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Ayşe Seda Yüksel
Anuac
“Economic nationalisms” and the immediacy of war: Turkey’s Syrian policy
Text.Serial.Journal
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Thematic section: Economic nationalisms in a world on fire
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Ayşe Seda Yüksel
2022/11/25
10.7340/anuac2239-625X-4932
127
University of Vienna, Austria
2239-625X
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150
urn:nbn:it:unica-28912
“Economic nationalisms” and the immediacy of war: Turkey’s Syrian policy
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                                         2022 | Anuac. Vol. 11, n° 2, Dicembre 2022: 127-150




“Economic nationalisms” and the immediacy of war
Turkey’s Syrian policy
Ayşe Seda Yüksel
University of Vienna




Abstract: This article examines the current economic nationalisms in Turkey through the
lens of the effects of the Syrian war. The empirical focus of my discussion is Gaziantep, an
export city bordering Syria. The city has been radically shaped not only by the migration
waves from Syria in the wake of the Syrian war but also by the broader re/structuring
effects of the Iraq war and a low-intensity war in the last 30 years. In Turkey, wars have
always been essential reference points for local and national economic agents to build
different nation-framed economic discourses. In the last decade, we observe a new form
of economic nationalism that is expansionist and outward-oriented – contrary to discus-
sions associating the term with inward-oriented economic policies. Turkey’s assumed
role in the reconstitution of the Syrian economy and its aspired position in the Middle
East as a political, economic, and military center constitutes a crucial symbolic horizon
in this nationalist economic discourse.

Keywords: Economic nationalism; Syrian war; Migration; Warfare; Turkey.




This work is licensed under the Creative Commons © Ayşe Seda Yüksel
“Economic nationalisms” and the immediacy of war. Turkey’s Syrian policy.
2022 | Anuac. Vol. 11, n° 2, Dicembre 2022: 127-150.
ISSN: 2239-625X - DOI: 10.7340/anuac2239-625X-4932
128                                                                         Ayşe Seda Yüksel

Introduction1
      I am in Gaziantep, an export hub bordering Syria, to attend the annual
      Development Agencies Conference bringing together the representatives
      of the newly established Development Agencies all around Turkey. It is the
      third year of the Syrian war; tens of kilometers away from the skirmishes,
      we discuss the new draft of the Development Policy during the planetary
      meeting held in the city’s colossal congress complex. The room is full of
      young aspiring graduates of the best public universities in Turkey who have
      started their government jobs recently. “These are the best minds of the
      state bureaucracy,” my friend, a former bureaucrat, tells me. Gaziantep’s
      local development agency representative welcomes us “with hopes for a
      prosperous future”. After a short introduction on the 5-year development
      policy of the Ministry of Development, he briefs the audience on Gaziantep’s
      economic profile over the last five years. Gaziantep is taken as the pinnacle
      of neoliberal Turkey by national media and the paragon of its primary
      developmental strategy in the last 30 years, namely export-led growth. His
      short introduction proudly underlines this popular image. During his talk,
      the city’s export rates catch my attention. The city has almost doubled its
      export volume in the last five years, particularly during the height of the
      Syrian war. After the panel, I approach him to ask about the export numbers
      in his talk. “This export boom is the Gaziantep miracle,” he responds. “The
      people of Gaziantep create miracles in the direst conditions […] Another
      miracle is how the city shelters our Syrian guests”. He refers to the Syrian
      refugees who fled the war and took refuge in the border cities2.
      Later in the afternoon, I meet Aykan in his office. Aykan is a businessperson
      that I interviewed several times during my fieldwork back in the 2010s. He
      and his friends discuss the changing dynamics of the Syrian war and its
      reflections on the local economy. I join the conversation by questioning
      Gaziantep’s export boom to Syria under war conditions. A short silence
      follows my question. One of them responds: “This is no surprise. War is
      good for trade if you know well who controls the other side of the border
      […]”3.


1. The early version of this paper was presented at the AAA/CASCA Annual Meeting in 2019
   in the roundtable titled Transnational Perspectives on Economic Nationalism and Contested
   Belonging. I would like to thank the organizer, Ann Kingsolver, the chair, Chandana Matur
   and the participants of the roundtable for their valuable comments. I benefited great-
   ly from the comments and suggestions of the article’s two anonymous reviewers; I am
   thankful to them. I am also indebted to Dana Mckelvey who proofread and edited my essay
   with great precision. Editing of this article was funded by the Faculty of Social Sciences at
   the University of Vienna.
2. Since 2011, Turkey has been receiving refugees displaced by the ongoing war in Syria. As
   of 2021, 98.7 percent of 3.7 million Syrians residing in Turkey live in towns and cities.
   Syrians in Turkey are not recognized legally as refugees. Turkey signed the 1951 Geneva
   Convention with a geographical limitation. Due to this limitation, only recognized refu-
   gees who have sought asylum as a result of “events occurring in Europe” can benefit from
   asylum rights whereas the rest of the world falls under the category of “people with tem-
   porary protection status” (Kirişçi 1996).
3. Field notes, April 2014.


