[Federal Register: January 4, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 3)]
[Notices]
[Page 916-921]
[DOCID:fr04ja08-61]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

[Docket Number PHMSA-2007-28119; Notice No. 07-9]

Proposed Recommended Practices for Bulk Loading and Unloading of
Hazardous Materials in Transportation

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).

ACTION: Notice; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: This notice solicits information and comments on proposed
recommended practices for loading and unloading operations involving
bulk packagings used to transport hazardous materials. In this notice,
we summarize incident data related to bulk loading and unloading
operations; discuss recommendations issued by the National
Transportation Safety Board and the Chemical and Safety Hazard
Investigation Board; provide an overview of current Federal regulations
applicable to bulk loading and unloading operations; summarize the
results of a public workshop we hosted earlier this year; and set forth
proposed recommended practices for bulk loading and unloading
operations. Based on information and comments received, we plan to
consider strategies for enhancing the safety of bulk loading and
unloading operations, including whether additional regulatory
requirements may be necessary. In addition, we are soliciting comments
on whether there are existing gaps and/or overlaps in regulations
promulgated by PHMSA, OSHA, EPA and the USCG that adversely affect the
safety of these operations, and how any identified gaps and/or overlaps
in Federal regulations should be addressed.

DATES: Submit comments by February 8, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the docket number
(PHMSA-2007-28119) by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov.
 Follow the online instructions for submitting

comments.
     Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Operations, U.S. Department of
Transportation, West Building, Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Routing
Symbol M-30, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: To Docket Operations, Room W12-140 on the
ground floor of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal Holidays.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number for this notice at the beginning of the comment. Note
that all comments received will be posted without change to the docket
management system, including any personal information provided.
    Docket: For access to the dockets to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov, or DOT's Docket

Operations Office (see ADDRESSES).

PRIVACY ACT: Anyone is able to search the electronic form of any
written

communications and comments received into any of our dockets by the
name of the individual submitting the document (or signing the
document, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor
union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in
the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477), or you
may visit http://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rick Boyle, Office of Hazardous
Materials Technology,<PHONE_NUMBER> or Kurt Eichenlaub, Office of
Hazardous Materials Standards,<PHONE_NUMBER>, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

I. Background

    A recent PHMSA review of hazardous materials transportation
incidents occurring over the past decade indicates that roughly one-
quarter to one-half of all serious hazardous materials incidents may be
associated with loading and unloading operations involving bulk
packagings such as cargo tank motor vehicles (CTMV) and rail tank cars.
In addition, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the
Chemical and Safety Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) have investigated
a number of accidents associated with these loading and unloading
operations. PHMSA's data review and the NTSB and CSB investigations
suggest that there may be opportunities to enhance the safety of such
operations.

A. PHMSA Analysis of Bulk Loading and Unloading Incidents

    On February 8, 2007, PHMSA issued, ``A Summary Evaluation of Risk
Associated with Bulk Loading/Unloading of Hazmat,'' a summary report of
a risk assessment conducted to identify risks associated with bulk
loading and unloading operations for highway and rail transportation.
The report provides both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of
incident reports involving loading and unloading of bulk packagings
submitted to PHMSA in accordance with the reporting criteria specified
in Sec.  171.16 of the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR
Parts 171-180). The report focuses on highway and rail transportation
incidents because 89% of total incidents and 97% of all serious
incidents occur during transportation operations in these two modes.
Serious incidents in highway and rail transportation include any
unintentional release that results in death, major injury, closure of a
major transportation artery, release of radioactive material from a
Type B package, suspected release of certain infectious substances, or
release of a bulk quantity of hazardous material. The data used for the
report are from the Hazardous Materials Information System (HMIS), as
of January 7, 2007. The results of the data analysis showed that:
     During the 2004-2006 period, 27% of all serious incidents
occurred during bulk loading and unloading operations.
     During the 2004-2006 period, hazardous materials shipments
transported by highway and rail in bulk packagings were involved in
approximately 9 out of 10 high consequence events.
     The number of incidents occurring during the loading and
unloading of bulk packagings has remained relatively unchanged over the
last 10 years.
     Many of the identified causes of both en route and storage
incidents can be attributed to loading and unloading operations (i.e.,
overfilled, overpressurized, loose closure, component or device, etc.).
    PHMSA's summary report and analysis of bulk loading and unloading
incident data is available for review in this docket.

