10.13135/2036-542X/7595
application/pdf
2036-542X
7595
2
en
Christopher Dowling
Trópos
The value of Ingenuity
Text.Serial.Journal
https://ojs.unito.it/index.php/tropos
4
Monografica
2012-04-01
2023-05-21
2012-04-01
2023-05-22
47-63
1
Christopher Dowling
2011
10.13135/2036-542X/7595
47
The University of York
2036-542X
2
en
63
The value of Ingenuity
https://ojs.unito.it/index.php/tropos/article/download/7595/6330
4
                                                                     isbn 978-88-548-4716-3 – ISSN 2036-542X-11002
                                                                             doi 10.4399/97888548471634 – pp. 47-63




                 The Value of Ingenuity
                                Christopher Dowling
                                  The University of York




Abstract: Ingenious activity has been taken to be valuable because it constitutes a re-
  markable frugality or economy of means in arriving at creative solutions to given prob-
  lems. Taking as a starting point for discussion a recent pamphlet, How to be Ingenious,
  produced by the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufacturers and
  Commerce (RSA), I engage critically with recent attempts to define ingenuity as a
  subclass of creativity. By challenging each of three criteria that have been identified as
  central to its definition I develop an original account of ingenuity and its value. The
  discussion is divided into three sections. The first briefly outlines the RSA’s approach
  to and account of ingenuity, suggesting two initial concerns and offering a range of
  examples to be discussed throughout. Section 2 engages with and develops each of the
  identified criteria for ingenuity, appealing for clarification to a useful discussion in the
  philosophy of art. The implications for our understanding of ingenuity, and in particu-
  lar its value, are set out in section 3, along with an amended definition of this form of
  creativity.

Keywords: Creativity, ingenuity, originality, economy, value.




1. Bounded Approaches to Creativity

   Many readers of this edition of Trópos will be familiar with the distinc-
tion between bounded and unbounded approaches to creativity, and with
the contention that unbounded approaches are generally thought to be
more fertile. As Hoegl et al. summarize: “Unbounded randomness is benefi-
cial […]; in order to find one good idea, hundreds, if not thousands of ideas
are needed” (Hoegl et al. 2008: 1385). This approach is in tension with the
stance of Finke et al. (1992) who contend that “limited resources force one
to think in more creative and less conventional ways” (cited in Young 2011:
34). This latter approach to creativity has recently been identified by the
RSA as involving one subclass of creative activity, namely ‘ingenuity.’
   Let me start, then, with an addition to Margaret Boden’s lexicon of dif-
ferent forms of creativity (Boden 1990: 2) by referring to this subclass as

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‘ingenious-’ or ‘I-Creativity.’ The RSA’s discussion generates the following
working definition of I-creativity that can be used as an initial focus for
the discussion to follow: I-Creativity is the solving of a practical problem
by combining remarkably few resources in an unusual or surprising way.
I-creative (ingenious) people have learned to be consistently good at devising
such solutions. This definition reflects the RSA’s contention that ingenuity
has three central characteristics: (1) it is a form of creativity, hence it involves
combining ideas in ways that are unusual, neat, clever, or surprising; (2) it
is a frugal form of creativity, utilizing the resources at hand; and (3) it is the
creative solving of some pre-existing practical problem (Young 2011: 5-10).
I-creativity is distinguished from creativity more broadly construed on the
grounds that the latter is not thought to essentially involve the need to
be frugal, nor need it constitute a ‘solution’ to some pre-existing problem.
Likewise, ingenuity is distinguished from innovation on the grounds that the
latter emphasises originality while the former only requires that the prob-
lem should be solved within certain parameters (Young 2011: 4, 10-12).
    The engineer is a prime example of one capable of demonstrating inge-
nuity. For example, the RSA’s pamphlet cites Ron Howard’s film Apollo 13
(1995), dramatizing the work of Ed Smylie and his team of NASA engineers
who improvised maps, duct tape, and other available materials into a device
capable of removing excess carbon dioxide from the Apollo astronauts’ cab-
in. In more everyday situations the character of the bricoleur (handyman or
tinkerer) is emphasised along with a range of familiar ‘make-shift’ solutions
many of us are capable of, such as using a shoe to block open a door. The
ways in which SMS and Twitter have prompted the dropping of linguistic
rules to form a more space-efficient language in line with restrictions in
message length are also cited (Young 2011: 14). A final class of illustrations
draw together examples from the arts, including improvisational comedy,
and the ability to create Haiku. Much discussion in this domain has been
limited to ingenuity in the face of practical problems, and while this focus
is understandable, I want to briefly suggest two notes of caution before we
proceed.
    The first is that in order to avoid an impoverished understanding of
I-creativity we should consider a range of domains in which ingenuity ap-
pears prominent. Sport, for example, seems to be a domain in which in-
genuity will be a mark of success given that it is densely populated with
situations in which various kinds of problem (such as gaining possession of
the ball, scoring a point, or winning the game) may be solved via activity
that requires utilizing limited resources. In the 2011 Queen’s tennis final
Andy Murray successfully executed a return shot against his opponent Jo-

