10.6092/issn.2038-3460/17432
The rise of post-truth has called into question STS, mostly in the defendant’s role. A critique from outside, such as Lee McIntyre’s, provides a debatable account of science deconstruction and its appropriation by “right-wing postmodernism”. Within STS, post-truth has revamped discussions on the implications of the symmetry principle, or elicited a reiteration of arguments for more inclusive generation of public facts. Steve Fuller stands out as a dissonant, more intriguing voice. He praises post-truth for triggering and expressing an emancipatory thrust against elites and an institutional rearrangement of science, and blames STS for being too shy with its midwifing role. However, he also underestimates the import of ongoing changes. The struggle over truth has shifted to an ontological level, raising doubts on optimistic views. If STS is relevant to post-truth, the vice versa also applies. Post-truth indicates that STS has to equip itself for a sociotechnical world ever-more distant from the one in which it has developed.
application/pdf
2038-3460
17432
1
en
Luigi Pellizzoni
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/
Tecnoscienza – Italian Journal of Science & Technology Studies
precipitatory governance
Innocent, Guilty or Reluctant Midwife? On the Reciprocal Relevance of STS and Post-truth
Text.Serial.Journal
https://tecnoscienza.unibo.it/
10
Scenarios
2019-07-16
2023-06-26
2019-07-16
2023-10-05
115-130
TS
Luigi Pellizzoni
2019/07/16
10.6092/issn.2038-3460/17432
115
University of Pisa
2038-3460
1
precipitatory governance
en
130
Innocent, Guilty or Reluctant Midwife? On the Reciprocal Relevance of STS and Post-truth
https://tecnoscienza.unibo.it/article/download/17432/16282
10
                                                                           Scenario

Innocent, Guilty or Reluctant Midwife?
On the Reciprocal Relevance of STS and Post-truth

Luigi Pellizzoni
University of Pisa


     Abstract: The rise of post-truth has called into question STS, mostly in
     the defendant’s role. A critique from outside, such as Lee McIntyre’s, pro-
     vides a debatable account of science deconstruction and its appropriation
     by “right-wing postmodernism”. Within STS, post-truth has revamped dis-
     cussions on the implications of the symmetry principle, or elicited a reitera-
     tion of arguments for more inclusive generation of public facts. Steve Fuller
     stands out as a dissonant, more intriguing voice. He praises post-truth for
     triggering and expressing an emancipatory thrust against elites and an insti-
     tutional rearrangement of science, and blames STS for being too shy with
     its midwifing role. However, he also underestimates the import of ongoing
     changes. The struggle over truth has shifted to an ontological level, raising
     doubts on optimistic views. If STS is relevant to post-truth, the vice versa
     also applies. Post-truth indicates that STS has to equip itself for a socio-
     technical world ever-more distant from the one in which it has developed.

     Keywords: post-truth; co-production; proaction; responsible innovation;
     precipitatory governance.

     Submitted: July 18, 2018 – Accepted: May 20, 2019

     Corresponding author: Luigi Pellizzoni, Department of Political Sciences,
     University of Pisa, via Serafini 3, 56126 Pisa, Italy. E-mail:
     luigi.pellizzoni@unipi.it




1. Introduction

    The rise of post-truth has thrown STS into the centre of the storm,
generally in the defendant’s role. In this paper, I outline some ways in
which the relationship between post-truth and STS has been accounted
for, outside and within STS, highlighting related limits (or what appear to
me to be so). The larger space is devoted to Steve Fuller, as the dissonant
voice in the choir: he praises rather than blames post-truth, and blames
STS for opposite reasons to those advanced by others, namely for being
too shy with its midwifing function. His claims about the present and
TECNOSCIENZA
Italian Journal of Science & Technology Studies
10 (1) pp. 115-130 – ISSN 2038-3460               2019
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116                                                          Tecnoscienza – 10 (1)

prospective social role of science are worthy of consideration, though it
seems to me he also fails to take full stock of what is going on. In any
case, as I argue, the post-truth debate offers STS an opportunity for re-
flecting on how to proceed in a socio-technical world ever-more distant
from the one in which it has developed.


