244. Generation Developers request that the modeling provision
specify the minimum model assumptions that must be posted, including:
(1) Shift factors used by region, sub-region, and even utility area;
(2) generation dispatch assumptions by fuel-type of resource by region
and sub-region for off-peak and peak hours; (3) load power factors; (4)
power flows; (5) whether violations of NERC Category A (TPL-001),
Category B (TPL-002), and Category C (TPL-003) require network upgrades
and contingent facilities in all or some instances; (6) treatment of
currently overloaded facilities; (7) the extent to which Network
Resource Interconnection Service (NRIS) is hard-coded in the base
model; and (8) contingency files.\421\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \421\ Generation Developers 2017 Comments at 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    245. NextEra notes that, in addition to models, interconnection
customers would benefit from two best practices: (1) Providing
information about other interconnection requests ``in the same location
by point on the transmission grid,'' instead of county-level data;
\422\ and (2) providing information about lower voltage facilities
(e.g., those below 100 kV) and higher voltage facilities.\423\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \422\ NextEra 2017 Comments at 23.
    \423\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Commission Determination
    246. While we appreciate the additional suggestions on what types
of information transmission providers should post, the information
requested by the commenters is outside of the scope of the proposal as
set forth in the NOPR. In response to AWEA's requests, we note that
when the Commission acts pursuant to FPA section 206, it ``must show
that [a] utility's existing rate is unjust and unreasonable and . . .
that [the Commission's] replacement rate is just and reasonable.''
Thus, the Commission would have to meet the requirements of FPA section
206 to make changes to a currently effective tariff provision.\424\ We
find that the current record does not support such a finding. With
respect to Generation Developers', NextEra's, and TDU Systems'
suggestions that transmission providers should have to post more
information on OASIS, we clarify that the final action does not mandate
an exhaustive list of minimum model assumptions. We find that the
record before us does not support mandating that each region post the
same set of information in the analysis of interconnection requests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \424\ Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. ALLETE, Inc., 156 FERC ] 61,061,
at P 18 (2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Congestion and Curtailment Information
a. NOPR Proposal
    247. In response to developer requests for increased transparency
of congestion and curtailment information, the Commission proposed to
require that transmission providers post congestion and curtailment
information in one location on their OASIS sites so that
interconnection customers can more easily access information that may
aid in their decision-making.\425\ The Commission proposed to require
that transmission providers post specific congestion and curtailment
information that is disaggregated, or more granular (e.g., hourly and
locational data) than the information that some transmission providers
currently provide.\426\ To effectuate this requirement, the Commission
proposed to add a new paragraph (l) to 18 CFR 37.6, which stated that
the Transmission Provider must post on OASIS information as to
congestion data representing (i) total hours of curtailment on all
interfaces, (ii) total hours of Transmission Provider-ordered
generation curtailment and transmission service curtailment due to
congestion on that facility or interface, (iii) the cause of the
congestion (e.g., a contingency or an outage), and (iv) total megawatt
hours of curtailment due to lack of transmission for that month. This
data shall be posted on a monthly basis by the 15th day of the
following month and shall be posted in one location on the OASIS. The
Transmission Provider should maintain this data for a minimum of three
years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \425\ NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,719 at P 128.
    \426\ Id. P 130.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    248. The Commission also sought comment on whether transmission
providers should provide interconnection-request-specific congestion
and curtailment information and whether transmission providers should
be required to provide this information to interconnection customers
during the interconnection study process (e.g., at the scoping
meeting).\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \427\ Id. P 128.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    249. The Commission also sought comment on the level of information
to be provided, the frequency at which the information should be
provided, and how many months/years the provided information should
cover.\428\ The Commission sought further comment on the value of
requiring transmission providers to post flow duration curves on the
major transmission interfaces based on hourly flow data on OASIS.\429\
Finally, the Commission sought comment on changes to section 3.3.4 of
the pro forma LGIP requiring transmission providers or transmission
owners to provide curtailment and congestion information at the scoping
meeting.\430\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \428\ Id. P 131.
    \429\ Id.
    \430\ Id. P 133.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Comments
    250. Some responsive commenters support the proposed requirement
for congestion and curtailment information to be posted in one location
on each transmission provider's OASIS site.\431\ AFPA asserts that the
proposal will allow interconnection customers to better use existing
transmission

infrastructure.\432\ Public Interest Organizations and IECA contend
that the proposal will help interconnection customers better understand
investment risks, which could result in more efficient markets and
lower costs.\433\ IECA, SEIA, and Joint Renewable Parties indicate that
the added transparency will improve access to information, increase
efficiency, and reduce discrimination.\434\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \431\ AFPA 2017 Comments at 11; Public Interest Organizations
2017 Comments at 5-8; IECA 2017 Comments at 2; SEIA 2017 Comments at
19; Joint Renewable Parties 2017 Comments at 11; Alevo 2017 Comments
at 6; NEPOOL 2017 Comments at 11; Alliant 2017 Comments at 12.
    \432\ AFPA 2017 Comments at 11.
    \433\ Public Interest Organizations 2017 Comments at 5-8; IECA
2017 Comments at 2.
    \434\ Id.; SEIA 2017 Comments at 19; Joint Renewable Parties
2017 Comments at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    251. Joint Renewable Parties, Alliant, Generation Developers, and
ITC state that access to the information will improve interconnection
customers' ability to appropriately site projects and will reduce queue
withdrawals, which occur due to high interconnection facility and
network upgrade costs.\435\ AWEA asserts that it is crucial for
interconnection customers to have access to historical local congestion
information, noting that study results do not provide this information
and that transmission providers frequently do not make it available.
AWEA also states that there is a lack of uniformity in the type and
location of information that transmission providers post.\436\ AWEA
states that non-disclosure agreements can prevent disclosure of
commercially sensitive information to the general public.\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \435\ Id.; Alliant 2017 Comments at 12; Generation Developers
2017 Comments at 31-32; ITC 2017 Comments at 17; see also AWEA 2017
Comments at 40.
    \436\ Id. at 39.
    \437\ Id. at 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    252. In support of the proposal, NEPOOL and Alevo both argue that
transmission owners, transmission providers, and system operators
should post data that are as granular as possible. They argue that
readily available transmission capacity data at the front end will
enable market participants to size their projects appropriately and to
anticipate network upgrade costs.\438\ AWEA contends that the burden on
transmission providers to post this type of information is minimal, as
the information is readily available and does not require significant
additional studies.\439\ TDU Systems also supports the proposal and
urges the Commission to clarify that transmission providers should
report on congestion that is avoided by dispatching generation out of
merit order.\440\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \438\ Alevo 2017 Comments at 6; NEPOOL 2017 Comments at 11.
    \439\ AWEA 2017 Comments at 42.
    \440\ TDU Systems 2017 Comments at 19-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    253. Several commenters argue that sufficient procedures already
exist for interconnection customers. TVA, EEI, and Xcel contend that
the Commission should make existing data collection resources available
to potential interconnection customers, rather than requiring
transmission providers to create redundant new ones.\441\ TVA argues
that the information that NERC stores via Transmission Loading Relief
(TLR) logs provides enough information to allow the interconnection
customer to evaluate its selected location.\442\ TVA also contends that
the time and expense of analyzing potential interconnection locations
should be the interconnection customer's responsibility.\443\ Xcel
argues that, to the extent stakeholder needs are not met by posting the
proposed information, RTO/ISO stakeholder processes should address
these issues.\444\ Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations ask the
Commission to convene a technical conference to determine what
congestion and constraint information utilities should maintain, the
format of that information, and what information would benefit
interconnection customers.\445\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \441\ EEI 2017 Comments at 45; TVA 2017 Comments at 10-11; Xcel
2017 Comments at 15-16.
    \442\ TVA 2017 Comments at 10.
    \443\ Id. at 10-11.
    \444\ Xcel 2017 Comments at 15-16.
    \445\ Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations 2017 Comments at 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    254. CAISO and PG&E note that the requested information is largely
already available on CAISO's website.\446\ CAISO explains that
transmission providers publish dispatch reports, congestion data, and
locational marginal price (LMP) data so that potential interconnection
customers can understand where there is available capacity.\447\ CAISO
also states that it already provides interconnection customers with as
much information as can be predicted, bearing in mind that economic
curtailment protects the grid from events that are difficult or
impossible to predict, such as outages, overloads due to oversupply,
and contingency events.\448\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \446\ CAISO 2017 Comments at 20; PG&E 2017 Comments at 6 (citing
http://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/OutageManagement/Curtailed-OperationalGeneratorReportGlossary.aspx).
    \447\ CAISO 2017 Comments at 19.
    \448\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    255. MISO argues that the sort of granular information the
Commission has proposed to be posted will not significantly resolve
issues with queue processing.\449\ MISO TOs state that MISO posts
market reports that contain LMP data and the marginal congestion
component for every commercial pricing node, which can be used to
develop information on congestion. MISO TOs state that it would be
redundant (and burdensome) to require MISO to publish this information
on OASIS as well as on its website, where it currently resides.\450\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \449\ MISO 2017 Comments at 28.
    \450\ MISO TOs 2017 Comments at 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    256. NextEra notes that operational snapshots of the transmission
provider's system are more useful than statistics of total hours or MW
of curtailment.\451\ NextEra notes that MISO and SPP already provide
state estimator snapshots from the prior two weeks, which include
generator dispatch, system congestion, and power flow information,
among other things. NextEra recommends that all RTOs/ISOs adopt this
practice and provide snapshots of their systems from different times of
the day to show system conditions.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \451\ NextEra 2017 Comments at 25.
    \452\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    257. PJM agrees with the proposal to require transmission providers
to post congestion data representing total hours of curtailment on all
interfaces and asserts that it currently posts these data publicly on
its website.\453\ PJM states that, along with LMP pricing information,
these data are adequate to allow an interconnection customer to make
informed business decisions relative to their interconnection
project.\454\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \453\ PJM 2017 Comments at 16.
    \454\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    258. However, PJM states that it opposes the NOPR's proposal to
require transmission providers to post total hours of transmission
provider-ordered generation curtailment and transmission service
curtailment due to congestion on a facility or interface, the cause of
the congestion, and total megawatt hours (MWh) of curtailment due to
lack of transmission for that month.\455\ PJM states that posting
information regarding unit-specific and constraint-specific generator
curtailment information would allow other market participants to
replicate market-sensitive data, such as unit offers, and would require
significant effort.\456\ PJM contends that publicly posting the cause
of congestion would improperly disclose commercially sensitive
information and require difficult and time-consuming power flow
analysis and market re-runs. PJM notes that it does not have the
software capability to determine causes of congestion.\457\ PJM states
that posting the total monthly MWh of curtailment

