TDEM data. As a geophysical method, TDEM survey is inherently qualitative and was
used only to get an indication whether high conductivity zones indicating the potential
presence of brine reservoir may exist under the WIPP repository. This survey was
undertaken after the major brine encounter by WIPP-12, the amount of uncontrolled
flow and the calculated volume of which indicated a strong possibility that this brine
reservoir may extend under the WIPP repository. The survey showed that high
conductivity zones indicating the presence of brine exist under the WIPP repository.

WIPP-12 and ERDA-6 Testing Data
The primary source of information about the brine reservoir under the WIPP site comes
from the deepening of WIPP-12 borehole in 1982 and subsequent testing of WIPP-12
and ERDA-6 wells. The information is contained in the DOE contractor's report,
Popielak, et al. (1983), that DOE, including Kirchner et al. (2012), cite but ignore the
critical information contained in it. It is therefore necessary to review the history of the
WIPP project's encounter with the pressurized brine in upper Castile Formation at the
WIPP site.

The original site selected for WIPP was northeast of the current site. An exploratory
borehole, named ERDA-6, was drilled in 1975 at the center of that site to understand
the general stratigraphy and to determine the thickness of the Salado salt, the planned
host rock formation for the repository. Unexpectedly, ERDA-6 encountered pressurized
brine at a depth of 2708 to 2711 feet at the top of the Castile Formation. The U.S.
Geological Survey geologist in charge, C.L. Jones, described this encounter as follows:
"Near the base of the banded anhydrite unit, at 2,708-2,711 feet, an influx of geopressured brine displaced the 2,710+--foot column of salt-base drilling fluid (weight=10.2 Ibs/gal) from the well-bore in about 12 minutes, and the discharge of brine at the wellhead was accomplished with much bubbling and evolution of H2S, C02 and other gases. The brine was derived from a 3-foot section (2,708-2,711feet) of fractured,
brecciated reservoir rock." (Jones, 1983).

The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), DOE's predecessor,
plugged ERDA-6 and abandoned the site after this encounter and selected the present
site for WIPP (after relaxing the criterion of minimum distance from an existing
borehole). A borehole, ERDA-9, was drilled at the center of the present site, but it was
drilled only to the lower part of the Salado Formation and stopped just short of the
projected Salado/Castile boundary, where the brine was encountered in ERDA-6.
Perhaps this was intentional, to avoid another ERDA-6 type situation, in which this site
would also have to be rejected. Another exploratory borehole, WIPP-12, located one
mile north of ERDA-9, was drilled in 1978, but that too was stopped short of penetrating
the Castile Formation. In 1981, the State of New Mexico negotiated a settlement of a
lawsuit with DOE that included reopening and deepening of WIPP-12 to the upper
Castile Formation. The EEG acted as technical advisors to the N.M. Attorney General in
this lawsuit and settlement, and had suspected that brine reservoir lies under WIPP-12
(Correspondence between L. Chaturvedi of EEG and R.P. Snyder of U.S.G.S., 1980).
WIPP-12 was re-entered and drilled deeper, hitting pressurized brine in November 1981
at a depth of approximately 3000 ft. ERDA-6 was also re-entered after removing the
plug and was used as an observation well in conjunction with pumping of WIPP-12.
Popielak et al. (1983) report that pressurized artesian brine from WIPP-12 flowed to the
surface at the rate of approximately 350 gallons per minute (22 liters per second) and
more than 1.14 million gallons (4.3 million liters) of brine "unavoidably" flowed to the
surface, and was collected in a large pond that had to be excavated in a hurry, before
the well was brought under control. Popielak et al. (1983) calculated the volume of brine
encountered by WIPP-12 to be at least 17 million barrels (535 million gallons, or 2 billion liters). The volume of ERDA-6 brine reservoir was calculated to be at least 440,000 barrels. Simultaneous hydrologic testing in the two wells concluded that the two
reservoirs were not interconnected, however, this conclusion can be applied to these
two reservoirs only. Kirchner et al. (2012) treat each brine encounter as a separate
"pocket", an assumption for which no evidence has been provided. Just because
WIPP-12 and ERDA-6 brine reservoirs were found to be not connected does not mean
that the three encounters in an east west line NE of WIPP (Fig. 5 of Kirchner et al.,
2012), for example, are not connected. The two wells that encountered brine
immediately outside the southwest corner of the site (Belco Hudson and another) may
also have tapped the same reservoir.

The volume of brine encountered by WIPP-12 was so large and WIPP-12 was located
so close to the repository that the WIPP repository layout was changed, placing the
repository in the southern part of the site and the experimental rooms in the north,
closer to WIPP-12. EEG (Spiegler, 1982; Chaturvedi et al., 1997; Neill et al., 1998,
Appendix 8.1) calculated that using WIPP-12 pressure recovery data, rock
compressibility, and thickness of the brine reservoir calculated by Popielak et al. (1983),
one can easily draw a circle around WIPP-12 that incorporates the entire WIPP
repository footprint. The TDEM survey was conducted in 1987, also at the request of
EEG, to confirm the presence of higher conductivity zones at that depth under the WIPP
repository. The results of TDEM survey showed that such zones exist under the
repository. After the experience with pressurized brine encounter in WIPP-12, there is a
very strong possibility that pressurized brine in the Castile Formation exists at the WIPP
site. A given well may miss it if it misses the interconnected fractures in which brine
exists, and that is why it is reasonable to assume the probability as less than 100%.

Fracture Orientation and Deformation Belt
The opening paragraph of Kirchner et al. (2012) states:
"The penetration of brine pockets during drilling intrusions of the WIPP repository can
have significant consequences with respect to releases. The term "brine pocket" seems
to imply that pools of pressurized brine exist in the Castile. However, Popielak et al.
(1983) reviewed the geologic data acquired during the WIPP-12 and ERDA-6 well
testing and other information related to the occurrences of pressurized brine in the
Castile formation and concluded that pressurized brine is associated with near-vertical
fractures. Borns (1983) confirms the near-vertical orientation of brine-producing
fractures through study of core from the WIPP-12 borehole. Furthermore, they stated
that these fractures are associated with a belt of deformation that parallels the Capitan
reef."

The term "brine pocket" actually downgrades the importance of the size of brine
reservoirs, particularly that intercepted by WIPP-12. That is why the WIPP project has
traditionally called them "brine reservoirs". As calculated by Popielak et al. (1983, p.
H-54), the volume of brine contained in the reservoir intersected by WIPP-12 is between
17 million and 86 million barrels, i.e., between 535 million and 2.7 billion gallons (@31.5 gallons to a barrel). That certainly is a large "pool of pressurized brine in the Castile" right under the WIPP site! Because it is pressurized, WIPP-12 "unavoidably" yielded 1.14 million gallons to the surface before the flow could be stopped.

It is not clear what Kirchner et al. (2012) intend to imply by emphasizing the near vertical
fractures association with WIPP-12 brine encounter. Fractures between 70 degree and vertical orientation were seen in the WIPP-12 cores and through a downhole camera, but the relevant point is the total calculated volume of water that most likely occurs in interconnected fractures. For the interconnected fractures to contain hundreds of millions of gallons of water in one brine reservoir, the reservoir has to extend laterally for a long distance under the WIPP site. (Chaturvedi, et al., 1997). With respect to the brine reservoirs association with "belt of deformation that parallels the Capitan Reef", that indeed was the hypothesis put forward by SNL and U.S.G.S.
scientists after the unexpected encounter of pressurized brine at ERDA-6, but was
abandoned after encountering brine in Belco Hudson well just outside the southwest
corner of the WIPP site, and later when WIPP-12 exploded with brine at the WIPP site.

Recommendation
It is recommended that if the DOE wishes to reopen the issue of the probability of brine
encounter, i.e. the parameter PBRINE, then a closer examination of the result of
WIPP-12 and ERDA-6 testing, as reported by Popielak et al. (1983) be used as a
primary guide. TDEM Survey data may be used as a supplementary guide. Recognizing
that some wells may miss the interconnected fractures in which the brine exists, and
guided by the results of TDEM survey, the EEG (Neill et al., 1998, Section 2.11)
recommended a fixed value of 0.6 (60%) for this parameter that still is a reasonable
value.

