


Traditionally, the ideas of “intuitive” and “discursive” forms of understanding have been seen as near opposites. Whereas an intuitive understanding could have a direct grasp of something, a discursive understanding would always depend on what is given to it, as mediated by concepts. In this essay, I suggest that Paul Ricoeur’s conception of analogy presents a way of overcoming this opposition. For Ricoeur, an analogy works within discursive understanding, but it depends on an eventful insight that leads beyond what is merely given in discourse. The analogy “gives more” for thought. Yet, as I argue, what analogy gives for thought is always explicable in conceptual terms: any intuitive understanding is commensurate with a discursive one. I illustrate Ricoeur’s mediation of discursive and intuitive understanding in particular with his conception of metaphor, which vividly depends on overcoming a discursive contradiction by analogical and intuitive means. Before introducing Ricoeur’s conception, I discuss the Kantian background of the intuitive/discursive distinction. In particular, I suggest how Goethe’s attempt to revitalize a notion of intuitive understanding can be compared to Ricoeur’s conception, though Ricoeur improves upon Goethe by grounding intuition in the specific phenomenon of analogy.



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Analogy as a Mode of Intuitive Understanding in Ricoeur
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                                                         trópos • anno X • numero 1 • 2017 – ISBN 978-88-255-0482-8
                                                            DOI 10.4399/97888255048286 – pag. 91-110 (giugno 2017)




                                            Analogy as a Mode
                          of Intuitive Understanding in Ricoeur
                                                                                 W. Clark Wolf⇤




   abstract: Traditionally, the ideas of “intuitive” and “discursive” forms of under-
      standing have been seen as near opposites. Whereas an intuitive understanding
      could have a direct grasp of something, a discursive understanding would al-
      ways depend on what is given to it, as mediated by concepts. In this essay, I
      suggest that Paul Ricoeur’s conception of analogy presents a way of overcoming
      this opposition. For Ricoeur, an analogy works within discursive understanding,
      but it depends on an eventful insight that leads beyond what is merely given in
      discourse. The analogy “gives more” for thought. Yet, as I argue, what analogy
      gives for thought is always explicable in conceptual terms: any intuitive under-
      standing is commensurate with a discursive one. I illustrate Ricoeur’s mediation
      of discursive and intuitive understanding in particular with his conception of
      metaphor, which vividly depends on overcoming a discursive contradiction
      by analogical and intuitive means. Before introducing Ricoeur’s conception,
      I discuss the Kantian background of the intuitive/discursive distinction. In
      particular, I suggest how Goethe’s attempt to revitalize a notion of intuitive
      understanding can be compared to Ricoeur’s conception, though Ricoeur im-
      proves upon Goethe by grounding intuition in the specific phenomenon of
      analogy.

   keywords: Paul Ricoeur, Analogy, Intuition, Immanuel Kant, J.W. von Goethe.

    Since Kant at least, the idea of an intuitive form of understanding has
commonly been set in opposition to a discursive one. A discursive intel-
lect knows its objects piece–wise, in its fragmentary employment of the
ever–finite set of concepts at its disposal; an intuitive intellect, by contrast,
would not be bound to a mediated, partial view of things, but could attain
immediate insight into the whole that remains inaccessible to any concep-
tual grasp. Thus, Kant, for one, suggests that only an infinite and divine
intellect could be an intuitive one, since this kind of intellect would be the
very origin of the whole that it knows, always prior to its conceptually acces-
sible moments. (See Kant 1987/1790: 291/Ak. 5:407) If we follow Kant’s way
of separating the intuitive from the discursive, it becomes axiomatic that
there is no discursive path to intuitive knowledge, that instead we can always
   ⇤
       Ph.D. candidate at Marquette University in Milwaukee. (william.c.wolf@marquette.edu).


                                                                                                               91
92    W. Clark Wolf


only assume that our knowledge belongs in a coherent whole, without ever
gaining access to it. Moreover, our hope for intuitive understanding could
only be funded by our dissatisfaction with the discursive, concept–laden
understanding we actually possess.
     The opposition between discursive and intuitive understanding finds a
significant challenge in the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, particularly in his
conception of analogy. For Ricoeur, analogy is a discursive phenomenon that
gives rise to an intuitive understanding: by means of analogical thinking,
the discursive mode of understanding that otherwise binds human thinking
becomes a source of productive insight.
     By “analogy” I mean simply what Ricoeur often refers to as “seeing–as”
(voir comme). A case of analogy would simply be the positing of some term A
as, or in terms of, something else, B. (Ricoeur 1975: 270–1/214) The relation
between the terms is neither identity, nor total diVerence. All that is needed
is an indirect grasp of something: not an immediate comprehension of A,
but only A through B. Analogy in this sense is obviously quite pervasive,
since to say “the experiment was a failure” and “her lover is a chameleon”
would both count as seeing one thing as something else. Even to see a
storm as a threat (without explicit predication) could be included here.
These all are indirect “seeings.” What Ricoeur is concerned with, however,
is not simply the near truism that all seeing comes with a background
understanding, that there are no bare facts without an interpretation, but
rather with the productive character of analogy. Seeing–as, according to
Ricoeur, is an “act” of understanding; it does not simply reflect on the given,
but gives something for understanding. (Ricoeur 1975: 270/213) It is not
to denounce objectivity but to promote novel understanding that Ricoeur
speaks of seeing–as.
     Seeing–as does not merely oVer a diVerent perspective on the world, but,
according to Ricoeur, can correspond with a “being–as” (être–comme); that
is, it can disclose something true about the world. (Ricoeur 1985: 225–6/155)
This makes analogy somewhat dangerous, however. If analogy is productive
of an understanding, how can its insight be trusted? In fact, analogy seems
prone to the same dangers as the ordinary appeal to “intuition.” The one
who asserts “That’s just how I see it” (insisting perhaps on some implicit
analogy) leaves us just as empty as the one who appeals to some intuitive
good sense, which is perhaps little more than a confident feeling or instinct.
However, while analogy and intuition are perhaps dangerous when sepa-
rate, Ricoeur oVers us a way to think them together in such a way that
they jointly make available new contents of understanding, while neither
becomes invulnerable as a source of knowledge.
     Thus, in the following I will defend a notion of intuitive understanding
that is limited by the indirect and discursive character of analogy in Ri-
                                   Analogy as a Mode of Intuitive Understanding in Ricoeur               93