B. NTSB Accident Investigations

    NTSB has investigated several serious accidents related to bulk
loading and unloading operations:
     On July 14, 2001, in Riverview, Michigan, during unloading
from a rail tank car, a pipe attached to a fitting on the unloading
line fractured and separated, causing the release of methyl mercaptan.
The methyl mercaptan ignited, engulfing the tank car in flames. Fire
damage to cargo transfer hoses on an adjacent tank car resulted in the
release of chlorine. Three plant employees were killed in the accident,
and about 2,000 people in the surrounding neighborhood were evacuated
from their homes. The fractured piping used for the unloading operation
exhibited significant corrosion damage. As a result of this
investigation, NTSB issued the following recommendations to DOT:
    [cir] I-02-1: Develop, with the assistance of the Environmental
Protection Agency and Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
safety requirements that apply to the loading and unloading of railroad
tank cars, highway cargo tanks, and other bulk containers that address
the inspection and maintenance of cargo transfer equipment, emergency
shutdown measures, and personal protection requirements.
    [cir] I-02-2: Implement, after the adoption of safety requirements
developed in response to Safety Recommendation I-02-01, an oversight
program to ensure compliance with these requirements.
     On September 13, 2002, in Freeport, Texas, a tank car
containing about 6,500 gallons of hazardous waste ruptured at a
transfer station. The car had been steam-heated to permit the transfer
of the waste to a CTMV for subsequent disposal. As a result of the
accident, 28 people received minor injuries, and residents living
within one mile of the accident site had to shelter in place for 5\1/2\
hours. The tank car, highway cargo tank, and transfer station were
destroyed. The force of the explosion propelled a 300-pound tank car
dome housing about \1/3\ mile away from the tank car. Two storage tanks
near the transfer station were damaged; they released about 660 gallons
of the hazardous material oleum (fuming sulfuric acid and sulfur
trioxide). As a result of its investigation, NTSB issued the following
recommendation to PHMSA:
    [cir] R-04-10: In cooperation with the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency, develop
regulations that require safe operating procedures to be established
before hazardous materials are heated in a railroad tank car for
unloading; at a minimum, the procedures should include the monitoring
of internal tank pressure and cargo temperature.
    NTSB has also issued previous recommendations I-88-1 and I-88-2 to
the Department of Transportation, and R-02-16 to the Federal Railroad
Administration related to loading and unloading safety requirements:
    [cir] I-88-1: Establish safety requirements for the movement and
temporary storage of hazardous materials at intermodal transportation
facilities.
    [cir] I-88-2: Strengthen minimum safety requirements for loading
and unloading of hazardous materials to provide adequate, uniform
safety in all modes of transportation.
    [cir] R-02-16: Issue a hazardous materials bulletin to warn
companies involved in tank car loading and unloading operations that
tank car excess flow valves cannot be relied upon to stop leaks that
occur during these operations.

C. CSB Accident Investigations

    CSB has investigated two incidents in which chlorine was released
during rail tank car unloading operations:

     On August 14, 2002, in Festus, Missouri, approximately 24
tons of chlorine was released during a three-hour period following the
rupture of an unloading hose. The magnitude of the incident was
exacerbated because the emergency shut down system failed to operate
properly. Consequently, 48,000 pounds of chlorine was released,
resulting in the evacuation or shelter-in-place of hundreds of
residents. Three residents were admitted to the hospital.
     On August 11, 2005, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, a chlorine
transfer hose ruptured. However, the emergency shut down system
operated properly, and the release ended in under a minute. The
successful activation of the emergency shut-down system prevented a
major release and off-site impact.
    As a result of its investigations, CSB issued DOT the following
recommendation:
    [cir] 2006-06-I-LA-RI: Expand the scope of DOT regulatory coverage
to include chlorine rail car unloading operations. Ensure the
regulations specifically require remotely operated emergency isolation
devices that will quickly isolate a leak in any of the flexible hoses
(or piping components) used to unload a chlorine rail car. The shutdown
system must be capable of stopping a chlorine release from both the
rail car and the facility chlorine receiving equipment. Require the
emergency isolation system be periodically maintained and operationally
tested to ensure it will function in the event of an unloading system
chlorine leak.

D. OSHA/EPA/USCG Requirements

    Both the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulate operations involving
the handling of hazardous materials at fixed facilities. For example,
OSHA's Process Safety Management (PSM) standard (29 CFR 1910.119)
contains requirements for processes that use, store, manufacture,
handle, or transport particular chemicals on-site. Bulk loading and
unloading operations involving PSM-covered chemicals are subject to the
requirements of the PSM standard. The OSHA standards also include
requirements for the handling and storage of specific hazardous
materials, such as compressed gases, flammable and combustible liquids,
explosives and blasting agents, liquefied petroleum gases, and
anhydrous ammonia. Similarly, EPA regulations establish a general duty
for facility owners or operators to identify hazards associated with
the accidental releases of extremely hazardous substances, design and
maintain a safe facility as needed to prevent such releases, and
minimize the consequences of releases. In addition, stationary sources
with more than a threshold quantity of a regulated substance in a
process are subject to EPA's accident prevention regulations, including
the requirement to develop risk management plans (40 CFR Part 68).
    The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) maintains regulations that apply to
hazardous materials directly loaded or unloaded to or from a hold or
tank on a vessel without the use of containers or break-bulk packaging
(46 CFR Parts 148-154). In addition, the USCG regulations establish
requirements for the transfer of hazardous material to or from a
portable tank while on a vessel; and, requirements for waterfront
facilities engaged in the handling, storage, loading, discharging or
transportation of packaged hazardous materials and solid bulk cargo (33
CFR Part 126).

II. PHMSA Regulations

1. Requirements Applicable to Loading and Unloading Operations

    The HMR include requirements for loading and unloading railroad
tank cars, CTMVs, and other bulk containers. Part 174 of the HMR, which
applies to the transportation of hazardous materials by rail,
establishes general loading and unloading requirements for hazardous
materials and specific loading and handling requirements for shipments
of Class 1 (Explosive), Class 2 (Non-flammable, Flammable, and Poison
gases), Class 3 (Flammable liquid), Division 6.1 (Poison), and Class 7
(Radioactive) materials. Part 177 of the HMR, which applies to the
transportation of hazardous materials by motor carrier, establishes
general hazardous materials loading and unloading requirements and
specific loading and unloading requirements applicable to Class 1
(Explosive), Class 2 (Non-flammable, Flammable, and Poison gases),
Class 3 (Flammable liquid), Class 4 (Flammable solid, Spontaneously
combustible, and Dangerous when wet), Class 5 (Oxidizer and Organic
peroxide), Division 6.1 (Poison), Class 7 (Radioactive), and Class 8
(Corrosive) materials. The HMR also include additional loading
requirements applicable to rail tank cars, portable tanks, cargo tanks,
and intermodal bulk containers in Sec. Sec.  171.31, 173.32, 173.33,
and 173.35.

2. Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles and Loading/Unloading Equipment

    The HMR include requirements for the inspection and maintenance of
cargo transfer equipment, such as piping and transfer hoses, that is
part of bulk packaging or carried on a vehicle used to transport a bulk
packaging. The HMR require each operator of a CTMV to conduct periodic
tests and inspections of the CTMV and its attachments and
appurtenances, including piping and transfer hoses used for loading and
unloading the CTMV. Each operator must conduct external visual
inspections, internal visual inspections, leakage tests, and pressure
tests in accordance with the schedule established in Sec.  180.407(c).
Section 180.407 also sets forth the specific procedures to be followed
for each inspection or test. In addition, for CTMVs used to transport
liquefied compressed gases, each operator must visually inspect each
CTMV's cargo transfer equipment, including piping and hoses installed
or carried on the CTMV, at least once each month (see Sec.  180.416).
These periodic inspections and tests help to ensure that each CTMV and
its cargo transfer equipment are free of leaks or other defects that
could adversely affect the safe operation of the CTMV, including the
safety of loading and unloading operations.

3. Cargo Tank Motor Vehicle Emergency Shutdown Requirements

    The HMR require DOT specification CTMVs to be equipped with
emergency discharge control systems. For example, an MC 330 or 331 CTMV
used to transport liquefied compressed gases must be equipped with an
emergency discharge control system activated automatically or by remote
control in the event of an unloading emergency. In addition, each CTMV
operator must carry on the vehicle written emergency discharge control
procedures for all delivery operations. An MC 338 CTMV tank must be
equipped with a remotely controlled self-closing shutoff valve with
both a mechanical and thermal means of automatic closure. On DOT 406,
407, and 412 CTMVs, each loading/unloading outlet must be fitted with a
self-closing system capable of closing the outlet(s) in an emergency
within 30 seconds of actuation. On DOT 406, 407, and 412 CTMVs used to
transport flammable, pyrophoric, oxidizing, or poisonous materials, the
remote means of closure must be capable of thermal activation.

4. Training Requirements

    Each person who performs a function regulated under the HMR must be
trained (see Subpart H of Part 172). This training must include general
awareness, function-specific, safety, and security training. Thus, each
person who performs a loading or unloading function regulated under the
HMR must be trained concerning all aspects of that function, including
emergency shutdown procedures. In addition, each person who performs a
loading or unloading function regulated under the HMR must be trained
concerning specific hazards associated with the materials handled and
personal protection measures.

III. Consensus Standards

    We are aware of a variety of existing national consensus standards
that address bulk loading and unloading operations. For example, the
Chlorine Institute has developed loading and unloading procedures for
chlorine (e.g., Pamphlet 57, ``Emergency Shut-off Systems for Bulk
Transfers of Chlorine; Pamphlet 66, ``Recommended Practices for
Handling Chlorine Tank Cars; Pamphlet 91, ``Checklist for Chlorine
Packaging Plants, Chlorine Distributors and Tank Car Users of
Chlorine''). The Association of American Railroads (AAR) has developed
Pamphlet 34, ``Recommended Methods for the Safe Loading and Unloading
of Tank Cars.'' The American Chemistry Council has developed the
Responsible Care[reg] management system, which establishes an
integrated, structured approach to drive results in seven key areas:
community awareness and emergency response; security; distribution;
employee health and safety; pollution prevention; process safety; and
product stewardship. PHMSA reviewed some of these industry standards to
ascertain if existing standards provide the necessary amplification of
the basic loading and unloading practices proposed in this notice.
    The industry standards address a number of topics related to the
loading and unloading of hazardous materials and are different based
upon the type of hazardous material, the physical form of the material,
the mode of transportation, and the type of packaging used to transport
the material. While the standards exhibit differences in specific
detail, there are a number of common general safety topic areas, such
as, risk evaluation, development of operational procedures, maintenance
and testing of equipment, training, and emergency response.
    The available industry standards clearly demonstrate industry's
focus on safety issues associated with loading and unloading
operations. Virtually all standards specifically require the use of
personal protective equipment, often specifying in detail the equipment
that should be used. In addition, most standards include considerable
detail concerning activities that appear to be associated with the
greatest personal risk (e.g., assuring evacuation of all hazardous
material residues from tanks before required interior inspections). The
wide variety of industry standards applicable to loading and unloading
operations provide useful information on industry standard practices,
which we considered in the development of the recommended practices
proposed in this notice.
    PHMSA recognizes that it reviewed only a sampling of guidelines and
standards that are available to the bulk hazardous materials shipping
industry. The documents are representative of what is available to
industry and were submitted by those industry personnel who believe
additional guidance would be useful.

