10.6092/issn.2531-6133/6361
The following article discusses the contradictory relationship between the concepts of the messianic and the law, and reconciles this in a critical interpretation of the legal maxim salus populi suprema lex esto. After discussing the concepts of the messianic, the law and the exception in the thought of Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Judith Butler, and others, this essay argues that there is a messianic presence in the law traceable from classical myth (particularly the myth of the Fates and Asclepius) to the figure of Jesus, the Trinity, and into contemporary constitutional structures. Appearing most clearly in the legal maxim salus populi suprema lex esto, a genealogy of the maxim is undertaken. Distinguishing the concept of health and the figure of the healer from the concept of necessity and the nomos, and demonstrating how these manifest in the maxim's opposing (mutative and conservative) meanings, the modern history of the maxim is explored. Following this, and a discussion of the interrelation of the concepts of law,  justice, and health, this essay concludes with a critical reinterpretation of the maxim, one that uncovers positive rights to water, food, housing, health care, and other conditions of health.
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Elliot Sperber
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The Messianic in the Law: Rule, Exception, Health and the Emancipatory Potential of the Legal Maxim Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto
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Elliot Sperber
2016/12/02
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The Messianic in the Law: Rule, Exception, Health and the Emancipatory Potential of the Legal Maxim Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto
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1
ARTICLES & ESSAYS                                                                    DOI 10.6092/issn.2531-6133/6361




The Messianic in the Law: Rule, Exception, Health and the
Emancipatory Potential of the Legal Maxim Salus Populi Suprema Lex
Esto

                                             ELLIOT SPERBER†



TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Introduction; 2. Law’s Ambiguity; 3. Nomos and Sherperd; 4.
Fate and Exception; 5. Health and Justice; 6. A Brief History of the Maxim; 7.
Reinterpreting the Maxim; 8. Conclusion.


ABSTRACT: The following article discusses the contradictory relationship between the
concepts of the messianic and the law, and reconciles this in a critical interpretation
of the legal maxim salus populi suprema lex esto. After discussing the concepts of the
messianic, the law and the exception in the thought of Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin,
Judith Butler, and others, this essay argues that there is a messianic presence in the
law traceable from classical myth (particularly the myth of the Fates and Asclepius) to
the figure of Jesus, the Trinity, and into contemporary constitutional structures.
Appearing most clearly in the legal maxim salus populi suprema lex esto, a genealogy of
the maxim is undertaken. Distinguishing the concept of health and the figure of the
healer from the concept of necessity and the nomos, and demonstrating how these
manifest in the maxim's opposing (mutative and conservative) meanings, the modern
history of the maxim is explored. Following this, and a discussion of the interrelation
of the concepts of law, justice, and health, this essay concludes with a critical
reinterpretation of the maxim, one that uncovers positive rights to water, food,
housing, health care, and other conditions of health.


KEYWORDS: Constitutional Theory; Legal History; Law and Literature; Political Theology; Law
and Health; Jurisprudence; The Nomos; Biopolitics.




                                           UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW

                                                   ISSN 2531-6133

                                                   [VOL.1:2 2016]

          This article is released under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License


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     1. INTRODUCTION

Although legal scholars and historians consider the claim that the U.S.
Constitution was inspired by the figure of Jesus of Nazareth to be little more
than myth,1 the figure of Jesus (or, more precisely, the messianic)
nevertheless maintains an objective, albeit unintended, presence in the
structure of the U.S. Constitution, as well as in Western law as such.

        Not only does an analysis of the relation between the U.S. Constitution
and the messianic figure of Jesus provide an opportunity to explore the often
contradictory concepts of justice and the law, on a practical level an analysis
of the presence of the messianic (in the general emancipatory sense) within
the law allows for the presentation of a theory of justice and rights
responsive to the exigencies of the early 21st century, and the demands of an
actually democratic form of politics.

        Beyond Carl Schmitt’s claim that all significant political concepts are
“secularized theological concepts,”2 or Hans Kelsen’s critique of the notion
that “the nature of modernity is Gnosticism,” 3 an examination of the relation
between law and myth reveals that present day legal structures are not only
theological, or mythical, in origin. An analysis of the structures of the trias
politica (the tripartite separation of powers schema) and the Greek Fates, and
their relation to the nomos, reveals the lingering presence of ancient models
of   order   in   present    day    constitutional     structures;    and      though          this
examination may not uncover “the metaphysical core of all politics,” 4 it may
at least uncover the theological, or mythic core of Western law and its
exception.

        By comparing these systems and their respective exceptions (the
mythical figure of Asclepius as the exception to the Fates, and the maxim


†
  Elliot Sperber is writer, attorney and theorist. He lives in New York City.
1
  See STEVEN K. GREEN, INVENTING A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE MYTH OF THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDING 3
(2015).
2
  CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 36 (George
Schwab ed. and trans., The U. of Chi. Press 2005) (1985).
3
  HANS KELSEN, SECULAR RELIGION, A POLEMIC AGAINST THE MISINTERPRETATION OF MODERN SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND POLITICS AS “NEW RELIGIONS” 262 (Clemens Jabloner et al eds., 2012).
4
  HEINRICH MEIER, CARL SCHMITT AND LEO STRAUSS: THE HIDDEN DIALOGUE 77 (Harvey Lomax trans.,
1995).




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salus populi suprema lex esto as the exception to the constitutions of the United
States of America, France, Italy, India, Pakistan, and others whose tripartite
separation of powers structure replicates that of the Fates), we can
distinguish the maxim from the maxim of necessity (necessitas vincit legem),
with which it is often conflated. Moreover, we can begin to distinguish a
critical notion of justice (related to a critical conceptualization of health)
from a model of order and public safety steeped in myth and religion,
enabling us to articulate the practical and emancipatory potential of the
Ciceronian maxim.

         After discussing the ambiguity of the concept of law, and the symbolic
manifestation of its antitheses (order and justice) in the figures of the
shepherd and the healer (which comprise two aspects, or roles, of the figure
of Jesus, as well), this essay will discuss the conceptual and symbolic
relationship between law as order and necessity (the nomos), and law as
justice and its historical and conceptual association with the concept of
health. After distinguishing the concept of necessity (and its appearance in
classical myth) from the concept of health, the figure of the healer, symbolic
of noncoercive power, and its opposition to coercive power, the nomos
(represented by the figure of the nomeus, the shepherd), will be examined.

         Appearing as an exception to a political order, functioning as a secular
messiah “associated with the destruction of the legal framework,” 5 the healer
points to affinities between the concept of health and the concept of justice.
After discussing the mythical and historical relationship between the
concepts of justice and health, and presenting a novel interpretation of the
iconography of the rod of Asclepius, the history of the maxim that the health
of the people should be the supreme law is surveyed. Employed historically to
support both conservative and emancipatory politics (the shepherd and the
healer), the maxim is discussed in the context of modern constitutional
history.




5
  Judith Butler, Critique, Coercion, and Sacred Life in Walter Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence,” in
POLITICAL THEOLOGIES: PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN A POST-SECULAR WORLD 207 (Hent De Vries & Lawrence
E. Sullivan eds., 2006).




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After examining its relation to the healer, and clarifying its emancipatory
aspects, the maxim is distinguished from another maxim, associated with
the nomos, which is concerned with bare survival, particularly the survival of
the state and coercive power (as opposed to health, wellness, and human
flourishing) – the maxim of necessity. Finally, in light of its history, and its
relation to the messianic, salus populi suprema lex esto, the maxim that the
health of the people should be the supreme law, is reinterpreted in the
context of the requirements for social, economic, and environmental justice
in the Anthropocene - the increasingly unhealthy and unjust world of the
early 21st century.




     2. LAW’S AMBIGUITY

Since at least the time of the Athenian statesman Solon, whose reforms in
the 6th century B.C.E. are credited with setting the historical stage for the
emergence of democracy in ancient Athens, the concept of law has contained
a crucial ambiguity. While the law is rightfully recognized as an instrument
of any existing order, legitimizing and maintaining a status quo, it is not by
any means restricted to this conservative function. Any consideration of its
origin raises its diametrical opposition. That is, mirroring its retentive,
conservative aspect, is law’s mutative, metamorphic one. In this respect law
may even be likened to D.N.A.; it not only clones itself (maintaining the
same), it mutates, and adjusts (a term which literally translates as ‘toward
the just’).

        This latter aspect of the law is what allowed Solon to not only nullify
the law of Draco – abolishing people’s debts, freeing debt-slaves, and
constraining the power of Athens’ ancient oligarchy 6 – but enabled a
relatively egalitarian redistribution of the social world of the ancient
Athenians to occur as well. And while it is important to note that this
egalitarianism did not extend to women, slaves, and other excluded people,
and so exposes the limitations of Athenian democracy, it does not diminish
the emancipatory potential of this mutative aspect of the law.
6
  See PLUTARCH, THE RISE AND FALL OF ATHENS 60-61 (Ian Scott-Klivert trans., Penguin Classics
1960).




