10.13135/2036-542X/8037
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2036-542X
8037
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Claudio Tarditi
Trópos
Between Nature and Ethics: 
Text.Serial.Journal
https://ojs.unito.it/index.php/tropos
11
Monografica
2018-06-01
2023-08-09
2018-06-01
2023-08-09
115-133
1
Claudio Tarditi
2018/06/01
10.13135/2036-542X/8037
115
Università di Torino
2036-542X
1
133
Between Nature and Ethics: 
https://ojs.unito.it/index.php/tropos/article/download/8037/6759
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                                                                                           – ISBN 978-88-255-1945-7
                                                             DOI 10.4399/97888255194577 – pag. 115-133 (giugno 2018)




                                               Between Nature and Ethics
                         Genealogy and Limits of Husserl’s Notion of Vocation

                                                                                  C T*




A: This paper aims at providing with a discriminating discussion of
Husserl’s account of vocation from the perspective of his phenomenological
axiology. In particular, I will deal with the relation between vocation and
natural life. My core thesis is that the transcendental structure of vocation
tends to “flow into” natural life, namely into the empirical world. Consis-
tently with a number of claims in the Crisis of the European Sciences, I will
argue that the phenomenon of “flowing” (Einströmen) of transcendental
subjectivity in natural life is particularly observable in the domain of ethics.
After a reconstruction of Husserl’s lectures on ethics ( and –’), I
will emphasize how the concept of absolute ought develops into the notion
of vocation throughout the s, together with Husserl’s interests in genetic
phenomenology. In the final section I focus on the relation between voca-
tion and the individual’s empirical life with its temporal and intersubjective
structures.

K–: Vocation, Phenomenology, Axiology, Value, Transcendental,
Empirical.


Although an extended literature is available on the concept of vocation
from a historical, sociological, and theological viewpoint, the philosophical
inspections of this issue are not copious. This paper intends to fill (at least
partially) this gap, through the discussion of Husserl’s account of vocation
from the perspective of his phenomenological axiology. In particular, I will
deal with the relation between vocation and natural life, an issue Husserl
never approached extensively nor in his published works neither in his
manuscripts. My aim is to demonstrate that the transcendental structure
   ∗
      Università degli Studi di Torino; claudio.tarditi@unito.it.
   . Cf. G .


                                                                                                               
        Claudio Tarditi


of vocation tends to “flow into” natural life, namely into the empirical
world. In other words, in line with a number of claims (often neglected)
in the Crisis of the European Sciences, I will argue that the phenomenon
of “flowing” (Einströmen) of transcendental subjectivity in natural life is
particularly observable in the domain of ethics.
    Following M. Robert’s suggestion (), one could distinguish four
meanings of the concept of vocation. Indeed, vocation may be understood
as: a) a divine command, namely a person–relative command from God; b) a
natural order, that is a call to be part of a divinely–ordained social structure;
c) a self–actualization of a divinely–given personal essence; d) an election,
namely the call to belong to a chosen community. As is self–evident, the
former three options clearly refer to a theological meaning of vocation: as
a means of exemplifying, let us remind of S. Kierkegaard and M. Scheler.
By contrast, the latter reveals a meaning of vocation fully independent from
any reference to religion. For instance, in his Critic of Practical Reason Kant
uses the word “vocation” (Beruf ) in order to clarify the notion of the endless
ethical progress leading to a perfect accordance between the individual’s
will and the moral law. More precisely, the moral law calls each rational
being to carry on his/her moral strain as if it would be a vocation from
God. Accordingly, from Kant’s perspective, vocation is a call to belong to a
rational community made of all rational beings committed to their infinite
ethical strain to attain the moral law.
    As I shall demonstrate, in his late writings on ethics Husserl often de-
scribes the individual’s process of decision making as grounded in a voca-
tion, namely a call to belong to a «personality of a higher order» (Husserl
: ). Accordingly, it develops a theory of vocation from a strictly ethical
standpoint, without any direct connection to theology. Indeed, in Husserl’s
view, vocation is the way through which the categorical imperative gives
itself to each subjectivity. In other words, Husserl maintains that, when
opting for an action, the individual feels to be called by an absolute ought
which orients his/her choice among many possible actions. This means
that, for Husserl, such an affective experience (Wertnehmung) of being at-
tracted by a certain realm of values plays a decisive role in our practical
life. For instance, one may be called by the values of philosophy, law, music,
painting, etc. and, accordingly, accept them as the main scope of his/her
life. In other terms, in our natural life we are committed to the realm of