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                                        The Value of Ingenuity

Wilfried Tsonga by playing through his own legs.1 This kind of move is not
wholly original and could constitute as much a part of one’s tennis playing
oeuvre as the serve (Roger Federer, for example, has executed similar shots
against Novak Djokovic in the 2009 US Open semi final, and against Brian
Dabul at Flushing Meadows in 2010 – the potential for this to become a
‘signature move’ is apparent), of course, this is no problem for the RSA, ac-
cording to whom originality is thought not to be an essential requirement
for I-creativity.
    Such examples go some way in drawing attention to a second note of
caution regarding approaches to understanding I-creativity.This is that most
of the ‘ingenious’ examples cited above are obviously impressive and highly
valued.Yet while the type of sporting play referred to above seems to fit the
working definition of I-creativity, it is often (although not exclusively) re-
ferred to in pejorative terms: as ‘cheeky,’ ‘dangerous,’ ‘reckless’ or even a ‘fluke.’
There are, I suggest, a range of cases in which the role of improvisation
stressed in many of the RSA’s examples invokes a less positive evaluation of
the use of ingenuity. Consider the poorly prepared talk show host or can-
didate for a job interview, both of whom successfully manage to ‘get by on
their ingenuity,’ delivering a satisfactory but fairly off-the-cuff interview. Or
consider the child who, on the request to tidy his room, arguably demon-
strates some ingenuity by cramming all his discarded clothes, books, and toys
under the bed in order to placate his parents while freeing up his afternoon
for more entertaining pursuits.
    Perhaps not all such examples will be accepted as non-question-begging
cases of genuine ‘ingenuity.’2 While I suggest each meets the initial criteria,
I concede that some may be unintuitive; regarding others (for me at least)
intuitions remain unclear. Progress can be made by engaging more carefully
with each of the three proposed criteria for I-creativity in order to arrive
at an understanding of this form of creativity that will enable us to system-
atically mediate such examples, and our value judgements about them. As
such, this discussion has a dual purpose throughout. One task (undertaken
in section 2) is to clarify the criteria for I-creativity. A second task (addressed
in section 3) is to go some way to articulate both the respects in which this
form of creativity is thought to be valuable, and the circumstances in which
more pejorative judgements may be understood.

   1
     Another well known example that comes to mind is the Colombian goalkeeper Rene Huigita’s
famous ‘scorpion kick’ in which Huigita executed an unconventional, yet successful block to a shot
from England’s Jamie Redknapp in 1995.
   2
     Or as cases in which it is the use of ingenuity per se that attracts criticism – I am grateful to an
anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this suggestion.

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2. The Criteria for I-Creativity

   My overall objectives involve widening, as well as clarifying, the scope
of discussion of I-creativity. In 2.1. I call for clarification by challenging the
RSA’s capacity to capture a sub-class of creative activity. The task of widen-
ing the scope of discussion begins in 2.2.-2.3. where, after establishing that
sole appeal to economy of means (for example) is inadequate to the task of
characterizing I-creativity, I open the way for considering other respects in
which creative problem solving may be bounded, and in which such activ-
ity may be valued. There are various ways in which one can demonstrate
valuable resourcefulness qua creative problem solver – in the final part of the
present section (2.4.) I develop the suggestion that creativity and resource-
fulness can even extend to the act of problem identification itself.