coeur’s thought. Unlike hermeneutical thinkers who wish to emphasize
a form of truth outside discourse, Ricoeur was careful to fully exploit the
power of discourse as a productive source of understanding.1 I wish to show
that, in doing so, Ricoeur in fact comes around to including intuition as
a complement to discursive thinking. By intuition, I mean an apparently
immediate insight, a novel belief that presently outruns its justification.2
An intuition “occurs” to one, often without obvious explanation.3 But Ri-
coeur’s analogical hermeneutic should be considered to suggest, somewhat
paradoxically, a form of discursive intuition — intuition brought about th-
rough language in discourse. As he remarks, there is “no intuition without
construction.” (Ricoeur 1975: 238/195) In Ricoeur’s thought analogy is that
constructive edifice that gives rise to intuitive understanding. Since intuition
is grounded in discursive phenomena, however, it does not become a source
of sui generis cognition. As we will see, the intuitive value of analogy is only
revealed by its explicit interpretation.
    In order to clarify what is at stake in a notion of intuitive understanding, I
will begin by giving a brief historical exposition of what is perhaps the locus
classicus of the issue, the debate surrounding “intellectual intuition” in the
wake of Kant, who famously denied that finite beings possess an intuitive
understanding. In particular, I will show how a notion of “intuitive percep-
tion” was significant for J.W. von Goethe in his scientific studies, precisely as
a mode of comprehension, and not as an independently valid source of con-
tent. With a historically clarified understanding of intuition in mind, I will
point out why Ricoeur’s conception of analogy lends itself it to be conside-
red under the rubric of intuition as understood in the post–Kantian context.
Simply put, analogy presents a synthetic understanding within the unity
of an event. The eventfulness of analogy gives it the singularity associated
with an insight, while its disclosure of a synthesis, a resemblance, gives it

      1. Tengelyi (2007: 162) assigns to Ricoeur’s concept of metaphor the development of a “particular
kind of truth,” which he designates as the “expression of a lively experience in language.” While
I agree that the experiential aspects of Ricoeur’s thought are central to his understanding of the
metaphorical presentation of truth, I will argue that Ricoeur presents not a diVerent conception of
truth, but a novel conception of the production of understanding.
     2. The role of intuition in philosophy, especially in terms of the value of intuition for epistemic
justification, has become the topic of lively topic debate in analytic philosophy. See especially Cappelen
(2012) and ChudnoV (2013). While I will not discuss this connection explicitly in what follows, I expect
that Ricoeur’s understanding of role of analogy in a form of intuitive understanding could make a
welcome (though indirect) contribution to this debate.
      3. It should be noted here that, unless otherwise specified, the use of “intuition” here has little to
do with Kantian sensible intuition (see section 2.3 below for the way Ricoeurian analogy subordinates
any sensory or imagistic aspect of resemblance to the verbal). Though Ricoeur himself distances
his hermeneutics from Husserlian phenomenology, Ricoeurian analogy shares the “intellective”
character of Husserl’s “categorial” or later “eidetic” intuition. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for
requesting clarification on this point.
94    W. Clark Wolf


productive content. This is both a transgression of Kant and an appropria-
tion of him: while analogy presents an understanding more comprehensive
than immediate sensible experience, Ricoeur uses Kant’s own notion of a
“productive imagination” to explain this possibility. Once analogy is seen
as a mode of intuitive understanding, we can examine how it can disclose
novel content for knowledge. I will argue that, while the analogy leads to an
understanding that is coextensive with the resemblance it constructs, this
understanding is always subject to the need for explication. If the seeing–as
of analogy is always an understanding, there can be no assertion of such
understanding, of truth, that hides from interpretation, which articulates
the content of analogy in discursive form. Analogy does not allow us, in
Kantian terms, to exceed the bounds of all possible experience. But we can
show how intuitions, because of their disclosure as analogies, may precede
all explication, that explication may depend on a prior seeing–as. Analogy,
then, both constrains and enables the reach of an intuitive understanding.


1. The Idea of an Intuitive Understanding

The need to formulate the nature of an intuitive understanding came to
be pressing in the light of Kant’s critical philosophy. Not only did Kant
put limits on the kinds of objects finite understanding can come to know,
but also on how one can come to know them. The basic limitation is two-
fold: human cognition requires both concepts and sensible intuition. (Kant
1998/1787: 254/B 146) Concepts depend for their meaning on what is given
to the senses, and sensibility only ‘makes sense’ through general concepts.
Sensibility, for Kant, is fundamentally receptive, and understanding must
wait, as it were, for the matter it provides. (See Förster 2012: 141) Kant calls
human understanding discursive because of this dependence on concep-
ts, which are mere representations or marks of sensible experience. Kant
writes, “All our concepts are marks, accordingly, and all thought is nothing
other than a representing through marks.” (Kant 1992/1800: 564/Ak. 9:58)
Accordingly, the universality of concepts is simply the rule by which we
bring various sensible intuitions under one such mark. A further implica-
tion of discursivity is the fact that our “marks” do not bespeak the nature of
anything; they do not comprehend any essence. Since the universality of
concepts is only their generality, to analyze them is only to discover what
they are useful to name. (Förster 2012: 150, 251)
    Kant formulates the discursive limits of understanding in contrast to a
diVerent kind of understanding, which he claims we can conceive of, but
do not possess. This of course is an intuitive understanding, or intellec-
tual intuition. Eckart Förster has recently argued that, even though Kant
                          Analogy as a Mode of Intuitive Understanding in Ricoeur   95