EPA Response to 7/14/2015 L. Chaturvedi Comment:
The EPA agrees with the commenter that the DOE's revised approach raises concerns. In particular, the EPA does not agree with the DOE's conclusions regarding the geophysical data. However, after reviewing the data again, the EPA disagrees with the commenter that a fixed probability of 60% is necessary. The EPA notes that 60% was the high end of the probability distribution used in performance assessments prior to 2014, with a mean probability of 30.5%, as recognized by the commenter. The updated approach developed by the EPA uses the geophysical data, but also incorporates newer drilling information into the probability distribution. The EPA believes this approach is sound and is acceptable for use in future performance assessments. The EPA will evaluate future proposals by the DOE to update the method for determining PBRINE. The EPA's review is discussed further in the technical support document Probability of Encountering Castile Brine Beneath the WIPP Waste Panels Using the TDEM Block Method, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609.

Issue 2	:	Issues related to whether DOE is disposing of spent nuclear fuel
      and high-level radioactive waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

G. Anastas (3/5/2015):

EPA (J. Edwards) response to March 3, 2015 letter from to G. Anastas): (Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609-0007)

Dear Mr. Anastas:

Thank you for your letter dated March 3, 2015. We have considered your questions which are based on your assertion that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), through its Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), has transported and disposed of high-level radioactive waste (HL W) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WJPP). We agree that Section 12 of the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (PL 102-579, as amended by PL 104-201) (WIPP LWA) prohibits the transportation to and disposal of SNF or HLW at the WIPP. However, we disagree with your contention that the DOE has disposed of HLW and SNF at the WIPP.

As part of its waste characterization inspections and its WIPP compliance recertification process, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reviews the DOE waste characterization information on an ongoing basis to make sure that HLW and SNF are not disposed at the repository. Our reviews of ANL's remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste characterization documentation, documented in the Agency's multiple ANL waste characterization inspection reports (see the list of docket citations included in response to question 2 in the accompanying enclosure), have found that no waste disposed at the WIPP violates the WIPP LWA prohibition on the transportation and disposal of HLW and SNF at the facility. Instead, based on the EPA's review of DOE documents. the Agency believes that the WIPP is only receiving and disposing of TRU waste, as allowed under Section 7 of the WIPP LWA. Also, there are several prescribed checks and balances (as outlined in DOE Order No. 435.1) that each TRU waste site must formalize; therefore. inclusion of HLW or SNF in TRU waste containers would not go unnoticed and unchecked. In addition, required compliance with regulations of external federal and state entities and associated penalties minimizes the potential for such an unlawful action.

Our enclosure to this letter addresses each of the questions outlined in your March 2015 correspondence. Although these comments were submitted as a public submission related to the DOE's WIPP 2014 Compliance Recertification Application, the EPA considers your letter as an inquiry specific to TRU waste characterization activities at ANL. Hence, we decided to respond to your letter in advance of our June 2015 informal public meetings, as you requested. We will also include this correspondence in the docket associated with the 2014 WIPP Recertification (EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609).

Responses to specific comments from George Anastas - March 3, 2015 Letter

Question 1. What actions will EPA take regarding the transport and disposal of HL W and spent nuclear fuel at WIPP consistent with other actions by the EPA where an organization violated EPA Permit/Regulatory Requirements?

Response: To date, after conducting more than 100 TRU waste characterization site inspections at TRU waste sites within the DOE complex, the EPA has not seen any evidence of the transport and disposal of HLW and SNL at the WIPP. Hence, no action has been necessary.

Question 2. EPA inspected Argonne National Laboratory prior to September 2013. Did the EPA inspection(s) uncover the fact that Argonne was planning to ship comingled TRU with HLW and SNF to WIPP?

Response: In accordance with the 40 CFR 194.8 regulatory changes that were finalized in 2004, the EPA performed a baseline site inspection at ANL in September 2006, and approved ANL's RH TRU waste characterization program in January 2007 (see www.regulations.gov, EPAHQ-OAR-2006-0881). Per 2004 regulatory changes, the site-specific baseline approval must identify Tier 1 (Tl) changes as the type of modifications that the Agency must approve prior to their implementation by an approved site. These may include characterization of new waste stream(s), use of a new or modification to an existing piece of characterization equipment and/or changes to approved procedures. As such, since the 2007 baseline approval at ANL, the EPA has approved ten T1 changes including the following five approvals of ANL's remote-handled (RH) waste stream, Argonne East Remote Handled Debris Mix (AERHDM, from K Wing Analytical Laboratory glove boxes):  1. September 2010 approval of K Wing AERHDM Debris (see www.regulations.gov, EPA-HQ-OAR-200 1-00 12-0449); 2. September 2010 approval to add additional containers of the same waste stream to the previously approved lot (see www.regulations.gov, EPA-HQ-OAR-2001-0012-0340); 3. September 2010 approval of addition of 100 containers in October 2008 (see www.regulations.gov, EPA-HQ-OAR-2001-0012-0450); 4. November 2010 approval of FEW debris (see www.regulations.gov, EPA-HQ-OAR-2001-0012-0451); and 5. February 2012 approval of K-Wing FEW waste stream (see www.regulations.gov, EPA-HQ-OAR-2001-0012-0312) All the above approvals required an EPA inspection/review of DOE-prepared supporting documentation describing the origin and radiological contents of the waste material packaged in containers for WIPP disposal. None of the documents reviewed indicate that HLW and SNF has been handled when analyzing test material in ANL's K Wing Analytical Laboratory glove boxes.
Question 3. What are EPA procedures to assure that comingled TRU, HLW and SNF are not shipped to, nor emplaced, at WIPP?

Response: When TRU waste is being approved for WIPP disposal, the EPA routinely evaluates acceptable knowledge (AK) documents and interviews AK and radiological characterization experts to verify that no HLW or SNL fuel has been comingled with TRU waste. TRU sites must provide up to date AK documents and radiological characterization records specific to every T1 change approval request. EPA pursues this verification step every time the Agency reviews revised AK documents (necessary to record what is being added to an approved RH waste stream) and radiological characterization records. For the five above listed T1 change requests, the EPA followed the above verification steps and evaluated accompanying radiological data to confirm that the ANL RH waste stream being proposed for WIPP disposal meets the definition of RH TRU waste. The Agency believes that ANL appropriately adhered to the DOE Order 435.1-1 when generating WIPP-compliant RH TRU AEHRDM waste resulting from analysis of test material consisting of fuel pin fines and debris not originating or associated with power or plutonium production.

Question 4. What volume and mass of SNF and of HL W from each DOE Generating Site has been transported and disposed at WIPP?

Response: The EPA has not seen any evidence of the transport and disposal of HLW and SNF at the WIPP.

Question 5. What analysis of any criticality considerations has EPA conducted because of the emplacement of containers of SNF at WIPP?

Response: Because the EPA has not seen any evidence of the transport and disposal of HLW and SNF at the WIPP, there has been no need for the Agency to evaluate any SNF-related criticality issues.

Question 6. Identify each container of HLW and SNF (any spent nuclear fuel, commercial, advanced United States reactor SNF, SNF originating from any foreign reactor, from any research reactor, any defense related SNF, any critical facility) disposed at WIPP by, at least, Generator site, Waste Stream Profile, Container Type, Container TRUCON Code, Container Disposal Date and Container Location (at least Panel and Room).

Response: Because the EPA has not seen any evidence of the transport and disposal of SNF or HLW at the WIPP, there are no waste containers in this category to identify.

Question 7. Under what authority were these materials packaged, transported and disposed at WIPP?

Response: Because the EPA has not seen any evidence of the transport and disposal of SNF or HLW at the WIPP, there is no need for any federal or state entity to authorize the stated activities.

Question 8. Were the containers of HLW and SNF approved for the transport of these materials from Argonne to WIPP? If yes, by what agency and when?

Response: Because the EPA has not seen any evidence of the transport and disposal of SNF or HLW at the WIPP, there is no need for any federal or state entity to authorize the stated activities.

Question 9. What are the EPA procedures to prohibit DOE from implementing internal guidance, directives or orders that circumvent EPA regulatory requirements?

Response: The Agency's review and concurrence are necessary prior to DOE implementing any waste characterization-specific changes to its previously-approved procedures (e.g., Waste Acceptance Criteria, Waste Characterization Program Implementation Plan) that incorporate the EPA's regulatory requirements. The DOE's procedures implement various DOE Orders that cover the TRU waste management program. In addition, the EPA can review applicable DOE internal guidance, directives or orders to confirm that the DOE continues to ship only TRU waste to the WIPP for disposal in accordance with the WIPP LWA.

G. Anastas (5/28/15):

G. Anastas (6/17/15):

G. Anastas (1/12/17):
United States Environmental Protection Agency WEBINAR Regarding the Completeness Determination for the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 2014 WIPP Compliance Recertification Application (CRA)
Albuquerque, New Mexico

I thank EPA for making it abundantly clear and unambiguous that its role in the Recertification Process is defined by the Land Withdrawal Act. (Reference: Page 3 of EPA Handout for the Webinar, WIPP Recertification Review and Process)

There is an apparent significant omission in the DOE material submitted to EPA in support of the CRA. That omission is that at least once DOE transported and then disposed of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste at WIPP. EPA should not issue a completeness determination until DOE provides full and accurate information about the waste emplaced at WIPP.