2. Post-truth and the Science Deconstruction Controversy

    With the election of Donald Trump and the Oxford English Diction-
ary’s proclamation as the word of the year for 2016, post-truth has come
to the forefront engendering heated debates, mostly building on the pejo-
rative sense of the definition of the Dictionary (“relating to or denoting
circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping pub-
lic opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”). As for STS,
post-truth has revitalized discussions concerning the legitimacy and im-
plications of social inquiry into the production of scientific knowledge.
    The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) had questioned (or, bet-
ter, regarded as irrelevant to its purposes) the epistemic exceptionalism of
science, raising for this very reason the problem of its own epistemic sta-
tus. With the development of lab studies and related methodological per-
spectives such debate had seemingly settled. Yet, in fact, the topic never
went out of sight; it rather changed in focus: from a discussion over the
epistemic status of science studies to a debate over the effects of decon-
structive approaches on science as an institution and the ensuing social
and political consequences. Taking initially the character of an external
attack (the “science wars” of the 1990s) and subsequently of a self-
critique (Latour 2004), criticisms built to a significant extent on the claim
that, more than supporting weaker social groups by exposing the hidden
links between scientific authority, economic interests and political pow-
ers, science deconstruction may undermine the very possibility of contest-
ing such interests and powers in the name of indisputable factual evi-
dence.
    The rise of post-truth has corresponded to a refuelling of these con-
troversies. This time STS is under attack simultaneously from outside and
from within. Debates over post-truth address a number of topics, includ-
ing the impact of traditional and new media on public opinion and the
state of health of contemporary democracies. Yet, in most accounts, post-
truth seems to consist primarily in an undermining of the role long given
to science in public affairs: from the privileged relationship, or elective af-
finities, between science and democracy theorized by Dewey and Popper
to the crucial function assigned to scientific expertise in the policy pro-
cess, thanks to its ability to “speak truth to power” (Wildavsky 1979).
And if science delegitimation is at the centre of the post-truth debate,
STS could hardly avoid being called into question.
Pellizzoni                                                                 117


3. Post-truth and the Critique of STS from Outside

     As for attacks coming from outside STS, a good example is offered by
the philosopher of science Lee McIntyre. He defines post-truth as an
“eclipse of truth”, in the sense of its growing irrelevance in shaping pub-
lic opinion and decision-making: a “careless indifference toward what is
true”; the replacement of factual evidence with “truthiness” (i.e. truth-
feeling); its subordination to political points of view up to denying basic
facts, hence challenging “the existence of reality itself” (McIntyre 2018, 9-
10). Why is this happening? For McIntyre the main reason is “science
denial”: the delegitimation of the authority of science occurred in the last
decades and the consequent growing possibility of casting doubts over
factual evidence, from the health effects of smoke to climate change. And
such delegitimation is an offspring of science studies, especially the
“strong programme” of SSK, with its claim that “all theories – whether
true or false – should be thought of as the product of ideology” (2018,
129). In its turn, SSK is an offspring of post-modernism, with its claim
that everything can be treated as a text, open to interpretation, and that
knowledge and power are to be regarded as interwoven, constitutive of
each other. Postmodernists regarded their move as “emancipatory” from
cultural and social hierarchies. What they did not foresee, says McIntyre,
was the rise of a “right-wing postmodernism”, that is reactionary forces
who learned from post-modernists how to undermine unwelcome scien-
tific evidence. Post-truth is an effective application of this lesson.
     I find McIntyre’s account problematic in various respects. First, he
defines post-truth as both disregard for truth and disbelief in truth, which
to me are different standpoints: one is compatible with straightforward
realism; the other corresponds to anti-realism, either methodological (one
cannot describe things “as they are”) or metaphysical (what we define as
real depends totally on our minds or conceptual schemata). Moreover,
disregard for truth and disbelief in truth are equated to perspectivism,
which in my view is yet another standpoint: one whereby, so to say, the
shape truth takes is affected by the (historical, social, gendered…) point
of access to truth. Second, possibly as a result of this conflation of mean-
ings, McIntyre misconstrues both postmodernism and SSK. Neither of
the two rules out the possibility of truth claims. Taking for example Fou-
cault (one of the champions of postmodernism, according to McIntyre),
his idea of critique (Foucault 2007) is based on a deflated account of
truth claims, seen as building on socially and historically positioned per-
spectives, which however does not mean they consist in mere “assertions
of authority” (McIntyre 2018, 126). Nor does the “strong programme”
correspond to McIntyre’s account. Symmetry is not an epistemic but a
methodological claim, concerning how to approach science as a social
field where the “truth, success or rationality of a given ‘belief’ [are irrele-
vant] in order to set up a social explanation of how it became ascendant
118                                                         Tecnoscienza – 10 (1)

and why adherents continue to hold to it” (Lynch 2017, 595). Third,
“right-wing postmodernism” does not necessarily deny or devaluate sci-
ence; on the contrary, as the tobacco affair and climate change denial
show, it may emphasise its relevance by stressing the lack of conclusive
evidence in contrarian claims. Again, the problem with McIntyre’s ac-
count seems that different phenomena are gathered under the umbrella-
term of post-truth. One thing is making a case for alternative interpreta-
tions of facts, as with climate change denial; another is making a case for
alternative (relevant) facts, as with the controversy over the health im-
pacts of electromagnetic fields (can non-ionizing radiations have relevant
effects? Of what sort? And how can we detect such effects?); yet another
is making a case for alternatives to facts, as with Trump’s political style.
The alleged novelty and dramatic implications of the latter should howev-
er be gauged not so much against a fact-based “good old politics” –
which has never properly existed, as politics has always been committed
to going “beyond facts” (by prioritizing values against all odds, or by cre-
ating new facts through action) – but against the growing emphasis
placed on “evidence” over the years, as a not-so-subtle ruse to depoliti-
cize decision-making.