excludes both intuitive understanding and intellectual intuition from hu-
man understanding, the two have importantly diVerent senses. (Förster
2012: 152) For our purposes, the most significant diVerence is that Kant
portrays intellectual intuition (such as God would be capable) as able to
produce the objects of its knowledge and thus know them immediately
(Kant 1998/1787: 255/B 145), while the role of an intuitive understanding
is to overcome additive restrictions on discursive knowledge, leaping as it
were to an understanding of a whole without requiring synthetic cognition
of the parts. Kant writes, “We can also conceive of an understanding which,
since it is not discursive like ours but is intuitive, goes from the synthetically
universal (of the intuition of a whole as such) to the particular, i.e., from
the whole to the parts.” (Kant 1987/1790: 291/Ak. 5:407) While intellectual
intuition would diVer from ours in its production of content, an intuiti-
ve understanding diVers mainly in its mode of apprehension, which Kant
nevertheless discounts for us as well.
    In the philosophically busy years following Kant’s critical work, many of
his prohibitions were taken as solicitations, and Kant’s ban on intellectual
intuition was stubbornly transgressed. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and seve-
ral of the early Romantics all developed a positive conception of intuitive
understanding, many of them singling out the notion as foundational for
philosophic knowledge. (See Beiser 2002: 299–301, 395–397, 580–584) Howe-
ver, the figure who made one of the more fruitful and distinctive uses of a
notion of intuitive understanding was Goethe, in his lifelong scientific study
of nature. In his influential treatment of the post–Kantian period, Eckart
Förster places special significance on Goethe’s scientific studies, which were
an attempt to apply the Spinozan idea of a scientia intuitiva to the study of
nature. (Förster 2012: 94) What Goethe gathered from Spinoza (as well as
from his reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgment) was the conviction that a
comprehension of some natural whole or essential idea was necessary for
the understanding of the derivative parts, especially in living nature. Goethe
writes, “The things we call the parts in every living being are so inseparable
from the whole that they must be understood in and with the whole.”
(Goethe 1949: I, 842/8) While of itself, this statement may have met ready
approval by Kant, Goethe understands such a principle in more than the
“regulative” manner Kant would endorse. Goethe wanted to demonstrate
positively that scientific understanding could not depend on additive know-
ledge of individual experiments, taken as collections of phenomenal data.
Rather, through the investigation of individual phenomena, Goethe grants
us the capacity to gain an insight into the essence or idea that pervades the
phenomena. Referring to what he calls a “sublime impression,” Goethe wri-
tes, “The mind may perceive the seed, so to speak, of a relation which would
have a harmony beyond the mind’s power to comprehend or experience
96      W. Clark Wolf


once the relation is fully developed.” (Goethe 1949: I, 842/9) Goethe thus
suggests the capacity to transcend ordinary understanding toward a com-
prehensive grasp of relations. This is what Goethe calls intuitive perception,
citing Kant’s denial of such intuition only to aYrm it.4 For Goethe, such
perception was accomplished through discerning an archetype, what he
called an Urphänomen (“archetypal phenomenon”), thanks to which the “eye
of the mind” intuits the essence of some natural process. (See Hindrichs
2011) He writes,

     In the process [of observation] we become familiar with certain requisite conditions
     for what is manifesting itself. From this point everything gradually falls into place
     under higher principles and laws revealed not to our reason through words and
     hypotheses, but to our intuitive perception through phenomena. We call these
     phenomena archetypal phenomena [Urphänomene] because nothing higher manifests
     itself in the world. . . (Goethe 1949: I, 69/195)

    Strange as it may appear, this notion granted Goethe some success,
especially in his theory of colors, for which it was precisely an understanding
of the singular relation between light and darkness in colors that enabled
him to perceive the image of the color–wheel that is still in currency.5
In this case especially, as Förster writes, “It is only in the context of the
specific ‘whole’ to which [the colors] belong that the individual angle and
the individual color are what they are: the whole makes the individual
part possible and determines it.” (Förster 2012: 271) The totality of relations
between the colors is an intuited whole, then, without which no individual
color is completely understood.
    The Goethean idea of an intuitive understanding, however, despite its
dependence on a mysterious “eye of the mind,” was nevertheless bound by
the fact that an intuited whole, since it captures the “idea” that animates the
actual parts, must be totally faithful to the particulars. Förster explains, “Eve-
ry idea also requires for its physical realization a material basis onto which
it can imprint itself, but which in turn constrains and limits it. . . [.] Once
[the idea] has been discovered, however, its eVects can be re–discovered
in experience.” (Förster 2012: 275) The intuition of the whole does not
provide knowledge of something over and above the phenomena, but the
very animating form that unites the phenomena. Goethe coined the term

     4. See Goethe’s “Judgment through Intuitive Perception” (“Anschauende Urteilskraft”) in his
(1949: I, 877–8/31).
     5. Here he describes what he takes as the Urphänomen in his theory of color: “On the one hand
we see light or a bright object, on the other darkness or a dark object. Between them we place
turpidity and through this mediation colors arise from the opposites; these colors, too, are opposites,
although their reciprocal relationship they lead directly back to a common unity.” (Goethe 1949: I,
69/195)
                                Analogy as a Mode of Intuitive Understanding in Ricoeur          97