2.1. First Criterion: The Role of Originality

    Dropping originality from an account of I-creativity looks contentious
in so far as at least some accounts of creativity in general – of which I-
Creativity, recall, is supposed to be a subclass – include such a criterion. To
identify a sub-class, one must increase the specification of the overarching
classification rather than dropping some criteria relating to it. The omission
of originality is probably the result of two related features of the RSA’s ap-
proach, both of which may be challenged. The first is the explicit distinc-
tion drawn between innovation and ingenuity, according to which only the
former needs to deliver something original. Ingenuity “assumes that ideas
don’t have to be new to be useful” (Homer-Dixon 2000: 230). The second
is the recognition that everyday acts of ingenuity are fairly ubiquitous. For
example, I-creativity in quotidian contexts is variously illustrated via refer-
ence to Jane Fulton Suri and IDEO’s publication Thoughtless Acts? (2005).
This photographic collection invites the audience to notice the subtle but
ubiquitous ways in which people react to the world around them, and in-
cludes phenomena such as using a chilled drinks can to cool one’s forehead
on a hot day, tying one’s house key into the laces of a running-shoe in order
to avoid losing it mid-run, or using a finger as a make-shift bookmark in a
temporarily closed book one is carrying.
         Following Flanagan (1963), the RSA’s first criterion involves the
claim that ingenuity is the ability to combine chosen resources and/or ideas
in ways that are novel, clever, or that few would expect by avoiding so-called
‘functional fixedness’ (the tendency to think of an object only in terms of
its typical or original functions).Yet the pervasiveness of the above kinds of

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examples illustrate that, in this domain at least, ‘functional fixedness’ is no
great problem and such makeshift solutions are familiar, often wholly unsur-
prising, and apparently unoriginal.
    One response to these observations would be to question the inclu-
sion of such examples, or – as is my preference – to treat many as at least
borderline cases that should not be thought primary to the task of defining
I-creativity. However, Boden draws a distinction between psychological- or
‘P-Creativity’ and historical- or ‘H-Creativity’ that may also be instructive
here (Boden 1990: 2). P-creativity occurs when someone has a valuable idea
that is original-to-them in the sense that it could not have occurred to them
previously. This contrasts H-creativity that occurs when someone has an
idea that has not occurred to anyone previously. The distinction allows cer-
tain combinations of ideas to constitute a form of creativity (P-creativity)
even though they may not be wholly (historically) original or novel. The
ubiquity of the everyday solutions discussed above suggests that many are
not historically original, and often appear not to be psychologically original
either. Still, at least for some such examples it may be that while the ideas
used are not new or original, the uses of such ideas will be original in at least
the sense associated with P-creativity. Someone else’s idea could be used as
a psychologically original solution to my own problem of frequently loos-
ing my house key while running, even if that idea was taken from a prior
context in which it constituted a solution to a very similar problem.3 In this
sense, ideas don’t have to be (historically) new to be useful, yet the impor-
tance of (psychological) originality can still be accommodated.
    There are various differing accounts of creativity, and not all readers will
accept the version I allude to (but do not defend) above. Still, all should
accept a minimum requirement here of consistency.Whatever one takes crea-
tivity to involve, the corresponding notion of I-creativity will be constituted
by doing those things in accordance with the remaining criteria. According to
the RSA, I-creativity is a subclass of creativity in that it is a form of creative
problem solving, and (furthermore) a subclass of creative problem solving in
that it is a form of frugal or economical creative problem solving. Thus I pro-
pose to leave the first criterion, turning attention to the criteria supposed to
identify ingenious creativity in particular.




   3
     One consequence of this move is that some forms of plagiarism might constitute I-creative acts.
While contentious, I am prepared to accept that this is correct, given that I allow for more pejorative
judgments of ingenious activity.

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                                         Christopher Dowling

2.2. Second Criterion: Ingenuity, Fortuity, and Skill

    The second criterion in our working definition risks defining I-creativi-
ty out of existence. I will argue that we should allow that ingenuity could be
the result of less frugal, more labor-intensive processes. This suggests a prima
facie need to amend the second criterion for I-creativity that I will develop
further in 2.3.
    Consider the distinction between creative products and creative pro-
cesses. Initially, the ‘frugality or economy of means’ criterion seems to make
ingenuity at least very difficult to establish. We might be too quick to judge
that some activity (the construction of a Haiku, or ‘tweet’ for example)
really demonstrated I-creativity given that frugality of resources in the fi-
nal product needn’t be indicative of the relevant frugality of creative process.
But the difficulty is more acute for in order to attribute to individuals and
teams some genuinely ingenious behavior we will often need to attribute to
them a fairly substantial amount of relevant and unavoidable background or
preparatory work. In the apparent spontaneity and simplicity of outcome,
Murray’s ‘trick shot’ had the appearance of being something anyone could
do, but this is not the case. Many could swing a racquet such as to return
a shot as Murray did – a poor tennis player like myself could do so acci-
dentally – but this wouldn’t constitute an act of ingenuity. Rather, it would
simply be an act of fortuity.
    Those inclined to call the shot ‘fortuitous’ rather than ‘ingenious’ might
be focusing on the significant role of ‘luck’ envisaged. To see this, just sup-
pose that Murray worked to significantly diminish these features by training
for this kind of scenario in advance; spending hours practicing such shots
from all parts of the court in recognition that it could sometimes pay off to
posses this skill. In so doing, his play moves further within the domain of
skill rather than luck.4 Like other more standard moves (such as the ‘block,’
or overhead ‘smash’) this shot was always part of the conceptual space of the
game (i.e. was always within the rules, and at least physically possible), but
through extensive training it becomes part of the stock of activities that can
be non-fortuitously attributed to the player.