4. Post-truth and STS’s Internal Debate

    In sum, I do not find compelling or particularly well argued a critique
of STS such as McIntyre’s. What about, then, debates internal to STS?
No doubt, the rise of post-truth has created some fuss. One can roughly
distinguish three main positions.
    First, we have those who, aligning with the Latourian self-critique, ba-
sically concur with McIntyre, blaming STS for having, if not exactly
caused, at least eased the rise of post-truth. For Collins, Evans and
Weiner, for example, “the logic of symmetry, and the democratising of
science it spawned, invites exactly the scepticism about experts and other
elites that now dominates political debate in the US and elsewhere”;
hence “we have to admit that for much of the time the views STS was es-
pousing were consistent with post-truth irrespective of their authors’ in-
tentions or their causal impact” (Collins et al. 2017, 581).
    Others, such as Sismondo (2017a; 2017b) and Lynch (2017), reject
such accusation, out of various considerations: that STS has never sup-
ported an “anything goes” approach, showing instead the hard work
whereby scientific facts take shape; that the very definition of post-truth –
as disconnect between facts and values, opinions, beliefs and emotions
and the predominance of the latter, or as plain bullshit, casual dishonesty
or demagoguery – has hardly anything to do with the type of work carried
out in STS, beginning with how STS questions the obviousness of the
very distinction between facts and beliefs or emotions; and that if any-
thing, through its own work, STS helps to account for why “the emer-
Pellizzoni                                                                  119

gence of a post-truth era might be more possible than most people would
imagine” (Sismondo 2017a, 3).
    A third position is represented by scholars who are less interested in
discussing the putative influence of STS on post-truth than in applying
STS insights into the intermingling of truth production with power strug-
gles, in order to analyse post-truth on these terms. Jasanoff and Simmet,
for example, see in the emergence of post-truth the expression of “moral
panics about the status of knowledge in the public sphere” (2017, 755), in
itself not a novelty but in its present configuration the result of funda-
mental flaws in how truth has been used in policy-making: namely, failure
in recognising that “debates about public facts have always also been de-
bates about social meanings” (2017, 752). As STS outlooks on the “co-
production” of knowledge and social order have documented, judge-
ments of truth are always premised on judgements of worthiness. Then,
against those who believe that “the only imaginable corrective [to post-
truth] is to get more science and truth back into the public’s uneducated,
misled or distracted minds” (2017, 760), Jasanoff and Simmet’s recipe
sounds pretty much a reiteration of well-known arguments for a “deliber-
ative democratization” of science: namely, to expand accountability for
and inclusion in the selection of relevant concerns and generation of re-
lated public facts, with “precaution” working as a regulative criterion in
between full scientization and full politicization of choices.
    I find all three these takes on post-truth somewhat disappointing. On
one side, holding STS as responsible (or otherwise) for the rise of post-
truth is a question that cannot be resolved by discussing the “right”
meaning of the symmetry principle or other features of STS approaches.
To properly connect STS and post-truth one would need to delve into
how, when, by operation of whom and to what extent STS outlooks have
become integral to policy-making and political strategies; that is, to do
something similar to the work carried out to account for how neoliberal
ideas have spread in the academy and educational systems, the public
administration and corporate management (see e.g. O’Malley 2004;
Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Lave et al. 2010). On the other hand, read-
ings such as Jasanoff and Simmet’s, perhaps because focused on the pecu-
liarities of a particular political system (the US’s), fail to notice that their
reply to post-truth (more public deliberation, grounded on the precau-
tionary principle) may and has indeed already become, in the hands of
skilled political strategists and communicators, part of the problem. In
this sense “right-wing postmodernism” is trickier to tackle than Jasanoff
and Simmet seem to assume. Claiming that “endorsing the ‘precautionary
principle’ can be seen as a first-order attempt to distinguish between wor-
thy and unworthy objectives through politics, when facts are not available
to resolve a dispute to everyone’s satisfaction” (Jasanoff and Simmet
2017, 760) means neglecting that climate change denial, as the “war on
terror” in Iraq, builds precisely on an application of precaution1.
120                                                         Tecnoscienza – 10 (1)


