10.13125/2039-6597/5161
Frankissstein: A Love Story, romanzo di Jeanette Winterson pubblicato nel 2019, è una ‘trasposizione a specchio’ del Frankenstein di Mary Shelley. Il testo adombra una vita post-umana o transumana da vivere “forever as brain emulation” (Winterson 2020, 104). Ciò che si è comunemente sempre definito ‘essere umano’ deve ora trascendere la biologia attraverso una "better biology" (ibid. 113), ovvero mediante l'intelligenza artificiale.&nbsp; Assumendo che l'homo sapiens non è un caso speciale, lo scienziato Victor Stein propone, nel racconto di Winterson, un'ontologia che trascende la divisione umano/non umano. Egli ipotizza che possiamo sviluppare il nostro software cerebrale attraverso l'apprendimento e l'esternalizzazione cognitiva a vantaggio delle macchine, fino ad imparare a condividere il pianeta con " non biological forms created by us " (ibid. 73). Entro tale dimensione utopica il rapporto fra il sé, l'altro e il potere è rielaborato in modo che, come scrive Donna Haraway, vi sia " agency ...without defended subjects " (Haraway 1991, 3). O, in altre parole, un mondo in cui la cyborgificazione (la fusione di natura e cultura/tecnologia) sia vista come inevitabile e non vi sia più necessità di 'difendere' la natura.
Oltre a investigare queste prospettive di pensiero, il presente articolo esplora i principali campi metaforici del racconto (mondi paralleli, simulacri) e i suoi dispositivi narrativi essenziali (metalepsi, montaggio alternato, parallelismo interno). Lo studio argomenta che il tentativo di fusione tra natura e tecnologia, come teorizzato dai tecno-scienziati nel racconto di Winterson, al più modifica l'atteggiamento di alcuni esseri umani ‘non aumentati’ nei confronti di altri esseri umani ‘non aumentati’, siano essi viventi o morti. Gli umani non sono cyborg, né inforgs, né transumani ad alcun titolo, ma creature di confine tra ontologie alternative, che spesso agiscono da ‘meno che umani’, infraumani o, come il transessuale Ry Shelley, " inappropriate others " (Haraway 1992).
&nbsp;
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Between
Artificial Intelligence
«The Future of Humans  in a Post-Human World»: <em>Frankissstein</em> by Jeanette Winterson
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«The Future of Humans  in a Post-Human World»: <em>Frankissstein</em> by Jeanette Winterson
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12
           «The Future of Humans
          in a Post-Human World»:
      Frankissstein by Jeanette Winterson

                                 Fausto Ciompi

Abstract

      Frankissstein: A Love Story, Jeanette Winterson’s 2019 novel, is a mirror
transposition of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. The novel adumbrates a
posthuman or transhuman life to be lived «forever as brain emulation» thanks
to artificial Intelligence. Scientist Victor Stein argues that we can develop our
brain software through learning, including outsourcing to machines, until
we learn to share the planet with «non-biological forms created by us». This
delineates a world in which the cyborgification (the fusion of nature and
culture/technology) is seen as inevitable and there is no need to ‘defend’
nature. With further lines of thought, my paper explores the metaphorical
fields (parallel worlds, simulacra) and narrative devices (metalepsis,
alternating montage, internal parallelism) that underpin this story. My point
is that the attempted fusion of nature and technology, as theorised by techno-
scientists in Winterson’s story, only produces a modification in the attitude
of some unaugmented humans towards other unaugmented humans, both
living and dead. Finally, humans are not cyborgs, nor inforgs, nor full-blown
transhumans but boundary creatures straddling alternative ontologies and
often acting as less than humans, infrahumans or, like transsexual Ry Shelley,
«inappropriate/d others».

Keywords

   Jeanette Winterson; Speculative fiction; Frankenstein; Transhuman; Post-
human; Simulacra; Artificial Intelligence



Between, vol. XII, n. 24 (novembre/November 2022)
issn: 2039-6597
doi: 10.13125/2039-6597/5161
Fausto Ciompi, «The Future of Humans in a Post-Human World»




           «The Future of Humans
          in a Post-Human World»:
      Frankissstein by Jeanette Winterson

                                 Fausto Ciompi




                                       We who were living are now dying
                                       With a little patience

