10.13135/2036-542X/8067
application/pdf
2036-542X
8067
1
en
Angelica Nuzzo
Trópos
Leopardi Beyond Spinoza: Hegel’s Logic of Essence
Text.Serial.Journal
https://ojs.unito.it/index.php/tropos
12
Monografica
2019-12-01
2023-08-16
2019-12-01
2023-08-16
77-86
1
Angelica Nuzzo
2019/12/01
10.13135/2036-542X/8067
77
Department of Philosophy, Graduate Center and Brooklyn College, CUNY, New York, USA
2036-542X
1
86
Leopardi Beyond Spinoza: Hegel’s Logic of Essence
https://ojs.unito.it/index.php/tropos/article/download/8067/6782
12
                                                                                       trópos – ISBN 978-88-255-2800-8
                                                                DOI 10.4399/97888255280088 – pag. 77-86 (dicembre 2019)




                                                     Leopardi Beyond Spinoza:
                                                      Hegel’s Logic of Essence
                                                                                     A N*




    Abstract
    The essay illustrates the meaning of the Absolute that leads Hegel’s Logic of
    Essence to its conclusion by bringing Leopardi’s conception of Nature to the center.
    Hegel’s Absolute, I contend, can be best understood as the Nature that appears
    in Leopardi’s  Dialogo della Natura e di un Islandese (Operette Morali) and in
    his late poem La Ginestra (). Hegel claims that the Absolute of the Logic of
    Essence “corresponds” to Spinoza’s monistic Absolute expressed as Deus sive natura.
    This “correspondence” and the criticism of Spinoza it entails have stirred reactions
    against Hegel’s alleged misunderstanding of Spinoza. Leopardi’s intervention will
    help us understand the core of Hegel’s position with regard to Spinoza’s substance,
    and will ultimately allow us to put in a novel perspective the crucial transition from
    necessity to freedom that this stage of the development of Essence represents.
    Keywords: Absolute, Nature, Hegel, Logic, Leopardi, Spinoza.

    My task in this essay is to illustrate the meaning of the Absolute that
concludes Hegel’s Logic of Essence, the second part of his Science of Logic,
by bringing Leopardi’s conception of Nature to the center. Hegel’s Absolute,
I contend, can be best understood as the Nature of Leopardi’s Dialogo
della Natura e di un Islandese () and the late poem La Ginestra ().
Hegel claims that the Absolute “corresponds” to Spinoza’s substance: Deus
sive natura. This “correspondence” and the criticism of Spinoza it entails
have often stirred reactions against Hegel’s alleged misunderstanding of
Spinoza. Leopardi’s intervention will help us understand Hegel’s position
toward Spinoza, and ultimately put in a novel perspective the transition
from necessity to freedom entailed in the conclusion of Essence. Ultimately,
     ∗
        Department of Philosophy, Graduate Center and Brooklyn College, CUNY, New York, USA.
ANuzzo@gc.cuny.edu.
     . For such criticism, see for all Birgit Sandkaulen, Die Ontologie der Substanz, der Begriff der
Subjektivität und die Faktizität des Einzelnen. Hegels reflexionslogische “Widerlegung” der Spinozanischen
Metaphysik, in Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Ide-
alism  (), Berlin, New York: , –. See also Angelica Nuzzo, “Truth and Refutation
in Hegel’s Begriffslogik,” in Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus, ed. E. Ficara
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, ), –.
     . I have developed an extensive argument for the claim put forward in this essay in Angelica


                                                                                                                   
       Angelica Nuzzo


I suggest that Leopardi’s view of Nature proves to be a better candidate for
the transition to the Concept’s “realm of freedom” than Spinoza’s Deus sive
natura.