“morphology,” the study of form, through his conviction that attention to
changes of form in organic nature was significant for understanding their
connection to a whole.6
    Goethe’s intuitive understanding intended to unite analysis and syn-
thesis. While a synthetic perception is always needed for the grasp of the
archetypal unity governing the phenomena, this unity could always be ana-
lytically explicated. (See Hindrichs 2011: 60) Thus, Goethe himself saw his
understanding to incorporate the Spinozan ideal of science within a broad-
ly Kantian framework. Goethe did not, however, abandon the discursive
content of human understanding, in that nothing separate from sensible
material (“intuition” in the sense acceptable to Kant) is given in the Urphä-
nomen; it is not as if the intuition of the whole contains material beyond
possible experience. According to Förster, in Goethe’s understanding, “all
the properties of the relevant phenomenon must (discursively) be sought
out and gathered together, in order then (intuitively) to bring the whole as
a whole into view so that the idea can emerge.” (Förster 2012: 255)
    Goethe’s conception gives us an outline of how an intuitive understan-
ding might play a role in understanding generally, though we would be
right to harbor some doubts. Notwithstanding the incomplete (though
not negligible) success of Goethe’s scientific studies,7 Goethe leaves us so-
mewhat unsure about the source of intuitive knowledge. Indeed, he insists
on the repetition of experiments and he emphasized the study of transitions
in the changes of phenomena, but his notion of an “eye of the mind” seems
to name a gap in his theory. How does this “eye” come to “see” the whole?
We may be convinced that a grasp of the whole would be necessary for
an understanding of parts, but this conviction is not proof of its possibili-
ty, especially insofar as Kant’s characterization of human understanding
holds. Thus, the theory of intuitive understanding requires a further groun-
ding than Goethe could give, even if Goethe modeled how an intuitive
understanding might be practiced.




     6. See Goethe (1949: II, 114–19/57–60), “Observation on Morphology in General.”
     7. The late Stephen Jay Gould, renowned paleontologist and evolutionary biologist, credits
Goethe with the pertinent invention of morphology and says he is an “exemplar” of formalist
method in science. He even claims Goethe provides a “test case” of the relation between scientific
thinking and the discovery of an “essence” of scientific phenomena. See Gould (2002: 281–91). Thus,
though no one would claim Goethe was entirely successful in his scientific studies, the fact that
his approach yielded any scientific gains is itself impressive for a man whose attention was divided
among his many interests, apparently without diminishment.
98    W. Clark Wolf


2. Analogy as Discursive Intuition

I hope to show that Paul Ricoeur’s conception of analogy provides a justi-
fication for a variation on the kind of intuitive understanding that Goethe
thought was both possible and necessary for the understanding of pheno-
mena. But Ricoeur finds the source for productive insights of the Goethean
variety strictly within the experience of discourse. Ricoeur himself was gene-
rally hesitant to speak in terms of intuition, especially because of this term’s
association with Husserl’s phenomenology. If intuition in Husserl’s sense
(whether sensible or eidetic) was an originary, immediate givenness, and thus
itself a legitimation of knowledge (see Husserl 2014: 43 [§ 24]), Ricoeur’s turn
to hermeneutics was in part constituted by his rejection of such unmediated
foundations: “The Husserlian demand for the return to intuition is countered
by the necessity for all understanding to be mediated by an interpretation.”
(Ricoeur 1986: 51/28) Intuition is paired with interpretation as its opposite, in
need of replacement by the latter. Describing a tendency he detects already
in Husserl, Ricoeur writes, “Step–by–step, the inversion of the theory of in-
tuition into the theory of interpretation begins.” (Ricoeur 1986: 74/45) Thus,
Ricoeur can say that phenomenology culminates in hermeneutics, precisely
as phenomenology’s supposedly intuitive evidence rightly becomes the “ex-
plication of evidence.” (Ricoeur 1986: 81/49–50) Whether as culmination or
improvement, Ricoeur stresses the turn to interpretation against intuition in
the sense of an immediate given.
    Despite the hesitance of Ricoeur to use the language of intuition, his
driving hermeneutical concerns can be fruitfully tied to the problem of an
intuitive understanding as framed by Kant and Goethe. Namely, Ricoeur
was convinced that privileged phenomena “give more” to thought, that
symbolic phenomena in particular teach us something more than we knew
before we encounter them. (See Ricoeur 1960: 323V./347 V.) Yet given that we
always bring our own conceptual resources to bear in the encounter with
these phenomena, how can they give us something new to understand?
I wish to show that Ricoeur’s account of analogy, as it functions in the
experience of discursive phenomena, holds the key to this question. Though
Ricoeur treats a number of discursive forms, his conception of analogy
is perhaps best seen in his discussion of metaphor. I will thus focus my
attention on showing how intuitive understanding can be connected with
the “semantic innovation” Ricoeur ascribes to metaphorical language. Along
the way, I will provide a few indications of how Ricoeur’s conception of
analogy in metaphor could be extended to his treatment of symbol and
narrative.
    Intuitive understanding, on Ricoeur’s account, comes about through
metaphor thanks to a threefold structure, characteristic of analogical under-
                                 Analogy as a Mode of Intuitive Understanding in Ricoeur           99


standing: (1) the experience of disparity; (2) the event of understanding; and
(3) the productive imagination.

2.1. The Experience of Disparity

To begin, we must clarify that in Ricoeur’s account, metaphor must be
seen as originally non–analogical and non–intuitive. Prior to any analogy,
metaphor presents disparity. This results from Ricoeur’s treating the me-
taphor in terms of the sentence rather than the word, as syntactic rather
than semiotic. Traditional theory, beginning with Aristotle, considered the
metaphorical predicate to be a substitute for a literal term that gives the real
sense. Thus, if one says “the heart is a pale dove,” one inserts “pale dove” as
an ornamental replacement for the real meaning — perhaps “fragile thing”
in this case. When one discovered the relations between these terms one
would find the sense that the metaphor hides. Here, metaphor is a matter
of “poetic license” that only obscures understanding for the sake of beauty.
(Ricoeur 1975: 29/19) Perhaps the most significant feature of the traditional
account is that the metaphorical resemblance is already contained in the
selection of the predicate. The meaning of the literal predicate is just what
the metaphorical predicate replaces. The metaphor expresses an analogy,
rather than producing it.
    Ricoeur argues, however, in line with the semantic theory of Émile
Benveniste, that the sentence is the most basic unit of discourse, and that
metaphor must therefore be understood at the level of sentence meaning.
Ricoeur still recognizes that the metaphor has at least two central parts,
which he calls the “tenor” and “vehicle,” after I.A. Richards. (Ricoeur 1975:
105/80) The tenor, in traditional grammatical terms, would be the principle
subject and vehicle its predicate.8 But Ricoeur prefers this alternate termi-
nology because it indicates the inseparability of the two. The tenor does
not “mean” by itself, but only conveys its sense through the vehicle when
the two are combined a sentence. However, to see the tenor as bound to its
metaphorical predication means that the metaphorical statement is strictly
contradictory. In terms of the sentence, Ricoeur argues, the metaphor takes
the form of an ordinary predication but is nonsense when thus understood.
Metaphor must initially be perceived as a “category mistake” in Gilbert
Ryle’s terms, “a deviation in relation to a pre–existing logical order, . . . a
dis–ordering in a scheme of classification.” (Ricoeur 1975: 31/21–22) Ricoeur
insists that, “interpretation of metaphor is not possible unless one first per-