due to lack of transmission could result in misleading information, as
curtailment may be caused by multiple factors.\458\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \455\ Id.
    \456\ Id.
    \457\ Id. at 17.
    \458\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    259. EEI, Six Cities, MISO TOs, CAISO, and Xcel assert that
historical congestion and curtailment information may have no bearing
on future congestion or curtailment at any specific location, and the
posting of this information should not be considered a commitment by
the transmission provider to guarantee the availability of additional
capacity or expose the transmission provider to damages or other
remedies should interconnection customers' expectations regarding
curtailment risk not materialize.\459\ Duke states that historic
congestion and curtailment information might only be useful if the
generating facility's location and the area of congestion
coincided.\460\ Duke and MISO TOs further state that system changes
including interconnection and transmission upgrades, large generators
going on- or off-line, or a transmission system topology change could
render historical congestion information meaningless.\461\ Xcel states
that future generation impacts future congestion, and that knowledge of
where other generation will locate is likely of more value to the
interconnecting generators.\462\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \459\ EEI 2017 Comments at 45; Six Cities 2017 Comments at 3-4;
MISO TOs 2017 Comments at 29; CAISO 2017 Comments at 19; Xcel 2017
Comments at 14-15.
    \460\ Duke 2017 Comments at 12.
    \461\ Id. at 13; MISO TOs 2017 Comments at 29.
    \462\ Xcel 2017 Comments at 14-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    260. Xcel notes that the impact of congestion and curtailment
varies by region, mostly due to the existence of regional markets,
different scheduling practices, and the treatment of firm transmission
service.\463\ ISO-NE argues that regional flexibility is warranted to
allow RTOs/ISOs to identify the relevant congestion and curtailment
information in their region and the information that is already
available to interconnection customers that meets the NOPR's
objective.\464\ ISO-NE states that the congestion and curtailment
information identified in the NOPR is not relevant in New England
because this information relates to availability of pro forma
transmission service and internal flow gates, neither of which is
applicable in New England.\465\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \463\ Id.
    \464\ ISO-NE 2017 Comments at 27-28.
    \465\ Id. n.65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    261. NYISO states that it has historically published significant
system information on its public website, including congestion and
curtailment information.\466\ NYISO argues that additional operational
data posted to NYISO's public website would not provide the information
the NOPR anticipates would be useful to interconnection customers.\467\
NYISO further states that the curtailment data requested by AWEA and
proposed in the NOPR would not be useful data to NYISO interconnection
customers and explains that it may not even have the capability to
provide certain data proposed by the NOPR.\468\ NYISO contends that it
need not maintain and post the same OASIS-related information as RTOs/
ISOs with a physical reservation transmission system.\469\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \466\ NYISO 2017 Comments at 24.
    \467\ Id. at 28.
    \468\ Id. at 26 (citing, e.g., N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.,
123 FERC ] 61,134, at PP 8-13 (2008); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator,
Inc., Docket No. OA08-13-003 (Nov. 12, 2008) (delegated letter
order)).
    \469\ Id. (citing, e.g., N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket
Nos. ER11-2048-003 & ER11-2048-004 (June 6, 2011) (delegated letter
order); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 133 FERC ] 61,208, at PP
12-13 (2010)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    262. MISO asserts that queue congestion is a sub-region-wide issue
and not an issue of locating around more granular points of congestion,
which the proposed requirements would illuminate. MISO contends that
for optimally locating around localized points of congestion, the
initial scoping meetings are sufficient to advise customers regarding
less congested points of interconnection within an interconnection
customer's general preferred area.\470\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \470\ MISO 2017 Comments at 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    263. PG&E questions whether this information should be posted on
OASIS, instead of on CAISO's website, since an interconnection customer
will not necessarily have access to OASIS until it becomes a
transmission customer.\471\ PG&E expresses concern about making much of
this information public, including but not limited to CEII, since CAISO
has a process that provides much of this information to interconnection
customers that have executed non-disclosure agreements.\472\ MISO TOs
state that RTOs/ISOs should develop a method to ensure privileged and/
or confidential information is shared only with interconnection
customers and is not available to market participants or others without
authorization to receive CEII information, in order to prevent market
manipulation and potential harm.\473\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \471\ PG&E 2017 Comments at 6.
    \472\ Id.
    \473\ MISO TOs 2017 Comments at 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    264. Duke, NorthWestern, Southern, Xcel, and Non-Profit Utility
Trade Associations argue that the proposal should not extend to
transmission providers that operate outside of RTOs/ISOs because the
information is neither available nor relevant.\474\ Duke states that
the transmission system outside RTOs/ISOs is planned, designed, and
operated so that generating resources with firm bilateral contracts to
serve load are not constrained.\475\ Xcel notes that, in non-market
areas, firm transmission service mitigates congestion and curtailment
risk. Xcel and Southern contend that congestion and curtailment
information is more relevant for RTOs/ISOs that have locational
marginal pricing, and because regional markets usually dispatch
generation according to price, curtailment is generally based on price
and not a lack of transmission capacity.\476\ Southern points out that
it provides congestion/curtailment screens specific to each
interconnection request in each interconnection study report.\477\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \474\ Duke 2017 Comments at 13; NorthWestern 2017 Comments at 6;
Southern 2017 Comments at 21-22; Xcel 2017 Comments at 15; Non-
Profit Utility Trade Associations 2017 Comments at 15-16.
    \475\ Duke 2017 Comments at 13.
    \476\ Xcel 2017 Comments at 15; Southern 2017 Comments at 21.
    \477\ Id. at 21-22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    265. NorthWestern and Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations state
that the definition of ``congestion'' is unclear in non-RTOs/ISOs.\478\
NorthWestern argues that posting congestion could be duplicative
because, in contract-path balancing authority areas that operate
outside of organized markets, ``congestion'' is synonymous with
``available transfer capability,'' which is already posted on OASIS in
real time.\479\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \478\ NorthWestern 2017 Comments at 6; Non-Profit Utility Trade
Associations 2017 Comments at 15-16.
    \479\ NorthWestern 2017 Comments at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    266. Duke, EEI, and OATI assert that the Commission should consult
with NAESB regarding standards for making congestion and curtailment
information accessible on OASIS.\480\ OATI states that it is critical
that access to all of these postings require secure and controlled
access through a registered OASIS user account per existing OASIS
standards.\481\ Duke states that NAESB is already working on this
issue, as evidenced by its 2017 Wholesale Electric Quadrant Annual Plan
item 2.a.ii.1, and should consider designing queries for
interconnection customers to use to obtain congestion and

curtailment information specific to their interconnection
requests.\482\ TVA suggests that adding these data to data that NERC
already tracks appears a more appropriate regulatory implementation
path.\483\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \480\ Duke 2017 Comments at 13; EEI 2017 Comments at 47-48; OATI
2017 Comments at 2.
    \481\ Id.
    \482\ Duke 2017 Comments at 13.
    \483\ TVA 2017 Comments at 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    267. NYISO suggests that instead of the proposed OASIS postings,
the Commission should consider adding the option of a pre-application
report for large facilities, similar to that required to be offered for
small facilities under Order No. 792 and the pro forma SGIP.\484\ NYISO
urges the Commission to consider such an approach as an alternative to
requiring cumbersome posting requirements that are not applicable in
all regions and that can only provide historical data--data that are of
little use to an interconnection customer and indeed may be misleading
compared to data that could be provided through an interconnection
study or in response to a pre-application report request.\485\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \484\ NYISO 2017 Comments at 29.
    \485\ Id. at 29-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Commission Determination
    268. In this final action, we decline to adopt the proposal in the
NOPR to require transmission providers to post certain specified
congestion and curtailment information, as described further below.
    269. We agree with commenters that access to congestion and
curtailment data could better inform the decision-making of
interconnection customers and allow them to more appropriately size and
site projects, resulting in more efficient use of the transmission
system and fewer late stage queue withdrawals. Accordingly, we
encourage all transmission providers that already make such information
available to continue to do so.
    270. However, upon consideration of the comments in this
proceeding, we decline to require transmission providers to post the
specific information that the Commission originally proposed in the
NOPR. We find persuasive those comments that assert that, in some
instances, generating information on the causes of congestion or on
unit-specific or constraint-specific curtailment information is
technically infeasible or would require significant additional
effort.\486\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \486\ PJM 2017 Comments at 16-17; NYISO 2017 Comments at 29-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    271. In addition, as several commenters argue, many transmission
providers already publish congestion and curtailment data such as LMP
data and dispatch reports on their public websites.\487\ Further, the
NERC Transmission Loading Relief (TLR) Logs make publicly available
information on the duration, direction, and MW total of curtailments in
the Eastern Interconnection.\488\ We also note that some commenters
question the usefulness of some of the data contemplated by the NOPR
proposal to prospective interconnection customers and that others argue
that some of this data is not available outside of RTOs/ISOs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \487\ See e.g., CAISO 2017 Comments at 20; NYISO 2017 Comments
at 24; PJM 2017 Comments at 16.
    \488\ NERC TLR Logs, http://nerc.com/pa/rrm/TLR/Pages/TLR-Logs.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    272. Accordingly, we decline to adopt the proposed revisions to add
a new paragraph (l) to 18 CFR 37.6 that would require transmission
providers to post specific congestion and curtailment information in
one location on OASIS.
4. Definition of Generating Facility in the Pro Forma LGIP and Pro
Forma LGIA
a. NOPR Proposal
    273. The Commission proposed to revise the definition of
``Generating Facility'' in the pro forma LGIP and the pro forma LGIA to
include electric storage resources, similar to how it revised the
definition of a ``Small Generating Facility'' in the pro forma SGIP and
the pro forma SGIA in Order No. 792.\489\ Specifically, the Commission
proposed to amend the definition of a Generating Facility in the pro
forma LGIP and the pro forma LGIA as follows (with proposed additions
in italics): ``Generating Facility shall mean Interconnection
Customer's device for the production and/or storage for later injection
of electricity identified in the Interconnection Request, but shall not
include the interconnection customer's Interconnection Facilities.''
\490\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \489\ NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,719 at PP 134, 136 (citing
Order No. 792, 145 FERC ] 61,159 at P 228 (emphasis in original)).
    \490\ Id. PP 138-139.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. General
i. Comments
    274. A majority of responsive commenters, including utilities,
RTOs/ISOs, and renewable interests, support the proposal.\491\ MISO and
NYISO state that they already account for electric storage resources in
their definitions.\492\ CAISO states that it has clarified that
electric storage resources can participate as generators to ``provide
supply'' and ancillary services. CAISO further states that it studies
the reliability impacts of an electric storage resource's charging, but
not as firm load.\493\ To the extent that an electric storage resource
requires firm load treatment, CAISO states that it can apply to the
local distribution company.\494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \491\ AFPA 2017 Comments at 12; AWEA 2017 Comments at 55;
Bonneville 2017 Comments at 5; CAISO 2017 Comments at 20; California
Energy Storage Alliance 2017 Comments at 4; Duke 2017 Comments at
15; EDP 2017 Comments at 6; ESA 2017 Comments at 6; IECA 2017
Comments at 3; ISO-NE 2017 Comments at 32-33; Joint Renewable
Parties 2017 Comments at 10-11; MISO 2017 Comments at 29; MISO TOs
2017 Comments at 32; Modesto 2017 Comments at 22; NEPOOL 2017
Comments at 12-13; NextEra 2017 Comments at 26; Non-Profit Utility
Trade Associations 2017 Comments at 17; PG&E 2017 Comments at 6; PJM
2017 Comments at 19-20; Public Interest Organizations 2017 Comments
at 7-8; TDU Systems 2017 Comments at 20; TVA 2017 Comments at 11.
    \492\ MISO 2017 Comments at 29; NYISO 2017 Comments at 30.
    \493\ CAISO 2017 Comments at 20.
    \494\ CAISO 2017 Comments at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Commission Determination
    275. In this final action, we adopt the NOPR proposal to modify the
definition of ``Generating Facility'' in the pro forma LGIP and pro
forma LGIA to include ``and/or storage for later injection.'' We find
that this definitional change will reduce a potential barrier to large
electric storage resources with a generating facility capacity above 20
MW that wish to interconnect pursuant to the terms in the pro forma
LGIP and pro forma LGIA. Additionally, this finding and definitional
change are consistent with provisions already implemented in the pro
forma SGIP and the pro forma SGIA.\495\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \495\ Pro forma SGIP at Attachment 1 (Glossary of Terms); Pro
forma SGIA at Attachment 1 (Glossary of Terms).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Electric Storage Resources as Transmission Assets
i. Comments
    276. ESA and California Energy Storage Alliance, both of which
support the proposal, raise concerns that the proposal may
inadvertently prohibit the deployment of electric storage resources as
transmission assets.\496\ ESA recommends that the Commission state that
neither a SGIA nor an LGIA is necessary for electric storage resources
to be employed as transmission assets and that electric storage
resources providing transmission services should not be excluded from
seeking an LGIA or SGIA to provide wholesale generator services.\497\
Public Interest Organization