   4
      Skills tend to be analyzed in terms of counterfactual success, and it is plausible to claim that
putting in a great deal of training is not the only way to ensure or increase the possibility of counter-
factual success – some people appear to be naturally skilled in certain respects. This admission, is,
of course, less pertinent to a discussion concerning ways in which ingenuity might be enhanced in
individuals. Berys Gaut (2003) has also discussed the importance of eliminating purely fortuitous
occurrences via his notion of “flair.”

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    This provides initial grounds for suspicion regarding the adequacy of the
second criterion for I-creativity given that (a) the appearance of economy
or frugality can often be deceiving, and that (b) the role of skill in attribu-
tions of creativity requires that in order to attribute I-creativity to an indi-
vidual or team one must often attribute to them rather uneconomical, lengthy,
and onerous means. I will later argue that some appeal to economy or fru-
gality as a feature of valuable I-creativity can be salvaged, but this must be
postponed until discussion of the third criterion in 2.4. First, I will develop
concerns about the second criterion – as well as suggesting a more viable
alternative – by returning to the matter of more pejorative views regarding
the use of ingenuity.

2.3. Monroe Beardsley on Valuing Economy

   The bricoleur is taken to be illustrative of one who has a valuably frugal
approach to resources in the context of problem solving. “Rather than pro-
curing exactly the right tool for the job, the bricoleur uses whatever is avail-
able, no matter how seemingly irrelevant” (Young 2011: 7). Recalling the
broken desk of one of my old philosophy professors, propped up at one end
by a pile of books (the desk, not the professor), the capacity to limit oneself
to the resources at hand is not an attractive capacity in all cases and often
seems to evoke making-do rather than making-good. Perhaps the philosopher
in question would demur, insisting that his time was better spent contem-
plating a philosophical text than a furniture catalogue. As with the sporting
examples, we are once again faced with a difference of opinion regarding
the value of (frugal) ‘ingenious’ activity. The activities of the bricoleur ap-
pear to include economical solutions some will find highly valuable while
others find only minimally (if at all) satisfactory. In order to clarify the situ-
ation, and to offer a final concern regarding the second criterion outlined
above, I enlist a discussion from the philosophy of art developed by Monroe
Beardsley (1956).
   Philosophers of art often distinguish between talk of local properties of
an artwork (formal or ‘surface’ features such as particular lines and arrange-
ments of colour) and talk of its regional properties (such as aesthetic or
relational properties). Beardsley draws this distinction before characterizing
the familiar claim that the local properties or ‘means’ of an artwork give rise
to its regional properties or ‘ends.’ Critics will often draw attention to the
way in which this occurs by saying, for example, that the represented light
and airiness of Rembrandt’s etching is achieved by a remarkable economy
in the rendered lines on the work’s surface. However, Beardsley presents an

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argument to the conclusion that at least such claims about economy are inco-
herent. The argument can be represented as follows:
   Premise 1: The ‘means’ on an artwork give rise to its ‘ends.’
   Premise 2: Critics often draw attention to the manner in which the
      ‘means’ of a work give rise to its ‘ends’ (such as claiming that some end
      is achieved by a remarkable economy of means).
   Premise 3: To say some end was achieved ‘economically’ implies that the
      same end could have been achieved less economically.
   Premise 4: But no less economical means would give rise to the same end;
      in art, means are not separable from ends.
   Conclusion: Therefore, it is incoherent to say that some particular end
      was achieved by a remarkable economy of means.

