10.13135/2036-542X/7966
With the antique practice of “aesthetics of existence” Foucault analyzed in the 1980s an approach to the subject which was one of self–formation rather than one based on the idea of a human nature. That this seemed to leave the choice of the form of conduct and life to the subject himself, corresponded to the late Foucault’s emancipatory theory, which concenters the notion that autonomy demands a critical ontology of ourselves. This ethos implies a persistent critique of what we are in order to overcome limits historically imposed on us by transforming ourselves. As neoliberal analysis explicitly encourages the transformation of the subject, Foucault appreciates it as an emancipatory theory of its own right. However, like Foucault’s emancipatory theory accepts an anthropological constant, so does neoliberalism: the human being is a rational decision maker who applies strategies in order to maximize his profit. This concept of the subject also seems to be at the bottom of Foucault’s own claim that power informs all relationships and has a penchant for domination. In this article I will show that in strategic games, especially such informed by asymmetry, decisions tend to be overwritten by the governing influences of others.
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Linda Schaumann
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The Problems with an Emancipatory Theory Based on an Aesthetics of Existence
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Linda Schaumann
2015/07/15
10.13135/2036-542X/7966
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2036-542X
1
153
The Problems with an Emancipatory Theory Based on an Aesthetics of Existence
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                                                    trópos • anno VIII • numero 1 • 2015 – ISBN 978-88-548-8594-3
                                                       DOI 10.4399/97888548859438 – pag. 133-153 (giugno 2015)




           The Problems with an Emancipatory Theory
                   Based on an Aesthetics of Existence
                                                                           L S



   : With the antique practice of “aesthetics of existence” Foucault analyzed
      in the s an approach to the subject which was one of self–formation rather
      than one based on the idea of a human nature. That this seemed to leave the
      choice of the form of conduct and life to the subject himself, corresponded
      to the late Foucault’s emancipatory theory, which concenters the notion that
      autonomy demands a critical ontology of ourselves. This ethos implies a persis-
      tent critique of what we are in order to overcome limits historically imposed
      on us by transforming ourselves. As neoliberal analysis explicitly encourages
      the transformation of the subject, Foucault appreciates it as an emancipatory
      theory of its own right. However, like Foucault’s emancipatory theory accepts
      an anthropological constant, so does neoliberalism: the human being is a ra-
      tional decision maker who applies strategies in order to maximize his profit.
      This concept of the subject also seems to be at the bottom of Foucault’s own
      claim that power informs all relationships and has a penchant for domination.
      In this article I will show that in strategic games, especially such informed
      by asymmetry, decisions tend to be overwritten by the governing influences
      of others.

   : Foucault, Aesthetics of Existence, Neoliberalism, Self–formation, Power.




Introduction

Foucault’s idea of emancipation largely concenters possible and actual trans-
formation of rules for action. It is therefore central to Foucault’s eman-
cipatory theory, that we overcome the idea of a human substance or an
anthropological constant, for, if rules for actions are linked to our nature,
transformation will not be possible or only to an extent permitted by our
nature.
    As the Antique practice of an aesthetic of existence is a practice of
self–formation, it is an approach to the human being, which does not
furnish it with a substance. Therefore it seems to offer the subject the
possibility to choose what and who it becomes by way of conducting itself
in accord with its own decisions. However, the aesthetics of existence is

                                                                                                            
      Linda Schaumann


directed towards the production of a form of conduct which meets the
requirements of a social role.
    Neoliberalist theory shares the aesthetics of existence’s approach to the
subject: it is not regarded with respect to a nature but only with respect to
its actions. The subject is that which chooses an action based on rational
deliberation in relation to a context. This context may be strategically influ-
enced by another subject, a group or the state, and the subject’s actions may
thereby be governed, but the subject as decision maker will be left intact.
    As it seems obvious, that Foucault appreciates this trait of neoliberal
analysis, the possibility that the Foucault of the s and s had become a
neoliberal, has long been rumored about. In the recent years, several mono-
graphs, such as “Critiquer Foucault” (Z ), the issue of “Raisons
politique” on “Le néoliberalismes de Michel Foucault” () and the book
by de Lagasnerie “La dernière leçon de Michel Foucault” (L )
have been dedicated to further investigate this question. The authors, who
believe that Foucault regarded neoliberalism as an emancipatory theory,
usually criticize this fact , and my article will also be a critical approach to
this matter.
    However, my study will not focus, like Zamora’s, on the problems im-
plied in the destruction of social security systems, nor will I, like Rehmann
(R ), focus on the loss of critical power because of the lack of a
critique of ideology.
    Rehmann criticizes Foucault for having missed the relation between
domination and assujetissement, understood in the sense of conducting one-
self, which informs neoliberalism, (R : ) and points out, that
the reality of neoliberalism differs greatly from its ideology as asymmetries
in society and exclusion increase. I will however hold, that it is also neolib-
eral ideology itself, which must be regarded as problematic. Therefore it is
not only the lack of possibilities, neoliberal reality means for some groups,
but also the narrowing down of possibilities inherent in neoliberal ideology.
In this context however, the problem is not one of domination, but one
of strategies of conducting another agent secretly informing the choices
of that agent. Furthermore, I wish to show that this problematic is also
inherent in Foucault’s emancipatory theory, as it is inscribed in a setting of
strategic relationships.