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Law as such is constituted by this very contradiction. Unstable, it is forever
adjusting and responding to the flux of the living world. Beside the
inanimate letter of the law that a given order enshrines and appeals to for
support and legitimacy, is its living, vital aspect – justice, the unwritten,
divine law that, among others, Martin Luther King, in his Letter from a
Birmingham Jail, argued trumps the written law of human beings. And though
King, in paraphrasing Augustine of Hippo that “an unjust law is no law at
all,”7 seems to resolve the contradiction between these two types of law, in
the diametrically opposed symbolic appearance of shepherd and healer, the
figure of Jesus expresses both of law’s contrary, overlapping, modes – and
maintains, leaving unresolved, the contradiction.

         In his role as shepherd, central to the institution of the pastorate, with
its emphasis on obedience, the figure of Jesus is not only a part of, but is also
symbolic of, the structure of the Trinity – a structure reflected in the U.S.
Constitution’s separation of powers schema. Norm and nomos, the shepherd,
or nomeus, represent the conservative modes of law: order, tradition,
precedent, obedience. Simultaneously, as a healer, the figure of Jesus appears
as the exception, or deactivation, of the law. Not only does Jesus, the healer,
oppose the law with grace; the healer is immanent in the ancient legal maxim
and metanorm salus populi suprema lex esto. As the following will demonstrate,
the contradiction of this double (antithetical) presence (of shepherd and
healer) is entirely reconcilable.




     3. NOMOS AND SHEPHERD

“All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized
theological concepts,” argued Carl Schmitt in his Political Theology,8
advancing the claim put forth by, among others, the philosophical giant
Leibniz back in the 17th century that there is a “systematic relationship
between jurisprudence and theology.”9 The theological, however, beyond the
merely conceptual and abstract, has determined the concrete structures of

7
  MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT (1964).
8
  SCHMITT, supra note 2, at 5.
9
  Id. at 37.




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legal systems and, consequently, the concrete world as well. In addition to
works of scholarship illuminating the degree to which secular legal concepts
and religious traditions overlap and interact, 10 in his The Kingdom and the
Glory contemporary philosopher and classical scholar Giorgio Agamben
discusses how the medieval administrative structures and institutions of the
Catholic Church mirror contemporary constitutional and administrative legal
structures. In particular, Agamben points out the degree to which the
structure of the Church’s Trinity corresponds to that other tripartite schema
of order, the separation of powers schema (the trias politica) handed down
from Montesquieu.11

         Indeed, it is not terribly difficult to see how the father – god, the
creator – has an analogue in the creative branch of the government, the
legislature. Nor is it difficult to recognize how the son, often referred to as
the one who judges, can be seen to correspond to the institution of the
judiciary. Lastly, the Holy Spirit – defined by the Fourth Lateral Council of
1215 as that “who proceeds” – corresponds to the executive branch. Insofar
as the verb ‘to execute’ means to carry out fully, the executive branch of
government conforms to this notion of one “who proceeds” quite closely.
Because the figure of Jesus is not merely one aspect of the Trinity, however,
but is symbolically inseparable from the Trinity (the basis for the institution
of the pastorate) one may arguably see an echo of Jesus (however
metonymically) in the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers structure –
the trias politica – as a whole. This aspect of the law, the conservative aspect
of order and norms, the nomos, may be regarded as one aspect of Jesus in the
law, the aspect of the shepherd.

         Hardly a novel coupling, the figure of the shepherd and the
conservative aspect of the law have a long and deep association. As such, it is
hardly surprising that the Greek word nomos (the conservative law of social
convention, tradition, norms, and culture generally, as opposed to nature12) is



10
   See Peter Goodrich, The Political Theology of Private Law, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 146 (2013) in which
Goodrich discusses the relationship between marriage and contract law.
11
   See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE KINGDOM AND THE GLORY 141-43 (2011).
12
   Dermot Moran, The Secret Folds of Nature, in REIMAGINIG NATURE: ENVIRONMENTAL HUMANITIES AND
ECOSEMIOTICS 111 (Alfred Kentigern Siewers ed., 2014).




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derived from the Greek for pasturing (nemein)13 and etymologically related to
the Greek word for shepherd, nomeus. Indeed, the conservative, traditional
aspect of the law, the social order that demands obedience, has been
associated with shepherds for over four millennia. From the ancient
Mesopotamian Epic of Gilgamesh, which apprises us that “the king should be a
shepherd to his people,”14 to the Sumerian myth of the shepherd-god Dumuzi
(consort of the fertility goddess Inanna/Ishtar), to countless images of
Egyptian Pharaohs wielding a shepherd’s crook to the shepherd turned
lawgiver Moses, to David, the shepherd turned King; from the Old Testament
(Genesis, Isaiah, etc.), to the New Testament, and from Plato 15 to the
medieval poem Beowulf,16 the nomos (the law as custom, tradition, and
authority) has been intertwined with the nomeus, the shepherd (associated
not merely with the King or a god, but with law, authority, and power in
general) since the earliest days of civilization.

         It is this, the symbolic shepherd’s demand for obedience and control,
that results in a naturalized though ultimately arbitrary social order, one that
the sociologist Peter Berger referred to as the nomos – that construct in which
customs and tradition merge “with what are considered to be the
fundamental meanings of the universe.” 17 Likewise, the concept of the nomos
is central to Carl Schmitt’s later writings. Expressing a comprehensive “unity
of space and law,”18 a nomos for Schmitt is an entire social world, a concrete
and cultural ideology that proceeds from an initial conquest of land or
territory.19 And, considering how politics and war are virtually indistinct in
Schmitt’s thought, it is hardly incidental that the concrete and cultural order,
that is the nomos, proceeds from this originary violence. Nor is it irrelevant
that, just as the shepherd demands obedience, Schmitt’s “political theology
places everything under the commandment to be obedient.” 20 Just as



13
   See, e.g., Benno Gerhard Teschke, Fatal Attraction: A Critique of Carl Schmitt’s International Political
and Legal Theory, 3 INT’L THEORY 179, 193 (2011).
14
   EPIC OF GILGAMESH 4 (Andrew George trans., Penguin Classics 2003).
15
   See PLATO, THE STATESMAN 10, 29 (Julia Annas & Robin Waterfield eds., Robin Waterfield trans.,
Cambridge U. Press 2000) in which the perfect statesman is equated with a shepherd.
16
   BEOWULF 200 (Seamus Heaney trans.,W. W. Norton & Company 2000).
17
   PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY 24-25 (Anchor Books Editions 1990)(1967).
18
   Teschke, supra note 13, at 193.
19
   Id.
20
   MEIER, SCHMITT & STRAUSS, supra note 4, at 80.




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Schmitt’s political theology is rooted in obedience and faith, 21 as opposed to
critical thought, subtending Schmitt’s nomos, with its emphasis on obedience
and order, is that blending and institutionalization of the shepherd and the
law that we find in the institution of the pastorate of the Christian Church.

        In his studies of governmentality and biopolitics, Michel Foucault
devotes a lengthy examination to this institution of the pastorate and the
specific form of power it wields.22 Referring to the type of power associated
with the shepherd (the power a shepherd exerts over a flock, which includes
panoptic surveillance along with the determination of all aspects of the
concrete context, and the obedience demanded in return) as pastoral power,
Foucault describes the pastorate as being comprised of certain characteristics,
foremost among which is that of “pure obedience.” 23

        While the story is most likely apocryphal, the “perfect obedience” and
“complete servitude” demanded by this type of political power is nicely
illustrated by an anecdote related by Ernst Kantorowicz in his The King’s Two
Bodies in which Attila the Hun arrives at the gates of a Christian town and
demands entrance. Asked by the bishop to identify himself, Attila the Hun
reputedly announced that he was the scourge of god. Ever obedient to power,
the bishop admitted the Hun, and was promptly eviscerated,24 cut down by
the sword of Attila (which, according to legend, was presented to him by a
shepherd).

        All of which is to say, as Foucault argues, the pastorate is a form of
power. And though, with its demands for submission, it is a predominately
coercive type of power (heteronomy, potestas),25 practical concerns dictate
that this power have some degree, however slight, of flexibility. For an
example of an absolute, essential form of power we must turn our attention
away from concrete, historically manifesting instances of power to the
abstract realm of myth where coercive power’s essence – total determination,




21
   Id.,at 68.
22
    See MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION 170 (Arnold I. Davidson ed., Graham
Burchell trans., 2004).
23
   Id. at 178.
24
   See ERNST KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES 54-55 (7th paperback printing, 1997.
25
   FOUCAULT, supra note 22, at 150-1.




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the tyrannical demand for complete submission and obedience – finds eidetic
expression in the Fates, or Moirai, of Greek myth.

Not only do The Fates illustrate the nomos (as a totality symbolic of a unity of
space and law), by following the law of the shepherd to its purest
representation we are also pointed to the diametrical opposition, the
exception, to the shepherd, and the second form in which Jesus appears in
Law – the healer, who not only contests but prevails over the “Hellenic or
‘mythic violence’”26 of the Fates.




        4. FATE AND EXCEPTION


While the trias politica, the separation of powers schema of the U.S.
Constitution, among others, and the Trinity correspond very closely, today’s
constitutional arrangement can be traced to an entity that predates the
Trinity – not to mention the mixed constitutions described by Polybius and
Aristotle – by centuries. Moreover, not only do the Greek Moirai, or Fates,
substantially predate the Trinity, its tripartite structure matches the U.S.
Constitution’s separation of power schema exactly.