. The Absolute and the End of Essence

In the Logic of Essence, the second book of the Science of Logic, Hegel
presents the Absolute as Essence itself in its concluding movement. The
Absolute is the identity and totality of its determinations, a “solid” and
“substantial” identity that is “absolute” in a sense that anticipates the concept,
yet falls short of the concept. It is a totality such that “each of its parts is itself
the whole,” just as each moment of the concept is “the whole concept.”
In the absolute, however, difference has vanished. The absolute is sheer
Abgrund: the “end” of all things. This “negative exposition” of the absolute
is essence’s first, unsatisfying because merely negative attempt to reach the
concept and thereby its end.
    There is, however, a more promising strategy than this merely negative
one. Hegel suggests that the absolute is “drawn out” of the preceding move-
ment of Being and Essence as its necessary conclusion. Now, the logical
“content” is neither imposed contingently from without nor plunged by
external reflection into the absolute as Abgrund. The content has instead de-
veloped according to its own “internal necessity” as “being’s own becoming
and as the reflection of essence,” and thereby has returned into the absolute
as into its ground. Herein the absolute seems to make an adequate end
to essence: it is the necessary and immanent end–result of the preceding
overall logical movement, the Grund to which such movement “has gone
back,” not simply Abgrund in which difference is dissolved.
    Dialectically, the act whereby “the finite founders” in the absolute

Nuzzo, Approaching Hegel’s Logic, Obliquely. Melville, Molière, Beckett (Albany: SUNY, ), chapter .
Obviously, I do not make any historical claim here. I propose instead a systematic and interpretive
“intervention” of Leopardi in order to put this passage of Hegel’s Logic in a novel perspective. Notice
also that henceforth I capitalize “Essence” to indicate the entire logical sphere of Wesen, i.e., the Logic
of Essence as a whole, and use “essence” to indicate the protagonist of the immanent development
of this sphere in the chapter on The Absolute that I am analyzing. A similar use is made of the
capitalized “Concept” as designating the sphere of the Logic of the Concept (Begriff ). Ultimately,
I suggest that Leopardi’s view of Nature proves to be a better candidate for the transition to the
Concept’s “realm of freedom” than Spinoza’s Deus sive natura.
     . See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, in Werke in zwanzig Bände, ed.
E. Moldenhauer and H.M. Michel (Frankfurt a. M., Surhkamp, ), voll. – (henceforth TW
followed by volume and page number); here TW , .
     . TW , .
     . TW , .
     . TW , .
                                                     Leopardi Beyond Spinoza   


“demonstrates that its nature is [. . . ] to contain the absolute within itself.”
The finite comes to an end in the absolute; this very act, however, is the mark
of its eternity, of its identity with the absolute. This is, indeed, Essence’s
solution to the problem of finitude that has plagued Being first, and then
Essence’s reflection. By ending in the absolute, the finite is eternal. In its
indifferent identity of Abgrund–Grund, the absolute destroys finitude but
also contains it as identical with itself: Deus sive natura. The absolute is the
perfectly and incessantly identical activity of production and destruction,
the pure repetition in which no manifold, no otherness (hence no change)
takes place.
    This, however, is not the true end of Essence since the act of going back
to the absolute cannot move forward beyond a merely repetitive identity.
There is no new beginning after (and from) this end — only incessant repe-
tition or a beginning forced arbitrarily by “external reflection.” It follows
that the absolute is not das Absolut–Absolute — the repetition signaling the
stalled predicament of essence at this point. Thus, essence downsizes the
identical absolute first to “absolute attribute” and then to mere “mode.”
Spinoza again.
    The attribute appears as the “expression” but also as the externalization
of the absolute. The “mode” instead is its sheer alienation, its “loss of itself
in the changeability and contingency of being.” The end, this time, is the
absolute’s self–alienation and disintegration. It is not the end of all finite
things but far more radically the end of the absolute itself. By revealing
the disintegration of the absolute in the “most external exteriority,” Nature
is the end of the absolute. And yet, Hegel argues that it functions as the
end because it is posited as exteriority by the absolute. There is, however,
no escape from identity, which is now repeated and repeated, indifferently,
again and again. In the mode, the absolute determines itself but does not
determine itself as “an other.” It only identically reproduces that “which it
already is.” The absolute has not come to an end, after all. In fact, as the
Logic of Being has already revealed, infinite repetition is the opposite of the
true end.
    At this point, essence moves from mode to modality becoming “blind
necessity,” the “destiny,” and “Nemesis” that decides the limits of existence
and action by assigning the non–negotiable limits and thereby the end

    .   TW , .
    .   TW , .
    .   TW , .
   .   TW ,  and –ff. respectively.
   .   TW , .
   .   TW , .
      Angelica Nuzzo


of all things. As “the form of the absolute,” absolute necessity has left
the thought of the absolute behind or has advanced beyond it. Absolute
necessity is “blind” and entirely self–enclosed. Differences are present in a
new modality unknown heretofore to essence: they are “free actualities”
as they refer neither to each other as semblances nor stand in any relation.
Essence no longer posits and no longer reflects, no longer manifests itself in
something other or even in itself. It abandons entirely the binary logic that
has dominated even its self–exposition in the monistic absolute. Essence
now “lets go free” its own actuality as absolute necessity. Truly, essence
finally lets go of itself and lets itself go. And this is the act that makes the
true end of this sphere. Necessity joins freedom in the act whereby essence
ends in letting actuality go free. Only at this point can the transition to the
Concept finally take place.


