; McNair, supra note 128, at 157-158, fn. 7; he acknowledges that the issue is
“controversial”.
140
    See Norman Bentwich, Palestine Nationality and the Mandate, 21 J.COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L., no. 4,
1939 at 230; when dealing with the issue of nationality, Bentwich argues that Palestine citizens
were not British subjects, precisely because Palestine had “not been transferred” to Britain. He
points out that Palestinians do not “owe allegiance to the Crown”. This is confirmed by the fact
that the issue of Palestine nationality was dealt with in an Order in Council, dated 24th July 1925,
under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act; Bentwich, supra note 133, at 100; Leeper, supra note 107, at 1206;
Lewis, supra note 97, at 469-470; Wright, supra note 137, 695; Quigley, supra note 7, at 66-68;
Kattan, supra note 6, at 136; Anghie, supra note 21, at 151-153, 182-186 (he describes how intrusive
the questionnaires were, which the Permanent Mandates Commission sent out to the mandatory
powers annually).
141
    I.C.J., International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. Rep 132 (11 July);
Quigley, supra note 7, at 66-68.



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Discussions during the Paris Peace Conference confirm this. President Wilson,
rejecting a French proposal that differed from the mandatory system, declared
that the French proposal “implied definite sovereignty, exercised in the same
spirit and under the same conditions as might be imposed upon a mandatory”,
while the mandatory system presumed “trusteeship on the part of the League
of Nations”.142 Lloyd George described the mandates system as a “general
trusteeship”.143 Accordingly, the I.C.J. has rejected the assumption that
sovereignty was “transferred” to the mandatory even when “C”-Mandates are
concerned. With the exception of South Africa, no mandatory power ever
claimed sovereignty over the mandated territories. 144

        The League of Nations’ role regarding the mandated territories was
certainly significant.145 However, it is questionable whether that role amounted
to sovereignty over the mandated territories.146 The mandatory powers were to
provide their “tutelage” to the mandated territories “on behalf of the League”,
and the League was to perform considerable supervisory functions as already
outlined. The Permanent Mandates Commission certainly took its supervisory
tasks very seriously and adopted “the widest possible interpretation” of its
rights. The I.C.J. has repeatedly stressed the importance of these supervisory
functions.147

        Nevertheless, given the following facts, it is difficult to sustain the
argument that sovereignty over the mandated territories rested in the League:
a) the fact that the mandates system’s official goal was that all mandated
territories should become independent states; b) the fact that the question of
who should become mandatory power had already been decided by the Allies
prior to the League taking up its functions; and c) the fact that the mandatory
power only was to provide administrative assistance on the behalf of the


142
    President Wilson, U.S. Department of State, Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume 3, 765.
143
    Lloyd George, U.S. Department of State, Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 770.
144
    Leeper, supra note 107, at 1207.
145
    Lauterpacht, supra note 97, at 514; Lewis, supra note 97, at 474.
146
    For the I.C.J.’s view, see supra note 136 and Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep 29 (21 June); Leeper, supra note 107, at 1205; he
points out that the League never claimed sovereignty; Wright, supra note 137, at 697.
147
     See I.C.J., International Status of South-West Africa, supra note 141, at 136.




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League, as far as the “A”-Mandates were concerned.148 Moreover, this is
confirmed by the discussions surrounding Iraq’s future independence (the
former Mandate for Mesopotamia/Iraq) in 1931: the question of a transfer of
sovereignty from the League -for example, by way of a treaty- was never
discussed.149

         The correct view of the mandates system seems to be that sovereignty
already rested in the nations under mandate, but it was exercised temporarily
by the mandatory power under the League of Nations’ supervision on behalf of
these nations.

         Early statements made by officials in the Foreign Office regarding
Britain’s aims confirm this. In December 1918, a future member of the
delegation to the Peace Conference in Versailles described it as the
“foundation” of British policy regarding Palestine that there should be “a
Palestinian State with Palestinian citizenship for all inhabitants, whether
Jewish or non-Jewish.”150 Accordingly, citizens of “A”-Mandates, including
Palestine, not only had a nationality separate from that of the mandatory, but
actually had their own nationality.151

         Furthermore, once the mandates were in place, the mandatory powers
and third states tended to treat the mandated territories as future states, even
though the governmental functions were exercised by the mandatory. Among
other things, the mandatory powers concluded treaties with third states for the
mandated territories. The United Kingdom concluded a number of treaties on




148
     Lauterpacht, supra note 97, at 514-515; Wright, supra note 137, at 697; Quigley, supra note 7, at
66.
149
    The Permanent Mandates Commission, in September 1931, enumerated the general prerequisites
regarding the termination of a mandate (which it examined in connection with Iraq’s prospective
independence). These principles were subsequently approved by the Council of the League of Nations;
a transfer of sovereignty was not among the requirements; see Permanent Mandates Commission,
League of Nations Doc. C.830M.411 1931 VI (1927).
150
    Arnold Toynbee (Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office); Minutes of 2
December 1918; reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 43 (PRO. FO. 371/3398); furthermore, Treaty
of Peace with Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne) art. 30, Jul. 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S 11 (concluded after the
Covenant of the League of Nations had come into force) stated: “Turkish subjects habitually resident
in territory which in accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty is detached from Turkey
will become ipso facto, in the conditions laid down by local law, nationals of the State to which
such territory is transferred.”
151
    Quigley, supra note 7, at 54-58; Kattan, supra note 6, at 137.




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behalf of Palestine,152 including, in 1922, a bilateral treaty between itself and
the mandated territory.153

         Third states took a similar view of the relationship between the
mandatory power and the Mandate. In 1932, the British government sought to
grant Palestine trade concessions, and enquired of states it already had
concluded Conventions of Commerce with as to their response to such a
move.154 Spain disapproved and declared that, as far as Palestine was
concerned, “the territory in question could in no way be considered as imperial
territory, but solely as a foreign country . . . . From this point of view, it was in
a situation with regard to the mandatory power analogous to other sovereign
states.”155 In their responses the United States and Italy both insisted that
Palestine was a “foreign country” in relation to the United Kingdom, and went
on to point out that this, in their view, also applied to all the other territories
under British mandate.156

         These reactions are also in line with the                               Permanent Mandates
Commission’s view, expressed in 1937, that the “Palestinians formed a nation,
and that Palestine was a state, though provisionally under guardianship.”157
The Chairman of the Commission, when responding to an Iraqi statement on
unrest in Palestine, expressed his views even more clearly:

           For the Mandates Commission, Palestine had never ceased to
           constitute a separate entity. It was one of those territories which,
           under     the    terms    of    the   Covenant,      might     be     regarded         as
           "provisionally independent". The country was administered under


152
     Quigley, supra note 7, at 53-54 (listing many examples, mainly of treaties concluded between
Palestine and Egypt); see also John Quigley, “The Palestine Declaration to the International
Criminal Court: The Statehood Issue” (2009) 1-11, 6 (he lists a number of bilateral and one
international treaty Palestine acceded to), http://iccforum.com/media/background/gaza/2009-05-
19_Quigley_Memo_on_Palestine_Declaration.pdf.
153
     Agreement between the Post Office of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Post Office of Palestine for the Exchange of Money Orders, UK-Palestine, Jan. 10-
23, 1922, 13 L.N.T.S. 9; Quigley, supra note 7, at 54.
154
     Quigley, supra note 7, at 61-64.
155
    The Ambassador in Spain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State, 28th October 1932; U.S. Department of
State, F.R.U.S., Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa,
36-37.
156
    See The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Osborne), 27th August 1932; The Chargé in Italy (Kirk)
to the Secretary of State, 22nd October 1932; U.S. Department of State, F.R.U.S., Diplomatic Papers,
1932, ibid, 32, 35-36.
157
     Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Thirty-Second (Extraordinary) Session,
Tenth Meeting, League of Nations, Jul. 30-Aug. 18 (1937); supra note 66.



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          an A mandate by the United Kingdom, subject to certain conditions
          and particularly to the condition appearing in Article 5: "The
          Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory
          shall be . . . . in any way placed under the control of the Government
          of any foreign Power".


          The Chairman would not go so far as to say that the Iraqi
          Government was making a deliberate attempt to control Palestine;
          but a foreign Power was intervening in Palestine's internal affairs,
          and it was difficult to distinguish between intervention and control.


          Palestine, as the mandate clearly showed, was a subject under
          international law. While she could not conclude international
          conventions, the mandatory Power, until further notice, concluded
          them on her behalf, in virtue of Article 19 of the mandate. The
          mandate, in Article 7, obliged the Mandatory to enact a nationality
          law, which again showed that the Palestinians formed a nation, and
          that Palestine was a State, though provisionally under guardianship.
          It was, moreover, unnecessary to labour the point; there was no
          doubt whatever that Palestine was a separate political entity.158

This understanding of the mandates system only seems compatible with the
notion that sovereignty already rested in the inhabitants of the mandated
territory. However, their exercise of that sovereignty was suspended to a
varying degree, according to the class of mandate, until such a time when the
peoples concerned “were able to stand by themselves”. 159 During this interim


158
   Permanent Mandates Commission, supra note 66.
159
    I.C.J., Legal Consequence for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion,
1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, 69 (June 21) (separate opinion by Vice-President Ammoun); Gainsborough,
supra note 43, at 14; very similar to this line of argument, as far as “A”-Mandates, and especially
Syria and Mesopotamia, are concerned: Corbett, supra note 109, at 129-130. He argues that
sovereignty was “vested” in Syria and Mesopotamia themselves, except for certain “powers” that
were divided between the Mandatory and the League of Nations; Leeper, supra note 107, at 1206;
he concurs as far as “A”-Mandates are concerned, but not as far as “B”- and “C”- Mandates are
concerned; Grief, supra note 62, at 6; referring specifically to Palestine. However, he implausibly
argues that sovereignty was vested only in the Jewish people; Wright, supra note 137, at 696; his
position is somewhat unclear; after having rejected the notion that sovereignty resided in the
“mandated communities”, he goes on to state that “communities under ‘A’ mandates doubtless
approach very close to sovereignty”; Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle East, 2d ed., London:
Penguin Books Ltd. (2003), 183 (he refers to the “A”-Mandates as “five new states”); Lewis, supra
note 97, at 464; he disagrees (he refers to the “A”-Mandates as “caricatures of independent
states”); Alexander also disagrees (supra note 135, at 425). He bases his argument on the
principles of the English concept of trusts. He, however, overlooks the fact that there is



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period, the mandatory power exercised the functions of sovereignty under the
League of Nations’ supervision.