                                       T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land


      Frankisssstein: A Love Story, published in 2019, is the latest novel by
Jeanette Winterson, one of the most inventive British authors on the con-
temporary scene. In this paper, first I will focus on the text’s characters,
structure and narrative techniques in order to delineate their relationship
with the posthuman or transhuman philosophies that are discussed in
the novel. Then, I will discuss Winterson’s response to the transhumanist
agenda of Victor Stein, the scientist-protagonist of her novel, who under-
stands life as a machine-readable form to be transferred into the cybernetic
dimension. I will also make references to 12 Bytes, Winterson’s 2021 essay
which investigates issues, such as Artificial Intelligence and Futurist think-
ing, which are fictionalized in Frankissstein. The novel depicts cyber-prac-
tices and the body not as intimately intertwined but as mutually exclusive.
They are not, in the words of French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty, the
same «fabric», the same «flesh» (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 168). The question
arises, then, whether the disembodied life envisioned by transhumanists
is a simulacrum of life or rather a network of desires which are ultimately
fulfilled by the mind. An issue that is for the in-dwelling resident of this
world to ponder, whether in a speculative fashion (Winterson’s attitude,
which I gladly adopt) or in the form of the neo-anthropocentric scientism
that is characteristic of most transhumanist thinking.



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   1. Text and paratext: mirror stories, mirror characters,
    characters without a double and printed characters
      As the novel’s title suggests, Frankissstein is a rewriting of Mary Shel-
ley’s Frankenstein. Or perhaps, rather than a rewriting, it is an updating or
‘mirror transposition’ of Shelley’s 1818 gothic masterpiece, because Win-
terson’s text alternates two parallel stories that reflect each other. The first
story, set in the early nineteenth century, begins with young author Mary
Shelley at the time when she is planning to write Frankenstein. The second,
focused on transsexual doctor Ry Shelley and his lover Victor Stein, con-
cerns events that reach the present day and deal with Stein’s attempt at
transferring human life into the cybernetic dimension. The contemporary
events and existents of the modern story duplicate and, one might say, up-
date the protagonists and circumstances of the romantic storyline. This is
the tabulation of correspondences between the characters in the two stories:

                                 Mirror characters
Romantic story                            Contemporary story
Mary Shelley: author of Frankenstein and Ry Shelley: doctor, transsexual and
narrator of her story                     narrator of his story

Percy Shelley: poet and Mary’s husband
                                               Victor Stein: Ry’s lover and Artificial
                                               Intelligence scientist
Victor Frankenstein: scientist who
creates the ‘monster’

Lord Byron: poet, womanizer, and atheist       Ron Lord: entrepreneur in the field of
                                               sexual robotics and amateur poet

Claire Clairmont: Mary’s half-sister and       Claire: clerk at the Memphis Fair, religious
Byron’s lover                                  activist, Max More’s assistant, Ron Lord’s
                                               business partner

John Polidori: author of the gothic novel      Polly D.: journalist
The Vampyre (1819)

The cast of characters is completed by minor figures who have no ‘double’
in the parallel story. In the contemporary narrative these include Max More,
who is, both in the text and in real life, CEO of Alcor Life Extension Foun-



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Fausto Ciompi, «The Future of Humans in a Post-Human World»



dation in Scottsdale, Arizona, philosopher, supporter of Extropianism, and
the person mainly responsible for the definition of the transhuman in its
current sense. The philosophy of Extropy – the opposite of entropy, i.e.,
rational order instead of chaos – is based on the faith in science, computa-
tional power, and nanotechnology. It promotes life extension and practical
optimism. Its first two principles, heartily endorsed by Victor Stein, are:


         1) Perpetual Progress: Extropy means seeking more intelligence,
      wisdom, and effectiveness, an open-ended lifespan, and the removal
      of political, cultural, biological, and psychological limits to continuing
      development. Perpetually overcoming constraints on our progress
      and possibilities as individuals, as organizations, and as a species.
      Growing in healthy directions without bound.
         2) Self-Transformation: Extropy means affirming continual
      ethical, intellectual, and physical self-improvement, through critical
      and creative thinking, perpetual learning, personal responsibility,
      proactivity, and experimentation. Using technology — in the widest
      sense to seek physiological and neurological augmentation along with
      emotional and psychological refinement. (More 2003: last accessed 3
      March 2022)

      Max More is just one of the transhumanist philosophers, sci-visionaries
and techno-gurus mentioned in the novel. Although they have no precise
counterpart in the romantic story, their ideas are anticipated by both Percy
Shelley and Victor Frankenstein, who, with different means, pursue «the
human dream» (Winterson 2020: 82 passim) of defeating death. In this sense,
the persistent repetition of similar episodes, as well as the return of human
characters and types in the two stories, testifies to the enduring nature of
this everlasting utopia, a dream that first appeared in literature with Gil-
gamesh and which has been reiterated ever since with unchanged pathos.
      As for the romantic story, characters with no double include Mr
Wakefield, director of Bedlam Asylum (historical figure); Captain Wal-
ton, explorer and scientist (from Shelley’s Frankenstein); Charles Babbage,
mathematician and inventor of the analytical machine (historical figure),
and Ada Lovelace, Byron’s daughter and ‘inventor’ of the calculating ma-
chine that has often been regarded as the first computer (historical figure).
      While these characters have no modern counterpart, Victor Stein has
two in the romantic story: the poet Percy Shelley and the scientist Victor
Frankenstein. Like Percy, Stein is in love with a Shelley, the transsexual Ry,
whose name, short for Ryan, obviously recalls Mary. Like both his counter-