generally supports the proposal but opposes requiring all electric
storage resources, including those intended to serve as transmission
assets, to go through the formal large generator interconnection
process.\498\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \496\ ESA 2017 Comments at 6; California Energy Storage Alliance
2017 Comments at 4.
    \497\ ESA 2017 Comments at 7 (citing Utilization of Electric
Storage Resources for Multiple Services When Receiving Cost-Based
Rate Recovery, 158 FERC ] 61,051 (2017)).
    \498\ Public Interest Organizations 2017 Comments at 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    277. AES and Alevo both oppose the change of definition, arguing
that electric storage resources can also act as transmission assets
instead of, or in addition to, participating in the markets and that
the proposal may prohibit the deployment of electric storage resources
as transmission assets.\499\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \499\ AES 2017 Comments at 9-11; Alevo 2017 Comments at 2-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Commission Determination
    278. We find that there is no need to further revise the definition
of Generating Facility to address these concerns because the
definition, as revised here, would not affect whether electric storage
resources operate as transmission assets. The Commission previously has
found that, in certain situations, electric storage resources can
function as a generating facility, a transmission asset,\500\ or
both.\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \500\ See, e.g., Western Grid Dev., LLC, 130 FERC ] 61,056
(Western Grid), reh'g denied, 133 FERC ] 61,029 (2010).
    \501\ See Utilization of Electric Storage Resources for Multiple
Services When Receiving Cost-Based Rate Recovery, 158 FERC ] 61,051.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    279. The purpose of this definition change is to make clear that
electric storage resources with a capacity of more than 20 MW may
interconnect pursuant to the pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA. These
final action revisions are meant to clarify that new technologies may
avail themselves of the existing pro forma interconnection process, so
long as they meet the threshold requirements as stated in those
documents.
d. Characteristics of Electric Storage Resources
i. Comments
    280. ESA asserts that the proposal does not address the differences
between electric storage resources and traditional generators.\502\ ESA
recommends that the Commission require RTOs/ISOs to develop Electric
Storage Interconnection Agreements and Processes that account for the
unique characteristics of electric storage resources.\503\ In addition,
ESA recommends that the Commission revise tariffs and modify the pro
forma LGIP and the pro forma LGIA into a pro forma Large Facility
Interconnection Agreement and Process, in which facilities are defined
to consist of only a generating unit, only an electric storage unit, or
a combination of generating units and electric storage units.\504\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \502\ ESA 2017 Comments at 6.
    \503\ Id. at 7 (citing, e.g., ISO New England, Inc., 151 FERC ]
61,024 (2015)).
    \504\ Id. at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    281. Alevo and AES state that the proposal does not account for the
full capability of electric storage resources.\505\ Alevo states that a
new definition should be made separately for electric storage
resources, while AES suggests that the development of a new
interconnection agreement specific to electric storage resources.\506\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \505\ AES 2017 Comments at 9-11; Alevo 2017 Comments at 2-4.
    \506\ AES 2017 Comments at 10-11; Alevo 2017 Comments at 2-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    282. EEI and Portland request that the Commission hold a technical
conference on this proposal.\507\ EEI states that it is unclear how
existing interconnection agreements and processes would account for the
generation and load characteristics of electric storage resources.\508\
Portland states that further discussions are necessary to address the
unique characteristics of electric storage resources and that a new
definition for storage facilities may be appropriate.\509\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \507\ EEI 2017 Comments at 48; Portland 2017 Comments at 3-4.
    \508\ EEI 2017 Comments at 48.
    \509\ Portland 2017 Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    283. Southern argues that redefining Generating Facility to include
electric storage resources would complicate the pro forma LGIP and pro
forma LGIA.\510\ Southern states that electric storage resources could
be considered generation or load, and this could cause problems when
discussing reactive power in article 9.6 of the pro forma LGIA, which
references the generating facility capacity rather than the load.\511\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \510\ Southern 2017 Comments at 22.
    \511\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    284. NYISO, while stating that it does not take a position,
suggests that any revisions should also reflect that the facility may
store energy for withdrawal, as energy storage facilities typically
both inject and withdraw energy to the grid.\512\ Indicated NYTOs, who
support the proposal, agree with NYISO on the addition of the term
``withdrawal'' to the definition.\513\ MidAmerican states that the
Commission should clarify that the proposal does not permit
transmission providers to impose restrictions on withdrawals by storage
resources in excess of restrictions imposed on any other load.\514\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \512\ NYISO 2017 Comments at 30.
    \513\ Indicated NYTOs 2017 Comments at 14.
    \514\ MidAmerican 2017 Comments at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Commission Determination
    285. We disagree with EEI's and Southern's arguments that the pro
forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA may be unable to accommodate the load
characteristics of an electric storage resource. We note that studies
under the pro forma LGIP already provide transmission providers with
the flexibility to address the load characteristics of electric storage
resources, and that electric storage resources have already
successfully interconnected pursuant to a Commission-jurisdictional
LGIP and LGIA.\515\ EEI and Southern provide no evidence that the
requirements of the LGIP and LGIA cannot accommodate the load
characteristics of electric storage resources. We note that, if a
transmission provider finds a particular resource to be outside the
scope of its existing LGIA, the LGIP permits a transmission provider to
enter into non-conforming LGIAs when necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \515\ See, e.g., AES New Creek, Docket No. ER12-1100-000 (Apr.
10, 2012) (delegated letter order) (accepting a non-conforming
interconnection agreement between PJM, Virginia Electric Power, and
a combined solar and electric storage resource).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    286. We find that ESA's suggestion that we remove the term
``generator'' from the pro forma LGIA and the pro forma LGIP in favor
of interconnection agreements based on a facility's technical and
operational characteristics is beyond the scope of this proposal. We
find that AES's and Alevo's assertions are beyond the scope of this
rulemaking because, as previously noted, the final action revisions are
meant to clarify that new technologies with a capacity of more than 20
MW may avail themselves of the existing pro forma generator
interconnection process and interconnection agreement rather than
defining an electric storage resource. In response to NYISO's
suggestion to add ``withdrawal'' to the definition, we do not believe
it is necessary to accept this suggestion. While the meaning of NYISO's
comment is unclear, to the extent that it refers to an electric storage
resource's ability to charge, our adopted definition already accounts
for this ability through the inclusion of the word ``storage.''
Anything beyond this interpretation is beyond the scope of this
proceeding.
e. Other
i. Comments
    287. EEI seeks clarification on whether the proposed change will
affect tax treatment of generators.\516\ In addition, EEI states that
the Commission should clarify the applicability of

wholesale distribution charges to electric storage resources using
distribution facilities and that the inclusion of electric storage
resources in the definition does not affect the jurisdiction of
interconnection studies.\517\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \516\ EEI 2017 Comments at 49.
    \517\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Commission Determination
    288. In response to EEI's concern that the proposed change to the
pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA definition of generating facility
might affect tax treatment of generators, we note that the purpose of
this proposal is only to allow electric storage resource's with a
capacity above 20 MW to interconnect pursuant to the pro forma LGIP and
pro forma LGIA. It should not affect tax treatment of electric storage
resources.
    289. We find that this definitional change will not affect the
jurisdictional issues EEI raises. The pro forma LGIP is the process
provided for Commission-jurisdictional interconnections by resources
above 20 MW, and this definition change ensures that electric storage
resources above 20 MW that seek a Commission-jurisdictional
interconnection can access that interconnection process. All relevant
jurisdictional delineations and precedent remain unchanged. This
definition change also does not affect the Commission's precedent on
wholesale distribution charges when distributed resources use the
distribution system to reach the wholesale market.
5. Interconnection Study Deadlines
a. NOPR Proposal
    290. The pro forma LGIP requires that transmission providers use
``reasonable efforts'' \518\ to complete feasibility studies in 45
days, system impact studies in 90 days, and facilities studies within
90 or 180 days.\519\ The Commission proposed to require that
transmission providers post on their OASIS on a quarterly basis summary
statistics indicating the number of interconnection requests withdrawn
and interconnection studies completed and delayed, the proportion of
studies completed within tariff timeframes, and the average time to
complete a study. Additionally, the Commission proposed to require that
a transmission provider that exceeds study deadlines for more than 25
percent of any study type for two consecutive quarters must file
informational reports at the Commission for the four calendar quarters
(Filed Report Requirement). If during this period, the transmission
provider exceeds more than 25 percent of study deadlines for any study
type for two consecutive quarters, the reporting requirement would be
retriggered for another four consecutive quarters from the date of the
last consecutive quarter to exceed the 25 percent threshold.\520\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \518\ The pro forma LGIP states that reasonable efforts ``shall
mean, with respect to an action required to be attempted or taken by
a Party under the Standard Large Generator Interconnection
Agreement, efforts that are timely and consistent with Good Utility
Practice and are otherwise substantially equivalent to those a Party
would use to protect its own interests.'' Pro forma LGIP Section 1
(Definitions).
    \519\ Pro forma LGIP Sections 6.3, 7.4, and 8.3.
    \520\ In this final action, we are modifying the calculation for
determining whether a transmission provider has triggered the Filed
Report Requirement so that it reads more simply. For example, for
the calculation in 35.2.2(E), the new calculation will be the sum of
35.2.2(B) plus 35.2.2(C) divided by the sum of 35.2.2(A) plus
35.2.2(C). For ease of readership, we abbreviate here as (B + C) /
(A + C). This calculation would represent the quarterly total of
late studies, i.e., completed late studies plus uncompleted late
studies, divided by the number of studies that should have been
completed, i.e., completed studies plus uncompleted late studies.
Although this is a simpler calculation, we note that it is
mathematically equivalent to the calculation proposed in the NOPR,
which we abbreviate here as 1-(A-B) / (A + C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    291. To implement this proposal, the Commission proposed to modify
section 3.4 of the pro forma LGIP \521\ to institute quarterly
reporting requirements for transmission providers to report
interconnection study performance on their OASIS. The Commission also
proposed reporting requirements and justifications that would be
triggered if a transmission provider exceeds study deadlines for more
than 25 percent of any study type for two consecutive calendar
quarters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \521\ In the ``Utilization of Surplus Interconnection Service''
section, the Commission proposed revisions to the pro forma LGIP
that result in renumbering of several existing sections. One section
that the Commission proposed to be renumbered is section 3.4. For
this reason, the proposed revisions to the ``OASIS Posting'' section
(current section 3.4) will begin at section 3.5.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    292. The Commission also sought comment on whether: (1) To require
different interconnection processing statistics to be posted on OASIS
by the transmission provider; (2) the Commission has proposed the
appropriate summary data requirements to enhance transparency and what
customizations of these requirements should be made to adjust for
different regional processes; (3) interconnection customers have
sufficient information regarding the cause of study delays; (4)
transmission providers should have to provide a more detailed
explanation to interconnection customers regarding the cause(s) of
study delays; (5) a transmission provider should have to inform
interconnection customers regarding its process for revising study
timelines once a delay occurs; and (6) the transmission provider should
also describe in sufficient detail any relevant issues that could
further affect the revised timeline for a particular interconnection
customer.
b. Interconnection Study Metrics Reporting
i. Comments
    293. Numerous commenters support a requirement for transmission
providers to report on their interconnection study performance.\522\
AWEA states that many transmission providers consistently experience
interconnection study delays due to factors completely within their
control.\523\ NEPOOL states that reporting requirements will provide
greater transmission provider accountability, thereby tending to
improve transmission provider performance and facilitating market
entry.\524\ NextEra notes that, while it would prefer to eliminate the
reasonable efforts standard, the NOPR proposal will improve
transparency into study delay causes and frequency, and this
transparency could lead to appropriate solutions.\525\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \522\ Alevo 2017 Comments at 7-8; Alliance for Clean Energy 2017
Comments at 1; AWEA 2017 Comments at 43; Competitive Suppliers 2017
Comments at 9; EDP 2017 Comments at 7; Joint Renewable Parties 2017
Comments at 11; NEPOOL 2017 Comments at 13; NextEra 2017 Comments at
27; PJM 2017 Comments at 20-21; Portland 2017 Comments at 5-6; SEIA
2017 Comments at 19; TDU Systems 2017 Comments at 21-22.
    \523\ AWEA 2017 Comments at 43-44.
    \524\ NEPOOL 2017 Comments at 13.
    \525\ NextEra 2017 Comments at 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    294. Some commenters support requiring transmission providers to
provide additional or even more detailed statistics than the Commission
proposed \526\ or argue that the Commission should lower the hurdle for
triggering the Filed Report Requirement (e.g., lowering the 25 percent
hurdle to 10 percent).\527\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \526\ Alliance for Clean Energy 2017 Comments at 1-2; AWEA 2017
Comments at 45; EDP 2017 Comments at 7; Generation Developers 2017
Comments at 34-36; NextEra 2017 Comments at 28.
    \527\ AWEA 2017 Comments at 44-45; Competitive Suppliers 2017
Comments at 10; Generation Developers 2017 Comments at 35-36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    295. Some supporting commenters would prefer scaling back or
eliminating specific aspects of the NOPR proposal. PJM opposes the
Filed Report Requirement; it argues that this requirement would not
increase efficiency and that the ability to meet study deadlines is
often outside the transmission provider's control.\528\ Portland also
opposes the Filed Report Requirement, stating that this proposal could
disproportionately affect utilities