. Remarkable Essay of His

Nature’s “exposition” takes place, paradigmatically, in Giacomo Leopardi’s
 Dialogo della Natura e di un Islandese [Dialogue Between Nature and an
Icelander], one of the most remarkable works of his Operette morali. Nature
is the end of the human species and of all living creatures, it is the destiny
of destruction from which, ironically and tragically, the Icelander has tried
to escape his entire life. On a collective scale, the Icelander’s efforts define
human civilization, which purports to flee and transform Nature and is
instead doomed by her. Leopardi’s view in this essay is reinforced in his
penultimate lyrical piece, La Ginestra (), written the year before his
death. These texts offer a picture of the poet’s late account of Nature and
human civilization that embodies as a real figure the way in which Essence
makes the end in Hegel’s Logic of Essence. In the Dialogo, Nature replaces
all transcendent, spiritualistic or theological “absolute,” which for Leopardi
is the product of abstraction and intellectualism, expressing a distinctly
modern form of rationalism. Nature is the material, immanent, all embrac-
ing, and pervasive “absolute” (in fact, Leopardi concludes with Hegel, not
“absolutely absolute”), a force endowed with negative, destructive power.
La Ginestra, however, goes a step further revealing the possibility of a new
creative beginning achieved by the transforming power of poetry. This is

    . TW , .
    . These are all modalities of determination that have successively characterized essence in its
sphere.
    . See, among the many Zibaldone’s texts, Zibaldone [p. –ff.], in Giacomo Leopardi, Zibaldone
di pensieri, Turin, Einaudi, http://www.letteraturaitaliana.net, –ff., for Leopardi’s view of the
absolute in a  note.
                                                                     Leopardi Beyond Spinoza            


the point where Leopardi goes beyond Spinoza offering the true transition
to the Concept.
    At the beginning of the Dialogo, Nature appears to the Icelander as a gigan-
tic presence, seemingly displaying all the features of the (Kantian) sublime —
magnitude, might, eternity, infinity. And yet, significantly, she does not gener-
ate any moral reverence (rather, she triggers moral condemnation). Nature is
a sublime presence, an enigmatic mix between the beautiful and the terrifying;
she is living (she is neither an artifact nor an illusory imitation) and utterly
detached in her dominating posture. And she is Woman. Although, when
seen more closely, Nature displays “the measureless form of a woman,”
but neither the conventional traits of womanhood nor the common analogy
of nature and woman are invoked. Nature is not the productive, nurturing
source and origin of all things but their destructive, pitiless, indifferent end.
Nature is Abgrund as much as Grund of all things. Nature, as La Ginestra later
maintains, Madre è di parto e di voler matrigna. Nature is this contradiction
of a productive force that annihilates the very productions in which she is
immanent and which constitute her. Nature’s negative “exposition,” i.e., her
indifferently destructive attitude with regard to all living creatures, is at the
same time her positive “exposition,” i.e., the display of her “absolute” (indeed
despotic) power over everything.
    The Icelander’s encounter with Nature takes place in the inner, wildest
heart of Africa — in its uninhabited and heretofore unexplored regions.
In its fully displayed actuality, Nature is indeed everywhere, immanent
in all its parts (just as everything is inescapably in nature, the Icelander
will soon find out at his own expense). And yet she is directly faced and
encountered only in its most disquieting, terrifying, and wild manifestations:
in the innermost regions of Africa or on the desolate slopes of Vesuvius, for
example (sull’arida schiena/del formidabil monte/sterminator Vesevo). Indeed,
Nature seems to thrive the most where the “human species is unknown,”
away from the human being and its civilization. For, herein Nature’s potenza
— her infinite power and might — is “better demonstrated than anywhere
else.”
    The Icelander introduces himself as “a poor Icelander fleeing from
Nature; and having fled her for almost my entire life in a hundred regions
of the earth, I am now fleeing her in this one.” Nature ironically responds:

     . See also La Ginestra vv. ff. for nature’s infinity and immensity against which man “is nothing”
(v. ).
     . Giacomo Leopardi, Dialogo della Natura e di un Islandese, in Operette Morali (Milan: Mondadori,
), –, here .
     . La Ginestra, v. .
     . La Ginestra, vv. –.
     . Dialogo, .
      Angelica Nuzzo


“So flees the squirrel from the rattlesnake, until in its haste and by its
own doing runs into the snake’s mouth. I am the one from which you are
fleeing.” The Icelander’s plan is doomed from the start, just as human
civilization is in its grandiose yet vain pretension of progress away from
Nature. Herein lies Leopardi’s poetic refutation of the anthropocentric view
that sees the human being as Nature’s final end. For, Nature is the indifferent,
non–teleological End–Abgrund of all things. Such an end is the immanent
action of Nature itself, not the intervention of an external final purpose.
Indeed, Essence rejects the assumption that its development is guided by
the Concept as its end–purpose. And Essence combats this proposition
precisely by positing the absolute as its end. Nature is the End (Ende); it
has no end (Zweck or Endzweck). The human being (along with its culture,
history, and civilization) is neither the end of Nature nor does it occupy a
privileged place within it. The relation is rather the opposite. Nature is the
End — the absolute termination and limit — of the human being and the
human species as such.
    Nature is indifferent to human actions and purposes just as she is to the
existence of all creatures. Contrary to the Icelander’s argument, Nature’s
indifference is morally neutral, properly beyond morality and devoid of
intentionality. Nature simply “posits” the finite beings that constitute her
with no will and no purpose. However, if she does not create them as a
caring mother with their interest, happiness, and welfare in view, Nature
does not have malevolent intentions either. What man construes as Nature’s
hostility is, quite simply, indifference. Nature is the power and manifestation
of Cosmic Indifference. In this sense, it is “absolute.” This is indeed the
hardest thought for the Icelander to accept, and, on Leopardi’s view, the
hardest thought for human reason and for philosophy more generally: it
seems that Essence cannot be thought without appealing to the Concept,
the end cannot be grasped without recurring to a purpose laying beyond
it. But Leopardi’s Nature as the material all–powerful absolute rejects this
view. Nature’s answer to the Icelander is a straightforward rejection of
anthropocentrism: “Did you perhaps imagine that the world was made
for your sake?” As hard as it is for the human being to accept, Nature
has neither awareness nor knowledge of what is supposedly good or bad,
beneficial or harmful to individuals in what she does, she has no intention
and no aim. Her action is simply and utterly indifferent to all these things.
    Nature is an interconnected whole in which all parts work for the sake of
     . Dialogo, .
    . In the Dialogo della Natura e di un’Anima, in stressing the same a–teleological and anti–
anthropocentric view of Nature, Leopardi suggests that Nature itself is subject to “blind fate” in all
its actions (see Operette Morali, cit., ).
     . Dialogo, .
                                                  Leopardi Beyond Spinoza   