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parts, Stein is a «limit-surpassing» character (Bottiroli 2017: 13) who defies
God’s and nature’s laws by envisioning a life beyond biological life. Not sur-
prisingly, in the novel’s ending, this prophet of transhumanism remains sus-
pended between two dimensions. He disappears. His body is nowhere to be
found. Perhaps he is dead or his mind has truly entered the cybernetic eter-
nity. Perhaps, by pursuing natural transcendence in the wake of Nietzsche’s
Übermensch, as is the case with many techno-heroes (Grantham 2005, 11),
he has been annihilated by his own will to power. A similar fate befalls his
romantic alter ego, Victor Frankenstein. With a typically postmodernist met-
alepsis, first Frankenstein meets his creator, Mary Shelley, in Bedlam, where
he asks her to “unmake” him; then, he sees her again at a party in Babbage’s
house, only to disappear into thin air like a shadow as if an unknown force
had really unmade him. We are thus left wondering whether the two Vic-
tors are the successful explorers of new life spaces or ‘necronauts’, as Tom
McCarthy in his novel titled “C” calls questers ready to undergo near-death
experiences (Baelo-Allué and Calvo-Pascual 2021: 15).
      In both storylines, characters, whether historical or fictional, tend to
behave in a similar way to their archetypes. Or, in Baudrillard’s terms, they
are a «precession of simulacra» in which both events and existents «are
born at the intersection of models» (Baudrillard 2006: 16). Winterson’s By-
ron, for instance, is a cynic and male chauvinist, with all the repugnance
and dark romantic allure that entails. Ron Lord, his satirical version in the
modern story, instead displays only the vulgar traits of this worn-out male
stereotype: he is the perfect hero of a retrosexual masculinity narrative.
But, in at least two cases, Winterson significantly alters the biography of
her characters. In fact, Shelley’s Walton, the explorer who collects the last
thoughts of the dying Frankenstein at the North Pole and recounts his sto-
ry in letters to his sister, terminates his treacherous pursuit without trans-
gressing the limits set by reason. A ‘sadder and wiser man’ who has learnt
his lesson, he takes Victor’s advice and renounces his project of scientific
exploration in order to seek «happiness in tranquility and avoid ambition»
(Shelley 1985: 262). On the other hand, Winterson’s Walton persists in his
quest, discovers the Northwest Passage, reaches the Antarctic and returns
to London as a hero. And he sends Frankenstein, who did not die at the
North Pole, to Bedlam asylum.
      Winterson also alters the biography of Mr Wakefield by making him
the director of Bedlam asylum. The historical Edward Wakefield, Quaker,
philanthropist and statistician, never actually filled that role. If anything,
he was the protagonist of repeated and animated campaigns against the in-
human conditions of the mentally ill who were confined to Bedlam. These


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Fausto Ciompi, «The Future of Humans in a Post-Human World»



activities contributed to the reform of the institute and to its relocation, in
the summer of 1815, from Moorfields to St George’s Fields, south of the
Thames, in more dignified premises and less deplorable living conditions
for its guests. As in Walton’s case, these uchronic re-adjustments of events
are a form of redress for the idealists who have been defeated by history or
in stories. For Winterson, the efforts of present-day transhumanists are of
uncertain effect, but idealists of past ages deserve posthumous, allohistoric
gratification. The general spirit of the novel, however, is one of scientific
curiosity and practical optimism. These are typical traits of transhuman-
ism and extropianism, whose unflinching faith in a better future for the
more-than-humans of tomorrow is tempered in Winterson by a deep sense
of the human as embodied here and now, especially by Mary and Ry. Mary
experiences miscarriage. She knows only too well what it means to lose the
life she had nurtured within her body. Ry, more than anybody else, expe-
riences the contradictions of a life lived across boundaries: «I am liminal,
cusping, in between, emerging, undecided, transitional, experimental, a
start-up (or is it an upstart?) in my own life» (Winterson 2020: 29). He is
scorned, mocked, harassed, almost raped because the transsexual monster
is a non-subject. He is part of the «inappropriate/d others» (Haraway 1992).
His/her gender fluidity – he is a woman who is transforming into a man
and is attracted by men – makes him/her aware of the pain and difficulties
involved in the development of identity, whether sexual or ontological.
For Winterson, however, techno-heroism (Donawerth 1997: 15) and trans-
humanism are male prerogatives. Mary and Ry Shelley are not affected.
They live to tell the story of the men they love, and the pains of their own
bodies, when their men’s bodies are no more.
      The gender binary is another form of duality which is explored in the
text. Its prominence is evident from the publisher’s outermost peritext, as
Genette calls the area of the peritext that is primarily the responsibility of
the publisher: the cover, the title page, and their appendages as well as the
book’s material construction (Genette 1997: 16). On the book cover, the tri-
partite title of the novel, Fran kiss stein, contains a play on words. Fran, which
ambiguously abbreviates both Francis (a male name) and Frances or Fran-
cine (its female equivalents), kiss(es) stein. The allusion is to Ry’s love for
Victor Stein. But the idea of a ‘third gender’, a gender that goes beyond the
male-female binary, is also suggested by the peritextual play on colours. The
cover of the first edition of the novel, published by Jonathan Cape, was in
three gendered colours: the background was dark blue (traditionally, the
‘male colour’); the author’s surname (Winterson) and the title were written
in pink (the conventional mark of femininity); the author’s name (Jeanette)