            Like the single power (potestas) that, according to the tria politicas
principle, is separated into legislative, judicial and executive branches – and
the Trinity, which is one thing with three distinct aspects – the Fates are one
force comprised of three aspects. The three daughters of Ananke are Klotho
(the spinner), Lachesis (the measurer), and Atropos (the cutter).

            Spinning the thread of life, Klotho corresponds to the creator of laws,
the legislature. Lachesis, whose function is to measure the thread of life, is
typically depicted with a scroll in her hand. She corresponds to the judiciary.
And it is interesting to note that, aside from the fact that measuring implies a
rule, or law, as a noun a measure is itself a rule or law. Thirdly, there is
Atropos. Known as the cutter, Atropos’ name translates as “the inflexible,” or
“the inevitable.” The cutter of the thread of life, Atropos’ analogue is the
executive branch. And it is telling that, in describing his executive function,

26
     Butler, supra note 5, at 203.




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former president George W. Bush famously characterized himself as “the
decider” (a designation that, etymologically, means to cut – unwittingly
drawing the executive and the cutter even closer).

        While the Fates manifest the nomos (in the general sense of an
ideological or mythical order, as well as in the sense it has for Carl Schmitt,
for whom “the political remains essentially fate” 27), it is worth pointing out
that, according to Hesiod at least,28 the three sisters are the offspring of
Themis (herself the personification of law, or the nomos). According to other
authorities, foremost among whom is Plato, the mother of the three Fates is
not the titan Themis, but an even more elemental entity: one of the
Protogenoi, or primordial deities, Ananke.29

        Known to the Romans as Necessitas, Ananke, it should be noted, was
the personification of Necessity. And, according to the maxim believed to
have been first formulated in the Decretum of Gratian in the 12th century,30 it
is equally pertinent to note that Necessity is said to both justify law and
create law. Generating the Fates, Ananke/Necessity is hardly distinct, then,
from the nomos, the law of the shepherd – illustrating the fact that, as
Giorgio Agamben reminds us, throughout history jurists have maintained
that the principle of necessity lies at the very root of law. 31 That is, politically,
mythologically,      and     mythically,     Necessity     subtends      legitimizations             of
political and legal orders. As such, it seems to reflect more than mere
coincidence (and, as “mythos” arguably “reveals, discloses, and lets be
seen”32 the otherwise hidden historical fact) that Klotho, Lachesis and Atropos
mirror Montesquieu’s, and the U.S. Constitution’s, tripartite separation of
powers schema (i.e., the structure of the nomos).

        To be sure, whether they are said to be the issue of Themis or Ananke,
both sources of the Fates are associated with law and the nomos. Those

27
   See MEIER, SCHMITT & STRAUSS, supra note 4, at 70. See also id. at 68-9, where Meier discusses
how Schmitt’s thought is rooted in faith, a faith which leads to obligation, and that “Schmitt
cannot understand the obligatoriness of the political in any other way than as fate.”
28
   See HESIOD, THEOGONY 41 (Richard S. Caldwell trans., 1987).
29
   See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 340 (Giovanni R. F. Ferrari ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
30
    See DIANE A. DESIERTO, NECESSITY AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY CLAUSES: SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN
TREATY INTERPRETATION 64, n.4, (2012)., Quia enim necessitas non habet legem, set ipsa sibi facit
legem (necessity knows no law but makes law).
31
   See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 25 (2005).
32
   MARTIN HEIDEGGER, PARMENIDES 60 (Indiana U. Press 1992).




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traditions that regard the Moirai as extensions of Ananke, however, may bear
a closer relationship to the nomos, the law of the shepherd. For, among its
other attributes, Necessity is that which cannot be avoided – its essence is
that which must be obeyed (that which, like the shepherd, demands total
subordination). Indeed, for Jean Bodin, the originator of the modern notion of
sovereignty, it is precisely this, “urgent necessity,” that releases a sovereign
from the duty to assure and protect “the interests of the people.” 33

         Furthermore, Ananke is typically associated with Bia, the goddess of
force, compulsion and violence34 – the “sine qua non” of the nomos. And, as
Leo Strauss points out, not only Parmenides and Thucydides, but Greek
thought generally equated necessity with what was compulsory; and the
“alternative to compulsion was right,”35 the unwritten law. Atropos, the
unyielding, and its negation, illustrates the conceptual contradistinction
inhering between law and justice. Substantiating this, Bia is counterposited in
Greek myth to Dike (justice),36 corroborating Walter Benjamin’s observation
in his Critique of Violence that “violence crowned by fate is the origin of the
law.”37 And yet, for all of the insuperable, unyielding power of the Fates, like
Law, the rule of the Fates has a (messianic) exception, “a distinct alternative
to mythic power.”38

         Although none can defy the Fates, and even Zeus, “who is more
powerful than all of the gods combined,”39 can do nothing to alter the
decisions of the Fates,40 the son of a god, a healer, who is referred to again
and again as “savior,”41 able to restore sight to the blind and raise the dead –
and who is ultimately killed and raised to the heavens as a god for his
transgressions against the nomos – is able to act beyond the Fates’ powers.


33
   SCHMITT, supra note 2, at 8.
34
   See, e.g., GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER 31 (1998).
35
   LEO STRAUSS, Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, in THE CITY AND MAN 174-77 (U. of Chi. Press 1978).
36
   Id.
37
   WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS 286 (1978).
38
   Butler, supra note 5, at 207.
39
    See LISA RAPHALS, Fatalism, Fate, and Stratagem in China and Greece, in EARLY CHINA/ANCIENT
GREECE: THINKING THROUGH COMPARISONS 224 (Steven Shankman, et al eds., 2002). See also
AESCHYLUS, Prometheus Bound, in THE COMPLETE GREEK TRAGEDIES: AESCHYLUS I 194 (Richard
Lattimore et al. eds., David Grene trans. 2013) in which Prometheus says of Zeus that “[Yes, for]
he, too, cannot escape what is fated.”
40
   See PLATO, supra note 29, at 218.
41
   See, e.g., JAMES H. CHARLESWORTH, THE GOOD AND EVIL SERPENT 164 (2010).




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The exception to the ancient nomos, the only figure able to act outside the
rule of the Fates, is the son of Apollo, Asclepius.

            Related to his function as exception, it is noteworthy that Asclepius’
name translates as “cut open.” Though this name derives from the
conditions surrounding his birth (cut from the womb of his mother, Koronis),
it also bears an inverted relation to the function of Atropos (i.e., cutting the
causal chain). In cutting, Atropos decides – executes, and, according to Carl
Schmitt’s definition of the sovereign as “he who decides on the exception,” 42
appears to manifest sovereignty through a decision. Contesting this sovereign
decision, Asclepius provides a countervailing sovereignty – or nullification, or
deactivation, of sovereignty. For through his healing practice Asclepius
demonstrates that he is not bound by the rule of the Fates. By raising the son
of Theseus, Hippolytus, from the dead, for instance, Asclepius operates
outside the nomos – beyond not only the arbitrary rule of traditional
authority and custom, but outside of Necessity/Ananke itself.

            Not merely able to operate outside the nomos, Asclepius is able to
rewrite (by raising the dead, for instance, and retroactively changing or
annulling Fate) what the Fates had previously decided. Illustrating Kelsen’s
critique of decisionistic notions of sovereignty as failing to account for the
power to make and unmake law,43 Asclepius’ acts demonstrate not only that
he is outside, or beyond, the power of the Fates, but that they are, as it turns
out, subsumed by his. In the battle of their respective sovereignties (or, in the
battle between sovereignty and its deactivation), Asclepius prevails, though
not by overpowering the Fates. Asclepius’ power is not quantitatively, but
qualitatively different from that of the Fates. Unlike the coercive power of the
shepherd (the potestas – force and violence) that demands obedience,
Asclepius manifests the power of the healer – a generative power analogous
to Spinoza’s potentia. Rather than the transcendent, smothering power of the
Fates, the immanent power of Asclepius is an enabling power. Enabling
autonomy, as opposed to heteronomy, the healer may be said to possess the
power to deactivate force – a type of power not unlike what anthropologist
Pierre       Clastres     described     as   noncoercive   political   power       among          the

42
     SCHMITT, supra note 2, at 5.
43
     See KELSEN, supra note 3, at 18.




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Tupinamba, and the Jivaro, 44 or what in Judith Butler’s reading of Walter
Benjamin’s Critique of Violence is associated with the notion of noncoercive
“divine violence.”45 Indeed, although Asclepius’ and Atropos’ respective
decisions may not illustrate the distinction between Carl Schmitt’s “genuine
decision” and its “degenerate” counterpart 46 (and the states of emergency
extending from them), the decisions of Atropos and Asclepius may be
illustrative of the distinction between the state of emergency and the “real
state of emergency”47 Benjamin refers to in his Theses on the Philosophy of
History.