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“Economic nationalisms” and the immediacy of war                               129

   In this article, I examine the economic nationalism of the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) through the lens of its militarized foreign policy
endeavors in Syria and its refugee policy by focusing on the city of Gazian-
tep. In the last decade, we observe a new form of economic nationalism that
is expansionist and outward-oriented, contrary to the traditional forms that
are based on national sovereignty and economic autonomy. I argue that
AKP’s novel economic nationalism cannot be comprehended without en-
gaging with the politico-economic dynamics of the war in Syria. Wars are
important symbolic reference points for mobilizing or persuading popula-
tions in pursuit of specific economic agendas and aims. Alternatively, the
immediacy and necessity of wars may enforce certain economic agendas or
policies on people.
   Gaziantep is an explicative case in discussing many elements of the re-
lations between economic nationalisms and wars: the city is located at the
edge of the Kurdish region in Turkey that has been shaped by the low-inten-
sity war between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party. The
city’s economy has been shaped by the spill-out effects of US interventions
in Iraq and the war in Syria. In the previous 20 years, Gaziantep has gradually
become one of the political castles of the AKP government. The city, known
as “little Syria,” accommodates around 420,000 Syrians, constituting more
than 20 percent of its total population. After Istanbul, the city is home to
Turkey’s second most populous Syrian migrant community (Erdogan 2020).
   The first part of the paper is devoted to a brief conceptual discussion on
economic nationalism and the characteristics of the pro-Islamist AKP’s eco-
nomic nationalism in the last decade. The second part is devoted to analyzing
the implications of AKP’s economic nationalism in its migration policy and
military interventions in Syria. The third part examines how AKP’s nation-
alist discourses are locally reproduced and challenged in Gaziantep. The
case of Gaziantep proves that economic nationalist discourses are not sole-
ly produced by states but also actively adopted and locally reproduced by
local actors. The last part focuses on the limitations of AKP’s economic na-
tionalism by showing how other economic nationalisms and nation-framed
economic discourses challenge it in local politics. The article shows that al-
though the Syrian war has invigorated the transformative and mobilizing
power of AKP’s economic nationalism in the last decade, it has not been
sufficient to turn it into a hegemonic discourse.




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130                                                             Ayşe Seda Yüksel

Putting AKP’s militarist/populist economic nationalism in context
   economic nationalism is a vague term in both academic and popular dis-
course. The mainstream definition that emerged in the interwar period refers
to an umbrella concept identifying a wide variety of policies that supposedly
fall outside liberal economics, ranging from tariffs and quotas to restrictions
on foreign investments and state subsidies in domestic activities (Nakano
2004: 211). In the 2000s, this policy-focused traditional approach has been
under harsh criticism for reflecting neither the current conditions nor the his-
tory of liberalism (Helleiner 2002; Abdelal 2018; Helleiner, Pickel 2018; Pickel
2003). These scholars argue that economic nationalism should be seen as the
context of economic policies and a facet of national identity rather than a
package of “protectionist” policies. Thus, the study of economic nationalism
involves how “national identities and nationalism shape economic policies
and processes in diverse and complex ways” (Helleiner 2018: 221, 224) rather
than a discussion on the outcomes of the policies.
   In a recent article, Baltz (2021) addresses the term’s conceptual inconsis-
tencies and historical diversity. However, he insists on the need to employ it
as a conceptual lens to investigate the current nationalist rhetoric and policy
responses. Baltz defines economic nationalism as various “national discours-
es” produced and practiced by different actors to articulate their agendas in
economic affairs. Economic nationalism cannot be seen as an ensemble of
policies but rather discourses that work as “practical categories” (Brubaker
2010: 13) for actors to legitimize their acts and policies (Baltz 2021). To exam-
ine the workings of economic nationalism, we need to consider categories and
normative ideas in nation-framed discourses attached to economic policies.
Among these normative ideas, the category of national interest is of partic-
ular importance. In their attempts to steer policymaking processes, political
and economic actors practically employ discourses about perceived “national
interests” to legitimize their policy agendas and to discredit their political
opponents and economic rivals.
   Economic nationalism has always been a dominant discourse in the Turkish
economy from early on, and local industrialization was its most significant
project. In the late Ottoman context starting from 1908, the ideal of eco-
nomic nationalism was based on four pillars: economic autonomy, national
industrialization, elimination of non-Muslims from the economic sphere, and
creation of a national business class in the Ottoman Empire (Ahmad 2014;
Toprak 1994). These pillars were maintained during the Turkish Republic and


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“Economic nationalisms” and the immediacy of war                                            131

adopted by its Kemalist ideology4 (Keyder 1987; Aktar 2006). From the Re-
public’s early years, the nationalist goals of economic autonomy, national
industrialization, and developmentalism led to a strong etatism and state-led
import-substitution policies (Keyder 1987; Toprak 1982, Buğra 1995). In this
inward-oriented economy, national economic interests laid in the economic
favoritism of groups aligned with Turkish nationalism for an autonomous na-
tional economy. Governments fed economic nationalist sentiments by casting
national minorities, particularly Armenians and Kurdish minorities, as “pos-
sible threats to the nation”5.
   As many scholars argue, the AKP embraced a new understanding of Turk-
ish nationalism that challenged its predecessor, Kemalist nationalism, in many
ways. Saracoglu and Demirkol (2015: 306-307) claim that the most significant
change in AKP’s conception of nationalism is the increasing weight of Muslim-
hood in the definition of the nation.6 Sunni-Muslim values have become the
core elements of the Turkish nation, whereas the Ottoman past has become the
central reference point (Kaya 2020). Moreover, the AKP’s Islamist and neo-Ot-
tomanist nationalism has brought on a new conception of territory:
      While Kemalist nationalism construed Turkish territories from a ‘defensive’
      perspective as a homeland that had been liberated from and had to be
      protected against the supposedly unending conspiracies of foreign and
      domestic ‘enemies,’ AKP’s nationalism sees the same geography from a rather
      more ambitious position; as a cultural and political ‘center’ from which the
      political influence of the Turkish state, as the heir of the Ottoman Empire,
      could be extended into the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East (Saracoglu,
      Demirkol 2015: 312).