IV. Public Workshop

    On June 14, 2007, PHMSA hosted a public workshop to bring
stakeholders together for conceptual discussions on the risks
associated with loading and unloading bulk hazardous materials and the
range of actions that could be taken by the government and industry to
address those risks. In the May 11, 2007 public notice advertising this
workshop (72 FR 26864), we invited interested persons to submit
comments related to the issues discussed at the workshop.
Representatives from industry, federal agencies, state and local
government, standards organizations, the emergency response community,
employee groups, environmental and public interest organizations, and
the public participated in the meeting.
    The workshop consisted of a series of panel presentations on
specific topics followed by discussions of the issues presented. Issues
covered at the workshop included: (1) Incident data analysis and
evaluation; (2) NTSB and CSB accident reports; (3) loading and
unloading procedures and recommended practices; (4) whether there are
gaps in the safety and regulatory programs; (5) training; and (6)
emergency response.
    Many workshop participants voiced strong support for the
development of loading and unloading procedures, suggesting that
development and adoption of such ``recommended practices'' or consensus
standards could significantly improve the safety of loading and
unloading operations. A working group of shippers, carriers, and
industrial package organizations (Interested Parties Working Group)
developed, and presented for consideration, a draft operating
procedures document for the loading, unloading, and incidental storage
of hazardous materials in bulk packagings having a capacity of greater
than 3,000 liters.
    The draft operating procedures document specifies information and
processes that the Interested Parties Working Group recommends
offerors, consignees, or transloading facility operators address in
their operating procedures. Some key elements include recommendations
applicable to pre-transfer operations (e.g., securement of the
transport unit, and inspection of the transfer equipment and
attachments), transfer operations (e.g., monitoring the temperature of
the lading and the pressure of the containment vessel), post-transfer
operations (e.g., evacuation of the transfer system and
depressurization of the containment vessel), storage (e.g., monitoring
for leaks and releases), and emergency procedures (e.g., use of
emergency shut-down systems). The Interested Parties Working Group
recommends that operators and facilities engaged in loading, unloading
and incidental storage activities develop and implement written
operating procedures inclusive of the elements outlined in the draft
operating procedures document, which are based on a safety and security
analysis of the functions performed at the particular loading,
unloading, or storage location or facility. The complete draft
operating procedures document presented by the working group is
available for review in this docket. This docket also includes a
transcript of the public workshop, presentations made by panel
participants, comments presented at the workshop or during the comment
period, and a petition for rulemaking submitted by the Dangerous Goods
Advisory Council on November 19, 2007 requesting the adoption of
operational procedures in the HMR applicable to loading, unloading and
incidental storage of hazardous materials in bulk packagings.
    Prior to publication, a copy of this notice was provided for review
to OSHA, EPA, NTSB, CSB, the International Association of Fire Chiefs,
the National Association of State Fire Marshals, DGAC, and the Chlorine
Institute. Comments we received from these agencies and organizations
are posted on the Docket.

V. Proposed Recommended Practices for Bulk Loading and Unloading
Operations

    As a result of the collaborative effort between PHMSA and our
stakeholders, we are proposing a set of recommended practices that
would apply to loading and unloading operations involving hazardous
materials in many different types of packagings and a number of
different operational and modal contexts. These proposed recommended
practices build on the submission from the Interested Parties Working
Group, the NTSB and CSB recommendations related to loading and
unloading of bulk packagings, and our analysis of bulk loading and
unloading incidents. Note that these proposed recommended practices
would supplement current HMR requirements applicable to loading and
unloading operations. For example, the recommendations applicable to
training would not replace the current requirements for general
awareness, function specific, safety, and security training established
in Subpart H of Part 172, but would be considered as additions to
current training requirements and programs.