with small queues or those that jointly own, but do not operate,
transmission facilities. Portland suggests that the Commission apply a
minimum threshold of delayed interconnection studies for triggering
justifications and that the Commission not impose these requirements if
the reasons for missing deadlines are outside the transmission
provider's control.\529\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \528\ PJM 2017 Comments at 20.
    \529\ Portland 2017 Comments at 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    296. Alevo and Invenergy favor financial incentives or penalties
over reporting requirements to encourage timely study completion.\530\
Relatedly, AWEA states that a final action should include remedies for
interconnection customers affected by transmission providers' failures
to complete studies accurately and in a timely fashion.\531\ AWEA
suggests that the Commission require transmission providers to specify
remedies in their study services agreements for failure to comply with
timeline provisions.\532\ While it concedes that the NOPR proposal
increases transparency, Invenergy likewise argues that concrete
incentives and penalties would result in more timely interconnection
study performance.\533\ Generation Developers assert that the proposal
does not respond to the issue of consistently delinquent transmission
providers. They argue that, as a consequence, such transmission
providers will have no motivation to improve.\534\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \530\ Alevo 2017 Comments at 7-8; Invenergy 2017 Comments at 8.
    \531\ AWEA 2017 Comments at 46.
    \532\ Id.
    \533\ Invenergy 2017 Comments at 3, 7.
    \534\ Generation Developers 2017 Comments at 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    297. Some commenters express concerns regarding the potential
administrative burden imposed by the proposal.\535\ Bonneville, PG&E,
and Alevo argue that the proposal could divert transmission providers'
planning resources from conducting studies to meeting administrative
burdens with no improvement on the underlying causes of delays.\536\
EEI states that posting the aggregate number of employee hours and
third party consultant hours expended toward interconnection studies is
overly burdensome, is not helpful in evaluating performance, and raises
customer costs.\537\ TVA notes that the process and tracking burden
would need to be borne continually by transmission providers, without
regard to whether a reporting trigger is met.\538\ In contrast, NextEra
believes that the proposal would not impose a material burden on
transmission providers because they already know the status of their
studies.\539\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \535\ See, e.g., Xcel 2017 Comments at 16.
    \536\ Bonneville 2017 Comments at 6; PG&E 2017 Comments at 6;
Alevo 2017 Comments at 7-8.
    \537\ EEI 2017 Comments at 51.
    \538\ TVA 2017 Comments at 12.
    \539\ NextEra 2017 Comments at 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    298. APS states that the proposal compromises transmission provider
flexibility to complete studies and argues that the time required to
properly assess an interconnection request may vary significantly.\540\
APS states that the addition of metrics would constrain the
interconnection process while providing minimal benefits to the
interconnection customer.\541\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \540\ APS 2017 Comments at 4.
    \541\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    299. A few commenters state that they do not object to the NOPR's
proposed reporting requirement.\542\ MidAmerican nonetheless would
prefer that transmission providers reform the queue process itself,
rather than reporting on existing processes.\543\ MISO TOs also do not
oppose the additional study reporting requirements, but they point out
that they are already subject to extensive reporting requirements.\544\
For this reason, they ask the Commission to allow MISO to retain its
existing reporting requirements, subject to modification as needed to
include the types of information required by the final action.\545\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \542\ MidAmerican 2017 Comments at 14; MISO TOs 2017 Comments at
34; Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations 2017 Comments at 17.
    \543\ MidAmerican 2017 Comments at 14.
    \544\ MISO TOs 2017 Comments at 33 (citing Midcontinent Indep.
Sys. Operators, Inc., 158 FERC ] 61,003, at P 108 (2017)).
    \545\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    300. Other commenters expressly oppose the proposal to require the
posting of interconnection study statistics.\546\ Duke states that the
primary reasons for delays are queue withdrawals and material
modifications.\547\ EEI argues that the proposal fails to consider
circumstances outside the transmission provider's control, and that
without additional context, this information will not benefit
interconnection customers.\548\ NYISO indicates that the 25 percent
missed deadline requirements are unnecessarily punitive and would
jeopardize NYISO's ability to be flexible as needed during the
interconnection process.\549\ NYISO also argues that additional
administrative requirements to track study statistics will not expedite
the study process.\550\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \546\ Duke 2017 Comments at 15-16; EEI 2017 Comments at 50; ISO-
NE 2017 Comments at 33-35; NYISO 2017 Comments at 32-34; Xcel 2017
Comments at 16.
    \547\ Duke 2017 Comments at 16.
    \548\ EEI 2017 Comments at 50-51.
    \549\ NYISO 2017 Comments at 34.
    \550\ Id. at 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    301. Xcel states that delays are often caused by interconnection
customer actions and minor disputes between interconnection customers
and transmission providers, but there is no evidence that transmission
providers are being opaque or have not provided sufficient
justifications for delays. Xcel notes that interconnection customers
can challenge unreasonable delays through a variety of means--including
the Commission's Enforcement hotline and the FPA section 206 process--
and that Commission audits review the interconnection process.\551\
Xcel also argues that the NOPR proposal does not account for regions
with fewer requests or delays caused by changes in study assumptions,
negotiation of contractual language, or interpretation of technical
study results. Xcel states that, if the Commission proceeds with this
proposal, it should limit the LGIP requirements to providing a written
description of the cause of the delay.\552\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \551\ Xcel 2017 Comments at 16.
    \552\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    302. Some commenters consider currently available information to be
sufficient for interconnection customers.\553\ Duke asserts that the
LGIP already requires transmission providers to inform interconnection
customers about the causes of study delays and schedule revisions.\554\
Indicated NYTOs state that NYISO currently provides sufficient
interconnection study information on its public website and to
interconnection customers, and NYISO updates its Transmission Planning
Advisory Committee on the status of all pending large generator
facility interconnections.\555\ Indicated NYTOs also state that NYISO
updates its OASIS with additional information as to where an
interconnection request is situated in the study process and which
studies have been completed.\556\ Additionally, Indicated NYTOs state
that interconnection customers receive more detailed information
directly throughout the study process.\557\ Xcel indicates
interconnection customers currently have sufficient transparency
regarding the causes of delays and that any delays are discussed
directly with the customer. Xcel states that if the customer does not
understand the cause