      .   Cf. H : .
      .   Cf. K ; S .
      .   Cf. K , book , chapter , section .
      .   Cf. H : .
      .   Cf. H .
                                                         Between Nature and Ethics   


values we love. More radically, in Husserl’s view, it is only when we follow
our vocation for a given realm of values that we are living the best possible
life. Vocation provides our life with a rational goal, to the extent that, by
developing decisions and convictions in line with it, we realize our own
subjectivity as oriented towards our personal telos (ibid.).
    Although this notion is highly useful in order to grasp Husserl’s account
of the absolute ought, it reveals some difficulties that deserve to be accurately
discussed. Notably, how is the relation between vocation and natural life to
be conceived? One can divide this question as follows: a) How is the relation
between vocation and the categorical imperative to be properly understood?
b) May the vocation change throughout the individual’s life and, if so, does
vocation lose its absoluteness? c) How does the different vocations get along
with each other within a certain community? With this aim, I will address
the question of whether and how the phenomenological notion of vocation
should be modified vis–à–vis the natural (intuitive, pre–scientific) structure
of human experience.
    My interpretive hypothesis is that the absoluteness of vocation is strictly
intertwined with the ego’s empirical life and its temporal and intersubjec-
tive structure. In other words, I will demonstrate that, rather than being
an extensive notion (vocation is absolute insofar as it lasts forever), the vo-
cation’s absoluteness is to be understood as an intensive concept (vocation
is absolute since it calls as an obligation). This means that the vocation’s
absoluteness has nothing to do with its temporal duration; rather, what
distinguishes vocation is its unconditionedness, regardless of whether its
duration consists in a given temporal range or the whole individual’s life.
As a result, vocation works as an absolute ought despite its possible changes
over the ego’s natural life.


. Structure and Limits of Husserl’s early Axiology

Husserl’s interest in ethics is doubtless connected with Franz Brentano’s
lectures on practical philosophy from  to  (Brentano  and
a). As is well known, in these lectures Brentano aims at providing an
account of ethics able to include subjective feelings and desires without
falling into subjectivism. His core argument is that the highest end of
an action «consists in the best of what is attainable» (Brentano a: ).
Brentano maintains that, although judgments of goodness are not based
upon perceptions and, accordingly, cannot be immediately evident, we are
able to make a judgment whether an action is right or wrong. This view

   . Cf. L, C, M  and P : –.
   Claudio Tarditi


depends on Brentano’s belief that there are feelings deriving from instinct
which are subordinate to a «higher class of emotional activities» (Brentano
a: ). According to Brentano, such a higher class of feelings, common
to all human beings, can be identified with the fact of being worthy of
love rather than being merely considered as providing pleasure (ibid.). As
a consequence, in Brentano’s view, feelings are included in the process
of decision making: our feeling love for an object (or action) is the basic
condition for evaluating its goodness. Analogously, our feeling preference
for an object or action is the basis upon which we judge this object or action
to be better than other ones. Moreover, it must be emphasized that Brentano
states that the acknowledgement of our feeling toward an object or action
implies a certain act of universalization (Brentano a: ): for instance,
when I reject a certain act of violence occurred in particular circumstances,
I reject violence in general as well. As a consequence, the recognition of
an action as good or bad entails the recognition of this action’s concept.
Thus, for instance, the experience of being beaten is the empirical condition
for recognizing the rightness of the disapproval of violence in general.
It goes without saying that this idea strongly inspires Husserl’s account
of phenomenology, and notably phenomenological ethics, as an eidetic
science.
    Under Brentano’s influence, Husserl accepts the idea that ethics must
take into account the role played by feelings in moral life. Furthermore,
Husserl’s theory of values inherits Brentano’s view about a fundamental
analogy between the laws of ethics and theoretical reason. In line with
Brentano’s perspective, Husserl develops his formulation of the highest end
of human action as a formal categorical imperative: «Do the best that is
attainable» (Husserl : ). Unlike Kant, Husserl attempts to develop
a categorical imperative that takes into consideration the manifold results
pragmatically achievable within the limits of a given situation. In a certain
sense, Husserl’s axiology is based on this project of “naturalization” of the
categorical imperative, namely an absolute ought within the limits of a
given empirical situation. Husserl’s basic idea is that the best action must be
a practicable one: to say it differently, a lesser achievement is better than a
best failure. What is at stake in this ethical framework is the dependence of
good actions on an evaluative process, through which each individual weighs
different practical possibilities in order to choose the one that shows the best
value and feasibility at the same time. According to Husserl, such a process
consists of three steps: a) firstly, one desires certain practical possibilities;
b) secondly, one becomes aware of all the practical possibilities within a
given situation; c) lastly, one chooses the practical possibility provided with
the best value and feasibility. Clearly, it follows that the process of decision
making lays on the individual’s capability to put his/her values in hierarchy
                                                   Between Nature and Ethics   


