10.13135/2036-542X/8113
Stefan Böhm wrote of Theodor Adorno, “Negative dialectics designates a position which includes its own failure, i.e. which produces the truth-effect through its own failure” (Böhm 2006 p. 188). This essay suggests that key humanistic truth-effects arise from the inevitable “failure” of Vattimo’s fundamentally “enlightenment” mode of hermeneutics. Is the inevitable consequence of Vattimo’s philosophical endeavour the “weakening” of hermeneutics itself ? Must hermeneutics fail to succeed? This argument is not so much critical of Vattimo’s account of the relation between hermeneutics and praxis as a thinking with and through his reasoning. The approach acknowledges the enormous achievement of Vattimo’s The End of Modernity which allowed Nietzsche’s nihilism as a post–Kantian metaphysical scepticism to become tractable as a vehicle of historico–philosophical critique. Nietzsche, the first modern philosopher to make a career from deploying the concept of interpretation, initiates a movement of thought which through Vattimo’s singular mediation comes, by implication, to question the possibility of hermeneutics itself. In addressing the very possibility of hermeneutics, or rather, its (inevitable) failure, our argument concerns fundamental horizon–questions concerning the future of hermeneutics. Would hermeneutics as an intellectual orientation prosper better if it were to pass over or to fall silent about the key questions of meaning and truth? As a “hermeneutical essay” the argument which follows is inevitably provisional. The concluding claim suggests that hermeneutics, as conceived by Vattimo should endure its own kenosis and that its defining concern with meaning and interpretation be abandoned in favour of participatory epistemology.
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Nicholas Davey
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Praxis and the Impossibility of Hermeneutics? 
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Nicholas Davey
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Praxis and the Impossibility of Hermeneutics? 
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                                                            trópos • anno IX • numero 1 • 2016 – ISBN 978-88-548-xxxx-x
                                                                DOI 10.4399/97888548xxxxx3 – pag. 25-43 (giugno 2016)




          Praxis and the Impossibility of Hermeneutics?*
                                      Reflections on Vattimo’s Beyond Interpretation
                                                and “The Future of Hermeneutics”

                                                                                  N D**



                                                                   Ever tried? Ever failed? No matter.
                                                                    Try Again. Fail again. Fail better.

                                                                                                      S. B




    : Stefan Böhm wrote of Theodor Adorno, “Negative dialectics designates
       a position which includes its own failure, i.e. which produces the truth-effect
       through its own failure” (Böhm  p.). This essay suggests that key human-
       istic truth-effects arise from the inevitable “failure” of Vattimo’s fundamentally
       “enlightenment” mode of hermeneutics. Is the inevitable consequence of Vat-
       timo’s philosophical endeavour the “weakening” of hermeneutics itself ? Must
       hermeneutics fail to succeed? This argument is not so much critical of Vat-
       timo’s account of the relation between hermeneutics and praxis as a thinking
       with and through his reasoning. The approach acknowledges the enormous
       achievement of Vattimo’s The End of Modernity which allowed Nietzsche’s ni-
       hilism as a post–Kantian metaphysical scepticism to become tractable as a
       vehicle of historico–philosophical critique. Nietzsche, the first modern philoso-
       pher to make a career from deploying the concept of interpretation, initiates a
       movement of thought which through Vattimo’s singular mediation comes, by
       implication, to question the possibility of hermeneutics itself. In addressing the
       very possibility of hermeneutics, or rather, its (inevitable) failure, our argument
       concerns fundamental horizon–questions concerning the future of hermeneu-
       tics. Would hermeneutics as an intellectual orientation prosper better if it were
       to pass over or to fall silent about the key questions of meaning and truth? As
       a “hermeneutical essay” the argument which follows is inevitably provisional.
       The concluding claim suggests that hermeneutics, as conceived by Vattimo
       should endure its own kenosis and that its defining concern with meaning and
       interpretation be abandoned in favour of participatory epistemology.
    : hermeneutics, failure, finitude, understanding, practice.
     ∗
       See G. V, Beyond Interpretation, trans. David Webb, London, Polity, , originally
published as Oltre l’interpretatione, Laterza and Figli, Roma–Bari , and G. V, “The Future
of Hermeneutics”, in The Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics, ed. Jeff Malpas and Hans-Helmuth
Gander, Routledge, London , p. –.
    ∗∗
       Professor of Philosophy at the University of Dundee (jrndavey@dundee.ac.uk).


                                                                                                                   
      Nicholas Davey


. The Meaning of Hermeneutics: Early Questions, Later Answers

Beyond Interpretation is a provocative title. Hermeneutically speaking, there
is always a “beyond” to interpretation, that is, more interpretation. This is the
principle of hermeneutic excess: no interpretation will exhaust the possible
determinations of meaning within its chosen target subject–matter: there is
always more to be said. A substantive point is that only because we interpret,
can the presence of what lies beyond it be disclosed as that which has yet to
be interpreted. Put differently, the meaning of what interpretation brings to
light will always lie ahead of itself, in what it reveals as the yet to be revealed.
In effect, the beyond (oltre) of interpretation keeps interpretation open and
goads it towards a future where it might be graced by the disclosure of the
insight it craves.
    The beyondness and futuriety of interpretation bring two of Vattimo’s
essays on hermeneutics into productive alignment: Beyond Interpretation
and “The Future of Hermeneutics” which provides (ominously so for the
hermeneutically minded) “The Conclusion” to Routledge’s Handbook of
Hermeneutics. If, as Beyond Interpretation suggests, meaning lies in what sur-
passes interpretation, that is, in one of its as yet unrealised determinations,
then, the meaning of hermeneutics does indeed reside in a disclosure al-
ready approaching. It is this spectre which Vattimo discusses as the “The
Future of Hermeneutics.” This is not suggesting that he seeks to colonise
that future. To the contrary, Gadamer’s reasoning seems to shape the ar-
gument: our present hermeneutic practices are implicitly guided by and
drawn towards what they project as anticipations of their completeness.
We will explore both the arc of Vattimo’s argument that links the 
volume and the  essay and reflect on the implications of the conclusion
of the latter essay, namely, that the future of hermeneutics must involve its
transformation into a practical philosophy or philosophy of praxis.