the whole. Herein, Nature posits that toward which it acts with destructive
power. This is what Nature does and what Nature is. Philosophically, this
“truth” leaves the Icelander as puzzled as ever. His exchange with Nature
has no resolution as no philosophy seems able to offer an account of Nature
that answers the question: Whose gain is the suffering in the universe?
Leopardi’s conclusion is quite simple: “No philosopher can tell.” This is
indeed only a human question, to which Nature puts a swift and pragmatic
end. “While they were discussing these and similar issues, two lions are
said to have suddenly appeared. They were so enfeebled with hunger that
they were scarcely able to devour the Icelander. They accomplished the feat,
however, and thus gained sufficient strength to live to the end of the day.”
    La Ginestra entails Leopardi’s final poetic answer to the question philo-
sophically left open by the Dialogo. It is now clear that poetry alone can
address the issue. Or perhaps, more accurately, poetry alone succeeds in
changing the question entirely. For the question may very well be unan-
swerable other than by the act whereby the two emaciated lions devour
the argumentative Icelander. Indeed, there is a sense in which Essence’s
reclaiming an end of its own against the Concept is fully justified and must
be let stand. Herein is the truth of Spinoza’s substance. There is, however,
another aspect to the problem. At least some creatures posited by Nature
in existence so as to be annihilated are also the positive manifestation of
something that exceeds the destructive power of Nature, although they are
themselves inescapably nature. Essence recognizes this point the moment
when it overcomes the absolute by declaring it not “absolutely absolute.”
Importantly, for Leopardi, the human being is not one of these creatures.
The poet addresses instead the solitary, “fragrant broom [la ginestra],” which
is content with her existence on the desolate slopes of the menacing volcano,
“innocent” in the acceptance of her “mortal” fate. Far from questioning
Nature’s alleged “reasons” and from imposing human morality on Nature in
order to condemn her in the name of our human entitlement to happiness,
the “fragrant broom” accepts her own fate sternly, thereby actively and
poetically transforming the end that Nature imposes on her. With her sweet
fragrance, the “gentle flower” offers “consolation” to the desert around
her, and almost “commiserates” i danni altrui — the harm afflicting others
but also the harm inflicted by Nature. Suffering cannot be avoided; the
end cannot be revoked. It can, however, be poetically accepted and thereby
dignified. Nature’s action can neither be changed by culture and civiliza-

  .   Dialogo, .
  .   Dialogo, .
  .   La Ginestra, vv. , –, –.
  .   La Ginestra, vv. –.
      Angelica Nuzzo


tion nor justified with higher reasons or final purposes. Instead, Nature’s
absolute indifference should be recognized by a sober a–teleological, non–
anthropocentric materialism. This is Leopardi’s late poetic conception of
Nature as the indifferent and necessary Abgrund of existence.
    Neither reason nor (utilitarian) morality but the comfort offered by po-
etry and individual beauty, along with the human compassion and solidarity
they engender, are Leopardi’s final answer to Nature. At issue is now the
way in which Nature’s hostility must be acknowledged and transformed.
This is the task of poetry — the task of the Concept. At the end of the
lyric, the lenta ginestra becomes the ally of the poet’s fight against the hubris
and arrogance of human culture, against the foolish progressivism of
Enlightenment rationalism (its famously mocked magnifiche sorti e progres-
sive), and against the misplaced blame that humans place on one another,
thereby inflicting gratuitous harm fighting one another in a Hobbesian way
instead of forming a bond of solidarity against their only true enemy. The
solitary wild broom carries a message of dignity, consolation, and perhaps
solidarity for all human beings who are wise enough to accept their place
in Nature with humble Stoicism. This is also the only possible form of
freedom available to the human being. Freedom lies in the act of acknowl-
edging necessity, in accepting one’s negligible position within Nature and
the destiny of destruction that is common to all creatures.
    Poetry can achieve what no theology and no rationalist philosophy can.
Its achievement is the transformation of the necessary end into a new possi-
bility of life — not its justification, not its postponement or acceleration, not
its negation in the search for an impossible eternity. Only poetry — and le
opere di genio more generally — is able to shake the absolute indifference and
insensitivity that in the human being are equal to death. Only the artwork
can offer a plausible human response to Nature’s cosmic indifference. This
is Leopardi’s final message. Herein, in the work of poetry, lies the liberating
transition to the Concept.




    . Presently, I want to stress the first (poetry and beauty) over the second point (solidarity); for
this, see Cesare Luporini, Leopardi progressivo (Rome: Editori Riuniti, ), , .
    . La Ginestra, vv. , .
    . La Ginestra, v. .
    . Zibaldone, [–], f.
                                                                 Leopardi Beyond Spinoza          