I think most of us here today believe that Federal Law should take precedence over any organizational internal guidance that patently circumvents Federal Law. Federal Law states that "The Secretary (of Energy) shall not transport high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel to WIPP or emplace or dispose of such waste or fuel at WIPP." Section 12: BAN ON HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL. : WIPP Land Withdrawal Act, P.L. 102-579, as amended by P.L. 104-201

The United States Department of Energy transported from Argonne National Laboratory commercial, research and foreign nuclear reactor fuel and high-level radioactive waste to WIPP and disposed of the fuel and the waste at WIPP. The shipment left Argonne on September 13, 2013, was received at WIPP on September 15, 2013 and was placed in Panel 6, Room 2 on September 18, 20 and 21, 2013. The DOE basis for transporting and disposing of these materials at WIPP is DOE Radioactive Waste Manual 435.1-1 that purports to allow DOE to comingle spent nuclear fuel or high-level waste with transuranic waste and call the mixture transuranic waste.

The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act was approved by Congress and signed into Federal Law in 1992. DOE Order 435.1 was approved by DOE on July 9, 1999, years after the LWA was signed into law.

F. Marcinowski (reply to G. Anastas/HLW comments) (2/3/17):

G. Anastas (4/6/17):

ACTION: Notice of completeness of recertification application and
announcement of end of public comment period. (March 10, 2017 EPA Federal Register Notice: Federal Register Volume 82, Number 46 (Friday, March 10, 2017)] [Pages 13282-13285]

The EPA Completeness Review of the DOE Compliance Recertification Application is in error because of the issues stated below.

The WIPP inventory must be amended to include all spent nuclear fuel and high level waste disposed at the WIPP. The omission of these items from the WIPP Inventory materially impacts the WIPP Performance Assessment and begs the following questions: "what other prohibitions have EPA and DOE ignored" and "what is the total quantity of spent nuclear fuel and high level reprocessing waste has EPA allowed DOE to dispose at WIPP"?

The EPA allowed the DOE to transport and dispose of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste at WIPP in patent violation of EPA statements made at he WIPP January 12, 2017 WEBINAR, EPA Statements in the March 10, 2017 Federal Register Notice and statutory prohibitions in the Land Withdrawal Act. The WIPP inventory must be amended to include all spent nuclear fuel and high level waste disposed at the WIPP.

1) EPA Statements during the January 12, 2017 WEBINAR are (partially) as follows.
Statement by EPA: What is EPA' s Role? Defined by the Land Withdrawal Act.
EPA has ignored the LWA prohibitions on the transport and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste at WIPP. EPA has even encouraged such transport and disposal.

Statement by EPA: EPA's Goals and Agenda. "provide general information on the recertification process-specifically, completeness issues ... "
The inventory at WIPP includes commercial and research spent nuclear fuel and UREX reprocessing high level waste. These materials are not identified by EPA and DOE as violations of the LWA even though both EPA and Argonne/DOE acknowledge that these materials were knowingly transported
and disposed at W IPP.

2) An Extract from Part II of the March 10, 2017 EPA Federal Register Notice: Federal Register Volume 82, Number 46 (Friday, March 10, 2017)] [Pages 13282-13285]
Page 13283
"The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) was authorized in 1980, under section 213 of the DOE National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-164, 93 Stat. 1259, 1265), "for the express purpose of providing a research and development facility to demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive wastes resulting from the defense activities and programs of the United States. The WIPP is a disposal system for transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste."

"The 1992 WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (L WA; Pub. L. 102-579) limits radioactive waste disposal in the WIPP to TRU radioactive wastes generated by defense-related activities."

"The WIPP L WA further stipulates that radioactive waste shall not be TRU waste if such waste also meets the definition of high-level radioactive waste,"

"The TRU radioactive waste proposed for disposal in the WIPP consists of materials such as rags, equipment, tools, protective gear and sludges that have become contaminated during atomic energy defense activities."

3) Federal Law states that "The Secretary (of Energy) shall not transport high level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel to WIPP or emplace or dispose of such waste or fuel at WIPP." Section 12: BAN ON HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL.: WIPP Land Withdrawal Act, P.L. 102-579, as amended by P.L. 104-201

EPA knowingly allowed the DOE to transport from Argonne National Laboratory commercial, research and foreign nuclear reactor fuel and UREX reprocessing high-level radioactive waste to WIPP and dispose of the fuel and the waste at WIPP.

The shipment left Argonne on September 13, 2013, was received at WIPP on September 15, 2013 and was placed in Panel 6, Room 2 on September 18, 20 and 21, 2013.
The EPA and DOE basis for allowing the transport and disposal of these materials at WIPP is DOE Radioactive Waste Manual 435.1-1 that purports to allow DOE to comingle spent nuclear fuel or high-level waste with transuranic waste and call the mixture transuranic waste.

The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act was approved by Congress and signed into Federal Law in 1992. DOE Order 435.1 was approved by DOE on July 9, 1999, years after the L WA was signed into law.

When does an internal organization document supersede a Federal Statute? No organization, including the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the United States Department of Energy, is above the law.

EPA Response to issues related to whether DOE is disposing of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant:
Under the WIPP LWA, the focus of the EPA's present recertification determination is whether the WIPP continues to comply with the final disposal regulations. Although -- as the commenter notes and the DOE acknowledges -- the WIPP LWA bans disposal at the WIPP of spent nuclear fuel, the disposal regulations, themselves, currently do not expressly address disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The WIPP LWA incorporates the definition of spent nuclear fuel found in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982: "fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, the constituent elements of which have not been separated by reprocessing." 42 U.S.C. § 10101(23) (as incorporated by WIPP LWA § 2(15)). There seems to be no dispute that waste from the Argonne Lab includes some quantity of material that is not presently in the intact physical form of fuel withdrawn from a reactor following irradiation, but is fragments of or particulates from fuel pins withdrawn from a reactor following irradiation. The DOE states that the fragments or particulates resulted from research and development activities on test specimens from fuel pins withdrawn from a reactor following irradiation and claims that treatment of such material as other than spent nuclear fuel is consistent with the intent of the WIPP LWA. The DOE also asserts that attempting to segregate the fuel pin fragments and particulates from other debris shipped to the WIPP is infeasible and cost prohibitive and would increase worker exposure.

Reasonable contentions may be made that fragments and particulates resulting from research and development activities on specimens from fuel withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation ("pieces of pieces" of fuel pins) do not meet the statutory definition of spent nuclear fuel. The practical considerations of feasibility, cost, and worker safety associated with attempting to segregate such particulates from other waste shipped to the WIPP bear consideration. It is not essential, however, to the EPA's present recertification decision to attempt to definitively resolve this issue, because the current disposal regulations do not expressly address disposal of spent nuclear fuel.

On an on-going basis, aside from the periodic recertification of the WIPP, the EPA communicates with the DOE concerning the characterization of WIPP waste. The DOE provides the EPA with documentation relating to WIPP waste streams, including but not limited to, waste from the Argonne National Laboratory, and including documentation for both contact handled and remote handled TRU waste streams. The relevant information is confirmed by analyzing individual waste containers using the EPA approved processes, procedures and equipment. These steps allow the DOE to demonstrate that waste containers for WIPP disposal meet the EPA's WIPP waste limits for physical and radiological contents of the waste. So, concerning the waste shipped from Argonne National Laboratory, the EPA evaluated the waste characteristic information prepared for remote handled waste. The DOE provided historical information to document that waste generated from laboratory experiments at Argonne was defense related, and through radiological assay concluded that the waste in question met the definition of TRU waste and was appropriate for disposal at the WIPP. Following this determination, Argonne provided this waste for characterization. Radiological and physical characterization confirmed that the TRU waste in question (a) is remote handled waste; (b) exhibits the characteristics of debris waste; and (c) meets the regulatory limits of the EPA's WIPP waste acceptance requirements at 40 CFR 194.24.

The EPA thoroughly inspects and approves the waste characterization processes in place at all waste characterization sites including Argonne National Laboratory. As part of the waste characterization inspections and approvals, the EPA is responsible for evaluating the adequacy of characterization methods used to identify and measure radiological and physical contents of the TRU waste that affect the long term containment and isolation of waste at the WIPP and for ensuring that the WIPP-bound waste meets the disposal requirements under 40 CFR 194.24.