5. STS as Reluctant Midwife: Post-truth in Steve Fuller’s
Brave New World

    Against this backdrop, Steve Fuller’s contribution to the debate over
post-truth – first with short interventions (Fuller 2016; 2017), then with a
full-length book (Fuller 2018) – stands out as far more intriguing, deserv-
ing for this reason a closer scrutiny. The originality of Fuller’s position
lies in the fact that he both considers STS as largely responsible for the
emergence of post-truth and celebrates the latter as a valuable achieve-
ment of society.
    As the subtitle of his book states (“Knowledge as a power game”),
Fuller takes sides with Jasanoff and Simmet on the basic assumption that
knowledge cannot be separated from power, or science from politics, and
on the role of STS in investigating this. A role, Fuller however stresses,
which is more potential than actual, since “STS talks the talk without ever
quite walking the walk” (Fuller 2018, 59). STS recoils from post-truth
tropes – with special reference to the contingent, manufactured, negotiat-
ed status of consensus over interpretations, or what counts as relevant
expertise – which it actually “routinized in its own practice, and set loose
on the general public”; and it does so “whenever such politically undesir-
able elements as climate change deniers or creationists appropriate them
effectively for their own purposes” (Fuller 2018, 59). For Fuller, STS fails
to see how such very appropriation confirms the validity of the tropes,
and confounds a political battle with a methodological one. STS, in other
words, is a sort of reluctant midwife of post-truth. And if Jasanoff and
Simmet consider post-truth as a novel variant of recursive moral panics
about public knowledge, Fuller similarly regards it as “a deep feature of
at least Western intellectual life” (Fuller 2018, 6). Yet, contrary to the
former, he sees its rise to public relevance as a positive signal. Post truth
is not an indication of the diseased condition of contemporary society,
which reactionary forces turn to their own advantage, but rather of socie-
ty’s good health and dynamism. If elites can keep their position primarily
by controlling the rules of the game, then post-truth shows that individu-
als and groups outside elite circles have “gone meta” (Fuller 2018, 3).
They are increasingly able to question established rules, refusing to play
accordingly and challenging the status quo that the elites try to preserve.
In other words, people outside elites are increasingly able to exert “modal
power”, that is, “control over what people take to be possible” (Fuller
2018, 28).
    To make his point Fuller borrows from Pareto the metaphor of “li-
ons” and “foxes”. “Both species are post-truth merchants. The lions treat
the status quo’s understanding of the past as a reliable basis for moving
into the future, whereas the foxes regard the status quo as possessing a
corrupt understanding of the past that inhibits movement into a still bet-
ter future” (Fuller 2018, 2). Lions try to undermine the foxes’ claims as
Pellizzoni                                                                121

cognitively flawed and emotionally biased, thus failing on both epistemic
and moral grounds. Foxes make their way in the cracks opened by fla-
grant disconfirmations of the lions’ claims, which the latter’s call for addi-
tional research is unable to fix. In this sense, foxes play a crucial role in
social progress, exploring counter-inductive evidence and promoting
counter-factual imagination.
    The case for post-truth, Fuller notes, has already been made by
Thomas Kuhn, with his account of truth as dependent on the framework
of meaning by which evidence is elicited and assessed, and his portrayal
of the “Orwellian” procedure whereby a new paradigm, once established,
rewrites the past to make it match the current account of things. That
post-truth is receiving so much attention, then, indicates that science –
the most important field of play in the struggle over the definition of the
actual and the possible – is increasingly consistent with its inherent dem-
ocratic spirit, in both an epistemic and a social sense (Fuller 2018, 108-
109). “The post-truth condition is here to stay, […] mark[ing] a triumph
of democracy over elitism” (Fuller 2018, 181). Post-truth fulfils the dem-
ocratic “right to be wrong” (2018, 151), showing people’s growing will-
ingness “to take personal responsibility [for decisions] whatever the con-
sequences” (Fuller 2018, 13).
    Fuller opens his discussion by addressing not a scientific but a politi-
cal controversy, namely Brexit. He accounts for how foxes beat lions at
their own game, taking advantage from the latter’s own admission that
there are problems with Europe and the institutional opening offered by
the Parliament’s right to call a referendum. Foxes proved to be both
“more effective [and] perhaps more democratic and fairer to the people
concerned” (Fuller 2018, 15) than their opponents. They replaced the lat-
ter’s reliance on putatively objective yet actually flawed polling and survey
work with profiling techniques based on correlation of a variety of data to
reveal preferences, targeting communication to those segments of popula-
tion whose orientation might switch to the desired direction. This, for
Fuller, is no more – indeed arguably less – manipulative than coercing
people to express their preferences. It is also in accord with Popper’s vi-
sion of the open society as a living laboratory.
    Uproar has recently been sparked in Italy by an immunologist, Rob-
erto Burioni, who entered the controversy over the extension (to ten) of
compulsory simultaneous child vaccinations claiming that “science is not
democratic”, in the sense that expert and laypeople opinion cannot be
put on an equal footing. Fuller’s book, then, ideally replies to Burioni,
showing that post-truth concerns precisely the role of expertise, as “the
most potent non-violent form of power available” (Fuller 2018, 161). In-
deed, drawing on plenty of STS research, one can say that the breeding
ground of post-truth is not mistrust in science but in science and science-
based policies; not in scientists but in officially sanctioned experts. The
latter are not engaged in a self-contained quest for knowledge, searching
for answers to questions they pose to themselves, but in addressing issues
122                                                         Tecnoscienza – 10 (1)