     8. Bernard Dauenhauer (1983: 3) explains this in photographic terms by speaking of the tenor
as the “focus” while the sentence is the “frame.” This helps to indicate that, despite the turn to the
semantic level, the tenor is the principle subject of metaphorical alteration.
100     W. Clark Wolf


ceives the incompatibility of the non–figurative meaning of the lexeme
with the rest of the context.” (Ricoeur 1975: 232/182) Unlike simile, meta-
phor does not immediately signal resemblance between its terms; instead
it suggests dissonance. Hence Ricoeur speaks of metaphor as a “semantic
impertinence.” (Ricoeur 1975: 246/194)
    The fact that a metaphor, when finally understood, does not seem to be
contradictory in this way should not prevent from ignoring this stage of
incomprehension. When someone sings melancholically, “She’s a jar, with a
heavy lid” (Tweedy & Bennett 1999), the very “is” that ties together the wo-
man and a jar leads me to their identification, which as such is a contradiction.
If there were a natural resemblance between heavy–lidded jars and the wo-
man in question, the line would suggest nothing outside the ordinary logical
order (nor, for that matter, if the song was simply a gendered, personifying
ode to a piece of storage equipment). Instead, the connection brings about
shock, a disturbance, an offense to the understanding. This is significant for
our understanding of analogical intuition, for in Ricoeur’s understanding
the poetic metaphor is not first the inscription of an insight; it is the vehicle
of incomprehension. Moreover, the reader’s encounter with metaphor may
in fact be a pronounced case of misunderstanding in general, for anyone
who assented to a metaphor in its literal sense would exemplify a categorical
confusion. Likewise, when Ricoeur speaks of symbols, especially those co-
ming to us from an obscure historical context such as an archaic religion, he
claims their meaning is always “opaque.” (Ricoeur 1969: 285–86/290) Since
the meaning of a symbol is one intended at a level beyond its literal sense, this
superficial opacity is partly what constitutes the symbol as such; to understand
a symbol at its surface is to misunderstand it. (See Piercey 2011: 193–94) The
encounter with the symbol prior to adequate interpretation conveys a kind of
negative disparity, while the metaphor asserts a positive one. The symbol or
metaphor by themselves do not convey the analogy that would give them their
meaning.9 Yet it is through misunderstanding and thanks to such disparity
that understanding can appear.

2.2. The Event of Understanding

If the metaphor is in itself a disparity, a positive assertion of contradiction,
how can it contribute to understanding? To summarize Ricoeur’s thinking
on the issue, the metaphor leads to understanding in a productive event. Since
there is no natural resemblance between the tenor and vehicle in the meta-
phorical statement, metaphor has a meaning only as an analogy is produced

     9. “But in symbol I cannot objectivize the analogical relation that binds the second meaning to
the first [the literal sense].” (Ricoeur 1969: 286/290).
                                  Analogy as a Mode of Intuitive Understanding in Ricoeur             101


in its wake. Ricoeur explains, “metaphorical meaning. . . is not the enigma
itself, the semantic clash pure and simple, but the solution of the enigma,
the inauguration of the new semantic pertinence.” (Ricoeur 1975: 271/214)
The metaphorical enigma provokes a search for a resemblance, though this
resemblance is not contained in the contradiction itself. We see how the
woman from the song quoted above could be like the heavy–lidded jar when
we “see” that she conceals her secrets, that she is keeping something in that
cannot be pried out. The metaphorical enigma here becomes an analogy. In
the metaphor, “tension, contradiction, and controversion are nothing but
the opposite side of the reconciliation in which metaphor ‘makes sense.’
[. . . ] [R]esemblance is itself a fact of predication, which operates between
the same terms that contradiction sets in tension.” (Ricoeur 1975: 247/195)
While metaphor in its bare discursive presence is opaque, it provokes the
search for a sense within its contradiction that could resolve the opposition:
but this sense is made, not given. The analogy that is eventually “heard” in
the metaphor is coterminous with the discovered meaning. “Authentic” or
“living” metaphors are, for Ricoeur, “at once meaning and event.” (Ricoeur
1975: 127/99) This is because the meaning of metaphor must “occur” to
a reader or hearer, since it is the immediate resolution to a contradiction
presented to her. (Ricoeur 1975: 126–27/98) The meaning discovered in the
contradiction is an “event that means or signifies, an emergent meaning
created by language.” (Ricoeur 1975: 127/99)
      According to Ricoeur, the power to “see” the analogy within the contra-
diction posed by the metaphor cannot be explained purely on the conceptual
level, but the result of this seeing is always a new understanding, a concep-
tual gain.10 I suggest that the analogy resists conceptual explanation only in
the sense that, given the semantic impertinence of the metaphorical state-
ment, neither the conceptual content of the tenor and vehicle respectively
nor their predicative combination is suYcient to determine the eventual
analogical resolution of the statement. Though as I will amply stress be-
low, the analogy is always explicated in conceptual terms, a new meaning
eventually attributed to the tenor first functions as an indeterminate “=x”,
the resolving term of the analogy. We might say that the “x” is first posited
as the conviction that the terms have a resolution, even before what that
resolution is has been realized. Nothing can give sense to the variable other
than some conceptual content, but the intuition of some resolution must
come first.