      . This is different in the case of de Lagasnerie. In his abovementioned book and in his article
“Néoliberalisme, théorie politique et pensée critique” (L ) he studies the liberating
effects of Neoliberalism with regard to its criticism of the “raison d’État” and the state’s accumulation
of power, and shows, that Foucault’s analysis of Neoliberalism accordingly presents it as part of the
critical traditions. The author’s at least partly positive reaction to Foucault’s approach to neoliberalism
is supported by the fact that he finds most forms of criticism of neoliberalism identified with
right–wing conservatism.
        The Problems with an Emancipatory Theory Based on an Aesthetics of Existence      


. Aesthetics of Existence

According to Foucault, the aesthetics of existence is centered on the problem
of “which tekhne do I have to use in order to live as well as I ought to live?”
(F : ). Therefore it demands the application of a particular
practice to my own life in order to lend it an aesthetic form, which implies
that my life is to become and even I, myself, am to become an object of
style, being elaborated and transformed in a certain way, according to an
ideal of beauty.
    The aesthetics of the self often goes with the application of a strict
regime, as Foucault e.g. illustrates on the Baudelairian dandy’s aesthetics of
existence. The dandy’s attitude of creating himself in relation to modernity,
despite his choice to do so, involves a most ascetic practice: “To be mod-
ern is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments;
it is to make oneself an object of a complex and difficult elaboration”, it
means to fight and gain control over the “vulgar, earthy, vile nature” of man.
And the practice of self–formation therefore becomes “man’s indispens-
able revolt against himself ” necessary for achieving the aim of living up to
“the ‘doctrine of elegance’ which imposes ‘upon its ambitious and hum-
ble disciples’ a discipline more despotic than the most terrible religions”
(Foucault : f ).
    Ascetic practices are also a central part of the care of the self practiced
by the Stoics or the Cynics. The roman Stoics followed a certain regimen
of abstinence, which focused on refraining from indulgence, e.g. in eating
and drinking, and impose austerity and endurance in the bearing of hunger,
cold, or lack of sleep (F : ff ).
    The Cynics, for their part, targeted the reduction of their needs to what
was obligatory in order to live and therefore refrained from superfluous
food, clothes and all other kinds of conveniences as well as all riches and
most possessions .
    According to Foucault, most forms of the practice of aesthetics of exis-
tence have in common that the form the life is given is intended by the
subject to be recognized and admired by his contemporaries and/or by
future generations, therefore it must be regarded as the object of social
evaluation. Foucault points out that in antique ethics the person practicing
aesthetics of existence focused on the “the aspect his existence reveals to
others [. . . ]”, and on “the trace [. . . ] that this existence may leave and will
leave in the memories of others after his death” (F : f ).
    In the interview “The Ethics of Existence as Concern for Self as a Prac-

    . For more details on Cynicism see: F, M., , The Courage of the Truth, London,
chapters  and .
   Linda Schaumann


tice of Freedom” Foucault points out, how greatly the Ancient Greeks and
Romans valued individual freedom or not being a slave, but that the value
of freedom went with the question of right conduct and the proper practice
of freedom. This namely implied the striving “to surpass oneself, to master
the appetites that threaten to overwhelm one” (F : f ). Corre-
spondingly, the tekhne tou biou often focuses explicitly on gaining control
over one’s own emotions and on thereby becoming their master.
    To gain the ability of mastering one’s emotions, was particularly im-
portant for the form which the care of the self took in the lives of the
Stoics. Foucault describes, in this context, e.g. the premeditatio malorum, by
which one mentally put oneself in the position of facing a great misfortune,
a danger or even one’s own death (F : ff ). The idea was,
to anticipate and live through these anxiety–provoking events before they
could occur in reality, so that, when the hour of death came or when one
was befallen by a great misfortune, one was able to master the thereby
resultant emotions, like fear or sadness, and stay capable of acting in the
right way.
    However, the mastery of one’s own passions was also important in
power–relationships between subjects. A subject, who exercised power,
had to control his passions in order to not abuse his power and dominate
the other. This idea was especially important for subjects who possessed
a greater deal of power, like kings or masters of the household. In these
contexts, passions were to be controlled because they were considered to
cause a penchant for the abuse of power.
    Foucault often stresses, how thoroughly antique ethics is tied up with
social conventions. “[T]hese practices are [. . . ] not something invented by
the individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture and
are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and
his social group” (F : ). Other influences on the practice of
the aesthetics of existence are e.g. instructions from other people like the
guidance of the soul or the training in a practice by a teacher or master.
The acquisition of not only the right conduct but also — in many cases —
the right ideas, was always guided by the instructions of a master.
    Often, it was not just the way the subject conducted itself in order to
meet the requirement of a role, after it had chosen that role, which was
socially or societally pre–formatted, but also the fact that the subject chose
the role, as such, i.e. the subject was expected and urged to choose a role. In
some cases, like that of Socrates, this choice was even required by the gods.
    Hence we may conclude that the beauty of the form, which one gives
one’s conduct and life, is determined by what is considered the right way of
conducting oneself in relation to a social role defined by a specific historical
context, and corresponds to a social or societal requirement. When I adopt
       The Problems with an Emancipatory Theory Based on an Aesthetics of Existence   