         As far as the “A”-Mandates according to Article 22 (4) of the Covenant
are concerned any other interpretation is untenable. After all, these peoples
were already explicitly “provisionally” recognized as “independent nations”,
and their wishes were to be the “principal consideration” when choosing the
mandatory.160 But even as far as the “B”- and “C”- Mandates are concerned,
the fact that these peoples were only “entrusted” to the mandatory power until
they were able to stand on their own, implies that sovereignty resided in them.
Due to the fact that these peoples were viewed as not yet able to properly
exercise their sovereignty, it must be assumed that, during the period of the
mandate, sovereignty and the full exercise of its functions fell apart. This
interpretation has the further advantage of providing an identical answer to
the question of where sovereignty resided for all three types of mandate -a
state of affairs, which would normally be a treaty drafter’s goal when drafting
one single article such as Article 22 of the Covenant.

         The way Article 22 (4)-(6) of the Covenant were phrased, nevertheless,
makes it obvious that -contrary to the rhetoric- only the “A”-Mandates were
ever considered to be worthy of true independence in the foreseeable future. 161
There seems little room for doubt that nobody drafting or ratifying the
Covenant of the League of Nations truly envisaged the “C”-Mandates ever being




widespread agreement that the mandates system was not based on the English concept of trusts,
but only included elements of it. Since Italy, France, and Japan -all civil law countries- were
among the victorious allies anything else would also be surprising (see also: ICJ, International
Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 128 (July 11); Goudy, supra note 107,
at 177-182; Goudy persuasively argues that the mandates system was “derived from” Roman law -
hence the name- and that there were “numerous differences between the English law on trusts
and the mandates system; a point also made by Keith, supra note 97, at 75).
160
    Amos S. Hershey, The Essentials of International Public Law and Organization, 2d ed., New York:
The Macmillan Company (1927), 187-191, especially at 189, fn. 34; Hershey views mandated
territories of the “A”-Class as comparable to the “most liberal” kind of “protectorate” and
believes their status to be similar to that of Cuba. As far as Cuba (at 168, fn. 33) is concerned,
Hershey states that the United States-Cuba treaty of 1903-1904 imposes “legal limitations upon
sovereignty”, and that U.S.-Cuban relations are therefore best described as being those of a
“Protectorate”. It should be noted that Cuba was at that time already a member of the League of
Nations (at 169, fn. 33 cont’d.). Nevertheless, according to Hershey, it is not a “fully sovereign
state”. His comparison allows the conclusion that Hershey believed the “A”-mandates to be
states, although not yet “fully sovereign”; a view shared by Quigley, supra note 7, at 26-31, 70-79.
161
    Dajani, supra note 78, at 34; he argues that “A”-Mandates were recognized as already existing
“nations”, which “B”- and “C”-Mandates were not; Strawson, supra note 2, at 40-41.



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more than completely dependent territories.162 Their inhabitants’ sovereignty
was most likely going to be “suspended” forever.




      4.1.3. PRESIDENT WILSON’S CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE COVENANT

For the peoples subjugated to the mandates system self-determination proved
to be a rather hollow promise. During the League’s existence, only Iraq
(formerly Mesopotamia) managed, in 1932, to become an independent state,
albeit politically tied to the United Kingdom. The French attempted to grant
Syria independence in 1936. However, the French parliament never ratified the
relevant treaty so that Syria only became independent in 1946. Under
considerable -war-time- pressure, the French agreed to grant Lebanon
independence in 1941, although the process only was completed “in stages”.

          By devising a complicated novel legal system of governing “backward”
territories, Europe had managed to cling on to the “Fertile Crescent”.163 Old
European ideas about other nations had obviously triumphed in Paris.164
Further evidence of this is provided by the way territories were placed into
different categories of mandates.

          Based on their “stages of development” there was no objective reason
for granting the Arabs in what is now Saudi Arabia independence, while
insisting on       an “A”-Mandate for Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, and
Lebanon.165 There was no reason to place the Palestinian Arabs -who formed
the vast majority of the population in Palestine and invariably were described
as “backward” when praising Jewish colonizing efforts- in the “A”-Mandate
category, while denying that category to the whole of Africa.



162
    Strawson, supra note 2, at 40-41; Anghie, supra note 21, at 121.
163
    Philby, supra note 42, at 158; Strawson, supra note 2, at 40-41.
164
    See Dankwart A. Rustow, Defense of the Near East, 34 FOREIGN AFF. 271, 286 (1955);
writing in 1955, he states: “The West must rid itself of the habit .of thinking of Near Eastern
countries as wayward or compliant children rather than as free agents in international politics”;
Strawson, supra note 2, at 40-41; Anghie, supra note 21, at 137-139; Mansfield, supra note 159, at
174.
165
    Hirst, supra note 42, at 160; Hirst makes the point that “the most backward parts of the Arab
world” were to become independent states, while the more “mature and advanced were to come
under ‘direct or indirect’ rule”; Mansfield, supra note 159, at 183-184, 188; he makes a similar
point in respect of Yemen which became independent in 1918 - a country he describes as “remote”
and “backward”.



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These completely arbitrary categorizations only served to mask European
strategic goals and racial prejudice. The mandates system reflected the racial
hierarchy as seen in Europe at the time. 166 As Anghie has commented, the only
difference was that nations and cultures were no longer officially divided into
“civilized” and “uncivilized”, but instead into “advanced” and “backward”. 167
Lloyd George’s contribution to the discussion on the mandates system during
the Paris Peace Conference confirms this: he declared that the system for areas
where “the population was civilized but not yet organized” had to be different
from “cannibal colonies where people were eating each other.”168

         Differences in treatment of the same “race”, notably the varied
treatment of the Arabs, were due to strategic concerns. 169 Oil-rich and
strategically situated Mesopotamia could not be granted independence before
securely tied to Britain. Both Syria and Lebanon were always viewed as part of
the French sphere of influence; the French were frequently intervening in the
area under the guise of protecting the relatively high number of Christians in
Lebanon. Palestine, of course, required “tutelage” due to the holy sites in
Jerusalem, its strategic location and, last but not least, the Balfour Declaration.

         The way Palestine was dealt with would -in the coming decades-
provide clear evidence for the thesis that imperialism, not the rights of peoples
had triumphed at Versailles: although far removed from any concept of self-
determination, colonization of the territory by European, and therefore alien,
white settlers was deemed compatible with the mandates system. Balfour



166
    Examples of such views are to be found in Lewis, supra note 97, at 459 (“a formula for dealing
with the tribes of Africa who enjoyed not a different civilization, but no civilization”); see also
David Hunter Miller, The Origin of the Mandates System, 6 FOREIGN AFF. 277, 277 (1927-1928) (“. . . .
it involved the principle that the control of uncivilized people ought to mean a trusteeship or
wardship . . . . ”). Miller (at 281) also quotes General Smuts, credited with having invented the
mandates system, as saying that it was not meant to apply to the “barbarians of Africa”; Anghie,
supra note 21, at 168-178, 189-190; Mansfield, supra note 159, at 174.
167
    Anghie, supra note 21, at 189; Gresh, supra note 10, at 64; he makes a similar point by arguing
that European imperialism could no longer be justified on the basis of a “divine right” and was
therefore now justified as “tutelage”.
168
    Lloyd George, U.S. Department of State, Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume 3, 786; a similar view is reflected in Bentwich’s
article, supra note 88, at 48. In it, he refers to the mandated territories as “infant nations”
requiring a “guardian” and compares the mandates system to a “tutor/ward” relationship. He
also describes these territories’ status as similar to that of “minors”.
169
    Miller, supra note 166, at 281; Philby, supra note 42, at 158; Mansfield, supra note 159, at 174; he
describes the European view of the Arabs at that time as them being a “subject race” rather than a
“governing race”.



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admitted as much in 1919: “In the case of Palestine we deliberately and rightly
decline to accept the principle of self-determination.”             170




        The mandates system therefore did not truly reflect the principle of
self-determination, but instead reflected the compromises the Europeans
deemed necessary in order to appease the Americans. 171 The novel idea of
creating a supportive system that helped peoples towards independence, while
acknowledging their sovereignty -albeit suspended- is in some ways easier to
reconcile with old imperialist notions than with any modern concept of self-
determination.172

        Owen rightly concluded that, as far as non-European areas were
concerned, the “conflicts between the claims of race and language, the desires
of the populations concerned, and the requirements of strategy, economics and
national politics produced results which were neither admirable, nor, as it
turned out, even workable.”173 The United States, understandably distrustful as
far as the Europeans’ motives were concerned, therefore only extended
recognition to those mandates it had explicitly agreed to. 174




170
     Letter from British Foreign Secretary Balfour to the British Prime Minister Lloyd George of
February 19th, 1919; reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 61-62 (PRO. FO. 371/4179); Strawson,
supra note 2, at 40-41; Gresh, supra note 10, at 36, 48-49; he explains how the treatment of the
actual inhabitants of Palestine was typical of imperialism. They and their culture were virtually
invisible and therefore non-existent.
171
    Wright, supra note 137, at 691.
172
     Mansfield, supra note 159, at 174, 180 (he describes the mandate system as a “thinly disguised
form of colonial administration”); Owen, supra note 15, at 550; he describes how President Wilson
was at one time so frustrated during the discussions on the mandates system that he threatened
to leave the peace conference. Nevertheless, some were happy to use almost poetic language in
order to describe the virtues of the mandates system. Bentwich (supra note 88, at 56) states:
“It is the very basis of the new world order which is realised by the League of Nations, that the
attention of the world is focused directly and systematically on the tutelary government of the
younger and less advanced nations; . . . . not that international law will be enforced by new
physical sanction, but that it will be based upon a firmer and more systematic moral foundation; .
. . .”.
173
     Owen, supra note 15, at 554.
174
     Keith, supra note 97, 72; the USA recognized the Palestine Mandate in the Anglo-American
Convention on the Recognition of the Palestine Mandate (1924), UK Treaty Series 054/1925; Cmd.
2559.