    The addition of premise 3 seems uncontentious, resting on the plausi-
ble assumption that things can be undertaken more or less economically.
Regarding Beardsley’s fourth premise, derived from premise 1, the thought
is that sometimes it is possible to talk of ‘means’ and ‘ends’ as two separate
things (my tennis lessons were bought by means of money), but to say that the
beauty or airiness of an etching is achieved by means of an arrangement of
lines is not analogous to these but to cases such as the claim that my house
is built by means of an arrangement of bricks.The house just is this arrange-
ment of bricks in the same way this particular light and airy etching just is
this arrangement of these particular lines.
    Still, just as the house can have characteristics the individual bricks do
not, so too can the etching, as a whole, have characteristics the individual
lines do not. The art critic draws attention to the various ways in which
formal properties give rise to regional aesthetic and representational prop-
erties. But Beardsley thinks that to say this lightness and airiness is achieved
‘economically’ is confused precisely because the appeal to economy in this
context implies that the very same effect could have been achieved by more
extensive means – via more lines, for example. But this is not so because of
the nature of the relationship between aesthetic and formal properties in
this context.5 Etchings, in general, can have more or fewer lines than this
one but this particular aesthetic outcome could not have been achieved
with more or fewer lines. Rather, Beardsley thinks that what the critic ac-
tually means when saying some element is ‘superfluous,’ or that the means
to this end could be ‘more economical’ (or less so) is not that some lines
    5
       This claim can proceed without accepting aesthetic formalism. Kendall Walton (1970), for
example, has adequately demonstrated that aesthetic properties do not supervene on formal proper-
ties alone.

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are superfluous to this whole but that a different (counterfactual) whole
composed or more or fewer lines would be preferable to the actual whole
that includes these local features. The omission of certain lines would not
make the etching more economical; rather, they would make for a better – but
different – etching (Beardsley 1956: 374). I suggest that an analogous stance
should be taken regarding discussion of frugality or economy in relation to
I-creative problem solving.
    The analogy proceeds as follows: to say that we value (say) Murray’s shot
because of its ingenuity cannot be to say that the same shot could have been
achieved via less frugal or economical means. For, we cannot say the specific
end delivered from this one move other players could only have delivered
via more extensive means. But, as with the etchings, one might be able to
express a preference for the counterfactual situation of being faced with a
different problem to the one in fact faced, preferring the solution that might
resolve that distinct problem. This point may be obscured by an insufficiently
fine-grained conception of Murray’s particular problem or of the end he
achieved in solving it. For example, where the end is merely construed as
‘winning the game’ or ‘returning the ball’ one might feasibly claim that different
means could have brought about ‘the same end’ (and thus that some means
will be more economical than others). But the particular problem Murray
faced involved additional constraints dictated by (for example) his current
location on the court, the position of his racquet, and so on. Murray (or his
fans) might express a preference for a different situation in which there had
been time to maneuver the racquet into a more comfortable position, or in
which he had been able to play from further back on the court, enabling
play of a different kind. But this is not the claim that his solution to the ac-
tual problem was remarkably economical; it is an expression of a preference
for being presented with (and resolving) a different problem to the one in
fact encountered. It is true that one solution may be more or less economi-
cal than the other, but part of what is being compared here are solutions
to two different problems, not two different solutions to one and the same
problem.
    In the same vein, the NASA engineers might have wished that they were
grappling with a slightly easier problem; less constrained by time or limited
resources than the actual one. But these would not constitute the same
problem, so would not provide a context in which less economical means
might have brought about the same end. In such cases, to cite remarkable
economy of means to ends as a feature of the solution appears confused.
Thus it appears once again problematic to appeal to ‘economy’ or ‘frugality’
in the identification of I-creativity. Not only does it appear that in some

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cases of ingenuity such economy is not obviously present, but (following
Beardsley) the claim that a solution to some given problem is remarkably
economical will, in many cases, be incoherent. On the latter point, I agree
with Beardsley that such talk is mistaken, but suggest the mistake to be a
revealing one.