     The future of hermeneutics must take the form of the transformation of hermeneu-
     tics into a practical philosophy or philosophy of praxis [. . . ]

     There is no object proper to hermeneutical thought that is better understood,
     described or represented (as) through the development of hermeneutics into an
     explicit philosophy of praxis. (Vattimo, , p. )


   In important respects, Vattimo’s development of hermeneutics into an
explicit philosophy of praxis is a response to a challenge laid down by
Gadamer. In the essay of , “Classical and Philosophical Hermeneutics”,
an essay invited by editors of the Italian publication Enciclopedia del Novecento
(), he writes,
                                         Praxis and the Impossibility of Hermeneutics?        


   Hermeneutics understood in this wider universal sense moves into the region of
   “practical philosophy,” a region which Joachim Ritter and his school, finding them-
   selves situated in the midst of the German tradition of transcendental philosophy,
   tried to revive. Philosophical hermeneutics is aware of what it could mean to move
   in this direction. A theory of the praxis of understanding is obviously theory and
   not practice, but a theory of practices is still not some kind of technique, nor is it
   an effort to make societal practice more scientific. Rather, hermeneutics offers a
   philosophical reflection on the limits of all scientific and technical control of nature
   and of society. These limits are truths that need to be defended against the modern
   concept of science, and defending these truths is one of the most important tasks
   of philosophical hermeneutics. (Gadamer, , p. )

    Vattimo too infers that a “poetics” of hermeneutical reason offers soft–
power resistance to the dictatorial tendencies of managerial thinking. How-
ever, the above passage reveals a Gadamerian prejudice that is not unprob-
lematic for Vattimo’s espousal of hermeneutics as a philosophy of praxis.
Hermeneutical reasoning may define itself by placing the (epistemological)
“limits” of both science and technology into question but what of its own
limits? If understanding is related to limit–experiences, how is praxis itself
to be understood? What are its limits?
    The question of limit shapes our discussion. We shall suggest () that the
limits of praxis lie in what comes to us as future experiences of negativity.
() Experiences of limit or, in Vattimo’s terms, moments of “weakening”,
mark, we suggest, both the birth of “hermeneutic reflection” and the end
of hermeneutics as a distinct method or mode of philosophy. Vattimo
associates his philosophy of weakening with the transition of hermeneutics
from “a rationally grounded understanding of texts” to “the thinking of a
general ontology” (Vattimo, , p. ). Our substantive claim is that in
the two essays under discussion Vattimo succeeds in a certain way of going
“beyond” Vattimo. With all due consistency, Vattimo’s nihilistic reduction
of metaphysics culminates in the weakening of hermeneutics itself.

   Our thesis is simply stated: the formal impossibilities of hermeneutic practice
   culminate in the birth of hermeneutic reflection and, furthermore, that this birth
   marks the end of methodical hermeneutics as traditionally conceived. Vattimo’s
   argument that hermeneutics must become an explicit philosophy of praxis will, in
   its very exposition, dissolve any conception of hermeneutics as a specific method
   or conceptual device. Whereas Gadamer claims that hermeneutical philosophy
   dissolves itself into praxis, Vattimo’s position implies that praxis dissolves hermeneu-
   tical “philosophy” understood in any substantive sense. The implication is clear,
   the consequence of saying goodbye to truth and meaning is also having to bid a
   “farewell” to hermeneutics. How final this addio is, we shall see.

   This essay will explore how the questions asked in the  essay about
“the beyond of interpretation” culminate in the principal claim of the 
      Nicholas Davey


essay that the future of hermeneutics resides in its transformation into a
philosophy of praxis. For reasons that become increasingly clear, this paper
is positively disposed to the practice–turn in hermeneutics. However, the
conclusion of the  essay that hermeneutics re–thought as a philosophy
of practice that “will draw the world ever closer to being what for Hegel
(and afterwards for Marx) is the place of the spirit, where the spirit feels
itself finally (but never thoroughly) at home” (Vattimo, , p. ) is, we
shall argue, open to serious challenge. I do not intend to debate whether this
remnant of Hegelian thought plays the role of a necessary organising fiction
in Vattimo’s hermeneutics (much in the same way that Gadamer’s “antic-
ipation of completeness” does in his). However, I will question whether
the centrality of praxis in hermeneutics will ever succeed in allowing the
hermeneutic agent to ever feel at home in the world. There is, perhaps,
an analogy here between Schubert’s Winterreise and Vattimo”s argumen-
tation: the consequence of dissolving hermeneutics as method is that the
hermeneutical agent (the journeying spirit) can never return to itself. If the
aim of praxis is to facilitate that return, then the question is simply whether
hermeneutics construed as a de–alienating praxis is doomed to fail?
    What renders Vattimo’s concluding appeal to praxis problematic is that
() there is (literally) a world of difference between turning hermeneutics
towards an explicit “philosophy” of practice and recognising the operation of
praxis within hermeneutics. If the operation of praxis is recognised as driving
hermeneutics towards the question of future orientated meaning, the future
of hermeneutics can never, arguably, conclude. () If hermeneutics is turned
towards an explicit philosophy of praxis, then, will it not have to confront
what Gadamer calls “the indissoluble problem of its rational application”?
(Gadamer, , p.). In other words, hermeneutic praxis always faces
the possibility of its failure. () If hermeneutics is to be developed into a
“philosophy of praxis” how does Vattimo avoid realising precisely the fear
articulated in Beyond Interpretation, namely, that hermeneutics becomes just
one philosophy amongst others? Let us turn directly to some of the key
arguments in that text.