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and the three x’s penned above the title were orange. In genetics the three
x’s identify a female individual with supernumerary chromosomes, the so-
called ‘superfemale’, or, in more scientific terms, a subject suffering from
trisomy or triple x syndrome, which affects, with no visible effects, one fe-
male in a thousand. In fact, the implicit message of the cover is that the hero/
ine (and perhaps the author) of the novel is neither blue nor pink, neither
male nor female. He/she wishes to be orange, a superfemale whose gender
identity transcends binaries and is defined by culture and desire rather than
genetics. It should also be noted that Winterson’s debut novel, Oranges Are
Not the Only Fruit, used the word ‘orange’ to contend that gender is not an
irrevocable fact, but a vocation. Nearly twenty-five years later, Frankissstein
re-evaluates orange, by transforming it from the colour of homologation into
the emblem of multiple possibilities. Orange is the new black in the sphere
of sex, just like «brain emulation will be the new normal» (Winterson 2020:
280) in Victor’s brave new world of science. This emancipation from biology
responds to the admonition contained in the Transhumanist Handbook edited
by educator, futurist, and chairman of the California Transhumanist Party,
Newton Lee: «The longer we stay in the purgatory of humanity as we know
today, the more human suffering we have to endure» (Lee 2019: 8). This de-
lineates a utopian dimension in which the relationship between self, other,
and power is reworked so that, in Donna Haraway’s words, there is «agency
...without defended subjects» (Haraway 1991: 3). Democracy (or transhu-
man paradise) «to come», as Jacques Derrida often repeated (Derrida 2005).

          2. All that is double tends towards oneness:
              the duality of voices and of structure
      The main narrative device in the novel is the alternating montage of
two parallel stories told by two first-person narrators. This is far from in-
frequent in postmodern novels. Among texts with a ‘dual structure’ one
may count Possession (1990) by A.S. Byatt, Hawksmoor (1985) and English
Music (1992) by Peter Ackroyd. But while these novels are divided into
chapters that are conventionally marked by numbers or titles, in Frank-
issstein two different stories alternate with less clear paratextual demarca-
tion. These usually short sequences are arranged in a continuous narrative
flow, which is interrupted only by blank spaces and epigraphs: maxims,
long quotations and even dictionary definitions. This sense of continuity is
reinforced by the use of epanadiplosis, the figure of speech that consists in
the repetition at the beginning of a sentence of a word or phrase that has



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Fausto Ciompi, «The Future of Humans in a Post-Human World»



been used at the end of the previous sentence. For example, at the end of
the Lake Geneva episode, in the opening scene of the novel, Mary Shelley
announces her resolution to write Frankenstein in the following terms: «On
the morrow I announced that I had thought of a story» (Winterson 2020: 23).
     Then, the epigraph to the next sequence opens with the repetition of
‘story’, thus producing the epanadiplosis:

          Story: a series of connected events, real or imagined. Imagined or real.
          Imagined
          And
          Real. (Ibid.)