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      4.2. THE PALESTINE MANDATE IN DETAIL

      4.2.1. FIRST DECISIONS

Palestine, as a former part of the Turkish Empire, was an “A”-Mandate. At
their conference in San Remo in April 1920, the Allies decided that Great
Britain should be the mandatory.175

           How that was to be reconciled with Article 22 (4) Covenant of the
League of Nations, which by then already had come into force,176 and which
stated that the “wishes of the communities must be a principle consideration
in the selection of the Mandatory”, remained a very controversial issue.
Balfour always had opposed consulting the Palestinians, as he made clear in a
memorandum to Lord Curzon: “Whatever deference should be paid to the
views of those living there, the Powers, in their selection of a mandatory do
not propose, as I understand the matter, to consult them.” 177

           The Americans,178 on the other hand, did try to determine what local
feeling was. In March 1919, the Americans had proposed that a commission be
sent to Syria (which at that time included Palestine) in order to investigate how
best to administer the area in future. The French, however, refused to
participate, and the British withdrew. 179 Realizing that the European powers
had      probably     made      secret   deals    regarding      the      area,       the      Americans,
nevertheless, decided to send their own fact-finding mission, the “King-
Crane-Commission”              (hereinafter      the   Commission).180            The        Commission
concluded that 60% of the petitions received were in favour of an American




175
    San Remo Resolution, 25/04/1920, para. (c), supra note 94; France was to be granted Syria;
Britain was to be the mandatory power for Mesopotamia.
176
    10th January 1920.
177
     British Foreign Secretary Balfour in a memorandum addressed to Lord Curzon, dated 11st
August 1919; reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 73 (PRO. FO. 371/4183).
178
    As has already been pointed out, the Americans insisted on not being an “ally”. They claimed to
be an “Associate Power”, also because the United States had never declared war on the Ottoman
Empire.
179
    Ingrams, supra note 1, at 70; in a letter Balfour had sent to Herbert Samuel in early 1919, he had
already expressed “great hopes that Palestine will be eliminated from the scope of any
Commission”; reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 66 (PRO. FO. 800/215); Mansfield, supra note
159, at 180; Barr, supra note 21, at 81-84.
180
    Pappe, supra note 11, at 8-10; Kattan, supra note 6, at 49.




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mandate. No other power had received more than 15% support, and there was
least support for a French mandate. 181

         The disregard shown towards this local feeling would come to haunt the
British. During the next few decades, numerous British commissions were sent
to Palestine in order to deal with the fragile situation there. They were
invariably confronted by the Palestinian Arabs who rejected the legitimacy of
the British mandate on the grounds that Article 22 (4) Covenant had been
violated, when Britain was chosen as the mandatory power for Palestine. 182
However, it cannot be ignored that Britain did emerge as the local inhabitants’
second choice during the Commission’s investigations,183 and that, by April
1920, the Americans had made it plain they would not be taking on the
Mandate.

         The fact that the Allies ignored the wishes of the local inhabitants that
Syria remain unified,184 and that no part of the area be placed under French
“tutelage”,185 was an early indication of the Allies’ attitude towards the newly
created international legal order. Adherence to the new norms was going to be
an opportunistic affair.

         Furthermore, the Allies, in San Remo, agreed that the “mandatory” was
going to be responsible for “putting into effect” the British declaration “in
favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people”. The safeguard clauses contained in the Balfour Declaration were to be
respected.186

         This, too, evidenced complete disregard for the local inhabitants’
wishes as described in detail by the Commission in 1919:

           5. We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification of the
           extreme Zionist Program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of

181
    “Recommendations of the King-Crane-Commission”, 28/08/1919, para. 6 (3), supra note 6;
Barr, supra note 21, at 84-86.
182
    Dajani, supra note 78, at 35; Weiß, supra note 17, at 154; he also cites the Iraqi Foreign Secretary
making a statement to this effect in 1947 (fn. 20).
183
    “Recommendations of the King-Crane-Commission”, 28/08/1919, para. 6 (6), supra note 6.
184
     A unified Syria consisting of Syria, the Lebanon, and Palestine; “Recommendations of the
King-Crane-Commission”, 28/08/1919, para. 2, supra note 6.
185
    The Commission claimed that more than 60 % of the petitions had protested “strongly and
directly” against the French taking on any role in the area; “Recommendations of the King-
Crane-Commission”, 28/08/1919, para. 6 (6), supra note 6.
186
    San Remo Resolution, 25/04/1920, para. (b), supra note 94.




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          Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State . . .
          . (3) The Commission recognized also that definite encouragement
          had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's often
          quoted statement, in its approval by other representatives of the
          Allies. If, however, the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are
          adhered to- favoring "the establishment in Palestine of a national
          home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing
          shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of
          existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine"-it can hardly be
          doubted that the extreme Zionist Program must be greatly modified.
          For a "national home for the Jewish people" is not equivalent to
          making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a
          Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the
          "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
          Palestine." . . . .

          In his address of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the
          following principle as one of the four great "ends for which the
          associated peoples of the world were fighting": "The settlement of
          every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic
          arrangement or of political relationship upon the basis of the free
          acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned,
          and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any
          other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for
          the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery." If that principle is
          to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive
          as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered
          that the non-Jewish population of Palestine -nearly nine-tenths of
          the whole- are emphatically against the entire Zionist program. The
          tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population
          of Palestine was more agreed than upon this. . . .187

The Commission’s report can be seen as a prescient prediction of Palestine’s
fate. Nevertheless, the Americans and the Allies suppressed it. 188 The original
justification for this was that the report might deter Congress from ratifying

187
    “Recommendations of the King-Crane-Commission”, 28/08/1919, para. 5 (emphases by
author), supra note 6.
188
    Pappe, supra note 11, at 10; Wright, supra note 21, at 5; Kattan, supra note 6, at 49; Macmillan,
supra note 12, at 434 (she claims that “nobody paid the slightest attention” to the commission’s
report).



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the Peace Treaty of Versailles. However, even though the Americans had
rejected the treaty much earlier, it was not until 1922 that the Commission’s
findings were published.189

        The Allies’ conduct at San Remo concerning the wishes and aspirations
of Palestine’s inhabitants again exposed the hollowness of all the promises of
self-determination.190 Nevertheless, it also needs pointing out that many
leading Arabs did not take the Palestinians’ wishes very seriously either. Faisal,
son of the Sharif of Mecca and later King of Iraq, repeatedly expressed his
sympathy for Zionist aspirations in Palestine.191 In the “Faisal-Weizmann-
Agreement” of 3rd January 1919, it was agreed that: “In the establishment of
the Constitution and Administration of Palestine all such measures shall be
adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the British
Government's Declaration of the 2nd of November, 1917.”192

        However,       Faisal   conditioned      this    agreement        on      achieving           Arab
independence as promised by the British. Of course, the implementation of
parts of the Sykes-Picot-Agreement meant that this promise would not
materialize to the extent envisaged by the Arab leaders, so the “Faisal-
Weizmann-Agreement” never came into force.193

        Faisal, however, also wrote a letter, dated 3rd March 1919, to Felix
Frankfurter, President of the American Zionist Organisation, declaring that

          The Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest
          sympathy on the Zionist movement. Our deputation here in Paris is
          fully acquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday by the
          Zionist Organization to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as
          moderate and proper. We will do our best, in so far as we are




189
    Mansfield, supra note 159, at 181; Kattan, supra note 6, at 49; they both also mention strong
British and French resistance to publication.
190
    McGeachy, supra note 6, at 241; he describes the “Jewish occupation of Palestine” as “a
conquest against the will of the inhabitants - made possible and respectable by the military
support of a Great Power”.
191
    Samuel, supra note 10, at 143; Weizmann, supra note 10, at 335; Strawson, supra note 2, at 43;
Barr, supra note 21, at 70; Macmillan, supra note 12, at 433.
192
    Faisal-Weizmann-Agreement, art. 3 (Jan. 3, 1919), http://www.mideastweb.org/feisweiz.htm.
193
    Macmillan, supra note 12, at 433; Fromkin, supra note 9, at 324-325.




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            concerned, to help them through: we will wish the Jews a most
            hearty welcome home.194

For Arab leaders, too, the advancement of their personal ambitions was much
more important than trying to ascertain, let alone respect local feeling in
Palestine.195




      4.2.2. TURKEY

The legality of the decisions taken at San Remo, including those on Palestine,
is further put into doubt by the fact that at the time there was no peace treaty
with Turkey.196

           The Treaty of Sèvres, concluded in 1920, dealt with Palestine in Articles
95 and 96. Article 95 specifically referred to the Mandate and the terms of the
Balfour Declaration. Turkey, however, never ratified the treaty. 197 When peace
finally was agreed in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923,198 Turkey’s declaration was
much vaguer.199 In Article 16 it was agreed that

            Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or
            respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in
            the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her
            sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these
            territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties
            concerned.

The Treaty of Lausanne came into force on 6th August 1924, at a time when the
Mandate already had been approved and was being implemented. Such a
sequence of events can hardly be reconciled with the 1907 Hague Regulations,

194
    Letter from Emir Faisal to Felix Frankfurter, 03/03/1919. For the text of the letter, see:
<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/FeisalFrankfurterCorrespondence.html>;
Frankfurter himself also quotes the letter (supra note 5, at 413-414).
195
    El-Alami, supra note 57, at 180; Shlaim, supra note 9, at 7-8.
196
    Keith, supra note 97, at 72; he describes the legal situation in the “A”-Mandates in 1922 as
“anomalous” due to the lack of a peace treaty with Turkey; Lewis (in 1923), supra note 97, at 460;
he states that “the position in respect of Palestine and Syria is somewhat anomalous . . . . Turkey
has neither ceded them formally nor recognized their independence”.
197
     See The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey (Treaty of Sèvres),
Aug. 10, 1920, 113 B.F.S.P. 652; for Articles 1-260,
<http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I,_Articles_1_-_260>.
198
     See The Treaty of Peace with Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne) (24 July 1923) 28 LNTS 11; for full text
<http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne>.
199
     Lauterpacht, supra note 97, 514.