4. Kemalist ideology is the founding official ideology of Turkey, which has put modernization,
   secularism and westernization at its center (Bozdogan, Kasaba 2011). Kemalist ideology
   has been criticized for not being compatible with liberal democracy (Parla, Davison 2004),
   and being extremely repressive towards non-Muslim, ethnic and Islamist communities
   (Göçek 1996; Yavuz 2003).
5. There is substantial literature on the links between minorities, Turkish nationalism, and eco-
   nomic policies. For the transfer of wealth from Christian communities, see Bali 2011 on the
   infamous Capital Levy; Kuyucu 2005 on pogroms of September 1955; Yilmaz 2012 on the
   appropriation of Armenian properties. Turkey’s economic nationalist policies against the
   Kurdish people have been framed through the argument of economic disparities and the
   de-development of the Kurdish regions in Turkey (Yadirgi 2017; Sonmez 1992; Besikci 1969).
6. With its roots in the Islamist movement since 1970s, the AKP presented itself as a synthe-
   sis of democratic secular politics and religious appeal for the Turkish people (Cizre, Çınar
   2003; Hale, Özbudun 2010). However, the consequent electoral victories in 2007 and 2011
   have resulted in a slow trend of autocratization processes in which religious (Yabanci
   2021: 3) and nationalist references have become visible.


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132                                                                       Ayşe Seda Yüksel

   The exceptionality of AKP nationalism can be best understood from the
party’s unique formulation of “national interests.” The AKP gradually reced-
ed from its position as “a typical candidate country of the EU” (Onis 2014)
and defined being a regional economic and military power in the geographies
of the Ottoman imperial history within Turkey’s national interests. Turkey’s
highly disputed military operations in Syria7 and its military presence in Libya
and Iraq serve its national goal of becoming a regional economic leader and
an expanding military power. A recent report states that in the last five years,
the AKP government has increased its overseas military bases by placing more
than 15.000 troops in the Middle East and Africa, especially in Syria, Qatar,
and Somalia (Adar et al. 2020).
   The AKP’s expansionist militarist nationalism is accompanied by a populist
discourse that dramatically reshaped the internal dynamics of Turkish poli-
tics. Since its early days in power, the AKP’s political discourse has been built
upon a harsh criticism of the elitism of Kemalist and Republican groups that
suppressed the will and the core values of the Turkish people (Taş 2020). This
earlier version of populism has gradually become more exclusionary and ag-
gressive by constructing a dichotomy between the people as a nation and the
enemies within. AKP’s economic nationalism is colored by three leitmotifs: a
transnational claim to the regional leadership of Muslimhood, an exclusion-
ary nationalism pitting the deserving Turkish people against the undeserving
ones (Yabanci 2021: 13, 23), and an increasing militarist discourse based on
the immediacy of Turkey’s military power and war, particularly in Syria.

AKP’s militarist/populist economic nationalism- at-work
   in the last decade, Turkey has seen a radical authoritarian shift accelerated
by a fluid geopolitical environment due to the Syrian war and a less asser-
tive European Union (Öktem, Akkoyunlu 2016). After the June 2015 elections
which signaled the end to the AKP’s dominant party status in the parliament,
this authoritarian shift has increased its pace.8 The AKP has adopted a more
securitized and militarized nationalist discourse in economic affairs – a

7. Turkey has conducted four major military operations to Syria until now: Euphrates Shield
   initiated in 2016 targeting the al-Bab region, Olive Branch initiated in 2018 targeting the
   Afrin region, Peace Spring initiated in 2019 targeting the region between Ras al-Ayn and
   Tel Abyad and the Spring Shield initiated in 2020 targeting the Idlib region.
8. The fall of the Peace Process between the PKK and the Turkish state and the restart of
   war in Kurdish cities in 2015 and 2016, and a failed coup d’état in 2016 constituted the
   milestones of this new authoritarianism, which relies on judicial and economic pressures
   on opposing but also controlling the media (Somer 2016).


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“Economic nationalisms” and the immediacy of war                                            133

discourse of “national survival” and national unity in the face of attacks by in-
ternal and external enemies that aim to hinder Turkey’s progress (Taş 2020)9.
This discourse on national unity and survival has become most visible in 2018
when Erdogan stated that he would start economic warfare against the exter-
nal powers as a remedy to the currency crisis:
      If they have dollars, we have our people, righteousness, and God… The interest
      rate lobby will not be able to crush this nation. Our responsibility is to you, not
      to George or Hans, but to Ahmet, Mehmet, and Ayse. […] They tried everything
      to bring our country to our knees (Yackley 2018)10.