     . The conclusion is anticipated in Farewell to Truth where Vattimo writes at its close, “The
absolute character of the spirit consists, for us, not in the fact (as the still somewhat Cartesian
Hegel perhaps thinks) of being near to itself in the most total certainty and self–transparency but
in constituting the only end which all objective attainments, the pragmatic truths, may aim as the
authentic, never totally given, overcoming of every form of alienation.” p. . A Farewell to Truth,
Columbia University Press, .
                                       Praxis and the Impossibility of Hermeneutics?     


. Beyond Interpretation

Beyond Interpretation opens with an historical observation: in contemporary
philosophy, hermeneutics has acquired an ‘ecumenical’ form so vague
and generic that it is loosing much of its meaning (Vattimo , p. ix).
Given the variety of philosophical thinkers associated with hermeneutics,
Vattimo confesses that it is hard to avoid the thought that “the contemporary
pervasiveness of hermeneutic seems to have come about at the expense
of a dilution of its original philosophical meaning” (Vattimo , p. ).
It is, of course, dangerous to invoke the notion of an original name for
hermeneutics. If the Word was in the beginning, ambiguity, and hence
hermeneutics has also been with us from the beginning. A Heideggerian
move would be more appropriate: the origin of hermeneutics lies in what it
originates. The argument should shift to the productivity of hermeneutics,
to reflective on engagement and participation rather than on any notion
of hermeneutics as a specific philosophy or method. What hermeneutic
reflection occasions are epiphanies of the meaningful arising from the
accidents of interpretative practice. However, we need a philosophical route
to such a position. The initial steps derive from Vattimo’s question, what is
the meaning of hermeneutics for contemporary philosophy?
    There is substance to Vattimo’s initial worries. The context of his question
concerns the manifest assimilation of hermeneutics within the array of tradi-
tional philosophical dogmatics. This renders hermeneutics as one method
of interpretation amongst others. Vattimo’s criticism could be harsher. If
hermeneutics is one of many methodological tools available to the human
subject, it becomes a vehicle of the subject, a tool for over–coming hin-
drances and obstacles that challenge or, to use Wittgenstein’s phrase, its sense
of knowing how to go on. Hermeneutics becomes a problem–solving tool
kit. This minimalizes the ability of hermeneutics to put our instrumentalist
pre–conceptions to the test. Worse, this “normalisation” of hermeneutics
ignores the nihilistic “weakening” of the very subject–based tradition of epis-
temology that grounds such instrumentalism. Normalisation anaestheticizes
“instrumentalist” hermeneutics to its status as a will to power.
    The question, “What is the Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy?” is
not ex vacuo. It emerges from within what Vattimo respectfully appropriates
as Nietzsche’s history of nihilism coming to self–awareness.

   What I relate is the history of the next centuries: I describe what is coming, what
   can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism [. . . ]

   What does nihilism mean? That the highest devaluate themselves. The aim is
   lacking; “why?” finds no answer. (Nietzsche, , p.  and ).
    Nicholas Davey


    Nietzsche is not just concerned with a radical subjectivisation of truth
claims. His observation that “a critique of being is still this being” suggests
something ontological: critical thinking is enabled by and discloses a his-
torical movement. Nietzsche’s “weakening” or worldly re–appropriation
of the metaphysics of being is linked by Vattimo to Heidegger’s notions of
weak Being and his related tactic of Destruktion. The occurrence of Being
in Heidegger’s ontology is presented by Vattimo as a weak force, an un-
noticed and marginal back ground event (Vattimo,  p. –). However,
(and here the Biblical analogy is appropriate) such “weakness” “inherits”
the earth ( Vattimo, , p. ). Heidegger’s return to the question of Being
is doubly apocalyptic. () Apokalypsis meaning “uncovering” is translated
literally from the Greek as a disclosure of something hidden. () Apoca-
lypse in the Biblical sense refers to the coming millennium of “end of age”.
Heidegger’s revelation of the apocalytic character of Being announces “the
end to the age of philosophical modernity”. The related hermeneutics of
Destruktion clears the edifices of metaphysics, their claims to truth having
covered up and placed beyond remembrance the “forgotten question of
Being”. The history of metaphysics emerges, then, as a palimpsest revealing
many forgotten philosophical pentimenti. Vattimo’s hermeneutics similarly
“weakens” the edifices of metaphysics, stripping them of their universal
claims and exposing them as particular responses to the distinguishing ques-
tions of a particular time and age. Recovering the ‘truth” or the “meaning
of hermeneutics” is, then, for Vattimo an act of participation, an act of local-
ising and rendering–particular a contemporary meaning for hermeneutics.
It animates a wider received tradition of questioning and is not the recov-
ery of a supposed “authentic” original doctrine. To ask after the meaning
of hermeneutics is, then, to turn to its effects, to turn to what it does or
brings about as a practise and to participate in what the practice brings
discloses. This is true of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. The logic of Vattimo’s
case, however, implies a weakening of hermeneutics itself.
    The historical logic of weakening (or what might be described as ap-
plicative dissemination) implies that hermeneutics, initially received as a
philosophical category and then as a method, must itself become subject to
weakening through the exercise of its own interpretive practices. In outline,
we might say that the nihilistic logic of weakening announces itself with
an act of epiphany, an announcement, or an evidential experience. Vattimo
follows Pareyson in this respect: “If philosophy is the verbal and speculative
translation of revelatory and ontological thought, its task is to vindicate
the revelatory and ontological nature that every human activity, including
practical action, can have in itself ” (Vattimo, , p. ). However, once an
evidentiary truth is hypostasised by philosophical or religious tradition as a
substantive truth worthy of assimilation, the process of nihilistic weakening
                                  Praxis and the Impossibility of Hermeneutics?   