        The vertical arrangement of words in this epigraph iconises the
paradigmatic and metaphorical dimension of language, which Jakobson
called the vertical axis of language (Jakobson 1964). The syntagmatic and
metonymical dimension (Jakobson’s horizontal axis) is instead the mutu-
ally exclusive sphere of «Imagined or real» events, where actions usually
come across as horizontally connected or disconnected. Winterson’s novel
envisions a new kind of romantic/transhuman hyper-connection, which
is based on the ‘vertical’ identification of multiple timelines and spaces.
Numerous epigraphs insist in fact on the identification between fiction
and ever unstable reality. Just as frequent are the epigraphs which empha-
size the overlapping of old and updated ontologies. «Reality is water solu-
ble» (Winterson 2020: 1). Reality bends with the heat or blurs in the mist.
The mind is, as argued in an epigraph quoting a Max Planck dictum, «the
matrix of all matter» (Winterson 2020: 69).
        Formal duality, which in Winterson aspires to dissolve in a unified
flux , is instrumental to outlining the universe as imagined in Frankissstein.
    1

The reduction to oneness is clearly thematized in the final part of the novel,
which illustrates the Gnostic idea of pleroma with reference to the codi-
ces of Nag Hammadi. The cosmology outlined in those texts, discovered


      1
        This applies to a great part of Winterson’s literary production. She has
spoken of her novels from Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit (1985) to The Power Book
(2016) as of a single uninterrupted cycle. Some critics prefer to describe this con-
tinuity as a persistent variation on the same thing (see discussion in Onega 2006:
203-204). Especially in The Stone Gods (2007) Winterson understands futurity as
repetition, mere iteration that is just as lethal as the past (Rine 2011: 74). At the
same time, «Rather than rejecting science, in Haraway’s terms she ‘refus[es] an
anti-science metaphysics’» (Watkins 2020: 76).


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in Egypt in 1945, is hybridized by Winterson with gender discourse and
cybernetics. The pleroma, traditionally conceived by the Gnostics as the
cosmic zone of fullness between the ideal absolute and the material sphere,
is re-imagined by Winterson as an indistinct unity of male and female, and
in analogy to the alternation of 0 and 1 in computer code: «Think of them
as the zeros and ones of code» (Winterson 2020: 294). In 12 Bytes, more
an incunable than an appendix to Frankissstein, Winterson further clarifies
that, just like the universe, «Our new intelligence – embodied or non-em-
bodied – is built out of zeros and ones of code» (Winterson 2021: pos. 18).
Clearly Winterson’s main concern is not simply about textual cohesion,
as prescribed by Forster’s famous slogan ‘only connect’, or about the il-
lustration of vague analogies between the cosmos and the mind. This hy-
per-connection alludes to the technological revolution that has brought the
citizen of the Novacene, the coming era of hyper-intelligence according to
scientist and philosopher James Lovelock (Winterson 2021: pos. 56), to the
threshold of the so-called internet of things. Hyper-connection concerns
the total integration of the human being in the surrounding environment.
As Winterson explains, in ambient computing, or the internet of things,
our mind does not converse with the environment. It is the environment.
Things around us, devices and appliances of all sorts, operate like com-
puters integrated into our minds and fulfill or even anticipate our needs
and desires (Winterson 2021: pos. 51,9). We co-belong, just like the devices
that are with us, to one Umwelt, a world of life that is no more artificial
than primal. The human mind is already physically expanding beyond the
province of the skull. As Margaret Atwood never tires of repeating, specu-
lative fiction is «about things that could happen» (Atwood 2011: 6), possi-
ble worlds that are already, at least in part, real ones.


        3. The transhuman explained to humans:
 a Royal Society lecture and an underground experiment
      Victor Frankenstein’s dream was to create life from death by reanimat-
ing inanimate matter through the process of galvanisation. Victor Stein’s
dream is to translate the electro-chemical impulses of the human brain into
bytes, artificial intelligence, and thereby enable man to survive as a cogni-
tive subject, while the corporeal shell decays and dies. Within a cybernetic
platform, dematerialised, freed from the perishable carcass of the body, the
man-brain will thus be able to eternalise itself as consciousness, thought
and memory. In his out-of-body omnipotence, he will even be able to colo-



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Fausto Ciompi, «The Future of Humans in a Post-Human World»