    10. The case is parallel with symbols: “The symbol gives: I do not posit the meaning, the symbol
gives it; but what it gives is something for thought, something to think about. [. . . ] [A]ll has already
been said in the enigma and yet it is necessary even to begin again and rebegin everything in the
dimension of thought.” Ricoeur (1969: 284/288). The enigma has its own power to present, but what
is received occurs for determinate thinking.
102     W. Clark Wolf


    This is how, in my reading, Ricoeur binds intuition (in the sense of an
eventful insight) and discursive analogy together. Indeed, though Ricoeur
speaks of metaphor as a creation of meaning within language, if he places
seeing–as outside the strictly verbal resources of the metaphorical statement,
this is only accurate with an expanded sense of language, which includes
the subjective activity of its users.11 The innovation of meaning is indeed
partly due to the “open texture” of language, which includes a “permeabi-
lity of semantic fields.” (Dauenhaur 1983: 4) But this openness itself only
enables, but does not accomplish, the innovation that will emerge. Instead,
Ricoeur allocates the mediation of meaning to the subject, the reader (or
listener) capable of resolving the metaphorical contradiction.12 It is here that
he is willing, on occasion, to speak of intuition, though he always makes
this moment of vision dependent on its verbal articulation. Glossing on
Aristotle, Ricoeur insists that there is “no intuition without construction.
Indeed, the intuitive process, bringing together what is disparate, contains
an irreducibly discursive moment.” (Ricoeur 1975: 248/195) The intuition
mentioned here, which Ricoeur associated with conjoining the disparate,
is elsewhere identified with the seeing–as in metaphor: “To explicate a
metaphor is to enumerate all the appropriate senses in which the vehicle is
‘seen as’ the tenor. The ‘seeing as’ is the intuitive relationship that makes
sense and image hold together.” (Ricoeur 1975: 269/212) Moreover, Ricoeur
even claims that “‘seeing as’ designates the non–verbal mediation of the me-
taphorical statement.” (Ricoeur 1975: 271/214) If Ricoeur insists, as he does,
that the metaphorical statement by itself only provides a contradiction, it
is coherent that the resolution of the contradiction would lie outside the
metaphor itself, in the subject provoked by the metaphor. This resolution
relies on a subjective realization of the analogy.

2.3. The Productive Imagination

Ricoeur somewhat paradoxically insists both that seeing–as is a non–verbal
achievement, even speaking of it as an “intuitive talent,” and that it “contains
an irreducibly discursive moment.” (Ricoeur 1975: 270/213; 248/195) We mu-

    11. Stephanie Theodorou seems to take Ricoeur’s suggestion of a creation of meaning too far
when she suggests, “the logical disruption of naming brought about by a metaphor beings about a
wider range of semantic and ontological signification: the new name creates a new form of being.”
See Theodorou (2005: 134). Besides conforming Ricoeur’s theory to a transformation on the level
of names, Theodorou seems to assume too much continuity between Ricoeur and Heidegger’s
understanding of the task of hermeneutics. I will mention only briefly below some central points of
diVerence between Ricoeur and Heidegger.
    12. Likewise, David Klemm (1983: 102–105) speaks of certain “subjective conditions” necessary
for understanding texts, particularly in the “suspension” of the ordinary of meaning in metaphorical
language, which precedes the “conceptual elaboration” that achieves the understanding of the text.
                             Analogy as a Mode of Intuitive Understanding in Ricoeur       103


st understand how Ricoeur ties these aspects together in his understanding
of analogy. Perhaps surprisingly, in several places across his oeuvre Ricoeur
explains this power of understanding in terms of the Kantian “productive
imagination.” To recall, unlike the reproductive imagination, which can
produce images only out of a store of sensible intuitions already gathered,
the productive imagination for Kant is the mysterious origin of “schema-
ta,” the mental links between pure concepts and sensible intuition. (Kant
1998/1787: 272/A 138/B 177) Since “pure” for Kant means non–empirical, a
pure category like “substance” cannot be immediately applied to something
empirical like a table. Instead, the productive imagination, according to
him, provides the mediating image of something permanent in time, which
allows the desk before me, for example, to be ‘seen as’ a substance. (Kant
1998/1787: 273/A 144/B 183)
    Ricoeur adopts Kant’s productive imagination and schemata to illustrate
the mediation of sense in analogy, which he employs in the cases of symbol,
metaphor, and narrative.13 In each instance, Ricoeur speaks of “schema”
when a sense must be produced from the analogy in its disparate, contradic-
tory form. With metaphor in particular, a schema is not required to mediate
pure concepts with sensible experience but to overcome the disparity of the
metaphorical statement with the sense made in the resemblance between
tenor and vehicle. Ricoeur calls this realization of resemblance the “iconic
moment,” but his very adoption of the Kantian productive imagination in-
tends to “bracket” the visual sense of imaginary resemblance, to the benefit
of verbal meaning that results from the analogy. He insists,

   The only way to approach the problem of imagination from the perspective of a
   semantic theory, that is to say on a verbal plane, is to begin with productive imagi-
   nation in the Kantian sense, and to put oV reproductive imagination or imagery as
   long as possible. Treated as schema, the image presents a verbal dimension; before
   being the gathering–point of faded perceptions, it is that of emergent meanings.
   (Ricoeur 1975: 253/199)

   Ricoeur gives imagination preeminently the function of verbal articula-
tion, in deference to Kant. As Robert Piercey articulates Ricoeur’s point, “to
imagine something is to find oneself called to speak about it in a certain
way.” (Piercey 2011: 194) The imagination, for Ricoeur, first has to make
meanings from the “semantic shock” (choc sémantique) of the metaphor be-
fore it can image the metaphor in a visual manner. (Ricoeur 1986: 242/168)
The sense of the metaphor, then, is the production of a verbal schema. A
metaphorical statement such as, “He slithered back into his oYce,” can be