         Along with the incarnation of force, Bia, the Fates are subsumed by
and subordinated to the healer who manifests law as recht, as opposed to
gesetz – not force, but a type of righteousness. And it is in this context all the
more relevant that the word salvation (the essence of the figure of Jesus,
which is also the purview of the healer, the “savior”) is derived from the
Greek verb ‘to heal.’ For not only are the figures of Jesus and Asclepius both
healers,48 the two share a similar messianic function; not merely the secular
or political messianism of Marxism, 49 or of a messianic class,50 but the
broader secular notion of the messianic “associated with the destruction of
the legal framework”51 and the delivery of people from the tyranny of the
nomos. Or, as Jacques Derrida put it, a “demand for salvation and for justice
beyond law.”52

         Acting outside of the nomos, and exposing what was thought to be
necessary as arbitrary, the command that demands faith and pure obedience
(the purview of the Fates, nomos, potestas, and heteronomy) is revealed by
Asclepius to be not only illusory, but tyrannical. As such, we see in the figure
of the healer generally not only a manifestation of noncoercive, emancipatory


44
    PIERRE CLASTRES, SOCIETY AGAINST THE STATE 30 (Robert Hurley & Abe Stein trans., Zone Books
Rev. ed., 1989).
45
   See Butler, supra note 5, at 207.
46
   See SCHMITT, supra note 2, at 3.
47
   Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS: ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS
257 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1968).
48
   See CHARLESWORTH, supra note 41, at 371. Asclepius is “virtually a mirror of the story of Jesus.”
49
   See KELSEN, supra note 3, at 44.
50
   Id. at 8.
51
   See Butler, supra note 5, at 207.
52
   See JACQUES DERRIDA ET AL., SPECTRES OF MARX: THE STATE OF DEBT, THE WORK OF MOURNING AND THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL 210 (Peggy Kamuf trans., Routledge 2006) (1993).




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power, autonomy, and potentia, but justice (the overcoming of an arbitrary
determination) prevailing over, or overruling, law.

         This contrast between the shepherd and the healer finds further
expression in the symbolism of the symbolism. The shepherd, the nomeus,
carries the staff – the scepter, the rigid, unyielding letter of the law. And it is
noteworthy that the staff, insofar as it is a phallus (associated with the
symbolic order generally, according to Lacan, and with the law in
particular53), is related to law in this respect as well. As the legal scholar
Joseph Indaimo observes: “it is the masculine phallus which is the symbolic
expression for the power and logic of traditional politico-legal institutions.”54

         The healer Asclepius, meanwhile, is not represented by the staff alone
but by a staff constrained by a serpent. Symbolic of Asclepius, and his
daughter, Hygieia, aka Salus (as well as, according to the Ophidians – early
Gnostics who worshiped Jesus as a serpent 55 – the figure of Jesus himself),
the serpent, as opposed to the staff, is flexible, rather than rigid, living,
rather than dead. Symbolic of wisdom, the serpent may be said to represent
not simply the generative, healing power (known to classical thought as the
vis medicatrix naturae, associated with the life force itself) but the mutative
function of the law of the healer.56

         Among many others, the story of the physician Eustochius of
Alexandria illustrates this symbolism. A follower of the neo-Platonic
philosopher Plotinus, Eustochius reported that, as the philosopher lay dying,
a serpent mysteriously appeared in his chamber. And just as the serpent
disappeared into a hole in the wall, into another realm, Plotinus died.57
Though most likely apocryphal, this tale nevertheless reflects the symbolic



53
  ALEXANDRA HOWSON, EMBODYING GENDER 103 (2005).
54
   . JOSEPH A. INDAIMO, THE SELF, ETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, LACAN, LEVINAS, AND ALTERITY 88 (2015).
Incidentally, the term phallus is related to the Greek phalle – which means whale, and is closely
associated in the cultural imaginary with the leviathan – which for Hobbes is symbolic of the
potestas.
55
    See CHARLESWORTH, supra note 41, at 36.
56
     It should be noted that the mutative and retentive aspects of the law of the healer and the
mutative and retentive aspects of the law of the shepherd are distinct. Whereas the former tends
to radiate, or distribute its surplus, the latter strives toward concentration. Concentrations of
power are but one manifestation of this tendency.
57
    See M.J. Edwards, Birth, Death, and Divinity in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus in GREEK BIOGRAPHY AND
PANEGYRIC IN LATE ANTIQUITY 59 (Tomas Hagg & Philip Rousseau eds., 2000).




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value of the serpent in classical thought. Not the serpent of Adam and Eve58,
but the serpent who, in eating its tail (like the ouroboros), and in sloughing
off its skin, represents renewal, regeneration, noncoercive power and, by
extension, autonomy.

        Relatedly, the lawgiver Moses, who had worked as a shepherd for
years in Midian, carried a rod that was instrumental to the realization of his
powers. But while his staff was generally stiff and unyielding, in performing
the role of an emancipator of the enslaved Hebrews, his rod was transformed
into a flexible, living serpent.

        In light of this symbolism, rather than simply symbolic of deliverance
from death,59 we may recognize the serpent-entwined rod of Asclepius as
symbolic of the healer’s noncoercive power prevailing over, and constraining,
the coercive, unbending power, and demand for obedience, of the law of the
shepherd. Relatedly, we may also view the fasces – the bundle of rods, or
hypertrophied rod, that is symbolic of coercive power and authority, i.e.,
mythic power – as the symbolic antithesis of the rod of Asclepius.

        None of this, however, should be construed to support the argument
that Hans Kelsen critiqued in his Secular Religion – i.e., that modernity is
characterized by a hidden gnostic order.60 Rather, the structural resemblances
between the trias politica and the Fates point to the presence of mythical
structures embedded not merely in subjective beliefs but, to some degree, in
objective structures and traditions – structures in conflict with properly
modern structures that, as Kelsen notes, go “hand in hand with emancipation
from religion.”61 In light of this it is no small irony that in the 1920s, decades
before writing his Secular Religion, Kelsen helped draft the Austrian
constitution, which incorporated the trias politica, this theological echo of the




58
    Not only do Adam and Eve not know the difference between good and evil in the story of
Genesis, Yahweh wants to keep them ignorant of this knowledge. That is, he wants to prevent
them from thinking for themselves, from developing autonomy. In leading them to negate a
command that has no other reason than obedience – i.e., the shepherd – the serpent contests
this nomos. And, though arguably not terribly successfully, the serpent contributes in this
respect to the development of autonomy over heteronomy, too.
59
   See CHARLESWORTH, supra note 41, at 164.
60
   See KELSEN, supra note 3, at 262.
61
   Id. at 269.




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Trinity and the Fates.62 Yet, this ancient mythical schema does not only
perpetuate ancient superstitions and traditions. In both the myth of Asclepius
and, in a more ambiguous way, in its analogue, the maxim salus populi
suprema lex esto, the superstitious order’s negation is embedded as well.
Contrary to the determinism of the Fates, Asclepius, and the caring healer in
general, contests traditional orders, arguably symbolizing an unconscious
recognition that, among others, human health and flourishing are contrary to
traditional authority, order and force.




     5. HEALTH AND JUSTICE

But it is not simply the heteronomy of the Fates that is trumped by the
emancipatory, noncoercive power of the healer. The law of custom (common
sense, ideology, traditional authority – the nomos), and of the written law in
particular, with its reliance on precedent (the principle of stare decisis), is
trumped by the law as justice; not justice in the narrow, punitive sense of
retribution – of the equilibrium of jus talionis, in which the weight of an eye
is balanced out by the weight of another eye – but the equilibrium of
egalitarian social conditions necessary for the actualization of a healthy and
just society.

         In addition to its relation to the concept of value,             63
                                                                               health has a deep
conceptual relationship with the notion of justice. Reflective of this kinship,
everyday speech is replete with examples of the interchangeability of the
language of justice and the language of health. When speaking of being
wronged, for instance, one frequently expresses this in nominally medical
language, remarking that one “suffers a harm,” or “is injured.” While the
language of justice appears to be employing a type of medical metaphor,
however, the term injury literally translates as ‘not,’ or ‘the opposite of’
right, law, or justice. In other words, the language of justice does not employ


62
   See David Ingram, A Morally Enlightened Positivism? Kelsen and Habermas on the Democratic Roots
of Validity in Municipal and International Law, in HANS KELSEN IN AMERICA – SELECTIVE AFFINITIES AND
THE MYSTERIES OF ACADEMIC INFLUENCE 202 (D.A. Jeremy Telman ed., 2016).
63
   Beyond that reification of value, money, the word value itself derives from the Latin word for
health, valetudo.




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a medical metaphor in this case, so much as medical language appeals to
notions of justice in the articulation of its most basic concepts. Similarly,
notions of justice are often borrowed from the terminology of health. For
example, the remedy for many types of legal wrongs, or injuries, is ‘to be
made whole’ – and whole, like the word hale, derives from the word health.64

        These metaphorical and symbolic associations reflect more than a
superficial relationship. In many respects the material and social conditions
necessary for the development of a genuine, general notion of health (not
simply the health of individuals, but the health of communities and their
general environment) may be said to be homologous with conditions of actual
social justice. Hardly an outlier, when it comes to expressing the conceptual
and symbolic relationship between health and justice, the myth of Asclepius
is one of many illustrating the overlap, or greater unity, of the two concepts.