Proposed Recommended Practices for Loading and Unloading Bulk
Quantities of Hazardous Materials

1. Loading/Unloading Safety Analysis

    A shipper, carrier, or facility operator should conduct a thorough,
orderly, systematic analysis to identify, evaluate and control the
hazards associated with specific loading and unloading operations. The
analysis should be appropriate to the complexity of the process and the
materials involved in the operation. For example, the analysis should
consider the hazards of the material to be loaded or unloaded,
including any temperature or pressure controls necessary to ensure safe
handling of the material, and conditions that could affect the safety
of the process, such as access control, lighting, ignition sources, and
physical obstructions. The analysis should also assess current
procedures utilized to ensure the safety of loading and unloading
operations and identify any areas where those procedures could be
improved.

2. Loading/Unloading Operational Procedures

    Based on the safety analysis, the shipper, carrier, or facility
operator should develop a step-by-step guide to loading and unloading
that is clear, concise, and appropriate to the level of training and
knowledge of its employees. The written guide should address pre-
loading/pre-unloading procedures, loading/unloading procedures, and
post-loading/post-unloading procedures.
    (a) Pre-loading/Pre-unloading procedures should include:
    (1) Inspection of the transport unit and transfer area. For
example, shippers should ensure that a DOT specification packaging is
marked to indicate that it has been designed, manufactured and
maintained (including periodic inspection and testing) in accordance
with specification requirements.
    (2) Securing the transport unit against movement.
    (3) Grounding and bonding of the transport unit, as warranted.
    (4) Inspection of transfer equipment and connections, including
hoses and valves, to ensure that they are free of defects, leaks, or
other problems that could result in an unsafe condition.
    (5) Identification and verification of piping path, equipment
lineups and operational sequencing and procedures for connecting
piping, hoses, or other transfer connections.
    (6) Identification and verification that the materials that are
being loaded or unloaded are being transferred into the appropriate
packagings, temporary storage facilities, or production containment
vessels and that the compatibility of the material to be transferred is
appropriate, authorized and consistent with applicable procedures.
    (b) Loading/Unloading procedures should include:
    (1) Measures for initiating and controlling the lading flow. For
example, if the material is to be heated prior to its transfer, the
facility operator should analyze a sample of the material to ascertain
the heat input to be applied, if warranted. The maximum heat input to
be applied and the rate at which the heat input will be applied must
not result in pressurization to a level that exceeds the packaging's
test pressure.
    (2) Measures for monitoring the temperature of the lading and
pressure of the containment vessel (e.g., cargo tank or rail tank car)
and receiving vessel (e.g., storage tank). For example, for loading or
unloading operations involving heating of the material to be
transferred, during the heating process, the facility operator should
monitor the heat input applied to the containment vessel and the
pressure inside the containment vessel to ensure that the heating
process does not result in over-pressurization or an uncontrolled
exothermic reaction.
    (3) Measures for monitoring filling limits and ensuring that the
quantity to be transferred is appropriate for the receiving vessel.
    (4) Measures for terminating lading flow. For example, personnel
responsible for monitoring a loading or unloading process should be
familiar with shut-off equipment and procedures, and should be trained
to take necessary actions to stop the lading flow as efficiently as
possible.
    (c) Post-loading/Post-unloading procedures should include:
    (1) Measures for evacuation of the transfer system and
depressurization of the containment vessel, as warranted.
    (2) Measures for disconnecting the transfer system.
    (3) Inspection and securement of transport unit fittings and
closures.
    (d) Review and Revision of Procedures:
    The operating procedures should be reviewed as often as necessary
to ensure that they reflect current operating practices, materials,
technology, personnel responsibilities, and equipment. To guard against
outdated or inaccurate operating procedures, the hazmat employer should
consider revalidating the operating procedures annually.