    13. Respectively: Ricoeur (1969: 286–90/291–94); Ricoeur (1975: 253/199); Ricoeur (1983:
11–12/ix–x).
104     W. Clark Wolf


visually evocative, productive of a new image, only once we understand how
“slithering” can refer to the demeanor of a man rather than a snake. The
schematic “discursive” meaning enables the imagery. The “schematism”
for Ricoeur as for Kant is the “rule for producing images” (Ricoeur 1986:
243/169; emphasis added) not itself an image. In metaphor, the schema is the
verbal meaning that resolves the contradiction between tenor and vehicle,
while the productive imagination is the source of this verbal meaning itself.
    The productive imagination for Ricoeur is like Goethe’s “eye of the
mind,” but what it perceives is discursive meaning: “we see images only
insofar as we first hear them.” (Ricoeur 1986: 245/170) Ricoeur’s adoption
of the Kantian schematism helps explain how he considers analogy to
come about through an intuitive power while remaining within the grasp
of the understanding. According to Ricoeur, then, coming to realize the
meaning of a metaphor or other symbolic forms is a productive event of the
understanding.14 Since this realization is “at once event and meaning,” the
intuitive grasp of a resemblance arrives concurrently with a grasp of a new
semantic pertinence. When the metaphor invites us to see the tenor as the
vehicle, this contradictory identity only leads us to discover an alternative
in the analogy, which is “no longer the resemblance between two ideas, but
that very resemblance the ‘seeing as’ establishes.” (Ricoeur 1975: 270/213)
After Marcus Hester, Ricoeur calls seeing–as an “experience–act.” It is at
once a mystery, an event that “cannot take place. . . without intuitive passage”
(Ricoeur 1975: 271/214), and a productive schema, an act that establishes a
determinate conceptual meaning. For this reason, it seems quite appropriate
to call Ricoeurian analogical understanding “discursive intuition.”


3. Explication and Analogical Understanding

At this stage, I would like to broaden the scope of this inquiry in order to
set the insights gathered mainly from the Ricoeurian account of metaphor
(but which apply to his idea of analogy in general) within a larger question
concerning the nature of understanding. As we have seen, for Kant, the

    14. Ricoeur proposes a similar resolution of contradiction in the reading of literary narrative, this
time in the disparity between the world the text and the world of the reader, which can likewise be
overcome through analogical understanding. Ricoeur often emphasizes the incompleteness of a text
in the face of its readers, and thus the need for the act of reading to complete the text. Citing Roman
Ingarden, he writes, “. . . a text is incomplete, first, in the sense that it oVers diVerent ‘schematic
views’ that the readers are asked to ‘concretize.’” Ricoeur (1985: 244/167). He suggests a kind of
balance between text and reader: “. . . the configuration of the text in terms of structure becomes
equal to the reader’s refiguration in terms of experience.” (Ricoeur 1985: 248/170) Later he calls this
an “analogizing relation”. (Ricoeur 1985: 261/178) Thus, in narrative the analogy is only complete
when the plot finds a relation to the world of the reader.
                               Analogy as a Mode of Intuitive Understanding in Ricoeur      105


discursivity of the understanding leaves cognition confined to what we can
experience sensibly, unable to produce a picture of the whole that could
comprehend experience at large. Such an intuitive grasp, however desirable
it would be, simply could not be justified as a legitimate possession of un-
derstanding. Yet Goethe protested that scientific study had to work within
an intuitive comprehension, without which its sober analysis could not give
sense to the holistic, organic movements of nature. Detailed experimenta-
tion had to give way to the discovery of an Urphänomen or morphology that
would in some way stand for the whole of a natural process.
    In Goethe’s view, the comprehensive intuition was the gift of the “eye
of the mind.” For Ricoeur as well, the psychic source of intuitions is myste-
rious, but Ricoeur makes an improvement over Goethe in his understanding
of intuitions in as much they are given specifically as analogies. While Goe-
the sought the source of intuition directly among the objects of his study
(that is, within his “seeing”), Ricoeur credits novel understanding to an
indirectness, to seeing–as. For Ricoeur, the analogy is the intuition. This
allows us to see intuitions not as direct visions of a whole, but as indirect
visions that mediate holistic knowledge within the schematic rule they
provide. Metaphors are a pronounced case of this, but the productive nature
of analogies is also evident when in ordinary experience we “see” (whether
rightly or wrongly) a novel as a parody, the mind as a machine, injustice as
a system. When an analogy “occurs” to us, we are led to draw connections
between its “terms” that suggest a further grasp of the primary subject.
We can remain ignorant on the source of these occurrences themselves wi-
thout ignoring their contribution to knowledge. One could even reinterpret
some of Goethe’s own “intuitive perceptions” as productive analogies: the
color wheel for example, though suggested by the angular emanations of
light from a prism, could result from seeing the colors as a circle, such that
colors are given diametric positions thanks to this intuited resemblance.15
‘The colors are a wheel’: the Goethean metaphor, whose sense demanded
resolution in the wake of its (ultimately fruitful) assertion of categorical
disparity. Without analogy — here we speculate — no “eye of the mind.”
    If intuitive knowledge is a grasp of analogy, we can add that there is no
intuition without explication. If intuitive understanding is an event of seeing
something as something else, then there is no avoiding the question: how
so? That is, the sense(s) in which the terms of the analogy are related cannot
be indeterminate. These senses are determined in the process of explication,