in order to identify which is endowed with the highest value. In other terms,
for Husserl actions depends on a law of «value absorption of the lesser value
by the higher value» (ibid.: ). The notion of absorption is fundamental
in order to determine the hierarchy of values, insofar as the highest value
absorbs all the other ones without being absorbed in turn. This means
that one good prevails on the multiplicity of achievable goods because of
its higher rank of ethical value. To put it differently, when determining
the highest good for us, we organize all other goods according to their
contribution to the achievement of the highest good. As a consequence,
in his lectures from ,  (ibid.) and –’ (Husserl ), Husserl
seeks to formulate a precise hierarchy of values. In line with his theory of
absorption, he puts spiritual values (including values related to art, science,
philosophy, etc.) on a higher level than sensual values, insofar as these latter
are always in a position of being absorbed by the former. If there are two
similar spiritual values, their connection with sensible values provides us
with a criterion for the estimation of their rank in order to place them in
hierarchy. However, Husserl is aware of the fact that there may be a conflict
between two (or more) values: in this case, the categorical imperative allows
the individual for determining which good is the worthiest. In other words,
formal axiology is the condition for establishing the a priori goods internal
to each material good.
    Whichever experience of values is affective. This means that the feeling
toward a thing gives us its value. Nevertheless, such a feeling depends on a
cognitive experience, insofar as the thing, before becoming desirable or not,
must be recognized as an object of experience. In this sense, the value of
the thing is objective because it derives from its intersubjective constitution
as an object of purely cognitive experience. It is clear that Husserl attempts
to find a priori material goods as the content of formal axiology. Material a
priori, identified by a process of eidetic variation, indicates the conditions
for an object of being of a certain type: more precisely, material a priori’s
function is to eliminate certain possibilities of variation in order to establish
objective values. To put it differently, material a priori determines the limits
of variation of practical possibilities when considering the best good achiev-
able. For the sake of clarity, the best good one can reach in a given situation
is not open to all possible actions, since only some of them are compatible
with the material a priori and some are better than others. For this reason,
the best possible option is attainable only through a process of limitation.
    As a result, Husserl conceives of phenomenological axiology as perform-
ing three main tasks: (i) an accurate description of the intentional acts which
constitute the different types of values; (ii) a precise discussion of the process
of transformation of values in laws or norms; (iii) an analysis of the appli-
cation of these laws or norms in social life (Husserl : ). Thus, from
     Claudio Tarditi


Husserl’s standpoint, phenomenological axiology consists of four main
subareas: on the one hand, formal and material axiology focused on the
noematic elements of ethical life; on the other hand, formal and material
practice devoted to the noetic aspects of ethical life. To say it differently,
whereas formal axiology takes into account the laws derived from values
and material axiology inspects the laws’ content, formal practice deals with
the formal determinations of the highest ethical principle, the categorical
imperative, and material practice provides values with a content. In so doing,
material practice explains the constitution of both ethical subjectivity and
community (ibid.: ). The most relevant difficulty one has to deal with in
the proper understanding of Husserl’s –’ lectures is the absence of
material axiology and practice, although Husserl himself bestows them a
great importance in the framework of his phenomenological approach to
ethics.
    However, after  Husserl becomes more and more aware of the in-
sufficiency of his account of the categorical imperative (Husserl F I : a).
Indeed, in his lectures on ethics, the imperative seems to be in a neutral posi-
tion and, analogously, any individual is expected to do the same thing within
the limits of what is practically attainable. As a consequence, in this context
the individual ends up being bereft of his moral responsibility. In other
words, Husserl admits that, in his –’ lectures, the best objectively
achievable depends on external judgments rather than the individual’s will
(Husserl B I : a). Moreover, in my interpretive hypothesis, his version
of the categorical imperative does not adequately emphasize the fact that
natural life has a decisive function in the process of values’ constitution.
This means that, although Husserl follows Brentano’s claim that feelings
play a peculiar role in revealing values, his interpretation of the categorical
imperative reduces the importance of the empirical world in order to avoid
any variety of subjectivism, with the result of putting the individual in a
position of unrealistic neutrality.
    As I will demonstrate, the incompleteness of Husserl’s account of the
categorical imperative in his lectures on formal axiology derives from his
static approach to ethics. Indeed, an ethical theory based upon the concept
of the best objectively achievable does not take into account the real com-
plexity of the individual’s moral life. In other words, Husserl’s theory of the
categorical imperative only considers the structural features of the process
of decision making. By contrast, ethical values are always experienced by
means of the empirical context in its natural, historical, intersubjective,

     . Furthermore, it sounds quite strange that Husserl remained silent about Scheler’s Formalism
in Ethics and Non–Formal Ethics of Values, partially published in  on the Jahrbuch fur Phänomenologie.
     . Cf. M : XX.
                                                               Between Nature and Ethics       


and cultural aspects. Accordingly, phenomenological axiology should pro-
vide an in–depth explanation of the passive emergence of moral feelings
throughout the flowing of the intuitive (pre–scientific) experience of the
natural/empirical world. More precisely, axiology does not deal only with
the intentional activity of values’ constitution; rather, it must inspect the
passive genesis of the primordial conditions of values’ arising as well. In
this way, axiology would be in a position of describing the development
of values’ constitution throughout the history of a given community. As
emphasized by Husserl himself in The Crisis of European Sciences, the inquiry
into axiology needs a systematic analysis of both the life–world of a certain
culture and the constitution of personhood and community. Nevertheless,
it must be noted at this point that the notion of Lebenswelt cannot be merely
reduced to a cultural or sociological structure. Rather, it consists of the
multiplicity of the possible modes of givenness of the world for a possible
subjectivity (Husserl , ). Accordingly, the life–world cannot be in-
habited by any empirical subject, with a certain language, gender, history,
etc. This means that Husserl does not think that the systems of values arise
directly from the life–world, which remains a transcendental notion. Rather,
values appear precisely in the process of “flowing” of the life–world into
the empirical world of a given community. More precisely, the flowing of
transcendental into the natural world is the condition of possibility of a
phenomenological axiology. Far from being a merely passive contemplation
of the system of values of a certain culture, this approach asks for a recon-
sideration of the natural and transcendental dimensions of values: thought,
affectivity, and action.