of public relevance, on which no one can claim to possess a comprehen-
sive expertise. As Fuller (2018, 185) notes, in so doing experts tend to
apply “scientific consensus” or “normal science” to defend the status quo
from which their own rank depends2.
    Fuller (correctly, in my view) remarks that post-truth cannot be
equated to anti-science. It rather indicates the acknowledgment that sci-
ence plays a crucial role in one’s life, hence cannot be left entirely in the
hands of others. The risk is that in this way chaos prevails over order
(Fuller 2018, 181), since “if the field of play in science is opened to all
comers, then the rules of the game itself might change to become unrec-
ognizable” (Fuller 2018, 6). Such risk, however, is for Fuller worth run-
ning, and indeed can be faced by applying quality control criteria to the
production of truth in a reframed institutional arrangement, whereby sci-
ence leaves its (alleged) ivory tower from which to dispense pearls of wis-
dom to the laity, to enter the marketplace, while university withdraws
from its growing commitment to research to focus on teaching, that is on
fulfilling its crucial historical role of breaking down expert hierarchies
and elites, giving outsiders the instruments for challenging the status quo
and taking new directions.
    The above already indicates that the pars construens of Fuller’s argu-
ment is far removed from McIntyre’s plea for a return to (imaginary)
“good old days” of ordered relations between science, politics and socie-
ty, as it aims to offer a “project for the post-truth condition” (as the title
of a chapter of the book reads). Such project can be schematized in three
steps.
    First, one has to recognize that there is a problem with the academic
outlook on truth searching, which makes it “not obvious that left to their
own devices academics will necessary explore, let alone, exploit, all that is
knowable to the fullest extent” (Fuller 2018, 69). On one side academics
tend to give more relevance to the journey than to the usable results they
produce along the way. On the other, as testified by the difficulties of in-
terdisciplinary work, there is a rent-seeking tendency whereby disciplines
come to ‘own’ a field, controlling access to and use of related knowledge,
leading to ostensibly large amounts of “undiscovered public knowledge”
(Fuller 2018, 70). Outside academy, however, there are “academically
trained and interested parties” (Fuller 2018, 7) provided with a “strong
sense of success” (Fuller 2018, 81) and committed to unleashing the
“Promethean potential” (Fuller 2018, 92) of such knowledge. Fuller calls
these “the military-industrial will to knowledge” (Fuller 2018, 81), whose
hub is represented by the corporate foundation and whose organizational
form coincides with the “mode 2”, “post-academic” or “triple-helix”
model of knowledge production.
    Second, in the post-truth world science is undergoing a sort of
Protestant Reformation. It is becoming “Protscience”, that is science
“taken personally […] as a life-shaping form of knowledge”, whereby self
and world are rearranged “to enable one to live – or die, as the case may
Pellizzoni                                                                  123

be – with whatever one happens to believe” (Fuller 2018, 107).
Protscience indicates that science is now “the target rather than the agent
of secularization”, as a result of its “increasing visibility in public affairs,
[which] coincid[es] with the ability of people to access the entire store-
house of scientific knowledge from virtually any starting point on the In-
ternet” (Fuller 2018, 108), their increased education and the acknowl-
edgment that science is increasingly relevant to their lives. Thus, “in the
age of Protscience, the public continues to fund scientific research [yet]
without being bound to the scientists’ own interpretation of their find-
ings” (Fuller 2018, 118).
    Third, consistently with the above, science has to become, and is actu-
ally becoming, “customized”. Customized science “consists in idiosyn-
cratic interpretations and appropriations of scientific knowledge that, to
varying degrees, contradict the authority of expert scientists” (Fuller
2018, 7), building on the distinction “between what one ‘knows’ (that is,
has learned), and what one ‘believes’ (that is, acts upon)” (Fuller 2018,
184). As a result, the relation between expert and layperson is reshaped in
terms of a deal between manufacturer and retailer “so that, say, a doctor
comes to regard a patient in her clinic as more like a client who needs to
be sold on a treatment than a machine that needs to be fixed” (Fuller
2018, 110). Science customers are not necessarily science consumers; they
can make any use of the knowledge purchased and “assume responsibility
for their science-based decisions” (Fuller 2018, 120).


