[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 49 (Friday, March 13, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 13246]
[FR Doc No: 2015-05809]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 117

[Docket No. USCG-2015-0109]

Drawbridge Operation Regulations; Hackensack River, Jersey City,
NJ

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of deviation from drawbridge regulation.

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SUMMARY: The Coast Guard has issued a temporary deviation from the
operating schedule that governs the operation of the Port Authority
Trans-Hudson (PATH) railroad bridge across the Hackensack River, mile
3.0, at Jersey City, New Jersey. This deviation is necessary to allow
the bridge owner to replace rails and ties at the bridge. This
deviation allows the bridge to remain closed on Saturday and Sunday for
twenty six consecutive weekends.

DATES: This deviation is effective from April 4, 2015 through September
27, 2015.

ADDRESSES: The docket for this deviation, [USCG-2015-0109] is available
at http://www.regulations.gov. Type the docket number in the ``SEARCH''
box and click ``SEARCH.'' Click on Open Docket Folder on the line
associated with this deviation. You may also visit the Docket
Management Facility in Room W12-140, on the ground floor of the
Department of Transportation West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC, 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this
temporary deviation, call or email Mr. Joe M. Arca, Project Officer,
First Coast Guard District, telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>,
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>If you have questions on viewing the docket, call
Cheryl Collins, Program Manager, Docket Operations, telephone (202)
366-9826.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The PATH railroad bridge across the
Hackensack River, mile 3.0, at Jersey City, New Jersey, has a vertical
clearance in the closed position of 40 feet at mean high water and 45
feet at mean low water. The existing bridge operating regulations are
found at 33 CFR 117.723.
    The waterway is transited by seasonal recreational vessels and
commercial vessels of various sizes.
    The bridge owner, Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH), requested a
temporary deviation from the normal operating schedule to facilitate
structural repairs, replacement of the rails and ties, at the bridge.
    Under this temporary deviation, the PATH railroad bridge may remain
in the closed position for twenty six weekends, between 12:01 a.m. on
Saturdays through 12:01 a.m. on Mondays from April 4, 2015 through
September 27, 2015.
    There are no alternate routes for vessel traffic; however, the
vertical clearance at the bridge is 40 feet at mean high water and 45
feet at mean low water, which should allow most vessels that normally
transit this bridge to pass under the closed draws during this repair
period. The bridge may be opened in the event of an emergency.
    The Coast Guard will inform the users of the waterways through our
Local and Broadcast Notice to Mariners of the change in operating
schedule for the bridges so that vessels can arrange their transits to
minimize any impact caused by the temporary deviation.
    In accordance with 33 CFR 117.35(e), the drawbridge must return to
its regular operating schedule immediately at the end of the effective
period of this temporary deviation. This deviation from the operating
regulations is authorized under 33 CFR 117.35.

    Dated: February 23, 2015.
C.J. Bisignano,
Supervisory Bridge Management Specialist, First Coast Guard District.
[FR Doc. 2015-05809 Filed 3-12-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 9110-04-P


[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 198 (Tuesday, October 13, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64539-64542]
[FR Doc No: 2020-22476]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-90101; File No. SR-FICC-2020-010]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation;
Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change To Describe Key Components of
the Mortgage-Backed Securities Division Stress Testing Program

October 6, 2020.

I. Introduction

    On August 11, 2020, Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (``FICC'')
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'')
proposed rule change SR-FICC-2020-010, pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4
thereunder.\2\ The proposed rule change was published for comment in
the Federal Register on August 25, 2020.\3\ The Commission did not
receive any comment letters on the proposed rule change. For the
reasons discussed below, the Commission is approving the proposed rule
change.\4\
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 89616 (August 19, 2020),
85 FR 52387 (August 25, 2020) (SR-FICC-2020-010) (``Notice'').
    \4\ On January 21, 2020, FICC filed a portion of this proposed
rule change that is subject to Section 806(e)(1)(A) of Title VIII of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
entitled the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of
2010 (``the Clearing Supervision Act'') and Rule 19b-4(n)(1)(i)
under the Act, as an advance notice with the Commission (the
``Advance Notice Filing''). 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1); 17 CFR 240.19b-
4(n)(1)(i); Release No. 88266 (February 24, 2020), 85 FR 11413
(February 27, 2020) (SR-FICC-2020-801). The Commission issued a
notice of no objection to the Advance Notice Filing on March 13,
2020. See Release No. 88382 (March 13, 2020), 85 FR 15830 (March 19,
2020) (SR-FICC-2020-801). A copy of the Advance Notice Filing and
the Commission's notice of no objection are available at: http://www.dtcc.com/legal/sec-rule-filings.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Description of the Proposed Rule Change