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especially Article 43, as, formally, the British position in Palestine at that time
was that of a military occupier of “hostile” territory and no more. The British
government implicitly acknowledged this anomalous situation in its Report on
the Mandate for the year 1924 in which it stated: “The ratification of the Treaty
of Lausanne in August, 1924, finally regularised the international status of
Palestine as a territory detached from Turkey and administered under a
Mandate entrusted to His Majesty's Government.”200




      4.2.3. THE MANDATE’S PROVISIONS

The League of Nations approved the text of the Palestine Mandate on 24th July
1922 and it came into force on 29th September 1923. The United States
explicitly recognized the Mandate and its contents in the American-British
Palestine Mandate Convention of 3rd December 1924. 201

Its main provisions were that the mandatory was to have “full powers of
legislation and administration” 202 and be “entrusted” with Palestine’s “foreign
relations”.203

          However, many of the articles dealt with the creation of a Jewish
homeland in Palestine. The Balfour Declaration was reaffirmed in the
Preamble.       Arguably,     its   scope     was     extended      by    the      statement            that:
“recognition has . . . . been given to the historical connection of the Jewish
people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national
home in that country.”204 That was language rejected by the British cabinet
when the Balfour Declaration was being drawn up.205

          The mandatory was to be responsible for creating the necessary
conditions for a Jewish national home in Palestine; 206 Jewish immigration was


200
    Report of His Britannic Majesty’s Government on the Administration under Mandate of Palestine and
Transjordan for the year 1924, Section I; supra note 104.
201
     Mandate for Palestine, League of Nations Doc. C.529.M.314 1922 VI (1927); Anglo-American
Convention on the Recognition of the Palestine Mandate, supra note 174.
202
    Mandate for Palestine, supra note 201, art. 1
203
    Id. art. 12.
204
    Id. Preamble.
205
     Allain, supra note 17, at 83; Strawson, supra note 2, at 46; Mallison, supra note 53, at 1033; he
argues that the Mandate must nevertheless be interpreted in line with the Declaration; as does
Weiß, supra note 17, at 152.
206
     Id. art. 2




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to be encouraged, also by enacting a suitable nationality law and allowing
“close settlement”;207 Hebrew was to be one of the official languages, 208 and the
Zionist organisation was recognized as the “Jewish Agency” the mandatory
was to cooperate with.209

          However, due to a late amendment proposed by the British, they were
released from their obligation to help establish a Jewish national home in the
territory of Palestine east of the Jordan.210 This area was later to become the
state of Trans-Jordan (now the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan).

          The Mandate was thus the moment when the content of the Balfour
Declaration definitely had arrived in international law. 211 From now on, the
British government officially could claim that any move by it in favour of
establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine was not simply in accordance
with international law, but actually an international legal obligation. The terms
of that obligation arguably went beyond what the majority of the British
cabinet had envisaged when it approved the Balfour Declaration. Nevertheless,
the British had agreed to undertake the mission and achieved a considerable
reduction in territory to which the Mandate’s terms applied.



      4.2.4. THE MANDATE’S LEGALITY

Many have argued that the Mandate was illegal. While some have argued that it
contravened the principle of self-determination,212 others argue that its terms
simply cannot be reconciled with Article 22 (4) of the Covenant. Before
analysing these claims, it should, however, be pointed out that neither the



207
    Id. art. 7 (nationality law), art. 6 (settlement); regarding Article 6, the Military Governor of
Palestine (1917-1920), Ronald Storrs, later commented: “The thinking Arab regarded Article 6 as
Englishmen would regard instructions from a German conqueror for the settlement and
development of the Duchy of Cornwall, of our Downs, commons and golf-courses, not by
Germans, but by Italians “returning” as Roman legionaries . . . .” (supra note 27, at 356).
208
    Mandate for Palestine, supra note 201, art. 22.
209
    Id. article 4.
210
    Mandate for Palestine, supra note 201, art. 25; Grief, supra note 62, at 6; he argues that this was
a “false interpretation”, invented by Churchill, that “sabotaged” the Mandate.
211
    Dunsky, supra note 25, 167; Frankfurter, supra note 5, 414; Allain, supra note 17, 78; El-Alami,
supra note 57, 147; Strawson, supra note 2, 46.
212
    Keith, supra note 97, 78; Quincy Wright, “The Palestine Conflict in International Law” in Major
Middle Eastern Problems in International Law, Majid Khadduri (ed.), Washington D. C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (1972), 13-36, 26.



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P.C.I.J,213 nor the Permanent Mandates Commission,214 or the United Nations ever
questioned the Mandate’s legality.215




      4.2.4.1. SELF-DETERMINATION

As has already been pointed out, the concept of self-determination, certainly
when applied to “backward peoples”, was comparatively novel to European
politicians at the end of the First World War. The Covenant of the League of
Nations reflects this. The American President had to compromise in order to
avoid friction with former allies. The subsequent American withdrawal from
multilateral engagement made a bad situation worse, by encouraging the
Europeans to continue as far as possible on their well-trodden path of
acquiring ever more power and influence in vital regions.

          Notwithstanding the development or not of self-determination as a
political principle, however, there can be little doubt that, by 1923, it had not
yet become a right recognized in international law.216


213
    See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3 (Aug. 30);
Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 5 (Mar. 26).
Arguably, the Court implicitly confirmed the Mandate’s legality by not questioning the British
Palestine Administration’s right to make the necessary decisions regarding the concessions at
stake.
214
    The Permanent Mandates Commission declared (when dealing with a petition from the Palestinian
Arab Congress that alleged the Mandate’s terms were contrary to Article 22 Covenant of the
League of Nations):
“. . . . .(b) Secondly the petitioners protest against the terms of the Mandate itself, as established
by the Council of the League of Nations on July 24th, 1922 . . . . . the Commission, considering its
task is confined to supervising the execution of the Mandate in the terms prescribed by the
Council, is of the opinion that it is not competent to discuss the matter.”
Observations by the Permanent Mandates Commission on the Petition Discussed at its Fifth Session, 6
League of Nations O.J. (1925) 219; the Permanent Mandates Commission’s stance was subsequently
approved by the Council, 32nd Session of the Council, 6 League of Nations O.J. (1925) 133.
215
    When the General Assembly of the United Nations attempted to find a solution to the problems
in Palestine, Sub-Committee 2 of the Ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question suggested
referring the question of the legality of the Palestine Mandate to the International Court of Justice. In
a narrow vote, this proposition was rejected. For the report of Sub-Committee 2, see: “Ad hoc
Committee on the Palestinian Question, Report of Sub-Committee 2”, U.N. Doc. A/AC.14/32; see
http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/AAC1432.pdf.
216
    I.C.J., Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 79, 82
(Jul. 22); the court pointed out that the right of self-determination had “evolved” only in the
“second half of the twentieth century”; Bassiouni, supra note 25, at 32; he describes the 1914-1945
period as one of “unfulfilled declarations on ‘self-determination’”; Dunsky, supra note 25, at 170;
Dunsky views the principle as “not part of international law” in 1919/1920, and as “a purely
political factor, not binding in nature”; Collins, supra note 4, at 140; he describes the concept of
self-determination post-World War I as only “theoretically based” but “gaining acceptance”;
Green, supra note 117, at 46; writing in 1971, he argues that even then there was no right of self-
determination in international law; Murlakov, supra note 4, at 86 (no right of self-determination



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As the International Commission of Jurists, reporting on the Aaland Island issue,
stated in 1920:

          Although the principle of self-determination of peoples plays an
          important role in modern political thought, especially since the
          Great War, it must be pointed out that there is no mention of it in
          the Covenant of the League of Nations. The recognition of this
          principle in a certain number of treaties cannot be considered as
          sufficient to put it upon the same footing as a positive rule of the
          Law of Nations.217

Although the jurists, in their subsequent examination of the principle, did
allow for specific exceptions to this categorical statement, 218 the text of the
Covenant proves that their conclusion was fundamentally correct. When
contrasting President Wilson’s statements on self-determination outlined
above with the failure even to mention “self-determination” in the Covenant,
it becomes obvious that the majority of states did not recognize this principle
as a legal principle, let alone an obligation.219 Consequently, the I.C.J., too, has
described the right of self-determination as having “evolved” only “during the




even in 1947); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 108, 428, 433 (2nd ed.
2006); he describes the developments in the inter-war period regarding self-determination as
demonstrating “the political force of the principle . . . . Nonetheless there was little general
development before 1945” (at 112); Strawson, supra note 2, at 88; Martti Koskenniemi, National
Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice, 43 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 241, 257 (1994);
Kattan, supra note 6, at 120-121, 140-141; Kattan, however, wants to make an exception for “A”-
Mandates under Article 22 (4) of the Covenant. He argues that these “communities” were granted
the right of self-determination by the Covenant. That argument is difficult to sustain. It was, after
all, not up the “communities” to decide whether they had “progressed sufficiently” to be
independent, but up to the mandatory power and the League of Nations. Article 22 (4) is perhaps
best seen as holding out the promise to these “communities” that they will at some point in the
future, to be determined by others, be able to claim a right to self-determination.
217
    Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands
Question, League of Nations O.J., Special Suppl. 3, 5th October 1920.
218
    Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands
Question, ibid, 5, 6; Koskenniemi, supra note 216, at 246-247.
219
    Green, supra note 117, at 42; Gainsborough, supra note 43, at 11; he cites Feinberg as offering a
completely different explanation, whereby it remains unclear whether Palestine was ever included
in the “A”-Mandates category; furthermore, 22 (4) only contained “permissive, not obligatory”
rules as implied by the sentence “where their existence . . . .”. This argument has no merit. It is
self-evident that Palestine was an “A”-Mandate. The majority of writers at the time, Britain, and
the League of Nations referred to it as such (certainly until 1939). The discussions of the wartime
allies provide ample evidence that all the former Turkish territories that were not granted
independence were to be “A”-Mandates. Interpreting the language in Article 22 (4) Covenant of
the League of Nations as optional is also beyond any reasonable interpretation. The text simply
provides no basis for Feinberg’s arguments.