. From Static to Genetic Axiology

As is well known, throughout the s Husserl substantially reshapes his
account of the relation between transcendental subjectivity and natural
world. Indeed, genetic method (Husserl ) leads him to reassess the
interaction between natural and transcendental life, in order to show how
these two realms are much more interconnected than Husserl himself
seems to suggest, for instance, in Ideas I. In a series of manuscripts from
–’, known as the Bernauer Manuskripte (a), where he develops (also
thanks to E. Stein’s accurate work of transcription) his –’ lectures on
time–consciousness at the University of Göttingen (published first in 

   . Cf. S . For a precise reconstruction of the problem of the life–world, see C
, S , G , G , S , B,  and .
     Claudio Tarditi


and then as the volume X of the Husserliana series), Husserl scrutinizes
his theory of time through the notion of “individuation”, which largely
prepares the reflection on passivity he develops throughout the s. Even
though Husserl does not address the issue of individuation from an ethical
standpoint, it doubtlessly provides us with useful phenomenological tools
in order to approach the relation between values and natural world. In
this section, I will suggest that formal (static) axiology is to be developed
following the genetic approach to transcendental phenomenology.
    In the light of these reflections, it becomes clear how the Bernauer
Manuskripte, in which the problem of individuation is discussed in depth,
represent a turning point in Husserl’s phenomenology. From –’
onwards, the irruption of the genetic method goes at the same pace with
Husserl’s awareness of the fact that constitution has to take into account
its temporal features. This view is confirmed by the fact that, already in
Ideas I, Husserl admits that not all constitutions are based upon the ego:
this is precisely the case for passive constitutions. This decisive intuition
leads Husserl straight to the problem of individuation as a temporal process,
as described in the Bernauer Manuskripte. From a genetic point of view,
it is precisely in this process that the ego originates in its immanence. In
other words, the immanent “living–present” is the most originary kind of
individuation, composed of a variety of sensible givens unified in sequence.
    Consistently with Husserl’s view, my claim is that such a project is to
be extended to axiology as well, insofar as the process of sedimentation of
pre–scientific experiences, far from including only perceptual ones, involves
also the domain of ethical life. More closely, genetic phenomenology makes
room for a reconsideration of the individual’s ethical features, insofar as
it inspects the process of values’ arising from the natural world. In order
to corroborate this view, I will show that, from the late s onwards,
Husserl is increasingly convinced that a phenomenological explanation of
how the intuitive natural life contributes to the settling of certain systems of
values is the condition for an in–depth description of practical life in general.
As already explained, as early as  Husserl works on the problem of
the structure of the categorical imperative, notably in his  lectures
about Fichte’s ideal of humanity (Husserl : –). Also due to the
cultural crisis after World War I (during which he lost his son Wolfgang
and a number of pupils), in the well–known –’ Kaizo Articles Husserl
argues that ethics, rather than merely establishing the best attainable in a

   . This lecture course from –’ has not been published in its entirety. Only its third and
fourth parts have been published, respectively in Husserl  and  (English transl. ).
   . Cf. D W .
   . Cf. D W, W .
                                                    Between Nature and Ethics   


given situation, should provide an inspection of the development of the
individual’s moral attitude (Husserl : –). As a consequence, Husserl’s
commitment to the problem of the individual’s ethical development leads
him to the issue of the relation between subjectivity and the empirical life
from which it originates.
     Under these premises, how does Husserl’s notion of the categorical im-
perative develop in his late writings? In a manuscript from  (H F I
), Husserl argues that the individual’s ought is absolute to the extent that
it is only by a total adherence of the will to this ought that the individual is
who he/she is. In other words, such an absolute ought provides the indi-
vidual with his/her value as a human being. According to this manuscript,
the absolute ought requires the individual to opt for the best possible life
«from now on in all its acts and with its total content of mental processes,
that it is my best possible life, my best possible, that means, the best pos-
sible that I can live. That ought is a correlate of the will, and indeed of a
rational will. The ought is the truth of the will» (ibid.: a). To put it more
clearly, one could say that, for Husserl, living the best possible life means
having no regrets. In this light, Husserl does not abandon the formalism
of his early approach to ethics; rather, he strongly reaffirms the relevance
of the categorical imperative of doing the best achievable in a given situ-
ation. Nevertheless, according to Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, such
a categorical imperative has a different content for each individual insofar
as it depends on the temporal process of sedimentation of habitual con-
victions and cultural conditionings. In other words, each individual must
do the best possible consistently with his/her absolute ought: otherwise,
his/her identity would run the risk of losing its inner coherence. It is for
this reason that the categorical imperative loses its universality, namely its
possibility of being applied identically to all moral situations. Rather, it is to
be understood within the realm of the individual’s life–world in order to
preserve his/her individuality. In this framework, Husserl emphasizes the
relevant role played by the categorical imperative in the process of values’
arising: more closely, the absolute ought strongly influences the process of
decision–making so as to develop all decisions into habits and convictions.
     It is precisely in this context that Husserl introduces his idea of the
absolute ought as a «vocation» (Husserl : ). In the next section I will
discuss its implications and limits, both on the level of the active ethical
decision and the intuitive genesis of values within a given culture.
       Claudio Tarditi