    The proposed rule change consists of a proposal to amend the FICC
Mortgage-Backed Securities Division (``MBSD'') Clearing Rules (``MBSD
Rules'') \5\ to include a new section that would describe the purpose
and the key components of MBSD's stress testing program. The proposed
rule change would also provide that vendor-supplied data would be used
in the stress testing program, and that a back-up calculation would be
used in the event the vendor fails to provide FICC with the vendor-
sourced data. The proposed changes are further described below.
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    \5\ Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined
shall have the meanings assigned to such terms in the MBSD Rules,
available at: www.dtcc.com/legal/rules-and-procedures.aspx.
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A. Background

    MBSD provides trade comparison, netting, risk management,
settlement, and central counterparty services for the U.S. mortgage-
backed securities market. FICC manages its credit exposures to its
Clearing Members by collecting an appropriate amount of margin
(referred to in the MBSD Rules as Required Fund Deposit) from each
Clearing Member.\6\ The aggregate of all Clearing Members' margin
amounts (together with certain other deposits required under the MBSD
Rules) constitutes MBSD's Clearing Fund, which FICC would access should
a Clearing Member default with insufficient margin to satisfy any FICC
losses caused by the liquidation of the defaulting Clearing Member's
portfolio.\7\
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    \6\ See MBSD Rule 4, supra note 5.
    \7\ Id.

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    FICC uses stress testing to test the sufficiency of its prefunded
financial resources.\8\ In contrast to FICC's margin methodologies,
which are designed to limit FICC's credit exposures under normal market
conditions,\9\ FICC's stress testing methodologies are designed to
quantify FICC's potential losses under extreme but plausible market
conditions.\10\ Therefore, stress testing is designed to help FICC
identify credit risks beyond those contemplated by FICC's margin
methodologies, including credit exposures that might result from the
realization of potential stress scenarios, such as extreme price
changes, multiple defaults, or changes in other valuation inputs and
assumptions.\11\ As a result, stress testing helps FICC identify the
amount of financial resources necessary to cover its credit exposure
under stress scenarios in extreme but plausible market conditions.\12\
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    \8\ On December 19, 2017, the Commission approved FICC's
adoption of the Clearing Agency Stress Testing Framework (Market
Risk), which among other things, sets forth the purpose of FICC's
stress testing and describes certain methodologies FICC uses in its
stress testing. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 82368 (December
19, 2017), 82 FR 61082 (December 26, 2017) (SR-DTC-2017-005; SR-
FICC-2017-009; SR-NSCC-2017-006) (``Stress Testing Framework
Order''). The Stress Testing Framework is an FICC rule, pursuant to
Section 3(a)(27) of the Act, although it is not part of the MBSD
Rules, and it has been filed confidentially with the Commission. See
15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(27).
    \9\ See e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 80253 (March
15, 2017), 82 FR 14581, 14582 (March 21, 2017) (SR-FICC-2017-004)
(notice of filing and immediate effectiveness of a proposed rule
change to amend MBSD Rules with respect to the intraday mark-to-
market charge).
    \10\ See Stress Testing Framework Order, supra note 8 at 61083;
Notice, supra note 3 at 52388.
    \11\ See id.; 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(a)(17).
    \12\ See Stress Testing Framework Order, supra note 8 at 61083;
Notice, supra note 3 at 52388.
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    The purpose and the key components of MBSD's stress testing
program, among others, are provided in the Stress Testing
Framework.\13\ FICC's stress testing methodologies have three key
components: Risk identification, scenario development, and risk
measurement and aggregation. The key components generally provide that
FICC identifies the principal credit risk drivers, develops sets of
extreme but plausible historical and hypothetical stress scenarios for
the identified risk drivers, and calculates risk metrics for each
Clearing Member's actual portfolio to estimate the profits and losses
in connection with such Clearing Member's close-out under the chosen
stress scenarios.\14\
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    \13\ See Stress Testing Framework Order, supra note 8 at 61082-
83.
    \14\ See Stress Testing Framework Order, supra note 8 at 61083;
Notice, supra note 3 at 52388.
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B. MBSD's Stress Testing Program