        In Hesiod’s Works and Days (c. 700 B.C.E.), for example, a work whose
authority, along with his Theogony, is rivaled only by the epics of Homer, we
are told that in the mythical Golden Age, people were not only free from the
need to perform physical labor, human beings were free from disease
altogether. It was only after Prometheus stole fire and granted this
technology to humankind, Hesiod apprises us, that people had to work, and
grew sick, and died. “Before this time men lived upon the earth/ Apart from
sorrow and painful work/ Free from disease, which brings the death-Gods
in.”65 Disease had been released from the jar of Pandora as a punishment.

        Frequently depicted in ancient myth, plagues and epidemics were
explained as divine retribution for transgressions of the law or as
consequences stemming from insults to the gods. At the opening of
Homer’s Iliad, “the basic text of European civilization,”66 the leader of the

64
   See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, The root of health, the Old English hEl, related to Hale, means
“Wholeness, a being whole, sound or well.”
65
   See Hesiod, Works and Days in HESIOD AND THEOGNIS 61-62 (Dorothea Wender trans., 1976).
 Hesiod recounts that had Prometheus not provoked Zeus “you [people] would easily do work
enough in a day to supply you for a full year even without working” 44-47, an amount of daily
work only moderately less than what anthropologist MARSHALL SAHLINS argues in THE ORIGINAL
AFFLUENT SOCIETY, and STONE AGE ECONOMICS, was the typical workload of early human beings; see
also MARK NATHAN COHEN, HEALTH AND THE RISE OF CIVILIZATION 32-53 (1989), in which the author
describes how diseases, from the common cold and the flu to tuberculosis, were introduced to
humankind through animal domestication, i.e. by civilization.
66
   See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 37 (Gunzelin Schmid
Noerr ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., Stanford U. Press 2002) (1987).




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assembled Greek forces, Agamemnon, insults Apollo’s priest Chryses. As a
punishment for this insult, Apollo ravages the Greek army with plague. 67 And
who can forget how, in the story of Oedipus Rex, the city of Thebes is afflicted
by a “grievous plague” as a consequence of Oedipus’ unintentional patricide
and matrophilia. Of course, the nexus of justice and health is not at all limited
to the realm of myth.

         Contemporaries of Sophocles, the writers of the Hippocratic Corpus,
rejected the superstitious notion that disease was of divine origin. In spite of
their rejection, however, they continued to assert that a strong relationship
existed between justice and health. In following the Hippocratic Oath (late
5th century B.C.E.), for instance, physicians not only submitted to the well-
known oath to “do no harm” to their patients, physicians swore to keep their
patients “from harm and injustice” as well. 68

         Among other places, the source of this plexus of justice and health lies
in the Ancient Greek regard for proportionality and harmony. As Ivan Illich
writes, “For Greek philosophers ‘healthy’ was a concept for harmonious
mingling, balanced order. A rational interplay of the basic elements. He was
healthy who integrated himself into the harmony of the totality of his world
according to the time and place he had come into the world.” 69

         Healthy means balanced, and proportional. And just as health was
regarded as an extension of this proportionality, harmony, and balance, so
too was justice. As Ernst Bloch apprises us, since Pythagoras “justice has
been thought without hesitation as proportionality par excellence.” 70

         A contemporary of Pythagoras, one of the most eminent medical
theorists of antiquity, provides us with further evidence of the homology of
justice and health. In his Concerning Nature Alcmaeon of Croton not only
defined health “as the proportionate blending of the qualities.”                         71
                                                                                              He also
maintained “that the equality (isonomia) of the powers (wet, dry, cold, hot,


67
   See HOMER, THE ILIAD, Book I (Collins ed., Robert Fitzgerald trans., 1986).
68
    See generally LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, ANCIENT MEDICINE: SELECTED PAPERS OF LUDWIG EDELSTEIN 6
(Owsei Temkin et Clarice Lilian Temkin eds., Clarice Lilian Temkin trans., 1987).
69
   See Ivan Illich, Brave New Biocracy: Health Care from Womb to Tomb, NEW PERSP. Q., Winter 1994,
at 4-12.
70
   ERNST BLOCH, NATURAL LAW AND HUMAN DIGNITY 40 (Dennis J. Schmidt trans., 1987).
71
   EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY 90 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1987).




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bitter, sweet, etc.) maintains health but that monarchy [a harmful
concentration] among them produces disease.”72 Beyond his definition of
health, by equating disease with the explicitly political notion of monarchy,
Alcmaeon drew the concepts of justice and health even closer.

         This connection was developed further when, about a century later (c.
380 B.C.E.),       in   outlining      what     he    reasoned      was the perfect                social
arrangement, Plato wrote in his Republic that, among its other qualities, the
“true city” is the “healthy version.”73 In contrast, the other version, the
luxurious one, is “the swollen and inflamed city.” 74

         Leading up to this comparison, Socrates informs us that in “looking at
the origin of a luxurious city [the unhealthy one] … we may perhaps see the
point where justice and injustice come into existence in cities,” 75 drawing a
direct connection between justice and health in the art of government.

         As the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer put it, “in Plato’s great
utopia of the Republic the true part of the citizen in the ideal state is described
in terms of health, as a harmony in which everything is in accord, in which
even the fateful problem of governing and being governed is resolved through
reciprocal agreement and mutual interaction.”76

         And though the political philosopher Leo Strauss, in his course on
Plato’s Gorgias, noted that “justice is restoration of health of the soul,” 77 the
conceptual relationship between justice and health must be construed to
include the health of the body as well. For even if the soul were not regarded
as a property of the body, physical health was an aspect of the good, the




72
   See IAIN M. LONIE, THE HIPPOCRATIC TREATISES “ON GENERATION” “ON THE NATURE OF THE CHILD”
“DISEASES IV” 330 (Gerhard Baader et al eds., 1981).
73
   See PLATO, supra note 29, at 55; the city which, incidentally, is referred to as the “city of pigs”
owing to the vegetarian dishes typically eaten there, described by Socrates describes a typical
meal in this healthy city. The description that generates his interlocutor’s ire, and thereby
inspires the appellation City of Pigs, is of a vegetarian meal – olives, wild roots and vegetables,
chickpeas, beans, figs, cheese, myrtle berries and acorns.
74
   Id.
75
   Id.
76
    See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, THE ENIGMA OF HEALTH 75 (Jason Gaiger & Nicholas Walker
 trans., 1996).
77
    See LEO STRAUSS, PLATO’S GORGIAS, A COURSE OFFERED IN THE AUTUMN QUARTER, 1963 AT THE
UNIVERSITY          OF          CHICAGO          (Devin          Stauffer           ed.,         1963)
https://leostrausscenter.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/Plato's%20Gorgias%201963.pdf




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actualization of which is the aim of law. As Aristotle writes in his Politics:
“Eudaimonia is the aim of the constitution.”78

         Notoriously difficult to render into English, eudaimonia literally
translates as “good spirit.” And though the term happiness has traditionally
been employed, eudaimonia is just as often translated as “wellbeing,” not to
mention “doing and living well.”79 In attempting to articulate a more
accurate definition, the term “human flourishing” has been adopted in recent
years by scholars.80

         Eudaimonia, Aristotle tells us in Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics, “is
the best, noblest and most pleasant thing in the world.” 81 Referring to the
inscription at Delos, which defines the most pleasant as winning what we
love, the most noble as that which is most just, and the best as
health,82 Aristotle writes that “these attributes are not severed.” 83 In other
words, health is a constitutive element of eudaimonia. Because Aristotle’s
notion of eudaimonia subsumes health – as a necessary precondition for its
realization – and because he writes that eudaimonia is the aim of the
constitution, health is implicitly the aim of the law as well.

         Importantly for the present study, this notion finds lasting expression
in the Roman legal maxim salus populi suprema lex esto – the health of the
people should be the supreme law. Derived from the writings of the Roman
statesman       Marcus       Tullius     Cicero84 (whose        notion      of    justice,        echoes
Hippocrates’ oath insofar as it “requires, first, not doing any harm to
anyone”85), this legal maxim continues to this day to function as a


78
   See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 426 (Trevor Saunders ed., Penguin Books 1992).
79
    See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 4-5 (David Ross trans., Oxford U. Press 1991);
equivalent to Aristotle’s concept of eu zen, good life.
80
   Whether regarded as constitutive of happiness, or flourishing, health is associated with each
in ancient thought. Ariphron of Sicyon (c. 550 B.C.E.) wrote of Hygieia that “without you no man
is happy.” [Ariphron, Fragment 813, in V GREEK LYRIC: THE NEW SCHOOL OF POETRY AND ANONYMOUS
SONGS AND HYMNS (David A. Campbell trans. 1993)] Also said of Hygieia: “Every house is
flourishing and fair, if with rejoicing aspect thou art there.” ORPHIC HYMN 67, TO HYGIEIA (Thomas
Taylor trans., 1792)
81
   See ARISTOTLE, supra note 79, at 17.
82
   Id.
83
   Id.
84
    See ANDREW R. DYCK, A COMMENTARY ON CICERO, DE LEGIBUS 459 (2003) where Dyck writes that
the maxim appears several times in Cicero’s work on law, DE LEGIBUS (c. 51 B.C.E.), as well as
appearing 18 times in his speeches and “is virtually Ciceronian property.”
85
   See Martha Nussbaum, Duties Of Justice, Duties Of Material Aid: Cicero’s Problematic Legacy, 8 J. OF
POL. PHIL. 176, 181 (2000).