Issue 3	:	WIPP will be safe for the next 10,000 years

Anonymous Public Comment (6/22/15):
My family has been in the mining industry since the early 1900's. My father worked in both coal and potash (similar to WIPP salt) for over 42 years, and I also worked in a potash mine. The community of Carlsbad, New Mexico is very familiar with operating a mining operation in salt, and has learned more about TRU Waste than any community in the world. We are proud to safely operate the WIPP and even though we are very much aware of the release of radiation from a container placed underground, we know that the facility performed the way it was designed to operate. There is continuous monitoring of the workers exposure in the mine as well as the air flowing into and out of the mine. We are working very hard to reopen WIPP in order to continue to resolve a much greater nation wide risk of accidental contamination. All citizens of New Mexico and even the entire US should be very thankful that the container that released the radiation because of error at Los Alamos, already was placed 2100 ft. underground in a facility that was designed to protect the environment. I believe that WIPP is safe to operate, and that the geology and precautions make WIPP the perfect place to put the waste, and that is will be safe for the next 10,000 years and beyond.

Response to 6/22/15 Anonymous Public Comment (7/11/17):
EPA thanks the commenter for their statement and will continue to provide oversight to the WIPP to ensure its continual safe operation.

Issue 4	:	Multiple issues in support of WIPP recertification

J. Heaton (7/14/15):

Response to 7/14/15 J. Heaton Comment
We thank the commenter for their support in our efforts to continue to provide oversight to the WIPP.

Issue 5	:	Multiple points against WIPP recertification
D. Reade (7/9/15):
Introduction
WIPP has failed. As a pilot plant it's over. What has been demonstrated is that under the
conditions and attitudes that exist in this country and specifically in the DOE, EPA and NMED today, it is impossible to demonstrate the safe deep geologic disposal of transuranic waste. There is not the competence, the creative thinking or the right attitude toward safety to bring that about.

During the recent meetings here in Santa Fe, both DOE and EPA representatives stated that WIPP's failure and release during the operational phase has nothing to do with whether it can contain the waste after closure and need not be considered at all. This shows the continuing problems with the project because an attitude like this virtually guarantees that the project will fail after closure as well.

During the WIPP RCRA hearings, DOE was told that their risk assessment was inadequate because it did not give enough weight to human error and did not take into consideration that problems caused by human error increase after 10 or 15 years of error-free operations. This is exactly what has happened at WIPP although I wouldn't say that the last 15 years have really been error-free - there just wasn't a major release before.

In fact, to see if WIPP can be re-certified, EPA must re-do their risk assessments for the
project because they too have not taken human error into enough account even from the
beginning and now, with the failure of the operational stage - caused by massive human error at multiple points in the system and multiple locations - an even larger factor for human error must be included. Even if DOE had straightened up their act (totally unlikely as shown simply by their statements at this meeting), closure will come again in 10 years or more - just when another big peak of human error is likely to occur.

It is almost criminal to ignore the operational history of the entity that will be responsible for closure, especially when this entity has shown themselves to be completely incompetent both in operations at the mine as well as at some of the generating sites. When they have ignored their own safety procedures, in my opinion committed criminal acts just to move waste to WIPP that isn't acceptable there, and have made mistakes over and over again for years. It is obvious that they don't learn from their mistakes, but why should they, when the overseeing agency - EPA - doesn't care how bad they are at all?

Total Lack of Interest in Public Participation and Public Comment
There was virtually no notice of the EPA meetings in New Mexico. I don't consider putting the meetings in the federal register to be notice, nor is an article in the newspaper that appears on the day of the meeting, adequate notice. However, this doesn't surprise me. Clearly, EPA is uninterested in hearing comments from the public and is simply going through the motions. You, in fact, do not want the public to participate. Your actions and notice do not meet even the most minimum requirements of the law. If you cared to hear what the public had to say, you would make a good faith effort to inform them of these meetings, but you did not. Even worse, you have made absolutely no effort to include Spanish speakers in the process. Where are the Spanish fact sheets? Why did you not advertise the meetings on Spanish radio, in Spanish newspapers and make other good faith efforts to include this segment of New Mexico's population? I was told that in previous meetings some Spanish speakers said they didn't want information in Spanish. However, this opinion from some Spanish speakers does not relieve you from your obligation to inform others for whom Spanish is a first or only language. you have utterly dropped the ball here and this is a discriminatory act.

I have included with these comments, a copy of the Title VI Complaint that we filed on the Triassic Park Hazardous Waste Dump which is sited near Roswell and WIPP. This complaint is currently under review by EPA's office of Civil Rights. You couldn't even be bothered to check your own agency to see if there was a need for Spanish information and notice. Yet folks in SE New Mexico stated in recent interviews supplementing our complaint that they were so happy to hear at first that information was going to be presented to them in their language so they could understand what was being proposed on Triassic Park, and then were so very disappointed when they found out that the promised translations and interpretation wasn't actually going to happen. With EPA, this pattern of discrimination is repeated again and you don't even seem to see what a serious problem this is.

Decision Already Made
It was clear at the meeting that EPA has already made their decision to recertify WIPP. When asked if the possibility of not recertifying WIPP was greater than zero, the EPA
representatives had a really hard time coming around to stating that there was even a .01% chance that they wouldn't recertify. When asked what the procedure would be if WIPP were not recertified, they were at a complete loss. Obviously, this was never thought of because not recertifying WIPP is unthinkable for EPA - no matter how likely the site is to fail. Finally the representatives scrambled around and came up with some answers, but it was clear that this had never been considered as a possibility.

In addition, EPA representatives were either being disingenuous (to use a charitable word) or had no understanding of the history of WIPP or of at least some of the risks to containing the waste. One representative tried to reassure a commenter not to worry because WIPP had been so thoroughly studied scientifically that they really knew everything about it. However, as I pointed out, much of this study was bogus as serious risks were simply eliminated from the assessment. In addition, EPA simply repeated running DOE's formulas with DOE's data and guess what? They came up with the same answers DOE did. This is not scientific inquiry or oversight.

The same representative stated mistakenly that the "worst case scenario was having another lid pop off." In fact, the lid did not "pop off." There was an explosion in the drum with a massive heat flash. And the worst case scenario is not even such an explosion, but having such an explosion or something else set off a massive waste fire underground. This is most likely to occur soon after closure when there is still oxygen in the mine. But if the mine is not properly closed, oxygen could continue to seep into the mine after closure through the shafts or through fractures. Proper closure is still experimental and will need cutting edge technology to make sure that all pathways are completely sealed (virtually impossible to do in the salt layer). EPA seems to see no problem with entities that have shown such a massive level of incompetence as led to the mine fire and drum explosion, trying to do something equivalent to landing on the moon. Such an attitude, again, almost guarantees a loss of containment before 10,000 years.

Containment Compromised by Waste That Isn't Supposed to be in WIPP
We now have many hundreds of drums of waste in WIPP that should never have been there. In addition to the extremely dangerous recent nitrate drums, LANL was putting organics into additional nitrate drums of waste back in 2012. How many of those drums are at WIPP? Also,
because DOE has slyly re-defined the WIPP waste, going against the requirements of the
Land Withdrawal Act, high-level waste has magically become transuranic waste. This doesn't really change its nature, however, and high-level waste is not supposed to be in WIPP. Again, inquiry needs to be done on how many "unacceptable" drums have actually been accepted and emplaced at WIPP. A new risk assessment including these dangerous drums needs to be done.

WIPP as a System
WIPP is not just the mine, but an entire system. Every part of that system has to work
perfectly for the waste to be contained for 10,000 years. Considering the myriad of places
where fatal mistakes can occur throughout this system, even if WIPP were a beacon of
scientific, engineering and planning excellence, it's doubtful that it could have gotten through the entire 35 years without a release - let alone 10,000 years. But the WIPP project is not a beacon of any of those things. Instead it is run on the principle of "good enough for government work." And frankly, such a description would be a compliment because the WIPP project, certainly in New Mexico, doesn't rise even to that level.

EPA and NMED were told about many of the potential problems that have occurred 15 or
more years ago. I personally testified at the RCRA hearings that DOE's risk assessments did not take human error seriously enough. Clearly, no one listened, as instead they got rid of the Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) - our only independent safety oversite group - because EPA, DOE and NMED felt they weren't needed anymore. Clearly that was a huge mistake. When the explosion and release occurred DOE kept saying how surprised they were because such an accident wasn't supposed to happen. However in their own EISs they themselves stated that the lid coming off a drum was one of, if not the most likely type of accident to occur.