commences. As Nietzsche understood, it is in the pursuit of truth that the
will to truth discovers “truth” to be one of its own interpretations. Vattimo
understands that this process neither ends in relativism nor subjectivism.
Rather, the re–appropriation of a major philosophical category as having
no metaphysical truth independent of its localised usages, renders the term
“tractable” in various different discourses. Such usages are no longer depen-
dent upon the general authority of fixed definitions or canons of meaning.
Rather, part of a term’s history of weakening is the process of its dissem-
ination into specific communities of debate. Weakening has a theological
resonance: Deus caritas est. Just as God gave of himself by coming to earth
in the form of his son, so too as in the history of weakening, the concepts of
metaphysics are brought to earth in pragmatically utilisable ideas (Vattimo,
, p. ). Vattimo claims, accordingly, that the process of weakening in
which the “true world” is rendered a fable, does not result in more profound
or reliable truth but gives way to a play of interpretations each of which are
subject to negotiation and debate. This allows Vattimo to shift hermeneuti-
cal engagement towards socio–political contestation. It is a key move and
suggests that a commitment to socially engaged interpretive praxis is a
plausible way of escaping the disabling scepticism of deconstructive theory.
    Vattimo’s thesis concerning weakening poses an irony. Both the secu-
larisation of religion and the weakening of metaphysics are customarily
associated with Enlightenment critiques of rationalist theology. Yet, “weak-
ening” considered as a historical process reveals itself as a teleology of
secularisation. This serves to re–appropriate theology from the negativity of
Enlightenment critique and, what is more, to subject the latter to a weaken-
ing critique itself. Enlightenment reasoning may have dislodged theology
from divine authority but such reasoning is itself tainted with the repressive
authority of reason as a will to power. However, once “truth” becomes a
matter of negotiation and interpretive exchange, truth as the “thus shall it
be” of the powerful is formally weakened and made available to all who
participate in social discourse. Enlightenment reasoning is, in effect decon-
structed and surpassed by a theological teleology of coming–to earth. If,
within this teleology, it is Enlightenment reason that secularises theology, it
is a secularised theology which in turn democratises Enlightenment reason
and underpins Vattimo’s appeal to praxis.
    That Vattimo should appeal for a turn from hermeneutic theory to en-
gaged praxis is consistent is consistent with the notion of the “intellettuale
organico” or public intellectual, a notion which like that of praxis emanates
from Antonio Gramsci (Benso and Schroeder, , p. ). The concept of
praxis is first articulated in the modern period by August von Cieszkowsk
in the volume Prolegomena zur Historosophie (). This is described as “an
auto–activity” (Selbsttätigkeit), that is, a liberation of action that opens up
       Nicholas Davey


the historical space of transformation and self–consciousness (Cassin, ,
p.). The connections with the German term Bildung are plain. Vattimo’s
own appeal to a filosofia della prassi derives from Gramsci’s Prison Note-
books (Quaderni del carcere, –). Core to Gramsci’s Hegelian notion
of the state as an organically evolving process of cultural hegemony and
democratisation, is the idea of an unfinished and uneven process concerned
with bringing about a collective praxis (ibid). Jan Luis Segundo suggests
that if thinkers are to be considered “organic intellectuals” of the common
people they must be charged with understanding popular democratic aspi-
rations and religious faith: the “intellettuale organico aims to understand a
people’s understanding of their political and religious faith and to explore
and act on the social possibilities that reside within it” (Rowland, , p.
). Étienne Balibar comments,

     It (praxis) essentially takes the form of a tendential transition between the passivity
     that class dominate imposes on “subaltern” social groups (what Gramsci calls “the
     economico–corporative stage’) and the “intellectual and moral reform” that is
     supposed to allow them to become actors in their own history (and in this sense
     seems to return strictly to the Aristotelian definition of motion: “The fulfilment of
     what is potential as potential. . . ”). (Cassin, , pp. –).

    The connection with Vattimo’s history of weakening is clear. The role
of the hermeneutic practitioner is to engage with the historical process
of weakening religious and metaphysical ideas so as to allow them to be
used locally and with emancipatory effect amongst the full diversity of the
human community. An analogy with Liberation Theology is clear: whereas
speaking in the name of the poor Liberation Theology uses the Bible “to
dialogue with and engage with the oppressive reality of their community”
(Rowlands,, p. ), Vattimo uses hermeneutic weakening to undo the
political authority of received tradition. However, a key question remains.
    Must not the dynamics of actual hermeneutic practice resist and undo
the teleological framework that Vattimo sets for it? If hermeneutic practice
is ‘“an auto–activity” that opens a historical space of transformation and
self–consciousness, what guarantees its compliance with the emancipatory
framework of reasoning which allegedly guides it? Is it also assumed that
“weakening” is inherently progressive? Furthermore, “weakening” is mani-
festly guided by values related to enlightenment and emancipation but are
these terms immune from hermeneutic criticism? Given these questions,
the meaning of hermeneutics remains unclear and, given its historical prove-
nance, perhaps appropriately so. Furthermore, in the context of the history
of nihilistic weakening, does the hermeneutics itself remain tractable? If
meaning and truth become become questions of negotiated consensus and
communalisation, must we not meet with the dissipation of any universal
                                   Praxis and the Impossibility of Hermeneutics?   