    FICC proposes to include a new section in the MBSD Rules to provide
the purpose and the key components of FICC's stress testing
program.\15\ By including such description of the stress testing
program in the MBSD Rules, which is a public document, FICC intends to
make the current stress testing program transparent to its Clearing
Members.\16\ Specifically, the proposed rule change provides that FICC
uses stress testing to (1) test the sufficiency of the Clearing Fund
against FICC's potential losses assuming the default of a Clearing
Member with the largest credit exposure and its entire Affiliated
Family under extreme but plausible market conditions, and (2) identify
both (x) Clearing Members who may pose a greater market risk under
certain market conditions, and (y) potential weaknesses in FICC's
margin methodologies. The proposed rule change also provides that
FICC's stress testing program has three key components.\17\ First, FICC
analyzes the securities and risk exposures in its Clearing Members'
portfolios to identify the principal market risk drivers and capture
the risk sensitivity of the portfolios under stressed market
conditions. Second, FICC develops a comprehensive set of scenarios
including historical scenarios and hypothetical stress scenarios.
Third, FICC calculates risk metrics for each Clearing Member's actual
portfolio to estimate the profits and losses in connection with such
Clearing Member's close out under the chosen stress scenarios.
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    \15\ The changes described in Section II.B. are consistent with
the existing Framework.
    \16\ See Notice, supra note 3 at 52388.
    \17\ See id.
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C. Vendor-Supplied Data in MBSD's Stress Testing Program

    In connection with FICC's stress testing program, FICC proposes to
use vendor-supplied data in MBSD's scenario development process, which
is the second component of FICC's stress testing program, and the risk
measurement and aggregation process, which is the third component of
FICC's stress testing program.
(1) Historical Data in the Scenario Development Component
    The scenario development component involves FICC's construction of
comprehensive and relevant sets of extreme but plausible historical and
hypothetical stress scenarios for identified risk drivers. In its
development of historical stress scenarios, FICC proposes to examine
vendor-supplied historical risk factor \18\ time series data
(``Historical Data'') to identify the largest historical changes of
risk factors that influence the pricing of mortgage-backed securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Generally, the term ``risk factor'' (or ``risk driver'')
means an attribute, characteristic, variable or other concrete
determinant that influences the risk profile of a system, entity, or
financial asset. Risk factors may be causes of risk or merely
correlated with risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FICC proposes to use Historical Data because it believes that this
data would explain the market price changes of To-Be-Announced
(``TBA'') securities transactions cleared by MBSD.\19\ In addition,
FICC believes that the data would (1) identify stress risk exposures
under broad and varied market conditions, and (2) provide MBSD with a
capability to design transparent scenarios.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See Notice, supra note 3 at 52389.
    \20\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Historical Data and Security-Level Data in the Risk Measurement and
Aggregation Component
    FICC represents that the risk measurement and aggregation process
calculates risk metrics for each Clearing Member's actual portfolio to
estimate the profits and losses in connection with such Clearing
Member's close out under chosen stress scenarios.\21\ In connection
with this calculation, FICC proposes to use a financial profit-and-loss
calculation that leverages the Historical Data and the vendor-supplied
security-level risk sensitivity \22\ data (``Security-Level Data'').
The Security-Level Data is generated using the vendor's suite of
security valuation models that includes an agency mortgage prepayment
model and interest rate term structure model.\23\ FICC believes that
the vendor's approach generates stable and robust Security-Level
Data.\24\ Because the stress profits and losses calculation would
include Security-Level Data, FICC believes that the calculated results
would reflect results that are close to actual price changes for TBA
securities during larger market moves, which are typical of stress
testing scenarios.\25\
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    \21\ See id.
    \22\ The term ``sensitivity'' means the percentage value change
of a security given each risk factor change.
    \23\ A prepayment model captures cash flow uncertainty as a
result of unscheduled payments of principal (prepayments). An
interest rate term structure model describes the relationship
between interest rates of different maturities.
    \24\ See Notice, supra note 3 at 52389.
    \25\ See id.