And the EEG in their report EEG 48: An Assessment of the Flammability and Explosion
Potential of Transuranic Waste discussed nitrate contaminated TRU waste in detail,
describing the dangers and giving multiple examples that had already occurred in the
inventory before WIPP even opened. Indeed, the biggest nuclear release before Chernobyl was caused by nitrate-contaminated radioactive waste when the nitrates exploded and burned, causing a massive radioactive release in the Urals. Of course, these are the same people at WIPP who "lost" a well in their records (which were also supposed to last for what, hundreds or thousands of years?) within years of starting their documentation - a well that they could see every day as they drove to the site. Frankly, if the EEG had been continued, the situation would not have degenerated to where it is today. Unfortunately, at this point even if the EEG were reinstated, the problems in the WIPP project are too huge to be fixed.

And where are we today? In a total mess. First there was the fire which revealed total
incompetence in how the mine was run. Safety was clearly the last concern. The mine had not been properly inspected for years - The Mine Safety and Health Administration failed to conduct the legally required 4x year regular safety inspections. In fact the mine was hardly inspected at all. If it had been, perhaps they would have caught the inoperable phones, emergency lights and obscured evacuation reflectors; Perhaps they would have seen that the automatic fire detection and suppression system was disabled, the chaining open of ventilation doors, the combustible buildup, the discontinued use of the vehicle wash station, the inoperable ventilation fans, the out of service regulator/damper. Perhaps they would have found out that there was almost no safety training or drills including no donning of selfrescuers or hands-on training with portable fire extinguishers. Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years?

When the fire occurred ventilation was manual and shifted around causing some ventilation to be shut off, filling some areas with smoke and damaging workers in the underground. People had to go into various areas of the mine to get people out because the PA system and alarms didn't work. Workers weren't trained to use fire suppression equipment properly and some of it didn't even work. Maintenance wasn't performed on a regular basis and this led directly to the fire. Carlsbad officials and even WIPP advocates in Carlsbad had been asking for more money for maintenance and repairs for years prior to the accident. DOE's reaction: Cut funding even more. Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years?

And what about the situation in the mine when the radioactive release occurred? After the fire, from February 6 through February 10th the ventilation was unfiltered and all the radiation monitors were shut off. When the release did occur, only one CAM was actually working; all the others had been broken for months or longer. Fortunately that one CAM was turned on before the release but how could anyone think it was okay to run this facility with only 1 radiation detection device? The ventilation system had to be switched to the HEPA filters manually because the automatic switch had been turned off years ago. And then guess what? They had forgotten for 15 years to plug the holes in the HEPA filter housing so radiation just went right out into the environment. How stupid is that? Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years?

Then WIPP delayed for days to inform NMED about the accident. NMED compounded the problem by not getting someone down to the site to monitor the release for additional days. After the release, DOE obstructed NMED's investigation by refusing to cooperate and share information. Not a good situation.

And what about LANL where the drum originated? LANL was under a deadline to get the WIPP waste off the mesa because of the danger of fire. The Cerro Grande fire came within 300 yards of TA 54 where the WIPP waste was stored. But again, how stupid is it to keep 40,000 drums of flammable mixed TRU-waste in fabric tents outside on the mesa in the first place in a known wild fire zone? Only in New Mexico would this be considered acceptable RCRA storage. Instead of rushing to get it off the mesa, they should have built a bunker for the waste as we asked for years ago. The deadline pressure led the Lab to ignore safety almost completely - pushing employees to ignore obvious safety problems in the push to meet their June deadline. Even after the explosion and before they had any clue as to why it had occurred, LANL insisted on continuing to ship this unstable waste to WCS so we now have an even bigger mess with unstable drums at WIPP, WCS and LANL. Shipping after an accident like this when you don't know what happened shows a total disregard for science and safety. Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000
years?

LANL itself is a portrait of incompetence and has been for years. These are the same people whose security folks shot their own people some years ago during a training exercise because they forgot to put blanks in their guns. The same people who have had 11 electrical incidents since 2003 and more before - some resulting in serious injury and death; the same people who have been cited for radiation and beryllium exposures in 2009 and 2012 including an incident when the Neutron Science Center and 9 homes were contamination in 2012.
They did not follow their own safety procedures when dealing with drums that were especially acidic and full of nitrates - it would have slowed things down, after all to have a safety review.

So they treated corrosive waste outside of their environmental permit by adding neutralizers and absorbents. This led to obvious problems, but again, it would have slowed things down to listen to workers complaining that organics were incompatible with nitrates or that smoke and foam were coming out of the drums. Then, I believe, they compounded the problem by lying on the documentation for the drum because it was obvious that the drum did not meet shipping or acceptance criteria at WIPP. It's hard to believe the drum labeling was only incompetence though there is precedent for that as at the RCRA hearing itself, DOE's most perfect drum was shown to be obviously mis-characterized by Don Hancock. They couldn't even get it right in their best first example. EPA and NMED should have seen right then what the future would bring. My suspicions are compounded by DOE's refusal to allow NMED to inspect the inside of the waste treatment facility for two years preceding the release during their annual permitting audits. However, some responsibility must go to NMED for not making themselves able to do that inspection and insisting on it. Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years?

And in fact, the problem is not limited solely to LANL and WIPP. In fact the whole system is flawed and those who should be monitoring it including EPA and NMED have also dropped the ball. DOE should never have been allowed to reduce and then virtually eliminate characterization to verify AK. It has been known from the very beginning and was testified to at the RCRA hearing that there was virtually no AK on the hazardous component of the waste for the RH waste and not much better AK for the CH-waste, including the nitrate drums. We were told 15 years ago that data on non-VOC hazardous waste was usually not available or data was only available for listed waste. Yet just a year before the release, testing was made "voluntary" which means the generator sites stopped characterizing the waste completely.

Again, if they hadn't gotten rid of the EEG, many of these problems would have been reduced or eliminated. DOE headquarters refused to fund WIPP adequately to do proper maintenance and repair in the mine and when WIPP officials were getting incomplete manifests from generator sites and complained to DOE, they were told to "...just keep taking the waste and shut up."

Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years? And I'm not the only one that thinks there's a problem with the LANL, WIPP and the system. In 2012 there was an organic mixture concern at LANL with some nitrate waste and organics were eliminated. However, the WIPP accident report said lessons were clearly not learned from this. In fact over and over again, year after year after year, reports delineate the same problems at the facilities. The accident report blasted WIPP and LANL just as the fire accident report blasted WIPP. House panels, federal safety reports and other studies continue to criticize the labs and WIPP. The answer seems to be various versions of "We made some mistakes in the past but now we know what we're doing." Yet the mistakes continue over and over again. Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years?

A recent GAO report says the NNSA oversight of contractors at LANL and WIPP is lacking. In fact, DOE allows most of the contractors to self-report any problems instead of checking up on them. The same problems occurred in 1990, 2000, 2013 and 2014. In 2015 they said there was little or no progress toward improvement. LANL has had serious problems not only with the accidents listed above which occur over and over again but also with losing classified information. A recent federal study said that WIPP and LANL were unprepared to respond to emergencies, which should be obvious by now. Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years?

And what is the situation now? We are left with unstable drums at WIPP, WCS and LANL and believe me I don't feel safe with these things sitting in standard waste boxes that can be breached with the pressure in your truck tire, inside essentially plastic bags in fabric tents on the mesa. LANL and WIPP seem completely unrepentant and want to get back to "normal" as quickly as possible. They have plans to increase pit production at LANL, creating more WIPP waste and want to open WIPP by the end of the year. Their so-called decontamination of WIPP is ridiculous - especially when they say the porous salt floor will contain the water spray runoff. The definition of porous is "Having minute spaces or holes through which liquid may pass." So containment is not in the salt floor but possible in some undefined layer below. And if this de-contamination works so well, why did they say that increased radiation readings were caused by radioactive dust kicked up during work on the panel closures?

And what about the panel closures? These are not seals and it's questionable if they actually will contain another explosion. Again, they have been weakened by changes WIPP wanted to save money. DOE seems to think that moving a few personnel around and having a few training programs and re-writing safety procedures will change things in a year that have been going on for decades and are totally embedded in the system. This is not happening. And not only are there additional plans for LANL but there are all kinds of new plans for WIPP, as if it is perfectly okay. Some of these plans are:
1. Expanding to receive more TRU waste
2. Bringing Hanford high level waste to WIPP
3. Bringing greater than class C waste to WIPP
4. Bringing West Valley commercial waste to WIPP
5. Bringing surplus plutonium to WIPP
6. Brining mercury surface storage to WIPP
7. Bringing TRU-waste surface storage to WIPP
8. Doing heater tests for possible high level waste disposal at WIPP

WIPP is not ready for any of this and frankly, I don't think it ever will be. What a waste of time and money to continue trying to make this failed project work. Much of what I have described above, including these new projects are not included in DOE's application to EPA. For that
reason alone the application should be rejected. However, let's just stop this for good now. It will be many many years before DOE, LANL and WIPP could solve the problems and retrain their personnel in a completely different way of thinking - a safety way of thinking. Based on their record and history, there is nothing to show that they have actually made significant changes in their approach so far. In fact, it isn't logical to think that they could in such a short period of time. The problems are too serious and too entrenched. They have made some mistakes in the past - many of them - but they clearly do not know what they are doing now. If they did, they would not be pushing for all these new projects for WIPP. Instead, they would be concentrating completely on finding a way to deal safely with the nitrate drums that they have spread around the State, which are a constant danger to us all, and on true safety measures at the mine.