. Vocation and the Life–World

It goes without saying that the notion of vocation as a personal telos is to be
put in connection with Husserl’s early account of the categorical imperative.
In the light of his late manuscripts on ethics, as well as his meditation on
the issue of a rational community, it is clear that the imperative cannot
uniquely be based upon the idea of the best practically achievable in a given
situation. Rather, the absolute ought strongly depends on the individual’s
vocation for a realm of values, namely his/her personal aims and projects.
Furthermore, in The Crisis of European Sciences Husserl explicitly intertwines
this issue with the question of the ought of a community (Husserl :
). This means that the categorical imperative loses its universality if it
is not placed within a complex framework of pre–scientific and intuitive
coordinates, that is its life–world (Husserl K III ). As shown in the previous
section, the temporal sedimentation of the ego’s decisions has an impact on
its habits, including its ethical life (Husserl : ): this means that the
entire life of the ego, included its ethical life, owes to time–consciousness
its inner consistency. Without Husserl’s genetic approach to the problem of
time–consciousness, there would be no room for understanding subjectivity,
including its ethical aspects, as a process of self–constitution.
    Nevertheless, from Husserl’s standpoint, ethical norms are not merely
subjective and contingent. Although moral values are not timeless and abso-
lutely universal, they come to light as particular features which determine
the cultural identity of a given community. As a consequence, if on the
one hand ethical decisions are influenced by the realm of values that we
inherit from the past, on the other hand we are not imprisoned in these
systems of values forever. Rather, we choose by ourselves our vocations,
insofar as these latter are not provided by tradition. In this light, the process
of decision–making consists of a reflection upon our personal vocation as a
manifestation of our own identity in its essential connection with tradition.
To put it differently, the vocation for a given realm of values is what makes
the ego actually human: our choice for certain values is at the same time
a choice for who we are. Accordingly, the process of becoming human is
ultimately an ethical process, insofar as vocation sets up for each individual
his/her absolute ought. Moreover, vocation is not only essential for the
identity of the individual; rather, it is only by means of each individual’s
commitment that the identity of a certain community is preserved. With
this respect, in a manuscript from  Husserl argues that the ethical life of
humanity is developed «in the midst of the configurations of manners, of

      . Cf. in particular manuscripts A V  ().
      . Cf. in particular manuscripts A V  () and B III  ().
                                                  Between Nature and Ethics   


law, of the scientific life work, or religion and finally of universal language»
(Husserl F I : a). This means that norms derive from community and
contribute to constitute the life–world of posterity, namely the «pre–given
spiritual surrounding world» (ibid.) into which the next generations will
grow up. Thus, we assume moral norms through passive association insofar
as they arise from our life–world: then, it is our responsibility to put these
norms into question in order to accept or refuse them. It is precisely in
this sense that Husserl argues that «the ethical stands before the individual
as an objective, questionless given. And so it remains from generation to
generation, although one does not generally realize it, to think about the
last ground of legitimacy of the demands stated in the various concrete
regulations, and to put them into question, to put them into theoretical
themes» (Husserl F I : b). In this passage, by means of vocation, the deep
interaction between the natural “questionless” world and transcendental
subjectivity becomes patent.
    As a matter of fact, Husserl implicitly introduces a hierarchy of voca-
tions. Indeed, all individual vocations are subject to the universal vocation
to rational life. This certainly means that Husserl is deeply convinced that
the practice of philosophy fosters the sense of responsibility among the
community members, precisely because philosophy allows for the process
of critique of traditional values. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the
best possible community is a community of philosophers. Rather, provided
that in Husserl’s view the main ethical task of reason is a discriminating
inspection of the traditional system of values, the ideal of a community of
philosophers is not limited to academic scholars in philosophy, but can be
extended to all persons committed to the process of critique and renewal
of moral values. However, it is worth noting that, at least in principle, this
rational activity is open to everybody, provided that they are able to take
on the task of reflecting upon their cultural tradition. In other words, if
on the one hand it is clear that Husserl does not justify the exclusion of
certain peoples from such a project, on the other hand he emphasizes that
the basic condition is the ability to make a proper use of reason. The point
that remains unclear in Husserl’s manuscripts is whether he believes that
all men are capable of thinking correctly or certain peoples (and cultures)
make an inappropriate use of rationality. At first glance, it appears to be the
case of Eskimos, Indians, and Gypsies, according to a highly controversial
      Claudio Tarditi