   He called on Turkish people to sell their dollars and euros to buy lira: “If
there are dollars under your pillow, take these out... Immediately give these
to the banks and convert to the Turkish lira, and by doing this, we fight this
war of independence” (Pamuk 2018). The “economic warfare” and “economic
independence war” against external and internal enemies have gradually be-
come central themes in AKP discourse. In the last four years, the government
has called on the Turkish people several times to participate in the “economic
war” against the “dark forces” by selling their currencies or managing their
consumption habits (Bilgic 2020; Diken 2020)
   Economic nationalism renders people members of a community by gen-
erating sentiments of autonomy, pride, prestige, and distinctiveness, if not
superiority and uniqueness (Müller 2005: 141). In the AKP’s recent nationalist
discourse, the words yerli (indigenous) and milli (national) have become com-
mon referents to define economic progress and prosperity. The AKP promoted
various indigenous products such as an “indigenous and national automobile”
helicopter and telecommunications. The growing Turkish defense industry
under the rule of the AKP and the ideal of defense autarky has also become
“political capital” for the AKP to reaffirm national pride in technical prow-
ess (Bağcı, Kurç 2017). Between 2008 and 2017, Turkish military expenditure
increased by 46 percent to reach $18.2 billion, making it the 15th largest
spender globally (Tian et al. 2018). Aviation and defense exports significantly
increased during the same period. According to reports by Stockholm Inter-


9. The enemies to the nation have been vaguely defined as “interest-rate lobby,” terrorist
    groups, separatists, “coalitions,” and “Western actors” (Yüksel-Pecen 2018; Göknar 2020).
10. The currency crisis was sparked when U.S. President Donald Trump doubled tariffs on
    Turkish steel and aluminum imports. The lira fell 18 % in one day. From January to August
    2018, the value of Turkey’s currency lost more than 34% of its value against the dollar.
    Retrieved March 2019 from https://www.ft.com/content/f33b9b90-9c8c-11e8-9702-
    5946bae86e6d


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134                                                                      Ayşe Seda Yüksel

national Peace Research Institute, Turkey is among the three fastest-growing
arm exporters in the world. Between 2014 and 2019, Turkey’s volume of arms
exports increased by 86 percent. Between 2015 and 2019, it ranked on average
as the world’s 13th largest arms exporter. Turkey has exported significantly to
28 countries, as well as Syrian rebels (Béraud-Sudreau et al. 2020).
   Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian war contributes to an increased internal
demand for the fledgling defense industry. Today, 60 percent of the aviation
and defense inventory of the Turkish Armed Forces, mainly utilized in Syria,
is produced domestically. Moreover, the party’s political vision underlines the
notion that becoming a regional power involves a solid defense industry (2023
Political Vision, 2013, cited in Bağcı, Kurç 2017). Recently, Erdogan celebrat-
ed the new crewless aerial vehicle by Baykar Savunma – a firm owned by the
family of President Erdoğan’s son-in-law, Selçuk Bayraktar – and by Turkish
Aerospace Industries. After proudly sayingthat Turkey has risen to the world’s
top three in combat drone technology, he added: “It is essential that our na-
tional technologies contribute to the security of allied countries, but we make
our decisions according to our strategic priorities” (Hürriyet Daily News 2021).
   These developments reflect a radical transformation of the AKP’s tumul-
tuous relationship with the Turkish Army. The military, perceived as the
guardian of the secular state, has enjoyed a privileged place in the political
system not only with the threat of arms but also by creating a belief that it
has been an indispensable requirement for the survival of the Turkish na-
tion (Demirel 2004)11. The AKP has put “democratization” through political
reforms as a central element of its hegemonic project and waged a political
battle against the military’s central role in Turkish politics (Bilgin 2007; Akca
2006). This political battle did not bring about further democratization nor
a rupture in the deeply entrenched militaristic currents within the Turkish
political culture (Altinay 2004). It restructured the military in line with the
AKP’s political ideology (Kingsley 2016) and strengthened a police-centered
authoritarian state (Akça 2018). The AKP government used the Syrian war as
an opportunity to prove the hitherto underestimated might and capabilities of
“this police-centered state” in regional and domestic politics.
   Syrian refugees have become another source of national pride in AKP’s eco-
nomic nationalism. The AKP and President Erdogan define Turkey’s temporary
protection regulation as a sign of “Turkish hospitality” and glorify Turkey’s ref-

11. The Kurdish issue and Irtica (political Islam) have been the main enemies of the State by
    the Turkish Army in the last decades (Balta, Akça 2013).


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“Economic nationalisms” and the immediacy of war                                         135

ugee policy as the proof of the moral superiority of Turkey over the Western
world, which has long turned a blind eye to the human costs of the Syrian war
(Yanasmayan, Üstübici, Kasli 2019: 48). The AKP has quickly converted this hu-
man cost into an economic-benefit discourse that would eventually serve the
national economy. In the heated debate over granting citizenship to the Syrians
holding economic and intellectual capital, the AKP focused mainly on the “ben-
efit” they would create for the Turkish economy (BBC 2017). In recent years,
this discourse on “economic benefit” has become even more visible. Recently,
Yasin Aktay, one of the chief advisors of Erdogan, stated that “investors and
industrialists are delighted with the Syrians, and if you remove them from some
significant workplaces, this country’s economy will collapse” (Cumhuriyet 2021).
   AKP’s discourse on “economic benefit” contrasts with the anti-immigration
populist discourses of the opposition parties. The Kemalist camp in Turkish
politics adopted an anti-immigrant discourse emphasizing “economic welfare
for nationals” and “sovereignty within national borders” and arguing that Syr-
ians were treated with more “privilege” than Turkish citizens.12 The chairman
of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Kilicdaroglu, has continuously made
references to the scarce resources and their unjust allocation to the Syrians:
      The Minister of Work and Social Security states that they will grant work
      permits to 2 million Syrians in Turkey […] We have 3 million unemployed
      people, our sons, and daughters… I am calling on our people’s conscience.
      To whom shall we give priority? Why did these 2 million Syrians come here?
      Which foreign policies did cause them ending up here? (AA 2014)