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constitutional metanorm, capable of nullifying those laws that conflict with
it. Replicating the god of medicine Asclepius’ function as exception to the
Fates, Asclepius’ daughter, the goddess of health Hygieia, known to the
Romans as the goddess Salus,86 finds her way into the maxim that functions
as an exception to the law. Insofar as it ushers the healer into the law (the
exception to the shepherd), Salus (translated as health, but also as safety,
security, good, welfare, and, notably, salvation), manifests the second,
countervailing, presence of Jesus in the law: the messianic (the secular, or
political messiah – such as Gramsci’s modern prince, or those discussed by
Kelsen87 and Butler88 – as opposed to a strictly theological, magical savior)
that negates the law of the shepherd.




     6. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MAXIM

Associated with declarations of states of exception (in which emergencies
justified limited suspensions of the law) during the late Roman Republic and
across the Roman Empire,89 the maxim salus populi suprema lex esto
functioned throughout the Roman world. And there, embedded in legal
systems, it remained long after the Empire’s dissolution. Among other
former Roman jurisdictions, the maxim has enjoyed an authoritative position
in English law (and, subsequently, in U.S. law) since the time that the
English Common Law was first cobbled together during the reign of Henry II
(1133-89). Throughout the Middle Ages and well into the modern period legal
maxims in general exerted “the same strength as acts of parliament” in
England.90 And the maxim salus populi suprema lex esto occupied a particularly
esteemed position among these.

        Usually translated as the health of the people is the supreme law, in
his Table Talk, 17th century English jurist John Selden pointed out that

86
    See Angelos Chaniotis, Book Review, 97 BRYN MAWR CLASSICAL REV., no. 3, 1997 (reviewing
 LORENZO WINKLER, SALUS. VON STAATSKULT ZUR POLITISCHEN IDEE. EINE ARCHEOLOGISCHE
UNTERSUCHUNG [Salus. From state cult to political idea. An archaeological study] 1995).
87
   See KELSEN, supra note 3, at 100-1.
88
   See Butler, supra note 5, at 207.
89
   See THOMAS POOLE, REASON OF STATE: LAW, PREROGATIVE AND EMPIRE 1-2 (2015).
90
    See SIR THOMAS EDLYNE TOMLINS, THE LAW-DICTIONARY, EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS AND
PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH LAW: DEFINING AND INTERPRETING THE TERMS AND WORDS OF ART, AND
COMPRISING ALSO COPIOUS INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECTS OF TRADE AND GOVERNMENT VOL. II 540 (1836).




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because “it is not salus populi suprema lex est, but esto,”91 the maxim ought to
be translated as ‘the health of the people should be the supreme law.’ In other
words, rather than a (descriptive) statement of fact the maxim should be seen
as a (prescriptive) command. When confronted with the question of how
social life ought to be arranged, of what the supreme law should be, the
maxim holds that the deciding factor should be the health of the people.

         Cited in innumerable U.S. state, federal, and Supreme Court decisions,
the maxim has exerted a significant influence on the development of U.S.
law.92 Yet, because the maxim suffers from the same ambiguity that law itself
suffers from (privileging sometimes its mutative character, the healer, and at
other times privileging its retentive, conservative aspect – the shepherd),
over the centuries the maxim has been construed to mean both responsive
justice and reactive order – the welfare of people in general, or the welfare of
particular people, or a particular social class, or even a particular person.
During the reign of Augustus, for example, the health of the people became
identified with the health (or power) of the emperor. 93 That is, far from
functioning as an exception to traditional order and custom (nomos), the
maxim was used to reiterate the rule of the shepherd; anticipating Bodin’s
concept of sovereignty,94 it enabled coercive power to function, in a state of
exception, outside of legal constraints, in order to preserve itself. 95                  96



         In other words, rather than the pursuit of anything approximating
social or public health (which is distinguishable from necessity insofar as
health is concerned not with mere self-preservation and survival but with
human flourishing) the notion and maxim of the health of the people became
conflated with necessity (Ananke), particularly with what is necessary for the
preservation and aggrandizement of the nomos. Consequently, over the
centuries, jurists and political philosophers alike came to view the maxim


91
   See JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE TALK 100 (London, 1821).
92
   WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICA 42-50
(1996).
93
   See STEFAN WEINSTOCK, DIVUS JULIUS 174 (1971); see also WINKLER, supra note 86.
94
   See SCHMITT, supra note 2, at 8.
95
   See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112
YALE L. J. 1011, 1011-1134 (2003).
96
   See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: a Tipology of Emergency Powers,
2 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 210 (2004).




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salus populi as interchangeable with Gratian’s maxim that necessity has no
law.

       Cicero’s more philosophical writings notwithstanding, the maxim was
used to further potestas since the time he penned it. While persisting in
various forms after the erosion of the Roman Empire, especially in Canon
Law (where the term salus was understood to mean, among other things, the
salvation of people’s souls), like so many facets of the classical world it was
revived during the Renaissance. As Ferejohn and Pasquino put it, its use by
Machiavelli, and later writers such as James Harrington, and Rousseau, came
to act “as a kind of bridge between the Roman model of dictatorship and the
modern idea of constitutional emergency powers.” 97 And this use was more
often than not inextricable from the defense or justification of necessity.

       Thomas Jefferson’s use of the maxim provides a good example of this
overlap. Zealously pursuing territorial expansion, Jefferson purchased the
Louisiana Territory from France in 1803. Justifying his extralegal executive
act after retiring from office in his 1810 letter to John B. Colvin, Jefferson
wrote that beating imperial rivals to possession of valuable and strategic
territory was necessary for “self-preservation and rendered the salus populi
supreme over the written law.”98 In writing that “A strict observance of the
written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but… the
laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger,
are of higher obligation,”99 Jefferson simultaneously conflated national
security with a notion of human security (the health of the people), and the
maxim salus populi with Gratian’s maxim that necessity triumphs over law.

       In spite of Jefferson’s claim and use, however, the actual health of the
people subjected to his decision was not advanced at all. While the ruling
classes and the state would profit from territorial expansion, nearly everyone
else experienced the opposite of security and health. The autochthonous
people of the territory of the newly expanded nation, for instance, were
annihilated. And for millions more it meant a new world of plantations to live

97
   Id. at 213.
98
    Quoted in MAURIZIO VALSANIA, THE LIMITS OF OPTIMISM: THOMAS JEFFERSON’S DUALISTIC
ENLIGHTENMENT 150 (2013 ed., 2013).
99
   Id.




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and suffer in, to say nothing of the plight of women, the poor, and others.
Although appearing to deviate from the nomos, the rule of the shepherd,
Jefferson was not instantiating the law of the healer. Rather, via Bia, he was
advancing Necessity, the mythical, the law of the shepherd in a less robed
form.

        Notwithstanding its utilization by coercive power/potestas, however,
the maxim’s inherent ambiguity continued to manifest throughout modern
political thought. In the mid-17th century, for instance, while common lands
were being transformed into salable things, enclosed, and sold off in England
(transforming the people that had historically lived on those lands into
refugees and paupers100), the Levellers, fighting in the English Civil War,
appropriated and radicalized the maxim salus populi, appealing to the
mutative, emancipatory aspect of the maxim for the satisfaction of their
demands.101

        Advocating autonomy over heteronomy, the Levellers (whose name
derived from the practice of those revolting against the enclosure and
privatization of the commons by leveling the hedges used to enclose plots of
land) stood for the rule of law, the extension of suffrage, and religious
tolerance, among other contemporaneous issues. And because the health of
the people requires land on which to live, among other conditions, or
preconditions, of health, its alienation was contrary to the supreme law and
must for that reason (that the health of the people should be the supreme
law) be halted, they argued.

        Reappropriating the maxim from the Levellers, invoking it in the
introduction to his Leviathan (the “artificall man” that in so many ways
resembles the coercive shepherd) Hobbes used the maxim for conservative
ends.102 This was not, of course, at all innovative. As the historian Peter Miller
notes in his study of the period, “in the war between parliament and the
crown, the salus populi could be found on all sides.”103


100
    See GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA OF POVERTY (1983) in which she discusses the historical
development of the new class of people of the pauper.
101
     See, e.g., JASON S. MALOY, THE COLONIAL AMERICAN ORIGINS OF MODERN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 160
(2008).
102
     Id.
See PETER N. MILLER, DEFINING THE COMMON GOOD 42 (1994).




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A generation after Hobbes, John Locke famously employed the maxim in both
the epitaph to his Second Treatise on Government as well as in its section on
executive prerogative. And it was by way of Locke (who wrote that “Salus
Populi Suprema Lex is so just and fundamental a rule that he who sincerely
follows it cannot dangerously err”104), among others, such as the Scottish
Enlightenment philosopher Francis Hutcheson, 105 that the maxim influenced
the Founders of the United States of America – who, like Locke, emphasized
the emancipatory dimension of the maxim (to the degree that it benefitted
them) in their efforts to free themselves from the nomos of the British
Crown.