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D. Back-Up Stress Testing Calculation

    Finally, FICC proposes to implement a back-up calculation that it
would use in the event the vendor fails to provide FICC with the
vendor-sourced data described above. Specifically, if the vendor fails
to provide any data or a significant portion of the data in accordance
with the timeframes to which FICC and the vendor agreed, FICC would use
the most recently available data on the first day that such disruption
occurs. If FICC and the vendor expect that the vendor would resume
providing data within five business days, FICC would determine whether
to calculate the daily stress testing calculation using the most
recently available data or a back-up calculation, described below. If
FICC and the vendor expect that the data disruption would extend beyond
five days, FICC would utilize the back-up calculation.

E. Delayed Implementation of the Proposed Rule Change

    FICC proposes to implement the proposed rule change within 45
Business Days after the Commission's approval of this proposed rule
change. Prior to the effective date, FICC would add legends to the MBSD
Rules to state that the specified changes to the MBSD Rules have been
approved but not yet implemented, and to provide the date such approved
changes would be implemented. The legends would also include the file
number of the approved proposed rule change and state that once
implemented, the legends would automatically be removed from the MBSD
Rules.

III. Discussion and Commission Findings

    Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Act \26\ directs the Commission to
approve a proposed rule change of a self-regulatory organization if it
finds that such proposed rule change is consistent with the
requirements of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder
applicable to such organization. After careful consideration, the
Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with the
requirements of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder
applicable to FICC. In particular, the Commission finds that the
proposed rule change is consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the
Act,\27\ as well as Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(iii) and (iv) thereunder \28\
for the reasons described below.
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    \26\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
    \27\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
    \28\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4)(iii) and (iv).
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A. Consistency With Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act

    Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act requires, in part, that the rules
of a registered clearing agency, such as FICC, be designed to promote
the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities
transactions, and, in general, to protect investors and the public
interest.\29\
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    \29\ Id.
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    First, as described in Section II.B., the proposed rule change
would incorporate a new section explaining the purpose and the three
key components of the stress testing program, which is currently
included in the Stress Testing Framework. By incorporating the purpose
and the key components of the stress testing program in the MBSD Rules,
the proposed rule change would provide FICC stakeholders with a better
understanding of what the stress testing program is designed to
accomplish and how FICC manages its credit exposures. The Commission
therefore believes that this aspect of the proposed rule change is
consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F), in that this increased
transparency would protect investors and the public interest.
    Second, as described in Section II.C., FICC proposes to use vendor-
supplied data in MBSD's scenario development process and the risk
measurement and aggregation process. The Commission believes that
vendor-supplied data should allow FICC to identify and analyze risk
exposures under a broad and varied range of stressed market conditions,
which should, in turn, help FICC identify the amount of financial
resources necessary to cover its credit exposure under stress scenarios
in extreme but plausible market conditions. The Commission further
believes that the use of vendor-supplied data should enable FICC to
perform a robust assessment of the stress profits and losses
calculation, identify and address potential risks with risks with
respect to specific Clearing Members and their affiliates, and in turn,
should help FICC ensure that it is collecting adequate prefunded
financial resources to cover its potential losses resulting from the
default of clearing members and their affiliates under extreme but
plausible market conditions.
    Moreover, as described in Section II.D., FICC proposes to use a
back-up calculation in the event the vendor fails to provide FICC with
the vendor-sourced data. The Commission believes that the back-up
calculation is designed to provide FICC with a reasonable alternative
method for calculating stress profit-and-loss in the event of an
interruption in the vendor-sourced data feed. By providing FICC with a
reasonable alternative method for conducting stress testing, the
Commission believes that the proposed back-up calculation is designed
to help FICC avoid gaps in assessing the sufficiency of its prefunded
financial resources due to the inability of particular data.
    Taken together, the Commission believes that these aspects of the
proposed rule change, as described in Sections II.C. and II.D., should
better enable FICC to evaluate and manage the credit risk presented by
its Clearing Members. The Commission believes that the proposed rule
change is designed to improve FICC's ability to meet its requirement to
maintain sufficient prefunded financial resources at a minimum to
enable FICC to cover the default of the Clearing Member (including
relevant affiliates) that would potentially cause the largest aggregate
credit exposure for FICC in extreme but plausible conditions, as
required under Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(iii).\30\ Accordingly, the Commission
believes that the proposed rule change should help FICC to continue
providing prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities
transactions even in extreme but plausible historical and hypothetical
stress scenarios, consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act.\31\
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    \30\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4).
    \31\ Id.
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B. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(iii) and (vi)