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second half of the twentieth century”, something it describes as “one of the
major developments of international law.”220

          The whole concept of the mandates system could not have been
reconciled with the existence of a right to self-determination, as it was not up
to the peoples in the mandated territories to decide when they could “stand
alone”, but up to the mandatory power and the League of Nations. For peoples
“not yet able to stand on their own” self-determination was therefore limited
to an aspiration for the future.            221
                                                  The conclusion therefore must be that the
Mandate did not violate the Palestinians’ right to self-determination because
there was no such right in contemporary international law. 222




      4.2.4.2. ARTICLE 22 (4) COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Many have advanced the argument that the terms of the Mandate, without
doubt an “A”-Mandate, cannot be reconciled with Article 22 (4) of the
Covenant.223

          Besides not having been consulted by the Allies on the choice of
mandatory (as already described above), the inhabitants of Palestine were
subject      to   a   system       whereby         the    “full   powers       of      legislation           and
administration” were exercised by Britain. Britain only was obliged to
“encourage local autonomy so far as circumstances permit.” 224 Articles 1 and 3
of the Mandate therefore clearly violated the provisions of Article 22 (4) of the




220
    ICJ, supra note 216.
221
    As Marc Weller, points out, the E.C. Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia even in 1991/1992
“found that in actual practice international law did not define the precise consequences of that
right or its scope of application . . . .the commission . . . . defined the right to self-determination
not as a people’s right to independence but as a human right of minorities and groups”.See Marc
Weller, The International Responses to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86
AM.J.INT’L.L. 569, 569-607, 592 (1992).
222
    Stone, supra note 28, at 17-18; Stone argues that it is irrelevant whether there was a right of
self-determination in international law at that time or not, as Arab demands for self-
determination were fulfilled by gaining independence in an area 100 times greater than Palestine.
That argument, however, fails to take account of the rights of the Arabs actually living in
Palestine, then 90% of the population, whose country, according to Stone was to be sacrificed to
allow Jews to achieve self-determination there -after all, the Jewish population amounted to only
10% of the whole population in Palestine.
223
    Dajani, supra note 78, at 34.
224
    Mandate for Palestine, supra note 201, art. 3.




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Covenant, which only allowed for the “rendering of administrative advice and
assistance” by the mandatory.225

         That Palestine was to have little in common with a “provisionally
recognized independent nation” is evidenced by the detailed and extensive
description of the mandatory’s powers and obligations: without any reference
to the locals’ wishes, the mandatory was to facilitate Jewish immigration,
enact a nationality law, and secure the Holy sites. 226 Obviously, such a course of
action would only be viable if British conduct went way beyond “rendering
advice” – rather, British usurpation of all executive functions in Palestine
would have to be considered a conditio sine qua non.

         Article 22 (8) of the Covenant does not help reconcile the Mandate with
Article 22 (4) of the Covenant either, as any decision of the Council on the
“degree of authority . . . . exercised by the Mandatory” must, of course, itself
be in accordance with the type of mandate concerned. The “degree of
authority” conferred to the mandatory in Palestine could only be within the
limits set out in 22 (4) of the Covenant, which evidently were not respected in
the Mandate.

         A comparison with the Iraq Mandate, approved by the League of
Nations on 27th September 1924, 227 further illustrates the special treatment of
Palestine.228 The Iraq Mandate incorporated the Anglo-Iraqi “Treaty of
Alliance”, signed 10th October 1922,229 and the “Protocol of April 30th, 1923,
and the Agreements subsidiary to the Treaty with King Feisal”. 230



225
    Bentwich, supra note 78, at 140; he acknowledges this fact and explains it as a result of the
“Jewish National Home” policy; Quigley, supra note 7, at 48; Keay, supra note 9, at 193, 203-204;
Gresh, supra note 10, at 69; Macmillan, supra note 12, at 436; she concludes: “In place of the duty
of the mandatory power to develop a self-governing commonwealth, they [the British] substituted
‘self-governing institutions.’”
226
    Mandate for Palestine, supra note 201; Stein, supra note 54, at 418; he, however, claims that the
Mandate differed from the other “A”-mandates only in as far as the “trusteeship” was deemed
“to be of indefinite duration”.
227
    For the text of the Iraq Mandate, and its approval by the League of Nations, see: British
Mandate for Iraq, League of Nations Doc. C. 412. M. 166. 1924 VI (1924).
228
    Bentwich, supra note 78, at 137 (“the mandate for Palestine has a distinctive character”); supra
note 88, at 50 (“markedly different”); Keith “Mandates”, 78 (“differentiate this from all other
mandates”); Quigley, supra note 7, at 48-51; Keay, supra note 9, at 203-204.
229
    For the text of the Treaty between Great Britain and Iraq, G.B.-Iq., Dec. 1922, League of Nations
O.J. C. 717 M. 429. 1922. VI.
230
    For the text of the “Protocol”, see: Treaty between Great Britain and Iraq, G.B.-Iq., July 1923,
League of Nations O.J. C. 373. M. 168. 1923. VI.



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In the “Treaty of Alliance” Britain recognized Feisal as the “constitutional
King of Iraq”.231 “At the request” of Iraq’s King, the British government
promised to “provide the State of Iraq . . . . advice and assistance”, however
without prejudice to Iraq’s “national sovereignty”, however without prejudice
to Iraq’s “national sovereignty”.232 Furthermore, Iraq was permitted to have
representations abroad,233 and both parties agreed to submit any disagreements
on the treaty’s interpretation to the P.C.I.J. 234 The Iraq Mandate itself included
the   statement      that    Britain    had    recognized      the    Iraqi       government              as
“independent”,235 and mentions the possibility of Iraq’s future admission to
the League of Nations.236

        Although the “Treaty of Alliance” also contained provisions severely
restricting Iraq’s ability to act independently, 237 the language used is strikingly
different from the language employed in the Palestine Mandate. 238 While it was
easy to claim that the Iraq Mandate adhered to the letter and spirit of Article 22
(4) Covenant of the League of Nations, the same was not possible with respect
to the Palestine Mandate, although both were “A”-Mandates.

        The Mandate’s terms’ (and subsequently Britain’s) lack of compliance
with Article 22 (4) of the Covenant was acknowledged implicitly by the
Secretary of State for the Colonies MacDonald before the Permanent Mandates
Commission in 1939:

          Mr. MacDonald reiterated that the Palestine mandate was different
          from all the others; but it was, nevertheless, a mandate and had to
          embody the spirit and principles of the mandate system. It was not
          so different that its provisions could contradict those principles. If
          the Arabs of Palestine, alone among all the populations of territories
          under mandate, were to be deprived of normal political rights, it



231
    Preamble, supra note 229.
232
    Preamble, supra note 229, article I.
233
    Preamble, supra note 229, article V.
234
    Preamble, supra note 229, article XVII.
235
    British Mandate for Iraq, League of Nations, Doc.C. 412. M. 166. 1924 VI (1924).
236
    Id. article VI.
237
    The Iraqi King agreed to be “guided” in “all important matters” affecting British “financial
and international interests” (supra note 229, art. IV), and no non-Iraqi was to be employed by the
Iraqi government without prior “concurrence” on the part of the British government (Article II,
supra note 229).
238
    Quigley, supra note 7, at 42-44; Keay, supra note 9, at 203-204.




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          would amount to saying that the Palestine mandate contradicted the
          spirit of the mandates system . . . .

          In   reply    to   Mlle.   Dannevig's     remark     about    the     premature
          introduction of self-governing institutions, he would remind the
          Commission that the Arabs and Jews in Palestine were fairly
          advanced peoples. It remained true, however, that, in twenty years,
          no progress whatever had been made with the establishment of even
          the most modest form of central self-government, apart from local
          government bodies. Palestine was, in fact, behind some other parts
          of the world where the people were actually more backward . . . .239

There is therefore little doubt that the Mandate did violate Article 22 (4) of the
Covenant.240 Although Palestine was an “A”-Mandate, its treatment at best was
equivalent to “B”-Mandate status.241 This “special treatment” of Palestine had
been foreshadowed in the defunct Treaty of Sèvres. While “Syria” and
“Mesopotamia”          were     to   be    “provisionally       recognized         as      independent
States”,242 there was no such provision for Palestine, which was simply to be
administered in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant. 243

         The fact that the mandates themselves generally are viewed as
international treaties in their own right -a view supported by the I.C.J.-244 does
not justify the violation of international law. 245 According to Article 20 (1) of the
Covenant, member states undertook the obligation not to enter into treaties
“inconsistent” with the Covenant’s provisions.246 Whether the League of
Nations’ approval of the Mandate can be viewed as an implicit abrogation,
either of Article 20 (1) or of Article 22 (4) of the Covenant, is rather doubtful.
There is no evidence of that being a consideration at the time.

239
    Malcolm MacDonald before the Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Thirty-Sixth
Session, Held at Geneva from June 8th to 29th, 1939, including the Report of the Commission to
the Council, Fourteenth meeting; <http://ismi.emory.edu/home/resources/primary-source-
docs/1939minutes.pdf>.
240
    Allain, supra note 17, at 87.
241
    Corbett, supra note 109, at 131; he describes Palestine as “a regime peculiar to itself” that “for
the purposes of legal definition” falls “within the same group as ... countries under mandates “B”
and “C”; Dajani, supra note 78, at 35.
242
    Supra note 197, art. 94; for Articles 1-260, supra note 197.
243
    Id. article 95.
244
     See South-West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 319, 330-331; Quigley,
supra note 7, at 37.
245
    Rosenne, supra note 55, at 48; Rosenne seems to disagree, without giving any reasons.
246
    The Covenant came into force on 10th January 1920. The Palestine Mandate was approved by
the League of Nations on 24th July 1922 (and came into force on 29th September 1923).