a beautiful form I fulfill such a requirement. For the leader of the household
taking care of himself means to know exactly what duties he has “as master
of a household and as a husband and father” and if he follows those rules he
will be able to give his life a beautiful form in the sense that he will enjoy “a
proper relationship with his wife and children” (F : ).
      But despite the strict regimes the subject had to apply to itself in antique
ethics, regimes, also informed by the wish to make the form of one’s life the
object of recognition and admiration by others, and despite the importance
herein attributed to the mastering of one’s emotions, Foucault describes
antique ethics as an ethics based on the freedom of the subject. In this
regard, he differentiates the care of the self as the form of antique Pagan
ethics from Christian ethics (F : ). Whereas Christian ethics
concenter the regula, the rule which one has to obey, antique Pagan ethics
concenter the forma, the form which one gives to one’s own life according
to the way one wishes to form it (F , ff ).
      The very difference between the Christian regula and the pagan antique
forma is, that the forma is a telos, in the sense that it has to be produced
by a certain technique and can therefore be chosen. The regula however is
grounded in a being, a substance, which already exists. It is therefore the
cause (or causa materialis) of the fact that I have to obey the rules. Foucault
describes these two different forms of work on oneself in relation to forma
and regula as two modes of assujettissement. In the case of the aesthetics
of existence subjects will have to fulfill the social demands, such as “to be
truthful to their wives, to not touch boys, and so on” if — and only if “they
want to have a beautiful existence, if they want to have a good reputation, if
they want to be able to rule others”. It is therefore they themselves who
“decide to accept this kind of existence” and the mode d’assujettissement
hence is “a choice, it’s a personal choice”. If the mode d’assujettissement
is however linked to our substance as human beings, e.g. to our rational
nature, we will be obliged to do, what our substance demands of us —
as the demand is not contingent and, furthermore, leaves no space for
decisions (Foucault : ). Therefore, the tekhne of “making one’s life
[. . . ] beautiful and good work (as everything produced by a good and
reasonable tekhne should be) — necessarily entails the freedom and choice
of the person employing this tekhne” (F : ).
      That I choose the form of my life, does not imply, at least not for certain
kinds of antique ethics like Stoicism and Cynicism, that the choice of a form
constantly has to be renewed. In Stoicism there are specific trainings by
which the subject turns certain judgments and ways of conduct into auto-
matic reactions, which occur without thinking as soon as the situation they
were intended for occurs. These practices were often meant to constitute
a relation to certain principles, which were to take the place of emotions
     Linda Schaumann


such as fears or desires. With the help of those techniques the subject used
in order to implement these automatic reactions in its being, its behavior
would no longer differ from the truth according to which the subject had
formed itself.
    These techniques can be called assimilations of logoi and are best illus-
trated by a metaphor from Plutarch, who prescribes to “learn the principles
in such a constant way that whenever your desires, appetites, and fears
awake like barking dogs, the logos will speak like the voice of the mas-
ter who silences his dogs with a single cry”. Foucault with regard to this
metaphor points out: “Here we have the idea of a logos functioning, as it
were, without any intervention on your part; you have become the logos,
or the logos has become you” (F : f ).
    The assimilation of the subject to the truth by the application of the
tekhne tou biou to its own life is particularly precise in Cynicism: “[Cynicism]
makes the form of existence a way of making truth itself visible in one’s
acts, one’s body, the way one dresses, and in the way one conducts oneself
and lives. In short, Cynicism makes life, existence, bios, what could be called
an alethurgy, a manifestation of truth” (Foucault : ) . Therefore, the
aesthetics of existence is a way of establishing a relation between one’s life
and a logos, which, at least in some cases, implies that the logos decides for
the subject and that the subject becomes identical to the logos.
    As the logos is informed by societal requirements, it is however, really
these requirements, which will act in place of the subject.


. The late Foucault’s emancipatory theory

What can be called the late Foucault’s emancipatory theory, i.e. the form
Foucault’s emancipatory theory took in the s, is based on three main
ideas: The work of emancipation has to be restricted to a work at the
frontiers of our reality, is a work on ourselves and is a continued work.
   Emancipation as a work on reality has to be guided by a criticism of
this reality, which is the task Foucault attributes to the intellectual or the
philosopher. The question, which is to define his or her criticism is: “In
what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is oc-
cupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary
constraints?” (F : f ). This critique is not intended to over-

     . In her study “The Embodiment of Truth and the Politics of Community” (L ), V.
Lemm investigates the possibility of the embodiment of truth as an approach to truth different from
that of philosophical discourse. Taking Foucault’s analysis of the Cynics as the basis of her study,
she parallels the herein uncovered relation of the bios to truth to the Nietzschean criticism of an
ideal truth.
       The Problems with an Emancipatory Theory Based on an Aesthetics of Existence   


come our alienation from ourselves imposed on us by societal requirements
or other contingencies.
    Criticism, in Foucault’s view, must manage “to grasp why and how that
which is might no longer be that which is. In this sense, any description must
always be made in accordance with these kinds of virtual fracture which
open up the space of freedom understood as a space of concrete freedom,
i.e., of possible transformation” (F : ). Correspondingly, the
aim of criticism, according to Foucault, has to be first and foremost to
overcome the idea, that there are universals and necessities which cannot
be transformed and therefore have to be accepted. Such ideas have to be
replaced by the believe in the possibility of transformation, and this believe
is to be fueled by the historical work of the intellectual, who is to apply an
archeological methodology in order to show, that there have been all kinds
of ways of thinking about things like the subject, or power, or insanity and
of shaping one’s actions in order to deal with sexual desires or in order to
have a good life. Thereby, the historical analysis will make clear that the
way we are, our behavior, and what we think is due to a specific historical
discourse and is the product of a contingency. Furthermore, the historical
analysis will have to be of a genealogical design in order to make evident
the development of those historical forms and how today’s forms have been
brought about.
    This description will not be a theoretical contemplation but is indeed
intended to provide practical knowledge, i.e. it is to be a direct preparation
for action and to be directly translatable into action. Therefore the descrip-
tion of what we are today is to provide us not just with the idea that change
is possible, but also with the knowledge where and in what form change is
possible, and, moreover, desirable. In accord with the ideal of the creation of
practical knowledge which can directly be translated into action, criticism is
not to be the drafting of a new start or the creation of new ideals. According
to Foucault, neither our time nor any time can rightfully be regarded as an
“irruptive point in history where everything is completed and begun again”
(F : f ). Therefore, we must “turn away from all projects that
claim to be global or radical” (F : ). The kind of transfor-
mation the late Foucault was looking for, correspondingly, was not to be
brought about by a revolution. Instead, Foucault was opting for a reform,
which was to be “profoundly rooted in reality” (F : f.) and
which was to be “put to the test of reality” (F : ).
    Furthermore, Foucault believed that the project of emancipation has to
be rooted in the self–transformation of the subject or “the work done at
the limits of ourselves” (F : ). Therefore, part of the work of
criticism has to consist in abolishing the idea of “inevitable anthropological
constants” (F : ) so that our way of being and thinking is
   Linda Schaumann