   From the start, the CHP opposed the interventionist foreign policies of
the AKP, particularly Turkey’s aggressive involvement in the Syrian war.
Despite this critical stance, the CHP, along with the rest of the opposition
parties in the parliament except the pro-Kurdish party, gave the green light
to all military interventions in Syria by supporting AKP’s proposal for the
authorization of military force in Syria. The Turkish state’s border policies
regarding Syrian migrants are highly shaped by the long-lasting Kurdish
question and the “state of violence” that has shaped the Middle East since
the 1980s, particularly the violent policies of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria
attempting to consolidate the Kurdish territories in their borders (Bozarslan
2014). Unified around the common threat of an autonomous Kurdish region
in Syria, the Turkish parliament has repeatedly voted for military interven-

12. The argument of “economic partiality” (Clift, Woll 2012: 308), which is based on the pref-
    erential treatment of actors considered as “insiders” and open discrimination against
    “outsiders”, is a dominant leitmotif for Turkish political parties in opposition.


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136                                                             Ayşe Seda Yüksel

tions in the last decade. As will be discussed in the following pages, the AKP
justified these military operations in the eyes of the public and of opposition
political parties as necessary steps for providing a safe zone to facilitate Syr-
ians’ repatriation. Currently, almost a quarter of the Syrian population lives
in territories controlled by either Turkey or its proxies – such as the Idlib
region in northwest Syria. Turkey attempts to keep Idlib as a “safe zone”
controlled by regime opponents. (Adar et al. 2020) In the following section, I
discuss the resonances of AKP’s economic nationalist discourse on the Syri-
an war and refugees in Gaziantep’s local politics.

The effects of the AKP’s economic nationalism on local politics: The case of
gaziantep
   In the early 1980s, Gaziantep was an ordinary city in the southeast region
of Turkey, which has connoted “underdevelopment” and “ethnic conflicts”
throughout the history of Turkey. Within less than 20 years, the city has be-
come an export giant in the region, producing textiles, food, chemicals, and
plastic products in five huge industrial zones – the largest zones in the coun-
try. For local business elites, the success of Gaziantep lies in the local spirit
of the city, which can be characterized by commercial aptitude, perseverance,
and inclination towards cooperation (Yüksel 2014a). However, a critical exam-
ination of the city’s recent history reveals that Gaziantep has made ample use
of the conditions of wars in its environs. In the 1990s, the city attracted mas-
sive migration waves of Kurdish populations from neighboring cities due to
the low-intensity war between the PKK and the Turkish state. Rural migrants
fleeing from skirmishes in the rural areas constituted an informal, cheap labor
force necessary for meteoric increases in manufacturing production. More-
over, Kurdish businesspeople who migrated to Gaziantep created the city’s
link to Iraqi Kurdistan – a new market for Turkish entrepreneurs after US in-
tervention in the early 2000s. Gaziantep has recorded an increase of 200% in
exports in 2004 compared to former years. The Iraqi market held the lion’s
share of the exports in the mid-2000s and is still the top export region in the
city’s local economy (Yüksel 2009, 2014b; Degisim 2019).
   The local business circles of Gaziantep, known for their pragmatic ap-
proach to politics, have gradually developed close relations with the AKP
government. AKP municipalities have governed the city since the early 2000s.
In 2011, during his visit to the city, Erdogan thanked Gaziantep for its com-
mercial success and political support:



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“Economic nationalisms” and the immediacy of war                                        137

      Eighty provinces in Turkey envy you. Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman,
      Baghdad, Cairo envy you […] On behalf of myself and my nation, I would like
      to thank you again for making each of us proud. Thank you for your common
      sense, tolerance, and hospitality. Thank you for producing, exporting, and
      making Turkey a developed country […]. The people of Gaziantep have sided
      with us and have always been with us. [he refers to his political party] (2011,
      June 9, Gaziantep).