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The more convincing conclusions are that the Mandate was -as Bentwich
would have presumably put it-247 “imperfect in its legal foundations”, and that
its terms violated Article 22 (4) of the Covenant, and therefore also Article 20
(1).248

          Nevertheless, some have contended that this conclusion faces four
“insuperable barriers”:249

          1.) The League of Nations’ approval of the terms of the Mandate had
“definitive legal effect so that no other body could question its legality.” 250

          2) The P.C.I.J. and the Permanent Mandates Commission had never raised
the issue of the Mandate’s alleged unlawfulness, despite having the
opportunity to do so.251

          3) All members of the League and “interested parties” had treated the
Mandate as legal,252 and, lastly,



247
     Bentwich, supra note 88, at 52 (referring to the implementation of new immigration laws
before the Palestine Mandate had been approved); Bentwich was Legal Secretary, then Attorney
General in the Government of Palestine.
248
     This is to some extent also confirmed by discussions that took place within the American
Delegation, which participated in the drafting of the U.N. Charter and was responsible for working
out the American response to suggested amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. The
Trusteeship system that was to be introduced in the U.N. Charter was to maintain the status quo
as far as the mandates were concerned. In this connection, the U.S. Delegation in the end decided
to reject an Arab League proposal, which would have explicitly included Article 22 (4) of the
Covenant in the articles dealing with the Trusteeship system. As the discussions demonstrate, this
rejection was due almost exclusively to the situation in Palestine. Although all the delegates
agreed that the United States was in favour of retaining the status quo there, inclusion of Article
22 (4) of the Covenant in the U.N. Charter would, it was feared, be strongly opposed by the Jewish
representatives. As Representative Bloom pointed out the phrase “the wishes of these
communities must be a principal consideration” might actually mean “the majority wishes” and
that “the Arabs were in a substantial majority”. According to Bloom, the Arabs wanted inclusion
of Article 22 (4) in order to “obtain something for their own protection”. He concluded his
assessment with the warning that incorporation of Article 22 (4) “might be equally dangerous to
other territories than Palestine”. On the other hand the discussions included various references by
different delegates to the importance of retaining the Palestine Mandate itself, and ensuring that
the “maintenance of the status quo be mandatory”. This seems to indicate that -certainly among
the U.S. delegates- there was a feeling that, while the continued implementation of the Mandate
would ensure the desired retention of the status quo, application of Article 22 (4) of the Covenant
might endanger that goal; Trusteeship, U.S. Department of State, F.R.U.S., Diplomatic papers, 1945,
General: the United Nations, 1945, 950-954.
249
     An additional argument is advanced by Grief, supra note 62, at 3; he argues that the rights
contained in Article 22 Charter of the League of Nations only applied to the Jews, as far as
Palestine is concerned. This is evidently not correct as all the ensuing discussions at the League of
Nations and in the British Cabinet demonstrate. There was agreement that the problems in
Palestine resulted from the fact that Palestinian Arabs -by having lived in the territory when the
British arrived- could claim the rights under Article 22 of the Covenant and that this was difficult
to reconcile with the promises made to the Zionist Jews.
250
    Crawford, supra note 216, at 429.
251
    Rosenne, supra note 55, 48; Crawford, supra note 216, 429.




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         4)    Article    80    (1)   U.N.     Charter      had    “legalized”           all     mandates
retroactively.253

None of these arguments is convincing. The League of Nations’ approval of the
Mandate did not automatically legalize inherent violations of the Covenant.
Since it is very doubtful that any League of Nations organ was legally
competent to rule on the Mandate’s adherence to the Covenant,254 it follows
that the Council’s approval cannot have been a judgement on whether the
Mandate’s provisions actually were in accordance with the Covenant. Rather,
the League’s organs’ lack of jurisdiction/competence to adjudicate on the
Mandate’s legality reinforces the point that there were severe doubts on the
part of the Allies as to what the result of any such legal analysis would be. 255
Furthermore, as all mandates generally were seen as treaties, Article 20 (1) of
the Covenant barred the United Kingdom from entering into a treaty that
contravened Article 22 (4), whatever the Council decided, especially as there is
no indication that the Council had the competence to overrule Covenant
provisions.

         However, it is true, as argued by some, that the P.C.I.J. and the
Permanent Mandates Commission never questioned the Mandate’s legality.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that the Mandate’s content was
legal. The P.C.I.J. was never asked to explicitly rule on the conformity of the




252
     Green, supra note 117, at 47; Wright, supra note 21, at 12; Crawford, supra note 216, at 429
(“general practice”).
253
     Rosenne, supra note 55, at 49; Wright, supra note 21, at 12; Crawford, supra note 216, at 429.
254
     See Lord Balfour, Statement, 18th Session of the Council, 3 League of Nations O. J. (1922) 547
(referring to the Council); implicitly: M. Hyman, Report to the 8 th Session of the Council, 1 League
of Nations O.J. (1920) 339 (describing the Council’s difficulty in determining appropriate terms for
the Mandate and asking the Allies for “proposals”); also implicitly: Letter to the Secretary of State of
the United States of America, adopted by the Council on March 1st, 1921, 2 League of Nations O.J. (1921)
142-143 (Responding to U.S. protests against the terms of a “C” mandate awarded to Japan, the
Council refers to its limited freedom of action due to the fact that the Mandate had already been
approved by it). The Permanent Mandates Commission declared (when dealing with a petition from
the Palestinian Arab Congress that alleged the Mandate’s terms were contrary to Article 22
Covenant of the League of Nations): “. . . . . (b) Secondly the petitioners protest against the terms
of the Mandate itself, as established by the Council of the League of Nations on July 24th, 1922 . . .
. . the Commission, considering its task is confined to supervising the execution of the Mandate in
the terms prescribed by the Council, is of the opinion that it is not competent to discuss the
matter”; Observations by the Permanent Mandates Commission on the Petition Discussed at its Fifth
Session, 6 League of Nations O.J. (1925) 219; Keith, supra note 97, at 81; he, writing in 1922, argues
that the P.C.I.J. had no jurisdiction to decide whether the Mandate conformed to Article 22
255
     Keith, supra note 97, at 75; he points out that even a mandate approved by the Council could
nonetheless contravene Article 22 Covenant of the League of Nations.



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Mandate with Articles 20 (1), 22 (4) of the Covenant. 256 The Permanent Mandates
Commission declared an Arab request to debate the Mandate’s conformity with
Article 22 of the Covenant inadmissible due to its own lack of competence. 257 If
it were correct that no League of Nations organ had the competence to examine
the Mandate’s legality after approval by the Council,258 the omission to do so on
the part of the Court and the Commission is not only explained easily, but also
devoid of legal consequence.

         Another argument sometimes put forward is that, by acquiescing in the
Mandate’s terms and their application, the League of Nations’ member states
and the “interested parties” may have created customary international law
with regard to Palestine.259

         Although there is arguably some state practice in support of that
proposition,260 no corresponding opinio juris can be discerned, because no state
ever claimed that Palestine was subject to any rules of international law that
went beyond the Covenant’s provisions. On the rare occasions the legality of
the Mandate was debated officially, its conformity with Article 22 of the
Covenant was stressed.261 Britain, too, always insisted that this was the case. 262
Furthermore, before 1939,263 no state and no League of Nations’ organ officially


256
     Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3 (Aug. 30);
Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 5 (Mar. 26), supra
note 213; Keith, supra note 97, at 81; Keith, however, argues that the P.C.I.J. had no competence to
decide whether the Mandate conformed to Article 22.
257
    See supra note 214.
258
    See supra note 254.
259
    Green, supra note 117, at 47.
260
     On at least two occasions Balfour explained the British policy of refusing to “accept the
principle of self-determination”, as far as Palestine was concerned, by claiming that the situation
in Palestine was “absolutely exceptional” or “unique”; Letter from Balfour to British Prime
Minister Lloyd George; 19th February 1919; and Minutes of a conversation between Balfour and
Justice Brandeis (leader of the American Zionists) in mid-1919; both reprinted in Ingrams, supra
note 1, at 61-62, 71-73 (PRO. FO. 371/4179; PRO. FO. 800/217).
261
    The League of Nations Council, for example, when dealing with the mandated territories,
including Palestine, declared in 1924: “Expresses itself...satisfied that the mandated
territories...are in general administered in accordance with the spirit and letter of Article 22 and
the terms of the mandates”; 32nd Session of the Council, League of Nations Doc. C.386M.132 1925
VI (1927); for the requirement of opinio juris in the creation of customary international law, see:
North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic Of Germany v Denmark and v Netherlands),
1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶73-74 (Feb 20).
262
    Officially, Balfour declared that the terms of the Palestine Mandate were “in conformity with
the spirit” and “in compliance with” Article 22 of the Covenant; The Chief of the British Delegation,
Council of the League of Nations (Balfour), to the Secretary General of the League of Nations (Drummond),
December 6th, 1920; available at: U.S. Department of State, F.R.U.S., 1921, 105.
263
    In 1939, the Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission asked the Secretary of State for
the Colonies MacDonald whether he viewed Palestine as falling under Article 22 (4) of the



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ever doubted that Palestine was an “A”-Mandate, to which Article 22 (4)
applied automatically.264

         Based on these facts, it follows that no rules of customary international
law were created in order to deal with the specific case of Palestine. By
avoiding the issue of legality as far as possible, and, when that was not
possible, by stressing the Mandate’s adherence to Article 22 (4) of the
Covenant, states and the League of Nations actively prevented the development
of divergent customary international law as far as Palestine was concerned.