nise the cosmos. The hubris of both Stein and Frankenstein is thus the same
as that of Prometheus plasticator, who in Ovid’s Metamorphoses creates man
from clay, and of Prometheus pyrophoros, who in the myth steals fire, the
symbol of knowledge, from the gods, to give it to man. But Stein’s hubris
is also that of the modern dictator as described by Martin Heidegger, the
overman that can direct the technological processes because he alone is ca-
pable of being completely ruled by the essence of technology: «The alleged
‘dictatorships’ are not a dictans…, but the dictatum of that essence of being
from which modern humans cannot withdraw» (Heidegger 2017: 336).
      Besides myth, both Shelley and Winterson draw on science. If the
«new Prometheus» alluded to in the subtitle of Shelley’s novel is, among
other sources, indebted to Galvanism and Machine Man (1747) by French
philosopher Julien Jean Offroy de La Mettrie, Victor Stein’s transhuman
philosophy is the distillation of Winterson’s copious readings on AI, which
she discusses in 12 Bytes. Among them, the essay The Singularity is Near:
When Humans Transcend Biology (2005) stands out. Its author, Ray Kur-
zweil, essayist, inventor, and director of engineering at Google, makes a
fleeting appearance in the novel, at the Memphis Tec-X-Po fair, where he
has an animated discussion about singularity with Elon Musk. Technolog-
ical singularity, or simply ‘singularity’, a concept introduced by mathema-
tician John Von Neumann in the 1950s, refers to the moment in the future
when technological development will be uncontrollable and irreversible.
According to the theory of the intelligence explosion, at the culmination
of a series of uncontrollable cognitive upgrades, an intelligent agent, what
we now commonly call a machine and Marx called ‘an animated monster’,
will rise to the rank of superintelligence: a cognitive level far beyond that
of human intelligence. Another mathematician, better known as a science
fiction author, Vernor Vinge, in a much-discussed article titled “The Com-
ing Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era”,
predicted in 1993 that this transition would occur between 2005 and 2030.
Futurist and environmental scientist James Lovelock, on the other hand,
speaks of hyper-intelligence and points out that «Artificial Intelligence will
not be a tool for long; it will be a life-form. But, before that happens, all of
us humans will be living in computer-world» (quoted in Winterson 2021:
pos. 56). However, this idea, central in Winterson’s novel, is certainly not
only Lovelock’s prerogative; he is just the most eloquent of its supporters.
Extropianist Max More, who unlike Lovelock is a character in the novel,
also shares it. More claims it will soon be possible to upload one’s memory
and psychological data, currently stored in the brain, to a technological
medium such as a hard disk, a chip or a database. Consequently, Extro-


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pianism advocates the merging of multiple identities into a single ‘collec-
tive consciousness’, bringing together all available information, making
transhumans immortal and omniscient. Homo Deus, homo sive computer, one
could say evoking Yuval Harari and Baruch Spinoza. This obviously turns
Percy Shelley’s romantic dreams about the immortality of the soul, which
he expounded in many of his verses and in the essay “On a Future State”,
into a technological nightmare: «I believe it is each man’s task to awaken
his own soul. His soul is that part of him not subject to death and decay;
that part of him made alive to truth and beauty» (Winterson 2020: 56).
      Alan Turing, Jack Good and Marvin Minsky are other mathematicians
whose reflections on Artificial Intelligence are echoed in Frankissstein. Inter-
estingly enough, in their life both Turing and Good experienced discrimina-
tion and in Frankissstein Winterson recalls their existential suffering along
with their professional achievements. She shows herself aware of the inex-
tricability of intellectual life from social and emotional life. In 1952 Turing, a
homosexual, was sentenced to jail for ‘gross indecency’ and forced to accept
chemical castration to avoid imprisonment. This was despite the fact that, by
breaking the Enigma code, he had probably proved the single most impor-
tant factor in determining the defeat of Nazi Germany during World War
II. Winterson also recalls Turing’s famous test, illustrated in the 1950 article
“Computing machinery and intelligence”, which appeared in the magazine
Mind. Turing’s argument was that a machine could trick a human being into
believing that it was itself human: the so-called imitation game. This was a
relevant first step towards the homologation of man and machine.
      Jack Good, who was brought up in London and studied at Cambridge
University, was harassed and marginalized by the English due to his Jew-
ish-Polish origins. In his studies, he had shown that unsupervised artificial
neural networks (mini-brains) were capable of self-learning and self-dupli-
cation, independently of human intervention (Winterson 2021: pos. 139).
He had also pondered, first in academic publications and then as a con-
sultant on the screenplay for Stanley Kubrick’s film 2001: A Space Odyssey,
whether super-intelligent machines could declare their independence from
humans, as the supercomputer Hal does in the film. In Frankissstein, Victor
Stein is Good’s disciple and, in a way that recalls Mel Brooks’ and Gene
Wilder’s parody film Frankenstein Jr, he plans to use his mentor’s brain for
the first experiment in the transition of human to artificial intelligence. His
intentions are Good. This programme is shared by AI biologist Aubrey De
Grey, whose credo is discussed in 12 Bytes. De Grey argues that it is even
possible for humans to live for a thousand years thanks to organ mainte-
nance and rejuvenation techniques (Winterson 2021: pos. 11.3). Failing this,


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there is always the possibility of uploading the brain onto another plat-
form, which in the early stages is not made of meat. This is exactly Victor
Stein’s transhumanist agenda.
     These theories are in fact the heart of the lecture Stein gives at the Roy-
al Society, a sort of transhumanist manifesto. Victor defines his thinking as
anti-binary. Binarism, proclaims the charismatic speaker, belongs to our
«carbon-based past. The future is not biology – it’s AI» (Winterson 2020: 72).
According to Stein, there are three types of life: the first type is based on
millennial evolution; the second, partially self-designed, is based on brain
development through the exercise of cognitive practice and outsourcing to
machines. The third, the one that really fascinates him, is fully self-designing:

         Type 3 Life: Fully self-designing.
         Now he gets excited. The nearby world of AI will be a world where
      the physical limits of our bodies will be irrelevant. Robots will manage
      much of what humans manage today. Intelligence – perhaps even
      consciousness – will no longer be dependent on a body. We will learn
      to share the planet with non-biological life forms created by us. We
      will colonise space. (Winterson 2020: 73)

     The emphatic crescendo of his speech clearly denounces Stein’s exal-
tation. At first, he sounds like an inflamed scientist. In the end, the atavistic
will to power emerges: for him, transhumanism is just another name for
neo-colonialism. Then, Stein proceeds to illustrate visually his posthuman
agenda. On the screen behind him, Leonardo’s Vitruvian man, the very sym-
bol of Western humanism, appears. With a remarkable dramatic effect, the
image animates itself, the man enters the sea and disappears into the waves:

         Behind him on the screen tonight is Leonardo’s drawing of The
      Vitruvian Man. As the audience sit in silence, Leonardo’s image
      animates itself, takes an appearing trilby from an appearing peg and,
      placing it on the back of its head, turns and walks into an appearing
      sea. The sound of the waves can be heard clearly. The image of the
      man walks without pausing until the waters reach his head. All that is
      left behind is the hat floating calmly on the indifferent sea. (Ibid.: 73-74)

      This brings to mind the concluding paragraph of Michel Foucault’s
essay The Order of Things, another well-known dirge to anthropocentrism.
Here, too, man, defined as a recent invention, seems destined to disappear
like a face drawn on the sand by the shoreline. Winterson adds a touch of



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irony to Foucault’s sombre picture of the end of humanism by hinting at
a mysterious hat, certainly not a part of the Vitruvian man’s clothing. This
probably echoes the ending of Conrad’s novella titled “The Secret Sharer”,
where Leggatt, the eponymous hero, also disappears into the sea leaving
behind a floating hat. However, this is irony with a meaning. The hat is
part of the typical attire of the bourgeois man, and, with this reference,
Winterson probably alludes to the mix of ideal and practical that character-
izes the prototypical European bourgeois as described, among others, by
Machiavelli, Aby Warburg and Franco Moretti (2013: 5):

        And [man’s] appearance was not the liberation of an old anxiety,
     the transition into luminous consciousness of an age-old concern, the
     entry into objectivity of something that had long remained trapped
     within beliefs and philosophies: it was the effect of a change in the
     fundamental arrangements of knowledge. As the archaeology of our
     thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one
     perhaps nearing its end.
        If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some
     event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the
     possibility – without knowing either what its form will be or what it
     promises – were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical
     thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly
     wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge
     of the sea. (Foucault 2002: 422)

    Victor smiles, walks forward, turning back to his screen. Then he re-
sumes his speech:

       […] I called this lecture The Future of Humans in a Post-Human World
     because artificial intelligence is not sentimental – it is biased towards
     best possible outcomes. The human race is not a best possible outcome.
     (Winterson 2020: 74)

     In Victor’s view, in fact, the future of mankind is through self-destruc-
tion (the posthuman agenda) and self-enhancement (the transhuman re-
demption of a being who does not resign himself to living like plants and
bacteria). What Victor wants to do away with is not only religion, race and
gender prejudices, but biology. The life of the mind will dispense with
biological limitations as well as with man’s default defects.
     Victor is brilliant. He is in control. His replies to the questions from
the public are erudite and witty. Then, a woman challenges him with the


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fatal question: «WHAT IS SO SMART ABOUT THE END OF THE HU-
MAN?» (Winterson 2020: 76). Victor, hardly disturbed, explains that sci-
ence no longer considers homo sapiens to be a special case. Even human
beings, like plants or frogs, can be regarded as input data. All the more so
because man has not performed well. He has caused climate change, mass
extinction of flora and fauna, destruction of habitat etc. His end is not to be
mourned, but celebrated.
      Then, paraphrasing the theory of singularity, Victor prophesies that
the first superintelligence can only be the product of human imperfection.
This imperfect first perfection will be inevitably marred by phallogocen-
trism. But it will self-emend:

         Even if, even if the first superintelligence is the worst possible iteration
      of what you might call the white male autistic default programme, the
      first upgrade by the intelligence itself will begin to correct such errors.
      And why? Because we humans will only programme the future once.
      After that, the intelligence we create will manage itself.
         And us.
         Thank you.
         […]
         The future is a plausible app. (Winterson 2020: 80)