6. Critical Remarks

    Fuller’s case should be at this point sufficiently clear, and the reader
familiar with this author may have recognised themes he has developed
elsewhere. His outlook builds on a critique of academy, the subscription
to the basic principles of liberalism (with or without the “neo” prefix it
depends on how one assesses Fuller’s plea for self-entrepreneurship and
responsibilization and for the market as the social institution more capa-
ble of delivering public goods), and a strong leaning towards Schumpet-
erian “creative destruction”, risk-taking vs. risk-avoidance, and proaction
vs. precaution (see e.g. Fuller 2000, 2002, 2010; Fuller and Lipinska
2014). For him, taking responsibility for innovation means that, since
“innovation is inevitable” (Fuller 2018, 179), one is to address it in a
“precipitatory”, rather than anticipatory way, that is, by building on the
assumption that “some harm will be done, no matter what course of ac-
tion is taken, and that the task is to derive the most good from it” (Fuller
2018, 175). The age of post-truth, then, sounds like a call for embracing
this challenge and opportunity.
    Fuller’s take on STS and post-truth is likely to elicit controversy, if not
outright dismissal by the “politically correct STS practitioner” (Fuller
2018, 59) he criticizes. However, one has at least to admit that his outlook
124                                                         Tecnoscienza – 10 (1)

is refreshingly different from those largely dominant both outside and
within STS, examples of which I discussed above; and that his critique of
STS as “talking the talk without making the walk” may be crude but is
not ungrounded. Then, some critical remarks may help further reflection
on STS and the present and prospective role of science in public affairs.
The first four points below address Fuller’s argument without taking
sides about its normative grounds. A last one, instead, is explicitly norma-
tive in character.
    First, I think Fuller underestimates the role of power differentials in
the struggle over the definition of the actual and the possible. It seems to
me that the most effective use of post-truth is made not by the outsiders
but by the elites themselves. If we compare, for example, those who con-
test the scientific (rather than commercial and organizational) grounds of
imposing precisely ten (rather than eight or twelve, or whatever) simulta-
neous vaccinations with those who contest the existence or the anthropo-
genic origin of climate change, who has been more successful so far? Or,
to stay within a same field, let's consider agroecology supporters and Big
Pharma. The former make a case for putting on an equal footing farmers’
on-field expertise and acquaintance with local conditions and biotechnol-
ogists’ lab-focused and generalist insights. The latter makes a case for the
simultaneous equivalence (to avoid specific regulation) and difference (to
get property rights) of genetically modified crops, compared with non-
modified varieties. Which of the two has been so far more successful? Is-
n't Big Pharma's strategy a textbook example of post-truth? The meta-
phor of the lions and the foxes is too schematic. Lions can be as astute as
(or even more than) foxes, and the advent of post-truth indicates that
they are increasingly inclined to behave accordingly. Like Jasanoff and
Simmet, Fuller underestimates the resources of “right-wing postmodern-
ists”, which makes revolting against elite protection of the status quo
more complex than showing that the king is naked. The illusion which
Fuller seems to incur is that, once “gone meta”, the game can be played
on an equal footing, whereas it is likely that power differentials will re-
produce themselves on such level as well. I can subscribe to the criticisms
he addresses to expert gatekeeping and academy rent-seeking, yet the
“democratization” of knowledge promoted by post-truth is less at risk of
leading to chaos than to subtler forms of domination. To avoid being
beaten at their own game, opponents of the ruling power – as the geogra-
pher Neil Smith once said (see Smith 2005) – should always be one or
more steps ahead of their target: in our case going further meta, or maybe
just stepping out of the meta race. In the same vein, the idea of science
customization, its transformation into a relationship between sellers and
buyers (that is the opposite to Jasanoff and Simmet’s deliberative democ-
ratization), may lead the latter to feel they are lord of their own life; yet,
such feeling is often likely to be more an illusion than an actual reality, as
it happens whenever customers are given the impression of purchasing
something they really choose and want. The market has its virtues, but it’s
Pellizzoni                                                               125