placed at our disposal. And that it is placed at our disposal is, in Foucault’s
concept of emancipation, the very key to transformation and the bringing
about of freedom.
    For Foucault, therefore, the main obstacle for our autonomy is, that we
are tied to the idea of a substance or an anthropological constant to which
is linked what we can and cannot do and what we must do. Therefore,
such ideas of a subject’s nature or of human nature as such are committing
us to a certain way of acting and being, which on the one hand makes
us governable and on the other hand defines a realm which is not left to
our choice. Each kind of government by the use of the idea of a nature
immediately acts on our way of being. As our way of being, according to
Foucault, however, is, just like anything else which is said to be due to a
substance, only due to a historical contingency, it can be transformed if we
believe it can be transformed and begin to work on ways of transforming it.
To help this transformation come about, we are to adopt an ethos which
Foucault calls “critical ontology of ourselves”, which is “a philosophical
life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the
historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the
possibility of going beyond them” (F : ).
    The “creation of ourselves in our autonomy” (F : ), fur-
thermore, is to be a permanent work. This permanence may first of all be
attributed to Foucault’s conviction, that a revolution is not the source of
autonomy, but that only a patient work on the limits of the order we are
presently living in can bring about effective change. But at the bottom of this
seems to be another assumption, which has to do with Foucault’s concept
of power: the assumption that freedom is to be archived and secured in
strategy games which always and ineluctably define our context.
    Foucault’s emancipatory theory of the s in comparison to his earlier
ideas on emancipation is marked out by a distinctly different approach to
power. Power is no longer per se criticized but appreciated as a productive
function. In  Foucault already states, that in short circuiting power with
repression one failed to see the real functioning of power: Power is not only
a force that negates our actions but it “also traverses and produces things, it
induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse”. Therefore, “[i]t
needs to be considered as a productive network” which furthermore “runs
through the whole social body” (F : ).
    In , however, Foucault continues to consider power as that which
is to be fought and therefore the idea of its productivity is still part of a
critical approach. This changes in the s. In  Foucault insist: “Power
is not evil. Power is games of strategy. We all know that power is not
evil!” (Foucault : ); and it is precisely not evil because it is in itself
productive and leaves room for productivity. In order to illustrate his (new)
       The Problems with an Emancipatory Theory Based on an Aesthetics of Existence   


way of looking at power Foucault mentions sexual or amorous relationships
which were informed by an “open–ended strategic game” as a natural part
of love and a way of producing “passion and sexual pleasure” (F
: ). Another example of the need for power in relations and its
positively connoted productive function is that of pedagogic institutions.
Foucault states with regard to power relationships: “I see nothing wrong
in the practice of a person who, knowing more than others in a specific
game of truth, tells those others what to do, teaches them, and transmits
knowledge” (F : ).
    According to the late Foucault, human relationships are always to some
extend informed by power, which thereby becomes an ineluctable feature
of society (F : f.), which Foucault makes very clear when
stating: “I do not think that a society can exist without power relations, if by
that one means the strategies by which individuals try to direct and control
the conduct of others” and calls “[t]he idea that there could exist a state of
communication that would allow games of truth to circulate freely, without
any constraints or coercive effects” utopian (F : ).
    In the s Power effects or games by Foucault, are no longer regarded
as presenting an immediate danger to autonomy, on the contrary: power
seems to presuppose freedom (F : ), as it is the application of a
strategy to the actions of a person in order to influence these actions or in order
to conduct a person’s behavior. In power relations, therefore, both subjects
involved are left intact as decision makers and agents. What is influenced
however is what can be called the “environment” in relation to which they
make their decisions and form their actions, as power “operates on the field of
possibilities in which the behavior of active subjects is able to inscribe itself. It
is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes
easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less; in
the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting
upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable
of action”. Therefore Foucault suggests to regard power as a “management
of possibilities” or “a question of ‘government’ ” (F : ). As a
management of possibilities still leaves the decision of which possibility to
choose or which action to carry out to the subject, Foucault regards the subject
as left free in its choice and as an autonomous agent. Foucault does not just see
no problem in the narrowing down or “management” of possibilities but even,
and again with regard to the idea of the productive function of power, seems
to think power–effects the key to the opening up of new possibilities: “faced
with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and
possible inventions may open up” (F : ).
    The late Foucault’s positive approach to power is made possible by the
fact that Foucault began to differentiate power–relationships from relation-
    Linda Schaumann