hermeneutical “philosophy”? What is more, if hermeneutic practice in-
evitably fragments, differentiates and disperses fixed meaning, why should
it establish a momentum towards overcoming humankind’s alleged alien-
ation from itself ? Christopher Rowland describes praxis in the following
way: “praxis: action, a term often used in liberation theology to describe
the actions and commitments which provide the context for theological
reflection (Rowland, , p. xvii). Gadamer makes a similar point about
hermeneutic reflection. However, he does so in such a way as to question
the ability of praxis to arrive at any pre–conceived goal. All these points
present as we shall see certain difficulties for Vattimo’s general position.
    The essay Beyond Interpretation argues with good cause that hermeneu-
tics is not just one amongst several“methods” of doing philosophy. Nor
is it just a history of ideas but something more radical. If hermeneutics
concerns itself with the question of meaning, both its own meaning and
the meaning of its relation to philosophy must constantly be called into
question: its being is always a being–in–question. If hermeneutics has a
discernible identity it is a militant self–questioning identity. And yet to raise
the question of meaning is to confess, as Heidegger knew, that one is al-
ready in and responsive to the wider play of historical and cultural meaning.
It is to witness how what is at stake in that implicit play has raised itself
explicitly into reflexive consciousness. However, the process of calling into
question suggests a distance from what is questioned. This has important
consequences for our argument.
    The lifting into reflexive consciousness of what is at play in the interplay
of interpretive processes, demarcates a point of distanciation. The emer-
gence of reflective consciousness is, arguably, the emergence of hermeneutic
awareness. Hermeneutic awareness of the arising of new possibilities in a
text or situation is synonymous with the moment an interpretive engage-
ment has failed. Nietzsche provides the precedent: the liberating awareness
that anything is possible arises in the moment when traditional modes of
approaching “truth” fail. This suggests that reflexive distanciation is a neces-
sary consequence of hermeneutics considered as praxis. Gadamer suggests
that the incommensurability of Being and knowledge guarantees that praxis
will fail. Hermeneutic reflection in effect emerges in such moments of
emergency. The link between the arguments of the  and  essay con-
cerning the meaning of hermeneutics appeals, then, to a transition within
hermeneutics itself, from hermeneutics conceived as a “rationally grounded
understanding of texts” to the thinking of a general ontology.” The shift
to hermeneutics ontologically conceived allows Vattimo to locate the pro-
cess of interpretation in the historical, as part of and as an agency in the
transformation of metaphysical and theological ideas into forms of socially
engaged praxis. If so, the move to praxis effectively dissolves hermeneutics
     Nicholas Davey


as a “philosophy” or a philosophical method and, perhaps, justifiably so.
More important, if hermeneutic praxis interprets texts of an emancipatory
potential it will, as we shall presently argue, inevitably render their key terms
problematic. The implications of these points must now be explored.


. The Saving Weakness of Hermeneutics

Beyond Interpretation argues that hermeneutics is not a simply a poetic vocab-
ulary: “the novelty and importance of hermeneutics ultimately consists in
the affirmation that the rational (argumentative) interpretation of history is
not scientific in the positivistic sense and yet neither is it purely “aesthetic”.
The task of contemporary hermeneutics seems to be that of articulating in
an ever more complete and explicit form, this original inspiration; which
means furthermore the task of corresponding responsibly to the appeal aris-
ing from its inheritance” (Vattimo, , p. ). The conceptual transition at
issue is that which passes from accepting hermeneutics as the transmission
and application of “received meanings” to regarding hermeneutics as the
praxis of negotiating the meaningful. Formally, speaking the pursuit of
such praxis will be compromised by the ontology that sustains it i.e. the
incommensurability of Being and knowing. This suggests that in formal
respects the “experience” of practice and its limits renders hermeneutics as
a methodological praxis formally impossible.
    Scepticism is not new to hermeneutics. What Ricoeur calls the hermeneu-
tics of suspicion has long been a strong element in hermeneutic thought
from Nietzsche, Marx and Freud through to Derrida. We might say that
even without deliberating on the question of praxis, philosophical hermeneu-
tics remains vulnerable to its own failure. The key points are as follows:

     a) The Hermeneutical Differential. To understand a subject–matter is
        to differentiate my understanding of what is understood from that
        which is understood. Understanding is not therefore a unitary but
        rather a differential process: it depends on an unclose–able differen-
        tial space.
     b) Hermeneutical Finitude.
           — All understanding is finite, arrived at from a singular perspective,
               from a specific tradition, or outlook. It is, therefore, impossible
               to anticipate all the effects that an object–understood can may
               have across the range of perspectives that engage with it.
           — Understanding is finite because subject to change. The objects,
               processes and circumstances of our understanding are always
               in motion.
                                   Praxis and the Impossibility of Hermeneutics?   


         — Consciousness can never grasp the totality of the relations of
           which it is a part: we are always more than we will ever know
           ourselves to. Whereas for Heidegger, Being precedes and is
           in excess of the beings that know it, for Gadamer Being is not
           so much incommensurable with being known but exceeds all
           knowing.
   c) Hermeneutical Incompleteness: If all linguistic meaning is indeterminate,
      there is always more that can be said of a subject–matter. There is
      no formal closure to hermeneutics.
   d) Hermeneutic Remainder. From the above, follows the axiom of excess
      or remainder: any statement of “x” will always invoke “x+”, i.e. those
      unstated (speculative) determinations of meaning which enable any
      understanding of x (Davey, , p. –.)
   e) Hermeneutical Incommensurability: Given that the range of meanings
      attached to a subject matter is indeterminate, no finite interpretation
      of a subject–matter can be fully commensurate with its object.

    Vattimo acknowledges many of these axioms: “the history of modern
hermeneutics and, so far as we can imagine, also its future is a history of
excess, the transgression of limits, or, to use another idiom, the history
of continuous ‘overflowing’ (Vattimo, , p. ) These limiting axioms
derive from the internal logic of hermeneutic procedures and render im-
possible any hermeneutic endeavour to make or endorse a universal truth
claim or to it render it fully explicable. The purpose, here, is not to establish
a hermeneutical via negativa but rather to mark its theoretical limits which,
interestingly enough, are more discernible because of the key historical
mover in Vattimo’s argument, the process of ontologisation itself.
    The axioms summarised set the formal limits to hermeneutic reasoning.
Because they are not just epistemological limits but ontological limits, they
set the limits against which practical wisdom in hermeneutics becomes
possible, that is, the wisdom that arises from the experience of hermeneu-
tic failure. What Vattimo’s arguments clarify after Heidegger is that the
ontologisation of hermeneutics spells the end of hermeneutics as an episte-
mological project. Interpretation can never formally overcome that which
resists its capture i.e. that excess or remainder which will always taunt in-
terpretation for its incompleteness. However, it could be suggested that
the weak point of hermeneutical thought is also its saving grace. Only
when practice stumbles on its hermeneutical limits are the humanising
truths of practice not so much shown but demonstrated. The collision of
hermeneutic’s epistemological projects with their ontological grounding
will (inevitably) frustrate them. However, it is precisely at such points of
      Nicholas Davey


collision or failure that hermeneutical reflexivity arises. To state the matter
more baldly, hermeneutic philosophy (considered as method) must fail in
order that hermeneutic reflexivity can emerge. The failure of hermeneutic
praxis broadly conceived, is the condition of the emergence of hermeneutic
reflexivity, or better put, hermeneutic reflexivity is a truth–effect, the saving
grace of failed practice.