I know there are many political pressures on the EPA to go along with the program. It's likely your own jobs are on the line if you don't agree to continue WIPP. But how bad does it have to get before you stop it? Are you going to be responsible for another Chernobyl or Fukushima? What if these nitrate drums at WIPP or LANL explode again and set off another even bigger explosion? Accident investigators said they could not rule out another explosion. Really, considering the incompetence and deception, the pressures to hurry up to get that deadline met and get that bonus, the WIPP project is practically written as a plan to create a disaster.

Currently, WIPP has a shaft that needs to be re-constructed. Instead of recertifying WIPP,
let's take this as an opportunity to see if that shaft can actually be closed and sealed - to
practice their experimental closure technology. That would give EPA some idea if closure is actually possible. Meanwhile, EPA could be re-studying and re-assessing risk assessments and other scientific studies. I believe it's possible that EPA does not have the money or trained personnel (as evidenced by some of the statements of the EPA representatives at the meeting) right now to properly assess recertification. There is nothing wrong with going to Congress and telling them that you don't have enough resources to properly evaluate recertification. If that is the case, however, you cannot just rubber stamp WIPP because you don't have enough resources to look into all the problems properly. And if you did go to Congress saying you can't recertify because of this, believe me, money would be coming your way very quickly.

I expect a lot from my government officials when they are regulating such dangerous and
important projects, but with WIPP I have been consistently disappointed. Money and politics are all that are considered. Safety is almost a dirty word, to be ignored and swept under the rug. However, you are in a position now to do what's right and to point out that the emperor has no clothes. I want you to refuse simply to re-certify WIPP without being assured through extensive investigation that it really can contain the waste. At this point I believe any true scientific study of the project will show that WIPP cannot yet prove containment for 10,000 years. I want you to protect us and do what's right - despite the admittedly enormous political pressures on you to just go along with the plan. And I want you to demand the resources you need to do your job properly. Unfortunately, I expect that you will not do the right thing and will simply rubber stamp the recertification. Please prove me wrong.

Response to 7/9/15 D. Reade Comment:
EPA appreciates the points made here. Our recertification of the repository is based on a thorough evaluation of a highly technical, peer reviewed, probabilistic risk assessment that incorporates the latest peer reviewed models, experiments, and monitoring data on the WIPP. The model addresses multiple features, events, and processes that account for possibilities of a release, including the probability of a pressurized brine encounter. Please refer to EPA's various support documents for further information on our evaluation process, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609.

Additionally, EPA believes it has provided multiple ample opportunities for public engagement on the WIPP, through public comment periods and webinars. The comment period for the recertification application closed on April 10, 2017, approximately two years and six months after it initially opened. This closing date was 30 days after the EPA's announcement in the Federal Register that the recertification application was complete.

Resumption of waste emplacement after the 2014 incidents at the WIPP is unrelated to the EPA's recertification decision, which is primarily concerned with compliance with the EPA's long-term disposal requirements. However, the DOE has acknowledged that recovery from the radiological release will result in design changes to the repository, which will need to be considered from that longer-term perspective. The EPA recognizes that the current recertification decision is based on a repository design that is likely to change, but the current application contains the information necessary to reach a decision without knowing the details of the future changes.

Issue 6: 	Several points on considering releases from WIPP, including an intrusion into a pressurized brine pocket

J. Radford (8/3/15):

EPA Response to 8/3/15 J. Radford Comment:
The EPA certified WIPP in 1998 based on thorough of site characteristics and potential processes and events that could be expected to occur at the WIPP site. In the undisturbed condition, the salt will encapsulate the waste and there is no realistic method for contaminants to escape the repository. The only possible mechanism identified for any radioactive material to be released at WIPP is via human intrusion into the repository. DOE has considered the potential for humans to inadvertently drill into the repository as required by EPA's radioactive waste disposal regulations. EPA has had comments on DOE's approach to calculating releases from human intrusion, but those comments have been generally resolved such that EPA has a reasonable expectation that WIPP will comply with the radioactive waste disposal regulations over the 10,000-year regulatory period.

The EPA agrees that there is an increased probability of a pressurized brine encounter due to drilling. Because of this, EPA has provided DOE with an approach to determine this parameter in future performance assessments. The updated approach uses the geophysical data, but also incorporates newer drilling information into the probability distribution. The EPA believes this approach is sound and is acceptable for use in future performance assessments. For further information on our determination of potential intrusions into the repository, please refer to the discussion above responding to the comment by L. Chaturvedi and the technical support document Probability of Encountering Castile Brine Beneath the WIPP Waste Panels Using the TDEM Block Method as well as the various supporting documents, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609.

Issue 7	: 	General supporting comments

K. Gettz (10/15/15):
This comment addresses the proposed re-opening of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).  The position of this comment is in support of the re-opening, due to the fact that WIPP has continued to meet EPA disposal standards even after the 2014 radiation release, transuranic (TRU) waste is still being generated and requires specific disposal to avoid adverse health and environmental effects, and the Department of Energy has a rigorous Recovery Plan outlined, as well as received suggestions by EPA to further preventative measures.

D. Leri (10/15/15):
Due to the radiation release at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant on February 14, 2014 in Carlsbad, New Mexico, the Environmental Protection Agency is evaluating whether or not the plant should reopen. Operation and filtration systems in the plant seem to be operating efficiently. Proper quality assurance methods are in place. The radiation release in 2014 did not cause any harmful consequences to the health of the environment or personnel. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant plays large role in the economic growth and success of the challenging desert setting of Carlsbad. After careful research and consideration of these filtration systems, health effects, and economic benefit, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is a positive attribute to Carlsbad, New Mexico and should reopen.

Response to 10/15/15 K. Gettz  and D. Leri Comments
EPA thanks the commenter for their statement and will continue to provide oversight to the WIPP to ensure its continual safe operation.

J. Heaton (1/18/17):
On behalf of the citizens of Carlsbad and the members of our nuclear task force, thank you for this update on the EPA's review of WIPP's 2014 Compliance Recertification Application. We understand this update is related to the pending completeness determination, which will then provide the Agency with six months to make its official recertification decision.

While we appreciate the EPA's public outreach during this period, we do have concerns about the organization's apparent unwillingness to keep the focus of these meetings on the CRA.

During our January web meeting, several individuals from northern New Mexico ignored
disclaimers insisting that the conversation remain on the CRA and used the time for lengthy diatribes on unrelated issues. This was disrespectful to your organization and to other stakeholders who wanted to utilize this time discussing the CRA.

It would be helpful to explain to the folks in northern NM what the certification represents, and that your focus is on the long-term performance of the repository. They seem to think EPA is responsible for day to day operations, and the fact that a 6 month or year delay in your certification has some impact on the 10,000 year performance. We know you want to be respectful of anyone's questions and want to try to answer them, but we would encourage you to not engage individuals attempting to derail the intended discussion.

This has, undoubtedly, been a historically lengthy process, in part due to a redirection of focus following the 2014's incidents at WIPP. We participated in informal meetings with the EPA, as well as an opportunity for official public comment, back in 2014. While we certainly understand the need to be thorough, we feel this particular effort has been examined in detail and recertification should happen soon. We also recognize that the next application is due in March of 2019, just over two years from now.

Acting on behalf of the Carlsbad Mayor's Nuclear Task Force, I submitted comments in 2014 and believe a reiteration of several key points is important.
 There are no conceivable long term impacts caused by the 2014 breach. WIPP's ability to do its job during the 10,000 years after closure has not been challenged.
 Based on the nature of long-term modeling, it is difficult to conceive of any new
      conditions which could impact certification.
 The conceptual models on which WIPP performance assessment is based are extremely conservative. WIPP PA intentionally over-estimates all potential cause for alarm, and there is still significant margin between predicted releases and the EPA-imposed release limits.
 The CRA, as it has in past re-certifications, captures the technical issues, features, events and processes that could possibly affect long-term performance. We appreciate allowing the residents of Carlsbad and Southeastern New Mexico the opportunity to participate in this discussion. We hope an announcement of recertification will be made soon.