         Article 80 (1) U.N. Charter could and did not obviate any legal
shortcomings the mandates had. Firstly, Article 80 (1) U.N. Charter, even if it
had attempted to legalize any previous violations of the Covenant of the League
of Nations, could not have had any bearing on the assessment of the legal
situation prior to that provision coming into force. Secondly, there are doubts
as to whether Article 80 (1) really sought to change the legal situation. Rather,
most agree that this provision was meant to preserve the status quo. This is
obviously at odds with the argument that the article retroactively legalized a
previously unlawful situation because that would necessarily imply an
automatic change in the status quo. 265 The explicit preservation of the “rights .
. . . of any peoples” in Article 80, which would seem to include the preservation
of the right not to accept an illegal situation, is a further bar to the contrary
interpretation.266


Covenant: “It should, however, be remembered that the question whether paragraph 4 of Article
22 of the Covenant could be considered as applying to Palestine was one which had on occasion
been disputed, and had given rise to differences of opinion.” MacDonald replied: “Without
enlarging on the point or making enquiries of lawyers who might possibly disagree, he felt it was
a matter which was open to some doubt.”; Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Thirty-
Sixth Session, Held at Geneva from June 8th to 29th, 1939, including the Report of the
Commission to the Council, Fourteenth meeting; supra note 239.
264
    In 1937, the Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission Orts declared: “For the Mandates
Commission, Palestine had never ceased to constitute a separate entity. It was one of those
territories which, under the Covenant, might be regarded as “provisionally independent.”; League
of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Thirty-Second (Extraordinary)
Session, Devoted to Palestine, Held at Geneva from July 30th-August 18th, 1937, Tenth Meeting,
supra note 66. This statement can only be reconciled with the view that Palestine was an “A”-
Mandate under Article 22 (4) of the Covenant.
265
    Gilchrist, supra note 121, at 991; Gilchrist argues that Article 80 U.N. Charter was included
because of the “fears of mandatory powers” that they might lose their “legal position in the
mandated territories”; Quigley, supra note 7, at 88.
266
    Quigley, supra note 7, at 88; The inclusion of the term “peoples” in U.N. Charter art. 80 has,
however, been interpreted as specifically referring to Jewish rights in Palestine (for example,
Wright, supra note 21, at 13). This argument is not convincing. All the communities living in
mandated territories, especially also of the “B” and “C” categories, did not yet fulfil the criteria of



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The conclusion therefore must be that the Mandate’s terms were contrary to
international law at the time of their approval and remained so until the
mandate’s termination.267

         In truth, the Mandate was an expression of “double” hypocrisy:
Palestine’s inhabitants were not only refused self-determination, but the rules
set up by the Allies in order to keep self-determination in check were also
flouted, because they were still too generous to allow the implementation of
the Balfour Declaration.268 Of course, this was the case because any indigenous
administration in Palestine was extremely unlikely to cooperate with the
European idea of settling Jews in Palestine, and creating a national home for
them there.269 Therefore, British administrators had to be in place in order to
enforce a concept the population was hostile to.

         However, this does not automatically lead to the further conclusion that
the entire Mandate was invalid. The fact that Palestine was a mandated
territory remained and was in accordance with contemporary international law
as reflected in the Covenant.




   4.2.4.3. OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Although the Allies had not bothered to consult the inhabitants of Palestine,
the fact that the United States refused the Mandate, means that it was in


statehood, but, nevertheless, had rights under the respective mandate that were preserved under
Article 80. There is therefore no reason to assume that Article 80 was adopted solely to protect
Jewish rights in Palestine.
267
    Even Bentwich, at the time of writing Attorney-General of the Government of Palestine, admits
that there is “scarcely any clause of the Palestine Mandate which is without its legal and practical
problems” (supra note 78, at 141); Pitman B. Potter, The Palestine Problem Before the United Nations,
42 AM. J.INT’L .L. 859, 860 (1948); Potter goes even further, when he states: “The Arabs deny the
binding force of the Mandate...and again they are probably quite correct juridically”.
268
    Kattan, supra note 6, at 4-5; Gresh, supra note 10, at 69.
269
    Bentwich, supra note 78, at 139; he states that the “policy of the Jewish National Home” had
“determined the particular character of the mandate for Palestine” and compares the mandate to
British policy in Trans-Jordan in order to emphasize this point; in his article “Mandated
Territories” (supra note 88, at 51) he reiterates that point: “the task of the Mandatory of Palestine
is very much more difficult . . . . It was clearly necessary . . . . that the Mandatory should be able to
exercise the powers inherent in the government of a sovereign state and should not have its
functions limited to rendering of administrative advice and assistance.”; Keith, supra note 97, at
77- 78; he compares the Palestine to the Iraq Mandate -where he sees Britain’s role “reduced to
the modest role contemplated in Article 22”. He then argues that “in Palestine, on the other hand,
the mandatory has and must retain sovereign power . . . . ”, and goes on to explain the difficulties
Britain will have when trying to create a Jewish national home there; Stein, supra note 54, at 417
(“sui generis”); Salt, supra note 6, at 127; Quigley, supra note 7, at 48-49.



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accordance with Article 22 (4) Covenant of the League of Nations that Britain,
the inhabitants’ second choice according to the King-Crane-Commission, was
installed as mandatory power (even if that was mere coincidence).

         Obliging Palestine to accept foreign, Jewish immigrants per se cannot
be classified as contrary to international law as it then was.270 As already
pointed out, the right of self-determination, which nowadays very likely would
be seen to be violated by such an obligation, was not yet developed in
international law. It is sometimes argued that the concept of a Jewish national
home as such violated Article 22 (1) of the Covenant, because it could not be
reconciled with the “principle that the well-being of such peoples form a
sacred trust of civilization”, as far as the Palestinian Arabs are concerned.271
There is little doubt that the implementation, in practice, of the concept of a
Jewish national home amounted to a clear violation of Article 22 (1) of the
Covenant. Nevertheless, it does not seem justified to categorize the mere
obligation to accept foreign immigrants -even if they were granted citizenship
rights- as necessarily harmful to the indigenous population and therefore
automatically illegal, especially when the safeguard clauses included in the
Mandate are considered.

         Based on the paternalistic, imperialist attitude evidenced by the whole
mandates system, it could be argued plausibly -as indeed it was- that the
Arabs would benefit from Jewish innovation and expertise, a sort of Imperial
tutelage in proxy. As outrageous as such an attitude seems today, it cannot be
denied that it provided the basic justification for the whole mandates system
and was therefore reflected in the Covenant of the League of Nations and
international law in general.

         Furthermore, the fact that this obligation -for practical reasons-
necessitated a violation of Article 22 (4) of the Covenant by requiring the
imposition of a British administration on Palestine does not render the
obligation itself illegal. Although hardly enforceable, it would have -at the
time- been possible to legally impose such an obligation on an indigenous


270
    Kattan, supra note 6, at 121; he believes this to be generally true, but not for areas classified as
“A”-Mandates because he believes those “communities” had been granted the right of self-
determination. As has been explained earlier, that view is not convincing.
271
    Crawford, supra note 216, at 429.




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administration (receiving British “advice”), without Article 22 (4) of the
Covenant being violated.272

         As had already been foreshadowed by the Churchill White Paper                         273
                                                                                                     and the
Mandate, the Palestinian area east of the river Jordan was no longer part of this
development. The Mandate -with few exceptions- allowed the British to decide
which of the Mandate’s provisions they wished to implement there. 274

         Shortly after the Mandate had been approved, the British government
issued “The Palestine Order in Council”.275 In its Preamble, the Order in Council
reiterated the obligation to fulfil the Balfour Declaration, but its Article 86
categorically stated that

          This Order In Council Shall Not Apply To Such Parts Of The Territory
          Comprised In Palestine To The East Of The Jordan And The Dead Sea
          As Shall Be Defined By Order Of The High Commissioner. Subject To
          The    Provisions     Of   Article   25   Of   The    Mandate,        The      High
          Commissioner May Make Such Provision For The Administration Of
          Any Territories So Defined As Aforesaid As With The Approval Of The
          Secretary Of State May be prescribed.

Thus, the foundations of the “first partition” of Palestine had been laid. 276
“Eastern” Palestine, under its ruler, Emir Abdullah, another son of the Sharif
of Mecca’s and a British ally, was to become independent as the Kingdom of
Trans-Jordan in 1946. Already in April 1923, however, Britain recognized Emir
Abdullah as the ruler of Trans-Jordan, pending the establishment of a
constitutional order there and the conclusion of a treaty between Britain and
Trans-Jordan.277 That Treaty was concluded on 15th May 1923, and therein

272
    As already pointed out in the case of Iraq, the other mandated territories, which were much
further advanced on the road to independence than Palestine, were also subject to various
restrictions; Kattan, supra note 6, 121; Kattan believes the argument made here to be generally
correct, but not applicable to areas classified as “A”-Mandates because, he argues, those
“communities” had been granted the right of self-determination. As has been explained earlier,
that view is not convincing.
273
    Winston Churchill, “The British White Paper”, supra note 49.
274
    Mandate for Palestine, supra note 201, art. 25; Kattan, supra note 6, at 53.
275
    The Palestine Order in Council, 10th August 1922:
<http://content.ecf.org.il/files/M00929_PalestineOrderInCouncil1922English.pdf>.
276
    This is confirmed by the Order in Council dealing with Palestinian citizenship (Order in Council
of His Majesty, 24th July 1925). Palestinian citizenship was not to be granted to residents of
Palestinian areas east of the Jordan; they became “nationals of Trans-Jordan”; Bentwich, supra
note 133, at 106; Kattan, supra note 6, at 53.
277
    Report of His Britannic Majesty’s Government on the Administration under Mandate of Palestine and
Transjordan for the year 1924, Section II, para. 2; supra note 104.



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Britain recognized Trans-Jordan as a state, albeit in need of further British
support on its road to independence.