ships of violence or domination. A relationship of violence contrarily to one
of power is defined by the characteristics that it “acts upon a body or upon
things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys, or it closes off all possibilities.
Its opposite pole can only be passivity, and if it comes up against any resis-
tance it has no other option but to try to break it down” (F :
). In relationships of violence it is therefore the case that the freedom of
one of the involved parties is impeded.
    However, Foucault makes it evident, that he believes, that a tendency to-
wards domination, violence or the abuse of power is inherent in all power
relationships. Furthermore Foucault regards freedom as a catalyst for an in-
crease in the use of power, for: “the freer people are with respect to each other,
the more they want to control each other’s conduct. The more open the game,
the more appealing and fascinating it becomes” (F : ).
    This penchant for the abuse of or the increase in the use of power is
linked to emotions and more precisely to passions. Accordingly, Foucault
defines the abuse of power as the transgression of “the legitimate exercise of
one’s power” by which one “imposes one’s fantasies, appetites, and desires
on others”. With regard to Greek philosophy Foucault points out that a
person who abuses his power was considered a “slave of his appetites”,
whereas a person who makes adequate use of his power is one who is
“simultaneously exercising his power over himself ”. As “it is the power over
oneself that thus regulates one’s power over others” (F : ).
    Thus, what is responsible for the abuse of power is the fact that a person,
who is exercising power, does not control his or her emotions in the proper
way. Emotions are consequently short–circuited with the source of the
penchant for violence and domination and therefore have to be controlled.
Correspondingly, Foucault integrates the aesthetics of existence in his eman-
cipatory theory in so far, as he, too, believes that autonomy is to be secured
by the control subjects gain of their emotions. Apart from this form of
self–management, Foucault relies on “rules of law, rational techniques of
government” (F : ) in order to secure freedom against the
constant threat the human penchant for domination poses.
    In this way power relations can stay a strategic game in which each one
involved tries to influence the actions of the other, either conducting them
in a certain way or provoking them, to which the other can respond with his
own strategy. However, it seems that this strategy cannot be separated from
the conducting influence of the other and it is insofar difficult to decide
if a person choosing a strategy on these terms can really be regarded as
autonomous.
    To answer this question, we should have a closer look at Foucault’s
emancipatory theory. Herein Foucault mentions two indicators of freedom:
. the subject is able of reacting to what others do and . the subject can
       The Problems with an Emancipatory Theory Based on an Aesthetics of Existence   


modify “the rules of the [power] game, up to a certain point”, which
Foucault attributes to the use of a strategy (F : ).
    Rules, with Foucault, can be understood that which can serve as a basis
for giving a behavior or action a certain form (F : ). This
makes it seem as if the rule itself were the ultimate point of reference
for the formation and evaluation of actions. However, often rules are only
that which enforces a principle which then becomes the ultimate point
of reference, whereas the rule is reduced to a certain form an action or
behavior can have so that it can meet the requirements of the principle. This
implies that the rule, furthermore, only describes a certain form of action
but not every form of action that will meet the requirements of a principle,
e.g. as a rule cannot take into consideration the specific requirements of
situations or those caused by historical changes. A rule does not even have
to be the best way to translate the requirements of the principle into actions,
but only the way that was thought best by a certain group at a certain time
and in relation to a certain amount of capabilities and knowledge.
    Rules therefore can be considered as that which gives actions a proper or
right form in relation to a principle which is accepted as the truth in a histor-
ical period. Rationality, now, implies the transformation of a true principle
into actions in specific moments, so that each action can be considered a
right and proper action. Rationality can therefore create a certain pattern of
action. A rational choice then is a choice, which is informed by the principle
and serves it. The question is: can the rules of a game be changed so that
the action, which is in accord with the new rules but not with the old ones
still is informed by and serves the same principle? This is of cause the case.
An indistinct number of actions can be informed by and serve the same
principle as there is more than just one way of translating the demands of
a principle into a momentary action. Therefore, rationality does not have
to lead to a pattern of action, on the contrary: in different contexts and
different situations it can even be required to change the form of action in
order to fulfill the requirements of the principle. In this case it will become
necessary to change the rules to a certain extent, as a new form for action
would be needed.
    Therefore, freedom as defined by Foucault, can imply actions, which re-
produce an existent and possibly alien principle, as the changing of rules can
be a mere variation of ways to meet the requirement of the same benchmark.
The same problem is applicable to Foucault’s draft of the way, emancipation
is to be achieved, i.e. a work at the limits of an existent order, which knows
and acknowledges reality, and which only strives after transformation, if and
where it is possible without suggesting principle changes or “new worlds”.
This presents the problem that, what Foucault regards as emancipation, sup-
ports any kind of order resulting from a principle, which allows for freedom
   Linda Schaumann


and transformation, and will, no matter what else the principle implies, allow
that order to continue to be informed by the same rationality.
    Let us assume a situation in which one agent has better or more means to
back up his strategy in a power relationship, than the other agent involved.
Let us assume further, the strategy of this privileged agent is informed
by the principle to make the greatest profit at the lowest costs. He could
now target at domination and thereby gain full control of what the other
does or he could continue to act on the other’s actions and influence his
decisions. In the latter case, however, the privileged agent could even ar-
range it so that the other would autonomously apply the strategy to his
own action, with which the privileged agent had acted on his actions. To
choose the latter outcome of the strategic relationship may proof more
reasonable for the privileged agent, as he would not have to control every
move of the other person and could profit from the productivity inherent to
power–relationships. It is also well possible that the less privileged agent will
be brought to make the guiding principle of the other agent the principle of
his own actions, if the privileged agent managed to make the choice implied
in his strategy seem the rational choice for the other. This may well be the
case, if the less privileged person e.g. also follows the principle to gain the
greatest profit at the lowest price, as he, should he back up the principle
the other person is suggesting to him by his actions, could simply follow
the way already paved by the other and would not risk to be dominated by
him. Now, as the privileged party is really only interested in the outcome
of the action of the other person, i.e. the increase in profit, and not in the
action as such, i.e. the specific form of the action, the less privileged party
is even free to change the rules as much as he likes, as long as his actions
stay committed to meeting the requirements of the principle, which should
allow, as shown, for a certain extent of transformation.
    And the less privileged agent may well be convinced that to go along with
the strategy of the other is a rational choice, what he does can be considered
a re–action to the other person’s strategy in the most demanding sense: as
the re–action is due to his own prior decision. This conviction need not
even be informed by the same principle which informed the privileged
agent’s strategy without causing a conflict with its demands. It is sufficient
that the less privileged agent is concerned for his autonomy (as Foucault
assumes he is) and wants to avoid being dominated, i.e. that he wishes to
stay capable of action.
    As the power game continues, the more privileged agent will, in accord
with his principle of the maximization of profit, continuously ask for more
which the less privileged agent will have to provide if he wants to avoid
being dominated. Therefore the less privileged agent will feel the need to
increase his capabilities in order to provide for the maximization, and will
       The Problems with an Emancipatory Theory Based on an Aesthetics of Existence   