We appreciate allowing the residents of Carlsbad and Southeastern New Mexico the
opportunity to participate in this discussion. We hope an announcement of recertification will be made soon.

EPA Response to generally supportive comments:
We thank the commenters for their support in our efforts in the recertification process. Based on our evaluation of the 2014-CRA, we have determined that there is a reasonable expectation that the WIPP will comply with the EPA's radioactive waste disposal regulations for the 10,000 regulatory period. For the Agency's full evaluation of the application, please refer to the Federal Register and supplemental technical support documents, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609.

Issue 8	:	Comments on multiple recertification issues

D. Hancock (1/18/17):
Dear People,

Following are additional comments from Southwest Research and Information Center (SRIC) regarding completeness and accuracy of the Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2014) submitted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) that was received by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on March 26, 2014. SRIC submitted written comments on October 24, 2014; and oral comments on June 17, 2015 at the Albuquerque meeting and the January 12, 2017 webinar. SRIC expects EPA to fully consider, and respond to, those comments as well as those that follow.

Once again, SRIC emphasizes that EPA regulations require: "Information provided to the Administrator in support of any compliance application shall be complete and accurate." 40 CFR 191.11. Both DOE and EPA must assure compliance with that requirement.

1. The CRA-2014 was incomplete when it was submitted.
SRIC believes that because of the incidents in the WIPP underground  -  truck fire and radiation release  -  in February 2014, the appropriate action would have been for either DOE to withdraw the CRA-2014 or for EPA to have required the submission of a new CRA that included an analysis of the errors in the CRA-2009 that were incorporated into the November 18, 2010 recertification decision (75 Federal Register 41421-41424). Neither DOE nor EPA took those actions.

EPA response: We agree that the CRA-2014 was incomplete when it was submitted and made comments to DOE to address the items where the Agency needed additional information. The Agency received enough information to declare the application complete on January 13, 2017.

The EPA also monitors air emissions from the repository to assure releases are below the regulatory limit of 10 mrem/year, per 40 CFR 61.92 and whether they exceed the 0.1 mrem/year periodic confirmatory trigger value as specified in 40 CFR 61.93 (b) (4) (i).  The EPA did evaluate the releases, per NESHAP requirements, from the repository during the February 14, 2014 incident. No violation was detected, which indicated the DOE remained within the Agency's air emissions requirements.

The EPA's purview is to assure the repository meets the regulatory requirements post-closure with a performance assessment. For the 2014-CRA PA, the DOE had a data cut-off date of March December 31, 2012. Based on this cut-off date, the EPA requested information related to any drums from LANL that may be a mixture of the nitrate products and organic kitty litter that could have been placed in the repository prior December 31, 2012. The DOE provided that information and the Agency has determined there is insignificant quantities of the nitrate waste/ organic material mixture emplace in the repository that would trigger a violation of our certification requirements. The EPA's evaluation of the WIPP waste and chemical conditions are provided in the following document; Technical Support Document in Support of Section 194.24 Evaluation of the Compliance Recertification Actinide Source Term, Gas Generation, Backfill Efficacy, Water Balance, and Culebra Dolomite Distribution Coefficient Values (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ- OAR-2014-0609).

2. A completeness determination and recertification decision must be specifically limited in time.
EPA clearly indicated at the January 12, 2017 webinar that it will soon issue a completeness determination. DOE's representative specifically reaffirmed during the webinar that the data cutoff for the CRA-2014 is December 31, 2012. Both EPA and DOE stated during the webinar that the data cutoff for the next application (CRA-2019) is December 31, 2017. Thus, the completeness determination and recertification decision must clearly acknowledge those dates so that it is clear to the public what the time parameters of the current RCA are and what the data cutoff for the CRA-2019 is.

EPA response: In order to plan, organize, run calculation, and generate final reports, the DOE has a self-imposed data cut-off date of approximately14 months prior to the five-year cycle for their CRA submittals to the EPA. This is self-imposed by the DOE and not a regulatory component.

3. There were inaccuracies in the CRA-2009 that DOE has not identified and analyzed in the CRA-2014.
The CRA-2009 did not state, among many other things, that the site would not receive and emplace waste for most of 2014, all of 2015, and all of 2016. The CRA-2009 stated that wastes that did not comply with the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) would not be emplaced at WIPP, but has subsequently admitted to NMED (though not in the CRA-2014) that hundreds of containers that did not comply with the WIPP WAC were emplaced at WIPP. The CRA-2009 stated that WIPP met the Quality Assurance (QA) compliance criteria, but has subsequently admitted in the Accident Investigation Board reports (though not in the CRA-2014) that among the reasons for the radiation release was inadequate QA. Those and other inaccuracies must be included in the CRA-2019 which will include data from that time period that is not included in the CRA-2014.

EPA response: The EPA's purview is to assure the repository meets the regulatory requirements during the 10,000 year post-closure period as provided using a suite of performance assessment (PA) calculations. Each PA is a projection of the waste emplaced in the repository, updated in each 5-year recertification cycle, based on the current emplaced waste and the projected waste from the various waste streams and the expected future condition of the repository. However, the DOE, as the operator of the facility, may make changes for future facility operations. No one could foresee the February 2014 incidents and the subsequent halt in operations. The Department will need to address the change in the facility operation in future recertification applications. The Agency will evaluate the adequacy of the projected final inventory and other changes at the appropriate time as part of a planned change request or a recertification.

4. There are inaccuracies in the 2010 recertification decision that must be acknowledged in the 2017 recertification decision.
EPA repeatedly states that in each RCA DOE need submit only new information and that the certification decision and subsequent recertifications are not revisited. Technical inaccuracies include that WIPP did not receive and emplace waste for most of 2014, all of 2015, and all of 2016 and that hundreds of containers that did not comply with the WIPP WAC were emplaced. That is the reality, despite the fact that the 2010 recertification decision states: "Recertification will ensure that WIPP is operated using the most accurate and up-to-date information available and provides documentation requiring DOE to operate to these standards." 75 FR 70588. The 2010 decision further states: "All wastes must meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria and all requirements of EPA's waste characterization program, and EPA must officially notify DOE before the Department is allowed to ship waste to WIPP." 75 FR 70592. On the contrary, not all wastes met the WIPP WAC. EPA also had stated that the recertification: "will set the parameters for how WIPP will be operated by DOE over the following five years." 75 FR 41424. EPA must acknowledge those inaccuracies. EPA should describe how it has ensures that the 2017 recertification corrected those errors so that they are not continued in future recertifications.

EPA response: The Agency's focus for recertification reviews is on what has changed since the last recertification; the DOE is only required to submit information that has changed since previous information is already part of the record. WIPP wastes are expected to meet the waste acceptance criteria. The recertification does set the parameters for how the WIPP will be operated, such as with the compliance recertification applications limits on the inventory expected for the following five years. The EPA reviews the adequacy of the processes the DOE uses to characterize the components important to long-term performance, but it is the Department's responsibility to appropriately implement the day to day activities. Even with the incidents of 2014 that affected the operation of the facility, the long-term performance of the system to contain waste is relatively unaffected.

The EPA's evaluation of the DOE's waste characterization activities is discussed in CARD 8, CARD 24 and in the Technical Support Document in Support of Section 194.24  Review of the Baseline Inventory Used in the Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2014) (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ- OAR-2014-0609).

5. EPA should fulfill its commitment to discuss with DOE and stakeholders how to improve the RCA-2019 and the review process.
The 2010 recertification stated: "EPA believes that with continued experience, future recertifications should become less lengthy. The Agency intends to continue to work with DOE and interested stakeholders to discuss and work on improving future recertification applications and processes." 75 FR 70594. In fact, the time from submittal of the CRA-2014 to the recertification decision is much longer than either of the two previous recertifications. EPA's information flyer at the June 2015 meeting stated: "While EPA is still conducting its completeness review, and additional information from DOE is forthcoming, the Agency does expect to complete the completeness review sometime in fall/winter 2015." There was disagreement between EPA and DOE officials at the January 12 webinar as to why the expected completeness determination was delayed for more than a year. As part of the discussion and improvement process, there should be further clarification of the views of EPA and DOE about that matter. SRIC also believes that EPA should begin a policy of having DOE respond to comments, such as those submitted by SRIC on October 10, 2014, that relate to the RCA.