good to keep in mind also its vices.
    Second, I am not sure that academy’s focus on teaching may work to-
day as a means for breaking hierarchies and challenging elite power.
Academy’s growing commitment to research is the outcome of a long his-
torical process culminated in the affirmation of the “triple-helix” model
and neoliberal regulatory interventions, with the ensuing obsession with
performance indicators and fund raising, pressure of corporate agendas
and use of low-paid precarious academic workers (Lave et al. 2010). Fo-
cusing on teaching might be a way for university to get rid of that, yet at
the price of becoming a place where students are given textbook notions
reflecting science totally produced elsewhere, according to choices which
the market is unlikely to rank according to the interests and concerns of
the less affluent segments of society.
    Third, as in previous work (Fuller and Lipinska 2014), Fuller makes a
case for proaction vs. precaution, risk-taking vs. risk-avoidance, or pre-
cipitatory vs. anticipatory governance, as if the latter term in each binary
were presently the rule. Yet, the success-oriented notion of truth has not
only been dominant for long (following the likes of Adorno and
Heidegger, one should say it is inbuilt in the DNA of modern science),
but has intensified to the point that, as Alfred Nordmann (2017) has
stressed, current techno-scientific truth has little to do with traditional
scientific truth. The guiding image of the former, Nordmann notes, is of
a reality that lies not beneath but beyond detectable phenomena – a van-
ishing point of perfect control. Truth, in this framework, is no longer a
matter of archetypes to be theoretically represented, tested, corrected and
elaborated further, but of prototypes to be made, produced and intro-
duced in the world. Truth, we could therefore say, has today less to do
with Descartes, or Popper than with Giambattista Vico’s claim that “the
true and the made are reciprocal or convertible” (verum et factum recip-
rocantur seu convertuntur); that “the true is precisely what is made”
(verum esse ipsum factum). Moreover, with the advent of neoliberalism,
risk-taking (or hazarding) has become the default or recommended
choice at any level, public and private, collective and individual. The une-
ven distribution of decision power and of the exposition to unwelcome
consequences has been managed through the spread of exonerating
clauses from liability for “unpredictable” events (what Ulrich Beck has
called “organized irresponsibility”), under the assumption, which is a
cornerstone of Fuller’s standpoint, that innovation is ultimately beneficial
to each and every one, including those negatively affected, hence risk-
taking is morally sound. In this framework, one can agree with Fuller that
there should be a correspondence between decision-taking and conse-
quence-bearing, and the rise of post-truth might indicate a thrust in this
direction, but I am less optimistic than he is that a fairer balance is under
way. A clue comes from the EU-promoted “responsible innovation” ap-
proach, which Fuller reads as consistent with precaution whereas in my
view it rather follows his idea of precipitatory governance. Gathering to-
126                                                         Tecnoscienza – 10 (1)

gether social actors (say Big Pharma vs. consumer, farmer or patient asso-
ciations) to discuss and decide how innovation is to be developed while
leaving untouched the respective dramatic differentials in agency means
amplifying, rather than reducing, “organized irresponsibility”. The narra-
tive of responsible innovation is: “we share the decision, we share the
consequences”. Yet, if power differentials are left as they are, neither of
the two assertions is remotely likely to correspond to reality when the
stakes are real (Pellizzoni, in press).
    Fourth, Fuller develops his argument on an epistemic level, as testified
by his definition of modal power as “control over what can be true or
false, which is reflected in intuitions about what is possible, impossible,
necessary and contingent” (Fuller 2018, 188), whereas it seems to me that
post-truth implies and expresses ontological struggles. Any truth claim, of
course, has ontic stakes, as it asserts something about the state of reality,
affecting as a consequence the course of the events by rearranging, as
Fuller says, the interface of self and the world. However, one thing is to
say that reality can be detected and assessed in different ways, and that
this produces real consequences; another that reality itself can be led to
match one’s knowledge claims. Modal power takes in the second case a
properly ontological import. Due to space limitations, I will not expand
on an argument I have developed elsewhere (Pellizzoni 2016), but suffices
it to note that a vast intellectual movement, sometimes called “new mate-
rialism” (Coole and Frost 2010), has in recent years built on how, in a
number of techno-scientific fields, traditional dualisms (subject/object,
mind/body, knowledge/matter, real/virtual, living/non-living, organic/
inorganic etc.) get increasingly blurred. This ontological shift, which in-
volves both the natural and the social sciences and humanities, is not
without consequences for the vicissitudes of truth, as it has entered influ-
ential narratives. When, for example, the champions of the Anthropocene
maintain that “nature is us” (Crutzen and Schwägerl 2011) or that we are
eventually “liberating ourselves from nature” (Arias-Maldonado 2013;
Breakthrough Institute 2015), in the sense that nature can legitimately be
reframed as an internal differentiation of society or technology which, as
with so-called ‘ecosystem services’, can be ‘let alone’ to be put at work as
such, they are shifting the post-truth game to a different level: one where
there is no residual layer of ‘hard’ reality to hamper the appropriative
thrust of powerful agents. Similarly, when one considers the rise of a form
of anticipation, ‘pre-emption’, which is neither precautionary nor proac-
tionary in that it does not follow a linear conception of time but one
where past, present and future remould each other, then the idea of “ret-
roactive truth” (Massumi 2007) takes a meaning that looks quite different
from an Orwellian rewriting of history, as the past is not just reinterpret-
ed but becomes a place where different things have happened, compared
with previous accounts (Pellizzoni, in press).3 From this perspective – as
critics of post-truth claim, but for reasons that to my knowledge they do
not consider – we may be faced not with an emancipatory thrust, but with
Pellizzoni                                                                127