continue to have to do so. If the means of both parties involved in the power
game are not great in difference, the privileged actor may also be forced to
increase these means, in order to secure his advantage over the other and
to keep up his strategy.
   If his advantage in power is not based on personal capacities but on other
means like money or structural advantages, we can say, that the privileged
agent is in a sense less involved, whereas a less advantaged agent whose
only means to preserve his freedom in the strategic game are his own
capacities, has to put his life at stake. He is involved in his strategy to the
extent that he himself becomes his strategy and thereby produces the truth
which guides his decisions. As these decisions are the reaction to the other
person’s strategy it is not wrong to point out that they are informed by the
principle of the other.


. Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism as an emancipatory theory

Foucault’s deliberations on neoliberal analysis concenter the concept of the
homo oeconomicus as it is conceived by this specific economic analysis, and
which shows more than just certain similarities to the concept of aesthetics
of existence.
    Foucault’s study of the concept of homo oeconomicus as it is interpreted
in neoliberal analysis starts by addressing L. Robbin’s doctrine, that the object
of economics is “human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce
means which have mutually exclusive uses”. This implies, economics have to
“try to bring to light the calculation [. . . ] through which one or more individ-
uals decided to allot given scarce resources to this end rather than another”.
Neoliberal analysis will therefore focus on human behavior as a rational be-
havior informed by ends, which is predictable in relation to a context of scarce
means and will therefore regard human actions as informed by strategies
(F, : f). Contrarily to classical economic analysis, therefore,
neoliberal analysis will not study market mechanism, but the choices and
actions of subjects which are rational and free decision makers and agents.
Foucault shows, that with this focus on the subject as agent, labor comes
to the forefront of neoliberal analysis. Whereas classical economic analysis
reduced labor to an amount of time invested in a production in relation to a
cost (the wage), neoliberalism regarded work as “economic conduct practiced,
implemented, rationalized, and calculated by the person who works” and
consequently focused on analyzing “how the person who works uses the
means available to him” (F : ).
    Therefore Foucault points out that for neoliberal in comparison to classi-
cal economic analysis the worker has become “an active economic subject”
   Linda Schaumann


instead of just “the object of supply and demand in the form of labor power”
(F : ).
    This means, as Foucault stresses, that the worker is now analyzed as an
entrepreneur and is no longer someone who simply sells his working power
on the market, but somebody who also continuously increases and adapts
his working power in order to increase his income and living conditions. As
a result, the subject’s income and living conditions become the responsibility
of the subject himself, as the subject’s abilities are regarded as the stake of
its strategy and that which is to be increased or transformed or otherwise
made to meet a demand and therefore a good price. As the worker can
himself influence the price his work fetches at the market by investing
in his labor power or moving where there is demand for his skills, it can
be wise to invest the wage he receives for his work in obtaining new and
better skills, in maintaining his skills or in moving. At the same time, the
worker whose living situation is left to his own strategy as an entrepreneur,
will have to shoulder all costs which come with the production or the
maintenance of abilities or the search for a (greater) demand for abilities
already produced. Above material costs, the worker may also be confronted
with psychological costs as part of the generation of what Foucault, hereby
using a term of neoliberal analysis, calls an income–flow, e.g. when a move
to a market of greater demand separates him from his family and friends
and the surroundings he was used to.
    However, as such behavior as migration is analyzed by neoliberalism
in terms of the subject being an individual enterprise, which makes in-
vestments in order to gain a higher revenue, mobility is seen as a personal
choice and not as a “pure and simple effect[. . . ] of economic mechanisms
which extend beyond individuals and which, as it were, bind them to
an immense machine which they do not control [. . . ]” (F :
). For neoliberal analysis, the subject stands in the context of “supply
and demand and of investment–costs–profit” (F : ) and
it is the subject’s own choice which strategy it will apply to itself in this
context.
    Neoliberal analysis regards the whole life of the worker and his very
being as subject to his strategy of generating profit, as the “ability to work,
skill, the ability to do something cannot be separated from the person who
is skilled and who can do this particular thing” (F : ) the
work invested in obtaining and maintaining skills is a work on the worker
by the worker. From this, Foucault infers, that in neoliberal analysis the
subject is not only “an entrepreneur of himself ” but also “for himself his
own producer” (F : ).
    This implies that what the subject is defined by itself in relation to the
market and not in relation to a substance, therefore Foucault can point out,
       The Problems with an Emancipatory Theory Based on an Aesthetics of Existence   