   Due to its political alignment with the AKP government and the local activ-
ism of its business classes, Gaziantep has emerged in the region as an economic
and political hub that controls the institutional channels of communication
between the region (and even the country) and supranational and interna-
tional actors, including the EU. In this sense, when the Syrian war started,
Gaziantep was already in a leadership position in the region in the eyes of
the central government and international and supranational institutions. The
city responded quickly to “the Syrian crisis”. In 2013, the Gaziantep Chamber
of Commerce (Gaziantep Ticaret Odasi, GTO) president stated that the Middle
East was in chaos and that the people of Gaziantep should turn this nega-
tive situation into a positive one. The president referred to an opportunity to
increase the volume of exports to Syria and to the small number of Syrian mi-
grant entrepreneurs who were seen as an advantage in expanding the existing
export volume.13 In 2013, the Chamber organized a meeting and produced a
“Common Wisdom Report”. In this short booklet, the business circles deter-
mined the problem areas and suggested solutions. The main emphasis in the
early report was on the informal working conditions of Syrians in the Gazian-
tep economy due to a lack of legal arrangements (Gaziantep Ortak Akıl Raporu
2013). During my visits to the city in 2013, businesspeople told me how they
were lobbying in the capital city, Ankara, for the government to take steps for
incorporating Syrians legally into the labor market. In 2014, government-reg-
ulated access to the labor market for Syrians under the Temporary Protection
bylaw. However, bureaucratic hurdles left the regulation ineffective. In 2015,
GTO prepared a second report. The 2015 report underlined that Syrians were
not consumers in the urban economy, but also emphasized the surplus value
they would create within urban economies and proposed a series of legal ar-
rangements for their economic inclusion (İcimizdeki Suriye [Gaziantep Ortak
Akıl Raporu-2] 2015).

13. In 2013, Gaziantep’s exports to Syria increased by 400 %. Reasons for the export boom
    included the increasing need for humanitarian aid to Syria and the relatively safe border
    zones created by armed groups in Syria who were supported by Turkey (İcimizdeki Suriye
    [Gaziantep Ortak Akıl Raporu-2] 2015).


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138                                                                      Ayşe Seda Yüksel

   Syrian business associations in Turkey, such as the Syrian Economic Forum
(SEF), also define themselves as successful entrepreneurs or buried treasures
in local markets who would help the Turkish exporters to increase their ex-
ports to Syria or to the former Syrian export countries (Syrian Entrepreneurs:
A Buried Treasure 2018). As the Syrian Business association president states,
Turkish and Syrian businesspeople will together rebuild Syria once the war
is over (Another Side to the Story: A Market Assessment of Syrian SMEs in
Turkey 2017). The increasing presence of Syrian businesses in the city is seen
as the background of the future collaborations. In 2020, GTO had 2387 firm
members owned by Syrians compared to 272 in 2014 (GTO Faaliyet Raporu
2014 2014; GTO Faaliyet Raporu 2020 2020).
   The AKP municipality has also worked as an effective agent in building
Gaziantep’s migration infrastructure. The mayor, Fatma Sahin, is a vigorous
defender of granting legal rights to Syrians, particularly in the labor market. In
2016, in a panel organized by the municipality for NGOs, she highlighted the
qualified workforce that Gaziantep had attracted:
      Last year, in Gaziantep, there were hundreds of Syrian doctors. They left for
      Scandinavian countries. We could not keep them here because we could not
      offer them legal rights and formal working conditions. We need to keep the
      qualified workforce in Gaziantep. Their presence harms nobody.

   These positive narratives about the necessity of work permits and the
elimination of informal working conditions contradict the actual working
conditions in Turkey and Gaziantep. According to reports by the Turkish Sta-
tistical Institute (TUIK), in 2019, 34% of actively working Turkish citizens were
not covered by any social security institution. In other words, more than 1/3
of the labor force was working informally (Erdogan 2020). In Gaziantep and
its environs, this rate is even higher, around 40% in 2019 (TUIK). The Turkish
government has revised the 2014-bylaw and issued a new regulation in 2016
that allowed Syrian workers to apply for a work permit. The application pro-
cess is still complicated and poses many barriers.14 Syrian firm owners also

14. Employers must apply for the work permit on behalf of the worker, pay a fee and prove
    they cannot find a Turkish citizen to fulfill the role. The employer must also submit tax
    reports, commit to paying at least the minimum wage, and pay the employee’s social
    security benefits. In each workplace, employees under Temporary Protection must not
    constitute more than 10 percent of the workforce, though an exemption is possible. Those
    under Temporary Protection must wait for six months upon receiving this status before
    they can apply for a work permit. Work permits need to be renewed every year (Leghtas,
    Hollingsworth 2017). In 2020 the Ministry of Work and Social Security issued 132.497
    work permits in Turkey. This number corresponds to 10% of the 1 million foreigners who


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“Economic nationalisms” and the immediacy of war                                       139

refer to many problems that hamper their business. Firm owners mention bu-
reaucratic hurdles in renewing the business licenses, getting credits, opening
bank accounts, bureaucratic hurdles in residence permit applications, limited
quotas for Syrian workers, and yearly renewal of work contracts (Türkiye’deki
Suriyeli İs İnsanlari ile Toplanti Raporu 2018). In contrast to AKP’s discourse
that defines the “integration of Syrians” as part of national pride, policies
regulating the working conditions of Syrian immigrants are practically inef-
fective.
   The discourse on returning Syrians has been a frequent theme in Gaziantep
municipality’s public discourse. In 2014, right after a series of mobs against
Syrians, the mayor calmed down the anti-Syrian sentiments:
     The neighborhood is a sacred relationship in our beliefs. We are making
     massive efforts to sustain peace in our neighbor Syria and enable everyone to
     live on their land in peace. Our president [she refers to Erdogan] stated that
     he would work for … the regional peace. We want to secure a region in Syria
     in which our Syrian brothers can (go back) and live in peace (Kirmizitaş 2014).