a season of ever-more nightmarish elitism and oppression.
     Which leads me to the last point: a normative one, as anticipated,
hence not amenable to agreement or disagreement on the same basis as
the previous ones. As said, and as made clear also in his previous work,
Fuller subscribes to the two interconnected driving principles of modern
(techno)science: namely, that truth corresponds to success in transform-
ing the world according to the needs and wants of an ever-expansive hu-
man subjectivity, and that for this reason innovation is always ultimately
beneficial to all. Yet, to tackle the hardly unlikely scenario hinted above,
time has possibly come to seriously reflect on these assumptions, chal-
lenging their TINA (“there-is-no-alternative”) status. Once admitted that
the eventual universal benefit of innovation may not necessarily come
true, one might proceed with exploring the possibility of science and
technology policies where “choosing not” (to do, make or achieve some-
thing doable, makeable or achievable) is really an option. Note that
“choosing not” differs from applying precaution, since the latter corre-
sponds to saying “I would like, but am afraid”, while the former corre-
sponds to saying “I prefer not”, or “I am not interested”. Along this way,
one might also start wondering whether another science is possible, that
is, one whose attitude towards the world, hence whose criteria of success,
are of another sort, which is different from pretending, as it happens now,
that “alternative” methods and practices have to pull off exactly the same
material results as dominant ones (Hacking 2000).


7. Conclusion

    This paper had no pretence to offer a comprehensive overview of the
debate over the relationship between post-truth and STS. What should
result, however, is that critiques from outside and from within STS such
as those addressed either revamp supposedly settled discussions on the
epistemic legitimacy and societal implications of science deconstruction,
or reiterate arguments for a more inclusive generation of public facts that
fail to take stock of how the situation has evolved. Fuller stands out as a
dissonant voice for both his diagnosis (post-truth is not a disease of socie-
ty but a sign of its good health, and STS should feel proud rather than
ashamed of its midwifing role) and therapy (one is to draw from post-
truth its full implications concerning the institutional rearrangement and
the social role of science). However, he also fails to take full stock of the
situation, and namely how the game of truth has shifted from the epistem-
ic to the ontological level, reality being increasingly accounted for as fully
conformable to the will to knowledge. In a society characterized by grow-
ing inequalities and power differentials, this means that the equation be-
tween post-truth, customized science and individual freedom and auton-
omy is a bit hurried.
    From this perspective, post-truth may be regarded as fashionable top-
128                                                             Tecnoscienza – 10 (1)

ic of passing relevance, yet it draws attention to an emergent challenge for
STS: how to rethink itself to deal with a world where neither a further
“democratization” of science nor a (re)turn to well-guarded cognitive for-
tresses is likely to guarantee progressive research and political agendas.


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Pellizzoni                                                                     129

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130                                                               Tecnoscienza – 10 (1)


      1
        In the former case, the argument is that it is prudent to avoid drastic re-
 strictions to extractive and industrial activities, which would entail giving up ma-
 jor benefits, before getting "sound" scientific evidence of their effects on climate.
 In the case of "pre-emptive war" in Iraq, the argument works in reverse, accord-
 ing a straightforward understanding of precaution: waiting to get full-blown evi-
 dence of weapons and of Saddam Hussein's hostile intentions would entail a dan-
 gerous postponement of reaction.
      2
         I have elaborated elsewhere on the difference between the role of the
 scientist and of the expert (Pellizzoni 2012). Though Fuller does not make it
 explicit, his account of expertise seems to be in accordance with such distinction,
 as he notes that “expertise should be seen primarily in sociological rather than
 strictly epistemological terms, [… since] the expert’s decision licenses a train of
 other judgements and actions that attempt to align the world with the decision”
 (Fuller 2018, 161).
     3
        The textbook case remains G.W. Bush’s (2002) claim that removing Saddam
Hussein was the right thing to do, since in this way Iraq has become what justified
such very action.