of a delay, it can ask the transmission provider for
clarification.\558\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \553\ See, e.g., EEI 2017 Comments at 51 (citing pro forma LGIP
Sections 6.3, 7.4, and 8.3).
    \554\ Duke 2017 Comments at 16; see also Xcel 2017 Comments at
16.
    \555\ Indicated NYTOs 2017 Comments at 11; see also NYISO 2017
Comments at 30.
    \556\ Indicated NYTOs 2017 Comments at 11.
    \557\ Id.
    \558\ Xcel 2017 Comments at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    303. NYISO states that it currently maintains on its OASIS a list
of all valid interconnection requests, together with the status of the
interconnection request including, for example, where the project is in
the study process and what studies have been completed.\559\ NYISO
asserts that adding additional detail regarding the status of a
particular study is not informative to the specific interconnection
customer, which already knows its status. Moreover, NYISO argues that
additional administrative requirements to track study statistics will
not expedite the study process.\560\ NYISO contends that the best way
to expedite interconnection studies is through targeted process
improvements, such as those NYISO has proposed to its stakeholders;
\561\ NYISO states that it has a number of proposals that would improve
study processing efficiency.\562\ Similarly, MISO recommends allowing
existing stakeholder processes to accomplish the objectives of the
proposed reporting requirements and notes that it is currently working
to increase study timing visibility.\563\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \559\ NYISO 2017 Comments at 30.
    \560\ Id. at 32.
    \561\ Id. at 30-32.
    \562\ Id. at 32.
    \563\ MISO 2017 Comments at 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    304. NYISO urges the Commission to allow it to tailor appropriate
process improvements with the goal of expediting the studies rather
than merely tracking their status.\564\ NYISO contends that posting the
requested information is only informative if a transmission provider
reveals additional details that may require disclosure of confidential
information. NYISO also argues that such detailed information regarding
the status of a particular study is appropriately shared only with the
interconnection customer, not all projects in the interconnection
queue.\565\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \564\ NYISO 2017 Comments at 32.
    \565\ Id. at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Commission Determination
    305. In this final action, we adopt the NOPR proposal modifying the
pro forma LGIP section on OASIS Posting \566\ to require transmission
providers to post interconnection study metrics to increase the
transparency of interconnection study completion timeframes. We note,
however, that we are modifying the posting location requirement, as
discussed further below in the subsection ``Requirement to Post
Interconnection Study Metrics on OASIS'' of this final action. As
proposed in the NOPR, transmission providers shall post this
interconnection study metric information on a quarterly basis. We also
adopt the Filed Report Requirement.\567\ The revisions to the pro forma
LGIP adopted in this final action are provided in Appendix B to Order
No. 845.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \566\ This has been renumbered to pro forma LGIP section 3.5
through this final action.
    \567\ Any informational reports that transmission providers file
at the Commission are for informational purposes and will not be
formally noticed nor require additional action by the Commission.
See Grid Assurance LLC, 154 FERC ] 61,244, at n.106, order on
clarification, 156 FERC ] 61,027 (2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    306. The current requirement that transmission providers complete
interconnection studies on a timely basis is based on a ``reasonable
efforts'' \568\ standard. This standard can be challenging to apply in
the absence of information required in this final action, including
information about how long it takes transmission providers to complete
studies and the resources a transmission provider uses to complete
interconnection studies. Information on interconnection study metrics
should provide needed transparency to allow interconnection customers
to assess whether a transmission provider is using ``reasonable
efforts.'' This information should also allow interconnection customers
to develop informed expectations about how long the interconnection
study portion of the process actually takes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \568\ ``Reasonable Efforts'' in Pro forma LGIP Section 1
(Definitions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    307. Many commenters that oppose this proposal cite concerns about
the potential administrative burden. We find unpersuasive comments that
these requirements will be administratively burdensome for transmission
providers in general, to those with small queues, or those that jointly
own, but do not operate, their transmission assets. We find that the
reporting requirement we adopt strikes a reasonable balance between
providing increased transparency and information to interconnection
customers while not unduly burdening transmission providers. We find
that the increased transparency resulting from these new requirements
should provide for improved queue management and better informed
interconnection customer planning--results that may be important enough
to support some corresponding burden on transmission providers.
Further, as noted by NextEra, transmission providers already know the
status of their studies, which suggests that the reporting requirement
should impose minimal, additional administrative burdens on
transmission providers. With regard to the assertion that the reporting
requirement will unduly burden transmission providers with smaller
interconnection queues, we find it reasonable for a transmission
provider with a small volume interconnection queue to detail the
reasons for the delay of a lone study or a small number of studies,
information that is still beneficial to interconnection customers. In
these instances, the reporting requirement would not be more burdensome
than for transmission providers with high volume queues that must
provide this information for a greater number of studies, if additional
reporting requirements are triggered. With regard to Portland's
contention that the reporting requirement will disproportionately
burden transmission providers that jointly own, but do not operate,
their transmission assets, we find little evidence in the record to
support this assertion. We note that a transmission owner's assignment
of operational responsibility to a joint owner does not necessarily
relieve it of its responsibilities or performance obligations.
    308. Multiple commenters argue that interconnection customers are
often the cause of interconnection study delays. Others question the
usefulness of the information to be posted for interconnection
customers or other stakeholders. We find that the detailed information
provided to the Commission through the Filed Report Requirement should
be particularly beneficial in identifying process deficiencies and the
causes of delays in regions that experience significant delays in
interconnection study processing. Additionally, this requirement
complements the requirement that the causes of study delays be provided
to interconnection customers upon request and does not duplicate the
requirement in sections 6.3, 7.4, and 8.3 of the pro forma LGIP related
to informing interconnection customers about the causes of study
delays. While those provisions require transmission providers to
provide the reasons for study delays to individual interconnection
customers, these newly adopted provisions require the transmission
provider to submit study delay information to the Commission.
    309. Some commenters encourage consideration of modifications and
alternatives to the Commission's proposal. We find that the reporting
requirements we adopt in this final action strike a reasonable balance
between transparency into the timing and processing of interconnection

requests while maintaining a transmission provider's schedule
flexibility to process complex and interdependent interconnection
requests. As noted in the NOPR and supporting comments, the
requirements should identify the geographical locations where
interconnection study delays occur most often and will document the
delays' causes. We recognize that often a delay will not be the result
of the transmission provider having acted inappropriately; therefore,
we do not propose implementing automatic penalties for delayed studies,
in recognition of this possibility. Nonetheless, we believe that
adopting pro forma LGIP provisions will improve transparency by
highlighting where interconnection study delays are most common and the
causes of delays in these regions. Such information could highlight
systemic problems for individual transmission providers and
interconnection customers. This information could also be useful to the
Commission in determining if additional action is required to address
interconnection study delays.
    310. In response to commenters that seek to eliminate the Filed
Report Requirement, we reiterate that this information should be useful
for identifying the causes of delays in regions that experience a
significant number of study delays. A number of entities should find
the publication of this information useful, including stakeholders
active in or considering entrance into a regional interconnection
queue, the Commission, and transmission providers as they actively
monitor their queue management efforts. We reiterate that we do not
expect this information to be overly burdensome, as it should largely
consist of information already tracked by the transmission provider. In
response to commenters that propose alternative metrics to trigger
reporting requirements, the Commission notes that the timeframes stated
in the tariff are clear and defined and thus should be familiar to the
transmission provider and appropriate to use for measuring transmission
provider performance.
    311. In response to commenters that advocate development of
solutions and requirements through the regional stakeholder process, we
find that the information required through interconnection study
metrics should better inform stakeholder discussions, including
discussions about need for further action. Further, many
interconnection customers develop generation projects in multiple
regions. Therefore, having a minimum set of information that is
comparable across regions would allow for quicker and more useful
assessment by interconnection customers of the viability of potential
projects. Furthermore, this reform is not intended to disrupt
stakeholder processes. We note that, on compliance, each transmission
provider may explain how it will comply with the requirements adopted
in this final action.
c. Requirement To Post Interconnection Study Metrics on OASIS
i. Comments
    312. CAISO objects to the requirement to post interconnection study
information on OASIS.\569\ CAISO contends that using existing public
websites, portals, and reports should satisfy any publication
requirement and would save ratepayers from the expense of moving data
onto OASIS.\570\ Additionally, CAISO argues that using existing public
websites, portals, and reports would allow the critical assets to
remain confidential.\571\ OATI states that the metrics proposed are in
line with similar requirements for transmission request studies but
asks the Commission to direct this posting requirement to NAESB to
establish a uniform location for the posting of these metrics on
OASIS.\572\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \569\ CAISO 2017 Comments at 22.
    \570\ Id.
    \571\ Id.
    \572\ OATI 2017 Comments at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Commission Determination
    313. In this final action, we are modifying the location
requirement for the quarterly posted summary interconnection study
metrics. In the NOPR proposal, the quarterly summary statistic
information required posting on OASIS. However, we agree with CAISO's
comments that transmission providers should have the flexibility to
post this information on their OASIS sites or on a public website. If
the transmission provider posts on its website, however, it must
provide a clear link to the information on OASIS.
    314. In response to OATI's request, we decline to specifically
require that transmissions providers work through NAESB to develop a
uniform posting location for these requirements. Transmission providers
may, of course, coordinate as they determine appropriate to implement
the Commission's requirements and to develop any relevant posting
protocols.
d. Reasonable Efforts Standard and Firm Study Deadlines
i. Comments
    315. Generation Developers and NextEra advocate elimination of the
``reasonable efforts'' standard as a way to improve study
timeliness,\573\ the result of which would be to impose firm study
deadlines Generation Developers state that, even with the new reporting
requirement, transmission providers still have no obligation or
incentives to meet the study deadline in their LGIPs.\574\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \573\ Generation Developers 2017 Comments at 33-34; NextEra 2017
Comments at 27.
    \574\ Generation Developers 2017 Comments at 33-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    316. Several commenters prefer to retain the ability of
transmission providers to use ``reasonable efforts'' to complete
interconnection studies.\575\ According to Imperial, numerous factors
affect timely study completion, and preserving the reasonable efforts
standard, while imposing these new reporting requirements, will afford
transmission providers the requisite flexibility to account for study
delays beyond their control.\576\ NYISO states that, in its experience,
interconnection customer non-responsiveness and inaccuracy interferes
with its ability to perform timely interconnection studies. NYISO also
notes that it must coordinate with all affected systems. NYISO states
that, given these factors and other unique project complexities, the
Commission should continue to evaluate interconnection study completion
in accordance with the reasonable efforts standard.\577\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \575\ Bonneville 2017 Comments at 6; Duke 2017 Comments at 15-
16; Imperial 2017 Comments at 19; NYISO 2017 Comments at 33-34.
    \576\ Imperial 2017 Comments at 20.
    \577\ NYISO 2017 Comments at 33-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    317. TVA expresses concern that the transmission provider efforts
needed to meet all deadlines would reduce the current flexibility that
benefits both interconnection customers and transmission
providers.\578\ PG&E and Indicated NYTOs oppose establishment of fixed
study deadlines.\579\ Indicated NYTOs argue that imposing artificial
deadlines can lead to prematurely completed studies that do not fully
investigate all reliability issues, which could result in transmission
owners having to pay for later-identified upgrades.\580\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \578\ TVA 2017 Comments at 12.
    \579\ Indicated NYTOs 2017 Comments at 10-11; PG&E 2017 Comments
at 6-7.
    \580\ Indicated NYTOs 2017 Comments at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    318. TDU Systems urge the Commission to consider adding a tolling
provision to relevant provisions of the