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(iii) requires that a covered clearing agency,
such as FICC, establish, implement, maintain and enforce written
policies and procedures reasonably designed to effectively identify,
measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and
those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes, by
maintaining additional financial resources at the minimum to enable it
to cover a wide range of foreseeable stress scenarios that include, but
are not limited to, the default of the participant family that would
potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the covered
clearing agency in extreme but plausible market conditions.\32\ Rule
17Ad-22(e)(4)(vi) requires that a covered clearing agency, such as
FICC, effectively identify, measure, monitor, and manage its credit
exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing,
and settlement processes, by testing the sufficiency of

its total financial resources available by conducting stress testing of
its total financial resources once each day using standard
predetermined parameters and assumptions.\33\
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    \32\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4)(iii).
    \33\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4)(vi).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As described in Section II.C., FICC proposes to use vendor-supplied
data, including Historical Data and Security-Level Data, in MBSD's
scenario development process and the risk measurement and aggregation
process. Historical Data would identify stress risk exposures under
broad and varied market conditions and provide FICC with an enhanced
capability to design more transparent scenarios.\34\ Security-Level
Data would provide stable and robust data that would enable FICC to
calculate stress profits and losses that is more accurate.\35\ In
addition, as described in Section II.D., FICC proposes to use a back-up
calculation in the event the vendor fails to provide data to FICC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ See Notice, supra note 3 at 52389.
    \35\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that the proposal is consistent with Rule
17Ad-22(e)(4)(iii) because it should better enable FICC to assess its
ability to maintain sufficient financial resources to cover a wide
range of foreseeable stress scenarios that include the default of the
member (including relevant affiliates) that would potentially cause
FICC's largest aggregate credit exposure in extreme but plausible
conditions.\36\ Additionally, the Commission believes FICC's proposed
stress testing methodology is consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(vi)
because it should enable FICC to test the sufficiency of its minimum
financial resources by conducting stress testing using standard
predetermined parameters and assumptions.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4)(iii).
    \37\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4)(vi).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Conclusion

    On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission finds that the
proposed rule change is consistent with the requirements of the Act
and, in particular, with the requirements of Section 17A of the Act
\38\ and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act
\39\ that proposed rule change SR-FICC-2020-010, be, and it hereby is,
approved.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
    \40\ In approving the proposed rule change, the Commission
considered the proposals' impact on efficiency, competition, and
capital formation. 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
    \41\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\41\
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-22476 Filed 10-9-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 160 (Monday, August 23, 2021)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 47036-47038]
[FR Doc No: 2021-17943]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2021-0691; Project Identifier MCAI-2020-01542-T]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier, Inc., Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD)
for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-100-1A10 airplanes. This
proposed AD was prompted by reports of erratic electrical system status
on the push button annunciators (PBAs) and the engine instrument and
crew alerting system (EICAS). This proposed AD would require revising
the existing airplane flight manual (AFM) and applicable corresponding
operational procedures to incorporate procedures to be applied during
erroneous electrical status indication conditions. The FAA is proposing
this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this proposed AD by October 7,
2021.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax:<PHONE_NUMBER>.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For service information identified in this NPRM, contact
Bombardier, Inc., 200 C[ocirc]te-Vertu Road West, Dorval, Qu[eacute]bec
H4S 2A3, Canada; North America toll-free telephone 1-866-538-1247 or
direct-dial telephone 1-514-855-2999; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
internet https://www.bombardier.com. You may view this service
information at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational
Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on
the availability of this material at the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket at https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2021-0691; or in person at
Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this NPRM, any comments
received, and other information. The street address for Docket
Operations is listed above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Steven Dzierzynski, Aerospace
Engineer, Avionics and Electrical Systems Section, FAA, New York ACO
Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone
516-228-7367; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed
under ADDRESSES. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2021-0691; Project Identifier
MCAI-2020-01542-T'' at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful
comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
the proposal because of those comments.
    Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to
https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you
provide. The agency will also post a report summarizing each
substantive verbal contact received about this NPRM.