2.4. Third Criterion: Problem Solving and Problem Seeing

    One thing that this mistake reveals is that, as with the other two criteria
for I-creativity, the third criterion (deriving a solution to a given problem) is
also in need of clarification and development. Rather than defining I-crea-
tivity in terms of a particular kind of solution (one that is remarkably frugal)
to a given problem I suggest ingenuity should be understood in terms of
the deriving of a creative solution to one particular kind of problem rather
than another. Following Beardsley, I have suggested that the literal expres-
sion of preference for more economical creative problem solving should
be characterized as conveying a preference for (being engaged in finding a
creative solution to) one problem rather than another. It may often appear
unproductive to express such preferences; however, I will briefly detail two
respects in which such claims can be instructive in this domain.
    Firstly, one issue that emerged in the previous section was the difficulty
involved in identifying or specifying particular ‘problems.’ The third crite-
rion for ingenuity made reference to problem solving ability and I suggest
that many disputes about the ‘ingenious’ credentials of certain acts, as well as
disputes about the value (or not) of ingenuity in some contexts, stem from
disputes regarding this criterion. Faced with a broken desk, the professor
characterized his problem as one of coming up with a quick, non-technical,
but minimally satisfactory way of holding up the tabletop. A carpenter in
the same situation might envisage a different problem: one of producing a
replacement leg out of matching materials, for example. Beardsley’s discus-
sion reveals that it is not simply that the carpenter has come up with a less
economical solution to the same problem as conceived by the professor.
The carpenter is certainly able to do more, but more in response to a differ-
ent problem; one that the professor is not concerned about. The difference
between the professor’s solution and the carpenter’s is not just a matter of
economy, it is a matter of which problem is to be engaged with. One act is
more economical than the other, but the value ascribable to that act is not
simply grounded in greater economy of means but in the fact that only one
activity constitutes a satisfactory solution to the specific problem envisaged.


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    Secondly, regarding pejorative judgments of I-creativity, appeal to Beard-
sley’s account reveals that when one criticizes ‘economical’ creative solu-
tions one may really be expressing a desire for a different starting problem
to which other, more extensive, kinds of creative activity might have been
possible – the assumption being that in arriving at a solution to a different
problem, something better might have occurred. The parent whose child
meets the instruction to tidy his room by hiding everything under the bed
might criticize this ‘economy of means,’ thereby expressing a wish that the
child had engaged with and attempted to solve a different problem (involv-
ing organizing rather than hiding, for example). The parent could, however,
congratulate the child on his (otherwise admirable) capacity for ingenuity
while also taking the opportunity to educate him on the merits of re-con-
ceiving the original problem expressed by the instruction to ‘tidy up.’ The
parent and the child had different conceptions of the problem in hand such
that the child’s tidying was entirely satisfactory as a solution to one problem,
but only minimally (if at all) satisfactory as a solution to the other. The les-
son to be learned – on both sides – seems to be about the importance of
clear, complete, and agreed articulation of an initial problem.
    The implications of this for a wider interest in ingenuity and its enhance-
ment become clear once it is recognized that what is being suggested is not
the recommendation of one particular kind of creativity over any other.
Rather, what is recommended is more general training in problem-iden-
tification. Not just with the aim of enhancing creative ability, but with the
aim of ensuring that teams and individuals endeavor to engage creatively in
the pursuit of outcomes that are thought valuable to all concerned. It seems
that when we evaluate ingenious activity, at least part of what we value is
the capacity of individuals and teams to conceive of a given situation or
conceptual space as generating one problem rather than another.6 On the
basis of this one might suggest that among the attributes one should hope
to encourage in ingenious individuals and teams will be the general ability
to engage flexibly with the task of identifying problems within some con-
ceptual space to which creative endeavor might be applied.




   6
       By ‘conceptual space’ I refer to some identifiable domain of interest in which a problem (or
range or problems) might be identified and creative solutions applied.The professor’s broken desk, for
example, generates a conceptual space in which problems might be identified relating to this state of
affairs. A more detailed account of ‘conceptual spaces’ can be found in Boden (1990).

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3. The Values of I-Creativity

   So far, I have agreed that I-creativity should be defined as a valuable form
of creative problem solving, but argued that the further claims that it is by
definition a particularly economical form of creative problem solving, or that
this constitutes an essential feature of its value, are unsatisfactory. I see no
reason to limit the explanation of the value of I-creativity to one feature
(such as economy of means) alone. This final section briefly illustrates some
other possible contenders for relevant values and also formalizes the defini-
tion of I-creativity I have been working towards throughout.