   15. Thus, Goethe speaks of a “conformity” between the wheel and nature, in that the diametric
oppositions shown in the wheel correspond to real relations that Goethe detected between colors:
“This wheel conforms fully to nature in its arrangement, and will help in the present discussion
because the colors placed diametrically opposite one another on the wheel are those which demand
each other in eye as complements.” Cf. Goethe (1949: I, 49/175).
106     W. Clark Wolf


always subsequent to the intuitive seeing–as. According to Jean Ladrière,
“explication is a process that reconstitutes a given from some principle.” (La-
drière 1991: 113) Ladrière therefore sees explication as a kind of “deduction.”
(Ladrière 1991: 119) In our case, the analogy provides the “principle” from
which explication can deduce its determinate content. In terms of metaphor,
Ricoeur writes, “To explicate a metaphor is to enumerate all the appropriate
senses in which the vehicle is ‘seen as’ the tenor.” (Ricoeur 1975: 269/212)
Though Ricoeur’s “expliquer” can also be rendered “to explain,”16 I believe
explication better conveys the sense of unfolding (ex–“pli”) or drawing out a
sense from a principle, rather than simply providing an external account of
a meaning.17 The importance of explication in a hermeneutical context is in
the fact that it works from an understanding as much as it contributes to an
understanding. The intuited analogy provides one pole of a “hermeneutic
circle,” of which explication provides the other. Ricoeur writes, “The most
fundamental condition of the hermeneutical circle lies in the structure of
preunderstanding which relates all explication to the understanding that pre-
cedes and supports it.” (Ricoeur 1986: 53/30) While in this context Ricoeur
alludes to Heidegger’s notion of preunderstanding, in which explication
would not be seen in discursive terms, his own work aYrms explication in
its primarily verbal dimensions. Sebastian Purcell cites this as a key diVeren-
ce between Heidegger and Ricoeur: the latter no longer needs to “regress”
beneath the understanding for a more fundamental domain, since (arguably
unlike Heidegger) he attributes rightful significance to the understanding.
(Purcell 2013: 146–48) For Ricoeur, analogy itself gives a “plenitude” for
interpretation (Ricoeur 1975: 124/96), but this plenitude must be drawn out
in a determinate explication.
    This was clear in the case of metaphor, in which any realization of
analogy was not owed to any inherent resemblance between the terms, but
to the resolution achieved as the resemblance was constructed. The analogy
discerned in the metaphor only is as it is subject to explication, as the relation
between tenor and vehicle is drawn out. An analogical intuition, a seeing–as,
provides the basis and even a preunderstanding of the resemblances to be
found, but this preunderstanding lacks what an actual understanding would
possess: the power of explication.
    Because of the need for explication in any analogy, any seeing–as is sub-
ject to critique. Intuition, by itself, is not a source of justification, since any

    16. As is usual in the translation of the Ricoeurian slogan: Expliquer plus, c’est comprendre mieux
(“To explain more is to understand better”).
    17. In the context of La métaphore vive, Ricoeur refers to the use of the English word “explica-
tion” by Monroe Beardsley. Cf. Ricoeur (1975: 121/94). However, he also connects explication to
phenomenological Auslegung in “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” (Ricoeur 1986: 69/41 and
passim).
                                 Analogy as a Mode of Intuitive Understanding in Ricoeur           107


understanding drawn out from it will be subject to the conflictual realm of
understanding in general. This is how we might understand Ricoeur’s sug-
gestion that seeing–as can disclose a “being–as” (cf. Ricoeur 1985: 225–6/155),
namely as a putative being–as. We learn from the analogy something that
may be the case, something that we had previously not thought to assert as
being so, but the analogy in no way provides a verification of such “being.”18
This does not mean analogy is somehow dispensable as a mode of under-
standing or as a source of content. For analogy provides the source for
explication, without which analysis lacks a guiding idea for any putative
understanding. It is not that one must reason analogically, as if it were a
kind of method; it is rather that analogy makes certain reasons available in
the first place.


4. Conclusion

We should recall Kant’s characterization of an intuitive understanding: “We
can also conceive of an understanding which, since it is not discursive like
ours but is intuitive, goes from the synthetically universal (of the intuition of
a whole as such) to the particular, i.e., from the whole to the parts.” (Kant
1987/1790: 167/Ak. 5:407–8) Our reading of Ricoeur mediates between
Kant’s reservations about such an understanding and Goethe’s assertion
of its necessity. If analogy is the ground for the grasp of the “synthetically
universal,” in that it presents a relation between tenor and vehicle whose
explication must be deduced from that relation, we can still agree with Kant
that such an understanding is not a direct intuition of the whole as such. In
this, we would surely chasten Goethe’s desire to speak of discovering the
“idea” or “essence” of phenomena; analogy proceeds indirectly, by positing
a relation to something outside the original phenomenon. Nevertheless,
inasmuch as genuine understanding may depend on some kind of prior
seeing–as, as much as some original grasp of a synthetic whole may be
prior to the analytical grasp of parts, a form of analogical intuition, which
remains tied to its discursive form, may be seen as necessary as it enables
discovery of holistic aspects of something through its relation to another.
    To suggest that analogy allows us to grasp phenomena intuitively wi-
thout contravening the need to interpret is to legitimate an alternative mode

    18. This is not to recommend at the outset any privileged kind of verification or epistemic
justification. It is only to deny that analogy contributes directly to epistemic justification, however
the latter should be properly construed. Instead the explicative results of analogy should be subject
to whatever form of epistemic justification are demanded by their kind of content (whether, for
example, scientific or poetic).
108      W. Clark Wolf


of understanding, one as tied to the literary arts as to the exact sciences.19 It
means that seeing–as often gives more to thinking, and eventfully so, since
it occurs simultaneously with the understanding it produces. In reference
to Ricoeur’s analogical phenomena — symbol, metaphor, and narrative —
Sebastian Purcell writes

      These qualify as events of meaning precisely because one will never be able to
      determine their existence through a critique of meaning or sense beforehand. They
      shatter the pretension of any such critical enterprise that would seek to assess their
      limits in an apriori way, and equally any claim to some form of pre–comprehension
      that only needs explication. (Purcell 2013: 151)

   Purcell places Ricoeur between Kant’s pre–judgment of the limits of
understanding and Heidegger’s founding of understanding on some prior
ontological grounds.20 Ricoeur’s version of intuitive understanding depends
on analogies that “occur” to us, as “events of meaning,” but it also depends
on — and is subject to — being understood. For this reason, Ricoeur un-
derstands intuition in such a way that it does not contravene and obviate
discursive understanding through concepts, but complements it. Analogy
presents a form of understanding that momentarily and “intuitively” trans-
cends the “bounds of sense” (Strawson 1966), but what it gives us is always
more sense.21


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                            Analogy as a Mode of Intuitive Understanding in Ricoeur   109


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