Confidential Business Information

    CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this NPRM contain commercial
or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that
you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to
this NPRM, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public
docket of this NPRM. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to
Steven Dzierzynski, Aerospace Engineer, Avionics and Electrical Systems
Section, FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410,
Westbury, NY 11590; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>; email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Any commentary that the FAA receives which is
not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket
for this rulemaking.

Background

    Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), which is the aviation
authority for Canada, has issued TCCA AD CF-2020-46, dated November 17,
2020 (TCCA AD CF-2020-46) (also referred to after this as the Mandatory
Continuing Airworthiness Information, or the MCAI), to correct an
unsafe condition for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-100-1A10
airplanes. You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2021-
0691.
    This proposed AD was prompted by reports of erratic electrical
system status on the PBA and the EICAS, while on-ground and during
flight. Some of those incidents resulted in the airplane experiencing
momentary loss of electrical power and loss of flight displays
following flightcrew actions. The FAA is proposing this AD to address
erroneous indications that could mislead pilots, causing them to turn
off active electrical power sources, leading to partial or complete
loss of electrical power. Loss of electrical power could result in the
loss of flight displays and reduced controllability of the airplane.
See the MCAI for additional background information.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    Bombardier has issued the following sections of the applicable
AFMs. This service information provides procedures to inform the pilots
not to turn off active generators in the event of an erroneous
electrical status indication.
     Section 03-19, Electrical, of Chapter 03, Emergency
Procedures, of the Bombardier Challenger 300 (Imperial Version)
Airplane Flight Manual, Publication No. CSP 100-1, Revision 63, dated
April 1, 2021. (For obtaining this section of the Bombardier Challenger
300 (Imperial Version) Airplane Flight Manual, Publication No. CSP 100-
1, use Document Identification No. CH 300 AFM-I.)
     Section 05-19, Electrical, of Chapter 05, Non-Normal
Procedures, of

the Bombardier Challenger 300 (Imperial Version) Airplane Flight
Manual, Publication No. CSP 100-1, Revision 63, dated April 1, 2021.
(For obtaining this section of the Bombardier Challenger 300 (Imperial
Version) Airplane Flight Manual, Publication No. CSP 100-1, use
Document Identification No. CH 300 AFM-I.)
     Section 03-19, Electrical, of Chapter 03, Emergency
Procedures, of the Bombardier Challenger 350 Airplane Flight Manual,
Publication No. CH 350 AFM, Revision 29, dated April 1, 2021.
     Section 05-19, Electrical, of Chapter 05, Non-Normal
Procedures, of the Bombardier Challenger 350 Airplane Flight Manual,
Publication No. CH 350 AFM, Revision 29, dated April 1, 2021.
    These documents are distinct since they apply to different airplane
configurations. This service information is reasonably available
because the interested parties have access to it through their normal
course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

FAA's Determination

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant
to the FAA's bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority,
the FAA has been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI
and service information referenced above. The FAA is proposing this AD
because the FAA evaluated all the relevant information and determined
the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop
on other products of the same type design.

Proposed AD Requirements in This NPRM

    This proposed AD would require revising the existing AFM and
applicable corresponding operational procedures to incorporate
procedures to be applied during erroneous electrical status indication
conditions.

Explanation of Incorporating Information Specified in an AFM Revision

    This proposed AD would require including the information that is
provided in the referenced AFM revisions in paragraph (g) of this
proposed AD. The language in paragraph (g) of this proposed AD is
designed to allow incorporating the specific information, regardless of
the revision level of the AFM in use, provided the language is
identical to the referenced AFM revisions specified in paragraph (g) of
this proposed AD. The language in a later revision of the Bombardier
Challenger 300 (Imperial Version) Airplane Flight Manual, Publication
No. CSP 100-1 that is the same as the language in Bombardier Challenger
300 (Imperial Version) Airplane Flight Manual, Publication No. CSP 100-
1, Revision 63, dated April 1, 2021; or in a later revision of the
Bombardier Challenger 350 Airplane Flight Manual, Publication No. CH
350 AFM that is the same as the language in Bombardier Challenger 350
Airplane Flight Manual, Publication No. CH 350 AFM, Revision 29, dated
April 1, 2021; may be incorporated.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD, if adopted as proposed, would
affect 275 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following
costs to comply with this proposed AD:

                                      Estimated Costs for Required Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Cost per       Cost on U.S.
                          Labor cost                              Parts cost        product         operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 work-hour x $85 per hour = $85.............................              $0              $85          $23,375
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    The FAA determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
    (2) Would not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Would not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13   [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:

Bombardier, Inc.: Docket No. FAA-2021-0691; Project Identifier MCAI-
2020-01542-T.