3.1. The Value of ‘Quick Fixes’ in Competitive Environments

    Ingenious creativity was initially contrasted with more exhaustive or un-
bounded creative approaches, from which it follows that situations in which
one is unable to exhaust creative possibilities will also be those requiring
ingenuity. I propose that I-creativity will often be valued because the solu-
tions derived may be ‘more economical’ not just with materials (as seemed
to be the RSA’s emphasis) but, in particular, with time. Many of our prac-
tical concerns, particularly in competitive environments, typically do have
time constraints built in. Thus the value we place on less time-consuming
creative solutions (such as those that utilize immediately available materials)
should be understandable.
    The RSA recognize that Britain is currently facing one particular form
of duress in the shape of the increasing demand for austerity and sustain-
ability in production and development. They argue that such circumstances
prompt a particular need for people to develop the capacity for ingenuity
(Young 2011: 37). While important, one should not overlook the fact that
this is a contingent circumstance reflecting factors such as a weak economy,
aspirations for a ‘Big Society,’ and particularly urgent environmental fears. In
the absence of these circumstances there is no obvious value to creative so-
lutions that utilize immediately available resources over creative solutions of
other kinds. But we can add to the suggestion that most practical problems
do in fact involve time-constraints, the realisation that many creative and
productive environments, whatever the state of the economy, or availability
of resources, are non-contingently competitive in such a way that being first
past the post is hugely important. More often than not, teams and individu-
als will be labouring for a creative solution under the duress of implicit time
constraints (even if that constraint is only specifiable as the requirement of
getting there before anyone else). And this, I suggest, makes a prominent claim

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for the value and prevalence of I-creativity as a subclass of creative problem
solving.
   One caveat to this identification of I-creativity as typically ‘quick’ crea-
tive problem solving is as follows: while we often appear to value I-creativity
because of its speed in generating creative solutions, I earlier noted that to
avoid accusations of fortuity, I-creativity must be a matter of skill, and skills
often take time to acquire. While I stress that I-creativity needn’t be quick,
nor need this constitute the sole explanation of its value, there are at least
two further potential responses to this issue, each of which I am sympathetic
towards. Firstly, one might concede that I-creativity is not always quick in
absolute terms, but – relative to more exhaustive approaches – is often at
least quicker than less bounded forms of creativity; and valued for this rea-
son. Secondly, one might claim that the relevant ‘quick’ creativity in these
sporting examples is exhibited in the player’s capacity to react quickly to a
given situation by electing to deploy a move developed in training as a re-
sponse to the problem encountered at this point in the game.

3.2. The Value of Risk-taking

    Many problems involve the imposition of implicit or explicit time con-
straints such that even if unbounded investigation of a conceptual space
might appear to yield a solution, part of the problem might be thought
to involve reaching a solution without recourse to such time-consuming
means. Often in such circumstances one cannot be exhaustive, one cannot
fully experiment or test various hypotheses but must just ‘go for it.’ This
reveals that risk is involved in ingenuity in a special sense. I suggest that the
relationship between creativity and risk constitutes a candidate for under-
standing another respect in which some forms of creative problem solving
can be more valuable than others.
    In any creative endeavor (including those that constitute ingenuity) there
will be risk of failure in the sense that it is possible that no viable solution
will be discovered, or discovered in time to be practically valuable. But I
suggest that with ingenious creativity the solution one elects to put into
practice will carry with it some palpable risk of failure. This is particularly
clear in cases in which a creative solution involves using materials for some-
thing other than their standard functions. In the NASA case, for example,
the creative solution arrived at involved relying on (rather than being as-
sured of) the adequacy of the duct-tape as a means of holding the contrived
device together. With ingenuity, it seems, one always acts with one’s fingers
crossed!

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                                 Christopher Dowling

    Earlier I developed the suggestion that ingenuity seems to be, in part, a
valuable capacity to mediate a conceptual space, identifying and engaging
with problems that require or would benefit from creative solutions (as well
as an ability to derive such solutions).To this one can add that it also involves
some capacity to identify or conceive of those problems for which some-
thing risky, minimally satisfactory, but also quick will constitute an adequate
solution. In other words, I-creativity involves the ability to recognize and
pursue the payoffs of a particular kind of risk.
    There are plenty of environments where this ability would be valua-
ble. Sport constitutes one such domain; some (perhaps all) commercial and
business environments constitute others. In brief, ingenuity constitutes an
important sub-class of creative problem solving because many domains in
which this is valued are competitive. Often, being first past the post with
something satisfactorily creative is considered to be more valuable to a com-
pany, individual, or team than spending a lot of time and money exhausting
and testing possibilities at the research and development stage. Risk-taking
is thought to be warranted where it opens up a chance of generating sub-
stantial pay-offs, and one concern that might recommend the risk-taking
involved in the ‘quick-creativity’ of ingenuity is that the alternatives might
be (a) that a competitor will get their first, or (b) while working more slowly
and confidently on some problem it, meanwhile, evolves into something
new to which the work one has undertaken has little or no application.
Rather than emphasizing the present climate of austerity and sustainability,
I suggest the particular values of ingenuity as a form of creativity may be
more accurately reflected in its potential role as a form of creative problem
solving that thrives in competitive environments. We might question whether
or not these are values we should encourage in the wider domain of creative
activity, but this is a debate for another day.