         While the maxim was instrumental in justifying the shift from
monarchical to nominally democratic rule in North America, its double nature
persisted. As John Adams put it, “The public good, the salus populi is the
professed end of all government, the most despotic, as well as the most
free.”106 And as British law gave way to U.S. law, this intrinsic ambiguity
persisted.

         In the late 1780s, for instance, when farmers and veterans of the
Continental Army found themselves facing the confiscation of their farms
and/or time in debtors’ prisons for debts accumulated during the time they
were fighting an ostensible war of liberation, what came to be known as
Shays’ Rebellion broke out in Massachusetts. Rising up against their creditors
to secure debt relief and the cessation of the confiscation of their farms, the
creditor-dominated Massachusetts legislature found little compunction in
opposing the movement with military force.

         At the same time, in February of 1787, debtors in the state of South
Carolina also challenged the legitimacy of their debts. Unlike the situation in
Massachusetts,       however,      the   South     Carolina     legislature       represented
predominantly debtors and, to the great chagrin of their creditors, the




104
    See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 2 (Crawford Brough Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publishing Company 1980)(1690).
105
    See generally ISTVAN HONT, JEALOUSY OF TRADE: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND THE NATION-
STATE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 412-419 (2005).
106
    CHARLES F. ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. III
479 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1851).




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legislature granted debtors radical debt-relief.107 Citing the maxim salus populi
suprema lex esto, the future attorney general of South Carolina, John Julius
Pringle, defended the debt nullification, maintaining that it is the purpose of
government to secure the welfare of the community (however narrowly
defined in this case); where the law of contracts conflicts with this, he
argued, the law must yield.108 Norms (laws) must yield to metanorms. Among
others who felt that the democratic tendencies (relatively economically
democratic, at least) of the revolution were going too far, George Washington
was prompted by these events to vocalize his support for a stronger national
government and the adoption of the Fates-like Constitution to achieve such
ends.109

         While the above example illustrates one aspect of the emancipatory
tendency of the maxim, the South Carolina example is problematic – not least
because of the proliferation of slavery (which was not seen as violating the
health of the people). Nevertheless, it marks an important event in the
history of the maxim – a precedent that contemporary debtors could arguably
employ as well.

         After the ratification of the U.S. Constitution (which both reflects the
structure of the Fates and alludes to the Ciceronian maxim in the phrase ‘the
general welfare’ in its preamble110), and throughout the 19th century, courts
in all regions of the United States deferred to the maxim in affirming or
sanctioning municipalities’ power to regulate all manners of daily life. Not
only were “the people” empowered to build things (e.g., sanitation systems)
that improved “the health of the people,” the maxim also empowered “the
people” to destroy unhealthy conditions. If, for instance, a slaughterhouse, or
tannery, a cache of gunpowder, wooden buildings, or any other noxious or
potentially harmful condition or activity were found to intrude upon the
public health (polluting waterways, producing toxic effluence, or noxious
smells, or creating fire hazards, inter alia), the courts found again and again

107
     See Robert. A. Becker, Salus Populi Suprema Lex: Public Peace and South Carolina Debtor Relief
Laws, 1783-1788, 80 S.C. HIST. MAG. 65, 74-75 (1979).
108
    Id. at 75.
109
     See LEONARD L. RICHARDS, SHAY’S REBELLION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION’S FINAL BATTLE 1-4, 129-
130 (2002).
110
    See generally NOVAK, supra note 92, at 52.




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that the people had the power and authority to eliminate the offensive
operation.111 Courts held nearly uniformly that the health of the people
trumped both property rights and the right of contract. 112

         If the above leads some to conclude that the public health was being
pursued in these instances in the interest of autonomy (over heteronomy),
and manifested the messianic, healing aspect of the maxim (over the
determinations of the invisible shepherd), they would do well to consider the
fact that, though public health legislation did reflect a general tendency
toward (quasi-) egalitarian salutariness, and while it did objectively
ameliorate       many        harmful       conditions        (the     noxious         presence            of
slaughterhouses, for instance), this apparent salutariness was in conflict with
a properly egalitarian health for the simple reason that these reforms were
not only pursued in concert with deep expressions of heteronomy (in the
form of economic exploitation, not to mention genocide, within a nomos that
justified the enslavement of millions, wars of expansion, pervasive, systemic
misogyny, among other concrete harms), the poor laws and sanitary reforms
were not pursued for their own sake. Rather than a genuine, general health,
the maxim’s use in North America reflects not the manifestation of the healer
but its semblance; instead of the deactivation of the nomos, its application is
congruent with Carl Schmitt’s particular notion of the nomos, which refers to
an antagonistic concrete social order derived from the forcible conquest and
“division of pastureland.”113

         Indeed, as Michel Foucault points out, public health legislation was
not instituted to help the public generally.114 Epidemics and health crises may
have been avoided, but these policies were enacted primarily to protect the
wealthy from the slums and disease of the poor. In addition to protecting the
rich from the poor, rather than the good health of the people in general, what
was strived for was the minimal health of the poor. As opposed to that which
was supportive of human flourishing, what was simply necessary for the
survival of the general order was advocated and pursued. These policies
advanced the interest of the nomos, the law of the shepherd, not the healer,

111
    Id.
112
    Id.
113
    Teschke, supra note 13, at 193.
114
    See Michel Foucault, Birth of Social Medicine, in POWER (James D. Faubion ed., 2001).




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since genuine health would not maintain and administer poverty (and mere
survival) but eliminate it. Likewise, eugenicist policies, human subject
research, and other practices that were justified by reference to the public
health pursued not an actual, critical (genuine, general) health but the health
of the state, or the health or wellbeing of only a particular class of people.

         As such, a critical conception of health (of a genuine, general health)
should not be mistaken for the type of health that Foucault, for instance, has
argued     provided      the     justification      for   the    pervasive       and       invasive
administrative control of populations.115 To be sure, such a conception
(concerned with health in an instrumental sense – not the health of the
human being but the limited health of the soldier or worker, or of the health
of such entities as forests for their exchange-value, rather than for their use-
value) may be said, to be the health of, if anything, the shepherd – of the
nomos (custom, tradition, and coercive power). In other words, it is merely a
qualified type of health, the health, ability, or power to dominate akin to
Randolph Bourne’s observation that “war is the health of the state.” 116 Unlike
the messianic, which is “radically distinct from, and opposed to, coerced
obedience,”117 such an instrumental type of health is an illusory health
ancillary to obedience to the nomos, rather than an end in itself.

         While history has produced numerous instances of this instrumental
form of health (the semblance of actual health), the Nazis’ concept of health
provides perhaps the most notorious example. Subjecting its population to
every manner of biopolitical intrusion, the Nazi order appeared to be obsessed
with health. In addition to the glorification of such outdoor activities (bound
up with nationalistic sentiments as they were) as mountain climbing, and
wrestling, and sports in general, scores of laws were passed that appeared to
promote social health in order to advance only the health of the so-called
volk. Bakeries, for instance, were required to carry whole grain bread 118 –
though, as with other regulations, this law had just as much to do with a
genocidal national chauvinism than with any appreciation for the salutary

115
    See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY; VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley
trans., Vintage Books 1990)(1976).
Quoted in HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 359 (2003 ed., 2003).
117
    Butler, supra note 5, at 215.
118
    See, e.g., ROBERT N. PROCTOR, THE NAZI WAR ON CANCER 47 (2000).




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characteristics or lack thereof of white bread (which was associated with the
French and said to be decadent).119 Rather than for its own sake, the Nazis’
racist, superstitious, and militaristic pseudoscientific notion of health was
entirely in the service of coercive power – the shepherd. In addition to
restricting people of Jewish descent from entering parks, for instance
(nominally to protect the fictitious German germ plasm from fictitious
contamination), German women were rewarded for producing many children;
not because a large population was good or healthy for its own sake, but
simply because this produced workers and soldiers that strengthened the
state – a type of instrumental reasoning that subtended the eugenicist
policies of Nazi Germany, not to mention those of the U.S. Supreme Court in
decisions upholding the constitutionality of forced sterilization in the 1920s
and 30s.120 Rather than an end in itself, health was always directed toward
violence and power. As Martin Heidegger, a one-time enthusiastic member of
the Nazi party, put it, for the Nazis the “essence of health” is “the capacity to
act for the state.”121

        Rather than aiding coercive forms of power (potestas), however, what
we might refer to as critical notions of health involve perpetual contestations
of and (in both the physiological as well as the political sense) resistances to
coercive powers and structures.




      7. REINTERPRETING THE MAXIM

Although the maxim would continue to be invoked by U.S. courts well into
the 20th century, as the industrial business classes exerted more influence
over social policy, a shift in legal philosophy led the courts to employ the
maxim less and less frequently.122 By the beginning of the 21st century, the
rise of the national security jurisprudence and the ideology of the so-called
war on terror only furthered the reading of the maxim prioritizing the



119
    Id.
120
    See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
121
     EMMANUEL FAYE, HEIDEGGER: THE INTRODUCTION OF NAZISM INTO PHILOSOPHY IN LIGHT OF THE
UNPUBLISHED SEMINARS OF 1933-1935 68 (Michael B. Smith trans., Yale U. Press 2011).
122
    See NOVAK, supra note 92, at 247.