passage of the Crisis, often assessed for Eurocentrism and racism. The
reason of Husserl’s claim is that certain cultures reveal different account
of community and temporality with respect to European civilization. As
a consequence, there seems to arise a strong tension between Husserl’s
account of universality, according to which every human being, «no matter
how primitive he is» (Husserl : ), is characterized by rationality, with
his idea of the self–enclosed particularity of certain cultures. As insightfully
emphasized by D. Moran (: ), Husserl’s account of European civiliza-
tion is to be understood not only in reference to the cultural context (and
prejudices) of his time, but also with regard to his project of a phenomeno-
logical explanation of the life–world as a ground for a scientific community
(Moran : ). Furthermore, it is only from the standpoint of Husserl’s
account of the transcendental subjectivity, with its intrinsic commitment to
ideality, teleology, and infinity, that his discussion of cultural particularities
and his remarks about certain cultural types can be correctly addressed. In
this perspective, the notion of vocation does not lose its absoluteness also in
consideration of the empirical differences among different cultures.
     However, the notion of vocation reveals other difficulties as well. For
instance, the relation between vocation and absolute ought is addressed in
different ways in Husserl’s late manuscripts and in The Crisis of European
Sciences. Indeed, whereas in a number of manuscripts Husserl conceives
of vocation as providing for the individual’s identity (Husserl F I : –a
and a), in the Crisis he refers to vocation as something the individual can
take on or leave depending on the empirical situation (Husserl : ).
On the one hand, vocation establishes each person’s absolute ought and
realm of values as something all–pervasive. On the other hand, vocation is
one among many possible attitudes towards the world: «When we actualize
one of our habitual interests and are thus involved in our vocational activity
[...], we assume a posture of epoché toward our other life–interests, even
though these still exist and are still ours» (ibid.). If this view is perfectly
understandable on the level of our everyday practical activities, it becomes
much more puzzling with regard to ethics. More precisely, is it possible
to put into brackets an absolute ought while performing other activities?
Husserl does not address such an issue. In my interpretive hypothesis, it
seems that the only possible answer is negative, insofar as the absolute ought

    . «We may ask, “How is the spiritual image of Europe to be characterized?” This does not
mean Europe geographically, as it appears on maps, as though European man were to be in this way
confined to the circle of those who live together in this territory. In the spiritual sense it is clear that
to Europe belong the English dominions, the United States, etc., but not, however, the Eskimos or
Indians of the country fairs, or the Gypsies, who are constantly wandering about Europe» (Husserl
: ).
    . Cf. for instance D : –, and B, C : –.
                                                   Between Nature and Ethics   


can be preserved even when vocation is put into brackets. For instance, I
can retain my absolute ought based on the vocation for academia’s realm of
values even when I am playing my guitar. Furthermore, the idea that the
absolute ought can be put into brackets is in contrast with Husserl’s claim,
mentioned above, that the absolute ought operates «from now on in all its
acts and with its total content of mental processes» (F I : a). As a con-
sequence, once an absolute ought has been set up through the individual’s
choice of a vocation, it cannot be bracketed, although the individual may
bracket the vocation for that ought.
    A last objection. At first glance, one could think that the major outcome
of this account of vocation is that the absolute ought, once chosen, must
remain the same «from now on», that is for the entire life. Nevertheless,
although Husserl does not discuss this point explicitly, under closer scrutiny
the claim that a moral ought is absolute if and only if it calls an individual
for the entire life is totally inconsistent with the general framework of
Husserl’s thought. Indeed, given that, on the one hand, all our ethical
decisions are influenced by the realm of values rooted in our life–world and,
on the other hand, we have the power to modify these systems of values,
a static/unmodifiable account of the absolute ought is a nonsense insofar
as it excludes that this latter may develop and change throughout life. In
other words, the intuitive, intersubjective, historical, and cultural structure
of vocation constantly reshapes the process of ethical decision, in a way
that the absolute ought keeps its absoluteness despite its transformations
throughout the concrete subjective life. As a result, the ought’s absoluteness
is to be understood as intensive, rather than extensive. This means that a
vocation for a certain realm of values may call me unconditionally (that is,
as an absolute ought) throughout a given season of my life and, then, fade
off or gradually develop into another vocation. In synthesis, the absolute
ought has a temporal feature despite its absoluteness does not derive from
temporal duration. Such a peculiar structure is in a position to defend both
the absoluteness and the constant flow of the vocation: far from giving
itself within a steady structure composed by intentionality and intuitive
fulfillment, vocation appears throughout the flow of subjective life, in which
nature, time, history, and intersubjectivity are inextricably intertwined.