that for neoliberalism there can be no alienation of the worker as he is
defined by his practice.
    If he becomes a good homo oeconomicus, that is to say, if he applies to
his own abilities a useful formation strategy with regard to revenue, he will
have done so out of free choice. Nonetheless, in the form he has given his
life and skills, he will have reproduced the truth of neoliberal analysis. If
the worker does not become a good homo oeconomicus his poor living
conditions will be his own responsibility and according to the rationality of
neoliberalism, the cost to pay.
    In the neoliberal notion of the homo oeconomicus is inherent an ex-
tension of economic principles beyond the realm of what is commonly
considered its responsibility to realms such as the personal and social realm
or the penal system, which are believed to differ greatly from the economic
realm in what, with Foucault, can be called their rationality. Foucault rec-
ognizes the problems herein implicated, but takes a positive approach to
neoliberalism, insofar as he finds many of his own emancipatory ideas
inherent in it. In this respect, Foucault appreciates neoliberal analysis as an
emancipatory theory in its own right.
    An appreciative approach becomes most evident when Foucault turns to
the neoliberal concept of the penal system. According to Foucault, this penal
system applies its laws not to the subject, but to its actions only. And a crime
is not defined substantially, but quite simply as an act which might cause a
person to be punished. Correspondingly, the subject who has committed
such an act is not judged normatively or morally but purely operatively: It
is not the person, who is punished, but the specific action which was against
the law according to its wording.
    For neoliberal law, the subject of a delinquent action then simply is
who, like any other person, makes rational decisions before he acts, i.e.
who decides for what he does. Furthermore, the subject’s decision is not
explained as due to a certain inner configuration of the subject but due to the
common pattern of maximizing profit and minimizing costs. Consequently,
the subject as it is considered by neoliberal law is a person who acts and
acts in accord with prior decisions which follow the pattern of maximizing
profit. In so far the subject is only taken into consideration as a homo
oeconomicus and analyzed economically, just like any other human being
is. This economic analysis then results in the idea, that it is not the human
being as such, who will have to be subject to an effective strategy of the
reductions of crime, but that its decisions are the place to be tackled. This
means that the amount of certain actions will have to be reduced and that
this can be done by increasing the costs for unwished–for actions so that
they will become less profitable or unprofitable. Their amount should then
reduce as each individual makes a rational decision before acting and will
   Linda Schaumann


judge the unwished–for action as unprofitable and therefore as an irrational
choice.
    In his lesson of  March Foucault points out, that the neoliberal penal
system applies an economic analysis to the behavior of individuals in order
to make it intelligible and governable, but stresses that this would not
imply the “anthropological identification of any behavior whatsoever with
economic behavior” (F : ). Instead it would explicitly leave
the subject free in all other respects in which it does not act as a maximizer
of profit. And it would also mean, that only the subject’s actions and not he
as a person is governed.
    It is namely this assumed restriction of government which intrigues
Foucault and leads him to appreciate neoliberal analysis as a form of eman-
cipatory theory. Foucault points out, that the neoliberal approach to law
and penalty is not at all informed by “the ideal or project of an exhaustively
disciplinary society [. . . ] in which a mechanism of general normalization
and the exclusion of those who cannot be normalized is needed”. Instead,
neoliberal society would be informed by “an optimization of systems of
difference, in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in which
minority individuals and practices are tolerated [...]”(F: f ).
    Furthermore, a government, which is in accord with neoliberal ideals
would not, as Foucault stresses, influence the “inner” being of the subject,
but restrain itself to influence the subject’s action. Therefore governmental
interventions will concentrate on the environment or the “market milieu”
of the subject’s actions, i.e. that in relation to which the subject defines,
what is a rational action and what is not, when measured on the principle of
the maximization of profit. The subject is left intact as an acting subject in
the full sense of orientating his action on his own prior decision, it is not
subjugated.
    According to Foucault, the consequences of the application of neoliberal
analysis to the subject who is part of the penalty system and the subject
who is a worker are the same: both are neither considered as the victims
of economic mechanisms nor as a universal or even individual pattern of
anthropological or psychological properties which can be known and taken
into consideration in governmental practices. Instead both subjects, that
whose action is the object of law and that who is a worker are considered
as rational decision makers who are granted their full autonomy of deci-
sion making, whereas the grounds on which their decisions are made are
influenced or set by the government or penal system (F : ).
    If this, however, can rightfully be regarded as a restriction of power and a
way to promote autonomy, as Foucault seems to judge, seems questionable
when we have a closer look on how restricted a government which focuses
on the homo oeconomicus really is.
        The Problems with an Emancipatory Theory Based on an Aesthetics of Existence             


    First of all, and contrarily to what Foucault points out in his lecture
of  March, namely that the concept of the homo oeconomicus i.e. the
concept of the rational decision maker is not extended to the human
being as such or to all human beings but is only a conceptual interface
for governmental influence, Foucault shows in his lecture of  March
that neoliberal analysis did indeed extend this concept so that it became
congruent with the concept of the subject as such. In this lecture Foucault
considers the question of “to what extent is it legitimate, and to what
extent is it fruitful, to apply the grid, the schema, and the model of homo
oeconomicus to not only every economic actor, but to every social actor
in general inasmuch as he or she gets married, for example, or commits a
crime, or raises children, gives affection and spends time with the kids?”
(F : ). Foucault calls this question a question of validity
and goes on to point out that this problem can be solved by defining the
object of economic analysis more precisely. He then defines the object
of economic analysis based on a definition of the neo–classical school,
as “conducts involving an optimal allocation of scarce resources to alter-
native ends”. Foucault takes this as a starting point, which allows him to
further extend the realm of economic analysis to “any purposeful con-
duct which involves, broadly speaking, a strategic choice of means, ways,
and instruments: in short, the identification of the object of economic
analysis with any rational conduct” (F : f.), until he finally
holds with Becker that the domain of economic analysis should be “any
conduct which responds systematically to modifications in the variables
of the environment, in other words, any conduct, [. . . ], which «accepts
reality»”. This, means that the “[h]omo oeconomicus is someone who ac-
cepts reality” (F : ), but according to Foucault it obviously
also implies that everyone who accepts reality is a homo oeconomicus, as
otherwise it would not be possible to make any conduct which accepts
reality the object of economic analysis.
    This firstly implies, that under neoliberal analysis the subject can be
governed in any respect of his life, as long as this respect is part of reality.
But secondly it implies that, according to neoliberal analysis each action
which does not deny reality, is actually a strategic action and an action
motivated by the wish to maximize one’s own profit.
    Now, the question remains, how free a homo oeconomicus is really
left by a governmentality which is obviously present in all respects of
his life and possibly concerned with each of his actions. Can we follow
Foucault and say, that an action upon an action in a closed strategic system

     . See G. B, Irrational action and economic theory, in «Journal of Political Economy», vol.
 (), August , pp. –.
   Linda Schaumann


of the described kind must still not be considered as really being an action
upon an agent? And would it not be even more correct to say that the
action does not stop at the subject as agent but takes possession of the
whole subject?