         Although Trans-Jordan was technically still included in the Mandate, it
in reality was becoming a completely separate entity. Trans-Jordan’s
administration was much closer to Iraq’s, and thereby conformed much more
to Article 22 (4) of the Covenant than the events in western Palestine, now
Palestine.278 While the Mandate itself can hardly be reconciled with Article 22
(4) of the Covenant, its implementation in eastern Palestine, in the Emirate of
Transjordan, nevertheless, was in accordance with the Covenant, which, as
explained, is much more than can be said for (western) Palestine.




         5. CONCLUSION

The British rule in Palestine was at no point consistent with international law.
As has been shown, its occupation regime exceeded the legal limitations
imposed on occupiers of enemy territory as laid down in the 1907 Hague
Regulations. There can also be little doubt that the Palestine Mandate was not
consistent with international law. As explained, it did not violate the
Palestinian Arab’s right to self-determination, as that concept had not yet
developed into a legal right in international law, nor did it violate Article 22 (1)
of the Covenant. However, the way Palestine was to be administered and the
omission of any verifiable road map on the way to independence represented
clear violations of Articles 20 (1), 22 (4) of the Covenant. 279

         This view was widely shared in Britain at the time. Shortly after the
White Paper had been published, the British government suffered a reverse in
the House of Lords. On 21st June 1922, the House of Lords passed the following
motion:

278
    This, according to Stein, despite “Eastern Palestine” being “smaller”, “more backward” , and
only being able to “keep its head above water” with the help of British subsidies (supra note 54, at
415-416); Mansfield, supra note 159, at 208; he describes Trans-Jordan as “poor, undeveloped and
thinly populated”; Barr, supra note 21, at 359; referring to Jordan being granted independence in
1946, Barr states: “The servile nature of Jordan’s relationship with Britain was not a well-kept
secret. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union . . . . would initially recognise Jordan as an
independent state.”; Quigley, supra note 7, at 46-48.
279
    Kattan, supra note 6, at 55-56.




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          That the Mandate for Palestine in its present form is inacceptable to
          this House, because it directly violates the pledges made by His
          Majesty's Government to the people of Palestine in the Declaration
          of October, 1915, and again in the Declaration of November, 1918,
          and is, as at present framed, opposed to the sentiments and wishes
          of the great majority of the people of Palestine; that, therefore, its
          acceptance by the Council of the League of Nations should be
          postponed until such modifications have therein been effected as
          will comply with pledges given by His Majesty's Government. 280

In the debate Lord Islington, the motion’s proposer, described the Mandate as
a “distortion of the mandatory system”.281 His motion was passed by a large
majority.282

Even the British Foreign Secretary Balfour himself concurred:

          The contradiction between the letters of the Covenant and the policy
          of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of ‘independent’
          Palestine than in that of ‘independent’ Syria . . . . What I have never
          been able to understand is how it can be harmonised with the
          declaration, the Covenant, or the instructions to the Commission of
          Enquiry . . . . In short, so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers
          have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and
          no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not
          always intended to violate.283


280
    Hansard,supra note 44; for further details: Palestine Mandate defeated in Lords, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 1922, at 4; Collins, supra note 4, 157; Ingrams, supra note 1, at 169 (PRO. CO. 733/22).
281
    Hansard, Palestine Mandate, H.L. Deb. 21st June 1922 vol 50 cc994-1033, c1000; supra note 44;
“Palestine Mandate defeated in Lords”, The New York Times.
282
    Lord Islington declared: “The first point I desire to make in relation to my Motion is that those
provisions embodied in the Palestine Mandate are in direct conflict with the fundamental
principles of the mandatory system. In order to make good that point I must ask your Lordships to
listen to me while I read two governing Articles in the Covenant of the League of Nations which
represent what I call the fundamental principles of the mandatory system. They are in Article 22,
which states that ‘To those colonies and territories which, as a consequence of the late war, have
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them [...] . there should
be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust
of civilisation.’ Paragraph 4 of Article 22 goes on to say: ‘Certain communities formerly belonging
to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent
nations can be provisionally recognised, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and
assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these
communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.’ The
establishment of a Zionist Home under the Palestine Mandate, as applied to the Articles that I
have explained, is directly inconsistent with the undertakings embodied in those two Articles.”
Hansard, Palestine Mandate, H.L. Deb. 21st June 1922 vol 50 cc994-1033, c997; supra note 44.
283
    British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour in a Memorandum (11st August 1919) to Earl Curzon;
extracts reprinted in Ingrams, supra note 1, at 73 (PRO. FO. 371/4183).



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Of course, notwithstanding these sentiments, Balfour officially declared that
the terms of the Mandate were “in conformity with the spirit” and “in
compliance with” Article 22 of the Covenant. 284

         Nevertheless, in the end, the British failed to benefit from this disregard
of international law. From the first until the last day of their reign in Palestine,
they were confronted by unrest. This would lead to numerous commissions
being sent out to Palestine,285 which came to contradictory conclusions of often
dubious legality.286 Finally, Britain could only admit defeat. In 1947, Palestine
was referred to the United Nations with Britain refusing to make any
recommendations on its future status.287 In a speech to the House of Commons,
British Foreign Secretary Bevin outlined the situation as follows:

           His Majesty’s Government have . . . . thus been faced with an
           irreconcilable conflict of principles. There are in Palestine about
           1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews. For the Jews, the essential point
           of principle is the creation of a sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs,




284
    The Chief of the British Delegation, Council of the League of Nations (Balfour), to the Secretary
General of the League of Nations (Drummond), 6 December 1920; available at: U.S. Department of
State, F.R.U.S., Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1921, Volume I, 105.
285
     See, for example, the following selection: The Peel Commission (1937), Palestine Royal
Commission Report, July 1937, Cmd. 5479 (often referred to as the Peel Commission Report, because
Earl Peel had been the commission’s chairman); Palestine, Statement of Policy by His Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom, July 1937, Cmd. 5513. For the full text, see also
<http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00023167/00001>; Policy on Palestine, Despatch dated 23rd December 1937, from
the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Palestine; for the full text, see:
<https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/BBBC9DD3AED1E0E2852570D20077E7DE>;                        The
Woodhead Commission (1938), see: Palestine Partition Commission, Report, Cmd. 5854; The
MacDonald White Paper (May 1939). For the full text of the White Paper (Palestine, Statement of Policy,
Cmd. 6019), see: 20 League of Nations O.J. (1939) 363-369; also reprinted Palestine, Text of the White
Paper, TIMES, May 18th ,1939, at 9.
286
    Due to the Jew’s minority status in Palestine, the Peel Commission, for example, concluded
that the proposed new Jewish state would include 250,000 Jews and 225,000 Arabs, making it
difficult to see how the prospective state’s Jewish character was to be maintained. Therefore, the
commission suggested a population transfer between the Jewish and Arab states, meaning, as a
last resort, the compulsory transfer of Arabs out of the Jewish state (Palestine Royal Commission
Report, Chapter XXII, paras. 39, 43, 390 (statistics), 391; Keay, supra note 9, at 252). This proposal
was clearly incompatible with Articles 2, 6, and the Preamble of the Mandate. The British White
Paper of 1939, on the other hand, advocated severe restrictions as far as Jewish immigration and
land transfers to Jews were concerned. This was also clearly contrary to the Mandate. Indeed, the
majority on the Permanent Mandates Commission at the League of Nations declared the new British
policy to be “not in conformity with the Mandate” (1939 Palestine, Statement of Policy, Cmd. 6019.
“Section II, Immigration”, “Section III, Land”); British Policy in Palestine, Report of League
Commission, Times, August 18th 1939, at 10, the article goes on to state that the Commission voted 4:3
to declare British policy as incompatible with the Mandate. For extracts from the Commission’s
report, see: Palestine Policy, TIMES, August 18th, 1939, at 9; Keay, supra note 9, at 261.
287
    Dajani, supra note 78, at 38; Shlaim, supra note 9, at 21; Mansfield, supra note 159, at 234; Keay,
supra note 9, at 365.



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          the essential point of principle is to resist to the last the
          establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine . . . .

          His Majesty’s Government have of themselves no power under the
          mandate to award the country either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or
          even to partition it between them.

          It is in these circumstances that we have decided that we are unable
          either to accept the scheme put forward by the Arabs or by the Jews,
          or to impose by ourselves a solution of our own. We have, therefore,
          reached the conclusion that the only course now open to us is to
          submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations.288

All the British efforts at disguising their frequently unlawful conduct were to
no avail. When Britain finally left Palestine, it could only claim a huge loss of
resources, and a reputation tarnished by its inability to impose order in its
mandated territory. Undoubtedly, international law had been damaged during
this course of events, but even more so Britain’s prestige and influence. The
French diplomat, Robert de Caix, had predicted as much in 1917. When
confronted with British plans for Palestine, he reacted with incredulity: “The
question of an English protectorate over a Jewish Palestine scarcely arises . . . .
The British government is certainly not dreaming of it . . . . It would, for very
thin profit, provoke serious difficulties.” 289 The historian Elizabeth Monroe,
referring to the Balfour Declaration, subsequently concluded: “Measured by
British interests alone, it is one of the greatest mistakes in our imperial
history.”290 This history of blatant disregard of international law also goes a
long way in explaining the Palestinians’ past and current emphasis on issues
of legality, often cited by others as evidence of Palestinian intransigence.
Compromises will have to be made if there is to be a peaceful future. Without
an admission of past wrongs, this will be much more difficult. An




288
    For Ernest Bevin’s speech before the House of Commons, see: Hansard, Palestine Conference
(Government Policy), HC Deb 18 Feb 1947 vol 433 cc985-994, c988;
<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/feb/18/palestine-conference-government-
policy>; extracts also reprinted in The Times, “Basis of British Decision on Palestine”, 19th
February 1947, 4. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/feb/18/palestine-
conference-government-policy>; extracts also reprinted in The Times, “Basis of British Decision
on Palestine”, 19 February 1947, 4.
289
    Robert de Caix; as quoted by Barr, supra note 21, at 35.
290
    Elizabeth Monroe; as quoted by Shlaim, supra note 9, at 4.




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acknowledgement of past injustices for what they were, on the other hand,
might enable both parties to start anew on the road towards peace.




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