      Winterson’s irony resonates in Ry’s final remark about a future of im-
maculate perfection made available by an app. The eternal human dream
of attaining immortality is no less pathetic when expressed in Percy Shel-
ley’s inflamed verses than in Victor Stein’s scientific parlance.
      The last occasion when Victor expounds his ideas is in his under-
ground laboratory in Manchester, the place where in wartime Alan Tur-
ing’s team conducted their research on the enigma code. Victor discusses
Gnosis, pits Sophia the Gnostic deity against Jehovah, and freely concedes
that the gods we have invented have failed. In the grip of new-age exal-
tation, he lists the Gods who had a mortal parent and an immortal one:
Jesus, Dionysus, Hercules, Gilgamesh, Wonder Woman. He calls them the
outcome of enhanced biology. This means that, for as long as they are im-
prisoned in a body, they, too, are cursed.
      It is no coincidence that Manchester is the setting of the novel’s catastro-
phe. Manchester is the place where everything began. It is where, according
to Tocqueville, at the time of the Industrial Revolution individual power cel-
ebrated its triumph over society. It is where Marx and Engels saw the looms
enslave the workers at the dawn of the man-machine conflict. As Winterson



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puts it in her essay titled Why Be Happy When You Could Be Normal,

         Manchester was all mix. It was radical — Marx and Engels were
     here. It was repressive — the Peterloo Massacres and the Corn Laws.
     Manchester spun riches beyond anybody’s wildest dreams, and wove
     despair and degradation into the human fabric. It was Utilitarian, in
     that everything was put to the test of ‘Does this work?’. It was Utopian
     — its Quakerism, its feminism, its anti-slavery movement, its socialism,
     its communism. (Winterson 2011: pos. 27)

      And it was in Manchester laboratories that Turing gave a decisive im-
pulse to building the ancestor of the computer. Manchester, Winterson’s
hometown, is a place of possibilities and contradictions. Here, Victor gath-
ers Ry, Ron and Claire, who are joined by the uninvited journalist Polly D.
They are the guests of his transhuman ark and the witnesses to his passage
to augmented reality. He attempts his experiment, but eventually disap-
pears in the deafening noise of machinery, never to be seen again. The other
characters, excluded from the ark, remain terrified with their feet in the
water let out by the security system. For a few days, Ry looks for Victor in
vain. «[P]resent and invisible» (Winterson 2020: 340), Ry is the struggling
reminder of the materiality of the body-self who eats, breathes, suffers. Pol-
ly D. invites him out to dinner. He accepts. Eating in settings conducive to
socialization is the answer: the body is the medium and the mediator of
experience, the initiator of responses to suffering, the mark of immanence
which the disengaged mind cannot obliterate. End of the modern story.
      The romantic story ends with Mary Shelley reflecting on Percy’s re-
mains, after he lost his life in the wreck of his boat and his body was burnt
on the beach in Viareggio. Perhaps Ada’s analytical machine could read
him back to life. Perhaps the voice calling to Mary from the crowd is Vic-
tor’s. «Shall we begin again?» (Winterson 2020: 344), she asks herself. The
only way to come to terms with the domain of becoming is to understand
it as a unity, a series of contingent experiences to be repeated again and
again, hardly picturing a telos. And this contingency must be inhabited.
Heidegger described dwelling as the ability «to cherish and protect, to pre-
serve and care for» (Heidegger 1971: 147). Ry eats and breathes. Mary pre-
serves and cares for. These two forms of sustainable care-taking – self-care
and care for others, including the memory of others – is Winterson’s final
answer to the transhuman simulacrization of life.




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                              The Author

     Fausto Ciompi

     Fausto Ciompi is Associate Professor at the University of Pisa, where
he teaches English Literature and Contemporary English Literature. He
co-edits the literary magazines Soglie and Synergies, has written extensive-
ly on Joseph Conrad, contemporary English and Anglophone Literature,


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Fausto Ciompi, «The Future of Humans in a Post-Human World»



Modernism, Romanticism, Victorian poetry and fiction. His present re-
search interests are focused on T.S. Eliot as a poet and intellectual.

      E-mail: fausto.ciompi@unipi.it



                                    The Article
      Date sent: 31/03/2022
      Date accepted: 06/07/2022
      Date published: 30/11/2022



                           How to cite this article
     Ciompi, Fausto, “«The Future of Humans in a Post-Human World»:
Frankissstein by Jeanette Winterson”, Entering the Simulacra World, Eds. A.
Ghezzani - L. Giovannelli - F. Rossi - C. Savettieri, Between, XII.24 (2022):
165-182, www.betweenjournal.it




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