EPA response: The Agency's statement made in 2010 related to future CRA reviews was an expectation on the experiences with the 2004 and 2009 Compliance Recertification Applications. With EPA's delayed review of the 2014 CRA (due to responding to the 2014 radiological incident at WIPP and the number of technical changes made by the DOE during this recertification process), it took longer than in the past to conduct thorough review. An overview of issues can be found in the EPA's Technical Support Document (TSD) Overview of Change Between PABC-2009 and CRA-2004 WIPP Performance Assessment (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ- OAR-2014-0609) and other technical support documents in the docket. The Agency will consider suggestions from the public on how to improve the recertification process.

6. The CRA-2014 continues to incorrectly calculate the volume of RH waste emplaced at WIPP and in the Inventory. This issue is discussed in detail in the October 24, 2014 SRIC comments.

EPA response: The Agency agrees that the DOE needs to realistically how it will address the issue of RH waste emplacement at the WIPP. Given the reduction in space for emplacing the RH waste, the DOE will need to determine what RH volume of waste can be put into WIPP in the future. The Agency approved the DOE's use of shielded containers as an alternative to emplacing waste in the walls. In calculating the volume of RH waste in the containers, the approach that DOE takes needs to be clear and technically sound.

The EPA's evaluation of the DOE-projected and current waste emplaced in WIPP is characterization is discussed in EPA's two TSDs; Technical Support Document in Support of Section 194.24 Evaluation of the Compliance Recertification Actinide Source Term, Gas Generation, Backfill Efficacy, Water Balance, and Culebra Dolomite Distribution Coefficient Values and Technical Support Document in Support of Section 194.24  Review of the Baseline Inventory Used in the Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2014)  (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ- OAR-2014-0609). We anticipate this issue to be raised in the 2019-CRA PA.

7. The completeness determination and recertification decision cannot be used to allow a substantial increase in the WIPP inventory.
The CRA-2014, including the Performance Assessment is based on the 2012 Inventory (DOE/TRU-12-3425), which has a total inventory of activity decayed through 2003 of 2,980,000 curies (Table 3-13). The current WIPP Inventory  -  2016 (DOE/TRU-16-3425) has a total inventory of activity decayed through 2033 of 5,190,000 curies (Table 3-11). That's an increase of more than 70 percent. DOE has not provided a PA based on such increased activity caused primarily by the addition of 6 metric tons of plutonium from the Savannah River Site (SRS). Thus, EPA cannot approve that new waste stream through the recertification process. That fact should be explicitly stated in the recertification decision.

EPA response: Each PA is a projection of the waste emplaced in the repository, updated in each 5-year recertification cycle, based on the current emplaced waste and the projected waste from the various waste streams. In the DOE's 2019-CRA the Agency expects the DOE to update the waste inventory incorporated into the 2019-PA based on the current emplaced waste and the projected waste; the Savannah River Site waste will need to be incorporated in that PA.

8. The recertification decision must detail why WIPP's re-opening was not contingent upon a recertification decision.
At the June 2015 public meetings, dozens of people stated that EPA should not recertify WIPP because of the radiation release. DOE's Recovery Plan states that recertification was required for re-opening (page 16). When asked repeatedly at the June 2015 public meetings as to whether recertification must be decided before re-opening, EPA officials stated that had not been determined. However, WIPP is now re-opened, so clearly some EPA official(s) made that determination. When asked who made the EPA decision, on what basis, and where the decision was posted on the EPA website at the January 12, 2017 webinar, EPA officials said it was made internally in consultation with EPA attorneys. That is not a satisfactory answer to the question, so the recertification must provide that requested detail and documentation.

Thank you for your consideration of, and response to, these comments.

EPA response: After implementing numerous corrective actions, the DOE resumed limited waste emplacement on January 4, 2017, and shortly thereafter also resumed limited shipments from waste generator sites. Page 16 of the DOE's Recovery Plan inaccurately stated that recertification was required for re-opening. As stated in the Federal Register notice for this recertification decision, "Resumption of waste emplacement at the WIPP is unrelated to the EPA's recertification decision, which is primarily concerned with compliance with the EPA's long-term disposal requirements." At the time of the first public meetings, the Agency had not had time to fully review and comprehend the February 2014 incidents and what affect they may or may not have had. With time the Agency was able to conclude that the incident was primarily an operational phase issue. The New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) is the primary regulator for operations at the WIPP via the hazardous waste permit, and as such, they had the primary responsibility for determining when operations could restart. The EPA did conduct an inspection of the WIPP facility in November 2016 (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2001-0012-469), prior to the resumption of waste emplacement in January 2017. Any non-compliance issues related to the operational phase are addressed by the state and it is the state that has the authority to close the WIPP based on any operational violations. Any mine safety issues are addressed by the Mine Safety and Health Administration of the Department of Labor. However, the DOE has acknowledged that recovery from the radiological release will result in design changes to the repository, which will need to be considered from a long-term perspective.


[Federal Register: March 5, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 44)]
[Notices]
[Page 11901]
[DOCID:fr05mr08-49]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Combined Notice of Filings 1

February 28, 2008.
    Take notice that the Commission has received the following Natural
Gas Pipeline Rate and Refund Report filings:

    Docket Numbers: RP08-211-000.
    Applicants: Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, L.L.C.
    Description: Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC submits Sixth
Revised Sheet 263 and Fourth Revised Sheet 283 of its FERC Gas Tariff,
First Revised Volume 1, to become effective March 28, 2008.
    Filed Date: 02/26/2008.
    Accession Number: 20080227-0148.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Monday, March 10, 2008.

    Docket Numbers: RP08-212-000.
    Applicants: Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC.
    Description: Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC submits Third Revised
Sheet 553 and Second Revised Sheet 575 of its FERC Gas Tariff, Fifth
Revised Volume 1, to become effective March 28, 2008.
    Filed Date: 02/26/2008.
    Accession Number: 20080227-0147.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Monday, March 10, 2008.

    Docket Numbers: RP08-213-000.
    Applicants: Egan Hub Storage, LLC.
    Description: Egan Hub Storage, LLC submits Fourth Revised Sheet 143
to its FERC Gas Tariff, First Revised Volume 1, to become effective
March 28, 2008.
    Filed Date: 02/26/2008.
    Accession Number: 20080227-0146.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Monday, March 10, 2008.

    Docket Numbers: RP08-214-000.
    Applicants: Saltville Gas Storage Company L.L.C.
    Description: Saltville Gas Storage Company LLC submits Fourth
Revised Sheet 143 of its FERC Gas Tariff, Original Volume 1, to become
effective March 28, 2008.
    Filed Date: 02/26/2008.
    Accession Number: 20080227-0145.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Monday, March 10, 2008.

    Docket Numbers: RP08-215-000.
    Applicants: East Tennessee Natural Gas, LLC.
    Description: East Tennessee Natural Gas, LLC submits Third Revised
Sheet 337 of its FERC Gas Tariff, Third Revised Volume 1, to become
effective March 28, 2008.
    Filed Date: 02/26/2008.
    Accession Number: 20080227-0144.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Monday, March 10, 2008.

    Docket Numbers: RP08-216-000.
    Applicants: Texas Eastern Transmission LP.
    Description: Texas Eastern Transmission, LP submits Fourth Revised
Sheet 602 of its FERC Gas Tariff, Seventh Revised Volume 1, to become
effective March 28, 2008.
    Filed Date: 02/26/2008.
    Accession Number: 20080227-0143.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on Monday, March 10, 2008.

    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest in any of the above
proceedings must file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the
Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and Sec.
385.214) on or before 5 p.m. Eastern time on the specified Comment
Date. It is not necessary to separately intervene again in a subdocket
related to a compliance filing if you have previously intervened in the
same docket. Protests will be considered by the Commission in
determining the appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to
make protestants parties to the proceeding. Anyone filing a motion to
intervene or protest must serve a copy of that document on the
Applicant. In reference to filings initiating a new proceeding,
interventions or protests submitted on or before the comment deadline
need not be served on persons other than the Applicant.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and
interventions in lieu of paper, using the FERC Online links at http://
www.ferc.gov. To facilitate electronic service, persons with Internet
access who will eFile a document and/or be listed as a contact for an
intervenor must create and validate an eRegistration account using the
eRegistration link. Select the eFiling link to log on and submit the
intervention or protests.
    Persons unable to file electronically should submit an original and
14 copies of the intervention or protest to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 888 First St., NE., Washington, DC 20426.
    The filings in the above proceedings are accessible in the
Commission's eLibrary system by clicking on the appropriate link in the
above list. They are also available for review in the Commission's
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an eSubscription link
on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail notification
when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For assistance with
any FERC Online service, please e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>or
call<PHONE_NUMBER> (toll free). For TTY, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
 [FR Doc. E8-4205 Filed 3-4-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P