pro forma OATT because hard deadlines can be a ``two-edged sword'' for
interconnection customers. Thus, they urge the Commission to toll the
deadlines during periods when the transmission provider is responding
to questions from the interconnection customer concerning study methods
or results. TDU Systems contend that this will ensure that the deadline
does not serve as a reason for the transmission provider to refuse to
respond to legitimate questions from the interconnection customer.\581\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \581\ TDU Systems 2017 Comments at 21-22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    319. Rather than set study timeframes, APS and Bonneville believe
that interconnection customers would benefit more from discussion and
establishment of realistic study timeframes than from the reporting
requirements.\582\ APS suggests that the Commission could better
address queue delays by empowering transmission providers to set a
default timeframe for study completion that is tiered based on specific
factors, such as size, location, presence of affected systems, or
expected amount of upgrades.\583\ APS asserts that, if the Commission
determines that an interconnection customer needs additional details
about a request's study progress, the best solution is a requirement
that the transmission provider coordinate more closely with the
interconnection customer.\584\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \582\ APS 2017 Comments at 5; Bonneville 2017 Comments at 6.
    \583\ APS 2017 Comments at 4.
    \584\ APS 2017 Comments at 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    320. If the Commission adopts the NOPR proposal, ISO-NE asks that
the Commission revise the reporting construct so that performance is
evaluated in accordance with the reasonable efforts standard and not
the timeframes established in the pro forma LGIP.\585\ ISO-NE states
that, alternatively, the Commission should allow regional flexibility
for ISO-NE to evaluate and revise the timeframes to more realistically
reflect the time that it takes to complete interconnection
studies.\586\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \585\ ISO-NE Comments at 35.
    \586\ Id. at 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    321. CAISO opposes the interconnection study reporting requirement
proposal as applied to CAISO and other transmission providers with firm
study deadlines.\587\ CAISO states that its interconnection procedures
and transmission planning process are coordinated such that one process
informs the other and that this linkage necessitates timely
interconnection study completion.\588\ As such, CAISO asserts, its
transmission owners complete studies on a timely basis, and it already
publishes detailed study process schedules for each queue cluster on
its public website.\589\ CAISO requests that the Commission clarify
that this proposal is limited to those transmission providers and
owners whose tariffs do not have firm study deadlines.\590\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \587\ CAISO 2017 Comments at 21.
    \588\ Id. at 22.
    \589\ Id. (citing https://www.caiso.com/planning/Pages/GeneratorInterconnection/Default.aspx).
    \590\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Commission Determination
    322. In response to concerns that the Commission is implementing
firm interconnection study deadlines, we clarify that the NOPR did not
propose, and the final action declines to adopt, firm deadlines for
completing interconnection studies. Further, the NOPR did not propose
to, and this final action does not eliminate, the reasonable efforts
standard or reduce transmission provider flexibility. Many commenters
seem to equate measurement of a transmission provider's ability to meet
the study timeframes in their tariffs as the equivalent of establishing
firm study deadlines. Many commenters argue against firm study
deadlines and against elimination of the reasonable efforts standard.
    323. We do not believe the current record supports elimination of
the ``reasonable efforts'' standard to meet study deadlines and to
instead impose firm deadlines. At this time, we believe the reasonable
efforts standard continues to be the appropriate approach to
interconnection study processing. We find that reliance on improved
reporting is a preferable approach to encourage timely processing of
interconnection studies, rather than moving to a regime of firm study
deadlines. Such reporting should also help inform the Commission if any
future action should be considered.
    324. We disagree with ISO-NE's argument that interconnection study
metrics should be calculated to reflect compliance with the reasonable
efforts standard rather than tariff deadlines. The reasonable efforts
standard is not meant to specify a timeframe but rather to impose a
performance standard on the transmission provider. If ISO-NE's request
\591\ is that each interconnection study conducted per an
interconnection request have a specific amount of time determined as
appropriate for completion under the reasonable efforts standard, we
note that ISO-NE has tariff-prescribed timeframes that are designed to
apply to most interconnection requests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \591\ ISO-NE 2017 Comments at 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    325. APS, Bonneville and ISO-NE contend that the Commission should
allow transmission providers to establish interconnection study
timeframes that more realistically reflect the time that it takes to
complete interconnection studies. This request is outside the scope of
this proceeding because the final action is not proposing to modify the
study timeframes currently memorialized in transmission providers'
LGIP.
    326. We disagree with CAISO's contention that transmission
providers with firm deadlines should not be subject to the reporting
requirements of this final action. Interconnection customers and the
queue management process would still benefit from posting relevant
metrics regarding study completion in prescribed timeframes. We also
note that, if a transmission provider has firm study deadlines that it
always meets, then it would not trigger the Filed Report Requirement.
e. Challenges in Calculating Reported Metrics
i. Comments
    327. Southern states that there are too many potential clock resets
and restudies to result in any meaningful metrics.\592\ It does not see
the value of using withdrawal metrics and considers average study cost
to be a more meaningful metric than aggregating the total number of
employee and third-party consultant hours.\593\ TVA asserts that, for
the proposed metrics to be useful, there would need to be consistent
definitions of start and stop times for each study phase and ways to
adjust for customer[hyphen]caused delays.\594\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \592\ Southern 2017 Comments at 23.
    \593\ Id.
    \594\ TVA 2017 Comments at 12-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    328. Consistent with Order No. 890, ISO-NE requests that the
Commission clarify that the starting point for interconnection study
metrics can be the date when the study begins or some other agreed upon
date instead of the date the study agreement is signed.\595\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \595\ ISO-NE 2017 Comments at 36 (citing Preventing Undue
Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order No.
890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241, at P 747, order on reh'g, Order
No. 890-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,261 (2007), order on reh'g,
Order No. 890-B, 123 FERC ] 61,299 (2008), order on reh'g, Order No.
890-C, 126 FERC ] 61,228, order on clarification, Order No. 890-D,
129 FERC ] 61,126 (2009) (clarifying that the 60-day due diligence
period starts on the date the transmission study agreement is
executed, unless the transmission provider and the customer agree on
an alternative day for the transmission provider to begin the study,
and explaining that, while the transmission provider and customer
may not alter the length of the study period, they can mutually
agree as to the day on which the study begins)).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    329. Additionally, ISO-NE requests that the Commission extend the
period for posting the information from 30 to 60 days to allow
sufficient time for the transmission provider to collect the
information, such as from third-party consultant invoices.\596\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \596\ Id. at 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    330. PG&E requests clarification as to the application of the
Commission's proposed metrics.\597\ PG&E states that it is unclear
whether they would apply to material modification applications, to
cluster studies only, or also to Fast Track, repowering, and in-service
date studies.\598\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \597\ PG&E 2017 Comments at 7.
    \598\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Commission Determination
    331. In response to Southern's and TVA's comments, we clarify that
the start date for each study included in the performance reporting
metrics is the date that the transmission provider receives a fully
executed study agreement. If multiple study agreements have been
executed for an interconnection request, or interconnection studies
have been completed, delayed, or are ongoing, then the metric reporting
period should begin the date that the transmission provider received
the last executed study agreement and be measured to the most recent
relevant study conducted or planned for that study agreement. In
response to TVA's comment about adjusting the performance metrics for
interconnection customer-caused delays, we note that one of the
objectives of the quarterly metrics is to identify regions where the
transmission provider consistently completes interconnection studies on
a delayed basis. The metric is not intended to identify the causes of
those delays. This information is potentially useful to existing
stakeholders as well as generation developers considering pursuing
projects in that region and the lack of metric adjustment for delaying
factors provides for easier comparability of interconnection study
completion timeframes across regions. The Commission believes that
stakeholders will be most interested in explanations for missed
deadlines in queue backlogged regions and an informational report to
the Commission from such regions will be useful for identifying the
delay causes.
    332. We disagree with ISO-NE that the starting point for
interconnection study metrics should be a date other than the date the
transmission provider receives a fully executed study agreement. The
metrics adopted in this final action provide information on the
transmission provider's ability to meet the timeframes described in the
pro forma tariff. These date ranges are clearly defined, and the period
between the executed study agreement and the study completion date
reflects the amount of time to complete a study after the study's terms
are formally agreed upon. Some regions may experience significant
delays in beginning a study after study agreements are signed; in these
instances, metrics based on a transmission provider's performance once
a study is begun--which could be long after executing the study
agreement--would not be as informative and useful as the Commission's
adopted metrics.
    333. We also disagree with ISO-NE that we should extend the posting
time period from 30 to 60 days. Interconnection customers make
decisions with information as it becomes available, and we believe that
30 days allows sufficient time for the transmission provider to post
the required information.
    334. In response to PG&E's question about the application of the
proposed metrics, we clarify that these metrics apply to
interconnection requests within the queue, including clustering and
fast-track projects. We expect that a change to a project that triggers
material modification provisions, though it will lose its queue
position, would be in the queue as would repowering projects. Thus, the
study performance metric calculations must include such projects.
6. Improving Coordination With Affected Systems
a. NOPR Request for Comments
    335. The interconnection of a new generating facility to a
transmission system may affect the reliability of a neighboring, or
affected, transmission system. Currently, section 3.5 of the pro forma
LGIP requires the transmission provider to coordinate the conduct of
any studies required to determine the impact of an interconnection
request on affected systems with the affected system operators. The
transmission provider should also, if possible, include those results
in the applicable interconnection study. Because the affected system
operator is not bound by the terms of the interconnection transmission
provider's LGIP, its process and schedule may differ from the
transmission provider's processing of the interconnection request. In
Order No. 2003, the Commission explained that:

[a]lthough the owner or operator of an Affected System is not bound
by the provisions of the . . . LGIP or LGIA, the Transmission
Provider must allow any Affected System to participate in the
process when conducting the Interconnection Studies, and incorporate
the legitimate safety and reliability needs of the Affected
System.\599\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \599\ Order No. 2003, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,146 at P 121.

    336. Order No. 2003 further explained that, if the affected system
operator does not provide information in a timely manner, a
transmission provider may proceed without accounting for any
information the affected system could have provided.\600\ Often,
however, transmission providers will not proceed without receiving
reliability-related analysis from any affected systems. AWEA raised the
issue of affected system impacts in its petition,\601\ and the
Commission discussed the issue at the 2016 Technical Conference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \600\ Id. On rehearing, the Commission clarified that delays by
an affected system in performing interconnection studies or
providing information for such studies is not an acceptable reason
to deviate from the timetables established in Order No. 2003 unless
the interconnection itself (as distinct from any future delivery
service) will endanger reliability. See Order No. 2003-A, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,160 at P 114.
    \601\ Petition at 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    337. Order No. 2003 does not require that transmission providers
publish their affected system coordination process. During the Order
No. 2003 proceeding, the Commission declined Duke's request to require
affected systems to participate in the interconnection process with
interconnection customers.\602\ The Commission reiterated, however,
that a transmission provider must allow any affected system to
participate in the interconnection study process and must incorporate
the affected system's legitimate safety and reliability needs.\603\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \602\ Order No. 2003, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,146 at P 121.
    \603\ Id. PP 120-121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    338. The Commission stated in the NOPR that providing affected
system coordination guidelines and timeframes could better inform
interconnection customers and could result in fewer late-stage
withdrawals due to the unforeseen cost of affected system network
upgrades.\604\ The Commission further posited that clear procedures and
timelines regarding the affected system's study of a proposed
interconnection memorialized in a Commission-approved affected systems

analysis agreement could ameliorate delays caused by the affected
systems coordination process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \604\ NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,719 at P 158.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    339. In the NOPR, the Commission sought comment on the following:
prescribing guidelines for affected systems coordination; imposing
study requirements and associated timelines on affected systems that
are also public utility transmission providers; standardizing the
process for coordinating with an affected system during the
interconnection process; developing a standard affected system study
agreement; and additional steps (e.g., conducting a technical
conference or workshop focused on improving issues that arise when
affected systems are impacted).
b. Comments
    340. Multiple commenters responded to the questions posed by the
NOPR. We have not included a summary of the comments pertaining to
affected systems coordination because the Commission did not propose
any specific reforms pertaining to affected systems in the NOPR and is
considering these issues in another proceeding, as discussed below.
However, these comments informed that discussion.
c. Commission Determination
    341. On April 3 and 4, 2018, Commission staff convened a technical
conference in Docket No. AD18-8-000 to explore issues related to the
coordination of affected systems raised in this proceeding. The
technical conference also explored issues related to the coordination
of affected systems raised in the complaint filed by EDF Renewable
Energy, Inc. against Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.,
Southwest Power Pool, Inc., and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. in Docket
No. EL18-26-000. The Notice Inviting Post-Technical Conference
Comments, which issued concurrently with this final action, states that
initial and reply comments are due within 30 days and 45 days,
respectively, from the date of the notice's issuance. The Commission is
considering next steps in light of the technical conference held in
Docket Nos. AD18-8-000 and EL18-26-000. We decline to take further
action in this rulemaking proceeding. Any further action on this issue
would reference Docket No. AD18-8-000.