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shepherd which sees the health of the state justifying harms, such as war
and torture, committed against the actual health of actual people. 123

         While the maxim that the health of the people should be the supreme
law has been interpreted over the centuries to support authoritarian and
heteronomous regimes, however, we must not forget that it has also been
employed in egalitarian and emancipatory struggles. And as manifold
exigencies (stemming from the unprecedented exploitation of the physical
and social worlds) daily confront us, we ought to consider that the maxim
could – and should – be (re)interpreted today to support a critical notion of
health, which would, in practice, translate to a radically egalitarian politics.

         Such a reinterpretation would have to grapple with three basic
components of the maxim: health, people, and the supreme law. Of these,
“the supreme law” is the most straightforward. We can simply refer to the
supremacy clause in Article VI of the U.S. Constitution and similar clauses in
other constitutions, which define the supreme law simply as that which
prevails in any conflict.

         Next is the term people. While Giorgio Agamben reminds us that,
historically, in European languages at least, people has referred specifically to
the poor,124 and the marginalized, there are competing traditions with less
egalitarian tendencies. The most notorious of these, perhaps, is that of the
Nazi volk, which had an explicitly racist and genocidal meaning. Relatedly,
since the Enlightenment ‘people’ has tended in practice to refer juridically to
wealthy or property owning, white, males – denying not only the status of
people but of human being from everyone else. In short, the term people has
exclusionary as well as inclusionary implications. And though a proper
examination of the term people would require a thorough investigation of,
among others, non-human entities (organic and inorganic) with which
human flourishing is interdependent (the so-called natural environment, or
ecology, for instance, not to mention the wellbeing of non-human animals),
for a provisional, emancipatory interpretation of the maxim we can note that,
in the early 21st century, international norms recognize, at the very least, all

123
    See Conor Gearty, State Surveillance in an Age of Security, in SURVEILLANCE, COUNTERTERRORISM, AND
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 288-289 (Fergal Davis et al eds., 2013).
124
    See AGAMBEN, supra note 34, at 176.




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human beings as people. As such, in addition to every human being, since our
health is interdependent with theirs, ecosystems and animals generally ought
to be included within the notion of people as well.

         Of the maxim’s three elements, the most problematic is the concept of
health. Associated for centuries with tyrannical norms, the concept of health
suffers from a host of definitional problems. For an egalitarian interpretation
of the maxim, however, it perhaps suffices to discuss health in the Asclepian
sense as that radiance or resistance which contests the coercive power of the
law of the shepherd – the immanent (as opposed to transcendent),
noncoercive power of autonomy, or potentia, as opposed to potestas and
heteronomy.

         Consistent     with     mainstream          bioethical     norms     (the      four       basic
principles     of   which      are    justice,    beneficence,        non-maleficence,               and
autonomy125), as well as with Cicero’s own position that something “is only
just if it is voluntary,”126 and that “a healthy human being could not live as a
slave,”127 so long as personal practices do not directly intrude upon the public
health, questions of personal behavior lie entirely outside the social category
of the “health of the people.” In the shadow of the racist, patriarchal, and
genocidal measures undertaken in the name of health and “the health of the
people” in recent history, distinctions between private and public health
remain crucial. In order for this autonomy, or potentia, to overcome its mere
potentiality, however, the presence of particular, concrete conditions – the
conditions for health – must be present. For just as it is in many respects an
absurdity to force a person to be healthy, it is equally the case that justice is
impeded to the degree that people are forced, by circumstances people are
born into, to be unhealthy.

         Because most people in the world today find themselves born into
circumstances in which basic conditions of health, such as housing and
nutrition, are systemically scarcified, and not only the energy systems and



125
    See Raanan Gillon, Medical ethics: four principles plus attention to scope 309 BRITISH MED. J.
184(1994 http://www.bmj.com/content/309/6948/184).
126
    CICERO, ON DUTIES 12 (Miriam T. Griffin & E. Margaret Atkins eds., Cambridge U. Press 1991).
127
     LEO STRAUSS, CICERO, The Leo Strauss Center, University of Chicago (Spring, 1959),
https://leostrausscenter.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/Cicero%20%281959%29.pdf.




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the water but the air itself is carcinogenic, 128 most people, then, find
themselves born into an unjust position. And just as Cicero noted that slavery
and health are antithetical, Schopenhauer’s observation that poverty and
slavery are indistinct129 must lead us to consider (as copious studies linking
poverty to shorter lifespans, poor nutrition, increases in unhealthy stress
levels, and heightened exposure to toxins, among other harms) that poverty
is contrary to health as well – and, therefore, is contrary to the supreme law.
Vis-à-vis these problems, an emancipatory interpretation of the maxim
might proceed in the following manner:

        If the health of the people should be the supreme law, then those
conditions that conflict with the health of the people should be against the
law. As such, the existence of unhealthy conditions (slums, food deserts,
brownfields, prisons, land mines, toxic waste, etc.) would be illegal according
to the maxim. Consequently, they must not be allowed to persist – a turn of
the maxim that gives rise to a duty to correct unhealthy conditions.

        While what constitutes a condition (or precondition) for health is
subject to debate, no reasonable person can disagree that there are certain
basic material conditions without which health cannot flourish. The most
basic of these are: housing, nutrition, health care, and a healthy environment
(which, in the urban context, at least, includes basic infrastructures such as
sanitation     systems,     transportation      systems,      communication            systems,
educational systems, etc.).

        If a particular condition for health, such as housing (of a quality
sufficient to support not basic survival but the minimal flourishing of health)
is absent, then, the health of the people, the supreme law, is violated. And
because this condition cannot be allowed to remain in a state of violation (a
form of neglect that is itself a type of violence) a duty to correct the
insufficient condition(s) arises. This duty, in this case, creates a positive right
to housing sufficient to support actual health. And because this is a right, it
must not only be supplied directly, not through exchange, but as an end in

128
    See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Ambient (Outdoor) Air Quality and Health, WHO.INT (Sep., 2016),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs313/en/.
129
    See ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, Government, in ON HUMAN NATURE: ESSAYS IN ETHICS AND POLITICS 23,
28 (Thomas Bailey Sauders trans., Dover 2010)(1897).




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itself, it must also be inalienable – i.e., not for sale. Through this
interpretation of the maxim, positive rights to housing, food, health care, a
healthy environment, and other conditions of health are uncovered.

       According to a critical reading, then, the (messianic) maxim does not
merely create a duty to deactivate the nomos – that is, to remove unhealthy
conditions (e.g. banning the ecocidal commercial meat industry, and the
fossil fuel industry). A duty of care, to supply basic conditions of health,
extends from this duty to correct, which in turn creates positive rights to the
conditions for health. The basis of a society’s legitimacy, the satisfaction of
its duty to itself, is to supply these conditions to itself – not in exchange for
any other thing, or act, but for its own sake. According to a critical reading of
the maxim that the health of the people should be the supreme law, the
society that neglects to correct unhealthy conditions and supply the
conditions of health – that neglects to dismantle the mythic law and realize
the law’s messianic command – commits a positive harm; where it fails to
satisfy this duty a society is in breach, and itself needs to be corrected in
order to comply with the demands of justice.




    8. CONCLUSION

This essay has argued that the fundamental structure of Western law is
grounded in a dynamic of conservation and change, law as order and law as
justice, preservation of the existing order and its messianic destruction.
Since the dawn of civilization, when legal systems were indistinct from
mythical orders, the concept of necessity, symbolized by the nomos, the
Fates, and the etymologically and conceptually related figure of the
shepherd, has played a role in justifying existing orders. So prevalent is this
symbolism that it arguably displaced and colonized its own negation; for as
the intuition of the messianic (the healer as opposed to the shepherd)
traveled through myth and into history the exception became conflated with
the rule. Jesus as healer became interblended with Jesus the shepherd, and
the healer (Asclepius, Hygieia, Salus, Jesus) of the maxim salus populi suprema
lex esto was fused, or confused, with Necessity and the Fates – i.e., the nomos.




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Conflated with necessity, the maxim has functioned to preserve and conserve
legal orders. Yet its messianic potentiality has historically flickered into
actuality as well, justifying emancipatory deviations from traditional orders.
And though the maxim remains ambiguous (and, like Augustine’s City of God
and City of Man, the healer and the shepherd are blended and to some degree
indissoluble), a critical reading of the maxim uncovers a radically
democratic, egalitarian notion of justice that, by prioritizing the actual
health, nourishment, and wellbeing of the people of the world over the
necessity of the existing biophagous order, could enable the development of
an actually healthy, just society. Rather than the states of emergency
justified by necessity, perhaps this is the “real state of emergency” of which
Benjamin writes,130 one which implies a messianic deactivation of the law of
the shepherd, and the instantiation of noncoercive modes of social life – the
law of the healer.




130
      Benjamin, supra note 47, at 257.




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