. Leopardi Beyond Spinoza

Hegel explicitly considers the Absolute of Essence as corresponding to
Spinoza’s substance. At this juncture, what Hegel criticizes in Spinoza can
be considered instead as the perfectly justified merits of his conception of
substance. For, while Hegel’s criticism is carried out from the more ad-
vanced standpoint of the Concept, the destruction of finitude, the absolute’s
indeterminateness and lack of subjectivity, its rigid and petrified eternity are
among the characters that have their necessary place precisely at the end of
Essence. They are necessary in order to articulate the specific way in which
Essence makes the end. And there is no other way from Being to the Concept
than to pass through the Abgrund–Grund of Spinoza’s substance. Herein lies,
for Hegel, the unsurpassed value of Spinoza’s Substance–Absolute. And yet,
Spinoza’s substance is unable to make the transition to the Concept. This is
precisely what Leopardi’s Nature does.
    In Spinoza’s system, substance is the monistic whole; it is «one sub-
stance, one indivisible totality.” Hegel underlines that “there is no deter-
minateness that is not contained and dissolved into it.” Precisely to this
extent, Spinozistic substance is posited at the same level of or as the same
totality that essence is, and more precisely, as the absolute with which
essence attempts to conclude its movement. There is no determinateness
that is not contained in the absolute as its Grund. But there is also no
determinateness that is not dissolved in the absolute as its Abgrund. Indeed,
Hegel recognizes that a valuable insight of Spinozism is that “anything
that to the natural way of representing and to the determining under-
standing appears as self–subsistent (Selbständiges) is entirely reduced in
this necessary concept to a mere positedness (Gesetzsein).” Against the
abstract freedom common to the formality of Kantian autonomy or the
arrogant and illusory independence of Leopardi’s Icelander — a freedom
that amounts to the stubborn pretension of the finite to claim some
form of “independency” or “self–subsistence” of its own, i.e., to claim
its being a Selbständiges — Spinoza’s substance shows the true destiny of
annihilation that inescapably awaits the finite within the whole (Nature
as the absolute). Freedom lies rather in the acceptance of the necessary
identity with the whole. The finite is posited as such as to be annihilated.
And it is posited with no further purpose in view. Indeed, this is the hard
truth that Nature (substance or the absolute) reveals to the Icelander.
There is no need for a Kantian dualism to soften this hard truth, that is,

  . “The concept of Spinozistic substance corresponds (entspricht) to the concept of the absolute,”
TW , .
  . TW , .
         Angelica Nuzzo


no need to see an unchanging autonomous supersensible character as
oddly coexisting with the conditioned natural progress of humanity.
    Hegel famously expresses the “absolute principle” of Spinoza’s substance in
the proposition “determinateness is negation,” a proposition that he considers
“true” but also limited. For it remains at the view of “negation as determinate-
ness or quality” and does not advance to negation as self–negation. Ultimately,
this means that the individual does not recover from — or does not survive
— the negation or annihilation within the absolute; that it does not subsist as
individual within it. Moreover, for Spinoza, the “manifold act of determining”
lies in “an external thinking.” While thinking is one with extension, it does not
“separate” itself from it. Hence thinking is “not as determining and informing
(als Bestimmen und Formieren), nor as a movement of return that begins from
itself.” The absolute’s end is not a turning back to a new beginning. Thinking
radically ends in the absolute substance but does not make a return back into
itself; hence it does not make a new beginning out of itself (which is the nature
of the action of subjectivity). Despite its definition as causa sui, the absolute is
not a creative self–determining power. It is the repetitive power that reproduces
itself in a self–identical position, with no otherness and no difference: Nature
repeating itself, but truly unable to imagine an utterly different order; thinking
identical with extension but unable to differentiate itself from it. However, the
capacity to make a new beginning out of itself and after the end is, for Hegel, the
dialectical meaning of the end: not a standstill but an utterly new beginning.
Indeed, the end entails the creative act that requires the production of otherness
as otherness. Herein we meet the true limit of Spinoza’s position. Thinking
stalls in the absolute, unable to turn back to itself and unable to gain the “con-
cept of an other by which it would have to be formed” anew, as different
from itself. Only the Concept overcomes the limit of Essence. “The concept
is not the abyss (Abgrund) of the formless substance [. . . ] but as the absolute
negativity it is that which forms and creates (das Formierende und Erschaffende).”
This activity of forming and creating is precisely that which Essence’s absolute
and Spinoza’s substance as well as Nature in Leopardi’s Dialogo lack. They are,
however, identical with the productive and transformative power of poetry
that, in Leopardi’s La Ginestra, disclose the only saving possibility beyond the
destructive force of Nature.



     .   TW , .
     .   TW ,  (my emphasis).
     .   TW , .
     .   For a full–fledged development of this point, see Nuzzo, Approaching Hegel’s Logic, chapter .
     .   TW , .
     .   TW ,  referring to .