3. Emergency Management

    Appropriate emergency procedures should be identified and
implemented, including identification of emergency response equipment
and individuals authorized in its use; incident response procedures and
clearly identified personnel responsibilities; personnel protection
guidance and use of emergency shut-down systems; and, emergency
communication and spill reporting. Emergency instrumentation and
equipment appropriate to the loading or unloading operation should be
identified, available, and in working order. Emergency procedures
should be clear, concise, and available to workers. Emergency training,
including the need for drills, should also be provided.
    Loading and unloading facilities may want to consider:
    (a) Instrumentation to monitor for leaks and releases.
    (b) Equipment to isolate leaks and releases and to take other
appropriate emergency shutdown measures, remotely if necessary.
    (c) Training in the use of emergency response equipment.
    (d) Procedures for incident response.
    (e) Procedures for use of emergency shut-down systems and the
assignment of shut down responsibility to qualified operators to ensure
that emergency shutdown is executed in a safe and timely manner.
    (f) Procedures for emergency communication and spill reporting.

    (g) Procedures of safe startup after an emergency shut down.
    (h) Procedures and schedules for conducting drills and exercises
necessary to demonstrate the efficacy of the plan, and to ensure a
timely and efficient emergency response.
    (i) Emergency procedures should be reviewed and updated as often as
necessary to ensure that they reflect current operating practices,
materials, technology, personnel responsibilities, and emergency
response information.

4. Maintenance and Testing of Equipment

    Loading and unloading equipment and systems need to be properly
maintained and tested. Shippers and carriers should develop and
implement a periodic maintenance schedule to prevent deterioration of
equipment and conduct periodic operational tests to ensure that the
equipment functions as intended. Equipment and system repairs should be
completed promptly.

5. Training

    Personnel involved in loading and unloading and emergency response
operations need to know and understand their specific responsibilities
during loading and unloading operations, including attendance or
monitoring responsibilities. Consider training in the following areas:
    (a) Overview of the loading/unloading process and, specifically,
the portions of the process for which the employee is responsible;
    (b) Safety systems and their functions;
    (c) Emergency operations and procedures, including shutdown
procedures;
    (d) Additional safe work practices.
    (e) Recurrent training as necessary to address changes to the
procedures or personnel responsibilities.

VI. Request for Comments

    Based on our analysis of incident data, the NTSB and CSB
recommendations, and information and recommendations presented at the
June 14 public workshop, we are considering strategies for enhancing
the safety of bulk loading and unloading operations, including whether
additional regulatory requirements may be necessary. To assist us in
developing such strategies, we invite interested persons to submit
comments on the issues and questions listed below:

1. PHMSA Proposed Recommended Practices

    As summarized above, the HMR include a number of requirements
applicable to loading and unloading operations. We invite commenters to
address whether the proposed recommended practices adequately address
the safety concerns discussed in this notice and to suggest how the
proposed recommended practices should be revised and strengthened. We
are particularly interested in comments concerning whether our proposed
recommended practices are consistent with Federal regulations and
guidance or industry consensus standards applicable to bulk loading and
unloading operations. We also welcome comments concerning the potential
costs that may be incurred to implement our proposed recommended
practices. Based on comments received, we will revise the recommended
practices and may issue them as a guidance document for hazardous
materials shippers and carriers that conduct bulk loading and unloading
operations.
    In addition, we are considering whether additional regulatory
requirements, similar to the measures in our proposed recommended
practices, are necessary. We invite comments to address whether the
recommended practices proposed in this notice should be incorporated
into the HMR and, if so, how that could best be accomplished. Should
the recommended practices apply to all bulk loading and unloading
operations, or should the scope of the recommended practices be
dependant upon the volume and/or type of bulk packaging being loaded or
unloaded? Should the recommended practices apply to the shipper,
carrier, and loading/unloading facility; or, should the recommended
practices apply only to the facilities at which loading/unloading
operations take place? What costs, if any, would be imposed on the
regulated community if we choose to adopt regulations similar to these
proposed recommended practices in the HMR?