. The Ethical Relevance of Intersubjectivity

As shown above, Husserl’s notion of vocation allows for an accurate inspec-
tion of the process of values’ arising from the ego’s natural life. Nevertheless,
such a process is necessarily intersubjective. In brief, practical life excludes
isolation. Rather, it takes place in a world constituted by others and inher-
       Claudio Tarditi


ited from previous generations. Thus, from an ethical viewpoint, each ego
constitutes itself in a life–world of intersubjective values. So doing, the ego
becomes a member of a historical community composed by other subjec-
tivities with their personal vocations. To some extent, the ego belongs to
a personality of a higher order and, accordingly, is called to the preserva-
tion of this communal self. Although the analogy between individual and
communal personality is highly problematic, to the extent that a commu-
nity often gathers together different traditions and oughts, Husserl argues
that this personality of a higher order can have a unified will and act as a
unity (Husserl : ). Reciprocally, such a many headed self depends on
the individuals of which it consists. In other terms, its members are inter-
connected so as one’s vocation cannot exclude the vocation of any other.
Rather, the individual’s vocation requires that the other follows his/her
own vocation. This means that our will influences the other and the others’
will is also our own, as if we live in one another. In this way, all men can
contribute to the absolute ought of a community (Husserl F I : ).
    For the sake of clarity, it is worth emphasizing the strict connection
between Husserl’s account of community and the «transcendental theory
of experiencing someone else, a transcendental theory of so–called empathy
(Einfühlung)» (Husserl : ). As is well known, Husserl introduces this
notion in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation in order to explain how «within
myself, within the limits of my transcendentally reduced pure conscious
life, I experience the world (including others) [...] as an intersubjective world,
actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its objects to everyone»
(ibid.: ). Consistently, in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation Husserl makes a
distinction between the physical body (Körper) and the lived–body (Leib),
namely the originary sphere of consciousness’ «peculiar owness» (ibid.: ).
Whereas, on the one hand, I can perceive the other’s physical body (as well
as my own body), on the other hand, only my lived–body gives itself as a
direct presentation for me. Instead, the other’s lived–body is given to me
only by means of an act of indirect intentionality, namely an «analogical
apperception» (ibid.: ). In Husserl’s words:

      Since, in this nature and this world, my animate organism is the only body that is
      or can be constituted originally as an animate organism (a functioning organ), the
      body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended as an animate organism, must
      have derived this sense by an apperceptive transfer from my animate organism, and
      done so a manner that excludes an actually direct, and hence primordial, showing
      of the predicates belonging to an animate organism specifically, a showing of them
      in perception proper (ibid.: –).


      . Cf. H : .
                                                    Between Nature and Ethics   


    This means that, following Husserl’s argumentation, each transcendental
ego constitutes the world in communion with other subjects, whose sphere
of pure owness, therefore, cannot in principle be given in a direct presen-
tation, but rather through an analogical association. Accordingly, although
my experience of otherness entails the fact that I cannot have access to
the other’s very subjectivity, «[...] the only thing I can posit in absolute
apodicticity as existing can be a world–experiencing ego only by being in
communion with others like himself: a member of a community of monads,
which is given orientedly, starting from himself» (ibid.: ).
    Nevertheless, such an account of empathy seems to play uniquely a
transcendental role, without any relevance for ethics. More closely, Husserl
apparently conceives of empathy merely on a perceptive (or apperceptive)
plan, without any further clarification about the fruitfulness of empathy in
the practical life of individuals and communities. In my view, it could be
demonstrated that Husserl shapes the notion of empathy precisely in order
to explain how individuals are essentially interconnected and, by virtue of
their intersubjective relation, give rise to a community as a personality of a
higher order. Indeed, a number of late writings (published or unpublished
manuscripts) provide evidence of Husserl’s commitment to an in–depth
inspection of the relation between empathy, life–world, and community. For
instance, Husserl writes on April : «The main premise of empathy is
the comprehension of the other I [...] as “putting in similarity” of myself
by an identification of the surrounding primordial worlds. [...] The I as
the I of my activity, of my affectivity, of my perceptive possibilities, of my
possibilities to instinctively aim at objects of pleasure, practical possibilities,
actions» (Husserl : ). Furthermore, in the last section of the Fifth
Cartesian Meditation, Husserl clearly attests the importance of empathy for
the relation among different cultures: «To me and to those who share in
my culture, an alien culture is accessible only by a kind of “experience of
someone else”, a kind of “empathy”, by which we project ourselves into
the alien cultural community and its culture» (Husserl : –).
    As a result, if one puts into relation Husserl’s genetic phenomenology
with his analysis of intersubjectivity, it becomes clear that the transcendental
ego is to be understood as the effect of the interaction among different life–
worlds. More precisely, given that the individual’s experience of the world
is oriented by the empirical and cultural sedimentations of the community
where he/she lives, it follows that temporality and intersubjectivity are the
most basic features of his/her life. Moreover, since each culture is essentially
interconnected with other cultures, such a relation strongly influences the
individual’s experience. According to my interpretive hypothesis, what is at
stake in the phenomenological approach to ethics is precisely an in–depth
description of the genesis of values through the interaction among different
   Claudio Tarditi