. Failures of Practice

The limiting conditions of hermeneutic understanding reveal a human–
predicament: we cannot know it all. The epistemological scepticism of
hermeneutic thinking stems from an ontological radicalisation of the part–
whole relationship: our thinking is indeed part of a whole nexus of re-
lationships which though it grounds our thinking, our thinking cannot
grasp. Thus, the limits of hermeneutical thinking are as both Gadamer
and Vattimo understand, the limits of managerial planning. Nevertheless,
uncertainty drives the need for decisive action. Hermeneutics is always
translational by nature: to apply the generalised understanding of literature,
history, and science to pressing individual situations requires a practical
turn. To his credit Vattimo notes how hermeneutics considered as praxis
is inexorably wedded to the Kantian tradition of practical judgement. He
comments,

     Of Aesthetic and Hermeneutic rationality: It’s a difference that picks up the question
     of the linkage in Kant between The Critique of Pure Reason and The Critique of
     Judgement. Although orthodox Kantians may find the proposition audacious, to
     me it seems clear that the Kantian intellect can function as an organ of objective
     knowledge of the world, that is, be universally valid, on the basis of the community
     that is established, in a manner ever historical and eventual, among subjects who
     share the aesthetic experience. Not just in their appreciation of the same works of
     art or natural beauty but in the acknowledgment of the same civil, religious and
     mythical models [. . . ] (Vattimo, , p. ).

    This observation is not developed though it offers clear philosophical
grounds for the important claim that technical and practical judgement is
more closely linked to aesthetical and rhetorical modes of judgement than
is commonly supposed. Indeed, as Habermas understood, when it comes to
social and cultural application, technology and science are dependent upon
rhetorical judgements. Yet all practical judgements are fallible and not just
because of the ontological limitations that circumscribe any action.
    All practical judgements are, by definition, vulnerable to failure for
three reasons. () Practice is obliged to treat the knowledge available to
                                  Praxis and the Impossibility of Hermeneutics?   


it as complete and certain and, in consequence, always runs the risk of
getting its judgements wrong. () Practice involves choice and decision
between possibilities: such decisions are are always potentially subject to
refutation by events. () Practice delivers its products into an uncertainty of
uses over which it does not preside (Gadamer, , p. ). This can lead to
unexpected successes as well as unintended consequences: “every addition
to knowledge is, regarding its significance and consequences, unpredictable”
(Gadamer, . p. ). Particular practical judgements can always produce,
in principle, entirely unexpected effects.
    These observations suggest why any hermeneutical practice considered
either as the application of a technique or as a method of understanding
will always be potentially subject possible failure. They imply that the mo-
ment of hermeneutic reflexivity coming into being is the moment when
hermeneutic techniques or applied practices are experienced as failing. Put
more strongly, hermeneutic reflexivity is a truth–effect of hermeneutic fail-
ure. In this respect, hermeneutics has something in common with Adorno’s
thought: “Negative dialectics (hermeneutics) designates a position which
includes its own failure, i.e. which produces the truth–effect through its
own failure” (Böhm, , p. ). Gadamer’s account of the negativity of
experience is, in this context, telling.
    Any evidential experience or insight is inseparable from a moment of
conscious experience. This is always an experience of self–consciousness —
the “experience” is the experience that consciousness has of itself (Gadamer,
, ). In this moment, the experiencer becomes aware of her experience,
she becomes experienced (ibid). Heidegger, Gadamer and Vattimo all accept
that in the experience of Being, art, poetry or music something fundamental
is announced. Yet there is always something negative in such epiphanic
events: “experience is always negative” and embodies the ancient axiom
pathei mathos (learning through suffering). Thus, coming to self reflection,
to hermeneutical reflection and to the experience of distanciation are all
the emergent consequences of practical failure. “Every experience worthy
of the name,” Gadamer suggests, runs counter to expectation” (Gadamer
, p.). We come to see things that we sense we should have seen
and, simultaneously, become aware of our both our ignorance and of our
arrogance. The formal asymmetry of Being and knowing underwrites
the inevitability of practical failure and places a major qualification against
Vattimo’s optimism that hermeneutic praxis offers a route to the overcoming
of alienation. Not only is hermeneutical reflexivity born of practical failure
but in its pursuit of praxis it is unavoidably subject to the possibility of
further failure. The possibility of hermeneutic reflection is premised on the
(formal) impossibility of hermeneutic practice.
    Nicholas Davey