C. Enhancing Interconnection Processes

    342. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed reforms designed to
enhance interconnection processes by making use of underutilized
interconnection service, providing interconnection service earlier, and
accommodating changes in the development process.
1. Requesting Interconnection Service Below Generating Facility
Capacity
a. NOPR Proposal
    343. The Commission proposed to modify the pro forma LGIP to allow
interconnection customers to request interconnection service that is
lower than full generating facility capacity,\605\ recognizing the need
for proper control technologies and penalties to ensure that the
generation facility does not inject energy above the requested level of
service.\606\ The Commission also requested comment on whether, instead
of such pro forma LGIP revisions, such interconnection requests should
be processed on an ad hoc basis.\607\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \605\ The term generating facility capacity means ``the net
capacity of the Generating Facility and the aggregate net capacity
of the Generating Facility where it includes multiple energy
production devices.'' Pro forma LGIA Art. 1.
    \606\ NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,719 at P 167-68.
    \607\ Id. P 173.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    344. The Commission proposed that an interconnection customer that
seeks interconnection service below its generating facility capacity
should be subject to reasonable provisions that enforce a maximum
export limit and a process for notifying an interconnection customer
that it has exceeded such limit.
    345. The Commission also specifically proposed that interconnection
customers be subject to reasonable penalties if they exceed their
requested service levels, and that such penalties could be discrete
financial penalties, a requirement to pay the cost of additional
interconnection facilities or network upgrades, or the loss of
interconnection rights. The Commission sought comment on the potential
penalties that may be imposed if an interconnection customer exceeds
its service level.\608\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \608\ Id. P 168.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    346. The Commission also specifically sought comment on the types
and availability of control technologies and protective equipment to
ensure that a generating facility does not exceed its level of
interconnection service.\609\ Finally, the Commission proposed changes
to the definitions of ``Large Generating Facility'' and ``Small
Generating Facility'' in the pro forma LGIP and pro forma LGIA so that
they are based on the level of interconnection service for the
generating facility rather than the generating facility capacity.\610\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \609\ Id. P 169.
    \610\ Id. P 172.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    347. Consistent with the proposals above, the NOPR proposed to add
the following new paragraph at the end of section 3.1 of the pro forma
LGIP (with proposed new text in italics):

    The Transmission Provider shall have a process in place to
consider requests for Interconnection Service below the Generating
Facility Capacity. These requests for Interconnection Service shall
be studied at the level of Interconnection Service requested for
purposes of Interconnection Facilities, Network Upgrades, and
associated costs, but may be subject to other studies at the full
Generating Facility Capacity to ensure safety and reliability of the
system, with the study costs borne by the Interconnection Customer.
Any Interconnection Facility and/or Network Upgrade costs required
for safety and reliability also would be borne by the
Interconnection Customer. Interconnection Customers may be subject
to additional control technologies as well as testing and validation
of those technologies consistent with article 6 of the LGIA. The
necessary control technologies and protection systems as well as any
potential penalties for exceeding the level of Interconnection
Service established in the executed, or requested to be filed
unexecuted, LGIA shall be established in Appendix C of that
executed, or requested to be filed unexecuted, LGIA.\611\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \611\ Id. P 174. In this final action, the adopted language
differs slightly from the NOPR language because we remove the word
``the'' before ``Transmission Provider.''

    348. The NOPR proposed to add the following language to the end of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
section 6.3 of the pro forma LGIP (with proposed new text in italics):

    Transmission Provider shall study the interconnection request at
the level of service requested by the interconnection customer,
unless otherwise required to study the full Generating Facility
Capacity due to safety or reliability concerns.\612\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \612\ Id. P 175.

    349. The NOPR proposed to insert the following language in section
7.3 of the pro forma LGIP in line 8 of the second paragraph (with
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
proposed new text in italics):

    For purposes of determining necessary interconnection facilities
and network upgrades, the System Impact Study shall consider the
level of interconnection service requested by the Interconnection
Customer, unless otherwise required to study the full Generating
Facility Capacity due to safety or reliability concerns.\613\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \613\ Id. P 176.

    350. The NOPR proposed to add the following language to the end of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
section 8.2 of the pro forma LGIP (with proposed new text in italics):

    The Facilities Study will also identify any potential control
equipment for requests for

Interconnection Service that are lower than the Generating Facility
Capacity.\614\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \614\ Id. P 177.

    351. The NOPR proposed to add the following language to Appendix 1,
Item 5, of the pro forma LGIP, as sub-item h (with proposed new text in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
italics):

Requested capacity (in MW) of Interconnection Service (if lower than
the Generating Facility Capacity).\615\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \615\ Id. P 178.

    352. Lastly, the NOPR proposed to change the definition of ``Large
Generating Facility'' and ``Small Generating Facility'' in section 1 of
the pro forma LGIP and article 1 of the pro forma LGIA as follows
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(proposed to delete the bracketed text and add the italicized text):

    Large Generating Facility shall mean a Generating Facility for
which an Interconnection Customer has [having a Generating Facility
Capacity] requested Interconnection Service of more than 20 MW.

    Small Generating Facility shall mean a Generating Facility for
which an Interconnection Customer has requested Interconnection
Service [that has a Generating Capacity] of no more than 20 MW.\616\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \616\ Id. P 179.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. General
i. Comments
    353. Most responsive commenters support the proposal.\617\ Alevo
states that electric storage facilities may not plan to use the maximum
power rating of their facilities; therefore, they should have the
ability to request interconnection service at the power rating of their
choice.\618\ NextEra also argues that rejecting requests for
interconnection below full generating facility capacity can result in
paying for unneeded interconnection facilities and network
upgrades.\619\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \617\ Alevo 2017 Comments at 8; AFPA 2017 Comments at 3; AWEA
2017 Comments at 52; Bonneville 2017 Comments at 7; CAISO 2017
Comments at 27; California Energy Storage Alliance 2017 Comments at
6; Joint Renewable Parties 2017 Comments at 12; ELCON 2017 Comments
at 7; ESA 2017 Comments at 8.
    \618\ Alevo 2017 Comments at 8.
    \619\ NextEra 2017 Comments at 34-35 (citing NOPR, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ] 32,719 at P 167).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    354. A number of commenters see benefits to the proposal. Several
commenters see the potential for lower costs.\620\ AFPA and the Public
Interest Organizations assert that allowing for interconnection service
below capacity will improve the efficiency and fairness of the
interconnection process and enhance reliability.\621\ ESA agrees,
adding that the proposal will allow interconnection customers to
request service that reflects a given resource's intended
operation.\622\ ESA and AFPA contend that the proposal will remove
undue discrimination toward highly controllable or unique resources,
such as electric storage resources or combined heat and power, in
interconnection processes.\623\ ESA further argues that the proposal
will facilitate market entry of electric storage resources by
eliminating excessive costs and will allow electric storage resources
to use spare interconnection service to repower existing conventional
generators or firm the deliveries of variable generators.\624\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \620\ AFPA 2017 Comments at 14; Public Interest Organizations
2017 Comments at 5-8; ELCON 2017 Comments at 7; ESA 2017 Comments at
8; IECA 2017 Comments at 3.
    \621\ AFPA 2017 Comments at 14; Public Interest Organizations
2017 Comments at 5-8; MidAmerican 2017 Comments at 17.
    \622\ ESA 2017 Comments at 8.
    \623\ Id.; AFPA 2017 Comments at 14.
    \624\ ESA 2017 Comments at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    355. AWEA states that developers of new technologies have an
interest in requesting interconnection service at levels below
generating facility capacity.\625\ It notes that wind turbine
manufacturers often make minor upgrades to equipment or software to
increase capacity, and these upgrades sometimes occur during the
pendency of an interconnection request. As a result, the final
generating facility capacity may be greater than what was originally
specified in the interconnection request. AWEA argues that in such
cases, the interconnection customer may prefer to avoid seeking an
increase in interconnection service because increasing the generating
facility capacity may constitute a material modification that triggers
the need for a restudy.\626\ AWEA further argues that allowing an
interconnection customer to increase its capacity without increasing
its requested level of interconnection service and without it being
considered a material modification would promote more efficient
operation of wind plants.\627\ AWEA states that allowing
interconnection service at levels below generating facility capacity
would benefit wind facilities due to the collector system losses that
occur, as the output of the multiple turbines at a wind farm are
aggregated before injection to the grid. According to AWEA, these
losses result in the maximum real power output at the point of
interconnection being measurably lower than the combined generating
facility capacity of the individual units.\628\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \625\ AWEA 2017 Comments at 52.
    \626\ Id. at 52-53.
    \627\ Id. at 52-53.
    \628\ Id. at 53-54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    356. ESA and NextEra also point out that, in Order No. 792, the
Commission revised the pro forma SGIP to allow small generating
facilities to attain interconnection service below installed capacity,
if the interconnection customer installs acceptable control
technologies to avoid violating injection limits; thus, it would be
inconsistent to not allow the same for large generating
facilities.\629\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \629\ ESA 2017 Comments at 11 (citing Order No. 792, 145 FERC ]
61,159 at P 230); NextEra 2017 Comments at 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    357. ELCON, ESA, and NextEra also note that the proposal will
reduce the overbuilding of interconnection facilities and network
upgrades.\630\ According to Industrial Energy Consumers of America,
this reform should also increase existing asset utilization and improve
the accuracy and reliability of interconnection studies.\631\
MidAmerican argues that the proposal may reduce late-stage withdrawals
from the queue by allowing interconnection customers to operate at
reduced output levels rather than requiring network upgrades that would
otherwise render them non-viable.\632\ NEPOOL suggests that the
proposal provides options and flexibility for market participants and
could facilitate market entry of new resources.\633\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \630\ ESA 2017 Comments at 8; ELCON 2017 Comments at 7; NextEra
2017 Comments at 35.
    \631\ IECA 2017 Comments at 3.
    \632\ MidAmerican 2017 Comments at 17.
    \633\ NEPOOL 2017 Comments at 14-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    358. CAISO notes that the flexibility afforded by the proposal can
benefit interconnection customers--especially for newer resources that
combine storage, conventional generation, high auxiliary load, and/or
onsite demand-side management.\634\ It further argues that the
transmission operator is unaffected so long as the interconnection
request studies the correct capacity and the generating facility never
exceeds that capacity.\635\ ELCON also notes that the proposal would
provide benefits for industrial co-generators or other behind-the-meter
industrial generation.\636\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \634\ CAISO 2017 Comments at 27.
    \635\ Id.
    \636\ ELCON 2017 Comments at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    359. Multiple commenters note that similar programs are already in
place in some RTOs/ISOs, either on a formal or informal basis,
including CAISO, MISO, PJM, and ISO-NE.\637\ ESA and NextEra offer
examples of where interconnection