   In 2019, the mayor asked for the locals’ patience in an interview. She esti-
mated that half of the Syrian population in Gaziantep would be settled in the
safe zone if Turkish military operations became successful (FFM Online 2019).
In a TV show in 2020, the mayor repeated that Turkey’s latest military inter-
vention to Syria, Operation Euphrates Shield, was a turning point concerning
the return of the Syrians: “After Operation Euphrates Shield, around 100.000
people returned to Jarabulus. About 400.000 people returned to Idlib. If this
military pact with the USA succeeds, 1 million people will return to Syria”.
   Returning Syrians are part of the expansionist economic visions of the AKP.
Fuat Oktay, the Deputy President, expects 1 million Syrians to return and live
in areas rebuilt by the Turkish construction companies:
     Our draft plans regarding the structure of the safe zone include a settlement
     area of 140 villages with ten districts. We also plan to build around 200
     thousand houses in the Operation Peace Spring region. Our plans include
     schools, hospitals, industrial sites, places of worship, green areas, roads,
     water, and electricity infrastructure […] Anyone who sincerely wants an end
     to the humanitarian crisis in Syria should take responsibility for the safe
     zone (Burun, Kanli 2019).

  In the eyes of the local business circles, these military operations might benefit
the local economy, as they did in the case of Iraq in the early 2000s. “Securiti-


   hold a residence permit and can apply for a work permit (Erdogan 2020); around 90% of
   them work without employment contracts.


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140                                                                    Ayşe Seda Yüksel

zation of the border zones” also has immediate effects on the local economy
of Gaziantep. In a commentary, the then GTO president explains that the as-
tronomical increase of exports to Syria in 2013 was due to changes in military
power in the border zone: “when rebel groups seized control of border cross-
ings on the Syrian side following Turkish military interventions, Turkish exports
perked– mainly in cooking oil, flour, and flour products, cement, iron and steel,
hygiene, and cleaning products, and automobiles” (Degisim 2019). In a meeting
with International Labor Organization (ILO) and other local representatives, an
expert working in the Gaziantep development agency (Ipekyolu Kalkinma Ajan-
si) offered the “Northern Iraq”solution to strengthen commercial ties with Syria:
“Back then, the safe corridor in Northern Iraq served our commercial ties with
Iraq […]. All commercial commodities were transferred to the Northern Region
and then distributed to the south. We can imagine a similar solution for the
Syrian commerce: creating a safe zone on the border and using it as a supply
zone” (ILO 2015). During the war, border trade, and humanitarian aid provided
substantial economic relief for border cities like Gaziantep with the necessary
industrial infrastructure. Today, Turkey is Syria’s leading supplier and, together
with China, accounts for more than half of Syria’s imports (Degisim 2019).

Conflicting discourses: Challenges to AKP’s economic nationalism
   This seemingly tolerant discourse of the local administration and local busi-
ness circles contrasts with negative discourses about Syrians that circulate
in everyday conversations. During my stays in the city 2013 and 2015, there
was already an emerging discontent against the Syrians and robust discourse
on “the unfitting of Syrian culture” to the local culture of Gaziantep. Syrians
“increasing rents,” “invading the parks and pavements,” “disrespecting the
queues in hospitals,” “being rude,” “being disrespectful to the culture of Ga-
ziantep by launching their businesses/restaurants everywhere,” “stealing jobs
by accepting to work for nothing,” are all recurrent themes in everyday con-
versations. As Senoguz (2017: 167-8) demonstrates, the locals in Gaziantep
draw boundaries between deserving and undeserving migrants, attempting to
challenge the state’s migration policy through a moral discourse.
   The culmination of anti-Syrian hostility in the city was the riots against
Syrians in Gaziantep in August 2014.15 The riots took place after the news that


15. These attacks followed initial and small-scale mobs against Syrians in May 2014. Two
    dozen Syrians had to leave the city after angry Turkish crowds attacked their homes in
    May (Yalcin 2014).


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“Economic nationalisms” and the immediacy of war                                          141

a Syrian tenant allegedly killed his Turkish property owner due to a discussion
over his family’s eviction. Shortly after the murder, youth mobs in the city’s
working-class neighborhoods started physically attacking Syrians and vandal-
izing their cars and shops (Burun 2014a). The police forces took control of the
mobs after three days, yet random attacks continued. During the following
weeks, Syrians were compelled to remain in their houses for safety reasons
(Senoguz 2017: 168). After the events, both the municipality and the governor
called on citizens to be calm. Shortly after the mobs, the municipality ini-
tiated the replacement of Arabic signs in Syrian shops and restaurants with
Turkish signs (Cumhuriyet 2014)16 and devised an eviction plan for thousands
of Syrian migrants from the city center to camps on the grounds of “unhealthy
living conditions”. This resulted in a wave of out-migration of Syrian migrants
(Burun 2014b). The tension in the city’s working-class neighborhoods stems
from fierce competition in Gaziantep’s informal economy. In a roundtable
with NGOs working on Syrian migrants in 2015, officials from the local branch
of the Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR) complained that 17.000 Turkish
workers lost their jobs, implying that Syrian workers working under informal
conditions occupied these positions (Türkiye’de Suriye Akinina ILO’nun Yaniti
Projesi 2015).
   The local branches of the opposition political parties are important actors
in challenging the AKP’s economic discourse on the Syrian refugees. Local
cadres of opposition parties echoed the moral repertoire of their party center
in even harsher tones by defining Syrian refugees as an “economic burden”
to corner the AKP for its economic and foreign policies. A few days before the
mobs in 2014, the CHP MP of Gaziantep stated that the city could not han-
dle the high number of Syrians: “Both Syrians and Gaziantep residents suffer
from this issue. Syrians turn to begging or immoral jobs. Their labor is exploit-
ed. […] We do not know where they stay or how they make a living” (Yalcin
2014). These discourses are still present. Recently, a CHP MP from Gaziantep,
Akif Ekici, criticized AKP’s argument on the Syrian’s economic benefit to the
Turkish economy: “Syrians who open small businesses employ Syrians. We
do not need their employment. Our soldiers die while Syrians enjoy smoking