    Yet there is a positivity in the negative dialectic of hermeneutic experi-
ence. The moment of failure (which is also the moment of consciousness
becoming self–aware) marks another truth–effect: the emergence of prac-
tical wisdom. The negativity of experience is synonymous with humans
becoming aware of their finitude. In this, the limits of self–knowledge and
practical reasoning are discovered (Gadamer, , p. ). In these moments
of failure we do not so much as catch but become caught out by what is
at play within our practices. In so many words, failure discloses the extent
of the practical ignorance that underlies our practical engagements. We
become undone by the incommensurabilities between being and knowing,
between being and our conscious doing. The wise practitioner has, then,
become aware of the extent of his past practical ignorance, of his blindness
to what was and is at play in those judgements. The emergence of practical
wisdom can be characterised, then, as the truth–effect of failed practice
which has knowingly arrived at its limits. However, the wise practitioner
also knows that he or she has become knowingly ignorant, that, all future
practice must remain wisely circumspect of its limits and of the unavoidable
likelihood of failure. According to this line of argument and contrary to
Vattimo’s own, hermeneutic reflexivity is born of the very practices that
are meant to resolve alienation and distanciation. However, the sporadic
emergence of practical wisdom will, collectively, have one effect — the
grounding of a democracy of failure.
    If success in modern popular culture individuates, failure promises a
collective bond. In this respect, Vattimo and Gadamer are similarly orien-
tated “spiritually.” For Gadamer, failures of judgement and an attendant
awareness of previous short–sightedness brings what he defines as a “reli-
gious experience”: the human is stripped bare and revealed in all its fragility
(Gadamer, , p. ). Whereas he emphasises the Classical dimensions of
the experience — “it is ultimately a religious insight — the kind of insight
that gave birth of Greek Tragedy” — Vattimo stresses the Christian — the
nakedness of all humans before their weakness. Let us return to our main
theme.
    Hermeneutical reflection has to be thought of as emerging from and
being a consequence of moments of failure within that practice. It is neither
a meta–reflection on practical involvements nor a separate commentary on
them. The value of Vattimo’s approach to hermeneutics is that it offers a
“weakening” of hermeneutics, a dissolution of its status as a methodological
tool and a revaluation of it as a speculative revelation of our mode of being.
It is not, therefore, a question of “a hermeneutics of practice“but rather of a
“hermeneutical thinking” (a dwelling on the meaning, purpose or direction
of one’s practices), thinking that is an element of and an essential accompa-
niment to practice and its disclosures. Adapting one of Gadamer’s remarks,
                                          Praxis and the Impossibility of Hermeneutics?         


we might say that, Hermeneutic) reflection is the capacity to adopt a certain
distance towards oneself and is not the same as a relation of opposition
towards an object. Rather, hermeneutic reflection is brought into play in
such a way that it accompanies the lived performance of task: hermeneutic re-
flection is a capacity to sustain thought along with the performance of a task.
A tangential remark is also made by Gadamer in the  essay “Citizens of
Two Worlds”: hermeneutics as

   practical philosophy is not the application of theory to praxis [. . . ] but arises itself
   from the experience of praxis due to the reason and reasonableness inherent in it
   (Gadamer, , p. ).

    Hermeneutic reflection is, then, the coming to be reflectively aware of
what is performatively at play in the practical experience of understanding
(Gadamer, , p.). This implies that the experience of distanciation,
alienation and failure is in–dissociable from reflexive hermeneutic conscious-
ness. Yet Gadamer insists, “this distance [. . . ] is what closest to us as human
beings: “it is the distance within which we live.” (Gadamer, , p. ).
The conclusion is problematic for Vattimo’s optimism. If hermeneutical
reflection arises as a “truth effect of practice”, there is no resolution to
nor an over–coming of the differences and the distanciations that are at the
root of practice. If hermeneutic reflection cannot dissolve the excess and
incommensurability that it depends on for its being, Vattimo’s dream for
hermeneutics as a philosophy of praxis is challenged. Since differentiation,
excess and incommensurability constitute the very being of hermeneutic
reflection, there is, it would seem, no way that such reflection “will draw
the world ever closer to being what Hegel (and afterwards for Marx) is the
place of the spirit, where the spirit feels itself finally but never thoroughly at
home” (Vattimo,  p. )


Conclusion: The Practice that Makes a Difference

Perhaps it is Vattimo’s strong allegiance to Heidegger’s notion of a destiny
of Being that prompts him to choose his “authenticity” as residing with
commitment within and hence furthering the “destiny–tradition” of post–
metaphysical (Christian) secular thought. Given Vattimo’s insight into the
cul–de–sac of deconstructive hermeneutics — the anything–goes nihilism of
indifference — his commitment to a hermeneutics of praxis is not without
justification. If Beyond Interpretation culminates in the scepsis there is only
interpretation, the question becomes what interpretation do we knowingly
chose? Vattimo argues we are already essentially involved in a process into
      Nicholas Davey


which we are always already thrown — the history of weakening which is
the destiny of Being — and that we have to remain true (authentic) to this
process. “The theoretical choice for hermeneutics and the specific choices
of our interpretive activity have to be guided by listening attentively to the
messages of the Schickung” (Vattimo, , ). This is the context in which
the  essay on “The Future of Hermeneutics” commits to a philosophy
of praxis which is presented as a willful and engaged continuance of the
process of opening which constitutes an on–going emancipation from the
repressive structures of religion, metaphysics and politics. On one level,
Vattimo is surely right. Choice and commitment is always demanded of
human beings. Only loyalty to chosen values offers an escape from decon-
structive scepticism in which anything can be said about anything. But is a
commitment to the values of post–Christian Enlightenment secularism the
only a viable response to Heidegger’s announcement of the event of Being?
Even if it were, would that commitment not be constantly undermined by
the internal dynamics of the very hermeneutic practices employed to realise
those values? However, although Vattimo can claim that this commitment
to a post–Christian Enlightenment secularism is a legitimate outcome of a
history of weakening, that history is but one reading of that event. Heideg-
ger certainly associates the eventual nature of Being with the inauguration
of historical epochs but it is precisely that eventual nature (and its associated
doctrine of the withheld) which installs the incommensurability between
Being and knowing. This suggests another understanding of Being, one
which is closer to the process–philosophies of Heraclitus, Nietzsche and
Nishitani and one which emphasises the fact that Being is essentially a mys-
terium which though it may reveal itself post–factum in history, nevertheless,
escapes all historical reduction? The incommensurability between Being
and knowing which Gadamer quietly insists on is bound to question (as
it clearly does) the folly of all human planning and social prediction and
to ask in consequence whether a Marxist conception of social organisation
is but another managerial form? In contrast, the notion of nothingness
which is at the heart of Buddhist approach to eventual Being is ethically
open to the wonder and mystery of all beings in their joys and suffering
independent of historical or social circumstance. These points reveal a
more fundamental contrast between Vattimo’s and Gadamer’s conception
of hermeneutic practice over the issue of whether tradition is to be mo-
bilised politically or whether tradition is something that we participate in
but can never instrumentalize.
    In Beyond Interpretation Vattimo argues,