cultures and their own life–world. Only in this way the phenomenological
method is in a position to set up an intercultural ethics.
    In the last years of his intellectual path, Husserl is committed precisely
to this project. Indeed, once clarified the role of empathy as openness to
alterity, namely the condition of social interaction, Husserl can address the
issue of the relation among different cultures. Despite the others live in
different life–worlds from ours, this difference is to be included in a broader
framework, within which we all share empathy as an originary relation with
them. Although we often do not understand their culture, their beliefs, their
vocations, and the social structure of their communities, we cannot but
acknowledge that they are subjects like us. Their life–world is precisely what
makes them different from us; nevertheless, the simple fact that they have a
life–world makes them similar to us. With this regard, Husserl argues: «I
cannot understand their relation to this world and [. . . ] how this world is
for them [. . . ]. Yet, I understand them and we understand each other as men.
In our basic relation we have a layer that is suitable to this aim» (Husserl
: ).
    In conclusion, throughout the theoretical path just sketched, I suggested
that the phenomenological notion of vocation plays a decisive function
in order to make sense of Husserl’s perspective on the relation between
natural life in its intersubjectivity, historicity, and community. With this
respect, it is worth recalling his reflection on the idea of Europe in the
Crisis of European Sciences. Following Husserl, European identity is the result
of the interaction with other cultures (Husserl : ), in a sense that
the relation to alterity shows that the problem of truth is to be addressed
from a teleological perspective. Although, in Husserl’s view, such an infinite
process plays a peculiar role in universal history, at first glance it seems to
give rise to a particular variety of Eurocentrism. Yet, on closer inspection, in
the Crisis of European Sciences there emerges a different account of Europe,
which is in no way geographically connoted. Rather, by virtue of its essential
openness to alterity, European identity overcomes the empirical aspects
of each local culture, in order to pose the question of the meaning of
totality. Thus, Europe has an open identity, insofar as is not characterized
by a final view of itself, as demonstrated for instance by the public debate
about the redaction of European constitution. Instead, according to Husserl,
Europe has always been open to modify its traditions, beliefs, and ways of
life. In extreme synthesis, Europe is an idea, which strongly resists to any
definition: «Thus we refer to Europe not as it is understood geographically,
as on a map, as if thereby the group of people who live together in this
territory would define European humanity» (Husserl : ). By contrast,
what is at stake is «the philosophical idea which is immanent in the history
of Europe (spiritual Europe) or, in other words, the teleology which is
                                                           Between Nature and Ethics         


immanent in it» (ibid.). This means that, in Husserl’s eyes, even though
we live in an extremely conflicting world, we are led by an ideal which
manifests itself through the empathic interconnection among individuals. It
is precisely within this framework that, from Husserl’s perspective, practical
life is to be understood as an attempt to become citizen of a rational world.
Doing so, European identity is in a position to overcome each local culture.
However, it is to be noted that Husserl is perfectly aware that such a process
is not necessarily oriented towards a moral improvement. Indeed, as the
XIXth century history clearly demonstrates, we constantly run the risk of
repudiating our empathic relation with the others, falling into violence and
barbarism.
    As demonstrated, Husserl’s genetic phenomenology shows how each
individual constitutes his/her subjectivity through a passive process of sedi-
mentation of natural life, history, culture, and values in his/her life–world.
Since this process, which plays a decisive role in the individual’s practical
life, is necessarily intersubjective, it follows that ethics has to deal with the
issues of value–constitution and the foundation of a community. In other
words, what is primarily at stake in Husserl’s axiology is a phenomeno-
logical description of the teleological process by which different personal
ought gather together in a community as a personality of a higher order
and, analogically, different cultures are synthesized in a rational entity of a
higher order, for instance European rationality. To put it briefly: Husserl’s
Eurocentrism consists in this, that those cultures which undertake the Eu-
ropean teleological task of a rational life open to other cultures are to be
included in European spirit, whereas those who refuse it are definitely out.
It is precisely from this perspective that, in conclusion of the Vienna lecture
Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity, Husserl argues:

   There are only two escapes from the crisis of European existence: the downfall of
   Europe in its estrangement from its own rational sense of life, its fall into hostility
   toward the spirit and into barbarity; or the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of
   philosophy through a heroism of reason that overcomes naturalism once and for
   all. Europe’s greatest danger is weariness. If we struggle against this greatest of all
   dangers as “good Europeans” with the sort of courage that does not fear even an
   infinite struggle, then out of the destructive blaze of lack of faith, the smoldering
   fire of despair over the West’s mission for humanity, the ashes of great weariness,
   will rise up the phoenix of a new life–inwardness and spiritualization as the pledge
   of a great and distant future for man: for the spirit alone is immortal (Husserl :
   ).
    Claudio Tarditi


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