2. PHMSA Regulations

    As described above, the HMR currently include a number of
requirements applicable to bulk loading and unloading operations. In
addition, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Coast Guard regulate
operations involving the handling of certain hazardous materials at
fixed facilities. We invite commenters to address whether the existing
loading and unloading requirements in the HMR adequately address the
risks associated with bulk loading and unloading operations. Are there
gaps or overlaps in the standards and regulations promulgated by PHMSA,
OSHA, EPA and the USCG that adversely affect the safety of these
operations? If so, how should these gaps or overlaps be addressed?

3. National Consensus Standards

    We invite commenters to compare national consensus standards with
which they are familiar to current Federal standards and regulations
applicable to bulk loading and unloading operations and to the
recommended practices proposed in this notice. Commenters should
indicate whether and to what extent the national consensus standards
are consistent with current Federal standards and regulations and the
proposed recommended practices. Should we consider incorporating
consensus standards applicable to bulk loading and unloading operations
into the HMR? If so, how could this be accomplished, and which
standards are appropriate?

4. Accident and Incident Information

    As indicated above, PHMSA conducted an analysis of bulk loading and
unloading accidents submitted to the agency in accordance with the
reporting criteria specified in Sec.  171.16 of the HMR. This analysis
did not consider accidents that may have occurred outside of
transportation, as that term is defined for purposes of the HMR. We
plan to work with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to fill that data
gap by including incident data on bulk loading and unloading accidents
that may have occurred outside of transportation, and therefore, were
not reported to PHMSA in accordance with Sec.  171.16. We invite
commenters to submit any information on safety problems or incidents
that may not have been reported, but that could help us to refine our
assessment of the safety risks associated with loading and unloading
operations and develop appropriate strategies for addressing those
risks. We also ask commenters to suggest other data sources that could
support this effort.

    Issued in Washington, DC on December 27, 2007.
Theodore L. Willke,
Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety.
[FR Doc. 07-6300 Filed 1-3-07; 8:45 am]

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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 74 (Monday, April 18, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 22881]
[FR Doc No: 2022-08241]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RM21-9-000]

Technical Conference on Financial Assurance Measures for
Hydroelectric Projects; Supplemental Notice of Technical Conference

    As announced in the Notice of Technical Conference issued in this
proceeding on January 25, 2022, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (Commission) will convene a Commission staff-led technical
conference to discuss how the Commission may require additional
financial assurance mechanisms in the licenses and other authorizations
it issues for hydroelectric projects, to ensure that licensees have the
capability to carry out license requirements and, particularly, to
maintain their projects in safe condition. The technical conference
will be held on Tuesday, April 26, 2022, from approximately 11:30 a.m.
to 4:15 p.m. Eastern time. The conference will be held virtually.
    Attached to this Supplemental Notice is a revised agenda for the
technical conference, which includes the final conference program and
expected speakers. The conference will be open for the public to attend
virtually. Registration is not required, and there is no fee for
attendance. Information on this technical conference, including a link
to the public webcast, will be available at https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/events/technical-conference-financial-assurance-measures-hydroelectric-projects prior to the event. The conference is also
posted on the Calendar of Events on the Commission's website,
www.ferc.gov. Transcripts will be available for a fee from Ace
Reporting,<PHONE_NUMBER>.
    Commission conferences are accessible under section 508 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. For accessibility accommodations, please
send an email to [email protected], call toll-free<PHONE_NUMBER>
(voice) or<PHONE_NUMBER> (TTY), or send a fax to<PHONE_NUMBER> with
the required accommodations.
    For more information about this technical conference, please
contact [email protected]. For information related to
logistics, please contact Sarah McKinley at [email protected] or
(202) 502-8368.

    Dated: April 12, 2022.
Debbie-Anne A. Reese,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-08241 Filed 4-15-22; 8:45 am]
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