     If hermeneutics has no source of validity beyond its belonging to an Überlieferung
     which is specifically that of modern thought, its relation with this tradition will
                                    Praxis and the Impossibility of Hermeneutics?   


   have to be thought in different and far more positive terms than those which
   characterise Gadamer’s position in Truth and Method. (Vattimo, , p. ).

    Vattimo argues that hermeneutics must be conceived as an attempt to
grasp the meaning of the transformation (of the idea) of Being that has been
produced as a techno–scientific rationalisation of our world. He concedes
that the meaning of history is not a fact to be recognised. Nevertheless, “the
guiding thread of history appears, is given, only in an act of interpretation
that is confirmed in dialogue with other possible interpretations and that, in
the final analysis, leads to a modification of the actual situation in a way that
makes the interpretation ‘true’” (Vattimo, , p. ). However, despite the
qualification, the argument still amounts to the appropriation of a tradition
by a populist majority and what it conceives as the emancipatory end of its
collective history or destiny. As Kolokovski warns any instrumentalisation
by the majority has a hint of authoritarianism about it. Gadamer overtly
avoids such instrumentalism and rightly so (see Kolakowski, )
    Tradition for Gadamer is the world already at play within our experiences
of culture and language. Tradition broadly conceived as the transmitted
enabling pre–conceptions of our thinking and speaking transcends both but
can never be contained by either. Though it may be moderated post–factum
by the judgements that it facilitates, Gadamer’s notion of tradition represents
a structure more radical than that which Vattimo claims to guide modernity.
Despite his debt to Heidegger, Vattimo remains socially and politically an
Enlightenment figure. Gadamer’s response to history is at once both more
classical and more protestant, classical in the sense that he is concerned
with how the historical past challenges our contemporary pre–conceptions
and protestant in as much as he eschews any collective response to those
challenges. Not only does Gadamer’s overwhelming sense of historical fini-
tude make him sceptical of any form of organised social planning but his
emphasis on dialogue neither aims at consensus nor at a collectively agreed
“truth”. Rather, participating in collective debate is to be brought to a point
whereby we may begin to conceive of our individual horizons differently.
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics remains dominated by the classical
virtue of reflective distance. Vattimo’s hermeneutics is shaped by a different
virtue: its praxis aims to articulate and fulfil a historical drive towards the
elimination of distanciation and alienation. In such matters, Vattimo’s and
Gadamer’s notion of hermeneutic practice are profoundly at odds.
    Before we turn to the positive inheritance of Vattimo’s argument, a con-
cern about the idealistic dimensions of his emancipatory praxis remains.
How does Vattimo protect it against disillusion and disappointment? In
The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche speaks of the “disaster slumbering in the
womb of theoretical culture.” This concerns arriving at what is, in effect, a
    Nicholas Davey


hermeneutic limit. Nietzsche knows that the circles of meaning attached to
key subject–matters such as Being, truth, Enlightenment or emancipation
from suffering, offer no point from which they can be definitely surveyed
and grasped. Their meaning can never be fully realised. Logic seemingly
coils up at such boundaries: interpretation can never grasp its object. The
limit of the intelligible marks the beginning of the unintelligible: promises
of truth and the socially transformative are forever postponed and compro-
mised. There is an irreducible if not tragic tension in Vattimo’s conception
of hermeneutic praxis. On the one hand, whilst hermeneutic weakening
moves towards the ideals of an emancipated rational society free of alien-
ation, the very hermeneutic practices which seek to realise those ideals
will inevitably problematise them. The viability of Vattimo’s emancipatory
hermeneutics of praxis depends on how and to what extent this tension can
positively negotiated without engendering the disillusionment and despair
that Nietzsche foresaw as the destiny for such projects.
    However, there remains much in Vattimo’s late appeal to a hermeneu-
tics of praxis that is of value. The hermeneutics of praxis is of value not
because of its aspiration towards a social enlightenment but because of
the points where interpretive practices fail. Only by participation in the
unrealisable practices of hermeneutics can we brought to see beyond our
immediate horizons and be forced to confront the unexpected. The life of
understanding lies in its constant and unpredictable motion: any end–point
would inevitably bring an end to the life that depends on such movement.
The key point is knowing what hermeneutic praxis does, what its effects
are. Praxis moves to fail better: failure is not refutation, but the uncover-
ing of previously unseen possibilities in the way we grasp our concerns.
Here we get to the crux of our argument. It is the adjunctive failures of
praxis that are key to opening other possibilities for understanding and
breaking the complacent habits of expectancy. In this context, pursuing a
political praxis certainly has value in galvanising a programme for action
but hermeneutically speaking the political aims of the praxis are secondary
to its consequent and unexpected effects. The value of a practice is not
what it aims at but what its inevitable failure will give rise to regarding both
the emergence of tempering wisdom and the unexpected transformative
insight it brings. In this respect, practice makes a difference because its
failure allows to understand differently. Emphasising the political aims of
a praxis must, hermeneutically, bring disappointment. By way of contrast,
promoting engagement in a praxis because of the indirect changes in under-
standing it might effect, always holds the promise of educative and spiritual
transformation. Which is emphasised by a practice makes, hermeneutically
speaking, all the difference.
                                     Praxis and the Impossibility of Hermeneutics?   


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