16. These Arabic signs continued to be a hot issue until 2019. When the Interior Minister stat-
    ed that all Arabic signs should be replaced by Turkish ones, the shop owners articulated
    their discontent, arguing that the Arabic signs created unfair competition as Arab tourists
    as well as Syrian migrants preferred to shop from Syrian shops rather than the “local
    ones” (Kam 2019).


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142                                                                Ayşe Seda Yüksel

their water pipes” (GaziantepPusula 2021). Another CHP MP from Gaziantep
accused AKP of insulting the Turkish nation and the city of Gaziantep:
      The government speaks as if the Turkish economy depends on the Syrians.
      These words are insults to our young people, industrialists, and our
      national industry… The EU puts Syrians on a salary to keep them in Turkey
      to protect their border security… A refugee game is played in our country
      (Gaziantepgunes 2021).


Conclusion
    Economic nationalism is an ensemble of nation-framed discourses that
work as “practical categories” (Brubaker 2010: 13). In this article I discussed
how political actors in Turkey, mainly the AKP, use these practical catego-
ries to legitimize their acts and economic agendas. AKP’s militarist-populist
economic nationalism, which defines national interests based on military
strength, regional leadership and expansion, and national survival against
enemies within and outside, is deeply embedded in the economic and politi-
cal dynamics of the Syrian war. These economic dynamics include economic
interests of different segments and institutions in Turkish society – i.e., the
politically realigned Turkish Army as the most significant arms producer, the
new capitalist class growing under the wings of the government, local busi-
ness circles of Gaziantep, local workers demanding the return of refugees. In
AKP’s expansionist economic nationalism, the human cost of the Syrian war
is converted into “an allegedly economic benefit”, and an opportunity to prove
the hitherto underestimated might of the Turkish state in regional and do-
mestic politics.
    The case of Gaziantep illustrates both the transformative power and the
limitations of AKP’s economic nationalism. The welcoming discourses of the
local municipality and local business associations that emphasize the eco-
nomic benefits of the Syrian refugees for Gaziantep’s economy and put their
repatriation in the future as part of the protection policy reveal the power of
AKP’s economic nationalism in capturing local discourses. As Abdelal (Ab-
delal 2018: 24) states, there is no single economic nationalism, but various
economic nationalisms. Compared to the welcoming narratives of the AKP
and politically active business circles in Gaziantep, everyday life in the city
is full of negative discourses about Syrians. Through a strong division of us/
them and a repetitive theme of “economic partiality,” opposition party rep-
resentatives produce counter-economic nationalisms that strengthen the
negative perceptions of Syrians by the locals. In these counter-discourses, the


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“Economic nationalisms” and the immediacy of war                               143

human cost of the Syrian war is converted into an “allegedly political and eco-
nomic cost” and a “burden that is put on the shoulders of the Turkish people”
because of the wrongful policies of the AKP. The discourses by the AKP and
the opposition parties re/define not only the desirable migrant but also rede-
fine the cost of the Syrian war by creating novel bases for discrimination and
exclusion in localities.
   Gaziantep’s case is also a fertile ground to discuss how economic nation-
alisms can be perpetuated through claims and practices of non-state actors
– in this article, business elites. GTO’s proactive political lobbying for work
permits is an example of how demands from below may shape the econom-
ic policies of state actors, albeit in limited ways. However, a close inspection
of the actual work conditions in Gaziantep reveals that Turkey’s Temporary
Protection Program is not as hospitable for the refugees as claimed by AKP’s
economic nationalism. Syrian refugees continue to constitute the backbone
of the informal economy in Gaziantep, and in Turkey, helping to sustain the
economic growth. The discourses on their repatriation are mainly embedded
in an economic vision of the afterlife of the war, which is expected to bring
further economic development via “rebuilding Syria”.




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144                                                                     Ayşe Seda Yüksel

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                                   2022 | Anuac. Vol. 11, n° 2, Dicembre 2022: 127-150
150                                                                         Ayşe Seda Yüksel

  Ayşe Seda Yüksel is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Vienna, Depart-
  ment of Social and Cultural Anthropology. She has written numerous publications
  and reports on the Kurdish issue in Turkey, local development, public policy, and
  Turkish media. Her current research interests include processes of capitalist urban-
  ization, war economies, the Kurdish issue in Turkey, state rescaling, place-promo-
  tion strategies, and legal foundations of neoliberal markets.
  seda.yuksel@univie.ac.at




This work is licensed under the Creative Commons © Ayşe Seda Yüksel
“Economic nationalisms” and the immediacy of war. Turkey’s Syrian policy.
2022 | Anuac. Vol. 11, n° 2, Dicembre 2022: 127-150.
ISSN: 2239-625X - DOI: 10.7340/anuac2239-625X-4932