service lower than installed capacity is already occurring without
reliability problems.\638\ ESA provides examples in CAISO, MISO, and
PJM, where it believes projects have been sized to allow greater
generation deliveries over time, but where the facilities (including
one that combines solar and storage) never deliver at maximum
output.\639\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \637\ CAISO 2017 Comments at 27; MISO 2017 Comments at 33; PJM
2017 Comments at 23-24; NEPOOL 2017 Comments at 14-15.
    \638\ ESA 2017 Comments at 10-11; NextEra 2017 Comments at 36.
    \639\ ESA 2017 Comments at 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    360. CAISO and PG&E state that CAISO allows interconnection
requests for less than generating facility capacity, as long as the
interconnection customer installs appropriate monitoring and control
technologies to enforce the maximum export limit.\640\ PG&E notes that
various projects have made such requests, particularly solar
resources.\641\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \640\ CAISO 2017 Comments at 27; PG&E 2017 Comments at 7 (citing
CAISO Business Practice Manual for Generator Management, Section
<IP_ADDRESS>).
    \641\ PG&E 2017 Comments at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    361. PG&E notes that CAISO also allows interconnection projects to
downsize their capacity, which is functionally equivalent to limiting a
project with excess capacity.\642\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \642\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    362. MISO notes that its generator interconnection agreement allows
interconnection customers to request interconnection service below the
capacity of the proposed generating facility and limits the net
injection to the allowed interconnection service level.\643\ MISO notes
that the additional limiting language gives the transmission owner and
MISO the right to enforce the limit.\644\ Similarly, NextEra explains
that MISO has allowed it to amend an existing interconnection agreement
to reflect an increase in the rating of a wind generation project
without an increase in the level of interconnection service
provided.\645\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \643\ MISO 2017 Comments at 33.
    \644\ Id.
    \645\ NextEra 2017 Comments at 36-37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    363. PJM states that it currently allows interconnection customers
to limit injection rights subject to additional studies at both the
requested level of interconnection service to identify required network
upgrades, as well as at the generating facility's full capacity.\646\
PJM explains that these studies allow PJM to specify the system
protections necessary in the event of system contingencies.\647\
NextEra states that PJM has allowed a wind generator to install
capacity in excess of the level of interconnection service in the
agreement.\648\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \646\ PJM 2017 Comments at 24.
    \647\ Id.
    \648\ NextEra 2017 Comments at 36-37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    364. ISO-NE states that it supports the proposal and has already
implemented a similar process under its existing interconnection
procedures.\649\ Similarly, NEPOOL states that interconnection
customers in ISO-NE can already request an amount of interconnection
service less than generating facility capacity at the time of the
interconnection request or before beginning the system impact
study.\650\ NEPOOL notes that if a generating facility consists of
multiple generating units, ISO-NE would need to study a number of
possible output combinations, which could increase study costs and
timelines but could also potentially reduce upgrade requirements.\651\
NEPOOL states that ISO-NE studies such requests at the requested below-
generating facility capacity amount, and the interconnection customer
must explain how it will limit output of its facility to that
level.\652\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \649\ ISO-NE 2017 Comments at 40.
    \650\ NEPOOL 2017 Comments at 15.
    \651\ NEPOOL 2017 Comments at 15.
    \652\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    365. Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations, NYISO, and SEIA do not
object to the proposal.\653\ Portland generally supports this proposal,
but states that there are potential queue and reliability impacts.\654\
TVA argues that the proposal imposes an undesirable monitoring and
mitigation burden on transmission system operators, and that the
necessary protective systems introduce undesirable reliability
challenges.\655\ Southern expresses concern that interconnection
customers could take advantage of this proposal to avoid costly network
upgrades.\656\ EEI requests that the Commission ensure that any
revisions to the pro forma LGIA or LGIP provide clear requirements for
interconnection customers.\657\ Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations
recommend establishing NERC reliability standards for interconnection
customers operating at levels below their rated capacity, which would
constrain them to the rating at which their generation was
studied.\658\
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    \653\ Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations 2017 Comments at 4,
21-22; NYISO 2017 Comments at 36; SEIA 2017 Comments at 21.
    \654\ Portland 2017 Comments at 6.
    \655\ TVA 2017 Comments at 14-16.
    \656\ Southern 2017 Comments at 25.
    \657\ EEI 2017 Comments at 54; NYISO 2017 Comments at 36.
    \658\ Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations 2017 Comments at 24.
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    366. In response to the Commission's question in the NOPR regarding
whether, instead of revising the pro forma LGIP, such interconnection
requests should be processed on an ad hoc basis,\659\ ESA states that
an ad hoc basis for considering interconnection requests below
cumulative installed capacity does not provide sufficient certainty to
interconnection customers seeking interconnection service below a
resource's installed capacity.\660\ NextEra agrees, arguing that an ad
hoc approach could lead to arbitrary and potentially unduly
discriminatory results.\661\
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    \659\ NOPR, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,719 at P 173.
    \660\ ESA 2017 Comments at 11.
    \661\ NextEra 2017 Comments at 37-38.
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ii. Commission Determination
    367. In this final action, we adopt the NOPR proposal to modify
sections 3.1, 6.3, 7.3, 8.2, and Appendix 1 of the pro forma LGIP to
allow interconnection customers to request interconnection service that
is lower than full generating facility capacity, recognizing the need
for proper control technologies and penalties to ensure that the
generating facility does not inject energy above the requested level of
service.\662\ We also withdraw the proposal to revise the definitions
of ``Large Generating Facility'' and ``Small Generating Facility'' in
the pro forma LGIA so that they are based on the level of
interconnection service for the generating facility rather than the
generating facility capacity, and make certain clarifications, as
discussed further below.
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    \662\ We are therefore not pursuing the alternative, ad hoc
approach to interconnections below generating facility capacity,
about which the NOPR sought comment.
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    368. The majority of responsive comments either support the NOPR
proposals outright or emphasize the importance of allowing transmission
providers to retain the tools necessary to continue to ensure reliable
operations. Furthermore, as noted by some commenters, some RTOs/ISOs
have already permitted such flexibility in the generator
interconnection process without causing reliability issues.
    369. We find that the reforms and clarifications made in this final
action, coupled with existing provisions in the pro forma LGIA, provide
the desired flexibility for interconnection customers while allowing
transmission providers to ensure reliability.
    370. The reforms adopted here are consistent with existing
provisions of the pro forma LGIA. Article 6 of the pro forma LGIA
provides transmission providers with broad ability to test and inspect
or require the testing and inspection of interconnection facilities and
network upgrades. Articles 7 and 8 of the pro forma LGIA provide a
similarly broad ability to transmission

providers with respect to metering and communications requirements
relevant to interconnection. All of these existing provisions would
apply to interconnection requests that are below generating facility
capacity, just as they do to other interconnection requests, and they
would thus help ensure that the necessary control technologies for
limiting injection adhere to transmission provider requirements.
    371. Most importantly, article 9 of the pro forma LGIA describes
both the transmission provider's and the interconnection customer's
obligations with respect to operations of the interconnection
facilities and network upgrades and, in particular, defines system
protection facilities to include ``the equipment, including necessary
protection signal communications equipment, required to protect the
transmission provider's transmission system from faults or other
electrical disturbances occurring at the generating facility.'' \663\
Article <IP_ADDRESS> of the pro forma LGIA requires the interconnection
customer to pay for the installation, operation, and maintenance of
system protection facilities associated with its interconnecting
generating facility. We find that the necessary control technologies
for limiting injection discussed in the NOPR are a subset of the system
protection facilities that transmission providers are empowered to
require and all interconnection customers are required to pay for under
article <IP_ADDRESS> of the pro forma LGIA.
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    \663\ LGIA Art. 1 (Definitions) (emphasis added).
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    372. We note that nothing in article <IP_ADDRESS> of the pro forma LGIA
prevents interconnection customers from proposing system protection
facilities to limit their injection rights to meet the transmission
provider's requirements. Therefore, this aspect of the final action
makes those interconnection customer rights explicit, while still
preserving the transmission provider's ability to ensure system
protection under the existing pro forma LGIA provisions. Commenters
have not argued that these broad, existing authorities are insufficient
in the context of interconnection requests operating below full
generating facility capacity.
    373. Furthermore, article 5.9 of the pro forma LGIA permits an
interconnection customer to request the study and, if appropriate,
subsequent use of, a lower level of interconnection service, termed
``limited operation,'' in cases where the transmission provider's
interconnection facilities or network upgrades are not reasonably
expected to be completed prior to the commercial operation date of the
generating facility. While this existing LGIA provision is intended to
permit temporary operation at below generating facility capacity, the
fact that entities have successfully made use of this provision
demonstrates that there should not be anything inherently unworkable
about the concept of interconnection below generating facility
capacity. Therefore, we find that this final action does not adversely
impact transmission providers' ability to ensure reliable
interconnection consistent with good utility practice.
    374. Finally, with respect to the Non-Profit Utility Trade
Associations' suggestion that a NERC reliability standard be considered
that would constrain interconnection customers operating at levels
below their rated generating facility capacity to the rating at which
the facilities are studied, we find that suggestion to be outside the
scope of this rulemaking proceeding. As discussed above, the existing
system protection facility provisions of the pro forma LGIA, which
apply to all interconnection customers, adequately ensure that below-
generating facility capacity interconnection customers do not exceed
the limits for which they are studied.
c. Study Assumptions and Modeling
i. Comments
    375. Commenters disagree on the appropriate way to model and
conduct studies of resources that seek to interconnect below their
capacity. Some commenters argue that the studies should focus solely on
the reduced generating facility capacity. For example, AWEA, ESA, and
NextEra assert that transmission providers should not be able to study
interconnection requests at full generating facility capacity. They
argue that the interconnection customer should be able to determine
operational assumptions and limitations, especially given the
sophisticated and reliable characteristics of available monitoring and
control technologies.\664\
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    \664\ AWEA 2017 Comments at 54; ESA 2017 Comments at 12; NextEra
2017 Comments at 40-41.
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    376. ESA argues that, if a transmission provider is skeptical that
proposed control systems are adequate, it should identify the
shortcomings of the proposed control scheme to the customer and suggest
what modifications address these shortcomings.\665\ NextEra argues that
requiring studies at full generating facility capacity would
``undermine the very goal of the Commission's proposed reforms.'' \666\
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    \665\ ESA 2017 Comments at 12.
    \666\ NextEra 2017 Comments at 39.
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    377. On the other hand, NYISO contends that, to ensure reliability,
short circuit analysis of the full generating facility capability and
steady-state and dynamic study evaluations of the specific mechanism,
which would serve to enforce this limit, are necessary.\667\ NYISO
asserts that these evaluations are necessary to ensure that the
mechanism does not impact the resource's ability to reliably
interconnect to the New York state transmission system or distribution
system and that, in the event that the mechanism fails, there are no
adverse short circuit impacts.\668\
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    \667\ NYISO 2017 Comments at 36.
    \668\ Id.
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    378. Similarly, ESA and NextEra suggest that short circuit and
stability studies should be performed using full generating facility
capacity, whereas thermal studies should be at the level of
interconnection requested.\669\ However, if a transmission provider
decides to perform thermal studies at the full generating facility
capacity rating, then NextEra suggests tariff language stating that
those study costs should be borne by the transmission provider and be
outside the normal queue timeframe.\670\ NextEra adds that a
transmission provider should be able to refuse to grant the requested
lower level of interconnection service just as it could refuse to
proceed with an interconnection request, subject to dispute resolution,
if a customer objects to a system protection facility proposed by the
transmission provider.\671\
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    \669\ ESA 2017 Comments at 12-13; NextEra 2017 Comments at 40.
    \670\ Id. at 41.
    \671\ Id. at 41.
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    379. Bonneville and Non-Profit Utility Trade Associations emphasize
that transmission providers should be able to study at full generating
facility capacity in cases where safety or reliability concerns may
arise.\672\ Duke goes further, stating that system impact studies and
facilities studies should use full generating facility capacity for
reliability reasons.\673\
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    \672\ Bonneville 2017 Comments at 7; Non-Profit Utility Trade
Associations 2017 Comments at 4, 21-22.
    \673\ Duke 2017 Comments at 19.
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    380. On the other hand, TDU Systems contends that, to ensure
transparency, the transmission provider must be able to document the
need for a study at full generating facility capacity.\674\ EEI is not
aware of any protection system that would eliminate the need to study
the full generating facility capacity and

therefore doubts that the proposal would reduce costs.\675\
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    \674\ TDU Systems 2017 Comments at 27-28.
    \675\ EEI 2017 Comments at 55.