(a) Comments Due Date

    The FAA must receive comments on this airworthiness directive
(AD) by October 7, 2021.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-100-1A10
airplanes, certificated in any category, serial numbers 20003 and
subsequent.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 24, Electrical
power.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by reports of erratic electrical system
status on the push button annunciators (PBAs) and the engine
instrument and crew alerting system (EICAS), while on-ground and
during flight. The FAA is issuing this AD to address erroneous
indications that could mislead pilots, causing them to turn off
active electrical power sources, leading to partial or complete loss
of electrical power. Loss of electrical power could result in the
loss of flight displays and reduced controllability of the airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.

(g) Revision of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)

    Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD: Revise the
Emergency Procedures and Non-Normal Procedures sections of the
existing AFM and applicable corresponding operational procedures to
include the information in Section 03-19, Electrical, of Chapter 03,
Emergency Procedures, and Section 05-19, Electrical, of Chapter 05,
Non-Normal Procedures, of the Bombardier Challenger 300 (Imperial
Version) Airplane Flight Manual, Publication No. CSP 100-1, Revision
63, dated April 1, 2021 (for airplanes having serial numbers 20003
through 20500 inclusive); or Bombardier Challenger 350 Airplane
Flight Manual, Publication No. CH 350 AFM, Revision 29, dated April
1, 2021 (for airplanes having serial numbers 20501 through 20999
inclusive); as applicable.
    Note 1 to paragraph (g): For obtaining the sections for
Bombardier Challenger 300 (Imperial Version) Airplane Flight Manual,
Publication No. CSP 100-1, use Document Identification No. CH 300
AFM-I.

(h) Credit for Previous Actions

    This paragraph provides credit for actions required by paragraph
(g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the effective
date of this AD using Section 03-19, Electrical, of Chapter 03,
Emergency Procedures, and Section 05-19, Electrical, of Chapter 05,
Non-Normal Procedures, of the Bombardier Challenger 300 (Imperial
Version) Airplane Flight Manual, Publication No. CSP 100-1, Revision
62, dated December 22, 2020; or Bombardier Challenger 350 Airplane
Flight Manual, Publication No. CH 350 AFM, Revision 28, dated
December 22, 2020; as applicable.
    Note 2 to paragraph (h): For obtaining the sections for
Bombardier Challenger 300 (Imperial Version) Airplane Flight Manual,
Publication No. CSP 100-1, use Document Identification No. CH 300
AFM-I.

(i) Other FAA AD Provisions

    The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, New
York ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this
AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In
accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal
inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office, as appropriate. If
sending information directly to the manager of the certification
office, send it to ATTN: Program Manager, Continuing Operational
Safety, FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410,
Westbury, NY 11590; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>. Before
using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal
inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the
responsible Flight Standards Office.
    (2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD
to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be
accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, New York ACO
Branch, FAA; or Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA); or
Bombardier, Inc.'s TCCA Design Approval Organization (DAO). If
approved by the DAO, the approval must include the DAO-authorized
signature.

(j) Related Information

    (1) Refer to Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information
(MCAI) TCCA AD CF-2020-46, dated November 17, 2020, for related
information. This MCAI may be found in the AD docket on the internet
at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket
No. FAA-2021-0691.
    (2) For more information about this AD, contact Steven
Dzierzynski, Aerospace Engineer, Avionics and Electrical Systems
Section, FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410,
Westbury, NY 11590; telephone<PHONE_NUMBER>; fax<PHONE_NUMBER>; email
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>    (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Bombardier, Inc., 200 C[ocirc]te-Vertu Road West, Dorval,
Qu[eacute]bec H4S 2A3, Canada; North America toll-free telephone 1-
866-538-1247 or direct-dial telephone 1-514-855-2999; email
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>internet https://www.bombardier.com. You
may view this service information at the FAA, Airworthiness Products
Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des
Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at
the FAA, call<PHONE_NUMBER>.

    Issued on August 17, 2021.
Gaetano A. Sciortino,
Deputy Director for Strategic Initiatives, Compliance & Airworthiness
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2021-17943 Filed 8-20-21; 8:45 am]
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