3.3. Redefining I-creativity

   In relation to these suggestions, it can be seen that – along with disputes
about the nature of the starting problem – a further explanation of the
more pejorative judgments regarding some acts of ingenuity will be that
these constitute expressions of some aversion to one or more of the features
described above. I-creativity may be valued because it involves the ability to
recognize (and deliver) the potential pay-offs of more risky creative solu-
tions. But if an individual or organization is, in general, highly risk-averse
they will be unlikely to value such behavior. If there are no other respects in
which this particular creative solution can be recognized as valuable (and I

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have suggested there may be a range of such respects),7 the accusation will
be that the solution in question does not constitute genuine ingenuity.
    I-creativity, then, is valuable as a particular kind of creative response to
certain kinds of problem. Ingenious individuals are those capable both of
identifying or conceiving of some conceptual space in terms of these kinds
of problem in the first place, and of recognizing (and realizing) the particular
value of the requisite creative solution. Having argued that there are a vari-
ety of ways in which creative problem solving can be bounded, and a variety
of ways in which opting to engage creatively with bounded problems can
be valuable, I have maintained that I-creativity may be exhibited in vari-
ous contexts (such as highly competitive environments) that favor quicker,
higher-risk, but thereby more valuable creative solutions.Thus my amended
definition of I-creativity can be summarized as follows:
    I-creativity is the capacity to discover or recognize a particular problem
whose creative solution may be quicker, riskier, more economical than the
solutions to other problems within the same conceptual space, but whose
payoff is of sufficient value to warrant creatively engaging with this problem.
    The I-creative individual is one who not only engages with, but also cre-
atively resolves problems of this kind (where ‘creative’ resolution has been
understood in terms of the combining of ideas in a way that is original,
valuable, and skillful). I-creative individuals will tend to see the costs of en-
gaging in more exhaustive, unbounded creative behaviour as outweighed by
the potential payoffs delivered by more risky, quick, or economical creative
solutions.

3.4. Highly Ingenious Individuals?

   I have suggested that I-creative ability may be enhanced via the develop-
ment of more general capacities for problem construction and identifica-
tion, yet the above definition is such that I-creativity needn’t involve the
capacity to discover new problems within some conceptual space.The NASA
engineers were forced to be I-creative (if they were to be creative at all)
by having a specific problem thrust upon them. Nonetheless, in engaging
creatively with that problem – recognizing it as a problem that, if solved
creatively, would be of life-saving value – they demonstrated ingenuity be-
cause they could have conceived of the problem differently. They could, for
example, have concluded that the Apollo 13 astronauts were doomed; con-

   7
     Including, perhaps, the parent’s recognition that the child’s hasty act of ‘tidying’ demonstrated a
capacity for ingenuity that is otherwise admirable in and of itself.

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                                    Christopher Dowling

ceiving of the problem they were faced with as one of ensuring nothing like
this should happen again. Still, I include (disjunctively) within this amended
definition the capacity to discover problems of a certain kind because I sug-
gest this reveals a further respect in which capacities for I-creativity may be
valuable. As I will briefly illustrate in closing, this respect appears to have im-
plications for the identification of highly ingenious individuals. The motor
company Honda pride themselves on being a creative and highly efficient
organization.This company demonstrates a high degree of ingenuity in their
capacity to see (and creatively resolve) problems that others might not no-
tice. For instance, Honda are one of the largest importers of soy-beans from
the United States as a result of having recognised as a problem the fact that
after having exported their vehicles they were paying to ship back empty
crates. Once identified, the creative solution to this new problem was to find
a new product to import, but also involved branching out into a whole new
soybean division of the company. Honda appears to be creative in terms
of problem-identification and in terms of problem-solving. Both abilities,
I suggest, would constitute valuable attributes of ingenious individuals. In
short, highly I-creative individuals seem to demonstrate a valuable capacity
not just for creative problem solving, but also for identifying the best, or
better, problems to solve creatively – a capacity that can itself be creative.8

                                                               chris.dowling@york.ac.uk




   8
    I am grateful to Matthew Watkins, Michael Wilby, and an anonymous referee for invaluable
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Finke, R., Ward, T., Smith, S., 1992, Creative Cognition, Bradford, MIT Press.
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