Conclusion

If we reconsider the neoliberal analysis of the worker who is a decision
making subject in a context of strategy, and remember that the subject
himself becomes an enterprise, as he himself is responsible for producing
his own revenue or living conditions, we must state, that not just is
the influence of other strategies (or governmentalities) on the subject
thorough but also is the subject itself the destiny of the strategy. It may
well be that the governmental actions focus on the actions of the subject,
but as he is himself the producer of his actions, in the sense that he has to
form himself in order to respond to reality, the subject is formed by his
actions. Furthermore, the subject whose living conditions are informed
by the actions he chooses in a strategic context, is forced to become, at
least to a certain extent, a maximizer of profit and a strategist himself, as
it is his life and in some cases even his sheer life that is put at stake and, at
the same time is the stake.
    That Foucault obviously was blind to the threat to autonomy which the
dynamic inherent in neoliberal analysis unfolds, may be attributed to what
Foucault seems to have considered the two conditions of emancipation: .
That all relations are informed by power games which tend toward violence
and domination and . That freedom is secured as long as the subject can
still make decisions and therefore can attribute the consequences of his
actions to himself.
    The first assumption, which, historically indicated or not, is the idea
of an anthropological constant, makes the quest for freedom a consistent
task and the task of a strategy. Furthermore, it seems obvious that it is
the — also — anthropological idea of the maximizer of profit — which is
behind the idea of the constant playing of power games. However, that
this need not be an appropriate idea of the human being as such, but is
instead an idea due to the historical order in which human beings are
involved, and which might be created by just some of them or even by
circumstances, does not occur to Foucault. Instead, what freedom is and
how it is achieved is so closely attached to strategic games that freedom is
identified with a power strategy. As it is inherent in power games that they
either continue or end in violence and domination, freedom is a continued
power strategy.
      The Problems with an Emancipatory Theory Based on an Aesthetics of Existence   


    The second assumption leads to the now contradictory seeming fact,
that Foucault regards the idea of a substance or an anthropological constant
of the subject as a historical idea which has strategically been imposed on
us by others, as a way of controlling us. Therefore we will not be free, if we
stay who we are or believe that we have to be ourselves more. It is only by
transformation that we can escape this imposed concept and in coming to
understand ourselves as our own changing practice.
    This idea however can insofar be reconciled with Foucault’s notion that
all relations are informed by power and tend towards violence, as firstly,
power relations not only allow but encourage transformation (they are
productive) and secondly, that Foucault regards the gaining of control over
the penchant for domination as one of our central tasks, if we are to achieve
emancipation.
    Still the problem of asymmetrical power–relationships remains. The
thought–experiment I suggested showed, that understanding ourselves
according to our transformable actions is no way to escape understand-
ing ourselves in accord with what is imposed on us by somebody else’s
power–strategy or of escaping an alien principle of action. I would even
suggest that the idea that our autonomy is archived and secured by our
transformability weakens us towards the strategies of more powerful
agents. In asymmetrical power relations a less privileged agent can con-
sider himself autonomous if he fulfills exactly what another subject wishes
him to fulfill, because: . his reaction or his variation of rules of action
need not conflict with the strategy of the other (as the strategy is never
aiming at an action but solely at the requirements of a principle) and . the
reproduction of the alien principle might be a side effect of what seems
the reasonable choice. Therefore, in an asymmetrical power relationship
the transformation of the actions and person of the less privileged agent
is very likely to be enforced by the privileged one, especially if the other
subject is targeting at the principle of highest profit at lowest cost. Con-
sequently we must state, that Foucault’s emancipatory theory not only
gets tangled up in the same problems as neoliberal analysis, regarding
the preservation of freedom, but does so because it is largely informed by
the same ideas. The problem that there is no transformation beyond an
order informed by the principle of power and of the principle of the maxi-
mization of profit as well as that of the fact that a less privileged subject
tends to reproduce the truth of a more privileged subject is severed by
the renunciation of the drafting of “new worlds” as part of emancipatory
critique and the restriction of emancipatory work to the immediate possi-
bilities the existent reality presents. This becomes even more problematic,
as the reproductive activity is less evident in neoliberalism than it was
in the antique practice of the aesthetics of existence, in which a clearly
     Linda Schaumann


defined logos was reproduced and was explicitly chosen as the goal of
self–formation by the subject, whereas in neoliberalism the reproduction
of an alien principle is a side effect of a strategy of maintaining one’s
freedom or even the possibility to fill one’s stomach .
    As it is identified with a rational choice, the problem of the reproduction
of an alien principle is largely disguised for the less privileged agent. This
blindness to the fact of being governed right down to his very being is
reinforced by the tendency to short circuit emotions and the penchant for
domination, which implies the control of emotions as such. This short cir-
cuit however, does not seem correct, as emotions, such as compassion, love
or an aversion to dominance might even prevent actions of power–abuse.
Furthermore, emotions can signal us, what is good and what is not and
what we can and cannot do without going against what is important to us
or within our possibilities. This signaling function, however, is covered by
an undifferentiated management of emotions.


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